Essays on House Allocation Problems
dc.contributor.advisor | Tian, Guoqiang | |
dc.contributor.advisor | Velez, Rodrigo A | |
dc.creator | Long, Xinghua | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-09-16T14:19:39Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-08-01T05:57:54Z | |
dc.date.created | 2016-08 | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-07-11 | |
dc.date.submitted | August 2016 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/157810 | |
dc.description.abstract | We study discrete resource allocation problems in which agents have unit demand and strict preferences over a set of indivisible objects. Such problems are known as house allocation problems. We define a new property that we call “balancedness." We characterize the top trading cycles from individual endowments by Pareto efficiency, group strategy-proofness, reallocation-proofness and balancedness. When there are at least four agents or just two agents, we characterize the top trading cycles from individual endowments by Pareto efficiency, group strategy-proofness and balancedness. When there are three agents, an allocation rule is Pareto efficient, group strategy-proof and balanced if and only if it is a top trading cycles rule from individual endowments or a trading cycles rule with three brokers. We also study house allocation problems with weak preferences. We show that the serial dictatorship with fixed tie-breaking satisfies weak Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and consistency. Furthermore, the serial dictatorship with fixed tie-breaking is not Pareto dominated by any Pareto efficient and strategy-proof rule. We also show that the random serial dictatorship with fixed (or random) tiebreaking is equivalent to the top trading cycles from random endowments with fixed (or random) tie-breaking. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.subject | house allocation | en |
dc.subject | top trading cycles | en |
dc.subject | hierarchical exchange | en |
dc.subject | trading cycles | en |
dc.subject | balancedness | en |
dc.subject | weak preferences | en |
dc.subject | housing market | en |
dc.subject | serial dictatorship | en |
dc.subject | school choice | en |
dc.title | Essays on House Allocation Problems | en |
dc.type | Thesis | en |
thesis.degree.department | Economics | en |
thesis.degree.discipline | Economics | en |
thesis.degree.grantor | Texas A & M University | en |
thesis.degree.name | Doctor of Philosophy | en |
thesis.degree.level | Doctoral | en |
dc.contributor.committeeMember | Manjunath, Vikram | |
dc.contributor.committeeMember | Wu, Ximing | |
dc.type.material | text | en |
dc.date.updated | 2016-09-16T14:19:39Z | |
local.embargo.terms | 2018-08-01 | |
local.etdauthor.orcid | 0000-0001-8629-2558 |
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Texas A&M University Theses, Dissertations, and Records of Study (2002– )