

**GERMAN IMPERIALISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY**

A Dissertation

by

NILES STEFAN ILLICH

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

December 2007

Major Subject: History

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ABSTRACT

German Imperialism in the Ottoman Empire:

A Comparative Study. (December 2007)

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The conventional understanding of German expansion abroad, between unification (1871) and the First World War (1914), is that Germany established colonies in Africa, the Pacific Islands, and to a lesser degree in China. This colonialism began in 1884 with the recognition of German Southwest Africa. This dissertation challenges these conventionally accepted notions about German expansion abroad. The challenge presented by this dissertation is a claim that German expansionism included imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire. Although the Germans did not develop colonies in the Ottoman Empire, German activity in the Middle East conformed closely to the established model for imperialism in the Ottoman Empire; the British established this model in the 1840s. By considering the economic, political, military, educational, and cultural activities of the Germans in the Ottoman Empire it is evident that the Ottoman Empire must be considered in the historiography of German expansionism.

When expanding into the Ottoman Empire the Germans followed the model established by the British. Although deeply involved in the Ottoman Empire, German activity was not militaristic or even aggressive. Indeed, the Germans asserted themselves

less successfully than the British or the French. Thus, this German expansion into the Ottoman Empire simultaneously addresses the question of German exceptionalism.

DEDICATION

To my brother—a finer friend I will never have.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

All of my scholarly interests and accomplishments have the same origin—a paper I wrote in 1995 on the Nazi Party in Mexico. Professor Arnold Krammer accepted me as a project and permitted me to do as much research as I could; before this project I had never heard of the National Archives. My friendship and relationship with Professor Krammer has prospered since that original project, and I am saddened that the conclusion of this dissertation will mean that I am no longer one of his students. In addition to a wonderful relationship with Dr. Krammer I have also benefited from the friendship, guidance, and demanding requirements of my other committee members. Among those, I owe a particular debt to Professor Bob Shandley who discussed dissertation topics with me for almost a full year and did far more than I could have expected from a committee member from an outside field. Professor Shandley was always willing to lunch, whether we were in Germany or College Station, and discuss the dissertation. I am also indebted to Professor Chester Dunning who permitted me to work closely with him on Early Modern Europe, and who constantly provided me with intellectual and academic challenges. Further, Professor Dunning trusted me enough to tell me about the “other side” of academics. We discussed topics ranging from personality conflicts to the always difficult academic job market. The purpose of these discussions was sometimes to help me avoid problems, but more frequently to help me understand what I was getting myself into as I prepared for an academic career. Lastly, I want to thank my friend Professor Hank Schmidt. Not only have I taken numerous classes from him, but I always enjoyed talking with him about fly-fishing and the Southwest.

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A graduate education is a luxury, and I would not have been able to enjoy this luxury without the support of my family. My parents made a financial and emotional investment in my academic career, and I could not have accomplished it without them.

My sister did a better job pretending to be interested in my research than anyone else, and I am enjoying her real interest in my legal career. I lived with my brother for almost my entire doctoral program, and there is no one with whom I would rather be than him. Thanks for everything brother.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Article one hundred-fifty five of the Treaty of Versailles, which is located in a section of the treaty devoted to German interests in China (articles 128-134), Egypt (articles 148-154) and other such territories, reads as follows:

Germany undertakes to recognize and accept all arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers may make with Turkey and Bulgaria with reference to any rights, interests and privileges whatever which might be claimed by Germany or her nationals in Turkey and Bulgaria and which are not dealt with in the provisions of the present Treaty.

The reference to “any rights, interests and privileges whatever might be claimed by Germany” attests to the unusual imperial relationship that existed between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. In spite of this obvious historical reference to the German relationship with the Ottoman Empire, historians have largely ignored German activity in the Ottoman territories. Thus, this dissertation is a polemic against the conventional historiographic understanding of German imperialism.

Traditionally, historians of German colonialism (there are very few historians who consider themselves to be historians of German imperialism, almost all such historians use the term colonialism) see the latter as a process begun with Bismarck’s recognition of German claims in what became German Southwest Africa (1884). Moreover, these historians see German colonialism principally in Africa, but also in China, and the islands of the Pacific (but generally nowhere else). This dissertation

This dissertation follows the style of *Diplomatic History*.

argues that such an understanding of German colonialism is unnecessarily narrow and even a distortion. As an example of this expanded notion of imperialism, this dissertation uses the Ottoman Empire, and, specifically, a comparative study of British and German activities there.

The notion that colonies are necessary for colonialism/imperialism to exist is a relic of the eighteenth-century and, in the nineteenth-century, a poor test of imperial activity. Instead, by the nineteenth-century, many of the European powers (and increasingly the United States) extended themselves into foreign territories and countries without the ambition to settle them or to establish colonies. Rather, in many such circumstances (of which the Ottoman Empire is certainly one), the Powers preferred not to formally colonize the territory, but instead to control it only to the point necessary to achieve specific goals. Indeed, in the Ottoman Empire, the cumulative consequence of a system of treaties reached between 1774 and 1856 prohibited any of the Powers from establishing colonies in the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire (peripheral territories, such as the European territories of the Ottoman Empire and parts of North Africa, were viewed differently). In the case of the Ottoman Empire this interest in control began with the British, who sought to secure the “overland” route between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, as the most important route for communications between London and India. The British formally established themselves in Gibraltar (1830) and in Aden (at the mouth of the Red Sea) (1839), securing two of the three possible “choke points” between London and India, before they established themselves in the Ottoman Empire. In establishing this overland route, the British created a model of imperialism

that all of the Great Powers, including Germany, used to extend imperialism (and in some cases colonialism) into the Ottoman Empire.

As this dissertation considers German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, it does so by first considering the international conditions that required the British to overcome their reticence to establish themselves as an imperial power in the Ottoman Empire. After explaining the international conditions that compelled the British to overcome their hesitancy to extend into the Ottoman Empire and the system of treaties that prohibited the formation of formal colonies, the dissertation then considers the specific model of imperialism that the British developed for the Ottoman Empire. This model is important to the history of modern¹ imperialism in the Ottoman Empire because it became the accepted method for imposing imperial desires on the Ottoman territories without upsetting the European balance of power. This British imperial model did not initially include formal colonies (in the principal areas of the Ottoman Empire, obviously it did include colonies in peripheral Ottoman territories, such as Aden), as the British did not make Egypt a “protectorate” until 1914, but instead dominated the Ottoman government (Sublime Porte) without formally imposing a system of colonialism on it. However, the British, like the rest of the Great Powers, had positioned themselves for the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and, when it fell, the Great Powers (who were already established there) became colonial powers (except for the obvious examples of Germany, which lost all of its colonial and imperial territory, including the territory in the Ottoman Empire, after the First World War, and Russia whose Revolution prohibited imperial expansion).

¹ The historiographic question of when modernity arrived in the Middle East is interesting and considered in the footnotes of Chapter II, however it is sufficient here to note that historians of the Middle East conventionally (but not universally) agree that the modern era begins in 1800.

Understanding this model is important for two additional reasons: first, the British model provided the Germans with an established and accepted method to impose themselves on the Ottoman Empire; second, British Imperial historiography recognizes this activity in the Ottoman Empire as imperial (whereas historians of German colonialism do not, in spite of the strong parallels between the activities of the two).

Some historians have considered this imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, and other places, as “informal imperialism.” This term is intentionally rejected in this dissertation, because, it is the contention of this dissertation that the imperialism that developed in the Ottoman Empire, by both the British and Germans, was both quite formal and intentional. However, this imperialism did differ from that of earlier periods. What has confused historians and other scholars is the lack of colonies in the principal areas of the Ottoman Empire. Somehow, without the immediate establishment of colonies the imperialism in these areas becomes “informal,” and thus less than the imperialism or colonialism of earlier periods (and in German history such areas are completely absent from the historiography leading to the general conclusion that all German imperial activity was colonial; such a position has distorted some of the arguments about the nature of German colonialism). What scholars often fail to consider is the long imperial incubation that occurred in the Ottoman Empire. While the Great Powers did not establish colonies immediately, by the early 1920’s, the victorious powers had formal colonies in the Ottoman Empire.

Instead of using a diluted definition of imperialism (such as “informal imperialism”), I contend that the international conditions had changed by the time the Germans and the British sought to establish themselves in the Ottoman Empire. These

new international conditions made the actual development of colonies undesirable, and, instead, emphasized the extension of influence (even dominance) without colonies (which were seen as a burden, both financial and logistic). These international conditions changed again after the First World War (because of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the new importance of petroleum, which had been discovered in Ottoman territories in the earliest years of the twentieth-century).

The British model for imperialism in the Ottoman Empire (which the Germans appropriated almost without change, albeit less successfully) extended British control over three principal areas of the Ottoman Empire: first, financial (involving loans to the Ottoman government, railway construction, port construction, and trade); second governmental (instituting changes to the Ottoman governmental system to facilitate the ability of the Sultan to control his empire and for the Europeans to oversee his activities); and, third, cultural (the British model brought Ottoman treasure back to the “mother” country to “teach” imperialism to the citizens). The Germans adopted the British model of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s, but never advanced it as far as the British did (with the possible exception of the appropriation of artifacts, the Pergamon Altar in Berlin is one of the greatest treasures taken from the Ottoman Empire).

Although this dissertation considers both German and British imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire, it is not a history of either. Rather, this dissertation is a polemic which contends that the Germans established a formal imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire. The principal goal of this dissertation is to convince the reader that it is worth considering whether Germany had an imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire and how this imperial activity might be accommodated within the historiography of German

colonialism. This dissertation shows the German imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire comparatively, by first establishing the British model of imperialism and illustrating that this British activity is included in the historiography of British imperialism. Once British imperialism in the Ottoman Empire has been established, the dissertation contends that the Germans developed an imperial system that paralleled (intentionally) almost every aspect of British imperialism in the Ottoman Empire (even if the Germans were less successful). The dissertation then asks, if the activities of these two powers were almost identical (although differing in intensity and success) and one (the British) is recognized as imperial, then why is the second example (German) not understood as the same?² Further, the dissertation questions the position of colonies in the Ottoman Empire, had the Germans won the First World War, it is entirely reasonable to expect them to have established colonies in the Ottoman Empire.

Consequently, this dissertation challenges the conventional understanding of German imperialism in two important ways. First, the dissertation confronts the conventional view that the German empire began in 1884; and, second that the German Empire existed only in Africa, China, and the Pacific Islands. This dissertation will show that German imperialism began significantly earlier than 1884, at least the 1870s, and that German imperialism existed beyond this narrow list of German colonial territories. Moreover, the dissertation concludes by considering the implications of including the Ottoman Empire in the historiographic arguments concerning German imperialism. It is expected that the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire will help “normalize” the German imperial experience.

² No effort is made to deal with the logical question, was British activity in the Ottoman Empire imperial. That has been addressed in the historiography of British imperialism.

There is no archive that produced a cache of documents that prompted this reconsideration of German imperialism; rather, this dissertation relies on generally well-known documents and archival sources that are quite familiar to scholars. Indeed, much of the material included in this dissertation is intentionally secondary. The reason for this is to illustrate that the argument presented here is not radical, because the materials considered here are conventional and well accepted by the community of German colonial historians. The primary archival material for this dissertation has been taken from the records of the British Foreign Office and the German Foreign Office; these are supplemented by contemporary publications addressing British and German imperialism. Although scholars are well acquainted with the records reviewed for this dissertation, this dissertation differs from earlier studies because of its comparative context, and the attempt to understand imperialism based on nineteenth-century terms rather than contemporary ones (as well as the obvious inclusion of the Ottoman Empire).

The second chapter of the dissertation discusses the historiography of German colonialism and the reasons why scholars have focused on colonies as the important test of German colonialism. This chapter attempts to provide some meaning to the difficult words colonialism and imperialism. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that the use of these terms must be considered relative to the historical period that the words are being used to describe. Consequently, there can be no useful universal definition of colonialism or imperialism; instead, scholars can only define these terms by qualifying them, such as “nineteenth-century imperialism” or “seventeenth-century colonialism,” which were quite different. Moreover, notions of imperialism are based (frequently) on the European imperial experience; however, imperialism occurred within the Ottoman

Empire without European participation, such imperialism differed importantly from European imperial activity. Further complicating an understanding of these terms is the problem that they differed, not only based on the people imposing the imperial system, but also because of the geographic location where this imperialism was being imposed. Imperialism in the Ottoman Empire differed significantly from imperialism in Africa or the Arctic (which occurred concurrently with the extension of imperialism into the Ottoman Empire). Thus, this dissertation contends that scholars must be even more specific, using increasingly detailed qualifiers like “nineteenth-century European imperialism in the Ottoman Empire” if they seek a meaningful definition of the term.

Using the definitions from the second chapter concerning the meaning of imperialism and colonialism, Chapter III treats the general conditions of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries that led the European powers, and specifically Britain, to impose this specialized form of imperialism on the Ottoman Empire. The chapter contends that the parallel rise in the importance of the “overland” route between London and India and the possibility of the Russians moving into Constantinople compelled the British to exert themselves as an imperial power in the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, the chapter emphasizes the threat that the Egyptian ruler (although technically Egypt remained part of the Ottoman Empire) Mehemet Ali and the French expansion in North Africa posed to the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire. These threats required the British to establish themselves in the Ottoman Empire and to impose their “reluctant imperialism.” However, the chapter also explains why the international conditions of the period prohibited the British from establishing a traditional or formal imperial system (a series of treaties signed between 1774 and 1856 aimed at maintaining the European balance of

power). The chapter concludes in 1838 with the British ascension to the position of the strongest European power in the Ottoman Empire, but does not describe the specifics of the British model of imperialism that the Germans appropriated thirty-five years later. The importance of understanding the specific reasons for the establishment of the British imperialism on the Ottoman Empire is that these conditions defined the manner in which the British could impose themselves on the Empire. Because the Germans copied the British model so closely, such an understanding concurrently explains German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the same factors that limited the British remained in place when the Germans began imposing themselves on the Ottoman Empire.

The fourth chapter explains the elements of the British model of imperialism. The model of British imperial influence in the Ottoman Empire has been divided into three components, each concentrating on a specific imperial goal. The three divisions of the British model for Ottoman imperialism are: commercial relations, British influence in the government of the Ottoman Empire (including British military influence), and the “teaching of imperialism” to the people of Britain. Each of these sub-topics is addressed in detail, and they are the basis for comparing British and German activity in the Empire. In comparing the German and British imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, these will be the specific topics considered.

Chapter V explains the rise of German financial influence in the Ottoman Empire, and the concurrent decline of the British. As the first element in the British model, this aspect of German and British imperialism has received significant attention from scholars. Specifically, this chapter considers the use of loans and the construction of

large capital projects (such as the Anatolian and Baghdad Railway, ports, etc.) to increase the Sultan's ability to administer his own territories but also to assert European influence in the Ottoman Empire. The principal actor in this imperialism was *Deutsche Bank*; however, its directors were hesitant to invest heavily in the Ottoman Empire, only the direct involvement of Kaiser Wilhelm II convinced them to extend the loans. Further, the chapter describes the new governmental administrations that permitted the European Powers (principally Germany, Britain, and France) to assert their influence in the Empire and the conditions that caused the British to reduce their influence, thus permitting the Germans an opportunity to become increasingly involved.

Chapter VI is a specific consideration of German involvement in the governmental administration of the Ottoman Empire. While the previous chapter addressed the involvement of the Germans in the financial aspects of the Ottoman government, this chapter describes the German effort to bring the Ottoman military to the standards of nineteenth-century European armies, both through training and through arms sales. Because the Ottoman government did not separate military and civil duties, influence in the military had immediate political consequences. Further, the chapter considers the growth of German influence in the Ottoman Empire that developed from Kaiser Wilhelm's two visits to the Near East. As the first sitting monarch to visit Constantinople, where he declared himself to be the protector of the world's Muslims, Wilhelm's visit to the Ottoman Empire catalyzed the German position in the Ottoman Empire.

The seventh chapter examines German cultural imperialism. Specifically, this chapter considers the German appropriation and display of Ottoman artifacts, as well as

the growing interest in teaching “Oriental” languages and the influence of “Oriental” architecture in nineteenth-century Germany. Moreover, the chapter also considers the interest in archaeological discovery and the importance related to it (both in Germany and internationally). The work of Heinrich Schliemann, as well as the discovery of the Pergamon Altar and the Ishtar Gates, made Germany one of the premiere centers for the study of Ottoman artifacts. Further, a discussion of the ability of the German public to see these artifacts (in the context of the work of Glenn Penny and Suzanne Zantop) will also be included.

Chapter VIII will conclude the dissertation and is specifically intended to incorporate the Ottoman Empire into the historiography of German imperialism. Many of the debates about German imperialism and German political affairs identify Germany as an aberration; however, this dissertation contends that the Germans were well within the recognized imperial activity of the period (and possibly even less aggressive than the French or the British). Additionally, the historiography of German imperialism discusses topics such as the motivation for the “sudden rise” in German colonial activity in 1884. This dissertation contends that this rise was neither sudden nor in 1884. Thus, the conclusion of this dissertation is devoted to reassessing the historiography of German colonialism and questioning the established historiographic debates.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF GERMAN COLONIALISM: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL

The British historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote a book entitled *Germany's First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885*.³ Published in 1938, the historiographical parameters of German colonialism had already been established, but the title of Taylor's book provides a succinct glimpse into the unreasonably rigid geographical and chronological boundaries of German colonial historiography. These boundaries have artificially restricted the discussion of German imperialism or colonialism⁴ to the period between 1884 and 1918 and to Africa, the Pacific, and to a lesser degree China. While there is no doubt that these territories developed into German colonies, it is important to consider that German imperial ambitions and activities existed beyond the narrow geographical and chronological boundaries that historians, such as Taylor, traditionally accept.

While it is overly simplistic to attribute this lack of a broader understanding of German colonialism to the writings of one historian, the work of Mary Townsend (the first historian to address German colonialism after 1918) provided a context that later historians largely embraced, especially regarding the geographic and chronological definitions of what constituted German colonialism. Her first book, *The Origins of*

³ A.J.P. Taylor, *Germany's First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885: A Move in Bismarck's European Policy* (London: MacMillian and Co., 1938).

⁴ It is important to define these terms, but for introductory purposes their general meaning is sufficient; and for this same purpose they will be used interchangeably. A latter section of this chapter is dedicated to differentiating between these words and providing a specific meaning for them. Nearly all historians who study German imperialism consider themselves German colonial historians, and rarely use the term imperialism.

Modern German Colonialism, 1871-1885, concludes with a chapter entitled “The National Inauguration of Colonialism,” where she contends that German colonial efforts culminated in the transformative year of 1884-1885.⁵

The conventional historiography of German colonialism does not include a debate concerning the question of what constituted German colonial territory; instead, historians have generally accepted the contention that Africa, the Pacific islands, and China comprised the entirety of German imperial territory. This lack of debate means that historians have focused on other components of the colonial historiography. Of the various other topics that German colonial historians have considered, the most important are the arguments that developed within the broader field of German history from the works of Fritz Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler—neither of whom considered themselves, specifically, colonial historians. While these scholars generally did not publish on German colonialism, the scope and intensity of the arguments they introduced affected the writing of German colonial history, as it did nearly every other sub-genre of nineteenth- and twentieth-century German history.

Publishing his most famous work in 1961, *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (*Grab for World Power*, entitled somewhat blandly *Germany’s Aims in the First World War* in its English translation), Fritz Fischer incited what became known as the “Fischer Controversy.” Influenced by the then obscure work of Eckart Kehr, Fischer jettisoned the constraints of Rankean history and insisted on the consideration of economic and social

⁵ Mary Townsend, *The Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871-1885* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1921). Authors writing in the years immediately following the First World War wrote about German imperialism outside of this narrow understanding of German imperialism. See for example: Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1923).

explanations for historical events, most notably the origins of the First World War. Fischer asserted, in his principal claim, that Germany intentionally precipitated the First World War in order to assure itself of “world power” through an extended colonial empire and the consolidation of the state at home. Although he did not specifically intend to write a book on German colonial history, his topic necessitated a consideration of the latter. Fischer did not overtly claim a broad imperial goal for Germany, beyond what historians generally recognize (i.e. Africa, some Pacific Islands and China); however, he emphasized the expansionist policy of the Imperial German government. The importance he placed on expansionism included considerations of German efforts to secure coaling stations in Yemen, German interests in expanding within Europe, German expansionist policy towards the Ottoman Empire, and British concerns with German expansion around India.⁶ Consequently, while Fischer did not develop a broader context in which German imperialism existed, he recognized the German expansionist goals beyond the traditional German colonies and the significance that other European states (especially Britain, Russia, and France) attributed to this. However, the most important contribution of Fischer’s work, for German colonial historians, is the emancipation from the limitations of Rankean history that traditionally bound German historiography. This newly accepted freedom stimulated a generation of scholarship, which embraced social, cultural, and other “non-traditional” historiographic approaches.⁷

⁶ Bruce Waller, “Hans-Ulrich Wehler on Imperial Germany,” *British Journal of International Studies* 1 (1975): 60-64.

⁷ Waller, 60-63.

Among the scholars emancipated from the Rankean limitations was Hans-Ulrich Wehler, who published a series of books, most notably *The German Empire, 1871-1918* and *Bismarck und der Imperialismus (Bismarck and Imperialism)*, that further catalyzed debate within the historiography of German colonialism. Instead of considering Wehler's many books individually, it is prudent to summarize his contributions to German colonial historiography. While Wehler is best known for his arguments in the historiographic debate concerning the German *Sonderweg*, he made an important contribution to the colonial historiography by acknowledging that Bismarck likely did not simply decide to embrace colonialism in 1884 as many historians contend.⁸ Instead, Wehler argues that Bismarck's interest in colonialism developed earlier, from his experiences in the Depression of 1873. Wehler further contends that Bismarck anticipated that colonies would moderate swings in the German economy by providing a market for surplus goods, a source of natural resources, etc.⁹ Bismarck's efforts to secure stability for the newly formed Reich also influenced large components of Wehler's most contentious arguments, commonly referred to as "social imperialism" and "negative integration."¹⁰ For Wehler, Germany's aggressive, expansionist, and imperialistic activities became Bismarck's tool for re-directing pressures for further domestic political emancipation abroad (giving rise

⁸ Ibid., 61.

⁹ Ibid., 62-63.

¹⁰ "Social Imperialism" is essentially the idea that colonies could contribute or even achieve German national unification (after political unification in 1871) by becoming a distraction to the existing class conflicts in the newly established Germany. "Negative Integration" referred to a similar idea, one in which the German's problems would be solved by identifying enemies of the state at home and rallying the rest of the country against them (such as Catholics or Socialists).

to the idea of *primat der Innenpolitik*, or the primacy of domestic politics, which differed dramatically from the foreign policy focus of the Rankean historians).¹¹

While Fischer and Wehler catalyzed a renaissance in German colonial historiography, their work focused German colonial historians on specific questions, such as the feasibility of “social imperialism,” in the case of Wehler, and the German intention to go to war in 1914 and the significance of colonial possessions in that decision, in the case of Fischer, instead of on the problem of the limited conception of German colonial activity. However, the work of these historians re-energized the debate about nineteenth-century German history and the German imperial system. Moreover, the renunciation of the Rankean limitations permitted latter historians to consider a wider array of evidence and topics.

The historiographic furor that Fischer and Wehler unleashed dominated nearly all of German history in western Europe, the United States, and above all West Germany. However, its influence in the East (especially East Germany) is not as evident. One reason that the significance of Fischer and Wehler is less apparent in the colonial history written in the DDR is that the historians of the DDR had devoted themselves to a study of colonialism since the early 1950s, and, thus, their interest in nineteenth-century German imperialism (and colonialism) predated Fischer. However, as previously stated, Western historians did not commonly devote themselves to the study of German imperialism until

¹¹ Waller, 65. Many historians have dedicated themselves to the question of the dominance of *Innenpolitik* or *Außenpolitik* in German motivations for colonial or imperial expansion. However, these historians have failed to consider that German imperial expansion paralleled that of the British and the French quite strongly. The German activities in the imperial realm were hardly aberrant, instead in many ways, as will be shown, remained quite in line with the activities of other European powers.

after the publication of Fischer's famous book in 1961. Unfortunately, the East German combination of Marxist dogma and the contemporary political interest in depicting West Germany as the successor to Nazism (which connected it directly to the *Kaiserriech*)¹² distracted historians from debating the broad parameters of German colonial history.¹³ While the historians of East Germany dedicated themselves to the issues of German colonialism, the ideological component of much of their work ultimately proved unfounded. Consequently, these texts did not contribute to the historiography as fully as they might have.

In spite of the innovations of Fischer and Wehler as well as the contributions by East German historians, the historiography of German colonialism remains fettered by the contention that German colonial activity existed exclusively in the period between 1884 and 1918 and in only in Africa, China, and the Pacific. Indeed, historians have concluded that German activity in the Ottoman Empire, while impressive, specifically failed to rise to the level necessary to constitute imperialism.¹⁴ In spite of the real

¹² Woodruff D. Smith, "Colonialism and Colonial Empire," in *Imperial Germany: A Historiographical Companion*, ed. Roger Chickering (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 429-431 (hereafter cited as Smith, "Colonialism and Colonial Empire,"). Regrettably, historians are just beginning to consider the significance of the "Fischer Controversy" in the DDR. See Matthew Stibbe, "The Fischer Controversy over German War Aims in the First World War and its Reception by East German Historians, 1961-1989," *Historical Journal* 46 (2003): 649-668.

