Toward an epistemological account of understanding
Date
1998
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Texas A&M University
Abstract
In this thesis I argue that understanding ought to be a central concept investigated by epistemologists. Contemporary epistemologists have largely ignored the concept of understanding, preferring instead to study propositional knowledge. Unlike propositional knowledge, understanding is a cognitive excellence which involves "chunks of information" rather than single propositions. Furthermore, I argue that understanding is distinct even from more complex forms of knowledge; understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I defend the distinction between knowledge and understanding against possible objections from some recent analyses of knowledge. Finally, I turn to axiological questions and discuss the value of knowledge and the value of understanding over and above true belief. I conclude that any attempt to investigate cognitive excellence in all its forms is incomplete without an inquiry into the nature of understanding.
Description
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Includes bibliographical references: p.72-73.
Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.
Includes bibliographical references: p.72-73.
Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.
Keywords
philosophy., Major philosophy.