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    The Deepwater Horizon Accident
    (2020-04-09) Tholstrup, Caitlin; Moore, Kenneth; Mouneimne, Mohamad; Abdulrahman, Jahan
    The overall objective of this report is to document and analyze the series of events leading up to the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon and the responses to the explosion with regard to the safety measures and protocols followed during the accident. The history of BP is discussed with regard to accidents caused by failure to comply with established safety procedures, including the Texas City Refinery Explosion in 2005, the Alaskan Oil Spill in 2006, and then the eventual Deepwater Horizon explosion in 2010. An analysis of these events show that negligence and malpractice conducted on BP’s part led to the aforementioned disasters. This foreshadows the events of the Macondo well in which negligence (on both BP’s and the United States Government’s part) and financial stress induced the failure of mechanical barriers to seeping hydrocarbons into the drill pipe. Though the Deepwater Horizon rig belonged to Transocean and the cement job was performed by Halliburton, the lease operator for the Macondo well was BP and thusly is assigned an overwhelming majority of the blame for the catastrophic explosion. At least 8 layers of safety were breached, demonstrating a severe lack of responsibility on behalf of BP and the personnel aboard the Deepwater Horizon. Following the explosion, the United States Government and the public had an ever-increasing tension-filled relationship with BP as the well gushed oil at an average of 70,000 barrels of oil per day for 87 days. Despite BP desiring to be transparent with the public and the government, BP was ultimately fined billions of dollars in damages and lost wages. Even though the spill has been capped and cleanup efforts have made considerable progress, the reputation of BP will never be what it used to be, especially after the two previous disasters before the explosion of Deepwater Horizon. Its status as one of the leading oil producers in the world is forever tarnished after this accident. A similar accident occurring in Bhopal, India in 1984 is also analyzed. Though the accident in Bhopal involves the toxic and fatal release methyl isocyanate (MIC) vapors instead of flammable hydrocarbons, analogues between the Bhopal incident and the Deepwater Horizon incident are readily observed. Both incidents involve the responsible company not following proper safety measures due to financial stress and negligence. While BP is being held fully accountable by the United States Government, the former company Union Carbide did not suffer nearly the same amount of punishment for thousands of victims the Bhopal incident claimed. Nevertheless, both incidents reveal the consequences of malpractice and negligence on behalf of the operating company. To ensure that the engineering profession is not tainted by theses travesties, stricter and more thorough practices of safety measures and procedures must be followed in future engineering endeavors.
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    Liquefied Natural Gas: Description, Risks, Hazards, Safeguards
    (2020-04-09) Manojahri, Maryam; Kafood, Maha; Kamal, Mohd
    Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) continues to be the economic and environmental fuel used all over the world and it is considered as the lifeblood of Qatar’s economic success. It can be defined as light hydrocarbon fraction of the natural gas, mainly methane, which is cooled and converted to liquid form storing or transporting. LNG has unique characteristics comparing to other energy sources and the main reasons behind the production of LNG will be discussed. Similarly, the overall process description of LNG will be viewed. LNG process consists of main parts that are discussed in this paper, namely locating, designing, operating, storing, shipping and LNG import terminals in the countries to which Qatar exports its LNG. The risk assessments associated within each part of LNG process will be talked about. LNG process is a very critical aspect in today’s technology. It is highly demanded in the energy market; thus for a safe and convenient supplying general safety guidelines are provided within this paper.
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    Inherent Safety
    (2020-04-07) Andotra, Gautam; Idriss, Wajih; Natarajan, Divya
    It is a known fact that prevention is always better than control but traditionally safety measures within the field of engineering is usually applied to control the hazards rather than reducing them. This approach based on controlling a hazard is often referred to as ‘extrinsic safety’ as opposed to the approach of reducing the presence of a hazard, which is called ‘inherent safety’15. The concept of inherent safety comes from theories formulated by Trevor Kletz, in his article, entitled “What You Don’t Have, Can’t Leak. Years later in 1991, Mr. Kletz published a more updated version of his studies titled “Plant Design for Safety – A User-Friendly Approach”, which gave rise to the modern concepts of inherent safety. Inherently safer design has been advocated since the explosion at Flixborough in 1974, which raised a lot of question about safety in chemical plants. As mentioned earlier an inherently safer design is one that avoids hazards instead of controlling them, particularly by removing or reducing the amount of hazardous material in the plant or the number of hazardous operations21. Hazards can be reduced or eliminated by changing the materials, chemistry, and process variables such that the reduced hazard is characteristic of the new conditions and such a process with reduced hazards is described as inherently safer. Inherent safety recognizes there is no chemical process that is without risk, but all chemical processes can be made safer by applying inherently safer concepts. Therefore in order to reduce the hazards we need to be able to understand the various concepts of inherent safety, more commonly called ‘inherently safer design strategies’21. The inherently safer design strategies have been grouped into four major strategies: 6    1. Intensification: Using smaller quantities of hazardous substances. 2. Substitution: Replacing a material or a process with a less hazardous one. 3. Simplification: Designing facilities which eliminate unnecessary complexity. 4. Attenuation: Facilities which minimize the impact of a hazardous release.
