Graduate and Professional Student Degree Program Research (Non-ETD)

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Finance for Low Income Communities: Possible Applications of US Experience for India
(2006) Coffman-Cole, Sandra; Du, Minghua; Hattan, Justin; Powers, Shawn; Rubenstein, Sarah; Santos, Araceli; Slupski, Steve; Varghese, Adel; Grameen Bank
The Peking Diary: George H.W. Bush and China: 1974-75
(2007) Princeton University Press
An Analysis of Nonprofit Capacity-Building 'Industry' in Minnesota
(2007) Flowers, Maggie; Jones, Kimberly; Hilborn, Rachel; Morisseau, Ainsley; Pearson, Kenneth; Bies, Angela; Minnesota Council of Nonprofits (MCN), led by Jon Pratt
The Interagency Process in Support & Stability Operations: Integrating and Aligning the Roles and Missions of Military and Civilian Agencies in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments
(2007) Baetjer, Patrick; Cline, Chris; Hernandorena, Carlos; Polley, Brian; Rogers, Kate; Smith, Amanda; Voelkel, Tyson; Cerami, Joseph; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations
U.S. Policy and the Future of Uzbekistan: Promoting Reform, Security, and Regional Stability
(2007) Napper, Ambassador Larry; Department of State
East Asian Security in 2025
(2008) Heavin, Reagan; Hudson, Adam; Krueger, Brandon; O'Neil, Sean; Rozell, Griffin; Suma, Matt; Layne, Christopher; Long Range Analysis Unit, National Intelligence Council (NIC)
Capacity Building in Meat Exports From Southern Africa
(2008) Chiriboga, Luis M.; Kilmer, Chris; Fan, Rocky; Gawande, Kishore; World Bank, Trade Division
Human Security and National Security Reform: New Paths for International Leadership
(2008) Abraham, Phebey; Cantrell, Catherine; Carman, Tara; Gruenwald, Emily; Rowley, Thomas A.; Cerami, Joseph; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations
Provincial Reconstruction Teams & Counterinsurgency Training (JRTC March Rotation)
(2008) Napper, Ambassador Larry; Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Ft. Polk, Louisiana
THE MORPHOLOGY OF KNM-ER1805: A Reconsideration of an Enigmatic Specimen
(2009) Grossman, Ricci L.
In the past, KNM-ER 1805 has been designated as a paratype for Homo erectus, H. ergaster, H. habilis, and H. rudolfensis. Based on its stratigraphic position within the KBS layer (~1.85mya) of the Koobi Fora Formation, this specimen can be temporally associated with all of these taxa, and with Paranthropus boisei. Although the majority of researchers attribute KNM-ER 1805 to the genus Homo, some suggest it might be more appropriately allocated to Paranthropus or Australopithecus, thus this issue remains unresolved. This study examines 27 metric and 122 non-metric cranial and mandibular features of several groups of African Plio-Pleistocene hominins to determine the phylogenetic status of KNM-ER 1805 relative to contemporary hominin taxa. It employs multivariate exploration techniques (principal components and discriminant function analyses) and phylogeny reconstruction methods: CONTML for continuous characters as well as PAUP* (parsimony) and MrBayes (Bayesian analysis) for discrete characters. Results of the multivariate analyses reveal an association between KNM-ER 1805 and specimens allocated to A. africanus, H. habilis, and H. ergaster. Cladograms produced from the phylogenetic analyses show little resolution, but in each instance where a clear separation between Homo and the australopithecines (Paranthropus and Australopithecus) is revealed, KNM-ER 1805 consistently groups with the australopithecines. These results suggest KNM-ER 1805 is not a typical specimen of H. habilis/rudolfensis or H. erectus/ergaster, despite the fact that it has been cited as a paratype for each of these taxa. Furthermore, these results suggest the affinity of this enigmatic specimen may not lie with the genus Homo at all.
Investigating the Current Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland - Determining al-Qa'ida's Targeting Strategy: Who's in the Crosshairs?
(2009) Bacon-Ward, Ashley; Bell, Kevin; Brandt, Gretchen; Brown, Nathan; Figuerola, Andy; Foix, Marissa; Formanek, Mary; Holden, David; Vrdoljak, Denis; Daly, Sara; National Counterterrorism Center
Simulated Interdiction: Proliferation Security Initiative
(2009) Gassam, Geraldine; Jacob, Savio; Jenecka, Bobby; Lanzing, Kevin; Lee, Jeonghoon; Reves, Nick; Slanker, Julie; Trojan, Anthony; Wismer, Ryan; Napper, Ambassador Larry; Nuclear Nonproliferation Office of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
Estimating the Economic Costs of Espionage
(2010) Bell, Rich; Bennett, J. Ethan; Boles, Jillian R.; Goodoien, David M.; Irving, Jeff W.; Kuhlman, Phillip B.; White, Amanda K.; Engel, Jeffrey A.