¹³ Smith "Colonialism and Colonial Empire," 430.

¹⁴ Donald McKale, *War by Revolution: Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East in the Era of World War I* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1998); Gregor Schöllgen, *Imperialismus und Gleichgewicht: Deutschland, England, und die orientalische Frange, 1871-1914* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1984); Lora Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884-1945* (London: Duke University Press, 2001), 1-2; Smith, "Colonialism and Colonial Empire," 430, Smith includes the following list of colonial territories: Africa, the Pacific, and Asia (i.e. China). A very recent dissertation laments

limitations on the understanding of what comprises German imperialism, there is an evolving component of the historiography that has contributed to the expansion of the understanding of what German colonialism and imperialism entailed. However, even these scholars have failed to broaden the consideration of German imperial activity adequately. The scholars who represent this group of historians include: Suzanne Marchand, Susanne Zantop, Glenn Penny, Mary Louise Pratt, Nina Berman, Nancy Mitchell, Woodruff Smith, and Mack Walker.¹⁵

The most relevant historiographic argument to develop from the work of this group of historians (relevant for this dissertation) addresses significance of the

“the relatively little known aspects of the German engagement in the Near East prior to World War I.” See: S.M. Can Bilsel, *Architecture in the Museum: Displacement, Reconstruction, and Reproduction of the Monuments of Antiquity in Berlin’s Pergamon Museum* (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2003), 32. One recent history of the Baghdad Railway described the German motivation for becoming involved in the Ottoman Empire in the following way: “Unlike their competitors [the British and the French], the Germans working in Istanbul chose to interact with the Ottomans to help place the empire back on its feet.” Jonathan S. McMurray, *Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001), 32. It is true that the Germans sought the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire; however, as will be shown, this was part of the established model for imperialism in the Ottoman Empire. Because formal colonies could not be developed in the principal areas of the Ottoman Empire, the European Powers asserted imperial influence within the existing state. Once the Powers had an influential position in the Ottoman state they sought to protect that position by sustaining the Ottoman state.

¹⁵ Scholars such as Penny, Zantop, and Pratt are principally concerned with reconsidering the elements of colonialism (i.e. not just planting a flag, but also the display of colonial artifacts). Other scholars, such as Smith, are more conventional historians of German colonialism. This dissertation chiefly considers these separately, first by defining colonialism and imperialism, and then by considering the “culture” of colonialism (among other aspects of colonialism and imperialism). What distinguishes the historians of the “culture” of colonialism (such as Zantop) is that they address German colonialism and imperialism before 1884. The idea of representation receives the most attention in this chapter because it is the only topic that has been addressed by several of these historians.

representation¹⁶ of the “colonial” (often centered on Latin America) in Germany. This contribution is relevant to the argument presented here because, finding imperialism in the Ottoman Empire requires considering unorthodox methods of imposing and teaching imperialism. This group of authors contends that colonial and imperial ambitions and activities can be discerned from the display of foreign objects in Germany. Suzanne Zantop prompted this debate with her *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770-1870*.¹⁷ Zantop’s well-received work is part of a larger field of social science research in which scholars consider the implications and didacticism of the display of colonial artifacts around the world.¹⁸ Zantop is hardly alone in this field as other scholars within the fields of German history and cultural studies, such as Nicholas Thomas,¹⁹ have also devoted themselves to the study of this “culture of colonialism.” These scholars emphasize the importance of moving away from defining colonialism or imperialism exclusively as political or economic domination and instead towards a more nuanced and less rigid understanding. Zantop uses this expanded understanding of colonialism to consider the representation of Latin America in an

¹⁶ This notion of representation is quite broad, Zantop considers the representation of literary works while Penny, and others place more emphasis on objects. The differences in the objects necessitates somewhat different interpretations of them.

¹⁷ Suzanne Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770-1870* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997).

¹⁸ John Noyes, *Colonial Space: Spatiality in the Discourse of German South West Africa 1884-1915* (Philadelphia: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1992). Noyes addresses similar material, by considering the relationship between literature and the colonization of German Southwest Africa, there are however many other historians who have addressed this topic.

¹⁹ Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism’s Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 2.

impressively broad array of nineteenth-century German books, pamphlets, plays, children's literature, magazines, etc.

Using these literary sources, Zantop argues that Germany established a “colonial fantasy” with Latin America. Zantop focuses her study on the “colonial fantasy” instead of “colonialism,” because for most of the period that she studied, Germany (of course Germany *per se* did not exist, but instead of considering the different German states she uses “Germany”) did not have formal colonies in Latin America (importantly, her work is concerned with formal colonialism, meaning actual colonies and she formally rejects the use of imperialism, preferring to use colonialism almost exclusively).²⁰ According to Zantop, the Germans established “colonial fantasies” because they did not participate formally in the colonial partition of Latin America. Instead of establishing formal colonies, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German scientists, authors, political theorists, anthropologists, etc. all observed and then incorporated aspects of this Spanish (and British) colonialism into the literature of their specific discipline. These authors contributed to the “colonial fantasy” because they conventionally concentrated on the negative aspects of Spanish or British colonialism and emphasized the ability of German colonizers to have conducted this colonization less brutally, or in her words, to have been “superior colonizers.”

²⁰ Zantop, 9. She writes “I prefer to use the terms “colonialism” and “colonial fantasies,” ... Since I focus on fantasies, not actions, and since these fantasies are informed predominantly by a settlement rather than an economic exploitation ideology, “colonial” seems to be the more appropriate label.” After this point, Zantop does not consider imperialistic or economic manifestations of imperialism, although she does not appear to doubt their existence either.

Zantop furthers her argument by introducing the powerful image of Alexander von Humboldt. According to Zantop (in an argument also advocated by Mary Louise Pratt²¹), Humboldt's famous journey and writings made him a "second Columbus," discovering a "new" Latin America for the Germans. This "new" Latin America evolved from Humboldt's scientific and highly descriptive writings on the previously largely unexplored interior of the continent. While the lack of colonies necessarily drove these fantasies, examples of "lost opportunities," such as Humboldt and the Fuggar and the Welser merchant and banking families, also contributed to the development of these fantasies. According to the "colonial fantasy," these "lost opportunities" provided evidence that the Germans would have been more benevolent colonizers. The importance of these "colonial fantasies" (especially with individuals like Humboldt and the Wesler and Fuggar families) is that the Germans developed a myth that they were "superior colonizers," which eventually led to a "moral entitlement" for actual German colonization.²² Ultimately, Zantop concludes that the representation of Latin America, through the literature of "colonial fantasies," propelled and even dominated the eventual development of German colonies, even if these future colonies were not in Latin America.

Glenn Penny contends that many scholars (including Zantop) who study the representation of colonialism in nineteenth-century Germany oversimplify German motivations. He acknowledges that these representations of the wider world (be it

²¹ Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 111-143.

²² Zantop, 202.

through literature, which Zantop studied, or through the artifacts that Penny considers) in Germany had limited imperial appeal, but contends there is a richer context in which to understand the foreign artifacts displayed in Germany.²³ The most important alternative explanation for Penny is the international ethnographic movement that characterized the middle and late nineteenth-century. According to Penny, viewing Latin American artifacts in Germany as purely colonial would be inappropriate, because, according his argument, they constituted a component of a broader effort by the Germans (as well as the rest of Western Europe) to develop a comprehensive knowledge of the rest of the world through museums dedicated to ethnology (*Völkerkunde*). The creation of ethnographic museums to display such objects did not advocate for colonialism because artifacts in these museums came from literally all over the world, meaning that if they are to be viewed as colonial, then this claim for colonialism is impossibly broad. Instead, these objects fulfilled an intellectual and scientific purpose, and that this appropriation and display of artifacts was an international phenomenon during the nineteenth-century.

Penny's convincing argument concerning the representation and display of foreign objects requires qualification. The general subject of colonial exhibitions is well developed in the broad historiography of colonialism; many historians who have written on colonialism place tremendous importance on the display of colonial artifacts for both

²³ H. Glenn Penny, *Objects of Culture: Ethnology and Ethnographic Museums in Imperial German*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 11-20. Admittedly, Penny and Zantop address different “colonial” materials, Zantop considers literature and Penny artifacts and contemporary cultural pieces. While their arguments are not precisely the same because Zantop considers objects “created” in Germany, while Penny considers objects created in potentially colonial territory they do intersect because of their ultimate conclusions; Penny contends there was no colonial effort in Germany before 1880 and Zantop considers the “pre-colonial” Germany essential to the development of colonial Germany.

foreign and domestic audiences.²⁴ Consequently, while Penny's argument has validity and the reality of the ethnographic museums was that they were places where many "scientific" and other non-colonial activities occurred, it cannot be forgotten that the objects displayed there (or at least some of them, especially those artifacts from the Ottoman Empire) may have had an imperial function as well. Although some of these objects may have been tools of scientific discovery, other objects displayed in ethnographic museums could not escape an imperialistic context (especially those items from the Ottoman Empire).

One of the problems with considering the work of scholars like Penny and Zantop is the necessity of understanding the meaning of, and the relationship between, the terms imperialism and colonialism. Many scholars inattentively use these terms interchangeably; however, more precise writers distinguish between the two. The malleability of these two words both in the context of the contemporary event and in the scholarship of later historians is problematic; however, historians have established conventional definitions.²⁵ These accepted understandings of colonialism and imperialism (and especially the relationship between the two) contribute to an appreciation of why the conception of German imperialism has often been so narrow.

²⁴ James R. Ryan, *Picturing Empire: Photography and the Visualization of the British Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Anne Maxwell, *Colonial Photography and Exhibitions: Representations of the "Native" and the Making of European Identities* (London: Leicester University Press, 1999). While Ryan and Maxwell address somewhat different objects than Penny, they (Maxwell and Ryan) are sufficiently similar to be considered in the same context as Penny. There are many other books in this category, but Ryan and Maxwell are a sufficient representation.

²⁵ Claiming that these definitions are conventional for the field is likely an overstatement. It is clear that certain sub-fields of the discipline defer to this definition.

Conventionally, it is understood that colonialism means the acquisition of colonies and that a colonial policy leads to imperialism, which is traditionally understood as initially a protective policy for the colonies and then, in the nineteenth-century, an aggressive economic policy.²⁶ In this generally accepted interpretation, colonialism must precede imperialism; while historians do not often call this “the British model,” it is too heavily dependent on the early imperial and colonial experiences of the British (and other early colonizers). Indeed, in the nineteenth-century, the United States specifically claimed that its model of imperialism was “exceptional” and “different from Europe’s and more morally acceptable.”²⁷ Edward Said recently reversed this relationship contending that imperialism, which he defines as “the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory,” leads to colonialism, which to him means “the implanting of settlements on distant territory.” Further, Said claims that while “direct colonialism has largely ended [meaning in contemporary society]; imperialism...lingers where it has always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic, and social practices.”²⁸

A further problem in establishing a definition for the words imperialism and colonialism is that the meaning of these words changes depending on the geographic area and the historical period that one considers. Even the relationship between these words (i.e. which one comes first) is relative to the historical period and area being considered.

²⁶ Zantop, 8-9. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), xi-11 (hereafter cited as Said, *Culture and Imperialism*).

²⁷ Maxwell, 6. Maxwell references Said for this, so it may also be useful to see: Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 350.

²⁸ Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 9.

Nineteenth-century imperialism in the Ottoman Empire provides several examples of this problem. One such example was the creation of the “greater” Bulgaria, which the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) accomplished following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. The Bulgaria created out of this treaty not only remained, formally, within the Ottoman Empire, but it also had to submit its new king for the Sultan’s approval and had to pay an annual tribute to the Ottoman government. However, contemporaries in London, Paris, and Berlin viewed this (properly) as a major assertion of Russian imperial interests into the Ottoman Empire. The contemporary reaction to this assertion of Russian imperial interests was so great that the European Powers met at the Congress of Berlin (1878) with the specific goal of reducing the Russian imperial influence in the Ottoman Empire through the new Bulgaria. Thus, a context exists that permits the assertion of German imperial interests in the Ottoman Empire (during the nineteenth-century) without the establishment of colonies or for the imperial territory to be separated (formally) from the Sultan’s Empire (Egypt and Tunis had similar imperial relationship). Consequently, the selection of an appropriate definition for the words imperialism and colonialism necessitates that the specific conditions of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire be considered, as this imperialism clearly differed from Spanish imperial activity in Central America in the eighteenth-century, or any other earlier (or even contemporary) imperial activity.

Based on the understanding of imperialism and colonialism from the Ottoman Empire, this dissertation will employ two methods to test for German colonialism or imperialism in the Near East: first, Said’s definition, in which imperialism precedes colonialism and that, presumably, imperialism and formal colonies are separate (albeit

potentially related) concerns; second, a comparative method with the imperial activity of the British, French, Russian, and other major powers. Specifically, after developing a model of British imperialism for the Ottoman Empire, German activity relative to this model will be gauged, and, thus, an assessment of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire can be made. It will be argued that in the case of the Ottoman Empire, German activity paralleled Said's understanding of imperialism and colonialism but that circumstances prevented the Germans from establishing formal colonies (the First World War); however, the failure of colonialism to follow imperialism does not invalidate the imperialism of the earlier period.²⁹

The use of a comparative model to test for the presence of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth-century is important because, by the eighteen-fifties, the European Powers (with limited exceptions such as Africa) seized fewer formal colonies and, thus, imperialism after eighteen-fifty differed from earlier nineteenth-century imperialism. In spite of these differences, British imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire has been generally recognized as such, even if the Crown failed to establish formal colonies. The decision not to establish formal colonies is not unexpected (by historians) as a growing British disinterest in additional colonies is illustrated by the fact that not only did the British seize colonies more carefully and less frequently after eighteen-fifty, but they also increasingly permitted their established colonies self-government and even autonomy under the crown. Canada is an example of this

²⁹ Bernard Porter, *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman Press, 1977), 2-28.

increasing autonomy;³⁰ but, by the 1860s, nearly all of Australia governed itself, as did New Zealand, and to a lesser degree the Cape Colony.³¹ The reason the British were willing to permit their colonies (except India) increasing autonomy was that many British officials recognized that the benefits of direct colonial rule no longer justified the expense.³² However, in spite of both the increasing autonomy permitted for the established colonies and the growing disinterest in establishing new colonies, the British simultaneously continued to expand their global imperial presence. The parallels between the extension of German and British imperial influence in places like the Ottoman Empire (without colonies) makes a comparative study of this phenomena particularly viable. Consequently, by comparing British and German imperial experiences, through a definition of imperialism that accounts for the historical context of events in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, scholars will not only expand the understanding of German imperialism, but they may also recognize that German imperial ambition and activity remained solidly within the practices of other European states (i.e. by extending influence without establishing large colonies).

One of the most effective tools for a comparison of British and German imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire is the idea of the “imperialism of free trade,” which has

³⁰ D. George Boyce, *Decolonization and the British Empire, 1775-1997* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 28-39. This is an oversimplification, there were many problems in Canada, not the least of which was the conflict between the descendants of the English and the French, and many solutions were considered, of which increased autonomy and self-government was one (and ultimately, the one that persevered).

³¹ Porter, 16.

³² Boyce, 43-46. The British recognition of the expense of maintaining colonies was so well recognized that there was a minor movement for the British to abandon most of their colonial possessions.

dominated British imperial historiography with its contention that the British were “reluctant colonizers.” The scholars most associated with the idea of “the imperialism of free trade” are Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher,³³ whose so-called “Gallagher and Robinson Controversy” dominated the historiography of British colonialism from the 1950s until the 1980s. Gallagher and Robinson contend that the conventional understanding of nineteenth-century British imperialism (i.e. the pre-1953 historiography) minimized the continuity of British imperial activity by claiming that in the latter nineteenth-century British imperial ambitions flagged because (in the latter nineteenth-century) the British seized fewer colonies and did so with apparently greater caution. Gallagher and Robinson reject this claim (that a decrease in the establishment of colonies equated to a growing disinterest in imperialism) and argue that British imperial activity existed, with significant continuity, throughout the nineteenth-century, through this “imperialism of free trade,” even if the British seized colonies less frequently.³⁴

Gallagher and Robinson contend, in what is likely their most frequently quoted statement, that “British policy followed the principle of extending control informally if possible [i.e. through free trade agreements] and formally if necessary.”³⁵ Consequently, while the British did not often overtly seize land after the 1860s (of course, they did participate in the “Scramble for Africa” as well as seize land elsewhere, but this does not

³³ John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” *Economic History Review*, Second Series, 6 (1953): 1-15. Also see, John Gallagher, Ronald Robinson and Alice Denny, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*, (London: MacMillan, 1981); William Roger Louis (ed.), *Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy* (New York: New Viewpoints Books, 1976).

³⁴ Louis, 3-5.

³⁵ Robinson and Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians*, xxi.

invalidate the argument) Gallagher and Robinson claim that this represented only a minor deviation from the established British imperial tradition. Further, when the British did seize territory, such as Egypt in 1881 (although Egypt remained, formally, within the Ottoman Empire until 1914), Gallagher and Robinson contend that local or domestic events (i.e. events in the eventual colony) triggered the colonization, instead of a British ambition to establish formal colonies. The argument that Gallagher and Robinson present is that if the British had an option, they preferred not to move along Said's path from imperialism to colonialism; it was only when domestic political activity (in the imperial territory) necessitated direct colonization that the British established a formal colonial presence. According to Gallagher and Robinson, this "informal imperialism" that the British reportedly preferred could manifest itself in the following ways:

- 1) The exertion of power or diplomacy to impose and sustain free trading conditions on another society against its will;
- 2) the exertion of capital or commercial attraction to bend economic organization and direction of growth in directions complementary to the needs and surpluses of the expanding economy;
- 3) the exertion of capital and commercial attraction directly upon foreign governments to influence them toward cooperation and alliance with the expanding country;
- 4) the direct intervention or influence of the export-import sector interests upon the politics of the receiving country in the direction of collaboration and political-economic alliance with the expanding power;
- 5) the taking over by European bankers and merchants of sectors of non-European domestic economies under cover of imposed free trade without accompaniment of large capital or export inputs from Europe, as in China.³⁶

The model established by Robinson and Gallagher has not seriously been considered within the context of German imperial and colonial activity, in spite of the fact that it appears to be quite adaptable to contemporary German imperial activities. While

³⁶ Louis, 3-5.

Gallagher and Robinson have been properly criticized on many points of their argument (and especially on the contention that domestic conflict catalyzed, and sometimes even “required,” the establishment of British colonies), its core emphasis on recognizing imperialism without the presence of colonies means that German activity in the Ottoman Empire should be evaluated against this model.³⁷ The official disinterest that the German government had in the establishment of colonies (under Bismarck) makes a comparison with imperial activity especially appealing.

This expansion of our understanding of colonialism and imperialism necessitates that historians also begin to question the assertion that April 1884 constituted a clear beginning to German imperial history. In spite of his public arguments against colonies, Bismarck, in April 1884, sent a message directing his officials in Africa to publish notice of the German “protection” of what was to become German Southwest Africa. Predictably, many histories of German colonialism have seized this and begin with some derivation of the following: “On April 24, 1884, Bismarck, chancellor of the then thirteen-year old German Empire, sent a cable to the German consul in Cape Town to proclaim “imperial protection” over the territories...”³⁸ The acceptance of 1884 as the

³⁷ There are problems and limitations to this theory, but its main contention that the British were reluctant colonizers remains an accepted notion in British imperial historiography. Instead of becoming focused on Robinson and Gallagher, this dissertation will use the argument that the British were reluctant colonialists and the ways in which “informal imperialism” can be established, but will not make arguments about the most contentious aspect of the controversy, the idea that peripheral crises led to colonization. Further, this dissertation explicitly rejects the notion of “informal imperialism” because, it will be argued, this imperialism was a formal government policy and, thus, quite intentional, all that differentiates it from “intentional” imperialism is a lack of colonies.

³⁸ Zantop, 1. Zantop’s book is one of the few books that addresses the realities of German colonial interests before 1884, but she still contends this is a “precolonial

beginning of German colonialism has almost universal approval within the community of German historians. However, to accept this, historians must be willing to ignore German (and especially Prussian) expansion within Europe, as well as German imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire.

An additional element that makes 1884 appear as a less plausible beginning for German imperialism is that when historians begin their books with some statement about 24 April 1884 they cannot quote the headlines of the *New York Times* or the *Times* (London);³⁹ the reason that historians cannot cite major headlines from these papers is that the papers did not report the alleged change in German colonial policy. On 27 June 1884 (in the first story devoted to German colonialism in that year), the *New York Times* flatly stated “There was a lively discussion of Germany’s colonial policy in the Reichstag today in connection with the consideration of the proposed treaty of commerce with Corea [sic.] and...”⁴⁰ The *Times* (London) is similarly mute on the alleged change in German imperial policy, reporting on 2 May 1884 about the German fear of trichinosis from American pork, and on 24 June about the appropriation of funds to increase the number of steamers to Australia and China.⁴¹ Had 1884 signified a major transition in German colonial policy, it is reasonable to expect that either British or American

Germany,” and thus she still sees 1884 as a seminal change in German colonial history. Also see: Smith “Colonialism and Colonial Empire,” 430. Smith is one of the most established historians of German colonialism.

³⁹ To my knowledge no historical treatment of German colonialism begins with a newspaper article but I have not reviewed each one.

⁴⁰ “Germany’s Colonial Policy,” *New York Times* 27 June 1884, 1:4.

⁴¹ “Germany,” *Times* (London), 2 May 5, 2005, 5:c; and “German Colonial Policy,” *Times* (London), 24 June 1884, 5:c-d.

newspapers would have reported this change. In fact there is no announcement in the principal newspapers of either country that claims that Germany suddenly became a colonial power.

The purpose of this dissertation is to argue that German imperialism did not begin with Bismarck's recognition of colonial territories in Africa in April 1884 and that it is equally inappropriate for historians to accept the traditional geographic boundaries of German colonialism. Instead, it will be argued that German imperialism existed in the Ottoman Empire before 1884. While German imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire does not adhere to the traditional models or definitions of imperialism, it does provide evidence of imperialism (and to some degree colonialism) outside of the generally accepted areas of German colonial activity (i.e. China, Africa, and the Pacific).

To sustain this argument several components of the history must be considered; consequently, this dissertation will attempt to make use of the resources of political as well as social history. Using the work of Zantop and related scholars as a model, selected writings on the Ottoman Empire will be considered as indicators of imperial activity. However, in the case of the Ottoman Empire the discovery, appropriation, and display of Ottoman artifacts (especially the Pergamon Alter and Heinrich Schliemann's discovery of Troy) will also be considered. Further, these unorthodox indications of imperialism will be complemented by documents from the *Auswärtiges Amt*. Within this context it will also be argued that the failure of imperialism to turn into colonialism (especially in the case of the Ottoman Empire) does not mean that German activity in that area should not be considered within the historical context of German colonial history.

The use of a comparative study of British imperialism will also be important in considering claims that German activity was imperial. This is especially important as British imperialists recognized the influence that the Germans were beginning to exert in the Ottoman Empire and competed with the latter for influence in the Ottoman Empire. Further, as British imperial historians have considered the activity in the Ottoman Empire as imperial, providing evidence that German activity there paralleled (strongly) that of the British increases the basis for considering German activity in the Ottoman Empire as imperial. The fact that the Germans had political or economic relations with a less powerful country is not sufficient to claim that the Germans had an imperial policy towards that country; it is important that an expanded definition of imperialism does not develop into an impossibly broad idea.

Thus, by considering a variety of archives and documents, it will be argued that historians have misunderstood the richness of German imperialism. Instead of focusing on the narrow group of territories that developed into formal German colonies, historians must consider the entire context of German imperialism. Using the Ottoman Empire as an example, it will be shown that the spectrum of German imperialism is broader and richer than most historians accept.

CHAPTER III

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE GREAT POWERS: IMPERIALISM AND EUROPEAN EXPANSION, 1850-1914

The Ottoman defeat at the gates of Vienna in 1683 marked the zenith of Ottoman expansion into Europe. This defeat also precipitated a permanent change in power relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. While European fantasies about the fighting abilities and ferocity of “the Turk” remained, from 1683 it would be the Europeans who advanced into the Ottoman Empire instead of the Ottoman armies marching into Europe. This European expansion into the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire developed its own peculiar form of imperialism (related to Robinson and Gallagher’s “reluctant imperialism”), in which concerns about repercussions within Europe generally trumped expansionist desires for the overt seizure of Ottoman territories.

The “reluctant imperialism” that developed in the Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth-century arose less out of jingoistic ambition for additional territory or prestige, and, instead, from the British need to secure and maintain strategic positions in the Mediterranean.⁴² This need arose specifically from the development of steam ships, in

⁴² This form of imperialism related specifically to the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire. Traditional seizures of land occurred in other “non-essential” areas of the Ottoman Empire, such as North Africa, the Red Sea, some Arabian provinces, etc. There is a historiographic debate in British colonial historiography concerning the establishment of the “Second British Empire,” in which a “swing to the East” meaning China, India, and to a smaller degree the Ottoman Empire are the representative cases. This position is best articulated by V.T. Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1762-1793* (London: Longmans, 1952). One of the problems with this argument is that it fails to address the reality that the Americas and Europe remained the most important British

the 1820s; after this development the most important communications route between England and India became the “overland route.”⁴³ This route, formally established in 1839, but in existence for at least ten years before that, sent British ships into the Mediterranean, to Egypt, overland to Suez, and then into the Red Sea. This route became important in the 1830s because, before the development of steam ships, the British considered sailing in the Red Sea too risky.⁴⁴ With the development of interest in the “overland” route, the British established themselves at the three critical strategic locations from which other powers could have interrupted British communications with India (the Straits of Gibraltar, the “overland” parts of the Ottoman Empire, and Bab el Mandeb, the strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, see Map One). This

commercial concern. Instead of considering commercial concerns as the reason for British activity in the Ottoman Empire, this dissertation uses geopolitical strategic concerns.

