Risk and Risk Aversion Effects in Contests with Contingent Payments
Abstract
Firms seeking new products, investors backing competitors, and government agencies in search of design solutions are all examples of different models of contest design found in the marketplace. In PERC’s working paper 1707, Risk and Risk Aversion Effects in Contests with Contingent Payments, authors Liqun Liu, Jack Meyer, Andrew J. Rettenmaier, and Thomas R. Saving analyze contests with contingent payment of costs where only the winner pays for the resources used in the contest.
Description
LaborCollections
Citation
Liu, Liqun; Meyer, Jack; Rettenmaier, Andrew J.; Saving, Thomas R. (2018). Risk and Risk Aversion Effects in Contests with Contingent Payments. Private Enterprise Research Center, Texas A&M University; Texas A&M University. Library. Available electronically from https : / /hdl .handle .net /1969 .1 /199333.