Catastrophic Success: Lessons Learned and Lost in Operation Just Cause, Panama 1989.

Abstract

The US invasion of Panama in 1989 was a brief operation in a century-long string of Caribbean military interventions, but it carried significant implications for America. The most significant proved to be what the US Army chose to tell itself about their triumph against the woefully outnumbered Panamanian Defense Force (PDF). To accomplish this in the isthmus the plan required near-simultaneous assaults on over two dozen targets by over twenty-seven thousand conventional and special operations forces, all in a small area of operations roughly the size and population of Houston. This led to over a dozen instances of “friendly fire,” including the destruction of three mechanized vehicles and one helicopter. The plan was incredibly detailed and allowed only for a small margin of error, tactically and politically. Following a swift Christmas-week victory, the commanding general of the invasion and the US Army asserted that the plan and overwhelming force had assured an American victory from the start. The record shows that US Army planners instead created a detailed, fragile, and tactically focused campaign that had many flaws and was only successful due to the individual initiative of quick thinking troops to avoid even more instances of friendly fire.