Assessing Effort Disutility in Decision Delegation Tasks
Abstract
There is an ongoing debate in the field of engineering over different approaches to the process of delegation, two of which are requirements allocation (RA) and value-driven design (VDD). In the RA approach, requirements are used to communicate the desired outcome. In the VDD approach, certain values of the project are used to communicate the desired outcome. Drawing on economic principal-agent theory, we expect individuals in the requirements allocation approach to have greater effort disutility than those in the value-driven approach. Participants played a computer game with a goal to receive points. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the requirements allocation condition, the task was described by the need to meet a specified threshold; in the value-driven design condition, the task was described by the need to optimize. The game required participants to make multiple decisions at different difficulty levels with measurements over their effort being recorded throughout the experiment. Our results reveal evidence supporting the value-driven design approach as well as patterns found in the data.
Citation
McCann, Cameron M (2019). Assessing Effort Disutility in Decision Delegation Tasks. Undergraduate Research Scholars Program. Available electronically from https : / /hdl .handle .net /1969 .1 /188505.