The effect of bureaucratic structure on individual contributions to a public good

Abstract

The effect of bureaucratic structure on individual contributions to a public good is examined using a laboratory experiment. It is proposed that when individuals are placed in the context of an ideal-typical bureaucracy (as described by Weber), they will become oriented to collective outcomes and contribute more to a public good, than if they are placed in the context of a non-bureaucratic setting. The experimental design is a 3x2 factoral with the factors being Position (worker, supervisor, manager) and Organizational Structure (bureaucratic, nonbureaucratic). One hundred and thirty five subjects are randomly assigned to the six treatments, with gender being a block variable (at least 10 males and 10 females are in each treatment). The dependent variable, individual contributions to the public good, is measured by the number of tokens contributed by the individual to a group fund. An analysis of variance finds no significant difference between the mean contributions of each treatment group. Therefore, it is found that bureaucratic structure has no effect on individual contributions to a public good.