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dc.contributor.advisorMcDermott, John J.
dc.creatorBurke, Catherine Margaret
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-16T19:08:11Z
dc.date.available2006-08-16T19:08:11Z
dc.date.created2003-05
dc.date.issued2006-08-16
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/3895
dc.description.abstractThe two questions that motivate the present inquiry are: is it possible that human beings will freely, and what does free will make possible? John Duns Scotus and William James are two defenders of the possibility of free will, although each has a very different notion of the will. First, I present the accounts of the will articulated by Duns Scotus and James, with attention to the context in which the accounts were developed and the reasons each philosopher gives for the possibility of free will. Next, I briefly consider the picture of human action each account of the will makes possible. Then, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each account. Finally, in response to a weakness of both accounts, I argue that in order to widen the possibilities of human moral agency, it is necessary to reflect not only on our strengths but also on our physical and moral frailty.en
dc.format.extent399902 bytesen
dc.format.mediumelectronicen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherTexas A&M University
dc.subjectwillen
dc.subjectfree willen
dc.subjectdeterminismen
dc.subjectindeterminismen
dc.subjectDuns Scotusen
dc.subjectWilliam Jamesen
dc.titleThe possibility of free will: John Duns Scotus and William James on the willen
dc.typeBooken
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.departmentPhilosophy and Humanitiesen
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen
thesis.degree.grantorTexas A&M Universityen
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Artsen
thesis.degree.levelMastersen
dc.contributor.committeeMemberBurch, Robert W.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberKosztolnyik, Zoltan J.
dc.type.genreElectronic Thesisen
dc.type.materialtexten
dc.format.digitalOriginborn digitalen


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