The effects of United States intervention in Latin America : a comparative analysis of political instability, 1958-1988

Abstract

In contrast to conventional wisdom, United States intervention in Latin America from 1958-1988 often exacerbates political instability. A quantitative analysis shows that United States intervention in the form of total aid, especially military aid, to repressive authoritarian regimes does not facilitate political stability; rather it has served to increase instability in existing volatile situations which United States policy was designed to reduce or eliminate. A synthesis of the theories of Karl Marx, Ted Gurr, and Charles Tilly is used to provide a more thorough analysis of the prevailing political environment in selected Latin American States. Standard and pooled regression techniques are used to analyze the data overall, regionally, by individual country, and by type of polity. Political instability is investigated by aggregating the data to illustrate the "pressure cooker effect" and then disaggregating it for analysis of separate categories of the dependent variable. Critical policy issues for the 1990s are discussed, and alternative policy options are suggested. Rehabilitation of the U.S. image in Latin America is shown to be an important policy priority for the future of U.S.-Latin American relations.