

DIRECTIONS IN EXPECTATION STATES RESEARCH*

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INTRODUCTION

To start out I must confess that when Martha Foschi and Murray Webster asked me to give this "summative" talk at the end of the conference, I had some reluctance. They had suggested that I talk about the present and future of the expectation states program, and also, if I wanted to, talk about some of my own research that is currently in progress. Frankly, I felt quite ambivalent about taking on this task. The simple explanation for my ambivalence was that Zelditch, Wagner, and I had just written a paper describing the history and the status of the program, Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch, 1985, and I thought that it would be difficult to reexamine the ongoing research from what I knew would be a very different perspective. But I also know that there was a deeper reason for my ambivalence. I realized that in undertaking this task I was going to take on, in some measure, the role of the "elder statesman" who describes what is going on, and who, one way or another, ends up telling young scholars what they should be doing in developing the program. Surely, I'm too young to play the role of an elder statesman. But am I really that young? I have had experience in doing research on expectation states processes. I've thought about the nature of this enterprise, and I've also thought about the question of where it is going. So perhaps there are observations on current research developments in the program that I can share with some profit.

With these thoughts in mind I accepted the invitation, and I shall concern myself with a number of different things. In the next section I shall describe some of the theoretical research

that is taking place right now. I not only want to give a sense of the substantive issues that researchers are concerned with, but also a sense of the ways in which this research contributes to the growth of the program. The expectation states program is "grounded" in its applications and interventions research, and in some basic sense, that research shapes the kind of theory that is being constructed. In section three I shall try to describe one of the mechanisms by which applications and interventions "shapes" this theory. In section four I shall describe some of the work I am presently concerned with, and which I would like to see further developed. (Here's where I shall permit myself to use a few "shoulds.") Finally, I will conclude with some thoughts on the long-term future of a theoretical research program such as that of expectation states theory.*

have excluded from discussion research concerned with developing new observational techniques and methods, Cohen, chapter____, Rainwater et al, chapter____, Driskell, chapter____, and Conner, 1984. I do this despite my belief that the construction of such techniques and methods is crucial to the development of this program. There are theoretical formulations in the program that are "stillborn" precisely because there does not exist observational techniques and methods that are appropriate to their investigation, Zelditch, 1972. Clearly, we must be concerned with this kind of work and with developing a deeper understanding of the relation of different types of observational techniques and methods to the theories that are being constructed. This subject, however, merits a separate treatment in its own right.

Before turning to substantive concerns, however, I want to comment briefly on the question of the impact of expectation states research on sociologists and social psychologists whose work is relevant to that in the program. This is a matter of some interest. In the absence of any empirical study of this matter, our judgments are largely impressionistic. It is clear, however, that expectation states research has influenced and has been influenced by the thinking and work of a reasonable number of researchers who were not initially connected with the program. Included in this list are such scholars as Yuchtman-Yaar and Semyonov, 1979, Epstein, 1981, Lorber, 1984, Ridgeway, 1982, Pugh and Wahrman, 1983, Zeller and Warnecke, 1973, Bradley, 1980, Nixon, 1979, Wilson, 1978, Eagly, 1983, 1985, Dion, 1985, Deaux 1985, Greenberg and Cohen, 1982, Dovidio and Ellyson, 1985, and Molm, 1986, among others.

We have also witnessed the recent appearance of formulations by others that are very much compatible with those in the program, Deaux, 1984, and Feinman, 1984; the appearance of formulations that compete with theories in the program, Archibald, 1976, Mazur, 1985; and the appearance of formulations that attempt to go beyond those that have been developed in the program, Skvoretz, 1981, 1985, and Martin, 1985. Insofar as the theories in the program are being used by others, and are generating alternatives, competitors, and successors, they are having the kind of impact that is of significance in understanding social processes. This presumably is what a theoretical research enterprise is all about.

Now to substantive concerns.

WHERE ARE WE? CHARACTERIZING THE ONGOING RESEARCH

Before I discuss where the program is let me remind you what it is. Expectation states theory is a theoretical research program. It is what Wagner and I call a branching program, Wagner and Berger, 1985. Its primary mode of development has been through the proliferation of theories. A core set of concepts and theoretical assertions as well as a set of metatheoretical directives have been used to generate formulations for different substantive domains. The program is also developed through theoretical elaboration. Some (although certainly not all) of these formulations have undergone a more linear development which has involved generalizing them, increasing their power and precision, and developing a body of empirical research that is relevant to them. In addition there exists in the program applied and intervention research that is grounded in its different formulations.

While this description is accurate in its own terms, it nevertheless gives us primarily an abstract and structural analysis of the work.² What are the specific research tasks that are engaging researchers? How do these individual research efforts relate to this conception of a branching program of interrelated theories? How can we characterize the ways in which the program is growing?

²For such an analysis involving the history and the present status of the expectation states program, see Berger, Wagner, Zelditch, 1985.

I shall simplify this task of characterizing the ongoing research by first considering in this section, in some detail, theoretical research activities, and by reserving for the next section a more brief set of comments on research activities that are concerned with applications and interventions. Further, I think we can understand the evolution and significance of ongoing theoretical research by distinguishing three types of such work: that which is concerned with testing existing theoretical formulations, that which is concerned with extending such formulations, and that which is concerned with developing new theoretical formulations; and this is the way I shall organize my analysis. One more word before I begin. This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of this research, and as a consequence I shall restrict myself to a few selected examples (while citing related work) in order to illustrate the nature of these different types of research activities.

Now let's turn our attention to "theoretical tests."

Theoretical Tests

Consider the experiments by Wagner and the Fords, on the confirmation and disconfirmation of gender-based expectancies, Wagner, Ford, and Ford, 1986, chapter , this volume. These experiments are perfect examples of theoretical tests. In each, predictions for specific status situations are first derived from the status characteristic theory, and these are then subjected to empirical tests. In addition, from a substantive standpoint these are highly informative studies in that they show that under certain conditions you can produce dramatic changes in

gender-based behavior. These are conditions where there are fixed and stable performance standards, and where there are clearcut and unambiguous evaluations of performance relative to these standards. Epstein, 1970, argues that these are optimal conditions for producing changes in gender behavior, and Wagner and the Fords have demonstrated, in fact, that this is so. Specifically, they show that, given differentiation in power and prestige behavior produced by gender-based expectations, confirmation of these expectations increases the magnitude of male/female differentiation while disconfirmation decreases that inequality. Furthermore, the magnitude of change produced by disconfirmation is greater than that produced by confirmation.

