NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A Thesis
by
ABRAM WIL PALEY

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

December 2008

Major Subject: Political Science
NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A Thesis
by
ABRAM WIL PALEY

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Approved by:
Chair of Committee, Ahmer Tarar
Committee Members, Shuhei Kurizaki
                                    James Rogers
                                    Michael Desch
Head of Department, Pat Hurley

December 2008

Major Subject: Political Science
ABSTRACT

Non-State Actors in International Politics
A Theoretical Framework. (December 2008)
Abram Wil Paley, B.A., New York University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Ahmer Tarar

In recent years, there has been a burgeoning of studies related to international terrorism—many related to and resulting from current events and occurrences. However, the enterprise of terrorism scholarship within the framework of political science and international relations poses some interesting dilemmas for the discipline. While other topics in the field have received increasingly rigorous examination, the study of terrorism, comparatively, remains in a nascent stage. Though many of the tools of analysis from other areas of international relations scholarship can be re-applied to the study of terrorism, it appears that some must be modified and others discarded altogether. Instead of seeking to fit terrorists, and, indeed, other state actors, into the common rubric of international relations scholarship, I argue here that it is important to reconceptualize international interaction in light of the problems that such actors pose to traditional research. Thus, in the following thesis, I will explore the challenges the study of terrorism poses to researchers in the fields of international relations and political science. After discussing the theoretical foundations and quandaries of the study of international terrorism in political science, I will utilize these remarks as a groundwork for developing a game-theoretic model that incorporates some of these challenges and an econometric model to test some of its implications.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Challenge 1: IR’s focus on states as the primary (or sole) actor</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Challenge 2: Picking apart the differences between terrorism and insurgency/guerilla warfare</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Challenge 3: Data issues</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Challenge 4: Current events versus history</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Summary</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Epistemological bases for a systematic study of non-state actors</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Toward an inclusive definition of non-state actors</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. NSA characteristics and their strategic dimensions</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Future research and conclusion</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III A FORMAL MODEL OF TERRORISM</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. The model</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The analysis</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV TESTING THE IMPLICATIONS OF A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF TERRORISM</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Relevant literature</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Theory</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Data and statistics</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Results</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Discussion</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Final concluding remarks</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VITA .......................... 87
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determinants of Terrorism</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>One Dimensional Policy Space and Ideal Points from Tarar (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Game Tree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Terrorism Stage Game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Number of Western European Terrorism Events by Year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been a burgeoning of studies related to international terrorism—many related to and resulting from current events and occurrences. However, the enterprise of terrorism scholarship within the framework of political science and international relations poses some interesting dilemmas for the discipline. While other topics in the field have received increasingly rigorous examination, the study of terrorism, comparatively, remains in a nascent stage. Though many of the tools of analysis from other areas of international relations scholarship can be re-applied to the study of terrorism, it appears that some must be modified and others discarded altogether. Instead of seeking to fit terrorists, and, indeed, other state actors, into the common rubric of international relations scholarship, I argue here that it is important to reconceptualize international interaction in light of the problems that such actors pose to traditional research. Thusly, in the following essay, I will explore the challenges the study of terrorism poses to researchers in the fields international relations and political science. Moving beyond a critical review of the literature to date, I will emphasize areas which require further exploration, and suggest novel approaches. I will draw heavily on other subfields of international relations and political science to elucidate examples of successful (and not-so-successful) attempts to frame similar issues. More specifically, my essay will be focused around four key challenges to terrorism research; 1) International Relations scholarship’s traditional focus on states as the sole, or primary actor in international interaction, 2) the lack of distinction amongst terrorism, insurgency, and criminal violence, 3) the limited availability of

The journal model is American Political Science Review.
high-quality all-encompassing terrorism data, and, 4) the categorizations of terrorism as ‘history’ versus a ‘current event’ and the temporal domain of terrorism.

The essay is set up as follows; in the following sections, I discuss each of these key challenges to terrorism research in greater detail. Within these sections, I will incorporate related existent literature in political science and other disciplines. I will also suggest new directions to ameliorate the problems discussed. The final section concludes and describes policy implications from a more refined terrorism research agenda.

A. Challenge 1: IR’s focus on states as the primary (or sole) actor

Since it began, IR as a discipline has been very focused on interstate relationships. While terrorism and counter-terrorism have become predominant issues in international relations, though, the body of scholarship in this area is much less advanced than others in the realms of international security and international political economy. This is perhaps surprising, given the increasing prevalence of terrorism in contemporary political discourse, especially since the end of the Cold War. While there are many reasons for this, one of the most convincing is the fact that terrorism, by definition, usually involves non-state actors as primary players. Traditionally, international relations scholarship has not been accustomed to accommodating such actors into the literature. Beginning with Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, even though scholars understood that there existed other actors that influenced international interaction, it was commonly assumed that “States are the units whose interactions form the structure of international political systems. They will long remain so” (Waltz 1979). Though in the same passage Waltz posited that “the importance of non-state actors and the extent of transnational activities are obvious,” one of
the bedrock assumption of the Realist tradition in International Relations was that states were the sole, unitary actors in the international arena (Waltz 1979). Given that much of international relations theory has been built upon the ideas of Realism, it is not hard to understand why international relations literature is still struggling to incorporate non-state actors into its discourse, whether they be international organizations, economic actors or terrorists. While there has begun to be a trend in the literature exploring the strategic dimensions of non-state actors, and their affect on international interaction, there are many questions that remain unanswered. Most IR literature assumes that states (or their leaders) are the primary actors on the international stage. However, while there is surely state-sponsored terrorism, terrorists are oftentimes (or usually) not state entities. How, therefore, can international relations scholarship and theories account for their behavior? While there have been recent efforts to explore terrorist actors as non-state entities, but still strategic actors (such as E. BdM, Powell, Tarar) there is still much more that needs to be done in this regards. Additionally, if states and their relationships are the primary focus of IR, why has there been little or no focus on how terrorists and terrorism affects interstate relationships? These are questions that I will explore in my final paper.

Additionally, implicit in the assumption of the unitary actor and/or leader-based international interaction is the idea that foreign policies and actions are dictated and crafted by a select few, the national elites. While this assumption poses problems for other types of international interaction, such as international political economy, where a vast number of business people are shaping international exchange, nowhere is it more problematic than with the issue of terrorism. As noted terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman points out, “the proliferation of ‘amateurs’ involved in terrorist acts has . . . contributed to terrorism’s increasing lethality” (Hoffman 1997). Whereas in the past terrorists needed not only the will and motivation but also sufficient resources
and expertise (more state-like attributes), now “the means and methods of terrorism can be easily obtained at bookstores, from mail-order publishers, on CD-ROM or even over the Internet. Hence, terrorism has become accessible to anyone with a grievance, an agenda, a purpose or any idiosyncratic combination of the above” (Hoffman 1997). On the other hand, Hoffman also claims that a ‘professional’ class of terrorists is developing new sophistication and technical competence. These terrorists have become “demonstrably more adept in their trade craft of death and destruction; more formidable in their abilities of tactical modification, adjustment and innovation in their methods of attack; and appear to be able to operate for sustained periods of time while avoiding detection, interception and arrest or capture” (Hoffman 1997). As such, it is not obvious that elite-centric models and theories apply to such actors. Though, theories of citizens and mass public don’t seem like a good match either. How then should terrorists be characterized?

**Terrorist characterization**

I posit that not only terrorists, but all non-state actors should be characterized strategically along similar lines in a previous working paper (Paley 2007). However, here I will briefly summarize the important points for the study of terrorism and discuss the five categories for characterization. The ideas of categorization can be conceptualized in two possible ways, depending on the given research question or approach. On the one hand, these characterizations can take dichotomous, or multichotomous, values. For instance, a terrorist group can either be related to a state or not, or can either be strong, weak, or middling. On the other hand, and perhaps more usefully, these characteristics can be conceptualized as five separate continuums, where for each group’s characteristic \( x_i, x_i \in [0, 1] \). The location on these continuums can inform further
inquiry and analysis. These characteristics can be summarized as follows (and will be expanded upon in the next chapter):

- **Relationship to state(s)** Perhaps one of the most easily observed characteristics (in some cases) of terrorists is their relationship to a state(s). This characteristic can take many dimensions, each of which contributes to the strategic dynamics of interaction in varying ways, given that there are many different types of such relationships. Terrorists and other non-state actors can be creations of states (the United Nations), closely related to states in terms of economics and interests (multi-national corporations or state-funded terrorist organizations), loosely related to the state structure (various NGOs, bloggers, etc.), or completely separate from the state structure (some terrorist organizations). Of course, given the structure of the international system, geographically and territorially, any actor will be located within a nation-state (unless he is out on the open seas or in space—though these frontiers, too, are disappearing).

- **Capabilities** In an interstate context, capabilities—whether actual or perceived—have been shown to greatly affect the expected utility of and responses to certain actions. Many long-standing theoretical traditions in international relations have focused on how the capabilities of states has affected their interaction, including (but not limited to) balance of power arguments, deterrence, power transition, hegemonic stability, systemic power concentration and movement, and expected utility theories.\(^1\) Additionally, scholarship has also focused on perception of capabilities as important in strategic relationships (Jervis (1976), Levy (1983)). Given the centrality of state capabilities to international relations

\(^1\)For a good summary see Bennett and Stam (2004).
theory, it makes sense that more attention is due to examining this characteristic of terrorist groups and other non-state actors. For instance, it is obvious to think that if a terrorist group is stronger, it will surely be paid more attention to than a weak actor. Additionally, if terrorists have better resources and capabilities, then they are most likely able to partake in a greater magnitude of (successful) activities on the international stage.

• **Organizational structure** Another common attribute of states used to explain international interaction, which can also offer important insights into terrorist groups and other non-state actors, is organizational structure. Many scholars have explored how the organizational structure of states is important in influencing international interactions. For instance, Fearon (1994), Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2002), and Schultz (2001), have shown how different organizational structures allow states to credibly commit to certain actions or convey useful information in varying levels. Reiter and Stam (2002) have shown how state structure allows different levels of mobilization in wartime. Others have argued that state structure and resulting bureaucracy affects the speed of state interaction on the international level (see Gaubatz (1996)). Finally, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) have shown how organizational structure affects the preferences and hence strategies of states’ leaders, through use of the selectorate theory. All of these discussions can and should translate to any investigation of terrorist groups and other non-state actors. For instance, NSAs can be thought of as on a continuum from simple to complex organizational structure, where single actors such as celebrities are at one end, and more complex entities such as MNCs or large transnational criminal organizations are located near the other. Another interesting way of exploring this characteristic is to discern how con-
strained the NSA is by its organizational structure. MNCs and other NSAs with large bureaucracy or winning coalitions could be thought to be constrained in similar ways that states are, whereas actors with more amorphous constraints, such as certain terrorist organizations or individual actors are not.\(^2\) As such, related interactions would have different dynamics.

- **Past action on the international stage** A terrorist group’s history of participation both domestically and on the international stage should be considered in any analysis. (I leave further discussion of this topic to a discussion a slightly different context below).

- **Veto power** The final characteristic of terrorist groups is that of veto power. Drawing loosely on the concept of veto players developed by Tsebelis (2001), the veto power (and agenda-setting powers) of terrorist groups has important influences on the international strategic setting. Tsebelis defines veto players as individuals or collective actors who have to agree on a proposed policy change in order for it to come into effect (Tsebelis 2001). These players “are specified in a country by the constitution (the President, the House, and the Senate in the US) or by the political system (the different parties members of a government coalition in Western Europe).” A special class of veto players, are “agenda setters.” This framework can and should be applied generally to terrorist groups and other non-state actors. The idea of veto players has been applied by Tsebelis and others to very specific instances of non-state actors; the European Union (Tsebelis and Garrett 2001) and the European Parliament.

---

\(^2\)Of course, certain terrorist organizations would have larger winning coalitions. These actors could be thought of as having winning coalitions that include citizens in the nations where they operate or from which they draw their recruits, funds, support, etc.—though this dynamic could be explored in terms of the group’s relationship to the state (and its subsets).
(Tsebelis 1994), though such work has not carried over into further inquiry, especially into terrorist organizations. While closely related to capabilities and relationship to states, a terrorist group’s ability to act as a veto player over interstate or state-non-state interaction has a strong influence on the dynamics of these relationships. Of course, there are many different ways in which a non-state actors could exercise this type of power. Examples include anything from the use of protests (grassroots activists), to formal reprimands (the United Nations), and from decisions to withdraw or invest in a country (MNCs) to acts of violence (terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations). The ability of NSAs to respond with a veto to a given situation or interaction, whether known, perceived or hypothesized, will affect the strategic dynamics of any interaction, much as it does in domestic political systems. While terrorist groups and other non-state actors are not appointed as veto players or agenda setters by the domestic political system, as described above, given their capabilities and relationship to states (and perhaps even past history or organizational structure), they can be thought of as being informally specified veto powers based on their part and role in the international system.

B. Challenge 2: Picking apart the differences between terrorism and insurgency/guerilla warfare

Another problematic facet of international relations terrorism research is the fact that there is oftentimes no clear distinction between terrorism and insurgency (and, relatedly, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency). Furthermore, this leads to a lack of demarcation between domestic versus international terrorism. In this section, I will untangle the definitions and discussions of each, and examine how a more focused
approach to understanding the complexities and intricacies of each of these varying phenomena will lead to a more nuanced research agenda.

