| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation positions American nonprofit organizations as important, but oft overlooked
American political institutions and challenges our current understanding of the purpose and function of the U.S. nonprofit sector. 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations are traditionally viewed and legally defined as institutions that function independently from politics. However, nonprofits determine who gets what, when, and how through their service delivery and advocacy; allow donors and nonprofit supporters to express their values; and indirectly exercise public authority through their tax exempt status. Failing to account for politics within nonprofit theory truncates our understanding of these organizations’ origins, operations, and role within the American political system.
I argue that nonprofit organizations (including 501(c)(3) organizations) are products of political forces like social construction and policy feedback. These forces shape the nonprofit sector through partisanship, elections, and political competition. Thus, American partisan politics—dynamics between major political parties—predict when and where nonprofits emerge, who benefits from nonprofit organizations, and nonprofit funding structures. Drawing upon foundational public policy, nonprofit, political science, and economic theory, I frame U.S. nonprofits as overlooked political institutions that represent the private pursuit of the public authority. A form of exit, nonprofits are an alternative means for individuals to pursue their goals when they perceive that government is failing to deliver benefits to populations they view as deserving of support.
I test the hypotheses generated by this theory in a series of empirical chapters. Using quantitative analyses, I find that more nonprofits support deserving, politically weak populations, and populations with contested social constructions. Using statistical analyses and qualitative case studies, I find that increasing deservingness increases voluntary contributions to nonprofits, and increasing political power increases revenue from contracts to nonprofits. Finally, I test the political conditions when exit to the nonprofit sector is likely. In a quantitative analysis, I find a preferred candidate’s electoral loss increases the likelihood that an individual will donate to nonprofit organizations. I conclude with insights on how integrating politics and nonprofits can improve our understanding of equity within the nonprofit sector and political engagement. | en |
