| dc.description.abstract | In what ways do metaphysical theories, language about objects in the world, and values we assign to those objects depend on social agents? I introduce a metaphilosophical model for how some of the characteristics of entities depend on social agents, particularly the characteristics involving language and values assigned to entities by social agents. In the first chapter I describe and summarize many of the positions I discuss in chapters two and three, including object theories, a model of social kinds, the project of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, and the metaphysics of words. Beginning in chapter two, I argue that 1) a two-dimensional model of social kinds is superior to the type-token model for explaining the conditions for a given type or kind, and 2) that the model’s superiority is further shown when the model incorporates some of the features from the project of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. Because I will be talking about objects with social features, I need to explain what I mean by “object”, given the differing object theories. And because many social objects like groups and money have value, there may be normative, conceptual ethics considerations, based on those objects’ value, that affect the conditions for what is preferred to count as an instance of OBJECT under those theories. We have at least prima facie motivation for thinking that we should prefer an object theory that is most consistent with affirming that there are such valuable objects, so I consider how each object theory accommodates that preference.
But that raises the question of which objects are social. So I then argue in chapter three that characterizing objects as social in degrees rather than social or non-social simpliciter gives us the right characterization of objects that count as social. Many objects we find in the natural world that we might not ordinarily characterize as social — for example, artifacts that non-human animals use — nonetheless seem to have at least some social features. Despite what might be a prima facie motivation to characterize social objects as a completely separate class from non-social objects, I show that a disjoint division between social objects and non-social objects delivers several counterintuitive results. So I challenge such a characterization and then offer my own alternative view where objects are social to some degree. Finally, I then explain some of the puzzling features of one of the most significant kinds of objects in the social world: words. As parts of language, words as social objects function as the primary representational devices that social agents use to assign concepts and values. I argue that the metaphysical features of words as representational devices depend in many ways on social agents, and that this fact that is often overlooked explains some of the puzzling features of words and other social objects more broadly. I end with some concluding remarks. | |
