The U.S. Army and the lessons of history
Date
1997
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Texas A&M University
Abstract
The United States Army values history as a practical tool. This organizational belief was no more apparent than during its preparation, execution, and assessment of World War I. After the Great War, the Army's leadership held review boards with the belief that lessons learned from its war experience could improve its training, tactical doctrine, and schools. This thesis, using the field artillery as a case study, will appraise how the United States Army institutionalized the lessons learns process in the first three decades of this century. Between the Spanish-American War and WWI, the Army's officers corps examined and discussed the modem tactics and equipment of foreign armies. The study of the Russo-Japanese and Boer wars encouraged progressive officers to modernize their own army, but their studies were individual efforts and influenced official doctrine marginally. The idea of the army formally studying battles, tactical developments, and equipment, a "lesson's learn approach," did not become an institutional process until 1918. Upon its entry into WWI, the U.S. found its equipment and tactics woefully inadequate to win on a modern battlefield. Consequently, the American Expeditionary Force (A.E.F.), upon its arrival in France, studied and used Allied materiel, instructors, training methods, and tactics to create and train its own independent army. Moreover, after observing the Allied methods and reviewing its own combat experience, the A.E.F. commanders and staff formally sought to improve its efficiency by evaluating its past performance to adjust its methods for better success in future operations. The assessment of the Army's war performance did not cease with the armistice. The Army's leadership, as did the artillery's, convened boards of review that recommended changes to improve its manuals, tactics, schooling, and equipment based upon its recent combat experiences. Real changes and improvements occurred within the Army because of its study and use of lessons gained in the trenches of France. Yet, the army's leadership clung sometimes too closely to the Great War's lessons or refused to act upon knowledge gained in the war, thus failing to advance their organization beyond 11 November 1918.
Description
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Includes bibliographical references: p. 85-95.
Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.
Includes bibliographical references: p. 85-95.
Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.
Keywords
history., Major history.