The scientific model concept and realism
Date
2003
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Texas A&M University
Abstract
The goal of this thesis is two-fold. First, while the model concept frequently is mentioned in the philosophical literature on scientific knowledge, it rarely is addressed as a focus for methodology. My aim is to support the view that models are central to scientific practice, and that for this reason, the model concept deserves further attention in general philosophy of science. Second, I hold that since models are an important part of scientific inquiry, various philosophical puzzles arise as a consequence of an analysis of the model concept. In particular, I investigate the problem of constructivism about scientific models for a realist view of science, and I urge that although it may be tempting to adopt an anti-realist position, methodological considerations demand that one must be a realist about the model concept.
Description
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Includes bibliographical references (leaves 71-75).
Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 71-75).
Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.
Keywords
philosophy., Major philosophy.