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Personal identity postmortem
| dc.creator | Schmutz, Catherine J | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-06-07T23:18:20Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2012-06-07T23:18:20Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2002 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2002 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2002-THESIS-S336 | |
| dc.description | Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to digital@library.tamu.edu, referencing the URI of the item. | en |
| dc.description | Includes bibliographical references (leaves 52-53). | en |
| dc.description | Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics. | en |
| dc.description.abstract | In this thesis, I argue that in order to coherently hold a belief about what happens to people when they die, one's theory of personal identity must be carefully chosen. I examine belief in immortality of the soul, annihilation of the person, and resurrection of the body. I maintain that for each view, at least one theory of personal identity conflicts with that view and, therefore, cannot be consistently held with that view. I argue that a psychological-continuity theory of personal identity is consistent with each of these beliefs about death. Some, but not all, physical-continuity theories of personal identity are consistent with annihilation of the person. I further argue that even on a psychological-continuity theory of personal identity, the soul's immortality is questionable. In light of the conditions that are necessary for a soul to be a person, we should not expect such a soul to be immortal (even if it outlives the body for some time). I also argue that resurrection of the body on a materialist's model is more parsimonious than resurrection on a dualist's model. | en |
| dc.format.medium | electronic | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | Texas A&M University | |
| dc.rights | This thesis was part of a retrospective digitization project authorized by the Texas A&M University Libraries in 2008. Copyright remains vested with the author(s). It is the user's responsibility to secure permission from the copyright holder(s) for re-use of the work beyond the provision of Fair Use. | en |
| dc.subject | philosophy. | en |
| dc.subject | Major philosophy. | en |
| dc.title | Personal identity postmortem | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | en |
| thesis.degree.discipline | philosophy | en |
| thesis.degree.name | M.A. | en |
| thesis.degree.level | Masters | en |
| dc.type.genre | thesis | en |
| dc.type.material | text | en |
| dc.format.digitalOrigin | reformatted digital | en |
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