⁴³ Halford Lancaster Hoskins, *British Routes to India*, (1928; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1966), 266. While Hoskin’s book is nearly eighty years old, it has evidently not been surpassed. Many texts (as recently as 2004) cite it as the best authority on the topic. Although the route around the Cape of Good Hope remained popular for bulk goods and less urgent business, the “overland” route became the most important link between England and India. Also see, “The Overland Route to India,” *Times* (London), 18 October 1838, 3:c.

⁴⁴ Thomas E. Marston, *Britain’s Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area, 1800-1871* (Hamden, Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, 1961), 64. This route cut the time to send a letter and receive a response from two years to a little over one-hundred days (provided immediate turn around), see: Robert J. Blyth, “Aden, British India and the Development of Steam Power in the Red Sea, 1825-1839,” in *Maritime Empires: British Imperial Maritime Trade in the Nineteenth-Century*, ed. David Killingray, Margarete Lincoln, and Nigel Rigby (Rodchester, New York: The Boydell Press, 2004), 68-69 and 75.



Figure One. Map of Strategic British Positions.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook* (Washington, DC: Government

process began in 1830 with the formal inclusion of Gibraltar in the British Empire,⁴⁶ and continued with the seizure of Aden, at the mouth the Red Sea (1839). However, the establishment of British administration in Gibraltar and at the mouth of the Red Sea provided the British only two of the three strategic points necessary to protect their “overland” route. To secure this route the British also had to establish themselves in the Ottoman Empire, where Russia (by 1833), was the dominant power. While the British could not formally colonize the Ottoman Empire (and no evidence exists to indicate they wanted to, specifically why the British could not do so is explained below) they needed to control portions (and make sure that Russia would not extend its influence there or destabilize the Ottoman government) of it to be certain that they could maintain their communications with India; this was the first step in the establishment of the British model of imperialism in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, in the 1830s, the British initiated a series of diplomatic maneuvers that culminated in their replacing Russia as the dominant power in the Ottoman Empire, and, thus, providing protection for the British “overland” route and establishing a peculiar form of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire. Although British imperialism is not the focus of this dissertation, this British imperial activity provided the model that the Germans eventually used (almost without revision) to establish themselves as an imperial power in the Ottoman Empire. While the Germans lacked the same security concerns as the British, the British model did not require the same motivations, merely the same methods.

Printing Office, 2005) 87.

⁴⁶ The British gained Gibraltar, in perpetuity, from the Spanish in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713); however, the British only formally incorporated it into the British Empire in 1830.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the conditions that led the British, and eventually other European powers, to impose this peculiar form of imperialism on the Ottoman Empire. Specifically, this chapter explains the international conditions that developed, which compelled the British to overcome their reticence to establish themselves as the imperial power in the Ottoman Empire. These international conditions arose (immediately) from the development of Russian influence in Constantinople and the Treaty of Hünkiâr İskelesi (1833), which the British feared provided the Russians a future opportunity to occupy Constantinople and, thus, the principal areas of the Ottoman Empire. In addition to explaining the conditions that led the British to become the most important imperial power in the Ottoman Empire, this chapter will also explain the elements of the peculiar imperialism that the British developed. Understanding this model of imperialism is important, because, by 1880, the Germans had appropriated it for themselves as they sought to become the premiere imperial power in the Ottoman Empire. The British model of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire represented a temporary solution to the broad European interest in Ottoman territories, which lasted from the seventeenth-century into the nineteen-twenties and became known as “the Eastern Question.”⁴⁷

Conventionally, the Eastern Question centered on two concerns: the debate about what would happen (i.e. would the European states fight each other or make some general agreement) when the Ottoman government collapsed and the Ottoman Empire no longer

⁴⁷ Until the eighteenth-century, the Eastern Question related to Poland, and in the nineteenth-century the term applied to both China and the territory of Central Asia (including present day Afghanistan). However, this dissertation considers the Eastern Question in the context of the Ottoman Empire.

existed (both of which were considered inevitabilities),⁴⁸ and what would the future relationship between the Balkan states and the Ottoman government be (sometimes called the Balkan Question)? Although the defeat of the Ottoman armies in 1683 catalyzed the Eastern Question, the latter did not appear immediately. Instead, many historians date the origins of the Eastern Question to the Treaty of Küçük Kainardji (1774), in which the Ottoman government, among other things, ceded a port at the mouth of the Don River on the Sea of Azov and territories along the Black Sea to the Russians and, importantly, the Khanate of Crimea (which had been administered by the Turks prior to the treaty) became an independent state.⁴⁹ The Eastern Question usually contemplated the end of

⁴⁸ Rene Albrecht-Carrie. *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna*, Harper's Historical Series, ed. Guy Stanton, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 40. The concern about the “inevitability” of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse has exercised historians interested in the Eastern Question for some time. Regrettably, most of these historians have dedicated themselves to a study of the reasons for the internal collapse of the Ottoman Empire, often focusing on the decadence or inadequacy of the Ottoman Sultans of the nineteenth-century. This is an inadequate answer and it must be considered more broadly, specifically within the geopolitical context of the nineteenth-century. For a good discussion of this, see: F.A.K. Yasamee, *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers, 1878-1888* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1996), 1-2. Also see, Cemal Kafadar, “The Question of Ottoman Decline,” *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 4 (1997-1998): 30-75.

⁴⁹ M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966), xi-9. Also see, Barbara Jelavich, *Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Of course, the Crimea remained a contested territory, with the Russians seizing it in 1783 and the Crimean War being fought over it from 1853-1856.

Subsequent treaties supported and reinforced the Treaty of Küçük Kainardji, including the Treaty of Peace (Jassy), signed between Russia and the Sublime Porte on 9 January 1792. Although this strengthened the Russian position it did not dramatically alter the spirit of the Treaty of Küçük Kainardji; thus, instead of detailing every treaty and agreement between Russia and the Sublime Porte, the Treaty of Küçük Kainardji will serve as the model for Russian expansion towards the Ottoman Empire. See, Jacob C. Hurewitz, “Treaty of Peace (Jassy),” in *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 92-100

the Ottoman Empire, but between 1774 and 1914 the Powers (in the late eighteenth- and all of the nineteenth-century) imposed a series of treaties aimed at preventing the Ottoman Empire from collapsing.

Scholars who have considered the Eastern Question have generally done so based on the premise that the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of immediate and uncorrectable collapse. Conventionally, these scholars explain the dire condition of the Ottoman Empire by detailing the decadence and corruption within its internal structure.⁵⁰ While this view corresponds with many contemporary understandings of the Ottoman Empire, it is too simplistic. Instead, to appreciate the condition of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth-century, it is important to recognize the significant role played by international affairs, which were particularly important because of the Empire's geography.⁵¹ Instead

(hereafter cited as Hurewitz, even though later citations will refer to treaties and documents other than the Treaty of Jassy).

⁵⁰ Yasamee, 1-2. Another important discussion of the long term reasons for the decline of the Ottoman Empire is Jack Goldstone, who places the Ottoman Empire within many of the same financial and demographic crises that faced Europe. Although the nineteenth-century history of the Ottoman Empire deviates somewhat from the European model, Goldstone makes a compelling argument for not viewing the problems faced by the Ottoman Empire as unique to them. See: Jack Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 354-355.

⁵¹ Yasamee, 1. It cannot be denied that the Ottoman Empire faced internal problems, specifically with tax collecting and independence movements; however, what differentiated the problems faced by the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth-century from those of previous centuries was the new international situation, and especially the technical advantages of the European powers. The Ottoman government had never fully imposed itself on its provinces, but in the late eighteenth-century these provinces had more autonomy than they conventionally did. Still the Ottoman government continued to exist and even "attained some success in military, cultural, and economic fields." See: William Ochsenwald and Sydney Nettleton Fischer, *The Middle East: A History* 6th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004), 247 (hereafter cited as Ochsenwald, this serves as the principal narrative history resource for this chapter).

of focusing on the decadence of the Sultan, this dissertation ascribes the weakness of the Ottoman Empire to, among other things, two major geopolitical issues that challenged the Empire's continued existence. These conditions were: the Empire's geographic proximity to the important strategic positions in the Near East (i.e. the Straits and India), and the number and proximity of the Empire's potential enemies.⁵² While the Ottoman Empire always faced challenges from its neighbors,⁵³ the consequence of its economic and technological backwardness, by the nineteenth-century, made the Empire's traditional international problems acute. However, in spite of its relative geographic vulnerability and the improved military technology of the West, the Ottoman Empire could not simply be divided among the European powers as other colonial territories of the period had been (or would be, in the case of Africa), because the colonization of the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire would upset the European balance of power and possibly precipitate a European war. A series of treaties signed between 1774 and 1856 created an imperial system in which the Powers could assert themselves in the Ottoman Empire without upsetting the European balance of power.

Although many factors discouraged the formal colonization, or even partition, of the principal Ottoman territories,⁵⁴ four require explanation (however, these factors can

⁵² Yasamee, 2.

⁵³ Kafadar, 44-50. Kafadar concludes "...the Ottoman Empire's internal conditions and the actions of its rulers were insignificant in the face of an irresistible outside power that simply swept them into underdevelopment." Kafadar, 50. Building on Wallerstein's theories, Kafadar contends that the important explanation for the Ottoman weakness by the nineteenth-century was the massive economic underdevelopment that began to impose itself in the seventeenth-century.

⁵⁴ These conditions did not always exist, and throughout early modern and modern history, the powers of Europe devised plans to divide the Ottoman Empire. It is not

generally be categorized as potential threats to the established European balance of power). First, unlike Africa and other contemporary colonial territories, all the Great Powers coveted the Ottoman Empire. The strategic location of the Ottoman Empire, near the Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits, as well the Empire's position relative to India, made its principal areas desirable to almost all the European powers. This general interest distinguished Great Power competition for territory in the Ottoman Empire from Great Power interest in other imperial territory. A distinction existed because, conventionally, in most imperial territories only one or two Powers would become involved. Consequently, most of the European Powers expected that any effort to seize principal Ottoman territory would result in a major European war, something that most of them viewed as undesirable. Second, the Empire contained a very large Christian population (the Orthodox Christians alone counted for approximately twenty-five percent of the Empire's population).⁵⁵ Not only did many European rationalizations for empire often wilt when fellow Christians were the subject of the colonization, but the various Great Powers had strong connections to different religious groups in the Ottoman Empire (specifically, the Russians to the Orthodox, the French to the Catholics, and less so the British to the Protestants; eventually the Germans claimed a special relationship with Islam). Because these religious groups did not live in segregated territories, the position

important to address these plans here, but many of these plans are collected in: T.G. Djuvara, *Cent projets de partage de la Turquie, 1281-1913* (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1914). Of course the European powers occupied peripheral Ottoman territories, such as Algeria or Aden with almost no international repercussions, but intervention in the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire was the more important issue.

⁵⁵ Yasamee, 8. Specific demographic statistics from the Ottoman Empire are tremendously difficult to find and to trust, however this appears to be a reasonable generalization.

of Christians in the Ottoman Empire complicated Great Power colonial ambitions. Third, the Ottoman Empire remained a rather substantial military power (even in the late nineteenth-century) and conquering it, or making it an official colony, would have instigated a prolonged and multi-national war. Although eighteenth- and nineteenth-century wars had depleted the resources of the Ottoman Empire, conquering it entailed a greater commitment than the conquest of German Southwest Africa or other contemporary colonies. Finally, the Great Powers had admitted the Ottoman Empire into the Concert of Europe in 1856 (in the Treaty of Paris) following the Crimean War; as such, direct colonization of the Ottoman territories created diplomatic problems.⁵⁶ Based on these limitations this dissertation contends that the Great Powers developed (between 1774 and 1856) a distinctive form of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire that permitted them to expand into it while maintaining the European balance of power.⁵⁷

This peculiar form of imperialism permitted the Great Powers to expand into the Ottoman Empire without the formal establishment of colonies and, therefore, without upsetting the balance of power. This policy developed informally and, did not exist as a formal document, but, instead, as a set of generally understood rules that governed the ambitions of the Powers while emphasizing the maintenance of the European balance of power. This distinctive imperial policy had four principal tenets, which included: first, a

⁵⁶ Ibid., 4; and Barbara Jelavich *Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 138. Yasamee does an excellent job explaining the differences between the Ottoman Empire and the contemporary colonies of Europe.

⁵⁷ This peculiar form of imperialism developed by the English coincided with the development of their first general government policy for the Ottoman Empire. This policy, a policy that emphasized “independence and integrity” necessitated the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire, but permitted the British to intrude as necessary to maintain this policy. See, Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1921* (London: Harvester Press, 1976), 10.

guarantee to maintain the territorial and governmental integrity of the Ottoman Empire; second, European seizures of *peripheral* Ottoman territories (such as Aden, Algeria, the Ionian Islands, etc.) could be tolerated; however, any seizure could not threaten the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire and, thus, the balance of power in Europe; third, various powers could establish themselves as the dominant imperial power in the region, but could not exploit this to the point of creating an imbalance of power in Europe; and finally, the Great Powers could establish themselves, informally, as the hegemonic regional power in different parts (i.e. Tunisia, Syria, etc.) of the Ottoman Empire. This complicated imperial policy governed European expansionist activity in the Ottoman Empire from 1838 until 1914; however, it required that the European powers pursue their colonial and imperial ambitions with great care and with the idea of maintaining the European balance of power as the primary goal.

The extension of the European balance of power to the Ottoman Empire developed no later than 1833 (and probably sooner) as Britain sought to limit Russian territorial ambition in the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁸ Simultaneously, this policy permitted the British to become the major imperial power in the Ottoman Empire within five years.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ While this general political philosophy governed European relations with the Ottoman Empire, there are important exceptions. The French occupied most of North Africa, the Balkans fell away (with significant assistance from the European powers), and the British occupied Egypt. While these appear to be deviations from this general philosophy, they largely fit. The peripheral areas of the Ottoman Empire were never under strong Ottoman control and thus could be taken without significant Ottoman opposition. More important areas like Egypt were effectively autonomous (and even rebellious) before the Europeans conquered and colonized them. The European goal in most of these colonial conquests was to maintain the Ottoman Empire, even if it necessitated direct European rule of formerly Ottoman territories (like Egypt).

⁵⁹ A.L. Macfie, *The End of the Ottoman Empire: 1908-1923* (New York: Longman Press, 1998), 98-99; Kedourie, 9-15.

Thus, in spite of the geographic vulnerability and strategic desirability of the Ottoman Empire, the extension of the European balance of power to the former generally limited the direct European seizure of territory (or the placement of formal colonies) in the principal lands of the Ottoman Empire. However, the lack of colonies and the reticence of European leaders to break the balance of power by seizing Ottoman territory, should not blind historians to the Great Power imperialism that developed within the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, by 1907, “the largest European empire [in the Ottoman Empire and surrounding areas, including India], that of Britain,...numbered ninety-six million Muslim subjects, almost one-third of the world’s Muslim population.”⁶⁰ In spite of the obvious British imperial success in the Ottoman Empire (described in Chapter IV), the specific conditions of the Ottoman existence and its important geographic position required a careful policy of imperialism that considered European relations first and expansionist goals second. However, because the imperialism that developed in the Ottoman Empire differed from traditional imperial activity, never developing into formal colonialism (in the principal Ottoman territories), scholars should not fail to recognize the Great Power imperialism that developed there.

The modern roots of European involvement in the Ottoman Empire, while greatly accelerated and intensified in the nineteenth-century, began no later than the sixteenth-century⁶¹ when the Ottoman government awarded the first capitulations (or *ahdnames*) to

⁶⁰ McKale, 2. This obviously includes Muslims in India, but a large number in other places as well. This became important when Wilhelm II declared himself the protector of the Muslims in 1898 (see Chapter V).

⁶¹ William Shorrock, *French Imperialism in the Middle East: The Failure of Policy in Syria and Lebanon* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 12; also

the French.⁶² Capitulations granted trading privileges, and were designed initially to increase trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. Additionally, these capitulations included promises of peaceful relations and, importantly, the right to hire Ottoman translators.⁶³ Significantly, the capitulations also permitted the French an ambiguous right to protect Christian citizens of the Empire;⁶⁴ eventually, this became an important component of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Great Power influence in the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁵ While capitulations may appear simply to be treaties between the

see, Daniel Goffman, “The Capitulations and the Question of Authority in Levantine Trade, 1600-1650,” *Journal of Turkish Studies* 10 (1986): 155-164.

⁶² Following the French and British model, most of the European states received capitulations from the Ottoman government: Habsburg (1718), Sweden (1737), Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (1740), Denmark (1746), Tuscany (1747), Prussia (1762), Russia (1774), and Spain (1782). See, Mautits H. van den Boogert, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls, and Beraths in the 18th Century*, Studies in Islamic Law and Society, ed. Ruud Peters and Bernard Weiss, no. 21 (Boston: Brill, 2005), 7.

⁶³ Ibid., 3-8. The right to hire translators became an important aspect of these capitulations. While it may seem insignificant these translators became powerful people in the Ottoman Empire, able to guide trade and business to the European merchants. Additionally, these interpreters (or *dragoman*, to Europeans, and *tarjuman* to the Ottomans) began to become increasingly associated with the official representation that European countries began to send to the Ottoman Empire (beginning with consuls). See van der Boogert, 3-10.

⁶⁴ The French developed a protective relationship with the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, French investment superseded this religious influence. One scholar concluded “a financial protectorate has superseded the religious protectorate which has for so long guaranteed French influence in the Orient.” Quoted in Donald C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of the Establishment, Activities and Significance of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), 5.

⁶⁵ Shorrock, 12. The French maintained “protection” for the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire into the twentieth-century and the Vatican used the French instead of establishing a formal relationship with the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, the Russians claimed (and had it recognized in a formal treaty with the Sublime Porte) to protect the Orthodox

Sublime Porte (the Ottoman government) and the western governments, the capitulations originally existed only as a favor granted by an Ottoman Sultan to the European Powers, and, thus, could be withdrawn at any time and for any reason. After the Ottoman defeat in 1683, the capitulations, which had been granted under the premise that they were temporary and at the will of the Sultan, became increasingly difficult for the Ottoman government to control and rapidly acquired the characteristics of formal agreements (and thus no longer revocable at the will of the Sultan).⁶⁶ The Ottoman position that the capitulations existed at the whim of the Sultan ended no later than the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which the Sublime Porte signed with Russia on 10/21 July 1774.⁶⁷ This treaty made the capitulations difficult for the Sultan to revoke because, the treaty specifically addressed the capitulations and, consequently, formalized them.⁶⁸ Moreover, by the

Christians. Of course, these competing claims contributed to the start of the Crimean War, but the also permitted Great Power involvement in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Government. Additionally, the British and Germans would claim rights to protect the Protestants and Kaiser Wilhelm II even claimed the right to protect Muslims.

⁶⁶ The Sublime Porte sent notice to the Ambassadors of the Great Powers on 9 September 1914 notifying them that the capitulations had been canceled. The note read, in part: “The...Ottoman Government...had, in former times determined in a special manner the rules to which foreigners coming to the Orient to trade there should be subject, and communicated those rules to the Powers. Subsequently, those rules, which the Sublime Porte had decreed on its own accord, were interpreted as privileges, corroborated and extended by certain practices, and were maintained...as capitulations.” U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, vol. 2 (1914) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), 1092 (hereafter cited FRUS, year, volume, page number).

⁶⁷ Feroz Ahmad, “Ottoman Perceptions of the Capitulations, 1800-1914,” *Journal of Islamic Studies* 11 (2000): 1-4.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 1-2. The Turks rejected the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1787 with the start of the Second Russo-Turkish War, but this war only reinforced the terms of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, and brought the Crimean under Russian control. This is also the origin of the famous “Potemkin Villages.” See: James Duran, “Catherine II, Potemkin, and

conclusion of the eighteenth-century the Sublime Porte recognized the peril of fighting the Great Powers, and, consequently, sought to avoid conflict the conflict that would have resulted from removing or restricting the privileges included in the capitulations. Eventually, it became essentially impossible for any Sultan to revoke these capitulations without risking war; the capitulations remained until the twentieth-century, when Ottoman government renounced them, within ten days of the start of the First World War.⁶⁹

Not only did the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (and the Peace of Jassy) formalize the capitulations, but it also represented the origins of European imperialism in the principal areas of the Ottoman Empire. The treaty contributed to the origins of modern imperialism in the Ottoman Empire because it accelerated the Eastern Question by granting Russia important concessions; these concessions, specifically the Russian possession of them, emphasized the strategic importance of the principal Ottoman lands to the other Great Powers.⁷⁰ Among the important concessions included in the treaty were the provisions that provided permission for the Russia of Catherine the Great to navigate the Black Sea (merchant ships) and, significantly, for her (commercial) ships to travel through the Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits.⁷¹ Importantly, this treaty also provided

Colonization Policy in Southern Russia," *Russian Review* 28 (1969): 23-36; and Hurewitz, 105-109.

⁶⁹ FRUS, 1914, 2, 1092-1094. Even when the Ottoman Empire revoked the capitulations, the United States and other countries protested and sought to limit this action.

⁷⁰ Hurewitz, 92-101.

⁷¹ Russian interest in the Black Sea and access to the Mediterranean began with Peter (1672-1725), but it only became a reality with Catherine (1729-1796); however, access to the Straits and thus the Mediterranean remained a contentious issue. The Treaty of

Russia a pretext for intervening in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, a pretext that the French, British, and Germans each, at some point (in the nineteenth-century), claimed applied to them as well. The justification for this intervention came in Article VII of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which permitted Russia to “make... representations...of the new [Orthodox] church at Constantinople, of which mention is made in Article XIV, on behalf of its officiating ministers, promising to take such representations in due consideration...”⁷² Eventually, the Russian leadership asserted that Article VII provided them jurisdiction over the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire; additionally, the Russian government claimed this article provided it the authority to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the latter’s Orthodox subjects.⁷³ This article, combined with Article XIV, which required the Sublime Porte to permit the construction of Orthodox churches and chapels in Constantinople, “made Catherine the Great virtually the protector of the Greek Orthodox

Çanak between the British and the Ottomans in 1809 officially revoked Russian access to the Straits, the Straits remained one of the most important issues in European policy towards the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire traditionally sought to restrict access to the Black Sea and the Straits because Ottoman leaders believed that permitting any other countries to actively move through the Straits would compromise the security of Constantinople. See, Immanuel Wallerstein and Reşat Kasaba, *Incorporation into the World Economy: Change in the Structure of the Ottoman Empire, 1750-1839* (Binghamton, New York: State University of New York, 1980), 21.

⁷² Hurewitz, 95.

⁷³ Eventually, France claimed a similar protection over Catholics in the Ottoman Empire, the British and Germans claimed to protect the Protestants; Wilhelm II would even claim, in 1898, to be the protector of the Muslims. The assertion to be the protector of different religious groups in the Ottoman Empire should not be taken lightly, as it permitted (or at least justified) direct Great Power intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

subjects of the Sultan.”⁷⁴ The Porte recognized the diplomatic humiliation of these claims and tried to assert a reciprocal right to protect the Muslims in Catherine’s empire; however, Russia never acquiesced to this demand.⁷⁵ The cumulative affect of these provisions was to make Russia, briefly, the most important foreign power in the Ottoman Empire, and to raise concern within the community of Great Powers about the relationship between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, thus, was an important step toward the imposition of European imperialism on the Ottoman Empire. While the British would not establish themselves fully until 1838, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca began the extension of modern European imperialism in the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁶ Thus, as the eighteenth- century concluded, the system that had governed Ottoman-European relations since the sixteenth- century had been formalized, the Great Powers recognized Russia as a threat to their strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Ottoman Empire was opened to European intervention in its internal affairs for the first time.

Following the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the conditions existed for the rise of modern European imperialism in the Ottoman Empire. The parallel recognition that Ottoman military forces could not win a war against any of the Great Powers, under most

⁷⁴ Ahmad, 3.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Until the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, France remained the strongest Ottoman ally. Although this relationship remained close, it did not rise to the level of imperialism that Ottoman relations with the European powers did in the nineteenth-century. See: Michael Hochedlinger, “Die französisch-osmanische ‘Freundschaft,’ 1525-1792,” *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 102 (1994): 108-164. The issue of when the modern period begins in the Middle East is complicated, see Hochedlinger, 41, 81ff.

circumstances, accelerated the conditions that permitted the extension of European imperialism into the Ottoman Empire. This recognition also catalyzed a shift in Ottoman foreign policy⁷⁷ that ultimately permitted the Ottoman government to accept the establishment of European imperialism in its empire. This shift in foreign policy was evident by the early nineteenth-century, and it produced two new principles that quickly began to direct Ottoman foreign policy. These two new principles were: first, that the Ottoman Empire sought to “avoid both conflicts and firm alliances” with any of the Great Powers and rely on the balance of power principle to mediate any conflict; and, second, [if the first were impossible] negotiate an alliance with one of the Great Powers and assure the defense of the Empire, even if it meant “temporary subordination.”⁷⁸ This willingness to submit to “temporary subordination” for defensive purposes became the cornerstone that permitted the Great Powers to extend their imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ William Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 21-22.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 20. Accompanying these changes in foreign policy, the Ottoman government also inaugurated a period of reform (based on European models of government, military, and economy), known as The *Tanzimat* (1836-1876). These reforms touched on almost every aspect of Ottoman government, but the principal goal was to ensure the protection of the Muslim citizens of the Empire and to assure the continued existence of the Empire. See Hale, 17.