While commonly grouped together, terrorism and insurgency should instead be thought of as analytically distinct. Following the influential terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman, terrorism can be conceptualized as “(1) political in its aims; (2) violent or threatens violence; (3) designed to have psychological repercussions beyond the immediate target; (4) conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure; (5) perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity” (Hoffman (1998) and Eland (1999)). Even though such a definition might seem overly complex, I agree with Hoffman that it is important to make clear distinctions between terrorist violence and other types of political violence—especially when seeking to analyze the events in a more rigorous fashion.

Such distinctions make substantive sense. In his review of Hoffman’s 1998 book, Ivan Eland believes instead that Hoffman should have used a more traditional definition of terrorism which follows “[Brian] Jenkins’s general orientation, [and] focuses on the act of violence rather than the perpetrators or the political cause they are promoting” (Eland 1999). However, by doing so, Eland and Jenkins “equate the intentional destruction of civilian populations by governments – for example, the Luftwaffe’s air raids on Warsaw and Coventry, allied firebombing of Dresden and Tokyo, and even the “mutual assured destruction” nuclear doctrine of Russia and the United States, which targets civilian populations – with similar acts by substate groups labeled as terrorists” (Eland 1999). While such aggregation might be useful for policy makers and pundits ³, such inaccuracy is surely not useful for political scientists, given that the causal mechanisms and processes both of decision-making and implementation are

³Although I find it hard to see how.
incredibly different for all of these events. By developing a more rigorous definition, scholars are able to develop a more coherent sample space, and more correctly theorize and model terrorism and its determinants. Without such a distinction, multiple causal processes are oftentimes grouped under one large umbrella, leading to inconclusive, or, worse, incorrect results and conclusions.

Furthermore, besides distinguishing amongst the many different forms of political violence, of which terrorism and insurgencies are a subset, it is important to make the distinction as well. Again, using Hoffman’s framework, while “guerillas [or, insurgents] often use the same tactics as [terrorists] (for example, assassinations, bombings of public places, hostage-taking), guerillas are a larger group of individuals that function in the open, function as a military unit and attack enemy military forces, and seize and hold territory ([terrorist] groups avoid all of those tactics)” (Eland 1999). However, such in making this type of distinction, scholars should not draw unsubstantiated conclusions, such as the claim by Eland (1999) that this definition can be summarized as saying “in short, [that terrorist] groups have fewer resources and are weaker than guerilla groups.” Instead, these properties of terrorists could (and have) indeed been viewed as contributing to their increasing strength and success. Without making clear distinctions, further investigations into these types of questions is impossible.

Another important differentiation, which is markedly less prevalent in terrorism scholarship is the issue of religion. International relations scholarship is often reluctant to incorporate ideas of religion and its affects into theory and models. Perhaps this stems from the fact that when it has been incorporated, it is often done in a haphazard way, making broad (sometimes stereotypical) claims about different religious

\(^4\)Of course, the following discussion, also applies to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.
groups or cultures. A foundational work in this regard is Huntington (1993). Though insurgency can be linked to religious beliefs, it is most often associated with territorial or political claims, as mentioned above. On the other hand, the most salient form of terrorism today is that of Islamic fundamentalism, which is highly linked (at least in its discourse) to religious ideas. By disregarding religious identity and motivations, international relations scholars can more easily lump terrorism and insurgency together, attributing similar (or identical) causal mechanisms to each, while as vastly different causal mechanisms may be at work. Only by accounting for this and other important aspects of the divergence, can scholars more realistically describe terrorism.

Closely related to each of the first two challenges, and others below, is the necessary distinction between domestic and international terrorism. As mentioned above, political science and international relations has made great strides to incorporate domestic politics into explanations of international interaction. The two-level games described in Putnam (1988) is a great example of this. Similarly, understanding the different processes of domestic and international terrorism is important in terrorism research. This will be discussed in greater length below.

Before turning to the next challenge, I must briefly note that by making these many important distinctions, using rigorous definitions and systems of classification, scholars will be better able to answer new challenging questions regarding terrorism and those who perpetrate it. For instance, Philip Bobbitt claims that in the past “violence had a declining marginal utility for terrorists as it increased above a certain level” (Bobbitt 2008). However quoting the U.S. National Commission on Terrorism, he concludes that “a growing percentage of terrorist attacks are designed to kill as many people as possible. In the 1990s a terrorist incident was almost 20 percent more likely to result in death or injury than an incident two decades before . . . Today’s terrorists seek to inflict mass casualties, and they are attempting to do
so both overseas and on American soil” (Bobbitt 2008). However, instead of merely arguing that terrorists are changing their aims, and seeking to apply the same causal framework, by using the same idea of distinction, scholars might be able to separate the causes of more traditional acts of terrorism, and the new breed Bobbitt describes. Scholars will be able to determine at what point such acts cease to be terrorism, and instead become mere acts of criminal violence or warfare. Indeed, the causal processes behind acts that are meant to terrorize the masses and those meant to kill as many as possible, while perhaps interrelated should be envisioned as distinct. Determining where this line falls is an important area for future research.

C. Challenge 3: Data issues

A very common challenge for international relations scholars is that of data-collection problems. Compared with other subfields of political science, much of the data sought by scholars is hard to come by, especially outside of the realm of International Political Economy or the Correlates of War project. Additionally, given that non-state actors have not been a primary focus of the discipline, there are not many easy sources to which to turn. In the following section, I will discuss these data problems, explore how scholars have, to date, coped with these issues, and posit some possible ways to get around such problems.

Terrorism studies are one of the few areas where international relations scholars are forced to rely on Events-datasets. Given that it is near impossible to collect accurate and specific information on terrorist organizations from different international organizations, or through survey-type research, researchers have turned to events-data collections. For instance, the most popular terrorism datasets, including ITERATE (or International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events), and TWEED (Terrorism
in Western Europe: Event Data (TWEED) (Engene 2007)) are both events-datasets. However, instead of applying the normal rigor to the use of such data, terrorism scholars usually use them as is, without understanding some of the basic fundamentals of events-datasets or seeking to improve them. Those who do not use terrorism events-datasets, use very small, usually self-collected data, or no data at all. While problems such as these are common in international relations research, they are more acute when it comes to the study of terrorism and other non-state actors.

Data collection efforts must be motivated by research questions, and research questions should take into account the arguments presented in this paper, including, most importantly, terrorism characteristics and the temporal domain of terrorism (to be discussed below). However, given that the present mind-set in international relations is to focus on state entities and their interactions, it is near impossible to begin to broach the problem of data availability on terrorism and other non-state actors. Thusly, an effort needs to be made to readjust the framing of data collection. Of course, as the prevalence of terrorism studies increases initiatives to collect proper data will inevitably occur. It is merely a question of whether at the beginning of a rigorous discourse on a subject attention should be paid to collecting high quality data, instead of realizing years down the line that the data are as useful as scholars had hoped—but still relying on the data because it is the sub-field standard. Experience has shown that the better the data in the first place, the more useful and substantively interesting information the sub-field is capable of producing. As such, scholars should endeavor on better terrorism data collection.
D. Challenge 4: Current events versus history

Closely related to the issue of data problems, is the issue of time. Many—if not most—IR scholars focus on events in the past, using history to get data and cases for their research. However, while there is some research along these lines when it comes to terrorism, oftentimes (perhaps because of the data issues) scholarship has focused on the evolving dimensions of terrorism, and predicting future terrorism events. Thusly, terrorism studies sometimes fall into a study of current events as opposed to historical studies and as such are inherently predictive in nature as opposed to being more descriptive. While much of political science research claims to be predictive, as Clarke and Primo (2007) discuss, this is a mistake belief (and goal), especially when it comes to formal approaches. How can these approaches be reconciled when it comes to studying terrorism? Studies of terrorism that seek to be predictive must utilize a different epistemology and frame of reference for the research. In the final paper, I will further examine these issues in the context of international relations scholarship.

Besides being a ‘current event’ terrorism also poses a problem for international relations scholars because it is considered to be ever-evolving. As Bruce Hoffman discusses, “An almost Darwinian principle of natural selection seems to affect subsequent generations of terrorist groups, whereby every new terrorist generation learns from its predecessors, becoming smarter, tougher, and more difficult to capture or eliminate” (Hoffman 1997). However, international relations scholars have not fully conceptualized the changing nature of terrorism. One promising avenue of research is that of Bueno de Mesquita (2005a). In this article, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita develops a framework for better understanding “one of the most puzzling facts reported by scholars of terrorism . . . that the level of terrorist violence often increases following government concessions” (Bueno de Mesquita 2005a). He develops a model in
which governments make concessions which moderate terrorists accept, leaving more extreme actors in control of the terrorist organizations—thereby leading to increased militancy. Even though this is the case, the governments are willing to strike deals with these more moderate actors because their collusion improves counterterror capabilities. While interesting and informative, his account does not factor technological and economic change into the equation. Further research that was able to explain the changing nature of terrorism based upon not only increased radicalization after concessions or bargaining or technological changes is needed.

*Past action on the international stage*

A NSA’s past action on the international stage can be thought of, in game-theoretic terms, as a subset of the “history” of a broader game of international interaction. This history consists of the complete sequence of moves that precede a given decision point or node, and contains information as to what each actor did during these previous moves (Morrow 1994). This history can provide players in the game with information as to how its opponents have acted in the past. Such information can then be utilized to update beliefs about opponent’s characteristics, such as preferences or capabilities. In the political psychology tradition, these past interactions and beliefs about characteristics have been theorized to lead to attribution of reputations to actors (primarily states) (Mercer 1996). These reputations, in turn, affect how other actors perceive and interact with these states. Although the evidence for specific claims about reputation building may be suspect, the idea of reputation on the international stage is appealing (Rosen 1997). Likewise, other research has focused on the idea of learning from past international interactions (Keohane 1988). All of these ideas support the claim that past behavior has some affect on future behavior.
in international interactions, even if the precise causal mechanism is unclear at the present stage of scientific development. As I have similarly argued above, this type of state characterization should also be applied to NSAs.

Past interactions can signal credibility and provide state actors with information about the NSA’s preferences or capabilities. When there is incomplete or imperfect information because of a lack of previous interaction, or varied past actions, states or other NSAs would be unsure how to act and cannot base decisions on this history. For instance, if a NSA has had past action on international stage, more information is bound to be known—such as their methods of interaction or stated goals, whether because states have been able to directly observe these actions or states have sought out further information (i.e., when a state’s intelligence agencies focus more attention on a terrorist organization after they have committed a terrorist act, an example discussed below). If the NSAs fall on the side of the continuum where there is little history, states will certainly respond differently, as they have not had a chance to learn or update their beliefs.

This dynamic is useful in understanding why states are so slow to respond to certain terrorists and their threats. While states can know of the broad influence of terrorists and other non-state actors (NSAs) in general, without a history of past

---

5Indeed, our methodological instruments may be no more developed than those of meteorologists, who claim that the best predictor of today’s weather is that of yesterday’s, as Guy Whitten likes to point out.

6The ideas of learning and past interaction are difficult to explicate. While, care should be taken when trying to analyze such characteristics, they cannot be ignored. Instead, future research should help explain the microfoundations of such aspects of international interaction and explore how learning and belief updating based on past interaction will affect future interaction. While there has been some research into such processes in state interaction, mentioned above, these processes are difficult to capture, and it is not clear that actual causal mechanisms have been identified. Of course, this is related to the idea of how do we know what we want to know, a topic I will discuss below.
actions, governments cannot be sure how these actors are actually going to act (after-
all, sometimes intelligence is faulty). A prime example of this phenomenon is the
case of U.S. actions toward Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden before September 11th,
2001. As Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed describes, “Western intelligence had been aware of
plans for such terrorist attacks on U.S. soil as early as 1995. Both the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had detailed
information about the possible use of hijack/suicide attacks by terrorists connected
to Osama bin Laden” (Ahmed 2002). It is even more startling that inquiry has also
revealed that the FBI had advance indications of plans to hijack U.S. airliners and use
them as weapons, but neither acted on them nor distributed the intelligence to local
police agencies (Ahmed 2002). While certain pundits (and conspiracy theorists) have
claimed that this was because of an “intelligence failure” or more nefarious agenda by
the U.S. government, the lack of activity or prevention, can be understood through the
framework of past history of NSAs (and additionally, ability—or inability—of actors
to “learn”). Even though there had been previous attacks on American soil by Islamic
terrorists (1993 WTC) none of the U.S. government’s indictments against Osama bin
Laden have suggested that he had any connection with this bombing. Though Osama
bin Laden and his Al Qaeda associates had carried out terrorist attacks in other places,
such as the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, while in port in Yemen, because of his
past (in)action, in the United States, the U.S. government was unable to predict or
prepare for September 11th, 2001. However, after the September 11th attacks, the
United States responded dramatically by restructuring its intelligence practices and
defense capabilities to track down Osama bin Laden and invading Afghanistan and
Iraq, in part to disrupt the Al Qaeda network—given that Osama bin Laden and Al
Qaeda had now established themselves as credible actors on the international stage.
Lack of temporal domain and multi-stage game

Additionally, scholars have tended to study terrorism without its temporal domain, and failing to separate the different stages of terrorism, that of internal and external terrorism.

