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dc.creatorFord, Joan Butler
dc.creatorZelditch, Morris Jr
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-17T01:00:07Z
dc.date.available2017-08-17T01:00:07Z
dc.date.issued1988
dc.identifier.citationFord, Joan, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. 1988. “A Test of the Law of Anticipated Reactions.” Social Psychology Quarterly 51: 164-172.en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161186
dc.description.abstracta. This WP continues investigations in WP 84-3 and 84-10. The authors report an experiment in which they varied the expected likelihood that an advantaged central actor would punish others for attempting to change an inequitable reward structure. Results showed that attempts to change the structure were inversely proportional to the expected likelihood of a penalty, even though the central actor never expressed preferences, demanded compliance, promised rewards, or threatened penalties. This TR was published by the authors (1988).en
dc.description.sponsorshipResearch for this paper was supported by the National Science Foundation, Grant SOC-7817434 for the study of "Group Determinants of Agenda Setting." We would like to acknowledge the assistance of Terry Amburgey, Dorine Barr-Bryan, David Lineweber, and Louise Smith-Donals in the conduct of this study, and the advice and assistance of Max Nelson-Kilger in analyzing the data.en
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherSocial Psychological Quarterly
dc.relation.ispartofseriesStanford Working Papers;86-2
dc.rightsAttribution-NoDerivs 3.0 United Statesen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/us/
dc.subjectLaw of Anticipated Reactionsen
dc.titleA Test of the Law of Anticipated Reactionsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
local.departmentSociologyen
dc.identifier.doi1986


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