| dc.description.abstract | In this work, I present three essays on the economics of crime. The first paper (joint with Jennifer Doleac, David Pritchard, and Adam Roberts) replicates and extends the analyses of data from three randomized controlled trials (RCTs) related to prisoner reentry in order to more cleanly identify the causal effects of treatment. This is important given that the way data from an RCT are collected and analyzed can unintentionally reintroduce omitted variable and selection biases even though RCTs are designed to avoid such biases. In two of the three experiments, our conclusions differ substantially from those of the original studies. We discuss best practices for running and analyzing RCTs, and consider our extension results in the context of the prisoner reentry literature. The second paper evaluates prosecutorial reform. While there is a breadth of evidence showing prosecutors’ abilities to affect case outcomes, little is known about whether prosecutors affect criminal justice contact in the first place. I answer this question in the context of decriminalization in Seattle, Washington. My results do not indicate any significant effects of prosecutorial reform on recidivism. The third paper (joint with Maya Mikdash) studies crisis intervention team (CIT) units, which aim to reduce police use of force against and unnecessary incarceration of individuals with mental illnesses - particularly those in crisis. Using data from El Paso, Texas, we find suggestive evidence that dispatching a CIT unit to mental health crisis calls reduces the likelihood of arrest, but increases the likelihood of low-level force. Additionally, our empirical approach provides a model for evaluating CIT units and similar interventions in other police departments. | |
