| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation explores why some large company CEOs elect to serve in nonprofit organizations. While public expectations regarding large companies contributing to solving social issues have recently increased, CEOs are generally under heavy job demands, and their boards expect them to concentrate on business-related activities that promise to produce higher performance. Based on the data of CEOs in US large publicly-traded, for-profit firms from 2001 to 2020, my dissertation examines the antecedents of CEOs’ formal association with nonprofit organizations (typically CEO outside directorships on nonprofit boards). Drawing on the volunteerism literature, I develop theory to predict that the antecedents of CEOs’ formal association with nonprofits include individual, situational, and environmental factors along with value and discretion dimensions. As an individual factor, I predict that a CEO political orientation of leaning toward liberal (value) increases the likelihood of CEOs’ formal association with nonprofit organizations, given that a liberal political orientation is linked to values such as caring for the community. CEOs having longer tenures (discretion) are more likely to serve in nonprofits because longer-tenured CEOs tend to have more managerial discretion in their organizations. Next, as a situational factor, CEOs with home boards that are more liberal (value) are more likely to serve in nonprofits because such boards may be more supportive and open to community involvement, a nonbusiness-related activity. CEOs in firms with dispersed ownership structure (discretion) may be able to serve nonprofits with less internal conflict. Finally, at the environmental level, I suggest that CEOs may join nonprofits to respond to the local community’s needs (value). CEOs in low-discretion industries (discretion) are more likely to serve nonprofits because when discretion is limited in their main domain, individuals may seek a place of influence in a peripheral domain. | |
