Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Rentschler, Lucas Aaren (2011-10-21)
      In common-value auctions and contests economic agents often have varying levels of information regarding the value of the good to be allocated. Using theoretical and experimental analysis, I examine the effect of ...
    • Liu, Liqun; Treich, Nicolas (Private Enterprise Research Center, Texas A&M University; Texas A&M University. Library, 2019-12-16)
      It has been established in the literature that, under the assumption of risk-neutral contestants, it is usually optimal for an effort maximizing contest organizer with a fixed prize budget to award everything to a single ...
    • Liu, Liqun; Meyer, Jack; Rettenmaier, Andrew J.; Saving, Thomas R. (Private Enterprise Research Center, Texas A&M University; Texas A&M University. Library, 2018-01-18)
      Firms seeking new products, investors backing competitors, and government agencies in search of design solutions are all examples of different models of contest design found in the marketplace. In PERC’s working paper ...