Intellectual discourse during the interwar years: a content survey of the United States Infantry Journal (1919-1939)

Abstract

The interwar United States Army is generally viewed as a force that was caught napping. Unpreparedness and an inability to recognize the potential of the weapons and tactics developed during World War I resulted in a bloody defeat at the Battle of Kasserine Pass between 19 and 20 February 1943. This thesis conducts a content analysis of the Infantry Journal between 1919 and 1939 to determine the nature of intellectual discourse among officers in the dominant branch of the army during this period. Between the Great War and World War II, army officers exhibited a desire to capitalize on the lessons of the previous conflict, frustration with their inability to implement concrete reforms based on previous experience and developing technologies and tactics, and most importantly, continued commitment to a productive discussion of the nature of future war. Officers remained dedicated to conducting this discourse in spite of both external limitations such as budget cuts, reduced strength levels, and an apathetic and anti-militaristic public, and also internal influences such as disagreement over which lessons should be learned, intra and inter-service conflict, and resistance to change among conservative army leaders. Analysis of the Infantry Journal reveals that despite extremely adverse conditions, a free and wide ranging debate continued over the important topics of organization, tactics, doctrine, motorization, and mechanization. Often, this debate reflected and drew upon the theoretical and practical efforts of foreign armies' attempts to resolve the very same problems of the period. These foreign influences played a substantial role in American officers' formulation of the debate surrounding modernization and reform. Rather than a conservative, entrenched U.S. Army bent on suppressing change, one finds an intellectual discourse conducive to innovative and forward looking thought. However, despite some success stories, in many areas the army failed to convert officers' proposals into concrete innovations prior to American soldiers' facing the enemy on the battlefields of North Africa.