In their initial experiment, Wagner and the Fords used females who believed that they were interacting with males. Would their results also hold for males who believe they are interacting with females? If a female interacts with a male, disconfirmation of gender-based expectancies leads to an increase in her status relative to the male while confirmation leads to a decrease. Could it be that the differences they found were due to these status gains and losses rather than, as predicted by the theory, due to the fact that status disconfirmation should have a greater effect on behavior than confirmation? Their second experiment, involving male subjects, was designed to answer this question. If a male interacts with a female, disconfirmation leads to a decrease in status position while confirmation leads to an increase. As is reported in chapter____, the results of the second experiment are consistent with those of the first, with status disconfirmation having a greater effect on behavior than

confirmation even in this case. In addition, the authors found that only the predictions from the status characteristics theory were supported when these were pitted against those based on a number of plausible theoretical alternatives.

The two experiments, that by Norman et al, chapter , this volume, and that by Smith et al, 1984, are also examples of tests of the status characteristics theory. The idea that, in the task situations with which we are concerned, salient status information is combined is probably a basic principle in this theory, but that the combining principle is that of organized subsets, as that principle is described by Norman et al, chapter is still another matter. The principle of organized subsets is certainly not intuitive, and even now I can see no way that this principle could have been "induced" (if any theoretical principle is ever induced) from the experimental results available when it was first formulated, Berger et al, 1977. The data available at that time were certainly compatible with simpler combining ideas.

Since the organized subset principle describes a process which is not directly observable, it is necessary to derive observable consequences and to determine the status conditions in which these consequences can be detected. Such an observable consequence is in the prediction of an "inconsistency effect." This is the prediction that, under certain inconsistency conditions, minority status information will have a greater effect on expectations than that predicted under a balancing principle or a simple combining principle.

Norman et al, in chapter , this volume, report the results of an experiment that provides support for the operation of the organized subset principle. But like any single study, its results are restricted to giving us information about a particular type of status situation. In the situations that they studied, the status characteristics were specific, the minority information was negative, and all characteristics were initially relevant to the task. How general is the organized subset principle? This is the question that led to the second inconsistency study by Smith et al, 1984, which deals with status situations in which the characteristics are both diffuse and specific, the minority information is positive, and the characteristics are not initially relevant to the task. The results of this second experiment are also as predicted by the principle of organized subsets, and thus provides additional confirmation of the status theory.

We are a long way from establishing the empirical validity of the organized subset principle, or determining its full generality across status situations.^ Yet this principle has considerable appeal. One aspect of its appeal is that it enables us to describe, on the basis of a single principle, behavior in situations in which "status positivity" and "status negativity"

3

In fact, in an experiment reported by Hembroff, 1982, he purports to show that his particular findings are in greater accord with an alternative information processing principle that he has formulated than with that of organized subsets. See also Hembroff, Martin, and Sell, 1981.

effects will occur. These are situations in which positive or negative status information have greater effects on behavior than is to be expected. But there is still another aspect for its appeal, and that is the idea that this may be an extremely general principle. As such it may be applicable not only to status processes but also to processes such as those concerned with affects and sentiments where the segregation of information (rather than its combining) may occur.⁴ The possibility that this same principle may be applicable to such very different kinds of processes as those involving status, sentiments, and affects, is an extremely attractive idea and one that we are anxious to exploit.

These four experiments have a number of interesting features that are worth noting.

4

The underlying idea here is that the combining effect that has been observed in status situations is due to the strong task demands in these situations. According to the organized subset principle, the real information components are homogeneous subsets, and these subsets may not be combined in processes which have strong emotional components such as sentiments and affects. Instead, we may find that in sentiment and affect processes there is balancing and oscillation between these subsets when there is inconsistent information. From this standpoint, whether we find that there is the balancing, the oscillation, or the combining of inconsistent information, is a consequence of situational factors and not the operation of different information organizing principles.

First, within each experiment we not only have predictions involving the presence and absence of differences between experimental conditions and the rank ordering of conditions, but we also have predictions of an interval ordering nature. These are predictions of differences between differences which enable us to deal with important, yet subtle, features of behavior in status situations. The latter type of predictions arise in the Wagner et al experiments in testing for the claim that "the magnitude of change under disconfirmation is greater than that under confirmation," Wagner et al, chapter , page . In the Norman et al experiment, this type of prediction arises in testing, for example, the argument that, "as you increase the number of consistent characteristics, the incremental differentiating effect decreases with the addition of each characteristic," Norman et al, chapter , page . In this context, it should also be noted that these are "parameter-free experiments." The predictions in these experiments do not depend on empirical estimates of the values of the parameters of the status model. Therefore these predictions, in particular, the interval ordering ones, depend simply on the general properties of the status model.

Second, while the logic of this type of testing research appears to be straightforward in that predictions for specific status situations are derived from the theory and are then subjected to empirical tests, in fact, there is much more going on here. There are many difficult problems involved in doing this type of research, the solutions to which are anything but straightforward. To begin with, substantively meaningful

statements, for example, the "confirmation and disconfirmation of status-based expectancies," have to be translated into appropriate graph theoretic structures. This is rarely, if ever, a routine task, but rather one that often requires some ingenuity. Assuming that this can be done, these graph theoretic structures, in turn, have to be translated into social psychological situations that are meaningful to the subjects. This also can be a difficult task but nevertheless it is a one that has to be dealt with when the research involves a highly controlled study. In addition, techniques and procedures with special properties may have to be developed to create desired experimental conditions. In the Norman et al experiment, for example, it was necessary to devise four specific status characteristics which have virtually identical effects on behavior before the critical conditions of the experiment could be created. And finally, of course, the testing experiment, if at all possible, has to be designed so that the predictions from the status theory can be pitted against predictions from viable theoretical alternatives. So while the logic of this work may appear to be straightforward, in fact there are hard problems that have to be solved to effectively carry out this type of model testing research.

