Abstract
This research examines adopters and nonadopters of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 96 (SFAS No. 96). The study takes a single industry approach because of the diverse tax laws, and thus noncomparable consequences of adopting SFAS No. 96, across industries. The focus of this study is on the oil and gas industry. Specifically, the study investigates the relationship between adoption decisions and managers' opportunities and incentives to use the adoption to manage earnings. Opportunities are the situational circumstances of the firm that might affect the adoption decision, such as purchase business combinations, NOL utilizations and deferred tax liability balance. These items are hypothesized to encourage adoption. The univariate and multivariate results indicate purchases and NOLs are related to the adoption decision. In addition to opportunity, managers' incentives for adoption are also considered in terms of easing debt constraints, smoothing a transitory decrease in earnings and political visibility. Results of multivariate statistical tests and detailed analyses of debt covenants provide no evidence of a relationship between binding debt covenants and adoption. The time-series analysis provides evidence that firms adopted SFAS No. 96 in order to smooth a decrease in earnings. The political visibility hypothesis is not supported by the univariate or multivariate tests. Generally, the statistical results indicate that the adopters were larger than nonadopters. This result is contrary to most previous studies in which size proxies for political visibility.
Friske, Karyn Anne Bybee (1994). An examination of the effects of standard setting and earnings management in the oil and gas industry : the lesson of SFAS no. 96. Texas A&M University. Texas A&M University. Libraries. Available electronically from
https : / /hdl .handle .net /1969 .1 /DISSERTATIONS -1550483.