Learning In Coordination Games
Abstract
Problems exist when a game contains multiple Nash equilibria. A number of selection principles have been suggested to deal with these problems. Vincent Crawford's dynamic theory is one recent proposal on how to do this for order statistic games. In this paper, two of Crawford's propositions will be examined. The first asserts that if the initial actions and the group size are held constant, an increase in the order statistic will bring about a statistical increase in the values of the players' actions and in the value of the summary statistic. The other deals with changes in the group size, stating that holding the initial actions and the order statistic constant, increasing the group size will result in a decrease in the values of the players' actions and in the value of the order statistic. Sections II through IV contain background information. Section V introduces Crawford's theory. Section VI discusses the experimental design and VII the experimental results. Conclusions are provided in section VIII.
Description
Program year: 1992/1993Digitized from print original stored in HDR
Citation
Aughinbaugh, Alison A. (1993). Learning In Coordination Games. University Undergraduate Fellow. Available electronically from https : / /hdl .handle .net /1969 .1 /CAPSTONE -AughinbaughA _1993.