Before leaving this subject of theoretical tests, let me cite some other examples of this type of work: there is the research by Kervin, 1975, on the operation of burden of proof

processes involving specific status processes;⁵ that by Webster, 1977, Martin and Sell, 1985, on the effect of the equating characteristics; that by Webster and Driskell, 1978, Hembroff, Martin, and Sell, 1981, Hembroff, 1982, Knottnerus and Greenstein, 1981, on the effects of status consistency and status inconsistency; and the work by Riznek, 1977, on the effects of referent actors.®

Theoretical Extensions

What about extensions?

The work by Markovsky et al, 1984, on the transfer of status expectations is an example of a theoretical extension. This research is concerned with the transfer of status expectations, that have already been formed, to new actors in new situations. The Markovsky et al study rests firmly on the work of Pugh and Wahrman, 1983. According to the status characteristics theory, the expectations that an actor forms for a former interactant continues to be significant to him as long as he remains in the same status situation, Berger et al, 1977. Information, for example, that equalizes the expectations of some particular

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Since the results of this study were not known at the time that the 1977 status model was developed, we treat this study as a theoretical test.

®Not all of these studies report results that are in full accord with the graph theoretical status model, and an overall assessment of all the available theory testing research is a worthwhile task for the future.

female to some particular male will continue to be significant to her when she interacts with a second male. The argument is that the first male, whether he leaves the situation or not, becomes a referent actor to the female while she remains in the situation. As a consequence, the equalizing expectations that she may have formed for the first male will affect the expectations she forms for the second male. In a series of cleverly designed experiments, Pugh and Wahrman, 1983, show that this referential process operates as predicted in that status information, under these conditions, does transfer across status occupants. Given the objective in this research program of devising techniques for overcoming status-based inequalities, this transfer result is of considerable importance.

There is another implication of this Pugh and Wahrman study. It provides the first empirical evidence on how an actor constructs expectations in a complex status situation that involves multiple actors. The theoretical argument is that through the operation of the referential process the actor builds up expectations for such complex settings out of his pairwise interaction with individual others. It is important to note that the results of the Pugh and Wahrman study provide direct support for this argument.

The toarkovsky et al, 1984, study took this transfer problem one important step further. Their basic question was: Given a status intervention involving a specific status occupant in a specific task situation, will this intervention persist if the interactant engages a different status occupant in a different task situation? The 1977 status characteristics theory is

concerned with a single task situation. By extending this theory so that it deals with a sequence of task situations occurring through time, Markovsky et al are able to predict that status interventions will transfer across both occupants and situations but at the same time there will be a (predictable) reduction in the effect of the intervention. This is what they found. Status interventions did transfer across occupants and situations and the effect of these interventions was reduced in this transfer.

As already observed, this work on the transfer process has important engineering implications. But there may be an additional payoff here. Situationally specific theories, such as those in expectation states theory as well as others, are confronted with the problem of explaining how an actor, on the one hand, is able to form situationally specific expectations that determine situationally specific behaviors and, at the same time is able to exhibit consistencies in behaviors across situations. See Stryker, 1985. The transfer of expectations process studied by Pugh and Wahrman and Markovsky et al is one of the mechanisms (but certainly not the only one) that can account for this phenomena. This it does by describing how actors in one situation become referents to interactants in subsequent situations thereby creating cross-situational linkages.

The research on status cues by Tuzlak and Moore, 1984, Ridgeway et al, 1985, and Tuzlak, chapter , this volume, is another example of a theoretical extension. An extensive body of research exists that shows how actors use verbal and nonverbal behaviors in identifying status states. Social linguists have long documented the important role of language and speech

characteristics in this process, Labov, 1966, Ellis, 1967, Tucker and Lambert, 1969, Fraser, 1973, Lakoff, 1973, Ryan and Carranza, 1975, Ryan et al, 1977, Terrell and Terrell, 1983. In addition, a more recent research tradition has focused on the effects of various types of verbal and nonverbal "assertive" behaviors and of different "styles" of behavior in creating positive evaluations of actors and in enabling them to successfully exert influence in task situations, Moscovici and Nemeth, 1974, Nemeth and Wachtler, 1974, Miller et al, 1976, Mazur et al, 1980, Exline et al, 1975, Dovidio and Ellyson, 1982, 1985. By conceptualizing parts of the research in each of these traditions as being concerned with different types of status cues, it is possible to construct a typology of cues that enables us to organize the results of that research in a manner that is relevant to the status characteristics theory.

To do this, Ridgeway et al, 1985, and Berger et al, 1986, propose distinguishing status cues as being "indicative," when the cues directly inform the other of the actor's status state, and as being "expressive" when they provide information from which that status state is inferred. In addition, they distinguish cues as being either "task" or "categorical" where the former provide information about the actors' task capacities in their immediate situation, and the latter provide information about the actor's status category. Using these distinctions, they construct a number of abstract generalizations to codify some of the major results from the research in each of these traditions. The theoretical problem then becomes one of extending expectation states theory—in particular status

theory—so as to account for these generalizations and so as to also generate independent tests for this theoretical account. The research by Tuzlak and Moore 1984, Ridgeway et al, 1985, and Tuzlak, chapter , this volume, deals with this problem and also provides data relevant to testing this extension.

One of the interesting things to come out of this research is the attempt to distinguish "high and low task cue behaviors" from "dominating and propitiating behaviors." These are normally confounded in the literature. The former represent competency claims the actor makes in a task situation, whereas the latter represent attempts by the actor to exercise controlling behaviors when he presumes an already established rank relation with an other or when he seeks to establish such a relation. An important argument in this line of research is that the effectiveness of "pure" dominating and "pure" propitiating behaviors depend heavily on the existence of a legitimated power and prestige order, while the effectiveness of task cue behaviors depends upon their impact on the performance expectations that are formed in the situation. This, in turn, has led to recent theoretical efforts to formulate a set of sufficient conditions for the legitimation of power and prestige orders in task oriented groups, Ridgeway and Berger, chapter , this volume. Thus, while this work on status cues is only in its initial phases, it is already leading to still further extensions to other substantive problems.