Economic espionage is a serious threat to the vitality of the U.S. economy. While this is a widely accepted fact, there is no formal way to measure the damage an incident of economic espionage has on the U.S. economy. The U.S. government would like to know how damaging economic espionage is on the economy. However, the full repercussions of an incident of economic espionage are never known. A stolen trade secret, over the course of many years, could be used in different products and in different industries. The loss of a trade secret is an immeasurable value. Instead of attempting to measure such an overarching elusive concept, the research team sought to measure the potential consequence of economic espionage. In this study, the research team constructed a model to identify the severity of an incident of economic espionage and its consequences on the U.S. economy. The model was designed for use by federal government employees with the intent that the federal government could apply publically available case information to the model. The model provides a qualitative estimate of “consequence” as it relates to economic loss. The model generates a severity score between 0 and 1, which corresponds to a „low‟, „moderate‟, and „high‟ consequence. The severity score incorporates the model‟s four main variables into two primary components: „Industry‟ and „Case Variables‟. „Industry‟ assesses the significance of where the incident of economic espionage occurred. „Industry‟ is derived from a combination of the percentage of GDP in terms of value added for each of the 14 industries and the „susceptibility‟ of each of the 14 industries. This process enables the model to be individualized to a specific industry, which allows a different potential consequence to the U.S. economy. „Case Variables‟ assess the significance of the incident of economic espionage. „Case Variables‟ include the „Characteristics of the Theft‟, „Cost‟, and „Beneficiary‟ variables. The model requires the user to first select the „Industry‟ where the incident occurred and then to identify the „Case Variables‟. Therefore, the potential consequence on the U.S. economy from an incident of economic espionage is dependent on the industry. To greater individualize the model, the research team designed a method whereby questions within the model would matter more when compared to others. As no two incidents of economic espionage are identical, the research team developed a system of weighing the variables and their respective questions. With all the variables measured, standardized, and weighed against each other, the model calculates an overall severity score, which corresponds to the level of consequence for an incident of economic espionage.
Master of Public Service and Administration Program Review and Evaluation
(2010) McElheny, Sue; McMillen, Stephanie; Payne, Tyler; Perez, Paige; Vela, Austin; Ward, David; Weissgerber, Alec; Lindquist, Eric; MPSA Program Director, Bush School of Government and Public Service
Ukraine's Military Role in the Black Sea Region
(2010) Coffman, Amy Beth; Crump, James Andrew; Dickson, Robbi K.; Mueller, Meaghan; Pulis, Sarah L.; Marin Thornton, Gabriela
Only Ukraine's civilian and military leadership can determine the best course of action Ukraine should undertake to secure the Black Sea region (BSR). By analyzing Ukraine's precarious security environment and assessing the current security situation in the Black Sea, this paper first sought to identify a prototype for Ukraine's role in the BSR. However, the result of this search was a clear realization of Ukraine's unique situation. Ukraine is a nation with divisionary demographics, external pressures on internal politics, and mixed ideas about economic opportunities and priorities in a neighborhood of states with competing influences and capabilities.
Pipeline Politics: Natural Gas in Eurasia
(2010) Landrum, William W.; Llewellyn, Benjamin B.; Limesand, Craig M.; Miller, Dante J.; Morris, James P.; Nowell, Kathleen S.; Sherman, Charlotte L.; Marin Thornton, Gabriela; Popadiuk, Roman
Eurasia is a major source of oil and natural gas, and events in the region have a great potential to destabilize global security patterns. Supplies of natural gas and oil from Eurasia are vital for the functioning of European economies, and also important to US efforts to reduce its reliance on Middle Eastern energy resources. Presently, pipelines in Eurasia stretch across thousands of miles throughout unstable political regions. Disruptions in gas and oil supplies negatively affect the economies and politics of the region. Future pipeline projects – such as the Nabucco pipeline – are highly controversial, and Russia’s efforts to control oil and gas supplies in the region have recently intensified. Russia has gained increased influence in its neighborhood by consolidating control of regional energy production and infrastructure. This project claims that Russia is using its energy monopoly to further its geostrategic aims: ensuring political influence in nearby countries, obtaining a rise in commodity prices, and returning to multi-polarity in which Russia maintains clear regional hegemony. On the other hand, the US has four key interests in Eurasia. These include averting tensions with Russia, stabilizing the flow of oil and natural gas to Western Europe, maintaining US regional access for counterterrorism operations, and promoting democratic regimes to reduce Russian influence. In this light, the report argues that the US must promote development of pipelines that bypass Russian control and advance alternative domestic sources. These actions will ease European dependence on Russian energy, shield Europe from disruptions in supply, and decrease Russia’s ability to exert influence through energy policy. Other options include promoting a common European Union energy policy to increase influence in energy markets, push for increased gas storage across Europe to provide temporary relief against gas disruptions, and explore increased US and European cooperation with Russia on energy market access.
