Who Gets to Free Ride? Status & Punishment in a Public Goods Game

Abstract

Previous research demonstrates that status expectations for cooperation and the possibility of punishment increase contributions and decrease free riding within public goods settings. Very little work, however, examines how these two mechanisms interact. This dissertation addresses this gap by examining how status relations among actors affect the degree to which they punish free riders.

I examine this question within the context of the Theory of Status Characteristics and Expectation States (SCES) and demonstrate how SCES translates to public goods settings. Drawing on this theoretical program, I outline four competing views about the effect of status on punishment. Some literature predicts that higher status actors are held to a higher standard and will therefore be punished more than lower status actors. Some literature predicts that lower status actors will be punished more than higher status actors, and other literature predicts that the status of the punisher and the status of the punished will interact with one another.

To arbitrate between these views, I use a standard, public goods experiment with a 2x2 (status of participant x status of free rider) factorial design. I manipulate status by generating a manager/employee relationship between participants. Results demonstrate that neither the status of the free rider nor the interaction (between the status of the free rider and the status of the punisher) have a significant effect on punishment decisions. The status of the punisher, on the other hand, does have a statistically significant effect. Contrary to previous findings, in this study, higher status actors punish free riders significantly more than do lower status actors. Implications and avenues for future research are discussed.