While there has been an increasingly large amount of research devoted to econometric analyses of terrorism, that which is rooted in International Relations Theory tends to fail in taking into account both domestic and international terrorism. As Abadie (2006) points out “while it is clearly interesting to elucidate the impact of potential policy interventions on the level of international terrorism, the effects of such policies on the overall amount of terrorism, both domestic and of foreign origin, is of importance.” However, instead of exploring both domestic and international terrorism, many scholars (e.g., Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2004) rely on datasets that only cover events of international terrorism—events that involve citizens or property of multiple countries—such as the U.S. Department of State data on transnational terrorist attacks. Though understanding the determinants of transnational terrorism is duly important, without realizing what affect certain attributes have on domestic terrorism, scholarship on terrorism is not able to explore the root causes of terrorism. However, presently there does not exist a commonly used terrorism dataset that deals with both domestic and international terrorism. The compilation of such data would surely be invaluable to the study of terrorism. For the purpose of this paper, I will therefore focus on domestic, or internal, terrorism. I argue that terrorism begins at the local or domestic level, and, only subsequently, when terrorists are unable to reach their goals this way, do they implement goals for international terrorism. As such, in order to understand the root causes of terrorism, I argue that it is important to analyze the nascent terrorism movements—or those
that are at the internal level—as a foundational step in the international relations terrorism research program.

Exploring terrorism at the domestic level is common in strategic analyses of terrorism in international relations scholarship. Indeed, though they often claim to be discussing international terrorism, many of the models being developed in international relations regarding terrorism model such phenomena at the domestic level. For instance, Bueno de Mesquita (2005b) presents a “model of the interaction between a government, a terrorist organization, and a population of terrorist sympathizers in which education or economic opportunity, and opposition to the government play important roles in determining whether an individual volunteers to join a terrorist group.” Likewise Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007), Bueno de Mesquita (2005a), Bueno de Mesquita (2005c), Bueno de Mesquita (2007), and Siqueira and Sandler (2006) focus on models of the domestic determinants of terrorism.

On the other hand, there are many articles that focus on the determinants of transnational terrorism. Li and Schaub (2004) examine the effect of economic globalization on the number of transnational terrorist incidents within countries, concluding that “in general, trade, FDI, and portfolio investment of a country do not directly increase the number of transnational terrorist incidents inside its borders. Economic development of the country and its top trading partners reduces the number of terrorist incidents inside the country . . . ” (Li and Schaub 2004). But what explains these differing effects? Li and Schaub provide no clear logic. Similarly, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) claim that, though tentative, their results “suggest little direct connection between poverty or education and participation in terrorism.” However, they use international terrorism data as their dependent variable, while seeking to explore domestic-level independent variables. As I argue below, this is not logical. Koch and Cranmer (2007), Abadie (2006), and Sandler and Enders (2004) all use domestic
level indicators to explain transnational terrorism, without exploring the temporal dimensions of strategic terrorist. Instead of aggregating all terrorist occurrences and all indicators, it is much more useful to pick apart the different layers of terrorism, as discussed below.

In the same vein, Tarar (2008) develops a formal model of the strategic decisions of terrorists to attack domestic targets versus international targets, however, as with above, he does not provide the terrorist, or opposition group, with a chance to make multiple moves and strategically change tactics. Finally, Powell (2007) explores counter-terrorism resource allocation in protecting against international terrorism, however, he does not fully consider the stage game of domestic terrorism spiraling into international terrorism. As such, the equilibrium analysis of the optimal resource allocation may be misguided.

E. Summary

The preceding pages illustrate that the study of terrorism through the lens of international relations scholarship faces tough challenges in achieving substantively interesting and informative results. While the four key challenges to terrorism research discussed above are some of the most pressing issues, there are surely others which scholars will encounter during their investigations and examinations. However, by accepting the challenges faced and discovering ways to work around them, the discipline as a whole will be better off. Many of the tools and understandings required to understand terrorism and the strategic nature of terrorist actions can be applied to other similar actors, especially other non-state actors. By developing these tools, scholars will be prepared to better understand and evaluate the world as it stands, instead of merely relying on simplifications and assumptions that exclude many of
the intricacies of the international stage. Specifically, by aiding in the escape from the all-encompassing mentality that the study of international politics is solely the study of interstate relations, the field of terrorism studies can lead the way in examining the many ways in which actors other than states influence the way that states interact with each other and with other non-state actors. The study of terrorism is ripe for use of many of the rigorous forms of analysis that have been so well-applied to other issues in international relations. With such an application, not only will the understanding of terrorism greatly increase, but the field of international relations can begin to tackle one of the most salient issues of our time.

With a solid framework for the investigation into the many aspects of terrorism, international relations scholars will not only be able to increase understanding of terrorism and issues involving other non-state actors, but, in developing tools and methodologies for dealing with these increasingly important actors, also be able to contribute to policy and business discussions and implementation. Scholars have made the case for policy-makers to pay more attention to political science, and sought to understand why they do not (Walt 1998). However, instead of merely claiming that “there is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy,” by focusing (some) agendas of research on issues most pressing to policy makers, and accurately examining such issues, scholars will have much to offer (Walt 1998). While it is surely true that policymakers “need theories to make sense of the blizzard of information that bombards [them] daily,” it is also true that these theories must accurately portray the world (Walt 1998). As Walt (1998) claims, “it is hard to construct good theories without knowing a lot about the real world,” it is also hard to know a lot about the world without understanding the specific dimensions and characteristics of the actors involved in the interactions that make up the “real world.” By following some of the suggestions developed in this paper, along with
developing new criteria for high quality future research, the study of terrorism in international relations will make great headway in the years to come.
CHAPTER II

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

While the outward trappings of the international system are still in place, there have been massive changes in how it really operates. Besides the huge increase in the number of nation states, there has been a fundamental change in the type of player involved in international affairs. Nation states still remain the primary actors, but increasingly international actors in the form of the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Community, Organization of African Unity, and a wide variety of nongovernmental organizations are making themselves felt in the international arena. In addition, transnational actors in the form of the media, religious movements, terrorist groups, drug cartels, and others influence international relations. Finally, subnational groups (e.g., the Zulus, the Serbs, the Kurds, and the Palestinians) are attempting to elevate their issues from matters of internal politics to a level of international concern—Retired U.S. Marine Colonel and counterinsurgency specialist Thomas X. Hammes

There is no such thing as the United Nations. There is only the international community [of states], which can only be led by the only remaining superpower, which is the United States... If the UN Secretariat building in New York lost ten stories, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference—Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John R. Bolton

Nation-states are not the only actors that participate on the international stage. However, there have been no systematic attempts to understand the affect of strategic non-state actors (NSAs) on international interaction. In order to develop a logical framework for understanding such interactions—and international relations in general—scholars must address the puzzles of how and why NSAs affect states’ international interactions, and how and why certain NSAs affect the strategic dimensions of the game of international interaction more so than others. While there have been various research programs devoted to understanding the causal processes underlying

---

1 Quoted from Hammes (2004).
2 Quoted from Watson (2005).
specific cases of state-NSA interaction, in the following pages, I argue that a more inclusive and systematic effort to understand the strategic nature of state and non-state interaction will provide interesting insights into the dynamics of this interplay, as well as that of interstate relations. The goal of this paper is not to address a specific research question or hypothesis, but instead develop a useful framework for future research into the strategic dynamics of NSAs.

The essay will proceed as follows: 1) I will first discuss the epistemological foundations for such an argument; 2) Next, I will develop a more inclusive and appropriate definition of non-state actors (NSAs), within a rational-choice framework; 3) In the third section, I will explore five systematic characteristics of NSAs, examine their strategic implications, and offer examples, highlighting how IR scholars can begin to unravel some of the puzzles related to NSAs by examining them along these five continuums; 4) in the final section, I will address avenues for future research and conclude.

A. Epistemological bases for a systematic study of non-state actors

Before moving on to a discussion of the strategic dynamics of NSAs, it is important to establish the epistemological basis for such an undertaking. International relations scholars have made great progress toward better understanding international interaction. Many, if not most, of the leading researchers in the field have moved away from teleological or philosophical debates regarding the ways of the world or

footnote:

3 For instance, see the exemplary discussion of international organizations in Barnett and Finnemore (2004), in regards to terrorism, see Bueno de Mesquita (2005b), Bueno de Mesquita (2005a), Bueno de Mesquita (2005c), Bueno de Mesquita (2007), and Powell (2007); in the realm of economics, see Vreeland (2003) and Stone (2002) discussion of the IMF and Jensen (2006)'s exploration of multi-national corporations; Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Hyde (2007) examine the affects of NGOs, exploring transnational advocacy networks, and international election monitors, respectively.
the international system. Instead, in the past few decades, scholars have devoted themselves to addressing key research questions by examining the causal mechanisms underlying political phenomena and developing falsifiable theory and subsequent empirical results. As a product of such labor, many parsimonious and generalizable theories have been developed and accepted as plausible “middle-range” theory, approximating Kuhn’s vision of “normal science” (Kuhn 1970). However, while many of these theories have proven successful at providing the field with widely generalizable and intuitively-appealing hypotheses, because of their lack of inclusion of NSAs as strategic actors, these theories and models have not identified accurate and credible causal mechanisms that describe the true reasons why dynamics occur in the real world. As such, many of the empirical tests related to these theories have provided unsatisfactory and uninformative results—even though many scholars deem empirical testing vital to producing knowledge and progress in the discipline, as evinced by the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM) movement.5

As MacDonald (2003) discusses, the importance of maintaining “a focus on epistemology is crucial for understanding the scope, purpose, and possibilities of RCT (rational choice theory) in political science.” Such an understanding is also critical in applying rational choice theory to international political phenomena. Using MacDonald’s terminology, much of the present research in international relations—that has focused solely or primarily on state interaction—has fallen under the “instrumentalist-empiricism” epistemology of rational choice theory that has favored “model(s) whose elegance and simplicity allow [them] to generate widely applicable hypotheses” (Mac-

---

4For those still interested, see Keohane (1986) for a good summary of the debate.
5See Clarke and Primo (2007) for a discussion of the pitfalls of blind acceptance of the necessity of empirical testing in political science, and Schultz (1999) for an examination of the failings of broad and general theory to explicate the specific reasons for the democratic peace.
Donald 2003). While this has perhaps been done unintentionally, because scholars have not systematically taken into account the affect of (omnipresent) NSAs on interstate interaction, they cannot credibly claim to have identified the accurate causal mechanisms influencing these relationships.

Research grounded (whether consciously or not) in the instrumentalist-empiricism paradigm certainly has its uses—and these should not be discounted, especially when one examines research as a subset of the broader development of the field of international relations. When the modern study of political science began, there was no clear understanding of the ways in which states interacted, and what influenced such interaction. Indeed, for many years (even to the present), there has been debate as to what the constituent and primary factors affecting international interaction actually are. Only in recent decades have refined approaches identified some of the general, but specific, characteristics influencing state interaction (Bennett and Stam (2004), Mearsheimer (2001)). Such approaches are important in understanding the macrofoundational nature of the international system and the broad questions of “why?”

In order to address the questions of “how?” by identifying accurate causal mechanisms and processes, a microfoundational approach must be pursued. This can be thought of as the next logical step in scientific discovery, as microfoundational approaches can shed new light on broader, more general findings. A “scientific-realism” epistemology encourages such an approach where “the primary standard for the development of theory is accuracy. Theories that clearly specify, describe, and explain the causal mechanisms that operate in a particular situation are superior to those that fail to provide any mechanisms at all” (MacDonald 2003). Thus, understanding the scientific-realism epistemology is important for the study of NSAs, and in

\[6\]

Indeed, one could argue—and (perhaps) rightly so—that the current undertaking falls under such an approach. This issue will be discussed below.
turn, NSAs for any scientific-realism study of international relations for two reasons—closely aligned to the key ways in which scientific-realism differs from instrumentalist-empiricism. First of all, Macdonald points out that “scientific-realism contends that scientific progress is possible only if scientists utilize unobservables, treating causal mechanisms and assumptions as though they operate in the real world.” Secondly, he claims that “scientific-realism points to the fact that the majority of successful scientific theories rely on phenomena that are not directly observable by scientists such as atoms, quarks, or gravity.” Although Macdonald makes such points in discussing rational choice approaches and the idea of rationality, these claims also make sense as applied to NSAs. For far too long, political scientists have argued that although NSAs are certainly important in the international system, any inclusion of them in a general theories of international interaction will lead to undue complexities (Morgenthau (1948), Waltz (1979), Keohane (1984), Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2005)). Others have argued that it is too hard to observable and quantify the systematic affect of non-state actors (Fearon and Wendt 2002). However, under a scientific-realism perspective, inclusion of NSAs is necessary in order to develop precise, higher-quality theory that provides clear descriptions of the microfoundations of international relations. While the effects of NSAs are hard to discern because of research instruments and complexity (and can thusly be thought of as related to unobservables), they still have an important place in political science research. Not only does a scientific-realism approach provide support for exploring NSAs—it necessitates it.

In light of the above discussion, at first glance, such an argument in support of a systematic approach to understanding NSAs as strategic actors in the international system could sound hypocritical. By creating generalized descriptions and assumptions of NSAs, wouldn’t such an approach be following the dictates of instrumentalist-
empiricism while actually claiming to subscribe to the scientific-realism epistemology? Yes—though ultimately, no.