There are other extensions of expectation states theory some of which I shall just cite in this context. There is the research of Crundall and Foddy, 1981, and Foddy, chapter , this

volume, which is concerned with extending the Webster-Sobieszek source theory; the research by Conner, 1977, 1985, on latency processes, which extends work on the formation of expectations in homogeneous groups, Berger and Conner, 1974;' the research by Fararo and Skvoretz on dominance structures, chapter___, this volume, which modifies and extends work on models of the evolution of status structures, Fisek, 1968, 1974; the research of Driskeli, 1982, on the effects of discriminating moral characteristics, which represents an extension of the status characteristics theory, see in this connection also Greenstein and Knottnerus, 1980; and there is the body of research by Webster and Smith, 1978, Cook, 1975, Harrod, 1980, Stewart, 1984, and Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Wagner, 1985, on the allocation of rewards which represent extensions of both the status value theory of distributive justice, Berger et al, 1972, and the status characteristics theory.

Why do we call these different research activities "theoretical extensions"? What do they have in common? The answer to these questions is not difficult to see. They have in common the fact that the theorist has added to an existing theory one or more concepts or theoretical assertions that are necessary to support the derivations that he/she wants to make. Without these concepts he/she cannot make these derivations. One can, for example, make the desired derivations for the transfer

7

For research concerned with changes in brain processes as a mechanism in the translation of status differences into behavior, see Barchas et al, 1984, and Harris, 1980.

process studied by Pugh and Wahrman from the existing 1977 status theory, but one cannot do the same for the process studied by Markovsky et al, 1984. Since the 1977 status theory is limited in scope to a single task situation and the dynamics of that situation, it is necessary to add additional assumptions and concepts to be able to describe the relations of the status structure developed in one task situation to that which emerges in succeeding task situations which is what is done in the Markovsky et al study, see also Berger, Fisek, and Norman, 1983. But basically what is important to keep in mind is that in developing the theoretical extension the theorist, while adding new elements, is still working within the structure of concepts, assumptions, and principles of the theory that he/she is extending .

New Formulations

Aside from tests and extensions there is a good deal of work going on in the program in developing new theoretical formulations. Again, I shall limit myself to describing a few of these and to citing some of the others.

There's a long standing interest in the family therapy literature on behavioral rigidities in couples and families. As you might expect, in this literature this phenomenon is typically explained in terms of the particular matching or configuration of different personality types that occur in specific couple and family systems. Johnston's research, Johnston, 1985, is an attempt to account for these behavioral rigidities from an entirely different perspective. She assumes that in these

intimate groups, actors have assigned to each other personality characteristics or attributes. In the theory she develops she takes the assignment of these personality characteristics as given, and she does not try to explain the process by which personality characteristics come to be assigned. She argues that under certain conditions—particularly those involving a breakdown in communication—these assigned personality characteristics are activated, they are used by the actors to define their situation, and they become the bases of complementary behaviors in the group which, through time, can become rigid. Thus the rigidity in behavior in those groups is accounted for through the operation of an expectation states process rather than through the matching of stable personality types.

Among other things, this work is a major attempt to formulate an expectation states theory for the intimate group, and therefore represents a new development in the program. In addition, as I shall describe shortly, this research ties in, in a crucial way, with still other formulations which are being developed that are also based on work with intimate groups.

Moore's research on "second order expectations," Moore, 1985, is another new formulation in the program. Starting with an old question of under what conditions do the expectations of other become the actor's expectations for self and other, he develops a theory to describe this process. He argues that a crucial condition for the operation of this process is that the actor's behavior, his "role enactment," be in accord with the expectations of the other. If the actor's role enactment is in

such accord then the expectations that jTe forms for self and other will come to be in accord with the expectations or "appraisals" of the other. By this process the actors conception of self and other is shaped by the situational appraisals of the other. But, argues Moore, the strength of this situational shaping process is itself dependent on the actor's generalized self esteem.

In this formulation Moore ties together ideas from different theoretical approaches in the study of the self: the ideas on situationally based expectations in expectations states theory, the ideas on role enactment in the work of Turner, 1968, and the ideas on general self-esteem from the work of Rosenberg and his group, 1979. This is certainly a promising development.

There are still other new formulations that have recently been developed of which I shall mention simply two: Jasso, building on ideas from the exchange-equity formulation by Adams, 1965, Walster, et al, 1976, and the competing status value theory by Berger et al, 1972, Cook 1975, Webster and Smith, 1978, Harrod, 1980, has developed a theory which is fully distinctive in its own right, and she is engaged in a research program to test, and apply this new theory, Jasso 1978, 1980. And Foschi, Foschi et al, 1985, Foschi, 1981, and Foschi and Foddy, chapter , this book, is developing a theory of multiple standards in which she is concerned with delineating the conditions in which such standards are used, including those involving status differences, and with describing the basic processes by which multiple standards are created and invoked in interpersonal

situations. Such a theory should enable us to apply expectation state theories to a wider range of evaluational situations.

As in the case of extensions, these new formulations are connected to those already in the program. They make use of concepts, principles, and heuristics—theoretical and metatheoretical frameworks and strategies—that have already been developed. At the same time, there are new concepts, new assumptions, and new principles that are introduced which are required for the explanatory goals of these formulations. I think that it is just this fact that is the critical feature in designating these as new formulations rather than as theoretical extensions, namely that they involve new explanatory goals and address new explanatory domains, e.g., new types of phenomena and processes. While it may not always be possible to distinguish easily in each case theory extensions from new formulations, when we can make that distinction it enables us to understand the different ways the program is evolving and the different issues the theorist faces. Be that as it may, what is clear is that both theoretical extensions and new theoretical formulations mark the elaboration and proliferation of branches in the program.

One final comment about this ongoing research. That so much of current research involves relating expectation states research to work in other traditions or has been developed in response to research from other programs, e.g., Lee and Ofshe, 1981, Mazur, 1985, is extremely important to the growth of the program. I believe this will occur even more in the future as new challenges arise, and as the substantive concerns of expectation states research continues to broaden.

APPLICATIONS AND INTERVENTIONS

Applications and interventions research has been part of our program from its earliest stages. This emphasis on applications goes hand in hand with the emphasis on abstract and general theories of social processes whether they be expectation state theories of status, justice, or social control. The abstract terms of these theories as in the status theory, for example, are such things as diffuse and specific status characteristics and status clusters (interconnected status elements). In the first instance, applications research is necessary to determine whether for some given population at some given time, gender, say, is an instance of a diffuse status characteristic, or whether reputation on reading ability is an instance of a specific status characteristic, or whether some particular ethnic distinction is a set of interconnected status differences. Such instantiational knowledge is factual knowledge and, since, through time, old bases of status distinctions disappear and new ones emerge, we require this knowledge to know the appropriate conditions for applying the theories in our program.

