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dc.contributor.advisorUnterberger, Betty Miller
dc.creatorCummings, Karan M.
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-01T16:02:04Z
dc.date.available2022-04-01T16:02:04Z
dc.date.issued1986
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/CAPSTONE-TrenkE_1991
dc.descriptionProgram year: 1985/1986en
dc.descriptionDigitized from print original stored in HDRen
dc.description.abstractIn their search for the correct course of action, world leaders and their advisers are often tempted to draw parallels between their own situation and those of their predecessors. One of the most popular historical antecedents is the September 1938, Munich Conference. It was here that Britain's Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain acceded to German absorption of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain's sincere effort to maintain peace was later termed "appeasement". This process of giving in to one's enemies by gradual degrees in hopes of pacification soon carne under attack; the show of weakness by the West led to the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and the invasion of Poland, and control of Czechoslovakia gave Hitler a gateway to the East in his quest for world domination. The anathema of Munich was ingrained in those who would later direct American foreign policy. In June 1950, Dean Acheson convinced Truman that nonintervention in Korea would be another failure by the democracies to stand up to aggression, which could conceivably lead to another world war. The ghost of Munich also played a part in Kennedy's initial decision not to trade the Jupiter missile bases in Turkey for their Soviet counterparts in Cuba during the October 1962, crisis. The aftermath of the 1939 Conference had made Kennedy wary of compromise. Finally, in Doris Kearnes' Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, Johnson is quoted as saying: Everything I knew about history told me that if I got out of Vietnam and let Ho Chi Minh run through the streets of Saigon, then I'd be doing exactly what Chamberlain did in World War II. I'd be giving a big, fat reward to aggression... And so would begin World War III. In my paper I will point out these instances and several others where the distastefulness of appeasement influenced the actions of this country's principal decision makers. I will also try to determine whether this influence was beneficial or detrimental in the majority of the cases.en
dc.format.extent41 pagesen
dc.format.mediumelectronicen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.subject1938 Munich Conferenceen
dc.subjectNazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pacten
dc.subjectAmerican foreign policyen
dc.subjectTrumanen
dc.subjectKennedyen
dc.subjectJohnsonen
dc.subjectNeville Chamberlainen
dc.titleThe Influence of the Munich Appeasement on American Foreign Policyen
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.departmentHistoryen
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity Undergraduate Fellowen
thesis.degree.levelUndergraduateen
dc.type.materialtexten


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