One key point that Macdonald fails to make in his discussion of the lack of clarity in rational choice approaches is that such discord is most likely the result of a major transition in the development of the field of international relations. Scientific discovery is a complex and drawn out process, whereby learning and the development of knowledge takes significant time. Broad, general theories under the rational choice framework were required to create a solid framework and basis for further knowledge. Making the leap from unsupported, teleological theories to logically coherent ones was a massive undertaking in-and-of-itself. However, with the development of such coherent, general theories of state interaction and international politics, scholars are now able to pick apart the broad causal mechanisms to identify the complexities and accuracies of the “true” causal mechanisms in international politics. The differentiation between instrumentalist-empiricism and scientific-realism can be understood not as competing epistemologies but instead, succeeding epistemologies. As such, while inclusion of NSAs is an important step toward microfoundational approaches to international interaction—and thusly compatible with a scientific-realism standard—the systematic approach of making generalizations and defining broad characteristics propounded here is by itself, macrofoundational. However, such an approach is necessary to provide the basis for a future, coherent research program into NSAs, as it endeavors to identify the key aspects of NSAs as strategic actors. Understanding these characteristics will be essential in later uncovering the strategic dynamics of interstate and state-NSA interaction. In the following section, I develop an inclusive definition of strategic NSAs and discuss how current research into various NSAs has been conceptually messy due to the lack of consistency in definitions, approaches, and aggregation.
B. Toward an inclusive definition of non-state actors

I will now clarify what I mean by *strategic* non-state actors. This inclusive definition has two key parts, the first regarding the inclusionary aspect of the concept, the second, the nature of the actors. To begin with, for a systematic approach to understanding strategic non-state actors, the definition must be inclusive of any actor on the international stage that is not a nation-state. This, of course, does not include international treaties (an issue I will discuss momentarily), or actors within the domestic political structure that affect international interaction through direct domestic processes, such as legislatures, voters, bureaucracies, and the like. However, what it *does* include is any actor that influences international outcomes by other means and/or participates on the international stage in a strategic manner. Some common examples include, but are not limited to, international terrorist organizations (i.e. Al Qaeda), international criminal organizations (the Mafia, the Chinese Tung On Gang), nongovernmental organizations and grassroots activists (Green Peace, Amnesty International), international institutions and inter-governmental organizations (the United Nations, the World Bank Group), multi-national corporations (Coca-Cola, McDonald’s), and individual actors (celebrities—such as Angelina Jolie, bloggers—“International Bloggers’ Day for Burma”).

Though some of these groups have been subjected to (varying degrees of) rig-

---

7 The latter have received a great deal of attention as strategic actors, and such research (which can be thought of as complimentary to the current NSA project) has proven useful in developing more elaborate and precise explications of international interactions. For instance see Putnam (1988), Schultz (2001), Milner (1998), and Martin (2000).

8 While most of these actors are easily recognized, International Bloggers’ Day for Burma may be less so. It was a campaign of individual bloggers who joined together to support “peaceful revolution” and democracy in Burma on October 4th, 2007. Over 14,000 participants signed up for the campaign in less than 7 days (Free Burma 2007).
orous analysis individually, by looking at NSAs systematically, scholars can better identify the key characteristics that affect strategic interaction, by comparing across cases. Such an approach will mirror the successful developments in research into state characteristics, and how they affect strategic interaction, as discussed above. As evinced by the development of the study of interstate relations, understanding what attributes affect different processes of interaction is an important first step. Much in the same way that such an understanding informed game-theoretic and other approaches to the study of interstate dynamics, it will be very useful in future research into NSAs. Also, by exploring NSAs in a consistent and coherent fashion, future research can more easily identify appropriate characteristics and their impact on interaction (either by accepting or refuting the claims made within), instead of trying to re-invent the wheel each time one endeavors to research a specific aspect of state-NSA or interstate-NSA interaction (and, as a result, devising slightly different—though largely interrelated—typologies that are unable to be generalized).

Perhaps more importantly, by aggregating NSAs, scholars can have a useful basis from which to make clear distinctions about why and how certain characteristics and related mechanisms actually affect the dynamics of international interaction. As King, Keohane and Verba (1994) point out, aggregation of cases is important in developing a coherent understanding of any phenomenon. While many of these actors have been examined before individually (though not all in a strategic context) through aggregation, scholars can explore the specific characteristics that matter in given instances

---

9For example, in regards to terrorism, see Bueno de Mesquita (2005b), Bueno de Mesquita (2005a), Bueno de Mesquita (2005c), Bueno de Mesquita (2007), and Powell (2007); for nongovernmental organizations see Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Hyde (2007); for international institutions and IGOs see Vreeland (2003), Barnett and Finnemore (2004), Keohane (1988) and Stone (2002); for multi-national corporations see Jensen (2006); for individual actors—especially celebrities—see Drezner (2007). To the best of my knowledge, international criminal groups and many individual types of actors, such as bloggers have not been the subjects of such research.
and unlock the key causal mechanisms underlying their affect on interaction. Current approaches that look at one particular type of NSA cannot possibly accurately identify the key causal mechanisms of such interaction, because there is no true base of comparison. Instead, such studies fall into the faulty research practice of not following the “basic and obvious rule” that selection of cases for a given study “should allow for the possibility of at least some variation on the dependent variable,” especially if the research hopes to draw generalizations, which is often a common stated goal (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). While these studies have provided interesting insight, without an underlying basis for comparison in the study of strategic international interaction, scholars cannot be sure of whether such identified processes and characteristics are inherent to all state interactions, all state-NSA interaction or particular to their given research question and focus. As Simmons and Martin (2002) claim, one of the major weaknesses with the current international institutions research program is the “lack of confidence we have in the ability to draw strong inferences from much of the research to date.” Not only do Simmons and Martin call for greater attention to be paid to the underlying causal mechanisms, but also for “greater attention to research designs that allow for systematic comparisons across time, across states, or across international institutions,” as such systematic research “would greatly enhance our ability to explain the world around us” (Simmons and Martin 2002). By broadening this approach to explore systematic comparisons across all NSAs, as opposed to merely international institutions, scholars will be even better able to identify key characteristics and dynamics of these actors and their relationships. Also, with a greater understanding of such information, political scientists will be increasingly able to accurately classify their research program within a more general framework (instrumentalist-empiricism-type approach) or as an attempt to identify more accurate and specific dynamics (scientific-realism). This, in turn, will increase the quality
of knowledge and further the development of international relations theory. More importantly, though, it will allow scholars to truly understand “what we know” and “what we are trying to know” from a given research project or results (Clarke and Primo 2007).

The second important aspect of the definition of NSAs is that they are indeed strategic actors and not issues or nonstrategic actors. All-too-often, NSAs are treated as issues over which states bargain or actors that do not have any strategic role in the model. They are commonly thought of as merely providing information and/or constraining or enhancing interaction in an unspecified manner.\textsuperscript{11} This is an extremely prevalent phenomenon in the norms literature (see, for instance, Reimann (2006)). In other literature, such as the epistemic community literature or Schultz (2003), NSAs are described as having a strategic role, although the causal processes and actors’ moves are not clearly specified or formalized in the arguments and models. While it makes sense to explore international agreements in an issue-based framework—given that these actually are issues over which states bargain—NSAs are not issue insofar as they have strategic dimensions that affect the dynamics of any interaction (such as preferences over outcomes, actions, histories, etc.).\textsuperscript{12} Such a definition draws heavily

\textsuperscript{10}There have been a few other attempts and arguments for a similar aggregation of NSAs, most notably, Taylor (1984), however, they have not viewed them as strategic actors, discussed their characteristics in light of strategic dynamics, or sought to provide frameworks for further analysis. Additionally, since then, the field of political science has developed many useful tools and methods, and the prevalence of certain related issues, such as terrorism, have drastically increased. For these reasons, a new look is surely warranted.

\textsuperscript{11}For instance, see Milner (1998), Martin (2000), and Schultz (2003) for informational arguments, and the epistemic community (Adler and Haas (1992)) and norms literature (Keck and Sikkink (1998)) for examples of enhancing and constraining attributes of NSAs.

\textsuperscript{12}Of course, and as will be discussed below, during the creation stages of international institutions, they can be thought of as issues over which states bargain. Much interesting headway has been made in the institutional design literature (see for instance Abbott and Snidal (1998) and Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001)), and
upon the claim in Barnett and Finnemore (1999) that international organizations should be treated as “purposive actors...[that] are powerful actors who can have independent effects on the world.” It seeks to expand their claim to be inclusive of all NSAs. While all states (and subsets of states—leaders, legislatures, voters) are commonly endowed with these characteristics in game-theoretic frameworks, without consistently looking at NSAs in a similar fashion, scholars are leaving out vital parts of the causal processes underlying international interactions.

To summarize, an inclusive definition of strategic non-state actors (NSAs) has two vital components: 1) any actor that participates on the international stage or affects international interaction, but is not part of the domestic state structure, and 2) an actor—not an issue—that has the common attributes with which all actors in common game-theoretic models are endowed—i.e. preferences, beliefs, strategies, etc.

In the following section, I will outline the important classification characteristics of NSAs and discuss their notable strategic dimensions.

C. NSA characteristics and their strategic dimensions

Now that I have developed the epistemological and definitional foundations for the systematic exploration of non-state actors, I will turn to the characteristics of NSAs and their respective strategic dimensions, in search of what and how certain aspects of NSAs influence the two puzzles in the introduction.13 Scholars should utilize the

indeed some of it even begins to look at how these organizations function once created affects their design. An interesting research program, drawing on the following characterizations of NSAs could be to explore specifically how the strategic dynamics of IOs once they are actually created, affect the dynamics of their conception.

13 For those of you not expecting to be quizzed on this reading, these were “how and why NSAs affect states’ international interactions, and how and why certain NSAs affect the strategic dimensions of the game of international interaction more so than others.”
following framework of categorization in two possible ways, depending on their research question and approach. On the one hand, these characterizations can take dichotomous, or multichotomous, values. For instance, a NSA can either be related to a state or not, or can either be strong, weak, or middling. On the other hand, and perhaps more usefully, these characteristics can be conceptualized as five separate continuums, where for each NSA’s characteristic \( x_i, x_i \in [0, 1] \). The location on these continuums can inform further inquiry and analysis. While there is certainly some correlation and covariation between them, even that information will provide scholars with interesting information. The important question to ask is: how are these characteristics interesting and useful analytically? In the following subsections, I will provide descriptions of these characteristics, describe their analytical usefulness, and offer examples. It is imperative to think of these characteristics not only as descriptive but also relational and relative—to other NSAs, and more importantly to states.

Such a systematic description of the strategic characteristics of NSAs can be thought of as a complimentary research approach to the literature that explores the strategic dimensions surrounding why and how international institutions (a subset of NSAs) are created in the first place (Abbott and Snidal (1998), Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001)). The current research program assumes that these NSAs exist, and is now seeking to consider their strategic dimensions as actors, not merely creations. As with Frankenstein, the object can be the scientist’s (or states’) logical creation while it is under design and construction, but once life is breathed into it, the institution or organization (or monster) takes on a life of its own. It becomes an actor on the international stage and must be understood and explored as such. Understanding these two facets of international institutions or organizations (their logical creation, and their actions once created) as interrelated, though separate parts of a process of state-NSA interaction is useful.
A further word regarding goals and ideologies of NSA is in order before proceeding. Some may take issue with the following characterization because it does not place NSAs according to their ideologies or goals. Here, I posit that this is not in-and-of-itself a useful way to classify NSAs. Because NSAs can be involved in many different activities, issues, or interest-areas, there can be no standardization or generalization of ideologies or goals. Even the common left-right or democratic-autocratic continuums commonly used for states (or subsets of state actors) do not make particular sense in the case of many, if not most, NSAs. Instead, I claim that the goals, preferences, and ideologies of NSAs are subsumed by the following characterizations. The only assumption that I make, following standard rational-choice approaches, is that NSAs are rational, meaning that actors have complete and transitive preferences over outcomes and choose “the best means to gain a predetermined set of ends” (Morrow 1994).

Relationship to state(s)

Perhaps one of the most easily observed characteristics (in some cases) of NSAs is their relationship to a state(s). This characteristic can take many dimensions, each of which contributes to the strategic dynamics of interaction in varying ways, given that there are many different types of such relationships. NSAs can be creations of states (the United Nations), closely related to states in terms of economics and interests (multi-national corporations), loosely related to the state structure (various NGOs, bloggers, etc.), or completely separate from the state structure (some terrorist organizations). Of course, given the structure of the international system, geographically and territorially, any actor will be located within a nation-state (unless he is out on the open seas or in space—though these frontiers, too, are disappearing). It is im-
portant to think about the relationship in terms of ideological and financial support relationships, and not only in terms of physical location. For instance, considering whether or not an NSA is funded by or ideologically identified with a state can provide much more information than merely locating an NSA on a world map. How then are these distinctions reflected in a strategic setting? I claim that such classifications can provide analytically interesting information of three types: regarding preferences, informational exchange/ asymmetries, and credibility.\textsuperscript{14}

For instance, Abbott and Snidal (1998) have considered how formal international organizations’ relationship to the state structure affects this one type of NSA. They use the encompassing ideas of centralization (closer relationship to state) and independence (further from state) to describe different dynamics of IO interaction.\textsuperscript{15} If an IO is centralized (both in terms of relationship to state and in terms of its organizational structure), the benefits can fall under two headings—“support for direct state interaction (the principal focus of regime theory) and operational activities (the traditional focus of IO studies)” (Abbott and Snidal 1998). If it is independent, “the participation of an IO as a...neutral actor can transform relations among states, enhancing the efficiency and legitimacy of collective and individual actions” (Abbott and Snidal 1998). Applying such a classification to all NSAs can be useful in exploring related dynamics among different types of actors.

It is often the case that if NSAs are creations of the state, or closely related to the state, then the state and NSA can share preferences over given outcomes. For

\textsuperscript{14}Using standard game-theoretic definitions, actors hold complete, transitive, and ordinal preferences over the possible outcomes of a game. See Morrow (1994) for a good introduction to game theory, and for a further explanation of game-theoretic terms and concepts.

