Setting The Boundary Conditions For Democratic Peace
Abstract
This essay sets out to illustrate that when certain variables, or dimensions, are altered, this effect begins to break down. The variables that will be investigated in this study belong in two issue areas: the economic and the strategic. These dimensions will be manipulated into core and peripherial conditions that will help to pinpoint the exact situtations in each that lead to a deterioration of democratic peace. In other words, both economic and strategic threats to the democratic regime will include core versus periphery variables that will distinguish the threshhold, if any, where democratic peace fails.
Specifically, this study is interested in changing the effect within the political incentive model. As will be illustrated later, Mintz and Geva established the lack of political incentives and benefits involved in a conflict between two democracies as a cause of democratic peace. With the introduction of certain industry-specific economic incentives and intensified strategic threats, however, will we see a breakdown in the theory? In the light of economic and strategic survival, will these 'democratic norms' that facilitate peace be put at the wayside? These questions will be approached in an experimental design with eight separate manipulations. The manipulations are in respect to three variables: regime type, dimension (economic and strategic), and locus (core and periphery).
Description
Program year: 1994/1995Digitized from print original stored in HDR
Citation
Trusty, Brian (1995). Setting The Boundary Conditions For Democratic Peace. University Undergraduate Research Fellow. Available electronically from https : / /hdl .handle .net /1969 .1 /CAPSTONE -TrustyB _1995.