⁷⁹ During this period, the position of Foreign Minister became one of the most important positions in the Ottoman government. This is significant because, previously, this had been one of the least important Ottoman governmental positions. See, Hale, 19.

Although the British became the first modern⁸⁰ Great Power to establish itself as the clear imperial power in the Ottoman Empire, it did not pursue such a position until the geopolitical circumstances of the 1830s compelled it to seek an imperial policy that would protect its strategic interests (the “overland” route to India, chief among them). The change in geopolitics resulted from three concerns. First, the importance of the “overland” route between England and India and the rise of Russian influence in Constantinople (after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca); second, the introduction of nationalism, following the French Revolution,⁸¹ into the already troublesome Balkan Peninsula; and, finally, Mehemet Ali’s rapid rise to power in Egypt (discussed below).⁸² Starting in the early nineteenth-century, several Balkan territories under Ottoman

⁸⁰ The historiography of the Middle East and of the Ottoman Empire contains a debate about the beginning of the modern Middle East. While it is not universally accepted, many scholars accept 1800 as the beginning of the modern Middle East, a date that coincides with the origins of Great Power imperialism. See, Ochsenwald, 203.

⁸¹ Geopolitics will continue to change and require the British to emphasize the Ottoman Empire even further. The introduction of the steam ship in the 1830s is a good example of this. See, Donald Quataert, Suraiya Faroqhi et al., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: Volume Two: 1600-1914*, ed. Halil İnalçik (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 800 (hereafter cited as Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*); also see Jelavich, 27.

⁸² It is important to note that the Ottoman Empire experienced revolts and revolutions by different groups within the Empire for decades. Its diversity created many problems throughout the century, but the introduction of nationalism into the already difficult circumstances of the Empire complicated matters. It is important to note that the revolutions in the Balkans were not something unknown to the Ottoman government; however, with the introduction of nationalism these revolutions became more complicated. See, Hale, 15-17. Also see: Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 37-55.

dominion sought independence; the Great Powers (especially Russia)⁸³ supported several of these independence movements seeking to assert imperial influence through them.

However, exclusive responsibility for the changing geopolitical conditions does not reside with the events in the Balkan Peninsula. Instead, the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt facilitated the rise of Mehemet Ali, who contributed, perhaps more than any one else, to the shift in geopolitical circumstances in the Eastern Mediterranean. This shift began as Ali extended his influence beyond Egypt into the Balkans and, eventually, into the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire. These changes ultimately led the British to become the first modern imperial power in the principal Ottoman territories and to establish the model of imperialism that the Germans embraced in the 1870s.⁸⁴

Mehemet Ali changed the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean because, as the ruler of Egypt, he established the region's most powerful and effective military force, which he used to advance his personal interests. Although Egypt technically remained a part of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth-century, the former had obtained a considerable degree of autonomy and was administered by the Mamluk tribe. Following the Napoleonic invasion, the Ottoman government sent Mehemet Ali to Egypt to support the British, hoping Ali would simultaneously return the province to the central control of the Sublime Porte. When the British left Egypt in 1803, Mehemet Ali operated with considerable autonomy, and eventually removed Egypt's Mamluk rulers; by 1805 he effectively governed the territory. Following a second British retreat from Egypt in 1807,

⁸³ It is misleading to see Russia as supporting these movements because she believed it right or proper that these states be independent. The Russians believed that they could extend their influence into the Balkans through the “independence” of these states.

⁸⁴ Shaw, *Possessors and Possessed*, 268.

Mehemet Ali became the ruler of Egypt (although he technically remained under the authority of the Sultan, the Sultan recognized Ali's autonomy). Ali's military prowess and the devotion of his troops discouraged the Sultan from challenging Ali's position in Egypt, and, consequently, the Sultan permitted Mehemet Ali to remain the ruler of Egypt so long as the latter recognized the Sultan's nominal supremacy.⁸⁵

Sultan Mahmud II's (1808-1839) position in the Balkans (and more importantly, his relationship with Ali) became acute with the start of the Greek Revolution in 1821. Great Power sympathy for the Greeks resulted in significant European assistance to the Greek rebels, and therefore significantly complicated the Sultan's efforts to quell the revolt. Facing such a revolt, Mahmud II requested Mehemet Ali's assistance in 1824; as compensation, the Sultan promised Ali the island of Crete. Ali sent his forces to Greece, and subsequently defeated the Greek rebels in several important battles, but did not end the revolt. The Great Powers sought a mediated solution to the Greek conflict when they met for the London Conference (1827). The conference did not produce the desired end to the war, and the Great Powers quickly attacked the Empire, destroying the Ottoman/Egyptian naval forces at the Battle of Navarino on 20 October 1827.⁸⁶ Ottoman difficulties increased substantially as the Greek War of Independence spilled over to a new war between Russia and Turkey (the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829).⁸⁷ Although

⁸⁵ Ochsenwald, 279-281.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 273.

⁸⁷ The details of this cannot detain us here, but the Sublime Porte declared war on Russia, but only Russia. The reason for this, according to one scholar, was that "his [the Sultan's] internal weakness made it essential for him to show his independence from Russia." See, Frederick W. Kagan, *The Military Reforms of Nicholas I: The Origins of the Modern Russian Army* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 78.

Russia and the Ottoman Empire were at war, the Russians waged a “peculiar kind of war”⁸⁸ in which they did not involve themselves in the principal Ottoman territories but fought in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea.⁸⁹

The Greek War of Independence and the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 ended with the Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) in 1829. This treaty, signed by Russia and the Sublime Porte, reestablished the boundaries as they existed before the war (no territorial gain for the Russians) and required the Sublime Porte to pay an enormous indemnity to Russia. Additionally, it provided for Russian “protection” to the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, required the Sublime Porte to recognize the Treaty of London (which established an independent Greece, ultimately under a Bavarian king, Otho I), provided the Russians further rights to protect the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans, and, most significantly re-opened the Straits to Russian commercial traffic.⁹⁰ Importantly, Russia consequently recognized the benefit of preserving a weak Ottoman

⁸⁸ Ochsenwald, 273.

⁸⁹ Ibid. Although Ochsenwald does not offer an explanation, it is reasonable to consider the balance of power as the reason Russia did not extend herself into Turkey proper. Had Russia invaded the heart of the Ottoman Empire, the other Great Powers likely would have considered Russia to have broken the balance of power.

⁹⁰ Stefan K. Pavlowitch. *A History of the Balkans, 1804-1945* (New York: Longman, 1999), 44-47; Jelavich, 88-89; and Ochsenwald 273-274. Pavlowitch discusses the extension of Russian influence in the Danubian Principalities on 48-50. Also see, Nicolaw Ciachir, “The Adrianople Treaty (1829) and its European Implications,” *Revue des Études sud-est Européennes* 17 (1979): 706-713. Othon’s selection as the first king of Greece had tremendous problems and was only made after other royal families declined the invitation, but it did reflect the connection that many in Bavaria felt with Greece, see: Richard Stoneman, “German Scholars and Otho’s Greece,” *Dialogos* 4 (1997): 70-82; Barbra Jelavich, “Russia, Bavaria, and the Greek Revolution of 1862-1863,” *Journal of Balkan Studies* 2 (1961): 125-150 (hereafter cited as Jelavich (Balkan)); and, Suzanne Marchand, *Down from Olympus: Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany, 1750-1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

Empire on its southern border, and Tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855) ordered his plenipotentiary to prevent the destruction of Turkey and not to permit Russian troops to enter Constantinople unless the representatives of the Ottoman Empire refused to sign the treaty.⁹¹ The Russian goal became “a policy of intimidation...the Sultan had to fear Russia more than any other power, and he had to be willing to turn his policy to suit Russia at all times.”⁹² This policy of controlling decisions in Constantinople through intimidation became one of two tactics that the Russians employed, into the twentieth-century, to affect the decisions of the Ottoman government; the other was by supporting the Balkan states in their perpetual effort to separate from the Ottoman Empire.⁹³ Additionally, the French and the British also recognized the benefit of maintaining the Ottoman Empire, believing it the most efficacious method of impeding Russian penetration of the Eastern Mediterranean.⁹⁴ Thus, the Treaty of Adrianople had three important consequences for the geopolitical condition of the Eastern Mediterranean: first, it recognized an independent Greece and thus led to a new era in Balkan relations with the Ottoman Empire; second, it led to a shift in relations between the Ottoman Empire and Europe; and finally, it represented an agreement on behalf of all the existing Great

⁹¹ Nicholas I wanted to occupy Constantinople, but he yielded to his advisors and elected not to, instead agreeing to decide the fate of the Ottoman Empire with the other Powers. See, Ian W. Roberts, *Nicholas I and the Russian Intervention in Hungary* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 5-8.

⁹² Ibid., 83.

⁹³ Edward C. Thaden, *Interpreting History: Collective Essays on Russia's Relations with Europe*, Social Science Monographs, vol. 24 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 99.

⁹⁴ Ciachir, 703 and 696.

Powers of the importance of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman government and its principal territories.

Although the Treaty of Adrianople brought a resolution to the immediate conflicts facing the Ottoman Empire, the Empire stood on the precipice of a new conflict, one that catalyzed the British decision to establish itself as the chief imperial power in the Ottoman Empire. This conflict developed from the promise Mahmud II made to Mehemet Ali when the former asked the latter for assistance against the Greek rebels. As payment for this service, Mahmud II promised Ali Crete, but because of the new Greek state this was no longer possible; consequently Ali occupied Syria. Although the initial extension of Ali's territory (into Syria) did not cause much concern in European capitals (France had the most concern but did not send troops), Ali's subsequent orders to march towards Constantinople caused Mahmud II to plead for the European powers to intervene; only Russia responded.⁹⁵ Reflecting on the decision not to aid Mahmud II, the British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston (1830-1841) wrote:

What Metternich says of our shirking from helping the Sultan when Mehemet was at Acre [a city in western Anatolia] and when a word might have stopped the Pasha [Mehemet Ali] without a blow is perfectly true, and *there is nothing that has happened since I have been in this office which I regret so much as that tremendous blunder of the English Gov[ernment]*(emphasis added).⁹⁶

Palmerston's regret over the British decision not to assist Mahmud II, when Mehemet Ali posed his greatest threat to the Ottoman Empire, developed, principally,

⁹⁵ Ochsenwald, 275.

⁹⁶ Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841: Britain, the Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question*, vol. 1(New York: Humanities Press, 1969), 283.

from the privileges granted to Russia in the Treaty of Hünkiâr İskelesi (Unkiar Skelessi) (1833, signed between Russia and the Sublime Porte) as a reward for Russian assistance against Ali.⁹⁷ Although this treaty purported to be nothing more than a defensive alliance between the two countries, it was simultaneously more than that and *the catalyst for the British to establish themselves as the dominant power in the Ottoman Empire.*⁹⁸ The reason the British reacted with such enmity towards this treaty was that it provided the Russians a pretext to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The alliance required the two powers to assist each other if one of them became involved in a defensive war; the British feared that Mehemet Ali would attack the Ottoman Empire, Russia would come to the aid of the Porte, and would occupy Constantinople and the Straits, never surrendering them (and thus, imperiling the British “overland” route to India). Additionally, the treaty contained a secret (albeit well known) clause, which relieved the Sublime Porte of its obligation to provide military aid to Russia. Instead, the treaty required the Sublime Porte to “close the strait of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever.”⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Ochsenwald, 275; and Hurewitz, 252-253.

⁹⁸ Although British historians do not always claim that the British became the imperial power in the Ottoman Empire, they do recognize that 1833, specifically the Treaty of Hünkiâr İskelesi forever changed the British policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the Eastern Question. See: Frederick Stanley Rodkey, “Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-1841,” *The Journal of Modern History* 1 (1929): 573. Although dated, many books and articles still rely on this two part, fifty-five page, article on Palmerston and the Ottoman Empire.

⁹⁹ Hurewitz, 253. The Russians feared that if foreign ships could sail into the Black Sea while Russia was at war, then Russia could be attacked from the South. However, the British feared that the intention of this treaty was to extend Russian territory south, and thus they feared for their “overland” route to India. There is some evidence to indicate that Nicholas was not interested in extending himself south. See, David Saunders, *Russia*

Because a primary British strategic concern for the Near East was that Russian warships be prevented from entering the Mediterranean and that British ships could operate in the Black Sea, the British viewed this treaty as a threat to their position in the Eastern Mediterranean and, thus, their ability to communicate with India.¹⁰⁰ Consequently, the British government responded to the treaty on 26 August 1833 with a note of protest from Lord Palmerston to the Sublime Porte stating: “That Treaty appears to Her Majesty’s Government to produce a change in relations between Turkey and Russia, to which other European states are entitled to object...if that treaty should hereafter lead to the armed interference of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, the British Government will hold itself at liberty to act...”¹⁰¹

Palmerston’s reaction to the Treaty of Hünkiâr İskelesi developed out of the British recognition of the strategic importance of a stable Egypt and Eastern Mediterranean. The principal British concern was that the Ottoman territories, due to the weakness of the Ottoman government and military, would fall into Russian hands and thus threaten the “overland” route to India.¹⁰² The stability of these areas was important

in the Age of Reaction and Reform, 1801-1881, Longman History of Russia, ed. Harold Shukman, no. 5 (New York: Longman, 1992), 188.

¹⁰⁰ Barbara Jelavich, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914*, Lippincott History Series, ed. Robert F. Byrnes (Philadelphia: Lippincott and Company, 1964), 55 (hereafter cited as Jelavich, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy*).

¹⁰¹ Hurewitz, 254.

¹⁰² Jelavich, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy*, 55. While the British feared an extension of Russian influence into the Ottoman Empire, Jelavich contends that the Russians recognized the difficulties in administering and defending such a large territory, and, thus, she contends that the Russian government coveted pieces of the Ottoman Empire rather than the entire whole, as many British officials feared.

to the British because the “overland” route, via Suez (approximately eighty miles from Cairo to Suez) had developed into the primary route for communications between England and India. While much bulk traffic traveled between India and Britain via the Cape of Good Hope, the “overland route” became popular not only with travelers (in spite of the challenges of crossing the desert), but also critical in achieving the fastest possible communications between London and India.¹⁰³ As previously mentioned, this route reduced the time it took for correspondence to be sent to India (and answered) from two years to approximately one-hundred days.¹⁰⁴ However, maintaining this important access to India required that the British be able to travel to Suez unmolested. The British preferred not to formally control this land; Palmerston wrote the Earl of Cromer regarding the proposed British colonization of Egypt: “We do not want Egypt, or wish it for ourselves, any more than any rational man with an estate in the north of England and a residence in the south would have wished to possess the inns on the north road. All he could want would have been that the inns should be well-kept...”¹⁰⁵ Palmerston also wrote to the British Minister in Naples, William Temple, in 1833 “[that] Turkey is as

¹⁰³ Hoskins, 233 and 268. Hoskins provides a long detailed history of the development of the overland routes, but what is important here is to see the strategic value of Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean and the importance of these routes even once the Cape route to India became popular more than the history of the development of the overland routes themselves. The Italians and French had an established interest in the Red Sea, see: Foreign Office, *Documents on British Foreign Policy* vol. 8 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1919), 273-295 (hereafter cited: DBFP: I:B:volume number, page number).

¹⁰⁴ Blyth, 68-69 and 75.

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in, Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1916), 92, note 1.

good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign [Mehemet Ali] would be...”¹⁰⁶

By 1833 the preservation of the land route over Egypt from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea had become the principal British strategic goal (and the establishment of the British in Aden (1839) and Gibraltar (1830) provided two of the three strategic locations that the British required). Maintaining this access did not necessitate colonization of Egypt, but instead, required reducing the established Russian influence in Constantinople, which also required British control over Mehemet Ali (whom the British believed, appropriately, to be the most likely power to challenge the Ottoman Empire, under the Treaty of Hünkiâr İskelesi if a power attacked the Ottoman Empire, the Russia had a treaty obligation to help defend the Ottoman Empire, which meant Russian troops into Constantinople and, in the British estimation, a permanent Russian occupation of the Straits). Should the Russians control the Straits and occupy Constantinople the British believed that the “overland” route would be compromised. Moreover, in spite of Russian assurances that they had no intention of invading India, the extension of Russian influence into Afghanistan in 1838 (under Dost Mohammed), after the collapse of the Persian Empire, exacerbated the British fear of Russian expansion into India.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Henry Lytton Bulwer, *The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston: With Selections from his Diaries and Correspondence* vol. 2 (London: Richard Bentley Publishers, 1870), 145. Palmerston also expressed his concern about the proposed expansion of Mehemet Ali’s kingdom.

¹⁰⁷ Hoskins, 275-276. Indian troops entered Afghanistan in 1839, occupying Kandahar and Kabul to arrest this Russian threat, see Hoskins, 276-277. The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842) is interesting for many reasons, not the least of which is that the British did poorly and many historians consider them to have “lost.” However, the details of this war are mostly beyond the scope of this dissertation. What is important to understand, however, is that the British understood the Russians to be a serious and legitimate threat

Consequently, the Treaty of Hünkiâr İskelesi, which provided Russia conditions that made her the dominant power in Constantinople, and permitted Russian troops to enter the Ottoman Empire if the latter were attacked (and an attack from Mehemet Ali was always a possibility) threatened the English position in India. As the most important colonial possession in the British Empire, threats to connections between India and London could not be tolerated. Moreover, the increasingly close relationship between France and Mehemet Ali, as well as French expansion into Algeria and Tunis further threatened the British position, as they feared that the Mediterranean might become “a French lake.”¹⁰⁸ Thus, the confluence of the Russian position in Constantinople, French expansion in North Africa, the unpredictability of Mehemet Ali, and the necessity of British travel overland in Egypt from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea created the circumstances that forced the British to overcome their hesitance to establish themselves as the dominant imperial power in the Ottoman Empire.

Faced with the recognition that the Russian threat in the Ottoman Empire had to be curtailed and also recognizing that Mehemet Ali had to be stabilized, the British began a series of diplomatic maneuvers that culminated in the Balta Liman Commercial Convention between Britain and the Ottoman Empire (signed on 16 August 1838, hereafter called the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838, described in Chapter IV). This convention established the British as the chief imperial power in the

to India. See: James A. Norris, *The First Anglo-Afghan War 1838-1842* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 3-31; George De Lancy Evans, *On the Practicability of an Invasion of British India and on the Commercial and Financial Prospects of the Empire* (Cambridge: J.M. Richardson, 1829); also see Christine Noelle, *State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826-1863)*, (Surrey, United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1997), 39-59.

¹⁰⁸ Hoskins, 270.

Ottoman Empire and restrained the Ottoman ambitions of both Russia and Mehemet Ali. Although this agreement was a commercial agreement it advanced the British interest in maintaining the territorial and governmental integrity of the Ottoman Empire by increasing trade, and thus theoretically also increasing revenue, to the Ottoman government (although the treaty did not always work as intended).

The British success in the Ottoman Empire between 1838 and 1880 should not obscure the challenges that the Russians continued to present to the Ottoman Empire. The most important such example (although there were others) was the Crimean War (1853-1856), in which the British and French supported the Ottomans to limit further Russian influence in the Empire. However, the treaty that resulted from the war was more important than the war itself. This treaty (and the subsequent Treaty of Paris, 1856, which reaffirmed the original treaty that concluded the Crimean War) instituted what historians have come to call the “Crimean System.” The Treaty of Paris formally brought the Ottoman Empire into the Concert of Europe, and guaranteed that the treaty’s signatories would protect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and Russia had to restrict severely its naval strength (even bases) in the Black Sea.¹⁰⁹ Britain, France, and Russia further codified the “Crimean System” on 29 April 1856 with a new treaty in which the signatories explicitly guaranteed the territorial and governmental integrity of the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁰ Consequently, the treaties that concluded the Crimean War, as well as the treaties of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), Adrianople (1829), and Hünkiâr İskelesi

¹⁰⁹ Huerwitz, 319; W.E. Mosse, *The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, 1855-1871: The Story of a Peace Settlement* (New York: Macmillen, 1963), 31-33.

¹¹⁰ Huerwitz, 319.

(1833), discouraged and then prevented any of the European Powers from establishing formal colonies in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, a component of the British “Crimean System” directed the British to go to war to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire (meaning going to war to prevent any power from establishing formal colonies in the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire).¹¹¹ This prohibition, based principally on the strategic locations within the Empire and the interest in maintaining the European balance of power, required the British to develop a specific method to extend their imperial influence into the Ottoman Empire; a model that the Germans adopted, almost without revision, in 1880 and used until 1908 (and in some cases until 1914).

Although it is easy to perceive the British as replacing the Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire following the Balta Liman Commercial Convention, the Russians remained a powerful influence and threat to the Ottoman Empire. However, after 1838, the British influence in Constantinople superseded that of Russia; as British officials furthered their influence with the Sublime Porte, the British grew to be the most important power in the region. While the British never formally challenged the Sublime Porte’s sovereignty, the British increasingly became an important imperial power in the Ottoman Empire. The subsequent chapter discusses this relationship in three specific areas: economics and trade, military, and the teaching of imperialism in Britain. The importance of considering the British example so carefully is that in the 1870s the Germans appropriated this model (almost without revision) as they extended themselves into the Ottoman Empire.

¹¹¹ H. Bayram Soy, “Wilhelm II, Weltpolitik, and Abdülhamid II,” *The Turks* 4 (2002): 304.

CHAPTER IV

THE BRITISH MODEL OF IMPERIALISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1838-1880

The signing of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838 signaled the beginning of British imperial supremacy in the Ottoman Empire. While Russia and France remained active in Ottoman affairs, the British operated as the most powerful and influential imperial power in the Ottoman Empire until at least the 1880s, when German imperial influence became increasingly assertive. Through this position, the British secured their “overland” route to the Red Sea (and after 1869 the Suez route) and opened the Ottoman Empire to an increasingly mercantile trade relationship. Moreover, during this period, the character of the Ottoman government changed, as it embraced western financial and military reforms, extended its influence into provinces that it had not effectively governed for decades, and facilitated the construction of railroads, ports, and roads. Each of these changes accelerated the extension of Great Power imperialism in the Empire, and cumulatively permit England, France, and Germany to be considered imperial powers in the Ottoman Empire.

This chapter is an examination of the model of imperialism that the British imposed on the Ottoman Empire from 1838 until 1880; however, as described in the previous chapter, the other European powers regulated the potency and character of imperialism in the Ottoman Empire (through the system of treaties developed from 1774 to 1856). Although the British remained an imperial power in the Ottoman Empire until the beginning of the First World War, this chapter considers British imperial activity in

the Ottoman Empire only up to 1880.¹¹² The chapter concludes with 1880 because, in subsequent years, the British imperial influence in the Empire flagged and the Germans rapidly replaced the British as the most important imperial power in the Empire. Thus, the subsequent three chapters consider German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire (beginning in 1880), which the latter based on an appropriation of the British model described in this chapter. As German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire is considered, its deviations from the British model will be explained.

This examination of the British model of imperialism is predicated on the notion that the Great Powers expected the Ottoman Empire to collapse.¹¹³ This model was based on the demise of the Ottoman Empire, because, while the model permitted the Great Powers to impose imperialism on the Empire, it prohibited the establishment of formal colonies (in the principal areas of the Ottoman Empire) as long as the Empire continued to exist.¹¹⁴ In fact, as British involvement in the Ottoman Empire waned after 1880, the British worried that if the Ottoman Empire collapsed that they “would not have

¹¹² Eighteen-eighty is only appropriate in some circumstances. The discussion of the British model of finances ends in 1878, just before the Congress of Berlin. The other topics considered here end in 1880.

¹¹³ A balance existed between the assumption that the Ottoman Empire would collapse and the desire to preserve it. Once the British established themselves as the most important imperial powers in the Empire, they sought to preserve the Ottoman state as long as possible (provided it did not require massive British intervention). However, the British model of imperialism described here was predicated on the idea that the Empire would fall, and that the imperial powers would then become colonial powers.

¹¹⁴ See: Letter, Joseph C. Grew (American Ambassador) to Secretary of State (Frank B. Kellogg), 3 October 1929, NARA, R.G. 59, 767.90d 15/14, 5. Grew referenced the competition between the European powers for position in the Ottoman Empire before the First World War.

the economic basis, with which to justify a political intervention.”¹¹⁵ Although the model required the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the imperial powers were frequently satisfied not to hasten (and indeed they often sought to retard) this collapse, as they were satisfied with their established position. Indeed, the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention, and other British efforts to bolster the authority and prestige of the Sultan’s government, represented a British effort to support the Ottoman Empire and to prevent it from collapsing. With the establishment of the “overland” route, the British possessed the strategic territories in the Ottoman Empire that mattered the most to them. Had the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the British position would have been endangered (The British had nothing to gain, and something to lose, if the Empire collapsed. By 1838 they controlled all the strategic locations important to them, but they could not be sure that they would control these same areas if the Ottoman Empire collapsed).