\textsuperscript{15}They, of course, also discuss centralization and independence in terms of organizational structure.
instance, consider a multi-national corporation whose interests are closely aligned with those of the home state. If the MNC does well economically, the state benefits because of generated wealth, taxes and job-creation for its citizens. Throughout history, states have often used their foreign policy apparatuses for the benefit of MNCs based in their countries, through the use of trade agreements, negotiation for favorable statuses and protection abroad. Such shared preferences can have differing consequences. While common preferences can lead to a situation of harmony and/or augment coordination, Keohane (1984) points out “discord sometimes prevails even when common interests exist.”

The relationship between NSAs and a state can be an important indicator of cooperation or discord. As Keohane (1984) describes, “the mere existence of common interests is not enough [for cooperation]: institutions that reduce uncertainty and limit asymmetries in information must also exist.” However, instead of considering international institutions or international regimes as institutions that limit such uncertainty, by considering NSAs as actors, scholars are able to understand the characteristics that could lead to higher levels of information transmission, and the strategic dimensions of why NSAs would transmit such information. Even if there are not shared preferences, if the relationship between a given state and NSA tends toward closer on a continuum, the actors in a given situation can be thought to have shared information and larger amounts of “common knowledge.” Such a situation can lead to different strategies or moves than if there were a situation of uncertainty over information, from a lack of relationship—for instance, if there is uncertainty over a NSA’s payoffs from a given outcome. While many authors have described various

---

16It is important to note that in cases where preferences are aligned and actors work together, such a situation is a “harmonious” one, not a situation of “cooperation” which instead “requires active attempts to adjust policies to meet the demands of others” (Keohane 1984).
NSAs as providing information to actors\textsuperscript{17} by understanding the characteristics of the NSA that allow such information transmission, a more in-depth understanding of the causal process can be discerned. This increased common knowledge (along with other attributes, such as capabilities, past history, and veto power—to be discussed below) can also lead to an increase in the credibility of such actors, given that under situations of complete information, actors are better able to lend credibility to certain actions (Fearon 1994).

Moving beyond discord and cooperation, there are other noteworthy dynamics which can arise from shared preferences or beliefs. One surprising result, utilizing Bayesian decision theory, from Calvert (1985) and summarized in Morrow (1994), is that under certain conditions, actors are able to signal greater amounts of information when they share particular biases. This runs counter to the common argument that people should seek out unbiased advice when making decisions. Instead, Morrow discusses how actors often rely on like-biased others when making decisions, a process referred to as “bolstering.” When applied to the case of NSAs, if they share particular biases with states, they may be able to signal greater amounts of information, thereby leading to different outcomes than when they do not. Because states “know” the preferences of these actors (i.e. there is complete information), in situations where NSAs are related, belief updating can play out in this type of way. Consider an inter-governmental organization that has the same general preferences as the members from which it was spawned (the World Trade Organization, for instance). When the WTO strongly disagrees with a certain action of the state and declares it inappropriate, it sends a strong signal because the state knows the NSA’s actual preferences. This is representative of a situation when the WTO passes rulings

\textsuperscript{17}Such as Keohane (1984), Martin (2000), and Milner (1998).
regarding domestic trade barriers, to which states subsequently comply. Of course, this type of information transition also occurs when the actors have diametrically opposed preferences (Morrow 1994). On the other hand, when NSAs are more neutral or when their preferences are not known because of a lesser degree of relationship to the state (or perhaps a loose relationship to many states), the information that it conveyed has little influence over state strategies.

Case one: preparing for fourth-generation warfare

Through a more complete understanding of NSAs’ relationship to states and the state structure, we can begin to unravel puzzles linked to the evolving concept of—and debate over—“fourth generation warfare,” first described in Lind et al. (1989). Tactically, fourth-generation warfare consists of wars fought worldwide across the spectrum of political, social, economic, and military networks in low-intensity conflict situations, and includes tactics and techniques from earlier generations (Hammes 2004). It also involves a mix of national, international, transnational, and subnational actors (i.e. state and non-state actors). What is interesting in the concept of fourth-generation warfare is the relationship between state and non-state actors. As Lind, the father of the idea describes, “in Fourth Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents such as Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the FARC. Almost everywhere, the state is losing” (Lind 2004). An important point distinguishing 4GW from insurgency, though, is that the nonstate actor must have a goal other than simply taking control of the state (Defense and the National Interest 2007).

Specifically then, a puzzle arises as to how and to what extent states should prepare for fourth-generation warfare (i.e. against terrorists and other non-state
actors) while also retaining their ability to engage in more traditional inter-state wars effectively. As military strategist Thomas X. Hammes describes, “the fact that fourth generation war will include elements of earlier generations of war means [state] forces must be prepared to deal with these aspects too” (Hammes 2004). If NSAs remain more closely related to states, the type of war required to defend against them will resemble more traditional interstate war. However, as they move further away, new techniques will need to be developed. As Lind points out, “How could the Defense Department’s concept of ”Transformation” be redefined so as to come to grips with 4GW… the current ”Transformation Planning Guidance” put out by DOD… is all oriented toward fighting other state armed forces” (Lind 2004). As terrorists and other violent NSAs move on the continuum from closely related to the state to further afield, states combating terrorism will have to adjust their technologies and capabilities. However, at the same time, they will need to remain prepared for more traditional interstate conflicts. Thusly, the puzzle—which has spawned much debate—is how states, with limited resources, can appropriately do both. To date, however, there has been no strategic logic developed to address this problem.

Studying this puzzle through the lens of political science could take much the same structure as Powell (2007). However, instead of considering distribution of scarce resources between possible terrorism targets, scholars could consider the strategic dynamics of choosing to allocate these resources between defending against state and non-state targets. While such a model would be more complex, considering a simple game of three players; two states and one NSA, perhaps in a zero-sum game, could offer interesting insights.\(^\text{18}\) In order to do so, it will be necessary to understand the basic dimensions of this characteristic—how violent NSAs are related to the state

\(^{18}\text{The model and equilibrium analysis of this game are outside the scope of this paper—perhaps another future research topic.}\)
structure—and how this dynamic is changing.

Capabilities

The credibility of NSAs is also closely related to their capabilities and resources.\footnote{For simplicity’s sake, I will assume that resources directly translate into capabilities, although understanding the dynamics of how they do so is surely valuable, though, it is outside the scope of this paper.} These can either be perceived or actual, given that depending upon the relationship to state, history of past action, and veto power (to be discussed below), it is possible for states to receive better information as to a NSA’s actual capabilities. In an interstate context, capabilities—whether actual or perceived—have been shown to greatly affect the expected utility of and responses to certain actions. Many long-standing theoretical traditions in international relations have focused on how the capabilities of states has affected their interaction, including (but not limited to) balance of power arguments, deterrence, power transition, hegemonic stability, systemic power concentration and movement, and expected utility theories.\footnote{For a good summary see Bennett and Stam (2004).} Additionally, scholarship has also focused on perception of capabilities as important in strategic relationships (Jervis (1976), Levy (1983)). Given the centrality of state capabilities to international relations theory, it makes sense that more attention is due to examining this characteristic of NSAs. For instance, it is obvious to think that if a NSA is stronger, it will surely be paid more attention to than a weak actor. Additionally, if NSAs have better resources and capabilities, then they are most likely able to partake in a greater magnitude of (successful) activities on the international stage.

Of course, these dynamics can work both ways, and relative state capabilities can influence NSA behavior. Such a process is described in economics literature in the in-
stance of multi-national corporations by Murtha and Lenway (1994). In this article, Murtha and Lenway provide a framework for exploring how governments’ capabilities and organizational structures affect multi-national corporations’ international strategies and organizational structures. They examine how the state’s capabilities to organize and motivate the complex organizational structure of its political and economic institutions to take concerted action affect MNCs. Murtha and Lenway point out how certain states are “capable of causing firms to change their strategies and organizational structures in ways that genuinely increase international competitiveness [whereas] others appear only capable of forbidding firms, particularly home firms’ competitors, from making investments” or taking other action (Murtha and Lenway 1994). A systematic understanding of how capabilities (and organizational structure—to be discussed in the next section) of NSAs, in turn, influence state behavior would greatly advance understanding of international interaction.

Case two: unsubstantiated reliance on NSAs

An interesting conundrum exists in international interaction: why do states rely on non-state actors to act or react to many of the most important and serious issues that face the international community, even though in most cases states have much greater capabilities? Many scholars have posited that NSAs allow states to coordinate action through some form of information transfer (Keohane (1984), Martin (2000), Milner (1998)). Thusly, states rely on NSAs when they could not accomplish coordination on their own. While this is certainly the case in some situations, understanding it in relationship to the dynamics of capabilities is important. When NSA have insignificant capabilities, they can best serve states as intermediaries described above. However, when NSAs are strong and/ or have vast resources, or know-how, there
is a different dynamic whereby states actually rely on NSA capabilities to perform certain actions. For instance, consider the know-how and resources of Doctors without Borders or the World Bank Group, respectively, and how they play a vital role, where states would not be able to do so.

Though, it appears that sometimes the capabilities of NSAs are misperceived, leading to a misunderstanding of what their key function for state assistance can and should be. A prime example of this is how states rely on NSAs (such as the UN, INTERPOL, or World Health Organization) to provide response capabilities for terrorism and criminal activities, because the states do not have the resources (or interest) to deal with these problems on their own. An interesting instance of this was a United States and Switzerland co-governmentally sponsored workshop for IGOs and NGOs, whereby these NSAs were to learn how to respond to bioterrorism events, given that many states were deemed to be relying upon them to coordinate action and provide responses. As pointed out in a briefing on this bioterrorism response exercise, through previous exercises and governmental discourse “it has also been very clear that some nations around the world intend to rely heavily on support of international organizations to respond to bioterrorism. If called upon to respond to bioterrorism, international organizations would quickly be involved in an intense and prolonged multisectoral effort with a broad range of international organization partners” (Crumpton 2007). As such, this exercise was deemed necessary in “promoting greater inter-organizational understanding of mandates and available capabilities, while looking for opportunities to leverage resources and support collaborative efforts among organizations as well as between organizations and national governments.” Interestingly enough, the exercise confirmed the misperception of NSA capabilities. The first recommendation made following the exercise was that “because of finite resources among international organizations, nations should increase their own capacity
to prevent and respond to bioterrorism” (Crumpton 2007). Given that states can (and do) misperceive NSA capabilities, it becomes more apparent why they may rely on NSAs, even when it seems counterintuitive. This example also shows how NSA misperception of their own capabilities could equally lead them to take on actions and responsibilities that they can not handle. As shown, understanding these various effects of capabilities can help scholars better recognize the strategic dynamics at play and address key puzzles.

Organizational structure

Another common attribute of states used to explain international interaction, which can also offer important insights into NSAs, is organizational structure. Many scholars have explored how the organizational structure of states is important in influencing international interactions. For instance, Fearon (1994), Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2002), and Schultz (2001), have shown how different organizational structures allow states to credibly commit to certain actions or convey useful information in varying levels. Reiter and Stam (2002) have shown how state structure allows different levels of mobilization in wartime. Others have argued that state structure and resulting bureaucracy affects the speed of state interaction on the international level (see Gaubatz (1996)). Finally, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) have shown how organizational structure affects the preferences and hence strategies of states’ leaders, through use of the selectorate theory.

All of these discussions can and should translate to any investigation of NSAs. For instance, NSAs can be thought of as on a continuum from simple to complex

---

21 Also interesting was the fact that NSAs were found to even misperceive their own capabilities, as another recommendation was that “International organizations should evaluate their bioterrorism response capabilities and systems to pinpoint potential areas for creative collaboration with other organizations.”
organizational structure, where single actors such as celebrities are at one end, and more complex entities such as MNCs or large transnational criminal organizations are located near the other. Another interesting way of exploring this characteristic is to discern how constrained the NSA is by its organizational structure. MNCs and other NSAs with large bureaucracy or winning coalitions could be thought to be constrained in similar ways that states are, whereas actors with more amorphous constraints, such as certain terrorist organizations or individual actors are not.\textsuperscript{22} As such, related interactions would have different dynamics.

Outside of political science, some contemporary research has focused on how emerging organizational structures of NSAs will affect their relationships with states, in fields as diverse as policy analysis (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001) to computational and mathematical organization theory (Dombroski and Carley 2002). For instance, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) discuss how new networked organizational structures have affected the strategic dynamics of actors as diverse as terrorists, criminal organizations, gangs, ethnic extremists, and civil-society activists (such as cyber-activists or WTO protestors). They discuss three specific types of networks; 1) the chain or line network, where end-to-end communication must travel through the intermediate nodes; 2) the hub, star, or wheel network, where a set of actors are tied to a central node or actor, and must go through that node to communicate and coordinate with each other; and, 3) the all-channel or full-matrix network, in which each member of the organization is connected to everyone else (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001). Each of these types are suited for different tasks and interactions, and various hybrids of

\textsuperscript{22}Of course, certain terrorist organizations would have larger winning coalitions. These actors could be thought of as having winning coalitions that include citizens in the nations where they operate or from which they draw their recruits, funds, support, etc.—though this dynamic could be explored in terms of the group’s relationship to the state (and its subsets).
these network types can also be organized. Additionally, there may be combinations of networked and more traditional hierarchical forms of organization; “for example, traditional hierarchies may exist inside particular nodes in a network. Some actors may have a hierarchical organization overall but use network designs for tactical operations; other actors may have an all-channel network design” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001). Arquilla and Ronfeldt rightly argue that in order to understand the strategic dynamics of emerging NSAs, it is imperative to understand these complex organizational structures. By applying similar logic to all NSAs in international relations discourse, scholars will be able to better understand the effects of organizational structure and its related strategic dynamics on state-NSA or interstate interaction.