Different theories in the program have been applied and used as bases for interventions. With respect to the status theory, among the most important applications are those of E. G. Cohen, 1971, in the study of race; Lockheed and Hall, 1976, Meeker and Weitzel-0 * Neil, 1977, and Ridgeway, chapter____, this volume, in the study of gender; Cohen and Sharan, 1980, and Yuchtman-Yaar and Semyonov, 1979, in the study of ethnic differences; and Webster and Driskell, 1983, in the study of physical

attractiveness. For a comprehensive review of applications using status theory, see E. G. Cohen, 1982. With respect to source theory, evaluation expectation theory, Berger et al, 1974 (as well as status theory), Entwistle and Webster have used these different theories as bases for interventions in their program of research in school settings. See Entwistle and Webster, 1974a, 1974b. With respect to the social control theory described below, J. Johnston and her colleagues in their work with families undergoing divorce, where social control is often conflictual, have applied this theory to explain how negative stereotypes come to be assigned by the interactants to each other, and are maintained by separate audiences. See Johnston and Campbell, 1986, and Johnston and Campbell, forthcoming.

Although it is common to think of applications and interventions research as following on the development of theory (which certainly has occurred), it is impressive how often problems that have originated in this applied research have shaped the way our theories have been developed. While interest in status inconsistency has many sources (since it is a classical problem in sociology), our desire to understand this phenomenon has been motivated by the fact that status inconsistency is related to the reduction of inequalities in status situations, which has been a central concern in interventions research. This has also been true of the desire to understand the effects of referent actors since these actors can be used to change the expectations of interactants. Similarly, interest in conceptualizing social control as a state organizing process derives from clinical concerns with the breakdown of

interpersonal social control, the assignment of personality stereotypes in intimate groups, and with the problems of how such assignments can be changed.

We often think of this program as having three major components: abstract theory of interpersonal processes, theoretical research, and applications/interventions research. Whereas theoretical research often involves highly controlled settings, applications and interventions research has involved open interaction settings, field settings, and now even clinical settings. Theoretical research is concerned with the testing of developed theory, but, as we have already seen, it may also be concerned with extending such theory; consequently, the influence relations between theory and theoretical research has been bi-directional. Similarly, the influence relations between theory and applications/intervention research have been bi-directional. These relations, in part, account for the considerable impact that applications and interventions have had on the types of theories developed in the program. They also

help to explain why these theories can be so readily used as bases of applications and interventions.⁸ But this is not the

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Theories of expectation state processes, by their structure, seem to be particularly well suited to the task of devising interventions that operate on various aspects of the social process. In the case of the status theory, for example, interventions can be devised to inhibit the activation of the process at the very outset. They may be devised to inhibit the operation of the burden of proof process (although a direct approach may not be effective, see Pugh and Wahrman, 1983). They may also be devised to affect the aggregation of expectation states process by introducing inconsistent information, see E. G. Cohen, 1982. In addition, by introducing special norms into the status situation, they may be devised to affect the basic expectation process so as to make power and prestige behaviors more independent of expectation state advantages, see Morris, 1979.

whole story. Recently Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch, 1985, have argued that

"Therefore the traditional conception that a theory is assessed primarily with reference to criteria of theoretical research (generality, testability, confirmation status, relative superiority over other theories) is incomplete. A theory may be general, testable, well confirmed, and superior to alternative theories but still be forgotten because it applies only to special social situations or describes a process that is so sensitive to competing processes or boundary conditions that it is difficult to detect in concrete settings or offers no effective way of manipulating the process it describes in order to accomplish interventions. All these criteria arise from applications and interventions, not from theoretical research." (p. 43).

In other words, in addition to the traditional criteria for assessing a given theory, there are distinctive criteria which come into play as a result of the objective of applying that

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theory and using it as a basis of intervention.^ This suggests that these additional criteria are being used to select out from a range of possible alternative theoretical constructions just those that can serve as a basis of applications and interventions. If this reasoning is correct, then our applications/intervention concerns will surely continue to play a major role in determining the very shape of future theoretical formulations. In a fundamental way the program is grounded in its applications/intervention research.

THEORIES IN PROGRESS

I shall now talk about research by myself and others that is in progress. This will also enable me to describe some of the directions in which I would like to see the program evolve. Specifically, I shall talk about developing theories for social processes which differ from those that have been of primary concern in the program, and I shall discuss also the problem of interrelating theories of different processes.

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This issue of differences in the criteria for assessing theories reminds me of an exchange I had with a therapist who had just finished a family case analysis in which he continually referred to the fact that there was a "core problem of an unresolved Oedipus complex." "But John, I don't understand this. You never use such concepts in your actual clinical work." "I know, but you've got to admit that that particular theory is so general and so comprehensive, and it explains so much. In addition, Joe, I just like that story."

In developing theories about "new" social processes, we make use of metatheoretical ideas of the program. Perhaps the most general of these is the idea of isolating different social processes and developing general and distinct formulations for each. This involves abstracting these processes from concrete settings of social interaction since, in this view, behavior in any such setting often involves the complex interplay of more than one social process.

There are of course many other metatheoretical ideas which guide us in developing theoretical formulations, but perhaps the most important are those that are involved in conceptualizing an isolated social process as a state organizing process, Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch, 1985.

In terms of the state-organizing conceptualization, a particular type of process occurs in an immediate situation of action in which specified social conditions obtain. Included among these are cultural beliefs, norms, understandings, and in general, cultural constructions that are part of a larger collectivity within which the immediate action occurs. In status processes these inputs from the larger collectivity are diffuse and specific status characteristics and status clusters with their associated expectations and evaluations. In justice processes they are referential structures which are existential beliefs on how various types of social rewards are distributed in the larger collectivity.

In this approach, a situation of action for a particular type of social process is abstractly defined, and so conceived it is applicable to various kinds of concrete settings:

interpersonal encounters, small groups, organizational contexts. Within a situation of action a particular type of social process is activated and evolves as the actors orient themselves to each other and to the management of the problems, issues, or tasks with which they are confronted.