Indeed, the model worked as the Great Powers anticipated; when the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the British and French (the only European Great Powers who could make a claim for new colonial territory) used their recognized imperial positions to establish themselves as formal colonial powers in the Ottoman territories.¹¹⁶ Although the Germans never established a formal colony in the Ottoman Empire, their imperial activity adhered closely to this model; had the Central Powers been victorious in the First World War, the Germans would have been well positioned to establish themselves as a colonial

¹¹⁵ K.A. Hamilton, “An Attempt to form an Anglo-French ‘Industrial Entente’” *Middle Eastern Studies* 11 (1975): 49-50. Economic imperialism was a principal element of this model.

¹¹⁶ The Young Turk Movement made colonialism in present day Turkey difficult, so European colonies did not develop there; however the European powers formally divided much of the rest of the Empire among themselves.

power in the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁷ Indeed, the American Ambassador to Turkey in 1915, Hans Morgenthau, wrote, regarding a potential German victory: “if Germany wins [the war], she will have such a preponderating position in this country [Turkey] that she [Germany] will practically govern Turkey.”¹¹⁸

The examination of the British model of imperialism in the Ottoman Empire will consider three areas of British (and later German) influence: first, economic influence; second, political and military influence and the educational reforms that accompanied them; and, third, the teaching of imperialism in Europe through the appropriation and display of cultural artifacts. Specifically, this model of imperialism permitted the British to dominate trade with the Ottoman Empire, control its finances and fiscal policy, contribute to the restoration of the Ottoman military, dramatically alter the Ottoman educational system (so that it was increasingly secular and western), to develop and exploit transportation networks (railroads, ports, and roads), as well as appropriate major cultural artifacts (sometimes against Ottoman law). The cumulative consequence of these incursions into Ottoman sovereignty permits historians to recognize imperialism even when the British (and later the Germans) did not establish colonies or assert a strong public claim to the imperial territory.

Before considering the specific elements of the British model of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire, it is useful to briefly recall the components of Robinson and

¹¹⁷ Letter, Myron T. Herrick (American Ambassador to France) to Secretary of State (Charles Hughes), 21 November 1922, NARA, R.G. 59, 767.90d 15/4, 1. This letter references the ambition for the “retention of Mosul by the British.”

¹¹⁸ Letter, Hans Morgenthau (American Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire) to Secretary of State, 22 December 1915, NARA, R.G. 59, 762.67½, 2.

Gallagher's "Free Trade of Imperialism," which include (this definition of imperialism does not require all of the components to be fulfilled):

- 1) The exertion of power or diplomacy to impose and sustain free trading conditions on another society against its will;
- 2) the exertion of capital or commercial attraction to bend economic organization and direction of growth in directions complementary to the needs and surpluses of the expanding economy;
- 3) the exertion of capital and commercial attraction directly upon foreign governments to influence them toward cooperation and alliance with the expanding country;
- 4) the direct intervention or influence of the export-import sector interests upon the politics of the receiving country in the direction of collaboration and political-economic alliance with the expanding power;
- 5) the taking over by European bankers and merchants of sectors of non-European domestic economies under cover of imposed free trade without accompaniment of large capital or export inputs from Europe, as in China.¹¹⁹

Although Robinson and Gallagher did not require all of these to be fulfilled for imperialism to exist, the British model will incorporate almost every component of this system, and in some cases greatly exceed it. However, it is important to note that the British (in concurrence with Robinson and Gallagher's theory) sought to exert control without the establishment of formal colonies. Based on this definition of imperialism, as well as Said's recognition that, in the nineteenth-century, imperialism preceded colonialism, this chapter will consider the imposition of imperialism on the Ottoman Empire, beginning with the so-called "British model" in 1838.

Before considering this British model of imperialism, it is worth noting the important domestic changes in the Ottoman Empire that contributed to the rise of European imperialism; specifically, the nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms focused on incorporating recent European advances in technology and finance into the established

¹¹⁹ Louis, 3-5.

Ottoman system. The Ottomans referred to these reforms as the *Tanzimat* reform movement (conventionally, simply the *Tanzimat*), and they lasted from 1836 until the eighteen-seventies; their principal goal was the preservation of the Ottoman state and the protection of its Muslim citizens.¹²⁰ These *Tanzimat* reforms, and the ones concurrently imposed by European imperialist powers, provided (among other things) the Ottoman Empire with its first fiscal budget (1862), brought western military tactics and weapons to the Empire (as well as European educational systems to make these military reforms practical, specifically the teaching of science and European languages), and led to the development of the first Ottoman constitution (1878), all of which facilitated European imperialism.

British Economic and Commercial Influence in the Ottoman Empire up to 1878

Stable economic relations between England and the Ottoman Empire originated in the Early Modern Period. However, during the eighteenth-century, British commercial relations with the Empire (which had been among the strongest in Europe) declined. Writing in 1799, William Eton described British trade with the Ottoman Empire in the following way: “Formerly, the trade to Turkey was of considerable importance to this country [England], but of late years it had been languishing, and at last dwindled into a state of insignificance, when the present war [Napoleonic Wars] entirely put a stop to all

¹²⁰ Hale, 17. Conventionally, the foreign minister, Mustafa Reşit Pasha (1800-1858) is credited with developing the *Tanzimat*. The Ottoman government employed an “intellectual ploy” to justify embracing European reforms and influence: that European advances originated from knowledge of the classics and depended on science and literature that had been preserved by the Islamic world during the Middle Ages. See: Shaw, *Possessors and Possessed*, 95.

communication with the ports of the Levant.”¹²¹ During the eighteenth-century, French commercial relations with the Levant surpassed those of the British; however, the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt convinced many officials in the Porte of French imperial ambitions for the Ottoman Empire, thus damaging the relationship. While this tension between the French and the Porte provided an opportunity for the British, British trade did not enjoy unqualified success following the Napoleonic Wars. An important explanation for the temporary decline of British trade with the Ottoman Empire (after the Napoleonic Wars) relates to the decision (guided by the Foreign Secretary, George Canning, who had a strong interest in the Levant) to dissolve the Levant Company, which had an established monopoly on trade between the Levant and England. This decision (based on the arguments of free trade,¹²² with the idea that British trade would expand beyond the capacity of the Levant Company) not only slowed trade relations between England and the Ottoman Empire, but it also temporarily weakened the British political position in the Near East. The revocation of the Levant Company’s charter contributed to a diminished British political position, because, until its demise, the company had funded

¹²¹ William Eton, *A Survey of the Turkish Empire* (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies Publishers, 1799), 472.

¹²² Free trade was an important idea in nineteenth-century British international commerce. Generally, this meant that both the British government and foreign governments did not involve themselves in private commercial relations between citizens of their respective countries. However, in the Ottoman Empire notable exceptions developed. See: D. McLean, “British Finance and Foreign Policy in Turkey: The Smyrna-Aidin Railway Settlement 1913-1914,” *The Historical Journal* 2 (1976): 521; for information on the British aversion to involvement in private commercial affairs, see: D.C.M. Platt, *Finance Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815-1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). The important thing to note is that dissolving the Levant Company fit within the broader scheme of nineteenth-century British commercial relations.

and staffed all the British embassies and consulates in the Ottoman Empire.¹²³ Thus, as Europe emerged from the Napoleonic Wars, the English had a weak commercial and political position in the Ottoman Empire.

Although the English had a limited commercial and political position in the Ottoman Empire after the Napoleonic Wars, in the later eighteen-twenties and eighteen-thirties, the British position in the Ottoman Empire improved, and even surpassed that of the other European powers, of which Russia and France were the most influential.¹²⁴ The British position improved due to the confluence of official interest in developing and then protecting the “overland” route and a simultaneous increase in interest in the Near Eastern markets, largely due to their increasing economic accessibility. The British considered economic accessibility particularly important because the economic theory

¹²³ Alfred C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1964), 199-203; “A Meeting of the Directors of the Levant Company was Held Yesterday,” *Times* (London), 12 February 1825, 4:a. The Levant Company formerly controlled British representation in Turkey; the company even had the responsibility of paying the members of the consular and embassy staff, including the ambassador. See G.R. Bridge, “English Dragomans and Oriental Secretaries: The Early Nineteenth-Century Origins of Anglicization of the British Embassy Drogtnat in Constantinople,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 14 (2003): 137-152. The Levant Company received its royal charter in 1581 to advance English trade relations with the Levant. See, A. Üner Turgay, “Ottoman-British Trade Through the Southeastern Black Sea Port During the Nineteenth-Century,” *Économie et Sociétés dans l’Empire Ottoman (fin du XVIII^e –début du XX^e siècle)* 22 (1983): 297. The French also disbanded their *Compagnie d’Afrique* at the same time and for similar reasons. See: Charles Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 62 (hereafter cited as: Issawi, “Middle East and North Africa”).

¹²⁴ Although this dissertation (and other publications) appropriately considers Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire to have diminished after 1838, it is a mistake to ignore Russia. Russian influence will remain important, and even critical. Moreover, Russian ambition for territory and influence in the Ottoman Empire will lead to the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, which produced the Treaty of San Stefano that was revised by the Congress of Berlin (1878). This conflict existed between governments as well as between merchants.

that directed British commercial (and political) affairs in the post-Napoleonic World emphasized achieving “free trade.” This economic theory postulated that if no restrictions on trade existed, then British commercial superiority would permit British commercial interests to dominate trade (this is also, clearly, an important element in Robinson and Gallagher’s “Imperialism of Free Trade.”).

The 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention (also known as the Balta Liman Convention, which the British pressured the Sultan into signing, based on threats from Mehemet Ali;¹²⁵ hereafter, cited as “the convention” when appropriate) established the formal agreement for the development of a “free trade” relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Britain. Among other things, the treaty included the following provisions: abolition of all state monopolies and state regulatory activities, British merchants received an exemption to taxes that the Ottoman government imposed on internal trade, and British merchants received the right to buy and sell goods at any price that they wished.¹²⁶ Although the terms of this treaty appear to favor the British (overwhelmingly), it is worth noting that the treaty also fit within the economic theory that governed Ottoman economic affairs in this period (discussed below). Additionally, it can be argued that while the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838 represented the imposition of free trade on the Ottoman Empire, the Convention also crystallized British interests in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire (especially after the British secured the “overland” route). Lord Palmerston contended

¹²⁵ Hurewitz, 265-266.

¹²⁶ Oya Köymen, “The Advent and Consequences of Free Trade in the Ottoman Empire,” *Etudes Balkaniques* 2 (1971): 49; Hurewitz, 265-266.

that “free trade” would intensify commercial opportunities for the Ottoman government, thus providing increased financial resources, which would permit the Porte to develop a stronger army (which would be trained by British officers).¹²⁷ Thus, the British believed “free trade” would contribute to the protection of the Ottoman Empire.

While British trade with the Ottoman Empire increased significantly after the 1838 Convention, this agreement was, at least in part, a successful effort to retard Russian commercial and political activities in the Ottoman Empire and, thus, secure the “overland” route. However, the convention was simultaneously (and intentionally) an effective tool in limiting the power of Mehemet Ali, who remained, officially, a subject of the Sultan, and thus bound to the treaty (even if Ali could disobey the Sultan, he could not challenge the British, because of their powerful navy). This treaty limited Mehemet Ali, because he extracted significant revenues from state (Egyptian) monopolies. With the abolition of all monopolies in the Ottoman Empire, Mehemet Ali lost an important source of revenue, because between twenty-five and thirty-three percent of Ali’s revenue came from monopolies on foreign trade.¹²⁸ Although the Convention intended to curb the

¹²⁷ Engin Akarli, “The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions” (Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, 1976), 17.

¹²⁸ Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914*, Publications of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, ed. Richard L. Chambers, no. 13 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 74-75 (hereafter cited as: Issawi, *Economic History*). Issawi’s book is a documentary history, also see 92-95. Recall that the fear of Mehemet Ali invading the Ottoman Empire and Russia coming to the aid of the Sublime Porte was one of the most pressing concerns for the British. Ali could not thwart this Convention, because both the British and the Sublime Porte signed it. In Egypt, Ali deviated from the economic development occurring in the rest of the Ottoman Empire. He emphasized the construction of factories and increasing agricultural production, both of which he intended for export, and he attempted to limit imports (the opposite of the rest of the

ambitions of Russia and Mehemet Ali and thus secure the “overland” route, it had predictable, but important, consequences for the imposition of British imperialism on the Ottoman Empire. Among the consequences of the convention was the increased accessibility of Ottoman markets to the British.

Ottoman markets became accessible to the British partially due to the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention, but also because of the recent economic reforms within the Ottoman Empire, including the destruction of the famous Turkish Janissary Corps (1826). Although the Janissary Corps originally existed as a component of the Sultan’s military (and to some extent in the 1820s it still did), the Janissary had established impressive commercial privileges, and they had become elite merchants in the Ottoman cities. As local elite merchants, the Janissaries, who remained powerful because of their established military training and position within society, became the strongest advocates for Ottoman protectionism. The destruction of the Janissary Corps (1826) increased the accessibility of Ottoman markets and encouraged European trade.¹²⁹ Thus, the confluence of the destruction of the Janissary Corps and the signing of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention produced an unprecedented period of “free trade” and market accessibility in the Ottoman Empire. The British embraced the new commercial

Ottoman Empire, where imports were encouraged and exports discouraged). See: Issawi, *Middle East and North Africa*, 18-21.

¹²⁹ Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 763-765. Although the destruction of the Janissary Corps did arise from Janissary opposition to the introduction of European military techniques, the authors are correct to emphasize the commercial influence of the Janissary Corps, which many scholars recognize only in its military context.

environment in the Ottoman Empire and used it to establish themselves as the premier imperial power in the Ottoman Empire.¹³⁰

British trade dominance in the Ottoman Empire is most easily illustrated statistically.¹³¹ Ottoman trade with England increased from £ 4 million in 1829 to £ 54 million in 1876 and to £ 63 million in 1911, an increase of about fifteen times.¹³² Further, between 1800 and the rise of German influence in the 1880s, the British accounted for approximately twenty-five percent of Ottoman exports (mostly agricultural products) and provided between thirty and forty percent of the imports to the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the British controlled about fifty percent of the foreign investment in the Empire.¹³³ Finally, the year before the Convention, 437 British commercial ships, with a gross tonnage of 86,253, called at Constantinople; ten years later (1848) 1,397

¹³⁰ Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 763. Also see, Charles Issawi, “Iranian Trade, 1800-1914,” *Iranian Studies* 16 (1983): 230-234. Iran (the former Persian Empire), while different from the Ottoman Empire in many ways, had a similar trade policy and this policy had similar consequences.

¹³¹ For a detailed account of the growth of British trade in the Ottoman Empire see: Sevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913: Trade, Investment and Production* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

¹³² Charles Issawi, “Middle East Economic Development, 1815-1914: The General and the Specific,” in *The Modern Middle East: A Reader* eds. A. Hortani, P.S. Koury and M.C. Wilson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 183 (hereafter cited as Issawi, “Middle East Economic Development,”). This is a slower rate of growth than much of the world at the same time, but it still permitted the extension of British and German imperial power in the Ottoman Empire, and it played a larger part in the overall economy of the Ottoman Empire than trade did in India. Issawi, “Middle East Economic Development,” 184. Also see: Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002, reprint), 85.

¹³³ Jonathan Grant, “The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914,” *The Journal of Military History* 66 (2002): 10-11 (hereafter cited as Grant, “Sword of the Sultan”).

British ships with a tonnage of 358,422 called on the same port¹³⁴ (a trend that continued into the late 1860s¹³⁵).

Although the Porte welcomed their relationship with England because of the protection that the Convention provided against the rampant ambitions of Russia and Mehemet Ali, this Convention did not receive universal approbation within the Empire. Opposition to the treaty developed from the resulting, nearly unrestricted, European trade with the Ottoman Empire, which contributed significantly to the devastation of domestic commercial enterprises; the Porte sought to remedy this problem by increasing import duties.¹³⁶ However, due to the Capitulations granted in the eighteenth-century (addressed in Chapter III), the Porte had to seek European approval to raise its own import duties, which the latter consistently denied.¹³⁷ This European control over the tariffs and import duties was merely the beginning of the European command of Ottoman finances.

Recognition of the benefits accrued by the British under the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention propelled the French to seek a similar agreement, which the Porte granted on 25 November 1838. Eventually, most of the European commercial powers, including: Sardinia, Belgium, Sweden-Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, the

¹³⁴ Vernon John Puryear, *International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant, 1834-1853* (New York: Archon Books, 1969), 127.

¹³⁵ British trade with the Ottoman Empire expanded in the 1860s as a result of the American Civil War. As textile merchants could no longer rely on cotton from the American South, Egyptian cotton became an increasingly important component of the Anglo-Ottoman commercial exchange.

¹³⁶ Issawi, *Middle East and North Africa*, 19-20.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 20-21.

Zollverein, and Prussia (individually), signed similar treaties with the Porte (all between 1839 and 1841).¹³⁸ The willingness of the Porte to sign such treaties developed out of what Charles Issawi, the preeminent economic historian of the Ottoman Empire, called the Ottoman “antimercantilist policy.”¹³⁹ This “antimercantilist policy,” in the words of a nineteenth-century British observer “adopted the extreme reverse of the Spanish fallacies for enriching and aggrandizing a nation. If Spain determined to admit nothing produced by any other country than her own colonies, Turkey seized upon the fanciful idea of becoming rich, prosperous and mighty, by letting nothing go out of, and to let everything come freely into, her dominions...”¹⁴⁰ In reality, the relationship developed a mercantile complexion, because Britain exported its manufactured goods to the Empire and purchased raw materials, especially cotton, there. This commercial policy permitted the Powers to extend imperial influence by having commercial and economic monopolies in many parts of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴¹ The Ottoman Empire maintained this economic theory until the eighteen-sixties, when it began to seek to revise the treaties that originated from the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838. However, by the eighteen-sixties, the Powers had so fully established this relationship that it remained a reality until the beginning of the First World War.

While the development of trade relations between the Ottoman Empire and Britain (and Europe in general) is worthy of consideration; the greater issue, relating to

¹³⁸ Puryear, 126 and 127, ff. 68.

¹³⁹ Issawi, *Middle East and North Africa*, 17.

¹⁴⁰ Quoted in Issawi, *Middle East and North Africa*, 17.

¹⁴¹ Pamuk, 68-69.

European imperialism, was the growing economic dependence of the Ottoman Empire on European loans, specifically from Britain and France (later Germany). This dependence began in 1854 and continued until 1914.¹⁴² Great Power investment in the Ottoman Empire can be divided into two categories: 1) direct investment into enterprises (railroads, ports, etc.); and, 2) direct lending to the Ottoman government.¹⁴³ However, by 1914 most of the loans that the Empire accepted went to “commissions and charges, or [were] used to repay earlier debts, or to finance wars, or for indemnity payments, or [were] spent by monarchs in various unproductive ways.”¹⁴⁴ This economic condition fostered a dependant relationship between the Porte and the European Powers and permitted the latter—again principally Britain and France and later Germany, but also Austria-Hungary and Russia—to advance their imperial ambitions through the development of bureaucratic entities within the formal Ottoman government. The imperial Powers eventually established a monopoly on the printing of Ottoman currency, developed Ottoman financial policy, and regulated the income of the Ottoman government. This process began with the French and the British, but after 1871, increasingly involved the Germans. Thus, while all of the Great Powers involved themselves in trade with the Ottoman Empire, it was the British, French, and German

¹⁴² Olive Anderson, “Great Britain and the Beginnings of the Ottoman Public Debt, 1854-1855,” *The Historical Journal* 7(1964): 47-63.

¹⁴³ Pamuk, 55.

¹⁴⁴ Charles Issawi, “Middle East Economic Development,” 181.

domination and control of the Ottoman economy that facilitated the imposition of European imperialism on the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴⁵

While British trade with the Ottoman Empire influenced imperial activity, the most important components of British, as well as French and later German, economic imperialism in the Ottoman Empire were the Imperial Ottoman Bank and the Public Debt Administration. These two organizations developed from loans extended by the British and the French to the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War (1853-1856). The Russian effort in the Crimean War to extend their influence into the Ottoman Empire catalyzed the concern of the British and the French about Russian interests in the Ottoman Empire and shattered Ottoman finances¹⁴⁶ (by the time the Ottomans began accepting loans from the West, the Ottoman government dedicated approximately seventy-percent of its regular revenues to maintaining the army).¹⁴⁷ Reacting to the fear

¹⁴⁵ Although trade relations between the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers do show mercantilism, these relations are not as compelling a case for imperialism as the loans and the subsequent economic control that France, England, Germany, and Austria-Hungary developed. However, the position that the European powers had (as the Ottoman Empire's major creditor) still permits analysis under Robinson and Gallagher's "Imperialism of Free Trade."

¹⁴⁶ André Autheman, *The Imperial Ottoman Bank* trans. J.A. Underwood (Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Center: Istanbul, 2002), 17. Also see, *DBFP*, vii: 36-109, which discusses the support provided by the Crown to the English bondholders. The Sultan and the Porte had resisted foreign loans for a long time, but the damage from the Crimean War forced them to surrender this position and accept loans from western bankers, see, Christopher Clay, *Gold for the Sultan: Western Bankers and Ottoman Finance 1856-1881: A Contribution to Ottoman and International Financial History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000): 26 (hereafter cited as Clay, *Gold for the Sultan*); Christopher Clay, Christopher Clay, "The Financial Collapse of the Ottoman State, 1863-1875," in Daniel Panzac (ed.) *Histoire Économique et sociale de l'Empire Ottoman ed de la Turquie (1326-1960). Actes du Sixième Congrès Internationale tenu à Aix-en-Provence du 1^{er} au Juillet 1992* (Paris, 1995):120 (hereafter cited as Clay, "Financial Collapse,").

¹⁴⁷ Grant, "Sword of the Sultan," 12.

of a Russian extension of power into the Ottoman Empire, the British sent armies to the Crimea, but, more importantly (for the purposes of considerations of economic imperialism), provided large loans to the Sublime Porte and, eventually, admitted the latter to the Concert of Europe, and thus guaranteed the integrity and continued existence of the Empire,¹⁴⁸ following the successful end of the conflict. Although these efforts temporarily, and in some cases for the long term, bolstered the ability of the Ottoman government to sustain itself, the acceptance of loans from Britain and France provided the latter with their most effective medium for the extension of Great Power imperialism into the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴⁹

Although the specifics of the loans made between the European Powers and the Porte are not themselves important, it is worth noting that the loans the banks that controlled these loans frequently floated these loans on the European markets and thus funded them through private means. Although private investors frequently funded the loans, the British public perceived these loans to have been endorsed by the government; a perception that inflamed tensions when the Porte defaulted on its foreign debts. As previously mentioned, the first loan from the European Powers to the Ottoman Empire occurred during the Crimean War (until this point, the Porte did not have foreign debt). This loan for £T (Turkish pounds)¹⁵⁰ 3.3 million represented the beginning of a transformation of Ottoman society and government. Following the influx of money from the 1854 loan, the Ottoman government contracted loans with the European Powers (or

¹⁴⁸ Clay, “Gold for the Sultan,” 47.

¹⁴⁹ DBFP, I:B:VII, 139.

¹⁵⁰ One Turkish pound equaled approximately £ 0.909 sterling, Owen, 104.

citizens of the European Powers) with increasing frequency and under increasingly poor terms (these loans were frequently, in fact predominantly made by private investors, but limited evidence indicates that the European Powers encouraged these loans).¹⁵¹ By 1877, the Ottoman government owed £T 268.8 million in loans, which required nearly thirty-percent of the regular Ottoman finances simply to service this debt.¹⁵² Not only was the Ottoman government hundreds of millions of pounds in debt, but its poor economic conditions required accepting more loans to service the debt that the Empire already had. This situation ended in 1875 when the Ottoman Empire announced the suspension of debt payments (discussed below).¹⁵³ The Ottoman Empire also had very little choice from whom to accept loans in the decades before the First World War—France, Britain, and Germany constituted the “chief capital exporting countries,”¹⁵⁴ and in 1914 their long term loans encompassed seventy-five percent of all the Empire’s outstanding international investments.

¹⁵¹ Blaisdell, 38.

¹⁵² Issawi, *Middle East and North Africa*, 65.

¹⁵³ Blaisdell, 35-37. Blaisdell contends that European imperialist ambitions in the Ottoman Empire did not manifest themselves through loans until after the 1875 suspension of debt payments. I disagree. The European interest in influencing the Ottoman Empire began earlier than that as the British sought to protect their “overland” route from the French and the Russians. However, I do agree that 1875 is an important date and that imposition of imperialism accelerated after that. Regardless, by the time the Germans become important holders of the Ottoman debt, Blaisdell and I agree that the financial arrangements between the European Powers and the Ottoman Empire constituted an imperial relationship.

¹⁵⁴ United Nations, *International Capital Movements During the Inter-War Period* (Lake Success, NY: United Nations, 1949), 1(hereafter cited as United Nations,).

The necessity of accepting loans from the British and French permitted the these Powers to impose themselves on the Ottoman government, and, specifically, to develop the Imperial Ottoman Bank (which was not administered by the Ottoman state, or even citizens of the Ottoman Empire, but rather, principally the French and the British, not even from Constantinople and the administrators represented private bond holders not the French or British government).¹⁵⁵ The Imperial Ottoman Bank originated out of the European insistence that the Ottoman government embrace European accounting standards and practices.¹⁵⁶ The Bank's bond holders¹⁵⁷ demanded such reforms because the disorganized financial structure of the Ottoman government did not permit oversight of the loans or an accurate understanding of the Ottoman financial condition. Henry L.