Critical Infrastructure and Cyber Security
(2011) Doll, Abby; Pirrong, Renee; Jennings, Matthew; Stasny, George; Giblin, Andy; Shaffer, Steph; Anderson, Aimee; Engel, Jeffrey A.
We were tasked by CENTRA Technology, Inc., to create a methodology that could be used to prioritize critical cyber assets in the United States. We have answered that call by developing a user-friendly, consequence-based methodology that requires end users to carefully consider their cyber assets' contributions to vital missions of national security, economic security, and public safety. The user will be able to clearly visualize the potential impact of a loss of cyber assets on those three indicators vis-a-vis one another, which is especially important in the midst of the current budgetary uncertainty in Washington. In this study, we present our definitions of the three indicators; an overview of the eighteen sectors of critical infrastructure and commonalities and the characteristics of their operating systems; a brief review of the literature on cyber security to date; and, of course, a thorough discussion of the intricacies of how our methodology works.
Identifying the Strength of Iranian Opposition Groups
(2011) Barnes, Riley; Davis, Stephen; Enderle, Dori; Jacobs, Matt; Joost, Laura; Perkins, Mike; Snodgrass, Steven; Stone, Nathanael; Woolfolk, Melisa; Castillo, Jasen J.
Angry about the results of the 2009 elections, the Iranian opposition took to the streets, coordinating widespread protests to challenge the authority of the regime in Tehran. The protests hampered, but did not stop, the regime's effort to impose its favorite candidate for president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The strength of this opposition appears to have caught both the government and the international community by surprise. Our sponsor asked this Capstone group to address the following questions: How strong are Iranian opposition groups? Under what conditions could they pose a threat to the regime? To answer these questions, the project develops a framework comparing opposition groups and regimes across different historical cases. We argue the Iranian regime retains a strong grip on power, using both the threat of US intervention and domestic support for its nuclear program to rally support for the government. Unlike recent revolutions in the Arab world, the opposition stands little chance of toppling the government. Opposition movements lack the resources to seriously challenge the government. The project's framework also identified the conditions under which the Iranian opposition might gain enough strength to overthrow the regime. We summarize our findings in both a briefing and a paper. Our findings aim to help intelligence analysts decide which indicators to use when assessing the strength of Iranian opposition groups, and opposition groups in general. The project team briefed the sponsor in Washington, DC, on May 11, 2011.
What to Cut and How to Cut? Historical Lessons from Past Reductions in the Intelligence Community
(2012) Cook, Austin; Edmiston, William; Glenn, Stuart; Goodwin, Derek; Kaehr, Matthew; Nebl, James; Phares, Benjamin; Yang, Elizabeth; Yeo, Jessica; Castillo, Jasen
Under what conditions can the Intelligence Community cut its resources while still maintaining their effectiveness? What do past eras of reduction suggest about what to cut and how best to cut? The United States Government faces pressure to reduce its overall expenditures. This will likely spur calls to reduce the country’s foreign policy and defense budget. Under the current fiscal environment, these cuts will surely include the Intelligence Community, which grew rapidly over the last ten year’s. Prudent policymakers, therefore, should start thinking now about what they can cut and how they should implement these changes while still carrying out their missions effectively. This project will help the Intelligence Community think about these problems by examining the lessons learned from previous eras of reduction. The project will produce an article-length report as well as a briefing. Team members will brief the sponsor in their Washington, DC office.
Evaluating the Implementation of the National Strategy for Biosurveillance
(2015-05-20) Armstrong, Iain; Berry, Erin; Bitter, Alexander; Colburn, Leland; Karika, Kathleen; Paulino, Jose; Redden, Rebekah; Vien, Thomas "Tex"; Williams, Lodrick;
Biological incidents, both man-made and naturally occurring, represent a significant threat to the national security of the United States. Identifying these crises begins with the detection and reporting of essential biological disease information, known as biosurveillance. As the first of its kind, the 2012 National Strategy for Biosurveillance targets the process essential information should take to reach decisionmakers. Although there are points of strength in the system, extensive research finds the current biosurveillance infrastructure does not adequately transmit information to decisionmakers. Therefore, this report recommends three improvements to the biosurveillance system: increase incorporation of information, improve interagency relationships, and strengthen governance in the biosurveillance community.

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