Tax Avoidance and Investment: Distinguishing the Effects of Capital Rationing and Overinvestment

Abstract

I examine the relation between tax avoidance and firm investment by drawing on two capital market imperfections, adverse selection and moral hazard, to provide a link between tax avoidance and investment. Firms experiencing capital rationing because of adverse selection rely on internal resources to fund investment opportunities because of costly external financing. Tax avoidance can provide additional cash-flows that may alleviate capital rationing. Alternatively, tax avoidance can exacerbate problems of moral hazard by facilitating managerial rent extraction in the form of overinvestment. I find a positive relation between tax avoidance and investment suggesting effects of either capital rationing or overinvestment. To distinguish between these two effects, I examine how the relation between tax avoidance and investment varies in settings where capital rationing or overinvestment is more likely to occur. My findings suggest that firms rely on the cash savings from tax avoidance to alleviate capital rationing.