As part of the evolution of the process, relatively stable self-other structures are formed. They arise out of the conditions and behavior that activate the process, and they in turn enable the actors to further engage each other from specific positions within these structures. Given that the actors have managed, as best they can, the situational demands that have activated the process, the process may become de-activated with the self-other structures and the behaviors contingent on these structures devolving. The stability of these self-other structures, from the standpoint of a given actor, depends on the particular type of social process, whether or not the process is activated, and the social characteristics of the others with whom the actor is interacting. It is important to note that in this conception while the process and its associated self-other structures and contingent behaviors are situationally specific, it can produce effects and products that are transferred to subsequent situations of action, Markovsky et al., 1984.¹⁰

This description of our conception of a state organizing process is admittedly quite abstract. I should now like to describe how my colleagues and I are using this conception to

10

For a conception of social processes which in many respects is quite similar to that described here, see Stryker, 1986.

construct state organizing theories of social processes which have not been dealt with up to now in the expectations states program.

Social Control Processes

The theory that I shall briefly describe is one that is being developed by Gerald Talley and myself, Talley and Berger, 1983, and is concerned with the operation of social control in interpersonal situations.

Basically, we have drawn from two sources for our work in conceptualizing this process. First, and probably most important, are our clinical experiences with couples and families. Talley and I, who are family therapists as well as sociologists, have worked with couples and families in the therapy context and have had extensive opportunities to see the operation of control processes and to observe how these processes can be related to the structuring of behavior. In addition, we have drawn upon an extensive and thought-provoking literature that is concerned with various aspects of the micro processes of social control. This literature includes Mills, 1940, Garfinkel, 1961, Scott and Lyman, 1968, Katz, 1972, Davis and Schmidt, 1980, among many others.

The basic elements in our conception of the control process are presented in Figure 1.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

In the first column on the left is presented the abstractly defined conditions that are assumed to obtain in a control situation. To make the formulation as fully general as possible,

these conditions are defined so as to include situations in which "local" rules and understandings, those constructed by the specific actors in the situation, either have or have not already been created. They are also defined so as to admit situations in which the actors either have or have not already assigned personality characteristics to each other.

The process is activated by a set of unexpected events—major violations and/or conflicts in expectations. There may, of course, be many maneuvers by which actors manage these unexpected events so as to bypass or curtail the operation of a control process. These events may be ignored, normalized, or even be simply "unobserved." We assume a situation in which these maneuvers either have not been used or have been used and have failed to curtail the process. So that the unexpected events that activate this process are seen to be a set of major violations or conflicts in expectations which the actors have defined as "should-not-be" events.

Given the activation of the process, the actors are seen as engaging in a wide variety of behaviors which are simultaneously addressed to managing the problematic events and to defining moral relations vis-a-vis each other. The outcome of these control behaviors is the formation of one or more of a finite number of control states, self-other relational structures, which the interactants negotiate for and seek to assign to themselves and the other. Such assignments may also involve acts of intimidation where anger and fear are manipulated in attempts to impose a structure in the immediate situation.

Once in these states, the actors' subsequent behavior is determined by their positions in the structure. This is most clearly seen in examining what we call the "basic control state," see column three, Figure 1. In this case, one actor has assumed and been granted the position of "norm-carrier," the individual representing what is right, proper, or normal in the situation, while the other actor has been defined and has accepted the position of "norm-violator," representing what is wrong, improper, or abnormal. From these positions their control behaviors are defined and complement each other in what is almost an orchestrated interaction ritual. See column four, Figure 1. The norm carrier's moral indignation is assuaged by the violator's expressions of remorse and guilt, his demands for explanations and meanings by the violator's externalizing situational attributions, his recitations of costs incurred by the violator's offers to redress these costs, and his demands for future commitments by the violator's willingness to accept such commitments. Insofar as there are control behaviors which can effectively address the problems created by the violations in the situation and at the same time reaffirm and articulate those understandings which give these violations their moral bases, they occur in this type of control structure.

The "conflict control structure" on the other hand, presents a very different picture. Here each actor seeks to establish control states in which he is the norm-carrier and the other a violator. Not only is the behavior of one actor not being mollified and restrained by the complementary behavior of the other, but in fact is being exacerbated and amplified by the

behavior of the other. Moral indignation by one individual is confronted with moral indignation by the other, recitation of costs by one with recitation of costs by the other, and demands for explanations and commitments on the part of one with similar demands on the part of the other. A consensual moral ordering of the interactants is not achieved in this control state. This is a situation of confrontation, and the intensity of conflict, that often marks such exchanges, appears sustained by the moral nature of the grounds that the interactants assume for their behavior.

One other control state is worth mentioning in this context, the "deferring state," where each interactant assumes the position of violator and seeks to assign that of norm-carrier to the other. This structure often serves as a transitory state enabling the interactants to move out of the conflict state, by simultaneously assuming the claims of the other, and thereby facilitating the closure of the control episode.

Given that the control episode is concluded and the process is deactivated, what possible outcomes might we expect to see? See column five, Figure 1. Perhaps the most obvious one is that the process produces no explicit resolutions. The problematic behavior which activated it is not resolved by the interactants, and the consensual moral ordering of the interactants is not established. The interactants may distance themselves from each other, and they may act to encapsulate both the problematic events and the control episode itself.

A second common outcome is what we call the construction of understandings. By virtue of the control episode, already existing understandings and rules may be reaffirmed, elaborated,

and interpreted, and new local understandings and rules may be explicitly constructed. These outcomes, in turn, become inputs to future episodes of the control process.

There is a third possible result that is of crucial importance. We believe that one of the most significant outcomes of the operation of the process is that the interactants come to assign to each other personality characteristics. These are broadly encompassing attributions, detached from situations and acts, that actors use to characterize the "true" nature of themselves and the other, and to define their "deeper" reality as persons. These can be thought of as individual-level stereotypes which, depending upon how the control process has evolved, may be positive or negative. In this process audiences often play a major role. In coalition with the interactants, they can provide validation for the personality assignments, and in particular where the control structure is conflictual and the assignments are negative, they can provide support to maintain these assignments, Johnston and Campbell, 1986, and Johnston and Campbell, forthcoming.

