| dc.description.abstract | Indexicals are linguistic expressions whose referents vary according to the context of their utterance. Common examples include words such as ‘now,’ ‘here,’ and ‘that.’ However, my attention is primarily directed toward the word ‘I’ in this paper. Many contemporary discussions regarding indexicals are centered on their interactions with opaque contexts – statements in which the substitution of co-referential terms can bring about a change in their truth values. In particular, there is a question as to whether substitution failures involving indexicals (instances of indexical opacity) have any features that distinguish them from substitution failures involving names, such as ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman.’ Those who answer this question positively are said to endorse essential indexicality, whereas those who take the opposing position deny this. In this paper, I explore both sides of this debate by examining the pro-essential indexicality arguments offered by John Perry (1979) and a particular counterargument proposed by Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever (2013). My primary objective is to evaluate and respond to this counterargument in order to defend essential indexicality on the grounds of motivational distinctiveness. | |