¹⁵⁵ This was not the first time western powers attempted to establish a bank in the Ottoman Empire, over the period from 1838 through the founding of the Imperial Ottoman Bank on 5 March 1863, several substantial attempts had been made for private western banks to establish themselves in the Ottoman Empire. These are not essential to the dissertation, except to note that the French and the British had banks there, and consequently when the Imperial Ottoman Bank was chartered, the Sultan insisted that both French and British interests participate so that neither country could exert itself too fully in the Ottoman Empire. See, Autheman, 30-48. The Imperial Ottoman Bank remains in existence today.

¹⁵⁶ Historian Christopher Clay contends that the Ottoman financial system was quite rational. However, Clay later claims in his book *Gold for the Sultan* that Ottoman financial decision making was based on “almost universal ignorance about finance among Ottoman ministers.” The chapter on the rational basis of Ottoman was not available for review, but interested scholars should see, Christopher Clay, “The Financial Collapse of the Ottoman State.” Note taken from Clay, *Gold for the Sultan*, 7, 15 and 575.

¹⁵⁷ It is important to emphasize that the Imperial Ottoman Bank represented the individuals who held bonds in the Ottoman Empire, and not (officially) the governments of England and France. However, while the Bank did not officially represent London and Paris, the relationship between the two was quite close. The Powers often extended themselves through private companies and individuals. These companies did not always place the imperial interests of the Powers first, and sometimes made sales that injured the imperialism of the Great Powers, see: *DBFP*, I:B:XVI, 7.

Bulwer, the English Ambassador to Constantinople, wrote Lord J. Russell in June 1860 regarding the structure of the Ottoman financial system:

The first thing necessary for Turkey is financial order, and the first step towards it was the framing of a regular budget. This as I have stated in a former dispatch has been done [Bulwer indicates in a footnote that he has not seen the budget].

...But what is still required is, a close examination into, and a strict control over, the State expenses on one side, and a better organization as to the collection and distribution of revenue on the other. The Sultan has promised me, in regard to the first, that each department shall be forced to furnish every detail of its proceedings to the Mixed Financial Commission [a commission with both European and Ottoman official on it to oversee financial affairs], of which I have often spoken, and which will shortly assume a more general and positive character; whilst, in regard to the second, the Government has, in a similar spirit, resolved that proper rules should be laid down by the aforesaid Commission, and efficiently carried out by a Finance Department, constituted in a new basis, and containing Europeans with special knowledge required for the task assigned them.¹⁵⁸

The reform in the Ottoman financial system that Ambassador Bulwer sought did not happen as quickly as he might have anticipated. However, the eventual development of the Imperial Ottoman Bank (5 March 1863) did bring remarkable reform and order to the Ottoman financial system. Interestingly, the Imperial Ottoman Bank did not develop out of pressure from either the British or French government; rather, it developed because the loans that the Empire attempted to float in 1860-1861 did not attract buyers (due to the chaos of Ottoman finances).¹⁵⁹ Without the backing of the Imperial Ottoman Bank

¹⁵⁸ DBFP, I:B:VII, 1-2; and “Treatment of Christians in Turkey,” *Times* (London), 20 March 1912, 12:b. Also see, DBFP, I:B:VII, 32 for more on the Mixed Economic Commission.

¹⁵⁹ The relationship between the Bank, its bondholders, and the European governments is difficult to ascertain. The various governments exerted themselves for the bondholders and used the Bank to advance the influence of specific states, but the relationship appears to have been informal.

(or the later Public Debt Administration), it became increasingly difficult for the Ottoman government to secure loans in Europe; eventually, almost every loan contracted by the Ottoman government came through one of these institutions. This importance gave the banks, their bondholders, and their respective government important political influence in the Empire. Consequently, seeking to establish this relationship, the Ottoman government promised the existing Ottoman Bank (a private British bank operating in the Ottoman Empire) the opportunity to become a “bank of issue,” if it would assist the Empire with a new loan. The loan succeeded, and after combining with the French interest in the Ottoman Empire so that neither the French nor the British would have too strong a position in Ottoman finances, the Ottoman Bank became the Imperial Ottoman Bank.¹⁶⁰

The agreement for the establishment of the Imperial Ottoman Bank (signed by the Ottoman Foreign Minister, among others) included the following provisions (among others): 1) the bank had a thirty-year monopoly on the issue of bank-notes; 2) the Ottoman government promised not to issue “paper money during the lifetime of that concession;” 3) in Constantinople the bank would be responsible for all of the operations of the Ottoman Treasury; 4) the bank would pay [out of Ottoman funds] the government’s domestic and foreign debts; 5) it would be the government’s “financial agent for both domestic and foreign purposes;” and, 6) the Ottoman government promised not to tax the bank.¹⁶¹ While the Bank’s actual decision making bodies and

¹⁶⁰ Autheman, 39-41.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 44-45. Christopher Clay, “Western Banking and the Ottoman Economy before 1890: A Story of Disappointed Expectations,” *The Journal of European Economic History* 28 (1999): 478 (hereafter cited as Clay, “Western Banking.”). Christopher Clay

leaders resided in London and Paris, it is mistaken to thus perceive that the Imperial Ottoman Bank was a remote administrator of Ottoman finances. While its decision makers resided in London and Paris, their representatives in Constantinople “had access to the government’s accounts, and indeed sometimes actually compiled them; they [the representatives of the decision makers] worked closely with Ottoman ministers and their senior officials...often meeting with them on a daily basis over long periods.”¹⁶² As citizens of the Ottoman Empire recognized the power of the foreign bankers, the Bank, in response to an outraged public, included a pasha as a token member of the decision making bodies.¹⁶³ In spite of the enormous concessions to the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the Sublime Porte still had a limited capability to refuse the Bank’s demands. However, as the Empire’s financial situation worsened, and the loans floated in Europe attracted

and André Autheman are the most authoritative scholars on the Imperial Ottoman Bank, both of whom have recently published a book on it. The Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Center (Istanbul) supported their research and published their books. Additionally, each has a number of articles on the subject. However, both have written rather narrow histories of the Bank and not devoted themselves to the connection between the bank and imperialism (although the topic is not totally ignored). The issue of the Imperial Ottoman Bank is one that scholars will find fruitful for study. An important reason why scholars have not devoted themselves to this important topic is that most of the archives from the London branch have been recently destroyed, and the archives in Paris are apparently quite narrow. Further, only recently have the documents in Istanbul been made available for scholars, but these are in Ottoman Turkish, and, consequently, beyond the linguistic abilities of many scholars of European imperialism. See, Edhem Eldem, “Archive Survey: The (Imperial) Ottoman Bank, Istanbul,” *Financial History Review* 6 (1999): 85-92. Also worth noting is Jacques Thobie, *Intérêts et impérialisme français dans l’Empire ottoman: 1895-1914* Série Sorbonne, vol. 4 (Paris: Impr. nationale, 1977); however this book obviously deals with France and it concentrates on a period outside the scope of the chronological interest of this chapter.

¹⁶² Clay, “Gold for the Sultan,” 4.

¹⁶³ Autheman, 41-42.

fewer investors, the position of the Bank in relation to the rest of the Ottoman government rose, especially after the failure of a loan in 1873 (discussed below).

As the original five year charter that administered relations between the Porte and the Bank expired, the two sought a new convention regulating relations between themselves. This new convention included all of the provisions of the original charter, but, the 1873 Convention provided the following additional powers to the Imperial Ottoman Bank: 1) to assuage foreign investors, the Bank accepted the responsibility to make sure the Ottoman debt was “maintained, [and] drawing the necessary funds” from the treasury; 2) it established branch offices; 3) included provisions that increased the profitability of the bank; and 4) the Bank had an *ex officio* representative on the commission that developed the official Ottoman budget.¹⁶⁴ Based on these provisions, the present historical expert on the Imperial Ottoman Bank, Christopher Clay, characterizes it as “perhaps the most powerful of the European financial institutions operating in the non-Western world.”¹⁶⁵ The Bank’s power grew as the Imperial Ottoman Bank absorbed other private European banks, including the Austro-Ottoman Bank,¹⁶⁶ operating in the Empire. The Bank simultaneously developed into the *trésorier-payeur général* for the entire Empire.¹⁶⁷ Historian Christopher Clay contends that the Bank had become so powerful with the addition of privileges (from the 1873 Convention) that “the

¹⁶⁴ Autheman, 75.

¹⁶⁵ Clay, “Western Banking,” 478.

¹⁶⁶ Autheman, 74-78.

¹⁶⁷ Christopher Clay, “The Imperial Ottoman Bank in the Later Nineteenth-Century: A Multinational “National” Bank?” in *Banks as Multinationals* (New York: Routledge Press, 1990), 145 (hereafter cited as Clay, “Multinational Bank,”).

arrangement amounted to a voluntary acceptance by the Porte of foreign supervision and, indeed control, of its finances.”¹⁶⁸

Although the Sultan, the European powers, and the bondholders of the Imperial Ottoman Bank were satisfied with the position of the Bank, members of the Ottoman government (as well as the previously mentioned Ottoman citizens) objected to the Bank’s power and influence, claiming that a foreign bank had “complete control over national income and expenditure.”¹⁶⁹ This internal opposition required the Sultan to seek to revise the relationship between the Bank and the Ottoman state. The specifics of this amendment are less important than the Sultan’s inability to achieve his goals, which sought to assert the authority of the state over the Bank. The Sultan could not force his new demands on the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and the Bank did not grant a single concession to the Sultan.¹⁷⁰

Although the Imperial Ottoman Bank was a powerful entity in 1875, the influence of European financial imperialism did not fully begin until the Sultan suspended payment on his debts, leading to the creation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (discussed in Chapter V). The Public Debt Administration (in which the Germans increasingly participated, was formed in the Decree of Muharrem (1881); it developed parallel to, but did not replace, the Imperial Ottoman Bank. However, as discussed below,

¹⁶⁸ Clay, “Gold for the Sultan,” 17. Clay completes the sentence quoted above with the following “an event which seems hitherto to have escaped the notice of historians.”

¹⁶⁹ Autheman, 80. Provincial leaders also objected because they traditionally collected revenue for the Sultan. However, the new agreement assigned this responsibility to the Imperial Ottoman Bank, both centralizing power in the Empire and expanding the influence of the Bank. See Autheman, 82.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 81.

the Public Debt Administration became a more assertive and imperialistic tool, extending its imperial powers beyond those of the Imperial Ottoman Bank.

British Involvement in Ottoman Construction, Military, and Governmental Affairs

As English commercial and economic imperialism began to exert itself in the eighteen-forties and fifties, the British began to involve themselves in the construction of a transportation network in the Ottoman Empire. The development of this transportation network, specifically railroads and ports, accelerated the extension of British (and quickly German) imperial influence in the Ottoman Empire. These railroads contributed to the acceleration of Great Power imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, because they permitted increased trade and mercantile commercial development as well as by extending economic (i.e. banking monopolies) influence in the area. The combination of financial (banking and trade) and transportation (railroad and ports) monopolies in areas of the Ottoman Empire tended to facilitate the ability of individual powers to identify specific areas of the Ottoman Empire as imperial territory. Additionally, the construction of these railroads increased the financial obligations owed by the Empire to the Powers. Finally, the concessions granted for the construction of these imperial railroads provided the imperial powers with limited ownership rights over lands adjacent to the tracks, sometimes as far as twenty kilometers on each side.¹⁷¹ The scale of this railroad development can be illustrated by the fact that, as late as 1850, the Ottoman Empire did

¹⁷¹ Owen, 197. One such example that Owen describes is mineral rights. This initially applied more to mining than petroleum, but by the twentieth-century these mineral rights were quite valuable.

not have a single railroad track,¹⁷² but, by 1900, the Empire (excluding Egypt) had seventy-five hundred kilometers of new track.¹⁷³ In addition to a non-existent rail system, the development of steam ships in the 1830s made the Empire's ports increasingly obsolete. Consequently, the Powers also constructed what became the four principal mid- and late nineteenth-century Ottoman ports. Between 1840 and 1914, the efforts and ambitions of the imperial Powers transformed the transportation network of the Ottoman Empire and accelerated the imposition of Great Power imperialism on the Empire.

Explaining these changes, Charles Issawi contends that three factors contributed to the European interest in developing a transportation network in the Ottoman Empire; these factors were: "the region's location, the pattern of growth of steam navigation, and the rivalries of the Great Powers."¹⁷⁴ Responding to these needs and conditions, the British, French, and Germans built nearly all of the railroads and ports within the Ottoman Empire between 1853 and 1914, and used this investment to extend their imperial influence in the Empire.

A clear precedent for the construction of railroads and transportation networks as tools of imperialism existed in British India; however, the relationship between railroads and imperialism extended beyond India and even beyond the boundaries of the British

¹⁷² Faroqhi, 804-805. It is important to note that Egypt was an exception to this. While it remained part of the Ottoman Empire, officially, by the 1860s it was so functionally independent, and, of course, in 1882 it becomes a formal British colony, that it is no longer considered as part of the Ottoman Empire. This is important because Egypt did have railroads and it built them quickly.

¹⁷³ Issawi, *The Economic History of Egypt*, 149.

¹⁷⁴ Issawi, "Middle East Economic Development," 181.

Empire.¹⁷⁵ In fact, Ronald Robinson (of the Robinson and Gallagher Controversy mentioned in Chapter II) contends that “Industrialized Europe cast its imperial influence over much of a still agrarian world in the half century before 1914 by building railways in other people’s countries.”¹⁷⁶ Although the British occasionally built railroads “merely” for economic gain, “the chief rational for building the railroad...[was that it] would serve as an arm of imperial strategy...”¹⁷⁷ Consequently, the construction of railroads and ports in the Ottoman Empire illustrates that while a particular form of imperialism was established for the Ottoman Empire, the differences between this form of imperialism and the general nineteenth-century imperialism were not so great as to obscure the imperial objective of the Europeans in the Ottoman Empire.

The parallels between the development of imperial railroads in the Ottoman Empire and India extended beyond the simple decision to build such railroads. The parallels extended to the planning and financing of the railroads, because, in both cases, the government in imperial territory maintained “the ultimate control over the quantity

¹⁷⁵ It is worth noting that the influence of this imperialism was not only in the imperial territory. This connection between railroads and imperialism was made in Britain as well. In 1830 the railroad station at Liverpool on the Liverpool and Manchester Railway was built to resemble the Gate of Grand Cairo and called the Moorish Arch. T.T. Bury completed a famous painting of this in 1831. See: Michael Freeman, *Railways and the Victorian Imagination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), ii-vi. Such expressions of imperialism are considered at the conclusion of this chapter, and more fully in chapter VI.

¹⁷⁶ Ronald E. Robinson, “Introduction: Railway Imperialism,” in *Railway Imperialism*, ed. Clarence B. Davis and Kenneth E. Wilburn with Ronald Robinson, Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies, no. 26 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 1. While this book covers Asia, Africa, India, and even South America, there is no article on the Middle East or the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁷⁷ Charles Miller, *The Lunatic Express: An Entertainment in Imperialism* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 2001), 7.

and direction of railway investment,”¹⁷⁸ although the railroads, in both India and the Ottoman Empire, were constructed to meet British imperial aims.¹⁷⁹ Moreover, in both territories, the local government financed the railroads through a combination of local funds and bonds floated in Europe (principally, but not exclusively, London).¹⁸⁰ The British generally only worried about the beginning and the end of the railway (and not the stops in between and did not pay for the construction), these railways served British (and later German) imperial interests because they: 1) permitted the establishment of a recognized imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire, without formal colonies; 2) permitted improvements in the internal administration (which facilitated trade) and the ability of the military to meet immediate security needs (and to protect the “overland”/Suez route);¹⁸¹ 3) provided a promising investment as the Ottoman

¹⁷⁸ W. J. Macpherson, “Investment in Indian Railways, 1845-1875,” *The Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 8 (1955): 177.

¹⁷⁹ The railroads were normally constructed from point X to point Y, and required local governmental approval, but between points X and Y local conditions and governmental interests directed the specific railroad route. In India economic concerns predominated and railroads conventionally followed the best route to maximize commerce, in the Ottoman Empire the railroads often avoided the economically promising areas for military expediency. These decisions ultimately reflected the specific British interest in the imperial territory.

¹⁸⁰ Bharati Ray, “The Genesis of Railway Development in Hyderabad State: A Case Study in Nineteenth-Century British Imperialism,” *The Indian Economic and Social History Review* 21 (1984): 54. Ray describes the financing for this railroad in the following way: “Nizam’s Government [the government of the Indian state where the railroad was being built] was to provide, with the aid of shareholders, all the capital required for the construction, maintenance and working of the railway,” in spite of the fact that it was the British who wanted the railroad constructed.

¹⁸¹ Macpherson, 177-185.

government guaranteed a return on each kilometer of rail constructed;¹⁸² 4) the construction of such large industrial projects required an enormous amount of money, permitting the imperial powers to extend additional loans and advance their economic imperialism; 5) they provided an opportunity to increase trade with the imperial territory,¹⁸³ as the railroads tended to “play a major role in providing inexpensive raw materials, foodstuffs and markets for manufactures to the country whose capital constructed the railroad,”¹⁸⁴ and, 6) the concessions provided limited ownership rights to the Great Powers along the route of the railroad track, sometimes as much as twenty kilometers on each side.¹⁸⁵ Generally, the British established themselves in Western Anatolia “after the construction of railroads in that region in the early 1860s,” and the French established themselves in Syria. Beginning in the 1880s, the Germans adopted this model of imperialism and “applied it to Central and Southeastern Anatolia.”¹⁸⁶

The intent of the Great Powers was evident, but Ottoman citizens pressured their government to facilitate the construction of railroads, because such construction provided

¹⁸² Owen, 120-121. The Ottoman government promised a specific return per kilometer of track built.

¹⁸³ Macpherson, 177-180. Macpherson does a good job explaining why the British government of India wanted railroads, and some of his reasons have been included here. It is important to note that while commercial interests were the principal British interest in India, that military concerns, specifically the protection of the “overland” or Suez route to India was paramount in British concerns in the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁸⁴ Pamuk, 68.

¹⁸⁵ Owen, 197.

¹⁸⁶ Pamuk, 69.

access to the world market, and better movement for the domestic market.¹⁸⁷ Ottoman officials inclined to reform (so called *Tanzimat* officials) also pressured the government to construct railroads, as a step towards modernization. However, without foreign assistance, the Porte could not meet this demand because the former did not possess the necessary technical expertise¹⁸⁸ or financing. In fact, Ottoman efforts to construct railroads failed, with one exception, because they lacked the technological knowledge. For example, one railroad constructed, without European assistance, could not climb the track because the grade was too steep.¹⁸⁹ Thus, the Porte had to rely on the British, French, or Germans to construct railroads within its borders, and, consequently, a reform intended to emancipate the Empire from western economic influence “made them [the Ottomans] more dependant...[and] made the whole process of penetration a great deal more easy.”¹⁹⁰

The necessity of permitting the Powers to construct the railroads within the Ottoman Empire and the external trade that it facilitated “emerg[ed] as one of the key developments in the partitioning of the Empire” in the years before the First World

¹⁸⁷ Trade within the Ottoman Empire is vastly understudied, partially because much of this trade occurred on caravans and formal records have not survived. However, it is clear that before the development of railroads, bulk goods (such as grain) often “remained locked up in the interior,” and that consequently costal towns, sometimes only three or four days from the grain producing areas imported grain, because it was less expensive to import grain from Europe than to purchase grain transported by caravan. In spite of these transportation problems, in the nineteenth century, trade within the Empire was greater than international trade. Owen, 120 and Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 174.

¹⁸⁸ Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 803.

¹⁸⁹ Owen, 121.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 58. Owen’s comment is intended to apply generally to reforms in the Ottoman Empire, but the development of railroads is certainly within the reforms he considers.

War.¹⁹¹ The combination of the transportation monopoly that developed from the construction of these railroads and the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention (and the similar conventions signed between the Porte and other Powers) permitted increased imperial control over portions of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, while the railroad facilitated access to world markets, its construction also enabled the European Powers to exert their influence in portions of the Ottoman Empire without formally colonizing it. This occurred because the railroad construction (as previously mentioned) facilitated the ability of the imperial power to establish a mercantile relationship with a portion of the Ottoman Empire; these territories (which became increasingly associated with specific powers) provided inexpensive raw materials to the imperial power and imported manufactured goods from the imperial power.¹⁹² Further, “in many instances, the only banks in the region [where Powers constructed railroads] were owned by the capital of the same country. The monopoly position enjoyed by the capital of that European country in extending agricultural and commercial credit and in transportation blocked commercial competition from other European Powers.”¹⁹³ Eventually, the Powers furthered their investments in “their” regions of the Empire by building utilities and ports (where appropriate) along these same railroad routes. As the British lost influence in the Ottoman Empire (in this case because British companies sold their railroads to the French), a British foreign office official lamented: “there now remains, therefore, only

¹⁹¹ Pamuk, 68.

¹⁹² Ibid.; and, *DBFP I:B:V*, 134-146.

¹⁹³ Pamuk, 69. Scholars would benefit from increased knowledge of the scope of European banks outside of the principal Ottoman cities, and the relationship between these banks and the individual Ottoman territories.

one British railway in Asia Minor, that of the Smyrna-Adin Line. As *our future influence* and the prosperity of this country must to a considerable extent depend on the continued success of this company as a British undertaking..." (emphasis added).¹⁹⁴

Although the British were the first Power to construct railroads in the Empire,¹⁹⁵ other Powers rapidly recognized the value of such construction and thus became involved in the building of Ottoman railroads. Among these other powers, Austria-Hungary made the most significant contribution (before the rise of German influence), because an Austrian, Baron Hirsch, connected Constantinople to Vienna via the Oriental Railway (completed in 1888).¹⁹⁶ Hirsch's accomplishments were eclipsed, however, by the eventual contributions of Germany. German involvement in the Ottoman railroad industry began in 1872, when the Ottoman government invited the well known Engineer Wilhelm von Pressel, to develop a comprehensive plan for the construction of railroads in the Empire (while von Pressel was German, it is premature to believe that his invitation signaled the beginning of the extension of German power into the Ottoman Empire, rather he should be viewed as an individual instead of as a representative of German

¹⁹⁴ DBFP, I:B:XVI, 7. Also see: Letter, Grew to Secretary of State (Henry Lewis Stimson), 3 June 1929, NARA, R.G. 59, 767.90d 15/12. This document emphasizes the interest the powers (in this case France) had in maintaining their railroads in the former Ottoman territories after the war.

¹⁹⁵ Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey*, 148; and Faroqhi, 807. Issawi argues that railroads were occasionally constructed for reasons other than imperialism, see Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey*, 194.

¹⁹⁶ Kurt Grunwald, *Türkenhirsch: A Study of Baron Maurice de Hirsch Entrepreneur and Philanthropist* (Jerusalem, Israel: Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1966), 28-63; Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey*, 148. Like many of the railroad construction projects, Hirsch's led to increasing indebtedness for the Ottoman Empire, but the process of raising the money for this railroad illustrated the deep financial trouble that the Empire was in. See: Blaisdell, 37.

imperial power). Pressel completed this task, and the Porte accepted his proposal, which called for a trunk line from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf (2,700 km) and eventually another eighteen-hundred miles of branch tracks.¹⁹⁷ The purpose of this line, the Anatolian Railway, was to connect Constantinople with the provincial capitals.

The Porte considered a reliable connection between Constantinople and the provincial capitals to be an important goal, because the distant provinces conventionally operated with only the most minimal of oversight from the Ottoman government; due, partially, to the difficulties of travel.¹⁹⁸ Recognizing the imperial potential of this railroad (although there was no reason, beyond the size of this railroad that it had greater imperial potential than other railroads in the Empire), other Powers, including the British (usually private companies supported by their governments attempted to construct these railroads), sought to build this line. An official of the Foreign Office, A.H. Layard, wrote to the Marquis of Salisbury on 5 August 1878:

The Duke of Sutherland has requested me to inform the Grand Vizier that he [the Duke of Sutherland] is the President of an Association [*sic.*] for the construction of a railway from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf, and to obtain from his Highness a promise that his scheme...should have the preference over any other that may be submitted to the Porte on equal terms.

...Several schemes for a similar railway have been submitted to the Porte by various European capitalists and speculators...¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁷ Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 806. It is important not to place too much emphasis on Pressel and his representation of Germany. The historical research on him is slight, but this invitation was extended in the earliest days of German existence and just as Germany began to exert itself in the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁹⁸ Issawi, *The Economic History of Egypt*, 148-149.

¹⁹⁹ DBFP, I:B:V, 130.

Eventually, a German company received the contract for the line, and, by 1900, more than a thousand kilometers had been laid.²⁰⁰ The combined efforts and ambitions of the imperial Powers led to the completion of approximately seventy-five hundred kilometers of railroad track in the Ottoman Empire by 1900.²⁰¹ However, this construction catalyzed the imperial partitioning of the Empire and led individual powers to assert increasingly powerful imperial claims (unofficially).

In addition to building thousands of kilometers of railroad track, the European imperial powers also constructed port facilities in Salonica (on the Gulf of Salonica in modern day Greece), İzmir (on the Aegean Sea), Beirut, and Constantinople, these became the Empire's four principal ports.²⁰² These port facilities, while receiving less scholarly attention than the railroads, also contributed to the extension of European imperialism in the Ottoman Empire. Much like railroads, ports permitted the extension of Great Power imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, because they: 1) provided a recognized area of imperial territory without formal colonization; and, 2) permitted an accelerated trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe (some of the ports permitted only ships from specific countries, and sometimes only from specific companies, to utilize them). Additionally, like the land ownership along the railroad tracks, these ports

²⁰⁰ Issawi, *The Economic History of Egypt*, 149.

