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dc.creatorTresidder, Cassidy A
dc.date.accessioned2022-08-09T17:05:53Z
dc.date.available2022-08-09T17:05:53Z
dc.date.created2022-05
dc.date.submittedMay 2022
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/196594
dc.description.abstractIn Bostock v. Clayton County (hereafter, Bostock), the United States Supreme Court answered the legal question, "does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereafter, "Title VII") encompass discrimination based on an individual's sexual orientation or gender identification?" Title VII, among other things, prohibits employment discrimination "because of . . . sex", a provision that prior to Bostock did not encompass sexual orientation or gender identification. However, the United States Supreme Court decided that the definition of "sex" within Title VII included sexual orientation and gender identification. In his dissent, Justice Alito did little to hide his disappointment in the majority's refusal to consider how its decision would be interpreted in future cases involving similar laws prohibiting sex discrimination in areas outside the employment arena. Specifically, he questioned how future courts would consider segregated bathrooms and locker rooms and women's sports under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (hereafter, "Title IX"). Accordingly, these manuscripts intend to examine these issues. Since Bostock, the lower courts have used its precedent in order to draw parallels between the application of "sex" under Title VII and the application of "sex" under another statute, namely Title IX. Comparing the two statutes, one can see pertinent similarities, which presumably have been the basis for the lower court's application of the Bostock precedent to Title IX cases. Examining relevant cases before and after the Bostock decision provides an interesting analysis of how the law has changed concerning the definition of "sex" and its implications for the future. Title VII and Title IX are admittedly different statutes with different purposes, intended for different areas of the law; however, the courts have managed to cross-apply the interpretation of a vague term ("sex") from one to the other. This thesis will delve into nuances regarding how the courts undertook this cross-application. Additionally, this thesis will explore what the expansion of the interpretation of the term "sex" means for the future of our society. A discussion of the latter is undertaken regarding two pertinent issues: bathrooms and locker rooms and women's sports. Winston Churchill once said, "[n]ow this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning." After the Bostock decision, many exclaimed with relief that the courts had finally answered the question definitively. However, a further understanding of the complications involved allows one to see that the end is not final with this decision. Everything we know about sex discrimination may come into question because of new policies and applications resulting from the inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity in the definition of "sex."
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.subjectBostock
dc.subjectsex
dc.subjectTitle VII
dc.subjectTitle VII
dc.titleAmerican Society After Bostock v. Clayton County: What Next?
dc.typeThesis
thesis.degree.departmentManagement
thesis.degree.disciplineManagement, Pre-Law Track
thesis.degree.grantorUndergraduate Research Scholars Program
thesis.degree.nameB.B.A.
thesis.degree.levelUndergraduate
dc.contributor.committeeMemberSchwartz, Mark E
dc.type.materialtext
dc.date.updated2022-08-09T17:05:53Z


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