Abstract
The fact that a nation's economic performance depends on the cohesion of political and economic markets is fairly obvious. However, few studies exist which make clear the specific links between politics and economics. This study employs a transaction cost theoretical framework to explain the extent to which certain institutional features (e.g., legislative/executive configurations, the style of corporate governance, and the extent of subnational autonomy) constrain the degree of market risk within a nation's capital market. The underlying assumption is that capital market risk is a valid measure of economic performance in that capital markets reflect the degree of transaction costs generated within a nation's political and economic markets. To test my hypotheses, I explore the long-term government bond markets in 18 advanced industrial democracies between 1955 and 1992. Using cross-sectional pooled data, this study attempts to identify the institutional features which are most essential to a nation's capital accumulation.
Perry, Robert Louis (1995). Political markets and capital markets : a cross-national study concerning the effects of political factors upon capital market risks. Texas A&M University. Texas A&M University. Libraries. Available electronically from
https : / /hdl .handle .net /1969 .1 /DISSERTATIONS -1575794.