These personality assignments will affect future episodes of the control process: whether or not certain events will activate it, how control states are assigned, and what are its outcomes. The assignments become inputs which can routinize the further operation of the process just as the process may come to sustain the assignments.

It is important to note that the theoretical argument that Talley and I are making at this point is not simply limited to the control process. We argue that the assignment by

interactants of personality characteristics to each other is an outcome of the operation of other state organizing processes such as status and affect processes in addition to that of control. In addition, we believe that in enduring groups, where different processes are continually being recycled, it is through the generation and maintenance of personality assignments by these processes that actors come to create and recreate themselves and others. From this perspective, the outcome of these social processes, in these groups, is the construction of social persons.

Even from this brief description it should be clear that there is still much to be done in fully conceptualizing social control as a state organizing process. At this stage we are abstracting the process and isolating what we believe to be some of its most important features, and in particular, its evolution in a situation. Still ahead of us is the task of formulating theoretical principles which will enable us to describe its operation and its development through time and across situations.

The Affect Process

Before leaving this topic of new processes, I want to briefly describe some work on affect processes. An interpersonal affect process is one in which the actors are experiencing intense sentiments of diffuse attachments and/or diffuse rejections of each other in a particular situation. Our interest in this process also stems from work with intimate groups. Individuals in such groups can on occasion identify the operation of such a process as a situation in which they are experiencing

and acting toward another (and the other toward them) in a "love-like" or "hate-like" manner. It is not uncommon for individuals to be aware of both the transitory and recurrent nature of such experiences.

As in the case of social control, our goal is to isolate the affect process from other social processes, to conceptualize it in state organizing terms, and to describe its evolution: What are the conditions of the situations in which it occurs? What kinds of events activate the process? What and how are affect states formed during the activation process? And what are the transituational outcomes of the process when it is deactivated?

We assume that there are certain beliefs, understandings, and norms, which are inputs from a larger collectivity which not only make possible but also legitimate the occurrence of an affect process. Our task has been to specify those cultural beliefs and understandings that obtain in an affect situation.

Given an affect situation, we assume that the process is activated by events which produce a high level of interpersonal emotional arousal. These generating events may be positive or negative, e.g., situations involving sexual gratification and pleasure as well as situations involving interpersonal conflict, frustration, anger, or fear.

With the activation and evolution of an affect process, affect states are formed. These states have, of course, emotional and cognitive components, and the behaviors that are contingent on these states are those made appropriate by the cultural beliefs, understandings, and norms that are applicable to such situations.

We conceive of these affect states as being univalent in that during the operation of the process individuals appear to behave to each other in purely positive or purely negative terms. It is as if (perhaps by a process similar to that in the principle of organized subsets) individuals decompose each other's attributes into positive or negative subsets. These subsets in turn are the basis of segregating the individual into a purely positive and purely negative social object. These affect states are generalized and diffuse orientations that the actors hold toward each other. Typically they are not specific emotional reactions, say, such as anger or fear. They may, however, be activated by specific emotions that are associated with particular events or with the operation of other processes. These affect states may also operate to sustain specific emotional reactions in particular situations.

During the operation of a given affect process, or in moving from one affect process to a second, individuals can oscillate between states in which they are oriented to each other as mutually positive or mutually negative actors, or where one person is oriented to a positive actor while the other to a negative one. While they exist, these states determine on the part of the interactants various types of culturally defined bonding and rejecting behaviors. When the process deactivates, these affect states and their contingent behaviors degenerate and, as with other processes, actors can assign to each other personality characteristics which affect the recycling of the process. Thus as is also true for other processes, the affect

structure of one situation has strong effects in determining the structure in subsequent situations.

Clinical observations suggest that the operation of the affect processes, in particular, is crucial in understanding the dynamics of distressed marital and family systems. In such systems the affect system may be so constrained that it is rarely activated, or when it is activated tends to exhibit oscillation patterns that are centered on asymmetric or mutually negative states.

We are still a ways from having a theory of this process. We believe, however, that conceptualizing it as an expectation states process may be a fruitful way to develop just such a theory.

Interrelation of Processes

Proceeding in this manner of isolating processes and developing formulations of these as expectation states processes we soon come up against the question of how are they to be "put together" in order to describe concrete situations of social interaction or in order to use these formulations conjunctively in devising social interventions.

One way of dealing with this problem (but certainly not the only way) is to develop formulations which interrelate different processes. Such work is already underway in our program, and I shall briefly describe two approaches, which are in no way mutually exclusive, that have been taken in dealing with this problem.

The first of these focuses on the relations to each other of the states of different processes. Implicitly it assumes that two or more state organizing processes are simultaneously operating in a given situation, and the concern is with how the allocation of the states of these processes to a set of actors affects their operation, Shelly, 1979, Wattendorf, 1979, Webster, 1980.

There are a number of different theoretical issues and general principles that have been important to those pursuing this approach. I would suggest that one of these is what I shall call the "congruence principle." See Shelley, 1979. Stated in most general terms this principle argues that: Given two processes that are simultaneously activated, if the states of one process are congruently allocated with the states of the second then the first will accentuate the behavioral effects of the second. If these states are incongruently allocated, then the first process will operate to constrain the behavioral effects of the second. In this context, the states of two processes are congruent if all the relevant states allocated by a given actor have similar evaluations, and incongruent if any such states which are allocated by a given actor are oppositely evaluated.

Assume, for example, that a control and a status process are operating and that the norm-carrier is also the high-status actor, while the violator is the low-status one, and that there is consensus on control and status positions. The argument is that the status states will magnify the behaviors that are determined by the control states, relative, say, to the situation where only the control process is operating. On the other hand,

the effect of a status allocation would be to reduce (or "dampen") the behavioral differentiation produced by the control states if the norm-carrier were low status and the violator high status. The same argument seems to be involved in the attempts to describe the effects of such sentiment states as "likes" and "dislikes" on status states. By this principle incongruent patterns, e.g., the low status person dislikes the high status person, while the high status person likes the one who is low status, can "dampen" the differentiating effects of status, while congruent patterns can accentuate these effects, Webster, 1980.

