Cold War Latin American Counterinsurgencies: A Mixed Record of American Involvement

Abstract

The dissertation process began with the goal of answering two primary questions and determining the methodology to employ. The first question was if there was a single model for explaining the success or failure of the Cold War Latin American Counterinsurgencies? The second, how did the sole superpower in the Western Hemisphere lose two of the three case study counterinsurgencies and yet win the other? While other questions arose during the research project, these two questions remained the main driving force of the dissertation. The methodology encompassed four main tracks. The first was to survey and critique existing models/theories of insurgency. The second was to survey and critique existing models/theories of counterinsurgency. The third was to use the analyses above, combined with existing social science data, to develop a new multidisciplinary model that explains the success or failure of a counterinsurgency. The last track involved choosing which case studies to incorporate and then process them. The argument began with the definition of an insurgency/counterinsurgency as “a violent conflict over the control of the population of a nation or part of a nation.” The definition immediately leads to the observation that success in a counterinsurgency is to maintain the control/support of the population; failure is to lose it. Social science research of past conflicts where opposing intranational groups (sometimes with outside third-party assistance) violently contest for control of the population shows how the population will decide which side it supports. That research shows that the decision turns on a determination of which side provides the most personal security. While a variety of tactics and strategies can lead to the maintenance or acquisition of the most personal security, that status determines success or failure. The preceding leads to a new model of insurgency/counterinsurgency. The new model provides the desired common explanatory framework for the success of counterinsurgencies both for the case studies and the wider regional cases. The new model also explains why the sole superpower in the region failed in two of the three cases and yet succeeded in the third case.