Does Stakeholder ‘Autonomous Agent’ Gaming in the General Economy Affect Last Planner System Performance?

Abstract

Lean Construction (LC) has proven to be beneficial for the productivity of individual projects; however, its impact on the industry has not been significant. One reason affecting the performance of LC is the self-interested behavior of stakeholders, formally named Autonomous Agents (AA) interacting in Game Theory frameworks. Examples of AAs are general contractors, architects, and consultants, but especially subcontractors, the main research focus. This thesis defines whether the behavior of AAs affects the performance of LC tools such as the Last Planner System (LPS). Using a qualitative approach, the researcher collected data through personal interviews of 74 participants, spread over eight projects throughout Texas, all of which were built by four construction companies. A quantitative approach was used to analyze the interviews. Findings indicate, with a 99% confidence level, that the majority of the study population supports these statements: (1) subcontractors behave as AAs, (2) the LPS does not prevent the AA behavior of subcontractors but it supports managing the associated issues, and (3) the AA behavior of subcontractors affects the LPS performance. Future research is proposed regarding possible solutions for this problem.