Why So Tough? Understanding the Politics Behind Aggressive Crime-Fighting Policies

Abstract

In democracies, how can coercive security policies that violate the rights of many be so pervasive, even when those most affected by their negative consequences are a large share of the electorate? I argue that the explanation can be found by examining voters’ incentives to demand security vis-a-vis other policies. Among low-income citizens, security concerns compete with other immediate needs, including food and shelter, thereby reducing the relative importance of violence as the primary driver of political demands. In response, strategic politicians become less responsive to the preferences of the poor on this policy dimension. With a multi-method research approach, I test the implications of my theory using an original survey experiment with politicians, five waves of survey data, and a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) modeling strategy designed to estimate the impact of a sudden rise in violence on voting behavior. I find that politicians emphasize security less when trying to attract the vote of low-income citizens relative to the wealthy, and that voters in a situation of socioeconomic vulnerability are less concerned with security relative to other policy areas and less politically responsive to violence shocks.