Case three: Greenpeace’s growing pains

An interesting way of exploring the differing organizational characteristics and their affect on NSAs’ actions and interactions is in looking at how the structure of an organization leads to its ability to act in counterintuitive ways. If NSAs are viewed as merely issues or only in terms of capabilities, then it would be puzzling as to why certain smaller NSAs can have much more dramatic influences on the international system than would be suspected. However, by exploring the organizational structure of NSAs, scholars can better identify a different dynamic. Considering the case of the nongovernmental organization Greenpeace offers interesting insights. Greenpeace was first founded in 1971 in Vancouver, Canada to oppose the U.S. testing of nuclear devices in Alaska. Soon, their actions and message spread worldwide, and a loose and unformal collection of groups that identified with such interests was formed. Greenpeace became well-known for its revolutionary methods of protestation. For instance, “In 1972 the yacht Vega a 12.5-metre ketch owned by David McTaggart of Greenpeace
sailed in an anti-nuclear protest into the exclusion zone at Mururoa in French Polynesia to attempt to disrupt French atmospheric nuclear testing” (Greenpeace 2007). However, Greenpeace soon ran into financial difficulties and various members lobbied to accept a new structure which would bring the scattered Greenpeace offices under the auspices of a single global organization. On October 14, 1979, Greenpeace International came into existence. Under this new organizational structure, the local offices would contribute a percentage of their income to the international organization, which would take (along with the money) responsibility for setting the overall direction of the movement. While this transformation was claimed to “enable [Greenpeace] to apply the full force of its resources to a small number of environmental issues deemed of global significance,” it was a controversial move, because the actions and goals of the formerly loosely assembled members became significantly constrained. David McTaggart, a spokesman for Greenpeace international summed up this approach in a 1994 memo: “No campaign should be begun without clear goals; no campaign should be begun unless there is a possibility that it can be won; no campaign should be begun unless you intend to finish it off” (Greenpeace 2007). While this shift in organizational structure allowed Greenpeace to bolster its capabilities, it also affected the dynamics of its actions.

*Past action on the international stage*

A NSA’s past action on the international stage can be thought of, in game-theoretic terms, as a subset of the “history” of a broader game of international interaction. This history consists of the complete sequence of moves that precede a given decision point or node, and contains information as to what each actor did during these previous moves (Morrow 1994). This history can provide players in the game with
information as to how its opponents have acted in the past. Such information can then be utilized to update beliefs about opponent’s characteristics, such as preferences or capabilities. In the political psychology tradition, these past interactions and beliefs about characteristics have been theorized to lead to attribution of reputations to actors (primarily states) (Mercer 1996). These reputations, in turn, affect how other actors perceive and interact with these states. Although the evidence for specific claims about reputation building may be suspect, the idea of reputation on the international stage is appealing (Rosen 1997). Likewise, other research has focused on the idea of learning from past international interactions (Keohane 1988). All of these ideas support the claim that past behavior has some affect on future behavior in international interactions, even if the precise causal mechanism is unclear at the present stage of scientific development.  

As I have similarly argued above, this type of state characterization should also be applied to NSAs.

Past interactions can signal credibility and provide state actors with information about the NSA’s preferences or capabilities. When there is incomplete or imperfect information because of a lack of previous interaction, or varied past actions, states or other NSAs would be unsure how to act and cannot base decisions on this history. For instance, if a NSA has had past action on international stage, more information is bound to be known—such as their methods of interaction or stated goals, whether because states have been able to directly observe these actions or states have sought out further information (i.e., when a state’s intelligence agencies focus more attention on a terrorist organization after they have committed a terrorist act, an example discussed below). If the NSAs fall on the side of the continuum where there is little

---

23 Indeed, our methodological instruments may be no more developed than those of meteorologists, who claim that the best predictor of today’s weather is that of yesterday’s, as Guy Whitten likes to point out.
history, states will certainly respond differently, as they have not had a chance to learn or update their beliefs.\textsuperscript{24}

\textit{Case four: The U.S., Al Qaeda, and the influence of past actions}

This dynamic is useful in understanding why states are so slow to respond to certain NSAs and their threats. While states can know of the broad influence of NSAs in general, without a history of past actions, governments cannot be sure how these actors are actually going to act (after-all, sometimes intelligence is faulty). A prime example of this phenomenon is the case of U.S. actions toward Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden before September 11th, 2001. As Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed describes, “Western intelligence had been aware of plans for such terrorist attacks on U.S. soil as early as 1995. Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had detailed information about the possible use of hijack/suicide attacks by terrorists connected to Osama bin Laden” (Ahmed 2002). It is even more startling that inquiry has also revealed that the FBI had advance indications of plans to hijack U.S. airliners and use them as weapons, but neither acted on them nor distributed the intelligence to local police agencies (Ahmed 2002). While certain pundits (and conspiracy theorists) have claimed that this was because of an “intelligence failure” or more nefarious agenda by the U.S. government, the lack of activity or prevention, can be understood through the framework of past

\footnote{The ideas of learning and past interaction are difficult to explicate. While, care should be taken when trying to analyze such characteristics, they cannot be ignored. Instead, future research should help explain the microfoundations of such aspects of international interaction and explore how learning and belief updating based on past interaction will affect future interaction. While there has been some research into such processes in state interaction, mentioned above, these processes are difficult to capture, and it is not clear that actual causal mechanisms have been identified. Of course, this is related to the idea of how do we know what we want to know, a topic I will discuss below.}
history of NSAs (and additionally, ability—or inability—of actors to “learn”). Even though there had been previous attacks on American soil by Islamic terrorists (1993 WTC) none of the U.S. government’s indictments against Osama bin Laden have suggested that he had any connection with this bombing. Though Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda associates had carried out terrorist attacks in other places, such as the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, while in port in Yemen, because of his past (in)action, in the United States, the U.S. government was unable to predict or prepare for September 11th, 2001. However, after the September 11th attacks, the United States responded dramatically by restructuring its intelligence practices and defense capabilities to track down Osama bin Laden and invading Afghanistan and Iraq, in part to disrupt the Al Qaeda network—given that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda had now established themselves as credible actors on the international stage.

Veto power

The final characteristic of NSAs to be discussed is that of veto power. Drawing loosely on the concept of veto players developed by Tsebelis (2001), the veto power of NSAs has important influences on the international strategic setting. Tsebelis defines veto players as individuals or collective actors who have to agree on a proposed policy change in order for it to come into effect (Tsebelis 2001). These players “are specified in a country by the constitution (the President, the House, and the Senate in the US) or by the political system (the different parties members of a government coalition in Western Europe).” A special class of veto players, are “agenda setters.” As Tsebelis explains:

In addition, political institutions sequence veto players in specific ways in order to make policy decisions. The specific veto players that present take it or leave it proposals to the other veto players have significant control over the policies that replace the status quo. I call such veto players agenda setters. Agenda setters have to make proposals acceptable
by the other veto players (otherwise the proposals will be rejected and the status quo will be preserved). In fact, they will select among the feasible outcomes the one they prefer the most. As a consequence, agenda setting powers are inversely related to policy stability: The higher policy stability (smaller the set of outcomes that can replace the status quo), the smaller the role of agenda setting. In the limit case where change from the status quo is impossible, it does not make any difference who controls the agenda” (Tsebelis 2001).

I argue that this framework can and should be applied generally to NSAs, and that such analysis will lead to interesting and novel findings. The idea of veto players has been applied by Tsebelis and others to very specific instances of NSAs; the European Union (Tsebelis and Garrett 2001) and the European Parliament (Tsebelis 1994), though such work has not carried over into further inquiry. While closely related to capabilities and relationship to states, a NSA’s ability to act as a veto player over interstate or state-NSA interaction has a strong influence on the dynamics of these relationships. Of course, there are many different ways in which a NSA could exercise this type of power. Examples include anything from the use of protests (grassroots activists), to formal reprimands (the United Nations), and from decisions to withdraw or invest in a country (MNCs) to acts of violence (terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations). The ability of NSAs to respond with a veto to a given situation or interaction, whether known, perceived or hypothesized, will affect the strategic dynamics of any interaction, much as it does in domestic political systems. While NSAs are not appointed as veto players or agenda setters by the domestic political system, as described above, given their capabilities and relationship to states (and perhaps even past history or organizational structure), they can be thought of as being informally specified veto powers based on their part and role in the international system.

Additionally, the agenda-setting ability of NSAs is likewise important. Previous scholarship has suggested the influence of various subsets of NSAs as agenda setters,
including the epistemic community literature (Adler and Haas 1992) and norms literature (Keck and Sikkink 1998). As Keck and Sikkink (1998) describe, advocacy networks “generate attention to new issues and help set agendas when they provoke media attention, debates, hearings, and meetings on issues that previously had not been a matter of public debate.” They claim that understanding the ability of these advocacy networks to participate in issue creation and agenda setting is vital to assessing the influence of these actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Similarly, Adler and Haas (1992) describe how “epistemic communities influence policy innovation by 1) framing the range of political controversy surrounding an issue, 2) defining state interests, and 3) setting state standards.” They further describe the agenda-setting and veto power of epistemic communities as follows:

> In the case of a specific issue-area—such as postwar economic management, arms control, pollution control, or regulation in trade of services—how governments think of interests, policy objectives, and ways of conducting policy coordination depends on how they conceive of the context in which particular efforts must be made. By identifying the nature of the issue-area and framing the context in which new data and ideas are interpreted, epistemic communities bound the range of collective discourse on policy, as well as guide decision makers in the choice of appropriate norms and appropriate institutions within which to resolve or manage problems” (Adler and Haas 1992).

The above combinations of formal and informal understandings of veto players and agenda setters, in domestic politics and as applied to certain NSAs, can provide a useful characterization when applied generally to NSAs, writ large. By thinking about NSAs along a continuum of these two properties, scholars can pinpoint another influence on the strategic dynamics and causal mechanisms of international interaction. Further, if researchers can identify the values of veto power and agenda-setting ability, as well as other above characteristics, such as capabilities and relationship to states, a much richer and accurate picture of international politics can be drawn. As Tseblis describes, “if we know the preferences of veto players, the position of the sta-
tus quo and the identity of the agenda setter (the sequence of moves of the different actors) we can predict the outcome of the policymaking process quite well” (Tsebelis 2001).

*Case five: Amnesty international and agenda setting*

The agenda-setting properties of NSAs are clearly evident in a 2005 Amnesty International report entitled, “Amnesty International 2005: Putting Human Rights on the Agenda” (Beeko and Bartlet 2005). Within this report, the authors discuss the challenges that Amnesty International faces in setting the international agenda to have a greater focus on human rights. The report describes how, “since 1961 Amnesty International has worked to raise public awareness of human rights violations, victims and human rights defenders worldwide. AI may take credit for having drawn the world’s attention to numerous cases and for helping to organise rapid and widespread reaction and resistance as well as addressing general issues of concern” (Beeko and Bartlet 2005). Interestingly however, given their goal, the report also describes how they have been unable to really set the international agenda on human rights. Though Amnesty International is well organized, and funded, the fact that they do not have any veto power means that their agenda-setting power is all but useless.

A telling example of the agenda setting and veto power of NSAs is the ability of terrorist organizations to respond to states’ policies. For instance, the 2004 Madrid train bombings are largely thought of as a retaliation for Spain’s presence in Iraq. Not only did the bombinsg raise the issue of Spain’s presence (leading, as some analysts claim, to the Spanish population’s ouster of the the government at the time), but it also was a show of the veto power of Al Qaeda over the interstate interaction. Likewise, hostage-taking situations by terrorist organizations can also be thought of as
agenda-setting and casting a veto of governments’ policy—although it is not clear that this veto is as potent, judging by many governments’ unwillingness to negotiate. As evinced, it is important to understand how differing abilities of terrorist organizations and other NSAs to set agendas and exert veto power over state actions lead to varying state (and substate) responses.

D. Future research and conclusion

The above discussion has meant to provide a useful framework for future research into the influence of non-state actors on international interactions. While there has been an increasing amount of scholarship into various types of NSAs, there has been no general and systematic approach to understanding the key characteristics that influence the strategic dynamics of NSA action and interaction. Of course, the above five characteristics, while important, are surely not the sole defining features of these dynamics. Though, by taking these characteristics into account, scholars can elucidate processes that might not seem clear and begin to explain puzzling interaction between states and non-state actors, or inter-state interaction where NSAs play some key role (almost all of them). Although these classifications are intricately related, by picking apart their component pieces, interesting insights can be gained, which instead might have been overlooked, as shown in the case studies. Future research into the true explanatory value of these characteristics, as well as others, is warranted. This paper will hopefully serve as a frame of reference for future insight and refutation. More importantly, however, it is my hope that this paper will convince its readers of three key NSA aspects: 1) that in order to understand the true and accurate causal mechanisms of international interaction according to a scientific-realism epistemology, scholars must account for the presence and strategic dynamics of non-states actors;
2) non-state actors can no longer be thought of as merely issues, and must instead be considered to be strategic actors—endowed with the qualities that all strategic actors possess in game-theoretic and rational-choice frameworks; and, 3) a general understanding of the characteristics that affect the strategic interaction of NSAs (along the lines of an instrumentalist-empiricist epistemology) is necessary before scholars are able to identify specific causal mechanisms and processes of differing types of actors.

