| dc.description.abstract | The ideological and national rivalries between Russia and China were centrifugal forces within the alliance; they re-emphasized and exacerbated differences of race, culture, etc. which had, until 1950, generated centuries of Sino-Soviet conflict. Thus the unity of the communist world gradually dissolved as its two giants became ever more jealous and fearful of each other's power. There is no precise time or event which meant the termination of their alliance; rather, the Sino-Soviet Split was the culmination of a long series of national, ideological, and historical conflicts. By June of 1960, however, the split was real enough for Khrushchev and a Chinese diplomat to resort to mutual insults and recriminations before a conference of eighty-one Communist parties in Bucharest. Then, at the 22nd Congress of the Russian Communist Party, in October of 1961, came an even grander display as Khrushchev violently attacked China's protege, Albania, accusing it of Stalinism and atrocities against the pro-Soviet faction there. When Chou En-lai, who was there representing Peking, responded by reprimanding Khrushchev, laying a wreath on Stalin's grave, and departing, it was clear that the age of Sino-Soviet hegemony and cooperation was past.
The Sino-Soviet split had tremendous implications for the United States. Not only had it shattered the unity of purpose which had once been one of the communist world's greatest strengths, it had also disproved the exaggerated conception of monolithic communism which for years had provided the intellectual rationale for much of America's foreign policy. The United States, however, could only benefit from the split to the extent that it was able to recognize and correctly interpret it. If there were errors in the American perception of the split, there would be parallel errors in its policy-making. A case in point would be the decisions made about Vietnam; for the American commitment to that small and obscure country cannot be viewed in isolation but only as a reflection of prevalent American assumptions about the communist world.
In order to trace the change in American attitudes effected by the split it is first necessary to explore early American perceptions of Russia and China. Until 1950 when the mutual assistance pact was signed by Moscow and Peking, the United States had a benevolent and paternal view of China; thereafter, the United States became fearful and mistrusting. Crucial to the American change in perception was its former alliance with Chiang Kai-shek in fighting the Japanese during World War II. The long war effort, as well as the propaganda and rhetoric necessary to sustain it, had resulted in a conceptual error: the United States was no longer fighting a war for simple political objectives but a battle against the forces of evil. Nor was American cooperation with the Nationalist leader viewed realistically- as a necessity of war. Instead Chiang became "our noble and democratic" friend and was elevated to near - heroic status. The importance of Chiang and the Nationalist cause was, thus, blown so out of proportion that their defeat by Mao Tse-Tung and the Chinese Communists in 1949 and the subsequent establishment of the People's Republic of China was interpreted as "our loss of China.” | en |
