Master of International Affairs (MIA) Capstones
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During their final semester, Master of International Affairs students participate in a capstone research course. These courses allow students to tackle a problem or project in the real world, often working in conjunction with a government agency or nonprofit organization. Designed to test the knowledge and abilities students have developed through their previous classes and experiences, capstones necessitate strong teamwork, careful research, writing ability, and often a large amount of ingenuity in identifying ways to approach an issue or find a solution.
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Item Finance for Low Income Communities: Possible Applications of US Experience for India(2006) Coffman-Cole, Sandra; Du, Minghua; Hattan, Justin; Powers, Shawn; Rubenstein, Sarah; Santos, Araceli; Slupski, Steve; Varghese, Adel; Grameen BankItem Command and Control in the Iraqi Insurgency(2006) Atkinson, Dwain; Collins, Matthew; Colmenares, Monica; McBane, Carla; Ritter, Kyle; Welling, Glen; Engel, Jeffrey A.; Centra TechnologyItem Applications to Homeland Security from the Katrina and Rita Hurricanes(2006) County Judge Randy Sims, Texas Director of Homeland Security; Department of Homeland SecurityItem Confidential and Privileged: The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board - Learning Lessons from Its Past to Shape Its Future(2006) Absher, Kenneth Michael; Desch, Michael; Popadiuk, Roman; Ambassador David Abshire and the Laury FoundationItem The Peking Diary: George H.W. Bush and China: 1974-75(2007) Princeton University PressItem Framing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change(2007) Boggs, Jay W.; Chellinsky, Andrew; Ege, David; Hodges, Allen; Reynolds, Tripp; Williams, Andy; Layne, Christopher; Long Range Analysis Group, Intelligence Council (Director of National Intelligence)Item The Interagency Process in Support & Stability Operations: Integrating and Aligning the Roles and Missions of Military and Civilian Agencies in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments(2007) Baetjer, Patrick; Cline, Chris; Hernandorena, Carlos; Polley, Brian; Rogers, Kate; Smith, Amanda; Voelkel, Tyson; Cerami, Joseph; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability OperationsItem U.S. Policy and the Future of Uzbekistan: Promoting Reform, Security, and Regional Stability(2007) Napper, Ambassador Larry; Department of StateItem Developed Countries' Imposed Standards on Trade of Agricultural Imports from Developing Countries(2007) Cabrera, Raul; Cochran, Matt; Dangelmayr, Lauren; D'Aguilar, Gavin; Lee, Jeongwoo; Speir, Ian; Weigand, Courtney; Gawande, Kishore; World Bank Trade DivisionItem Too Hot To Handle: Climate Change, Geopolitics, and U.S. National Security in 2025(2007) Boggs, Jay W.; Chellinsky, Andrew; Ege, David; Hodges, Allen; Reynolds, Tripp; Williams, Adam; Layne, ChristopherLooking ahead to 2025, what policies should future US administrations consider as appropriate responses to climate change, and what level of commitment should be devoted to addressing global climate change by the US government? To answer the key question, the project addressed the following secondary issues: Based on the best scientific evidence currently available, what will the most likely manifestations of global climate change be by 2025? This includes aggregate changes (surface temperatures, rising sea levels) as well as discrete changes (drought, flooding, disease, storms, heat waves). With respect to the latter, what are the probabilities that such events will be more (or less severe) than they are today? Based on the answers to the above, how politically salient will the issue of responding to global climate change be in 2025 (globally, by geographic region/location, by coalitions of similarly situated countries)? What low-probability, but potentially catastrophic events, may occur and how should these be taken into account by US policy? Responding to global climate change could be costly financially. However, there also could be positive spin-offs from addressing the consequences of global climate change. What may these positive spin-offs be (new technologies, energy independence, health, multilateral leadership, reputation gains)?Item Capacity Building in Meat Exports From Southern Africa(2008) Chiriboga, Luis M.; Kilmer, Chris; Fan, Rocky; Gawande, Kishore; World Bank, Trade DivisionItem East Asian Security in 2025(2008) Heavin, Reagan; Hudson, Adam; Krueger, Brandon; O'Neil, Sean; Rozell, Griffin; Suma, Matt; Layne, Christopher; Long Range Analysis Unit, National Intelligence Council (NIC)Item Human Security and National Security Reform: New Paths for International Leadership(2008) Abraham, Phebey; Cantrell, Catherine; Carman, Tara; Gruenwald, Emily; Rowley, Thomas A.; Cerami, Joseph; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability OperationsItem Provincial Reconstruction Teams & Counterinsurgency Training (JRTC March Rotation)(2008) Napper, Ambassador Larry; Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Ft. Polk, LouisianaItem Investigating the Current Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland - Determining al-Qa'ida's Targeting Strategy: Who's in the Crosshairs?