| dc.description.abstract | Process hazards analyses, such as Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOPs) and Layer of Protection Analyses (LOPAs), are structured, team-based exercises focused on hazard identification, risk assessment, and risk management. In order to manage the complexity associated with these analyses, recognized and generally accepted rules are imposed to manage and limit the review of hazard scenarios involving simultaneous failures. One of these rules has been dubbed “double jeopardy”. Based on the authors experience via direct observation and review of PHA documentation, PHA teams continue to struggle to understand double jeopardy and how to effectively address simultaneous failures when applying PHA methodologies, such as HAZOP and LOPA. In addition, more widely accepted emergence and use of enabling conditions and conditional modifiers when developing hazard scenarios has blurred the legacy definition of double jeopardy. In this paper, the authors provide an overview of double jeopardy along with specific PHA examples regarding credible as well as inappropriate applications of double jeopardy. They also present tools and recommendations to enhance PHA teams’ performances regarding the application of double jeopardy. More specifically, they address issues regarding latent failures (revealed vs. unrevealed conditions), concurrent incidence of failures, and independence of initiating events. The target audience for this paper is anyone whose responsibilities include (1) leading within an organization that uses PHAs, (2) establishing PHA guidance documents, (3) applying PHA methodologies, and (4) reviewing PHA outputs and reports. | en |