²⁰¹ Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 804. It is worth noting that the Empire lost track as it built it. As the Balkan states established their independence, they appropriated the Ottoman railroad tracks within their newly established borders. This, in several cases, constituted thousands of kilometers of track. The Arabian areas of the Empire did not get track until the twentieth-century, and after the Balkan states left the Empire, the Empire contained approximately nine-hundred kilometers of track. *Ibid.*, 807.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 802.

had an imperial element—monopoly privileges. These monopolies provided foreign companies control in “port areas;” the companies used these monopolies to break the power of the established Ottoman unions by hiring non-union or foreign workers.²⁰³ Before the development of these privileges, Ottoman workers ferried merchandise to the ships anchored in deeper water. This labor intensive process permitted a strong union influence in Ottoman commercial affairs. The preference for European (or alternatively non-union, but Ottoman) port workers contributed to the strengthening of central control in the Ottoman Empire, because, until the Powers displaced them, the worker’s unions had restricted the Porte’s ability to administer activity in costal areas.²⁰⁴

Although this study generally does not consider French imperialism, it is important to note that the completion of the Suez Canal by a French company subsidized by the state, increased the British imperial interest in the Ottoman Empire. Initially, the British opposed the canal, fearing it would jeopardize their position in the Ottoman Empire (and especially in Egypt).²⁰⁵ Earl Russell explained his concern to his superior at the Foreign Office about the disquieting potential for the canal to encourage French colonial settlements in Suez; Russell wrote:

²⁰³ Ibid., 803. The specific terms of the monopolies are unclear, but it is clear that the foreign companies controlled all aspects of the transport of goods in and out of the port facility. It is important to remember that the existing capitulations already provided extraterritoriality protection to foreigners in the Ottoman Empire.

²⁰⁴ Charles Issawi, “The Adaptation of Islam to Contemporary Economic Realities,” in *The Islamic Impact*, ed. Yvonne Haddad, Byron Haynes, and Ellison Findly (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984). Although not directly related, this chapter generally discusses the problems Muslims faced with the economic development of the Middle East.

²⁰⁵ DBFP I:B:VIII, 1-56.

The Sublime Porte must be well aware from that Report that the difference between 10,264 hectares and 1,784 hectares represents the difference which exists between the quantity of land required for the purpose of the Canal of Suez according to the judgment of an honest and dispassionate observer, and the quantity which may be required for the purposes of colonization, fortifications, and barracks, according to the ambitious calculations of those who wish to wrest the dominion of Egypt from the Sultan and his successors.²⁰⁶

In spite of British concerns, the overwhelming majority of the ships that ultimately utilized the canal came from Britain. Eventually, the British came to protect the Suez Canal as they had the “overland route.” As this interest in the protection of the Suez Canal became a national concern; Baron Henry de Worms, asked the House of Commons if the English, in light of the importance of the Suez Canal to British communications and commerce with India, would propose an international conference to recognize the preponderance of British interests in the Suez Canal. Specifically, he wished for Parliament to seek permission for the British to take “the necessary measures to prevent the communications of England with India from being interrupted by any Power.”²⁰⁷ Thus, Suez, while not constructed by the British, increased British imperial interests in the Ottoman Empire.

The construction of railroads and ports in Ottoman territories not only transformed the economic relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the West, but it also changed the relationship between the Ottoman government and its people. A

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 121.

²⁰⁷ “England and Turkey,” *Eastern Express*, 14 June 1882, 229:b (The *Eastern Express*, an English language paper printed in Constantinople, apparently numbered its pages beginning with one and increasing continuously throughout the year, thus in the case of the article cited here, they reached the 229th page on 14 June; also there is no formal system for citing the columns from this paper, I have elected to reference columns with a, b, or c, as there are only three per page.).

consequence of the large scale construction of railroads was that, for the first time, the Ottoman government could extend itself relatively quickly into most of its empire. Before the development of the railroad, the Porte had so little authority in some of its territories that merchandise traveling between provinces faced informal “taxes” from provincial leaders as well as threats from brigands (in 1857, brigands pillaged a caravan leaving Baghdad and made off with more than five million Turkish liras worth of cargo).²⁰⁸ This expansion of the Ottoman government’s ability to extend itself into the provinces was accompanied by a Tribal Pacification Program, which led the Ottoman government to administer provinces more effectively than it had in decades.²⁰⁹ This increased central control enhanced the imperial opportunities of the Powers by removing threats from brigands and illegal tariffs that provincial leaders often imposed on cargo transported through (or from) their province. The British railroads recognized these security concerns and, under guidance from Ottoman officials, these railroads sometimes initially bypassed areas of economic importance in favor of areas of military significance.²¹⁰

In addition to contributing to major changes in the infrastructure of the Ottoman Empire, the British model of imperialism also emphasized the support and enhancement

²⁰⁸ Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 816. Comparatively, the Ottoman government borrowed from 1854 to 1914 399.5 million Turkish Lira. See: Grant, 13.

²⁰⁹ Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 816. Also see: DBFP, I:B:VI, 181-192.

²¹⁰ Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 807. Recall that the Ottoman Empire, like the Indian government, had significant influence over the specific routes of the railroads. It is not surprising that both the Ottoman government and the British would have desired to send railroads through militarily sensitive areas.

of the Ottoman military forces.²¹¹ Robinson and Gallagher's "imperialism of free trade" (explained earlier), emphasized the imperial power not becoming directly involved in the imperial territory. Instead, the imperialism existed through (among others): 1) the imposition of free trade conditions on the imperial territory; 2) pressure for the imperial territory to organize and direct its economic activities to meet the needs and surpluses of the imperial power; 3) taking over by European bankers and merchants of the domestic economies of the imperial territory.²¹² Implementing such conditions on the Ottoman Empire required the latter to be able to defend itself against external pressure (i.e. maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire) as well as to control its provinces²¹³ (recall that Robinson and Gallagher contend that the move from imperialism to colonialism occurs because of internal conflicts that require the imperial power to intervene, thus stability in the Empire decreased the likelihood of the necessity of imposing colonialism).²¹⁴ Consequently, while the importation of weapons or military advisors was quite common in the nineteenth-century, it had an imperial purpose in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the importation of European military technology and tactics

²¹¹ For a short history of early Ottoman military reforms, especially those inspired by Europe, see: Anton Schaendilinger, "Die Entdeckung des Abendlandes also Corbild: Ein Vorschlag zur Umgestaltung des Herrwesens und der Außenpolitik des Osmanischen Reiches zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts," *Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit* 10 (1983): 89-112.

²¹² Louis, 3-5, as discussed in chapter I of this dissertation.

²¹³ This occurred in Mesopotamia, see: Mustafa Sitki Bilgin, "The Construction of the Baghdad Railway and its Impact on Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1902-1903," *OTAM* 16 (2004): 111-116.

²¹⁴ Louis, 5; discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation.

resulted in Ottoman education becoming increasingly western, as it sought to emphasize science and European languages over traditional Islamic education.

Once among the most feared fighters in all of the Eurasia, the Turks were marginal and in some cases, ineffective, soldiers by the nineteenth-century. Comprised of three components, a slave army, a territorial army, and an auxiliary army, the nineteenth-century Ottoman military resembled the forces of Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566)²¹⁵ more than a modern European military. The Porte recognized this, and instituted reforms intended to modernize the Ottoman armies in the eighteenth-century; however, the Russo-Turkish War of 1767-1774, which produced the previously discussed Treaty of Kuçuk Kaynarja, and the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt illustrated the insufficiency of these military reforms.²¹⁶ Part of the reason these reforms failed was the overt resistance, and even open revolt, from the Janissary Corps,²¹⁷ which had been the basis of Ottoman armies for centuries. Unable to completely disband the Janissary

²¹⁵ William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (New York: Routledge Press, 1994), 7 (hereafter cited as Hale, *Turkish Politics*,); also see: Jan Lucassen and Erik Zürcher, "Introduction: Conscription and Resistance. The Historical Context," in *Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775-1925* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 3-16 (hereafter cited as Zürcher,).

²¹⁶ In some cases these reforms were quite advanced and were continued in the period after 1835. Explaining the early reforms and their continuity into the modern era is less important than to recognize that these reforms began in the eighteenth-century and with European assistance. The important point for imperialism is the overall change in the Ottoman military, from a sixteenth-century army to a modern one, all under the guidance of European advisors, but also the consequences for the general population as traditional education systems were replaced by an educational program emphasizing western skills: science, European languages, diplomacy, etc.

²¹⁷ Hale, *Turkish Politics*, 10-19. Also see: Stanford D. Shaw, "The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-I Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III" *The Journal of Modern History* 37 (1965): 291-306.

(initially), Sultan Mahmud II, who disliked the Janissary for both their resistance to reform and the power they had, even sufficient power to depose a Sultan,²¹⁸ debased the Janissary by removing the standards that had previously guarded entrance into it. Consequently, a British observer in 1799 could write, “[the] character [of the Janissary Corps] has been more than proportionally degraded, and many of them are notoriously stigmatized for cowardice, theft and the vilest crimes, whilst others, enervated by a city life and the practice of the lowest trades have nothing military but the name of janizary [sic].”²¹⁹ Eventually, in 1826, Mahmud II disbanded the Janissary Corps. The destruction of the Janissary Corps, starting with the dilution of its power, and then the decision to destroy it, marked the end of the traditional Ottoman army; henceforth, the Ottoman Empire would look to Europe, specifically Britain and Germany (and to a lesser degree France), to provision and direct the army.²²⁰

The reorganization of the Turkish army had been underway since the eighteenth-century, but acquired new importance with the destruction of the Janissary (who refused to accept western reforms) and the implementation of the *Tanzimat* (1839-1876).

²¹⁸ The power of the Janissary Corps had led to Sultans being dethroned (Mahmud II came to power after the Janissary dethroned Sultan Selim III in 1807, and his cousin Mustafa IV), Mahmud feared this, but even if he was not dethroned, the Janissary were a very powerful group that exerted power and influence within the empire. The decision first to dilute that power and then in 1826 to dissolve the Janissary Corps should be seen as an effort to consolidate power in the person of the Sultan.

²¹⁹ Eaton, 63-64; also see *DBFP*, I:B:VI, 140-141.

²²⁰ Of course, the exchange went in both directions. In the early nineteenth-century, the British incorporated “Oriental” (i.e. Turkish) themes into some of their military uniforms. See: John MacKenzie, *Popular Imperialism and the Military: 1850-1950* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 40. Also see: W.Y. Carman, *Dictionary of Military Uniforms* (New York: Scribner, 1977), 27. Carman contends these accoutrements to the British uniforms were rarely used by the reign of Victoria (ruled, 1837-1901).

However, even after the removal of the Janissary, the Ottoman government did not implement sufficient reforms for European technology and tactics to be effective. An example of this insufficiency was the failure to deviate, in the mid-1820s, from the established theory that military leaders were born as such, and thus did not need significant specialized training or education. Not only did this decision prevent Ottoman military officers from receiving the necessary education to lead a modern army, but it also meant that the “new” officer corps consisted of officers from the Janissary (and other branches of the old Ottoman army).²²¹

The arrival of the Prussian Field Marshal Helmut von Moltke in Constantinople, in 1835, is a reasonable beginning for considerations of imperialism and the Turkish army.²²² However, even von Moltke’s efforts, while considerable, did not result in major changes, due to the Ottoman-Egyptian War of 1839, and the death of Sultan Mahmud II six days after the war’s conclusion.²²³ Mahmud II’s successor (Abdulhamid, 1839-1861)

²²¹ Avigdor Levy, “The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II’s New Ottoman Army, 1826-1839,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 2 (1971): 21-24. The potential importance of officers trained by European standards was evident. Mehemet Ali used the French Colonel Sève to train Egyptian officers. Levy, 21. Had the Ottoman government wanted to change and bring in European officers, the conflict between the Porte and most of the major European Powers over the independence of Greece would have probably prevented the European Powers from sending such advisors. The Greek War for Independence lasted from 1821-1829.

²²² Other scholars might disagree with this, as European military advisors had been present with the Ottoman army since the Ottoman defeat in 1730. This began with French advisors, who had to convert to Islam. However, by the time von Moltke arrives, the European advisors do not have to convert, and the Ottoman Army begins to purchase weaponry from the Continent. See: James McGarity, “Foreign Influence on the Ottoman Army, 1880-1918” (Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1968), 6-16. McGarity would likely agree with the above statement, as he contends the strongest influences on the Ottoman army were German, which began around 1880.

²²³ Hale, *Turkish Politics*, 20-21. Also see: Jehuda L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe: Die preußisch-deutschen Militärmisionen in der Türkei 1835-1919*

carried on the reform movement, and by the early eighteen-forties, the organization of the Ottoman army resembled a modern European force.²²⁴

The use of foreign advisors to modernize an army is not, by itself, particularly imperialistic. However, the reorganization of the Ottoman military along European lines did produce significant changes in Ottoman society (which facilitated imperialism); one such change developed in the Ottoman educational system. To produce soldiers and officers prepared to utilize modern military equipment and tactics, an understanding of mathematics, European languages, and, most importantly, science, was essential. A recent study of Ottoman educational reform contends: “modernization and scientification [sic.] became intrinsically linked together and a direct relationship was acknowledged to exist between modern Western science and Ottoman military revival.”²²⁵ Consequently, the *ulema* (Islamic religious establishment), which conventionally administered the Ottoman educational system and emphasized the development of the “perfect Muslim,” (and thus did not teach modern science or western languages), was gradually replaced by an educational system that emphasized science. The first such reform movement was the development of the *riüşdiyes*, which instructed graduates of the *ulema* in grammar, history, science and mathematics. This reform movement reached an apex in 1839 when

(Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1976), 15-29. Also see: Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945*, trans. Brian Battershaw (New York: Praeger Press, 1972), 71-73.

²²⁴ Hale, *Turkish Politics*, 22. However, even this army had problems and had not fully “modernized.” See: DBFP I:B:V, 95-117.

²²⁵ Berrak Burçak, “Science, a Remedy for all Ills, Healing the ‘Sick Man of Europe’: A Case for Ottoman Scientism,” (Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, 2005), 32.

secular education became the norm.²²⁶ Increasingly, primary Ottoman education focused on the study of European languages, science, while specialized education (often from early ages, especially in the case of the military) occurred in modern diplomacy, the military, law, etc. Sultan Mahmud II began the process of westernizing education to improve the military, and, by 1860, the Empire had its first staff college.²²⁷ Further examples of this specialized, western education were the *Mülkiye Mektebi* schools, which trained future Ottoman diplomats, and was based on the French *Grandes Ecole*,²²⁸ and the *Mühendishâne* military academy.²²⁹ Referring to the Galatasaray Lycée, a secondary school whose language of instruction was French, a recent scholar wrote that the French supported this “hoping to include the Ottoman Empire in their colonial...mission.”²³⁰

Not only did the Ottoman Empire face the problems of an antiquated military and an educational system based on religion, it also lagged behind in military technology (by the 1840s). During the late eighteenth-century, the Empire made enough weapons to be considered self-sufficient, and a recent scholar explains that the “Ottoman production of firearms...[was within] the technological mainstream in the 1790s.”²³¹ In spite of this

²²⁶ Ibid., 57.

²²⁷ Hale, *Turkish Politics*, 23.

²²⁸ Corinne Lee Blake, “Training Arab-Ottoman Bureaucrats: Syrian Graduates of the *Mülkiye Mektebi*, 1890-1920” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1991), 4.

²²⁹ Burçak, 32.

²³⁰ Shaw, 23-24.

²³¹ Jonathan Grant, “Rethinking Ottoman ‘Decline’: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth-Centuries,” *Journal of World History* 10 (1999): 198 (hereafter cited as Grant “Rethinking Ottoman ‘Decline’”); and Grant, “Sword of the Sultan,” 10. Grant expresses his surprise at how little attention the change

assertion, which implies that the quality of Ottoman firearm production approximately equaled that of the Powers, in 1799 William Eaton observed:

Their [Ottoman] musket-barrels are much esteemed, but they are too heavy; nor do they possess any quality superior to common iron barrels, which have been much hammered, and are of soft Swedish iron. They are thus made: round a rod of iron they twist soft old iron wire and forge it; then they bore out the rod, part of which often remains, according as the wire was thick or thin, and the bore large or small...²³²

Regardless of whether the Ottoman firearms met the technological standards of the Powers in 1800 or not, by 1840, the western advances in rifled barrels made Ottoman arms factories obsolete.²³³ Henceforth, the latter would require a massive importation of European arms, tactics, and instruction, first from Britain then from Germany.²³⁴

Based on the recognition that the Ottoman Empire would import arms instead of attempting to manufacture them, the *Times* (London) reported:

The Turkish Government lately resolved to re-arm the whole of their infantry, and to adopt the best rifle that could be found. For a long time already they had been converting their muzzle loaders to Sniders, but these have been superseded in the estimation of the best authorities by certain small-bore rifles, it was determined to adopt one of the latter. In consequence of this determination of the Government there have been recently gathered together in Pera agents of all the known rifle manufacturers in the world...the Sultan himself cut short the questions

in armaments sales to the Ottoman Empire has received. See: Grant, “Sword of the Sultan,” 12.

²³² Eaton, 74.

²³³ Grant “Sword of the Sultan,” 14.

²³⁴ It is a slight exaggeration to claim only Germany and England supplied arms to the Ottoman Empire, before the 1877-1878 war with Russia, the Ottoman Empire purchased a large number of firearms from the United States, however the overwhelming majority of the arms purchased by the Empire, between 1840 and 1918, came from Britain and Germany.

[to the rifle manufacturers] with all their complications by deciding in favor of the Martini-Henry rifle...As all the patents for the Martinin-Henry rifle are held in England by one company, the order will necessarily be executed in that country.²³⁵

Essentially, from 1840 until the conclusion of the First World War, the Ottoman army remained dependant on European weapons and leadership to rectify its two great deficiencies: discipline and technology.²³⁶

Capitulating to the reality that the Empire could not compete with European weapons, domestic military production shifted to clothing and other such low-tech military needs; however, this placed the Ottoman Empire in a precarious position. Ottoman officials recognized the danger in becoming dependant on one foreign country for weapons; thus, the Empire elected to import arms from all the European powers,²³⁷ although England initially had the greatest share. However, this policy effectively translated into the following reality: while the purchase of individual rifles and pistols issued to an Ottoman soldier might come from any of the European powers, or even the United States, Germany provided the overwhelming proportion of the Empire's artillery

²³⁵ "The Turkish Army," *Times* (London), 12 July 1872, 4:e.

²³⁶ This section briefly introduces the importation of European military technology to the Ottoman Empire, and it concentrates on the equipment that the army would use. It is important to note that very similar statements could be made about the Ottoman Navy. It used almost exclusively British technology (but also French, and even some from Norway). However, the inclusion of this history appears to duplicate what is already included about the army.

²³⁷ Grant, 15. It is difficult to distinguish the motivation for arms sales from the Powers to the Ottoman Empire, and part of the difficulty arises from the likelihood that there was not a single motivation. Certainly the Powers were interested in greater Ottoman control of the provinces within the Ottoman Empire and in the stability of the Empire, however they were also interested in increasing trade with the Empire. The shipment of arms and weaponry to the Ottoman Empire likely contributed to both goals.

and Britain provided the overwhelming proportion of the Empire's naval technology and ships.²³⁸ While the impressive English position in the sale of arms to the Ottoman Empire, before 1880, was not hegemonic, after the Germans began to extend themselves into the Ottoman Empire in the 1880s, the English position fell and the German position increased.²³⁹

The transformation of the Ottoman military, in terms of both military technology, discipline, and its educational system, is an important component in the extension of European imperialism in the Empire. As Robinson and Gallagher indicated in their theory of "imperialism of free trade" the European powers preferred not to intervene directly in the security and administration of the imperial territory. However, the weakness of the Ottoman military, which made it vulnerable from within as well as from external powers, had to be corrected. With the modernization of the Ottoman army, the Ottoman military could extend its influence and protection throughout the principal Ottoman territories. Additionally, the Tribal Pacification Program that accompanied the improvement of the Ottoman military permitted greater (and "freer") European trade with the provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

In addition to transforming the Ottoman economy, infrastructure, and military, British imperial influence also began to exert influence over Ottoman domestic politics. The most important example of this is the British effort to end the slave trade in the

²³⁸ Ibid., 15-17.

²³⁹ Ibid., 20-26. This is one of the only places where the Germans probably had a larger influence than the British, this is discussed in greater detail in chapter V.

Ottoman Empire.²⁴⁰ The British effort to end the slave trade did not originate in the Ottoman Empire; rather, this was a policy that the British adopted in the eighteen-forties for their colonies. The British first incorporated this into their Ottoman policy in 1847, when British pressure “encouraged” the Sultan to issue a *ferman* (order) giving the British the right to search suspected slave ships and to seize them if they indeed had slaves aboard. British control of the Gulf made this easier, but slave traders still sought to continue their trade in spite of this British naval supremacy. The policy culminated in 1880 with the Anglo-Ottoman Slave Trade Convention.²⁴¹ While the details of the British anti-slave trade movement in the Ottoman Empire are interesting they are less important than the recognition that the British extended this colonial policy to the Ottoman Empire.

British Cultural Imperialism

In addition to controlling Ottoman finances, being the primary recipient and originator for goods traded from and with the Ottoman Empire, building a transportation network intended to advance imperial interests (at Ottoman expense), and contributing to the restructuring of the Ottoman military and educational systems, the British engaged in

²⁴⁰ The British made a distinction between the slave trade and slavery. The documents relating to this explicitly state that the British had some cultural sensitivity to Ottoman slavery and thus they intended only to end the slave trade. The issue of Ottoman slavery is complicated because technically most of the Ottoman citizens were slaves to the Sultan and it was not, conventionally, considered degrading to be such a slave. When slavery and the slave trade are discussed here, it is intended to mean slaves in service to private persons or companies.

²⁴¹ Y. Hakan Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise, 1800-1909* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 67, 71-72, and 99-100. The Sultan’s *ferman* simply recognized the reality of the British position in the Persian Gulf, and the British wish for the Sultan to appear to govern his own territory. It is unlikely the Sultan had much choice in the issue of the *ferman* due to the powerful British position in the Gulf.

an active policy of appropriating Ottoman treasures and artifacts. Much as the construction of transportation networks or the control of Ottoman finances contributed to Great Power imperialism, the appropriation and display of archaeological treasures contributed to imperial relationship between England and the Ottoman Empire.²⁴² The purpose of this section is to introduce the imperial elements in the British appropriation and display of archaeological artifacts from the Ottoman Empire, as well as briefly introduce the importance of such manifestations of imperialism.

European interest in Ottoman archaeology, and to be more precise, the archaeological artifacts, developed from late eighteenth-century Hellenism;²⁴³ consequently, Europeans initially sought Greek artifacts. The modern appropriation of Ottoman artifacts (and in this case only technically Ottoman, because Greece was, in the eighteenth-century, part of the Empire) began with the Comte de Choiseul-Gouffier in 1784, but the most recognized of the early appropriations came in 1800 from the British expedition led by Lord Elgin. Lord Elgin's appropriation of the friezes from the Parthenon on the Acropolis catalyzed British archaeological interest in the Ottoman Empire.²⁴⁴ Beginning with the appropriation of the marble friezes, the British began a sustained campaign that uncovered and appropriated archaeological artifacts from the

²⁴² A social science scholarship exists that considers the implications of the display of foreign artifacts in museums, this is discussed further in chapter VI. However, a good treatment may be found in Elizabeth Hallam and Brian Street (eds.), *Cultural Encounters: Representing “Otherness”* (New York: Routledge, 2000).

²⁴³ Shaw, 62-63.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 70-71. The marbles did not receive a proper display in the British Museum for decades. See: Edward Miller, *That Noble Cabinet: A History of the British Museum* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1974), 194-195. Miller also notes that the display of antiquities clearly differed from the display of ethnographic material, see: 222.

Ottoman Empire, most notably in Egypt, Mesopotamia (present day Iraq), and the area around the Red Sea. These discoveries occurred concurrently with the broader European movement to build national museums intended to “represent and celebrate the nation.”²⁴⁵ These museums were to “assert an identity, [and] a ‘public culture,’”²⁴⁶ that transcended politics and even royalty; archaeological artifacts from the Ottoman Empire formed the core collection for many of these museums (including the British Museum, the “national museum” of England).

Parliament founded the British Museum in 1756, and among its original collection were Egyptian “lamps, papyri, and other small artifacts” from the collector Hans Sloane.²⁴⁷ As previously mentioned, British archaeological interests extended beyond Egypt, as English archaeologists appropriated the friezes from the Parthenon, treasures from Mesopotamia, and artifacts from the area around the Red Sea. The collection of artifacts from the Ottoman Empire was so intense, that, by middle of the nineteenth-century, the British Museum’s general collection “concentrated almost entirely on ancient Rome, Greece, Egypt and Mesopotamia.”²⁴⁸ The collection of these artifacts continued throughout the century, and, in 1888, a contemporary author wrote: “The department of

²⁴⁵ Gwendolyn Wright (ed.), *The Formation of National Collections of Art and Archaeology*, Studies in the History of Art, ed. Franklin Kelly, vol. 47 (New York: University Press of New England, 1996), 9.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Brian Fagan, *The Rape of the Nile: Tomb Robbers, Tourists, and Archaeologists in Egypt* (New York: Westview Books, 2004), 42 (hereafter cited as Fagan, *Rape of the Nile*).