It is also my hope that this paper serves to ignite a sustained and systematic investigation into non-state actors. While I have identified broad generalizations in this paper, in the future, these claims must be substantiated. Before proceeding to such stages however, scholars must do some serious thinking as to how we will know when we actually know something, and what the appropriate means of generating evidence will be. We must design models and, perhaps later, empirical tests, that directly and appropriately address the proposed characteristics and strategic dynamics of the NSAs to be explored. The above discussion, along with other theoretical approaches and methods in international relations and political science, can serve as a framework to utilize in addressing more specific puzzles regarding NSAs, and in identifying true causal mechanisms underlying international interaction as a whole.
A FORMAL MODEL OF TERRORISM

A. The model

In the model there are three actors; a Home Government (HG) (who is a nonstrategic actor in the model), an opposition group in that country (OG), and a foreign nation A (A) who has a strategic interest in the nation. Following the model in Tarar (2008), there exists a one-dimensional policy space that represents the set of policies that the home country will implement. Nation A’s ideal point is normalized to 0. The Home Government’s ideal point lies to the right of Nation A’s, with the OG’s falling even further to the right, as depicted in Figure 1.

![Fig. 1. One Dimensional Policy Space and Ideal Points from Tarar (2008)]

Again, following Tarar (2008), “At the end of the game whichever group is in power in the [home] country (the incumbent government or the opposition group) enacts its ideal point, and hence (assuming Euclidean preferences) [Nation A’s] utility for the incumbent government remaining in power is [-HG] (the negative of the distance between [Nation A’s] and the [HG’s] ideal points), and its (lower) utility for the opposition group coming to power is -OG.”

Figure 2 depicts the game’s moves.

In the first move of the game, similar to Tarar (2008), nation A chooses how much support to provide to the home government. The more aid that is provided, the less likely a (terrorist) attack by the opposition is to remove the incumbent home
government. Thusly, $p$ is conceptualized as “the probability that any attack on the [home] government will fail” (Tarar 2008). After observing Nation A’s allotment of $p$, the opposition group (OG) decides whether or not to attack the home government. This is where the game diverges from Tarar’s model. If the opposition group decides not to attack, the game ends, with the payoffs being those from the incumbent government remaining in power for both Nation A and OG. Note that the incumbent Home Government’s preferences do not matter, as it is not a strategic actor.
On the other hand, if OG decides to attack the incumbent Home Government, the attack’s success or failure is determined by the parameter $p$; with probability $p$ the attack results in failure (i.e., the Home Government remains in power), and success (removal of the Home Government) with probability $1-p$. Only, after the failure of the attack on the Home Government, will the OG face the decision whether or not to attack Nation A, the supporter of the Home Government. Following Tarar’s model, if Nation A is attacked, the Home Government remains in office, however, Nation A pays a cost $C_A > 0$. The opposition group gets a benefit $b_{OG} > 0$ for attack Nation A, thus making its overall utility $(HG - OG) + b_{OG}$. I follow Tarar’s interpretation of the parameter $b_{OG}$ a benefit related to “the opposition group’s inherent utility for attacking [Nation A] (e.g., if it regards [Nation A] as an infidel or anti-Muslim, or if an attack will rally more supporter to its side; e.g., Lake (2002)), or it can represent a benefit from a decreased likelihood that [Nation A] will support the foreign government in the future.” Although, of course, neither in Tarar (2008) nor here is this future modeled.

B. The analysis

Given that this model is an extensive-form game with complete information, I use backwards induction to determine the subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) (Morrow 1994). At its final decision node, OG will always choose to attack Nation A. This is because the payoff for attacking, $(HG - OG) + b_{OG}$, is strictly greater than that for not attacking, $(HG - OG)$. This makes sense substantively, given that OG’s attack on the Home Government failed, HG will remain in office, so the least OG can do is to save face by attacking Nation A and gaining the benefit payoff $b_{OG}$, while at the same time possibly affecting the probability that A supports HG in the future (not modeled
here). Moving up the game tree, OG’s payoff from failure is \( p((HG - OG) + b_O G) \) and its payoff from success is 0, keeping in mind that (HG-OG) is a negative number. In other words, failure is only better than success at the domestic level, if the benefit from attacking international far outweighs the fact that OG still has to live under the regime of HG. Turning now to OG’s first decision node, it’s payoff from not attacking the home government in the first place is (HG-OG), and its expected utility of attacking the Home Government is \( p((HG - OG) + b_O G) + (1 - p)0 \). Therefore, for OG to attack at its first node, \( p((HG - OG) + b_O G) \geq (HG - OG) \). This can be simplified as \( p \leq p^* = \frac{OG - HG + b_O G}{OG - HG} \). That is, OG attacks the Home government, as long as its probability of failing is sufficiently low, or \( p^* \leq \frac{HG - OG - b_O G}{HG - OG} \). Note, however, in the complete information version of the game, OG will always attack the HG given that \( p((HG - OG) + b_O G) + (1 - p)0 \) is always greater than \( (HG - OG) \) no matter what the value of \( p \) is.

Note also that here, unlike Tarar’s model, \( p^* \) is strictly positive. This is because \( b_O G > 0 \) and thusly the numerator is always less than the denominator, and given that they are both always negative, this means that the fraction always has a positive value. Therefore, there is no “Anti-[Nation A] Equilibrium” in the model, as there is in Tarar’s game. In Tarar (2008) if \( p^* < 0 \) the critical value of \( p \) simplifies to \( b_O G > OG - HG \), or in other words, when the inherent benefit from attacking [Nation A] is significantly high, then “the opposition group chooses to attack [Nation A] even if it is certain to be successful against the foreign government (i.e., even if p=0).” However, I argue that this is merely an artifact of his set up, which is shown by the equilibrium analysis of my model. Substantively, I claim that instead of opposition group’s being able to rationally attack Nation A, without first targeting the Home Government does not follow the historical record. Instead, as I will show in my case studies, the opposition group first attempts to remedy its situation domestically (the
easier solution), and only after failing does it strategically assess the other actors who are influencing its inability to defeat the Home Government (as modeled here).

Given that under complete information, OG will always attack the HG, and Nation A always has the ability to influence OG’s decision to attack Nation A (no “Anti-[Nation A] Equilibrium” as described above), the results that follow prove striking. Given that the OG will always attack Nation A if it fails domestically, Nation A makes its calculations based on its expected utility from being attacked versus having the incumbent government overthrown by terrorist attacks and no attack on A. Given that in the model here, and in Tarar (2008) $p$ carries no direct cost to Nation A, it directly follows that A will only consider offering $p_m in = 0$ or $p_m ax = 1$ in the complete information variant of this game. Therefore, A will offer $p = 1$ if and only if $-HG - c_A \geq -OG$. In other words, A will offer full assistance to the Home Government if and only if the expected utility from the Home Government remaining in office (entrenched through Nation A’s support), which in turn, causes the OG to attack Nation A, is greater than or equal to the expected utility of the opposition group obtaining office, through terrorist attacks on the Home Government. This result is similar to Proposition 3 in Tarar (2008), the “Fear of the Alternative Equilibrium.” If this condition does not hold, $-HG - c_A < -OG$, Nation A will offer no support to the Home Government. Finally, this equilibrium does not require the equilibrium conditions to be based upon the inequality $c_A > bOG$, which does not make much sense, given that there first portion is part of A’s payoffs structure and the second, part of OG’s. Instead, in my model, A and OG’s strategic decisions are based upon their own payoffs.

While counterintuitive, this interesting result provides a very nice formal description of reality. In this model, Nation A will support the Home Government, even if it will suffer the cost of a terrorist attack, if it believes it will be worse off
from allowing the opposition group to come to power. One need not look far into the historical record to see that this type of strategic thinking and acting is commonplace in international interactions. Consider, for instance, U.S. support of unpopular foreign regimes, mainly out of fear that the alternative would be worse. Because of this support for the foreign regimes, the U.S. has fallen victim to many terrible terrorist atrocities around the world. However, the U.S. deems supporting these rulers of critical enough importance to remain supportive and face the prospect of future terrorist attacks.

The model and analysis also posit that Nation A does not choose to “induce an attack against the foreign government” instead of itself” as in Tarar’s model. Instead, opposition groups do not base their decision to attack a home government on outsiders’ actions. If the situation domestically is bad enough (HG is far enough OG) OG will attack HG, and will not be deterred by Nation A’s participation. Thusly, Nation A’s decision to invest support determines, whether their attack will be successful or not (once OG has made the decision anyway) and whether or not OG decides to turn against Nation A as well. In other words, by getting involved, Nation A enters into an already bad situation and decides whether or not to prop up a government that is unpopular with OG anyway, and if so, whether it is worth doing so at the price of facing attacks by the OG itself. Unfortunately, this is reminiscent of U.S. engagement with many unpopular regimes around the world.

This model, while including the “Fear of the Alternative Equilibrium” from Tarar (2008), modifies the ideas behind why and at what juncture Nation A would be forced to choose to support a Home Government, providing interesting results. Also, it provides a more nuanced view of the strategic nature of the opposition group’s decision making and targeting processes. By allowing a multiple stage game, the model more directly reflects reality. Opposition Groups do not attack Nation A
merely because they derive positive benefit from it, but because their first option has failed *after which* it allows them to derive some benefit, even though they have failed at their primary objective. While there may be some instances where this model is not realistic, in many instances it seems plausible.
CHAPTER IV

TESTING THE IMPLICATIONS OF A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF TERRORISM

A. Relevant literature

While there has been an increasingly large amount of research devoted to econometric analyses of terrorism, that which is rooted in International Relations Theory tends to fail in taking into account both domestic and international terrorism. As Abadie (2006) points out “while it is clearly interesting to elucidate the impact of potential policy interventions on the level of international terrorism, the effects of such policies on the overall amount of terrorism, both domestic and of foreign origin, is of importance.” However, instead of exploring both domestic and international terrorism, many scholars (e.g., Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2004) rely on datasets that only cover events of international terrorism—events that involve citizens or property of multiple countries—such as the U.S. Department of State data on transnational terrorist attacks. Though understanding the determinants of transnational terrorism is duly important, without realizing what affect certain attributes have on domestic terrorism, scholarship on terrorism is not able to explore the root causes of terrorism. However, presently there does not exist a commonly used terrorism dataset that deals with both domestic and international terrorism. The compilation of such data would surely be invaluable to the study of terrorism. For the purpose of this paper, I will therefore focus on domestic, or internal, terrorism. I argue that terrorism begins at the local or domestic level, and, only subsequently, when terrorists are unable to reach their goals this way, do they implement goals for international terrorism. As such, in order to understand the root causes of terrorism, I argue that it is important to analyze the nascent terrorism movements—or those that are at the internal level—as
a foundational step in the international relations terrorism research program.

Exploring terrorism at the domestic level is common in strategic analyses of terrorism in international relations scholarship. Indeed, though they often claim to be discussing international terrorism, many of the models being developed in international relations regarding terrorism model such phenomena at the domestic level. For instance, Bueno de Mesquita (2005b) presents a “model of the interaction between a government, a terrorist organization, and a population of terrorist sympathizers in which education or economic opportunity, and opposition to the government play important roles in determining whether an individual volunteers to join a terrorist group.” Likewise Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007), Bueno de Mesquita (2005a), Bueno de Mesquita (2005c), Bueno de Mesquita (2007), and Siqueira and Sandler (2006) focus on models of the domestic determinants of terrorism.

On the other hand, there are many articles that focus on the determinants of transnational terrorism. Li and Schaub (2004) examine the effect of economic globalization on the number of transnational terrorist incidents within countries, concluding that “in general, trade, FDI, and portfolio investment of a country do not directly increase the number of transnational terrorist incidents inside its borders. Economic development of the country and its top trading partners reduces the number of terrorist incidents inside the country . . . ” (Li and Schaub 2004). But what explains these differing effects? Li and Schaub provide no clear logic. Similarly, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) claim that, though tentative, their results “suggest little direct connection between poverty or education and participation in terrorism.” However, they use international terrorism data as their dependent variable, while seeking to explore domestic-level independent variables. As I argue below, this is not logical. Koch and Cranmer (2007), Abadie (2006), and Sandler and Enders (2004) all use domestic level indicators to explain transnational terrorism, without exploring the temporal
dimensions of strategic terrorist. Instead of aggregating all terrorist occurrences and all indicators, it is much more useful to pick apart the different layers of terrorism, as discussed below.

In the same vein, Tarar (2008) develops a formal model of the strategic decisions of terrorists to attack domestic targets versus international targets, however, as with above, he does not provide the terrorist, or opposition group, with a chance to make multiple moves and strategically change tactics. Finally, Powell (2007) explores counter-terrorism resource allocation in protecting against international terrorism, however, he does not fully consider the stage game of domestic terrorism spiraling into international terrorism. As such, the equilibrium analysis of the optimal resource allocation may be misguided.

In order to truly understand the strategic decision-making of terrorists, and henceforth the reactions of domestic and foreign governments in counter-terrorism strategies, it is imperative to combine these two trends in the literature, to explore how domestic terrorism can lead to international terrorism, and to pinpoint the direct relationship. For international relations scholars, understanding this connection will provide a wealth of knowledge when it comes to terrorism’s affect on international interaction (and vice versa). By building off of the model in Tarar (2008), below, I show that a further extrapolation provides greater insight into terrorists’ decision-making procedures. Now, I turn to a discussion of my theory in greater depth.

B. Theory

The strategic decision to use internal terrorism differs from that to use transnational terrorism. Under a rational choice framework, actors decide upon actions that will give them the highest expected utility, given the available information. At the nascent
stages of terrorism and unrest—what from here out I will refer to as the “root stages” of terrorism, actors will base their decision on personal factors. Actors will be more likely to instigate terrorism at the root stage, if they personally are suffering hardship. Their decisions will not be based on their own country’s standing on the international stage, global economic patterns, and the like, at this stage. Instead, they will base it on personal hardships. If they are unhappy with their living situation, they will rise up against their government. While this unrest can take many forms, whether they be coup de’tats, revolutions, or terrorism, for the purpose of this paper, I will focus on terrorism. Thusly, at this stage it is personal indicators that matter most.