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    Chemical Safety Board and Qatar Proposed Chapter
    (2020-04-07) Al-Naama, Abdulla; Saleh, Aisha; Nicola, Sally
    The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) is a board responsible for carrying out investigations on chemical hazards and accidents that take place in the chemical industry in the United States of America. The Board consists of five appointed members by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and its members reached 35 professional staff in 2008. The mission of CSB is given to it by the Congress and no other agencies can influence or affect the Board’s activities as stated in the law. Its main purpose is to maintain the safety of the people and work environment in chemical plants. Once an accident has been selected for investigation, the CSB members follow a set of procedures to find out the causes of the accident and give recommendations to the industry and also to the regulatory agencies about what should be done to avoid such accidents. The completed investigations, as well as the current ones, are made available to the public in order to limit the number of accidents that take place in the chemical industry in the U.S. In this paper, a Qatar chapter of CSB, Qatar Safety Board (QSB), is proposed. Unlike CSB in the U.S., QSB will cover not only the accidents in the chemical industry, but also accidents that take place in the medical, industrial, sea and transportation sectors in Qatar. QSB will give recommendations to the industries on how to avoid the accidents. It will also try to raise awareness among everyone in the work environment in Qatar by making its reports on the accidents available, free-of-charge to the public. QSB will ensure a safer and healthier work environment in Qatar.
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    Inherent Safety and Chlorine in Water Treatment
    (2020-04-06) Al-Obaidli, Mashael; Anany, Abdalla; Hamad, Natalie
    Chlorine has been used for water treatment purposes for more than one hundred years. The simplicity and effectiveness of using chlorine and its derivatives for water treatment is one of the wonders of modern chemistry: it is cheap, it is safe, and it works. Chlorine has uses on water intake structures, for the removal of aquatic organisms, for pre-filtration, to kill bacteria and for water disinfection. The gas has a greenish-yellowish color and has a molecular weight that is two and a half times larger than that of air. In its gaseous form, chlorine is extremely toxic and dangerous. It also has a very high coefficient of expansion. For this reason, all chlorine containers’ volume must not be filled up past eighty five percent of their capacity. Chlorine gas is fed into the water treatment system under vacuum conditions. Chlorine tanks have an automated system of regulators, feed equipment and vacuum ejectors. Piping connections must be sealed with proper pipe thread compound and compression fittings must be sealed with a new lead washer. Also, chlorine gas scrubbers should be installed in any facility that uses chlorine gas. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires wastewater plants which store two-thousand five-hundred pounds or more of chlorine gas to conduct a risk management plan. Risk reduction begins with using the smallest cylinders possible of chlorine gas for the application. Water treatment plants can manifold as many ton containers as necessary while controlling for leaks at each individual container and throughout the entire system. In addition, the water plant should be located as far out of the city as possible, downwind of the prevailing winds. Booster systems at strategic locations can be placed. The Pasquill-Gifford model is a very good way to estimate the concentrations of a release at different distances from the source. However, a better Al-Obaidli, Anany, Hamad 3 3 model to use would be the Britter and McQuaid model for dense gases. Risk assessment software such as PHAST provides planners and retrofitters with a tool to determine various levels of risk. The example used about Ras-Laffan was simulated using PHAST for the three cases involved. The companies at Ras-Laffan assume that the wind direction from that region will always be North-West. If that were true, then the results from PHAST show that there would be no risk of the leak reaching any of the surrounding cities. The rupture of a one- ton cylinder could potentially produce a cloud one mile high by a half- mile wide by one mile long of toxic mustard gas that will kill everything in its wake. A train in Ontario derailed and a tank car of chlorine gas ruptured; if there had not been a large propane fire funneling the heavier-than-air mustard gas upwards into the atmosphere, many thousands of people in the city of Mississauga might have died. Although chlorine is by far the cheapest chemical to use for water treatment, the most widely accepted, and has the fewest risks to public health, other chemicals should also be investigated
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    Bhopal gas Tragedy: A safety case study
    (2020-04-06) Basha, Omar; Alajmy, Jawaher; Newaz, Tahira