(2009) Bacon-Ward, Ashley; Bell, Kevin; Brandt, Gretchen; Brown, Nathan; Figuerola, Andy; Foix, Marissa; Formanek, Mary; Holden, David; Vrdoljak, Denis; Daly, Sara; National Counterterrorism CenterItem Effective Intelligence Operations during Counterinsurgency Campaigns - Intelligence Community in Counterinsurgency: Historical Lessons and Best Practices(2009) Albers, Andrew C.; Binkley, Samuel G.; Chaudhry, Mariam F.; Craswell, Kimberly; Freeman, Jordan S.; Lytle, Carrie E.; Myers, Tristan L.; Naser, Rami; Sloan, Peter T.; Castillo, Jasen J.; Rand Corporation; Department of DefenseItem Simulated Interdiction: Proliferation Security Initiative(2009) Gassam, Geraldine; Jacob, Savio; Jenecka, Bobby; Lanzing, Kevin; Lee, Jeonghoon; Reves, Nick; Slanker, Julie; Trojan, Anthony; Wismer, Ryan; Napper, Ambassador Larry; Nuclear Nonproliferation Office of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)Item Assessing Regional Border Security(2009) Causey, Chris; Hahn, Jason; Heichelbach, Terry; Malecha, Lindsay; Meiners, Stephen; Race, Brandon; Engel, Jeffrey A.; Centra Technology; Department of Homeland SecurityItem Combating Child Labor through DESTINO - Reducing Child Labor in Panama: An Impact Evaluation of a Department of Labor-Funded Initiative(2009) Andisha, Nasir; Chiquito-Saban, Oscar; Emmerich, Eduardo; Figueroa, Aurelia; Jiang, Yuewen; Hui-Lee, Jun; Manning, Darren; Ortega-Sanchez, Alejandra; Gawande, Kishore; Creative Associates International, Inc.; U.S. Department of LaborItem Estimating the Economic Costs of Espionage(2010) Bell, Rich; Bennett, J. Ethan; Boles, Jillian R.; Goodoien, David M.; Irving, Jeff W.; Kuhlman, Phillip B.; White, Amanda K.; Engel, Jeffrey A.Economic espionage is a serious threat to the vitality of the U.S. economy. While this is a widely accepted fact, there is no formal way to measure the damage an incident of economic espionage has on the U.S. economy. The U.S. government would like to know how damaging economic espionage is on the economy. However, the full repercussions of an incident of economic espionage are never known. A stolen trade secret, over the course of many years, could be used in different products and in different industries. The loss of a trade secret is an immeasurable value. Instead of attempting to measure such an overarching elusive concept, the research team sought to measure the potential consequence of economic espionage. In this study, the research team constructed a model to identify the severity of an incident of economic espionage and its consequences on the U.S. economy. The model was designed for use by federal government employees with the intent that the federal government could apply publically available case information to the model. The model provides a qualitative estimate of “consequence” as it relates to economic loss. The model generates a severity score between 0 and 1, which corresponds to a „low‟, „moderate‟, and „high‟ consequence. The severity score incorporates the model‟s four main variables into two primary components: „Industry‟ and „Case Variables‟. „Industry‟ assesses the significance of where the incident of economic espionage occurred. „Industry‟ is derived from a combination of the percentage of GDP in terms of value added for each of the 14 industries and the „susceptibility‟ of each of the 14 industries. This process enables the model to be individualized to a specific industry, which allows a different potential consequence to the U.S. economy. „Case Variables‟ assess the significance of the incident of economic espionage. „Case Variables‟ include the „Characteristics of the Theft‟, „Cost‟, and „Beneficiary‟ variables. The model requires the user to first select the „Industry‟ where the incident occurred and then to identify the „Case Variables‟. Therefore, the potential consequence on the U.S. economy from an incident of economic espionage is dependent on the industry. To greater individualize the model, the research team designed a method whereby questions within the model would matter more when compared to others. As no two incidents of economic espionage are identical, the research team developed a system of weighing the variables and their respective questions. With all the variables measured, standardized, and weighed against each other, the model calculates an overall severity score, which corresponds to the level of consequence for an incident of economic espionage.
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