Only if terrorism at its root fails, will terrorists then strategically consider why such terrorism has failed. At this point, they will begin to consider what other actors or relationships influence their leaders and governments. Only here will terrorists’ decisions to act be based upon broader, macro-economic patterns, or international interaction and relationships. This latter stage is what most studies of terrorism in international relations literature have focused upon to date.

Consider the simple stage game depicted in Figure 3 (a simplification of the game in the previous chapter):

Fig. 3. The Terrorism Stage Game
As shown in Figure 3, the terrorist group first decides whether or not to attack or not attack its own government. Only after a failure, would the terrorists then consider attacking a foreign government. This mirrors very closely what has been found in the actions and manifestos of various terrorist organizations. For instance, consider the case of terrorism in Saudi Arabia. As early as 1979, a number of Islamic militants took over the Masjid al-Haram in Mecca, in an event commonly known as the “Grand Mosque Seizure,” to protest the policies of the House of Saud (Benjamin and Simon 2002). Though the Saudi government instituted new measures to better enforce Islamic code, and a way of life more in line with the Islamic fundamentalists wishes, the latter were not satisfied. As such, these militants turned to the foreign governments supporting the House of Saud. Not until February 23, 1998, did the so-called World Islamic Front, issue the infamous statement, entitled “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.” This statement from Osama bin Laden, and other Islamic militant leaders purported to be a religious ruling, or fatwa, requiring the killing of Americans, including civilians and members of the military. In this document Osama bin Laden claims that the Americans have “come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors” (World Islamic Front 1998).

Thusly, while as broad macro-level relationships would be predicted to affect decisions to choose international terrorism, micro-level effects would affect decisions to attack domestically initially. Previous research in international relations has focused on the transnational brand of terrorism, without considering first the domestic determinants. Because of a lack of available data on terrorism failure or success, at this juncture, I cannot test my theory completely. However, at this point, I will test the preliminary stage, or what I have defined as the root causes of terrorism.

I will test the following hypotheses:
• $H_1$ : Decreases in individual-level well-being indicators will lead to increases in the number of domestic terrorist events per year.

• $H_2$ : Decreases in national well-being indicators will lead to no change in the number of domestic terrorist events per year.

I will test both of these hypotheses against their respective null hypotheses: (1) ($H_{O1}$) individual-level well-being indicators have no influence over the number of domestic terrorist events per year, and (2) ($H_{O2}$) national well-being indicators will lead to a significant change in the number of domestic terrorist events per year. In the following section, I will discuss my operationalization of the hypotheses.

C. Data and statistics

*Dependent variable: TWEED*

In order to operationalize $H_1$ and $H_2$, my dependent variable will be the number of terrorist events per country per year. These data were drawn from the “Terrorism in Western Europe: Event Data (TWEED)” dataset (Engene 2007). As discussed above, this dataset covers internal terrorism. Terrorism is regarded as internal when “terrorists act within their own political systems. Terrorists originating from outside Western Europe but committing acts of terrorism inside the region, are excluded” (Engene 2007). This dataset considers both actions initiated by terrorist groups or non-state agents, as well as events directed against these actors by the government. For this paper, the latter are dropped. The TWEED dataset covers 18 Western European countries. In the TWEED dataset, “terrorism is understood theoretically as a form of violence that uses targets of violence in an indirect way in order to influence third-party audiences” (Engene 2007). During coding, this theoretical definition was
used in conjunction with a list of other specific types of events that are typically considered to be potential acts of terrorism, including bombings, explosions, rocket attacks, abductions, shootings, sieges, armed attacks, arson, and similar violent actions. Such actions were only included when they were “judged to be cases of indirect violence employed to influence third parties” (Engene 2007). For this paper, I reduce the sample to 15 nations in Western Europe, between the years of 1960 and 1999, based on data availability.

Why events data? Why Europe?

While event datasets are often problematic, most commonly used terrorism datasets in international relations fall into this category, such as the commonly used ITERATE (or International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) dataset—given the lack of other (better) alternatives. Therefore, in this paper, I follow the trend in international relations scholarship of using such datasets, fully cognizant of their shortcomings.

Additionally, I focus on Western Europe in my paper for three reasons, one substantive and two data-related. Substantively, Western Europe provides an interesting case for terrorism, because it is not as commonly linked with terrorism, and religious terrorism explanations. Of course, whether or not this region is indicative of other regions would be an interesting question for future research, although at this juncture such data is not readily available. This leads into the data-related selection of Western Europe. First of all, the TWEED dataset (which focuses only on Western Europe) is one of the only available datasets on internal terrorism. Secondly, in terms of the independent variables—to be discussed below—measures for Western Europe are much more reliable (and available) than those for other regions, in terms of both individual-level and national level variables.
Independent variables

For $H_1$ the independent variables are measures of individual-level well-being. These consist of GDP per capita in terms of 1995 U.S. dollars, and infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births, both drawn from the World Bank for the relevant country years (World Bank 2001). For $H_2$ the independent variables are measures of national well-being. These consist of the nation’s level of democracy for that given year, operationalized as a Polity score ranging from -10 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic), drawn from Polity IV (Marshall 2007), along with FDI as a percentage of GDP and annual percentage growth—both drawn from World Bank statistics (World Bank 2001). Finally, I control for population.

Statistics

The statistical method employed is a random effects negative binomial regression. I employ a negative binomial regression model rather than a Poisson model because of over-dispersion of the dependent variable (Long (1997) and Koch and Cranmer (2007)). I utilize a random effects model in order to control for country specific effects without having to create additional specific variables or controls.\footnote{I also estimated the model using a fixed-effects approach rather than random-effects approach. The results do not differ substantively, indicating that the results are robust to the choice of estimator.} The result from this test are displayed in Table 1.
Table I. Determinants of Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equation 1: Number of Terrorism Events</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>-0.0000525** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>0.031* (0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Democracy</td>
<td>-0.016 (0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual GDP Growth</td>
<td>-0.029 (0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
<td>0.006 (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.000** (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.879 (1.506)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 358
Log-likelihood: -851.431
\( \chi^2_{(6)} \): 45.628**
Likelihood-Ratio Test: 97.84**

Significance levels: †: 10%  *: 5%  **: 1%
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

A. Results

Table 1 presents the results of the random effects negative binomial regression for 15 Western European countries between 1960 and 1999. The upper portion of the table contains the independent variables related to $H_1$, the second portion, those for $H_2$, the third contains controls. The results provide striking evidence in support of the hypotheses. The coefficient on GDP per capita, the first measure of individual-level well-being, is statistically significant at the 1 % level and in the expected direction. As GDP per capita (or well-being) increases, the predicted number of terrorism events decreases. Similarly, the coefficient on the second measure of individual-level well-being is statistically significant at the 5 % level and in the predicted direction. As infant mortality goes up (or well-being decreases) the number of predicted terrorism events increases. These results both support the rejection of the first null hypothesis, $(H_{O1})$, that individual-level well-being indicators have no influence over the number of domestic terrorist events per year, and thusly the acceptance of $H_1$.

Turning to the national well-being indicators, the independent variables related to $H_2$, none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Thusly, I can also reject the second null hypothesis, $(H_{O2})$, that national well-being indicators will lead to a significant change in the number of domestic terrorist events per year, and accept $H_2$. Finally, the coefficient on the control for population is statistically significant at the 1 % level and in the expected direction. As population increases, the number of terrorist events increases.
B. Discussion

The results present a clear picture of determinants of internal terrorism. Personal well-being indicators matter, whereas national level factors do not. Individuals who decide to engage in terrorist activity strategically base their decision to act on their surroundings and standing. If citizens are happy with their way of life, their economic status, and health, they do not engage in terrorism. When discontent, they seek to remedy that with terrorism. An important question for future research would be to investigate why individuals turn to terrorism instead of using standard political institutions, given that the statistical tests show that terrorism events are not influenced by varying democratization levels. Additionally, as evinced by the data on terrorism occurrence, shown in Figure 4, terrorism is not as rare as commonly thought. Thusly, it cannot only be thought of as a last resort, or political tool for those severely disenfranchised.

While some might contend that it is hard to disaggregate personal from national well-being indicators, this test provides an important first look into their differing effects. If more data were available, future research could focus even further on these differing trends. For instance, another confirmatory test of the hypotheses in this paper would be to further disaggregate individual-level versus national well-being indicators by region or city within nations, and then compare this to incidence of terrorism. Doing so would resolve the problem of trying to derive personal-level data from national aggregates, which is, of course, problematic when one seeks to compare it to actual national-level data.

Another important next step would be to compare these results to a test of the determinants of international terrorism. If the results from such a test showed that personal well-being had a significant effect and national-level indicators had a
significant effect, this would be the strongest support of my theory. Of course, the best such test would involve a time variable that looked at international terrorism following domestic terrorism. If such a test resulted in these results, it would further prove that terrorists start at home, and when they can’t accomplish their ends, turn abroad—especially when the position of their nation in terms of global economy and security is worsening. However, even if a test showed personal well-being significant and national-level indicators insignificant (much like my results here) this would also support my hypothesis (if the test involved a temporal dimension) because it would also show that terrorists turned elsewhere if they did not accomplish their ends.

If the results of further testing showed that personal well-being had no significant effect on international terrorism, whereas national-level well-being did, the conclusions would not be as clear. If the terrorists had used domestic terrorism to increase their
personal well-being, and then used international terrorism, after the increase had occurred, such results would seem to contradict my theory. However, this might not be the case. Instead, I would posit that this would merely show that in some instances of international terrorism a different causal mechanism is at work than in the events which cause domestic terrorism. Of course, all of these issues would have severe policy implications, and further research is certainly due.

C. Final concluding remarks

While further investigation into this area is surely warranted, the results from this paper suggest stark evidence for insight that citizens engage in terrorism domestically based on their own personal well-being. This provides a more nuanced view of the determinants of terrorism, rather than lumping international and domestic terrorism into one category, and personal and national well-being indicators into another. By piecing apart the causal mechanisms of domestic terrorism, scholars can develop a more rigorous view of terrorism as a strategic action. Furthermore, by creating models of terrorism behavior in which there are multiple decision nodes, a greater amount of information about the strategic decisions can be gained. As with other models in political science and international relations, loosening the restriction that actors move once and only once, besides being a more realistic assumption, can also allow researchers to develop more plausible causal mechanisms and processes. When it comes to terrorist strategy a somewhat spliced version of W.C. Field’s words holds true,¹ “If at first you don’t succeed. Try, try again . . . There’s no use in being a damn fool about it.”

¹The actual quote reads “If at first you don’t succeed. Try, try again. Then quit. There’s no use in being a damn fool about it.” However, when it comes to personal livelihood and well-being, quitting might certainly seem to be the foolish option.
By better appreciating the temporal nature of terrorism’s strategic dimension, scholars will also be able to develop more useful policy prescriptions. Though econometric studies of transnational terrorism carry their own weight, the previously understudied causes of internal terrorism, which one might perhaps believe to be more of a comparative study, has prime importance for international politics. Key players in the “Global War on Terror” have sought to include allies, in their offensives, and to build coalitions to combat the scourge of terrorism. While countries are sometimes interested in forming alliances to assist friendly nations, scholars have determined that nations are more commonly interested in pursuing their own interests (Mearsheimer (2001) and Snyder (1971)). Furthermore, recent scholarship have shown that alliance pledges are not upheld when it is not in the leaders interest to do so (Mearsheimer 2001). In terms of terrorism—and, more importantly, its affect on international interaction—exploring internal acts will have far-reaching consequences on alliances and elsewhere. Crucial for understanding when nations will be willing to join in such coalitions, is an understanding of when they will be subject to threats of internal terrorism—acts that directly affect such nations’ primary interests. As such, a study which explores the determinants of internal terrorism is not only imperative for examining the root, or first stage, causes of terrorism writ large, but it is also vital to understanding when such nations will join in the formation of coalitions to fight against terrorism.

Additionally, a greater understanding of the differing determinants of domestic terrorism and international terrorism will lead to a more comprehensive and appropriate counter-terrorism strategy, both domestically and internationally. In order to counter terrorism, nations must not only fight and kill terrorists, but also remedy the root causes. This paper suggests that at the domestic level, nations which are better able to provide for individuals’ well-being are less likely to fall victim to terrorism.
Assisting domestic governments to fulfil these needs, as well as encouraging them to do so, may be as effective in stemming international terrorism, by ending it at the domestic level, as more militarily-based counter-terror strategies.
REFERENCES


Crumpton, Henry A., Ambassador. 2007. “Black ICE (Bioterrorism International Co-
ordination Exercise) Briefing.” http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/07/79413.htm,

http://www.dni.net/.

Terrorist Network’s StructureGraduate Student Best Paper Award, CASOS 2002


Engene, Jan Oskar. 2007. “Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe: The TWEED

Fearon, James. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of Interna-

Fearon, James and Alexander Wendt. 2002. Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skep-
tical View. In Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas

burma.org/.

Relations.” International Orgainization 50(1):103–139.


VITA

Abram Wil Paley received his Bachelor of Arts in Individualized Studies from New York University in May 2007. He entered the Political Science program at Texas A&M in August 2007 and received his Master of Arts in International Relations in December 2008. His research interests include political methodology, non-state actors in international politics, game theory, diplomacy and conflict studies.

Mr. Paley may be reached at Department of Political Science, c/o Dr. Ahmer Tarar, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4348. His e-mail address is apa-ley@politics.tamu.edu.

The typist for this thesis was Abram Wil Paley.