Development of a Conceptual Multi-Insider Risk Model for Nuclear Facilities

Abstract

In 2019, the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) stated a need for vulnerability analysis tools for multiple insiders. A brief literature review identified that while historical studies researched multi-insider threats in-depth, contemporary nuclear security research on multi-insider threats is sparse. To this end, a research problem was identified - there are no methodologies for evaluating how combining privileged access, authority, and knowledge allow coordinated insider teams to defeat insider security measures in ways that singular insiders or outsider adversaries cannot. Motivated by the NNSA’s call for new multi-insider analysis tools and the ever-growing threat of radicalized domestic extremists that may potentially have privileged access to nuclear material, the objective of this dissertation is to develop a conceptual multi-insider risk model useable that identifies how insider characteristics and privileges can combine to create emergent security risk. The conceptual model is built from concepts identified in nuclear insider literature streams and presents a novel characterization of how insider attributes and nuclear facility insider security measures combine to form some aggregate insider risk. While the conceptual model is not a prescriptive tool, it will be useable by nuclear security professionals and researchers for the purpose developing new approaches for identifying multi-insider threat vulnerabilities that meet DOE/NNSA INS needs.