More than imagination needed : Asquith's government and the Dardanelles Campaign

Abstract

The Dardanelles Campaign is generally viewed as a flawed operation that possessed some strategic value but could never actually succeed. Too many problems at home and in the campaign theatre doomed the expedition to failure. This thesis conducts an analysis of the government and the military in order to determine if structural flaws existed in the government, and what chances the military forces had for storming the peninsula. The government of Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith has been labeled as structurally insufficient to wage a modern war, and in some ways this is true. This assertion fails regarding the decision-making apparatus available to Asquith after November 1914. The War Council represented a body that could have acted as a central authority for the direction and prosecution of the war. That it was not used this way is due to Asquith's usage of it, not because it contained structural flaws. Further analysis demonstrates that Asquith and the military services suffered due to the actions of Lord Kitchener and Lord Fisher, the government's senior military and naval advisors. Their actions created much of the confusion and delay that beset the campaign and contributed greatly to the eventual defeat. Winston Churchill, instead of being the true cause of the failure, became a scapegoat for Kitchener's and Fisher's blunders. The Army and Navy deserve a fair share of the blame for the defeat as well. The mission was conducted on a short timeline, and much needed to be thrown together quickly, but each service missed golden opportunities to attain victory. Hesitation and weak leadership in critical moments cost the British victory at numerous moments in the battle, despite their otherwise heroic and commendable performance in a difficult situation. This analysis will demonstrate that victory could have, and should have, been achieved by both services during their operations.