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dc.contributor.advisorWiggins, Steven N.
dc.creatorHackett, Steven Curtis
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-02T20:04:35Z
dc.date.available2020-09-02T20:04:35Z
dc.date.issued1989
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/DISSERTATIONS-1017979
dc.descriptionTypescript (photocopy).en
dc.description.abstractThe essays that together make up this dissertation investigate the circumstances in which long term contracts and vertically integrated firm allocation are chosen to govern economic relationships. The analysis in the first essay evaluates a theory of efficient contractual adjustment to variations in either costs or revenues. Subjects endogenously choose contractual form in a market setting where quantity adjustment to cost or revenue variability and the competitiveness of pricing together determine the efficiency of contract. The analysis presented in the second essay uses experimental methods to investigate the choice between long term contracts and integrated firm allocation. Private information must be exchanged in these agreements, and the relative efficiency of these institutional forms depends on the incentives they provide for parties to reveal private information. In the third essay a theory of institutional choice in franchise systems is developed, and the predictions generated by the theory are then evaluated using field data collected from two contrasting industries.en
dc.format.extentx, 209 leavesen
dc.format.mediumelectronicen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsThis thesis was part of a retrospective digitization project authorized by the Texas A&M University Libraries. Copyright remains vested with the author(s). It is the user's responsibility to secure permission from the copyright holder(s) for re-use of the work beyond the provision of Fair Use.en
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectVertragen
dc.subjectNeue Institutionenökonomiken
dc.subjectTheorieen
dc.subjectMajor economicsen
dc.subject.classification1989 Dissertation H121
dc.subject.lcshInstitutional economicsen
dc.subject.lcshIndustrial organizationen
dc.titleEssays on the economics of contracting and institutional choiceen
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.grantorTexas A&M Universityen
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen
thesis.degree.namePh. Den
dc.contributor.committeeMemberBattalio, Raymond C.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberBaye, Michael R.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberBoggess, Albert
dc.type.genredissertationsen
dc.type.materialtexten
dc.format.digitalOriginreformatted digitalen
dc.publisher.digitalTexas A&M University. Libraries
dc.identifier.oclc21947606


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