There are some obvious problems that are connected with this congruence principle. At present it lacks a precise formulation. It is not clear to exactly which processes the principle does or does not apply and what are the conditions of its applications. Nevertheless, as a principle to inform empirical research in this area, I think it is worth pursuing. The outcome of such research may enable us to construct one or more abstract generalizations that can be important in developing theories of the interrelation of processes.

I simply want to note the nature of a second approach to this problem. The congruence approach, by focussing on the relations of stable states of different processes, concentrates on only one aspect of the interrelation of different processes. In situations where more than one process operates we can also be concerned, for example, with understanding how the activation of one process facilitates or inhibits the activation of the second, or with understanding how the particular sequencing of processes affects their operation, or with understanding how the evolution

of one process affects the evolution of a second. It is clear that this approach, where we are concerned with interrelating various aspects of the operation of different processes through time, poses difficult theoretical problems which we have only just begun to explore, see in particular Johnston, chapter .., this book, and Berger et al, 1985. However, this approach does attempt to exploit our conception of social processes as state organizing processes, and, therefore, it may turn out to be an effective way of conceptualizing this problem.

There are many problems of importance that I would like to see pursued in the expectation states program. But, certainly, among these I assign a special priority to the developing expectation state formulations for new processes and to the constructing theories which interrelate these processes.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This is my conception of the program when I examine what is currently occurring, and when I consider those tasks and problems that I should like to see addressed next.

But, what can we say about the program's future? Where is it going? If our time frame is a short one, the answer, I think, is clear. Within the next five years or so I expect to see very much of the same sort of research activities as those we have seen in the past and as those we see in the present. There will be research involving new tests and new extensions of existing formulations. Since proliferation is one of the major modes of growth in this program, I expect to see still further efforts to formulate other social processes, as state organizing processes,

and I expect to see a great deal more concern for the interrelation of social processes. Almost surely we will see more work on metatheoretical issues and problems as they arise from substantive concerns; and given our past experience, I expect that there will be increasing research on applications and interventions as the range of substantive problems addressed by these state organizing theories continues to expand. These are the activities that are occurring at present, and I expect to see them pursued in the future.

All this is concerned with the immediate future. But what eventually happens to a theoretical research program? What developments can we project for this program, as a program, if we consider it from a longer time perspective? Does a research program of this type come to an "end"? The answers to these questions are much less clear. As sociologists, we have so little experience with theoretical research programs that it is hard to project their long-term developments.

There are research programs which do seem to come to an "end," such as those concerned with explaining a particular effect. The program on "role-differentiation," Bales and Slater, 1955, Verba, 1961, Burke, 1968, 1971, and that on the "risky shift" effect, Cartwright, 1971, appear to be of this type. The objective of these programs is to explain a particular effect or class of effects, to determine the conditions of their appearance, or to determine the generality and stability of these effects which may be brought into question on either methodological or substantive grounds. This idea of coming to an end also seems to be true of other programs such as, for example,

research on status attainment where the objective is to predict some particular social outcome or class of outcomes in terms of a set of interrelated variables. In both types of programs, one can think of a set of specific questions that are raised and answered within the activities of the program. Given a specific set of variables, how effectively can we predict a particular class of outcomes that are of interest to us? How stable are a particular set of effects and under what conditions do they occur? To the extent that those working within the program succeed in answering such questions, the objectives of the program are being met, and the program may "wind down" and may even come to an end.

All this, however, does not seem to be applicable to theoretical research programs such as the expectation states program. What happens to such programs? My guess is that they continue to exist, in one form or another, as long as the major substantive ideas and metatheoretical themes which have been developed in the program can be applied to new substantive domains. In other words the program continues to exist as long as it is possible for the researcher to use the core theoretical and metatheoretical themes to develop potentially fruitful theories for new and different social domains. When this ceases to be the case, the core themes have "played themselves out," and the program reaches its substantive boundaries. At the same time I would expect to see changes in the structure of the program similar to those we have already seen. New formulations will appear including those which represent proliferations in the program. Some of these formulations will turn out to be false

starts and will not be developed very far, as has been true of the authority expectation states research. Other of these formulations will appear which become extensively elaborated and the basis of intervention research, as has been true of the status characteristics research. Finally, still other formulations will appear in which expectations states concepts and principles are theoretically integrated with those of different research traditions to constitute separate and distinctive formulations in their own right, as has been true of Jasso's research on distributive justice, Jasso, 1978, 1980. From this perspective, a theoretical research program, such as the expectation states program, is a context for generating theories, conceptual themes, and strategies; and presumably it exists just so long as the theories are viable, and the themes and strategies continue to have the promise of utility.

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i

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Figure 1

Interpersonal Control as State Organizing Process*

Elements of the Process

<u>Conditions of Control Situation at Outset</u>	<u>Activating Events</u>	<u>Underlying Control States</u>	<u>Obseivable Behaviors "of Basic Control State</u>	<u>Outcomes of Control Processes</u>
Two or more actors: interactants and audience	A set of unexpected events which, relative to rules, norms, and understandings in situation are "should not be events" such as: major violations of expectations, and/or conflicts in expectations	(Audience(s) are involved in formation of control states)	<u>Norm Carrier</u> 1. Moral Indignation 2. Demands for explanation 3. Expression of costs incurred 4. Demands for commitments for future	<u>No Resolution</u>
Actors may or may not have assigned to each other personality characteristics		Basic+ P (C,V] 0 fV,C]		<u>Construction of Understandings</u>
General rules, norms, and understandings relevant to situation		<u>Conflict</u> PTC,"V] 0 [C,V]	<u>Norm Violator</u> 1. Guilt, remorse 2. Situational attributions 3. Attempts to redress costs 4. Commitments for future	Actors construct local rules, norms, and understandings
local rules, norms, and understandings relevant to situation may or may not exist		<u>Deferring</u> P fV,C] 0 fV,C]		<u>Personality Characteristics</u>
Actors assume consensus exists on general and local rules, etc.				Actors activate personality characteristics to each other, e.g., rigid, insecure hysterical, irresponsible, etc. (Audiences may be involved in the assignment of these characteristics)
State of normal interaction, i.e., predictable, meaningful, accountable, influenceable, given the situation				

P = Person C = Norm Carrier
 0 = Other V = Norm Violator

*From "Social Control as a State Organizing Process," Tally and Berger, 1983.