Holding Oneself Accountable: Reactive Attitudes Borne Towards the Self

Abstract

In developing my moral compass, I became increasingly aware of people explaining morality as it pertains to others, but not as it pertains to themselves. Indeed, moral philosophy tends to approach morality as an interpersonal not an intrapersonal enterprise. In particular, it reflects on moral emotions like blame and resentment borne towards others but not towards the self. This thesis develops an account of moral emotions directed towards the self. The first chapter examines reactive attitudes directed to the self, arguing that I can hold reactive attitudes not just towards others but also towards myself. From there, I will provide an explanation as to why reactive attitudes borne towards the self has been overlooked by examining the relationship between one’s reactive attitudes and one’s conscience. The second chapter will analyze the morality of actions directed towards oneself. I will argue that it is possible to morally wrong myself through my actions. The final chapter will draw from each of the prior chapters to answer the question: is self-castigation ever fitting? I will explain how it is sometimes appropriate to sanction myself for my actions that wrong myself. The overarching thesis illuminates reactive attitudes towards the self, the relation between the conscience and reactive attitudes, the ability of a person to wrong themselves, and the connection of these ideas in sanctioning the self. The paper expands the contemporary discussion of reactive attitudes by adopting an introspective point of view. It gestures towards questions about the ability of sanctioning the self and about the concept of self-release.