Abstract
This dissertation is a theoretical, empirical, and experimental examination of the effect of competition in sealed bid auctions. Auctions in which objects have certain value and auctions in which objects have uncertain value are considered. The primary focus is on the relation between the number of bidders and an agent's optimal bid and on the relation between the number of bidders and the high or winning bid. First, a theoretical model is developed relating the effect of competition on the winning bid of an auction. The high bid of an auction is treated as the maximum draw from a distribution of bids for an object being auctioned. Second, the sealed bid auction market for rough rice in Texas is empirically analyzed. Finally, an experiment is conducted which is designed to investigate the effect of competition in auctions for objects of certain value.
Meyer, Donald J. (1983). The effect of competition in sealed bid auctions : certainty and uncertainty. Texas A&M University. Texas A&M University. Libraries. Available electronically from
https : / /hdl .handle .net /1969 .1 /DISSERTATIONS -537979.