|dc.description.abstract||The purpose of this research was to implement tools to reliably monitor and analyze incoming Part 810 General Authorization Requests for various nuclear technologies. Texas A&M has utilized and tested the following tools to do so: Excel, Tableau, Apriori and Paterva’s Maltego.
Received requests were converted into a searchable format and tagged such that they could be entered into a central repository to enable ad hoc searching. Other exploratory goals are as follows: reporting, analyzing, and predicting when a general authorization request is to be expected. Reporting requirements have been established using the visual analytics software, Tableau, wherein general authorization trends were determined and can be monitored. Prediction has been carried out using Tableau’s forecast option, which will anticipate the number of general authorizations to be received by a given country based on prior requests. The Apriori algorithm was also used for prediction purposes. Excel modeling was similarly explored, and it was determined that it should be used sparingly, as unknown variables, such as country and policy needs, are not taken into consideration. Maltego software has been implemented to search the internet and determine when a general authorization report is not received based upon news reports.
Supplementary questions posed by the Department of Energy were explored and answered. A statistical analysis conducted using Tableau, revealed that certain U.S. companies favor specific foreign entities; meaning the U.S. company of interest has iii significantly more nuclear technology transfers to one foreign company over others. It was further discovered that China has undergone the General Authorization Process when it is not a specifically authorized destination. Any country not destined as specifically authorized should undergo the specific authorization process; it is not known why this is not already in place. Moreover, certain countries that exceed several general authorizations per year should be monitored to ensure that general authorizations are not being used to circumvent the specific authorization process. The general authorization threshold should be determined by the National Nuclear Security Administration.||en