    This report provides an overview of the Bhopal Gas disaster which occurred  at the Union Carbide pesticide production plant in India in 1984.  A large amount of  Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) was released from tank 610 within the facility, a failure of  safety and alarm systems allowed the gas cloud spread and kill thousands of people  resulting in one of history’s worst chemical accidents.    This paper will first discuss the plants setting and establishment before providing a  brief background on the layout of the plant and the chemical process underwent. It  will then discuss MIC and pesticide toxicity and the importance of safety systems  within the plant and how Union Carbide’s plant failed to meet such standards.    The second major section of the report will describe how the leak propagated and  dispersed throughout the city, what emergency procedures were taken to  counteract it, and its aftermath and effects both on the local people and the people  involved with Union Carbide.    The report will then discuss previous investigations about the tragedy and will focus  primarily on the two biggest investigations conducted by both the Indian  Government and Union Carbide respectively, investigating the proposed scenarios  and their feasibility and whether there are other probable scenarios.    The last major part of the report will discuss how such an incident revolutionized  chemical process safety and the various conclusions that could be drawn from this
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    The Buncefield Accident
    (2020-04-06) Al Faheem, Duaa; Katbeh, Mary Anna; Ziaullah, Abdulwahab
    The Process failure that occurred at Buncefield site, Hertfordshire, UK was one of the landmark incidents in the process safety concerns of vapor cloud explosion. The vapor cloud that formed was due to overfilled large storage tank, containing unleaded fuel. The overflow of the tank was the result of a failed level indicating system and lack of operator‟s attention at the site. A legal investigation on the incident was carried out by Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (BMIIB), which presented the causes for the explosion and the recommendations for future prevention. The report briefly discusses the series of steps that led to the major incident. Prior to the Buncefield, a massive explosion on such scale was not predicted; hence the Buncefield incident breaches the worst case scenario that was predicted for vapor cloud explosion. The report also provides the explanation regarding why the explosion breaches the worst case scenario for predicted strength of the vapor cloud explosion. Moreover similar accidents are also presented along with the recommendations presented by Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board.
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    TAMU-Q Green Gym
    (2019-12-15) Al Muhannadi, Noof; Hedous, Sara
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    Sulfur Concrete for Paving Roads and Tunnels
    (2019-12-15) Ahmed, Ahmed; Muneeb, Mohammad; Al-Kaabi, Thanwa; Al-Hajri, Alreem
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    Photovoltaic Oven With Radiative Cooling System
    (2019-12-15) Al-Khayarin, Fatima; Al-Romaihi, Hala; Hasna, Muath; Aly, Omar
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    Not a Chocolate Bar But an Activity: A Vending Machine That Prints Out Productive Activities
    (2019-12-15) Al-Qahtani, Asmaa; Al-Obaidli, Njoud; Al-Khalifa, Ghada; Al-Sulaiti, Maha
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    Knowledge-Based Development Influences on Fatherhood in Qatar
    (2019-12-15) Fakhroo, Fatima; Alkhalaf, Dana; Mohammed, Eiman
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    Inject-S: A System for Delivering Sulfur Fertilizer to Enrich Your Soil
    (2019-12-15) Mohamed, Nadin; Al-Reyahi, Muneera; AlKaabi, Moza; Elshal, Omar
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    Eco-Friendly Plastics: Integrating Sulfur Polymers
    (2019-12-15) Shaikh, Afsha; Kazeem, Lukman; Mansour, Rana; Alagha, Rand
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    Bashrat: A Cream Made With Sulfur That is Beneficial For Medical Uses
    (2019-12-15) Almeer, Shayma; Omer, Omer; Ahmed, Afnaan
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    Threze
    (2019-08-18) AlBadr, Badour; Al-Saad, Majed; Arkoub, Mohammed Abou; Diab, Yousef
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    The War on Words: Free Speech in Qatar and its Neighboring GCC Countries
    (2019-08-18) Fattouh, Mohamed; Hatto, Abdul Rahman
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    Laws Relating to Freedom of Expression in Qatar
    (2019-08-18) Al-Heidous, Rashid; Al-Baker, Faisal; Al-Hemaidi, Abdulla
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    Languages in Qatar
    (2019-08-18) Al-Sada, Bader; Al-Marri, Saleh; Elmoussa, Abdulrahman
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    Improving the Anti-Knocking Properties of Gas To Liquid (GTL) Naptha
    (2019-08-18) Ahmed, Yusra; Roustazadeh, Laya; Karkoub, Lina; Alhawa, Dima Abu; Al-Abdulla, Bandar; Mohammed, Nasr; Mohamed, Eiman; Choudhury, Hanif; ElBashir, Nimir O.