Lobbying Exposure and Committee Preferences in the United States Congress
Abstract
Lobbying has been an important part of the U.S. political landscape for over a century. A rich variety of literature in economics and finance has shown that lobbying efforts aimed at congressional representatives can affect political outcomes, and that personal relationships of politicians with lobbyists can lead to deferred benefits for politicians. Because of these effects, I hypothesize that members of Congress seek access to lobbying, and I look for evidence of this in requests for congressional committee assignments submitted by members of the U.S. House of Representatives between 2000 and 2008. Modern political science identifies three central motivations that drive a congressman to request assignment to a specific congressional committee: constituency priorities, policy interests, and a broad desire for political power and influence. I hypothesize that a fourth motivation may exist: exposure to lobbyists. If so, then a congressional committee’s lobbying exposure would have a significant effect on the desirability of that committee and the number of requests to serve on it. Results show that lobbying is positively and statistically correlated with the probability that a congress member requests a committee.
Citation
Edmondson, Jason W (2019). Lobbying Exposure and Committee Preferences in the United States Congress. Undergraduate Research Scholars Program. Available electronically from https : / /hdl .handle .net /1969 .1 /194461.