²⁴⁸ Bernard Porter, *The Absent Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 88 (hereafter cited as Porter, *Absent Minded Imperialists*).

Egyptian and Assyrian Antiques is constantly receiving additions...[that are] of infinite importance.”²⁴⁹ Although many of the excavations that produced these artifacts originated privately, the British government (usually through the British Museum) eventually accepted financial responsibility for most excavations in the Ottoman Empire.²⁵⁰ Moreover, the discovery and study of these artifacts received significant attention in the British press (depending on the artifact, some artifacts, such as mummies received more attention than others),²⁵¹ and British citizens recognized it as a component of imperialism. Part of the reason that these Ottoman artifacts can be considered imperial is that similar Indian artifacts (and to a lesser degree, artifacts from other parts of the British Empire) had been appropriated and displayed in England (imperial museums existed all over the British Isles).²⁵² Even where individuals may not have had the opportunity to encounter imperial artifacts personally (for geographic, economic, or social reasons), this form of imperialism would not necessarily have been foreign to them. One manner in which the display of imperial artifacts diffused to the greater

²⁴⁹ Unsigned, “The British Museum and its Place in the Nation,” *Museums and Art Galleries* 1888, 219 (hereafter cited as Unsigned, “British Museum,”).

²⁵⁰ J.E. Curtis and J.E. Reade, *Art and Empire: Treasures from Assyria in the British Museum* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1995), 11 and 14.

²⁵¹ Porter, *Absent Minded Imperialists*, 93. Also see: “The Great Discovery of Mummies at Thebes,” *Times* (London) 19 August 1881, 3:d; “Corn Found with Mummies,” *Times* (London) 28 March 1859, 7:f; “Examination of a Mummy” *Times* (London) 16 March 1827, 2:f; and, “Dissection of an Egyptian Mummy,” *Times* (London) 16 December 1830, 7:a.

²⁵² Shelton, 158; Mildred Archer, “India and Archaeology: The Role of the East India Company,” *History Today* 12 (1962): 272-279; and Alan Trevithick, “British Archaeologists, Hindu Abbots, and Burmese Buddhists: The Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya,” *Modern Asian Studies* 33 (1999): 635-642.

population was though the visual art of the period, and, specifically, the art that depicted the Ottoman Empire, which concentrated on two general themes, “[the] archaeological and [the] Biblical.”²⁵³

The Ottoman government, contrary to some historical accounts,²⁵⁴ recognized the value of the artifacts excavated and appropriated by the Europeans. In a limited effort to curtail this activity, the Ottoman government began to develop its own museum, refused to grant permits for European excavators, and passed the Antiquities Law of 1874, the Antiquities Law of 1884, and the Antiquities Law of 1906. However, due to the strength of the European position in the Ottoman Empire, these efforts failed to check European seizures of Ottoman artifacts, and, in many cases, these laws and restrictions were simply ignored.²⁵⁵ For example, historian Wendy Shaw described Heinrich Schliemann’s willful disobedience to Ottoman law in the following way: “By the time Schliemann excavated Troy in 1870, the Ottoman government had established a pattern of granting foreigners permission to excavate...half of the antiquities found would go to the Ottoman government...Schliemann broke [the] agreement and secretly exported all of his finds to

²⁵³ Kathryn Elizabeth Monger, “The Mythologizing of Egypt in Late Nineteenth-Century British Art,” (Ph.D. diss. Virginia Commonwealth University, 2003), 2. Monger continues that “...those [paintings] of an archaeological nature were quite common...”, Monger, 2.

²⁵⁴ Fagin, *Rape of the Nile*, 54-55 and 57.

²⁵⁵ Shaw, 72-74, 89-96, 108-30. By 1906, these laws had greater authority, but the Europeans generally maintained the artifacts that they desired. Shaw continues and explains that thereafter, all of Schliemann’s excavations were observed by armed Turkish guards to make sure he provided some of the artifacts to the Ottoman government. However, there was a recognition that Schliemann could not be forced to comply with Ottoman law.

Greece in 1874.”²⁵⁶ This disregard for Ottoman sovereignty continued after the First World War²⁵⁷ and was evident to the Turkish delegation to the Lusanne Conference, where the position of Turkey was negotiated by the Allies and the Turks. At the conference, the mal-treatment of the issue of “antiques and archaeological research” by the Allies provoked strenuous protests from the Turkish delegation,²⁵⁸ who insisted on increased authority over their land and artifacts.

The importance of these artifacts originated from the general informality of the British Empire (as previously discussed),²⁵⁹ which, according to a recent scholar, “...featur[ed] [very] little in the concerns of the great majority of early and mid-Victorians...”²⁶⁰ If the great majority of Victorian Britons did not find the Empire a part of their daily existence, providing evidence of British imperial activity might have assumed an increased importance. A recent study of nineteenth-century British art contends that “artists were generally very careful to depict archaeologically correct backdrops and objects, easily corroborated by the viewer form knowledge of the many objects in the British Museum.”²⁶¹ This indicates that at least a significant proportion of

²⁵⁶ Shaw, 74-75.

²⁵⁷ It is worth noting that the British had related troubles in India. While India was under more direct form of imperialism, British archaeologists did not simply have the authority to do exactly as they wished in India. See: Trevithick, 635-656.

²⁵⁸ Grew to Department of State, Memo, 24 Jan 1923, NARA, RG 59, 767.68119F&M 3/7, 8.

²⁵⁹ Richards, 1-7.

²⁶⁰ Porter, *The Absent Minded Imperialists*, 134.

²⁶¹ Monger, 11.

the artistically inclined citizens of Britain were familiar with the displays in the museum. A contemporary author writing about the museum wrote: “So many people have visited the British Museum that it is not necessary to give more than a few brief particulars of its characteristics.”²⁶² Moreover, such displays addressed foreign audiences as well, by defining British imperial interests; the development of world fairs and exhibitions accelerated the ability of the Powers to use art and artifacts to define their imperial influence. Even cursory considerations of the Great Exhibition of 1851, the Antwerp Expedition of 1894, etc. indicate that the display of imperial artifacts and treasure had a profound influence on the domestic, as well as foreign, population.²⁶³

The use of artifacts, whether in “national museums” or great exhibitions, to clarify the relationship between the imperial power (Britain) and the imperial territory (the Ottoman Empire) is only one example of the broader use of culture to advance imperialism. Artifacts are an unusually effective tool in explaining this, because, in many cases, the value in them is inherently obvious (i.e. they are valuable if for no other reason than they are made of valuable materials), and they could not have been appropriated without taking them from the imperial territory (which is itself an illustration of imperial power). However, the display of artifacts is far from the only example of the use of culture to convey imperialism. The scholar most associated with the study of the relationship between culture and imperialism is Edward Said, whose books *Orientalism* and *Culture and Imperialism* catalyzed the debate about the relationship between the

²⁶² Unsigned, “British Museum,” 216.

²⁶³ Jeffrey A. Auerbach, *The Great Exhibition of 1851: A Nation on Display* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 137-140.

European Powers and the nineteenth-century Middle East by focusing on the association between culture and imperialism.

Said's principal contention was that the nineteenth-century academic discipline of Oriental Studies facilitated the imposition of European imperialism on the territories of the Ottoman Empire. While Said provided other characteristics for the Orientalism that he studied, he defined nineteenth-century Orientalism in the following way: "...in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient."²⁶⁴ As explained in the first chapter of this study, Said contends that imperialism precedes colonialism and he further argues that "it can be achieved by economic, social, or cultural dependence."²⁶⁵ Among the indicators of this dependence, Said used novels (but paintings, and other such representations would be appropriate as well) to illustrate the significance of the British and French (he devotes almost no attention to German) cultural influence in the Ottoman Empire.

Conventionally, literary scholars have understood nineteenth-century British literature to have had only a peripheral interest in the British Empire. Said disagrees and his works argue that through consideration of novels by Charles Dickens, Daniel Defoe, Jane Austen, and others, the literature of Victorian England had a powerful influence in clarifying the relationship between Britain and the Middle East.²⁶⁶ Although Said's

²⁶⁴ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vantage Books, 1994), 3 (hereafter cited as Said, *Orientalism*).

²⁶⁵ Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 9.

²⁶⁶ Said almost exclusively uses the term "Orient," but he also avoids addressing India or Asia, so this dissertation replaces "Orient" with "Middle East" and "Ottoman Empire." Keith Windschuttle, "Cultural History and Western Imperialism: The Case of Edward Said," *The Historical Journal* 1 (2000/2001): 173-175.

methods have been criticized, it is useful to briefly consider a few examples, most importantly, his treatment of Dickens' novel *Great Expectations*, completed in 1861. Said devotes considerable attention to this novel, but the aspect of this consideration that is important is Dickens' classification of Egypt (which did not join the British Empire until 1882) as "a British overseas territory;"²⁶⁷ Said also connects the activities of Henry James' character Ralph Touchett from *Portrait of a Lady* (1880, serialized in the *Atlantic Monthly* before its publication as a book in 1881) in Egypt and Algeria with imperialism in the Ottoman Empire.²⁶⁸

Critics object to Said's use of few sentences about Egypt or Algeria to claim that these Victorian novels belong not only "squarely within the metropolitan history of British fiction,"²⁶⁹ but also in the study of imperialism.²⁷⁰ However, the debate about Said's use of sources is less important here than the recognition that nineteenth-century authors such as Dickens and James referred, as early as the 1860s, to Egypt as a part of a British overseas territory. Indeed, one of the criticisms of Said is factual, claiming that, in 1861, Egypt belonged to the Ottoman Empire and not to England.²⁷¹ Consequently, the

²⁶⁷ Quoted in Windschuttle, 177. Also see: Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, xv-xvii.

²⁶⁸ Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 63.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, xv.

²⁷⁰ This is one of the main objections made throughout Windschuttle's article.

²⁷¹ Windschuttle, 177.

number and frequency of Dickens' statements about Egypt is less important than the recognition that he considered it, in 1860, to be an area under British control.²⁷²

Although Said does not devote himself to the study or consideration of visual art, it is worth noting that some British painters paid particular attention to the Ottoman Empire. Regrettably, scholars have not devoted themselves to the study of "the objectification of Islamic nations...in British academic painting...",²⁷³ but it is possible to appreciate that the "academic paintings focusing on an exotic or decadent Islamic Egypt worked to justify contemporary imperial policies..."²⁷⁴ often before the formal British colonization of Egypt. Similarly, visual arts justified the imperial relationship between Britain and her other imperial territories.²⁷⁵

Although scholars have not completed a comprehensive study of the relationship between British art and the Ottoman Empire, it is clear that individual artists in this period found a commercial market for their depictions of the East. One such artist (who was Scottish, but whose works sold in London and throughout England) was David Roberts (1796-1864). Roberts traveled to the Ottoman Empire following the completion of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention in 1838 and remained there, principally

²⁷² Said also does not devote much attention to newspapers and magazines. One satirical magazine, *Punch*, published satires on Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. Notably, most of the places in the magazine were either prominent in international affairs or British imperial territories. See: Unsigned, "That Infidel Earl!" *Punch* 11 November 1882, 222.

²⁷³ Monger, 11.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Kamille T.H. Parkinson, "Philip John Bainbrigge and the Group of 1838: Imperial Landscapes and The Colonial Art Scene in Canada," (Ph.D. diss., Queen's University (Ontario, Canada), 2005).

in Egypt and Syria, for more than a year. Robert's paintings did not concentrate on depictions of persons (as one might expect if Said had considered visual art), but rather on "accurate representations of architecture and landscape."²⁷⁶ The use of visual arts, such as those by Roberts, had an established imperial context. Roberts' paintings existed within a context in which "the formation of the Victorian public's image of India and Africa owed much to the work of British landscape painters traveling abroad."²⁷⁷ Finally, it is worth noting that beyond visual arts, archaeological artifacts, architecture, and literature an additional way in which cultural imperialism manifest itself was through the display of animals from colonies and imperial territories in British zoos²⁷⁸ —for example, the birth of a camel in Manchester was deemed worthy of coverage in the *Times* (London)²⁷⁹.

Conclusion

The British involvement in the Ottoman Empire, including control of Ottoman finances, changes in Ottoman military and educational systems, the appropriation of

²⁷⁶ J. Harris Proctor, "David Roberts and the Ideology of Imperialism," *Muslim World* 88(1988): 47.

²⁷⁷ Tim Barringer, "Imperial Visions: Responses to India and Africa in Victorian Art and Design," in *The Victorian Vision: Inventing the New Britain* John M. MacKenzie (ed.), (London: V & A Publications, 2001), 317. Barringer includes information on Roberts as well as on painters who focused on India and Africa; also see: Todd Burke Porterfield, "Art in the Service of French Imperialism in the Near East, 1798-1848: Four Case Studies," Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1990. Photography eventually replaced painting as the medium that conveyed imperialism, see: Anne Maxwell, *Colonial Photography & Exhibitions: Representations of the 'Native' and the Making of European Identities* (London: Leicester University Press, 1999).

²⁷⁸ Harriet Ritvo, *The Animal Estate. The English and other Creatures in the Victorian Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 217-222.

²⁷⁹ "Birth of a Camel in Manchester," *Times* (London) 26 March 1864, 12:d.

Ottoman artifacts, the development of an imperial transportation network, etc., allows for British activity in the Ottoman Empire, between 1838 and 1880 to be considered imperial. While this model of British imperialism did not precisely replicate the imperialism used by the British in the rest of the world, it does contain a number of strong and significant parallels (i.e. emphasis on trade, economic dominance, appropriation of cultural artifacts, etc.). Importantly, however, nineteenth-century British imperialism did not require uniformity; in fact, recent scholarship emphasizes the lack of coherence that British imperialism, in general, had:

In its piecemeal administration, effected through trading companies such as the East India Company, the Royal Niger Company, and the Imperial East Africa Company, a mosaic of semiautonomous provinces and an assortment of paramountcies, viceroys, dominions and protectorates, as well as fiscal and military policies, *British influence, while exercised to protect and expand important trade routes, lacked any over all coherence* (emphasis added).²⁸⁰

Thus, while the model of imperialism that the British established for the Ottoman Empire differed from that used in India or other places in the world, the lack of colonies and the emphasis that the imperial relationship between England and the Ottoman Empire placed on commercial affairs placed the Ottoman Empire (or portions of it) well within the recognized sphere of British imperial policy.

The British managed to establish their particular form of imperialism on the Ottoman Empire in the period between the signing of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention in 1838 and the rise of German influence in the Empire around 1880.

²⁸⁰ Anthony Alan Shelton, “Museum Ethnography: An Imperial Science,” in *Cultural Encounters: Representing “Otherness”* ed. Elizabeth Halam and Brian Street (New York: Routledge, 2000), 156-157.

However, after 1880, Germany began to take an increasingly important position in the Empire, eventually replacing Britain as the most important imperial power in the Ottoman Empire. A recent scholar contends that the British influence flagged after 1880 because, “British policy makers came to [the] conclusion that the Ottoman Empire was not a viable state any more [after about 1880]...and they expected that the Empire was sooner or later to collapse.”²⁸¹ Although the British believed that the Ottoman Empire faced collapse by the 1880s, the Germans believed it could be sustained longer. Thus, the Germans began to replace the British in the imperialism that had been established for the Ottoman Empire. The British recognition that the Ottoman Empire was no longer viable led to increasingly less capital investment (i.e. railroads, ports, etc., but trade remained) and loans. The Germans recognized the decreased British interest in investing in Ottoman projects as well as the concurrent decline in interest in loaning money to the Sublime Porte, and, consequently, the Germans began to replace the British in these areas. Thus, as the Germans recognized the intentional decline in British interest in the Ottoman Empire, the Germans began to embrace the imperial model established by the British and exert German influence in the Ottoman Empire.

There is no indication that the German imperial expansion into the Ottoman Empire was more aggressive or assertive than the British or French. Rather, the Germans used the model established by the British (and previously adopted by the French as well) to assert themselves in the Empire. This German imperialism intended to provide Germany an equal position in the Ottoman Empire, there is no belief that the Germans intended to establish a formal Middle Eastern colonial system, or any other major

²⁸¹ Bilgin, 117.

deviation from the established British model for Ottoman imperialism. Consequently, the subsequent chapters describe the flagging of British interests in the Ottoman Empire and the German effort to establish themselves as an imperial power in the Ottoman Empire.

CHAPTER V

THE RISE OF GERMANY AND GERMAN ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

With regard to the Colonies, I believe that we must learn gradually. The military system has already been abandoned, and we are learning more and more to imitate the English and to direct our Colonists and turn them to profits as merchants.²⁸²
 --Reichskanzler Prince Hohenlohe (1897)

Since the signing of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838, the British had maintained themselves as the chief imperial power in the Ottoman Empire. This position permitted them to assert their interests in the affairs of the Empire, but it also restrained the ambitions of the Russians and Mehemet Ali. Moreover, the strength of the British position (and the significance of its investment in the Near East, as well as the protection of the “overland route” and later the Suez Canal) fostered a British interest in preserving the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. However, the dual policy of maintaining the Empire’s territorial integrity and exerting imperial influence by providing large loans ended with the Porte’s 1875 bankruptcy (discussed below) and with Lord Salisbury’s (Robert Cecil, 1830-1903) appointment as British Foreign Secretary in 1878. Salisbury “believed that the Ottoman Empire was irrevocably doomed to collapse,”²⁸³ and that the Empire’s recent defeat by the Russians (the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878) signaled the end of its “independence; henceforth [Salisbury believed] the Sultan

²⁸² Friederich Curtius (ed.), *Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe- Schillingsfuerst: Authorized by Prince Alexander of Hohenlohe- Schillingsfuerst*, trans. George W. Chrystal (New York: AMS Press, 1970), 2: 487.

²⁸³ Yasamee, 57.

would survive, if at all, as a client of one of the Great Powers.”²⁸⁴ This perception of the Ottoman Empire’s future (based on the recent loss to Russia and the announcement that the Ottoman Empire would not make further debt payments) discouraged the British from continuing in the role of Ottoman protector after 1875. Moreover, it also indicated a conclusion to the “Crimean policy,” which, since 1854, directed Britain to go to war to prevent the breakup of the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire.²⁸⁵ Indeed, not only did the British hesitate to remain the Empire’s protector, but, in 1882, the *Eastern Express* (Constantinople) characterized the relationship between the Porte and England as estranged.²⁸⁶ The British reticence to accept the position of Ottoman protector meant that the Porte had few appropriate Powers from which to choose. The Porte had few suitable prospects because, since the Prussian defeat of France (1870), the Porte did not consider the French (who had actively colonized peripheral portions of the Ottoman Empire) an adequate protector. A protective alliance with St. Petersburg remained improbable because of the established Russian ambition for the Straits as well as Russia’s recent, imperial misadventures in Bulgaria (1885-1888, discussed in Chapter VI).²⁸⁷ Consequently, with the British disinterest in remaining the Ottoman protector and the distrust that the European Powers and the Porte had in France and Russia, an opportunity developed for the newly established Germany to assert itself in the Ottoman Empire.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Soy, 304. Barbara Jelavich, “Russian Acquisition of Batum,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 48(1970): 46 (hereafter cited as Jalavich, “Russian Acquisition of Batum,”).

²⁸⁶ “England and Turkey,” *Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 16 August 1882, 339:a.

²⁸⁷ *FRUS*, 1870, 237-239.

While international conditions favored an extension of German imperialism into the Ottoman Empire, Bismarck's commitment to the consolidation of the German state, in the years following the unification of Germany (1871), is well known. This Bismarckian interest in the consolidation of the recently unified Germany caused Bismarck to profess little interest in foreign affairs, beyond keeping Germany out of war. This determination to avoid involvement in a war catalyzed Bismarck's disinterest in formal colonies, which he emphasized in the Reichstag by declaring "*Ich bin kein Kolonialmensch...* (I am no colonizer...)."²⁸⁸ However, following the British decision to limit further financial involvement in the Ottoman Empire, the Germans (both governmental and non-governmental officials) recognized that conditions existed for the advancement of German interests in the Ottoman Empire through "trade, commerce, and a peaceful penetration."²⁸⁹ The conflict between Bismarck's official stated intention to avoid colonial fetters, and the general interest in extending German influence abroad made the acceptance of the British model of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire particularly attractive.

Bismarck's interest in avoiding colonization did not wholly differentiate him from those who advocated for German expansion abroad. Friedrich Fabri, in his famous

²⁸⁸ "The East African Question," *Times* (London), 28 January 1889, 5:c.

²⁸⁹ Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, "The German Middle Eastern Policy, 1871-1945" in *Germany and the Middle East, 1871-1945*, ed. William G. Schwanitz (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2004), 1. Regrettably, this volume dedicates very little space to German interests in the Ottoman Empire before 1900. This is one of the best books on the subject, particularly its footnotes.

volume *Bedarf Deutschland Colonien?*²⁹⁰ (Does Germany Need Colonies?), advocated for German economic expansion into regions where European colonialism already existed, and, thus, “political annexation was out of the question.”²⁹¹ Consequently, one of the most famous assertions for German expansion abroad (Fabri) promoted an imperial policy that specifically prohibited colonial development. Further, Karl von Koseritz, an influential German living in South America, and editor of the South American edition of *Deutsche Zeitung*, advocated a similar position.²⁹² Indeed, the effort to secure imperial influence without colonies accorded with the general pattern of imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire. The two most important examples of such imperial activity were the British occupation of Egypt (1882) and the creation of the new Bulgarian state (1878). Although the British occupied Egypt in 1882, the latter remained within the Ottoman Empire until the 1914 Turkish declaration of war against England. Similarly, following the creation of Bulgaria, in the Treaty of San Stefano (1878), which the European Powers considered an unacceptable extension of Russian influence into the Ottoman Empire, the new Bulgaria remained, formally, within the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, Bismarck’s support for the advancement of German interests in the Near East without formal colonization (while publicly proclaiming no interest in establishing colonies in the Ottoman Empire) indicates that his vision for the extension of German influence abroad

²⁹⁰ Friedrich Fabri, *Bedarf Deutschland der Colonien?/Does Germany Need Colonies?* trans., E.C.M. Breuning and M.E. Chamberlain (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998).

²⁹¹ Ian L.D. Forbes, “German Informal Imperialism in South America before 1914,” *Economic History Review* 3 (1978): 385. In other circumstances Fabri did seek formal colonies for Germany.

²⁹² Ibid., 386.

fit within the general context of European imperialism in the Ottoman Empire. Further, this Bismarckian interest in expansion without colonies permitted him to embrace the accepted and recognized British model of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire. Historians refer to the policy of German involvement in the Ottoman Empire as *Orientpolitik*, but they have not considered this as imperialism or colonialism.²⁹³ Rather, such historians have contended that Germany “intensified their economical, cultural, and military relations to the Middle East...”²⁹⁴ without considering the imperial implications of such “intensified activity.”

German involvement in the Ottoman Empire embraced the model established by the British, but subordinated imperial involvement in the Near East to Great Power politics in Europe. Bismarck even sought, in the early 1880s, to reestablish British interests in the Near East,²⁹⁵ believing that securing such involvement (recall that the British interest in maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire ended between 1875 and 1878) would bolster the position of the Ottoman Empire in the international arena. The British, however, had minimal interest in extending their position in the Levant (as previously discussed), and instead signaled a new relationship with the Porte by

²⁹³ Friedrich Scherer, *Adler und Halbmond: Bismarck und der Orient 1878-1890* (Munich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2001) (originally the author’s dissertation); this is the best and most complete treatment of Bismarck and the Ottoman Empire. A recent scholar contends that Bismarck’s *Orientpolitik* depended on the continued rivalry of the Russians, British, and French and focused on keeping German interests within Constantinople. However, the scope of the eventual German influence in the Empire went well beyond Constantinople, with or without the assent of Bismarck. See: Marchand, 92.

²⁹⁴ Schwantz, 1.

²⁹⁵ Scherer, 150-151; *Grosse Politik*, VII, doc. no. 1416.

partitioning Egypt from the Ottoman Empire (1882, as previously noted, but Egypt remained, formally within the Ottoman Empire until 1914). This British decision for disengagement permitted the French to enjoy heightened influence in the Near East through a near monopoly on loans to the Porte, but, by 1888, the Germans began to challenge this monopoly as their banks began to loan money to the Ottoman government with considerable governmental support (discussed below). However, the other European Powers regulated German, like the British and the French, imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire, and, thus, Bismarck and the Germans emphasized maintaining the *status quo* (i.e. no formal colonial development) as the first element in their Middle Eastern policy.²⁹⁶ The importance of maintaining peace in the Ottoman Empire found support among the Powers, whose ambassadors emphasized their willingness to use bold action to prevent the peace from being compromised.²⁹⁷ The formal establishment of colonies or other intensified imperial activities (far outside of the established British model) would have likely caused the other European powers to intervene in the Empire, possibly sparking a European war. The Germans, under Bismarck, never intended for Ottoman policy to supersede European policy and, consequently, they carefully followed the established British model of imperialism.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁶ Schwanitz, 1-2.

²⁹⁷ “The Ambassadorial Reunion,” *The Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 21 October 1885, 394: a. While this could be conventional diplomatic rhetoric, the sentiment of this statement appears genuine as most of the Powers sought to prevent a war in the Ottoman Empire.

²⁹⁸ The coverage of British activity in Egypt by the *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* helps support this idea. See: “Emin Pascha und die deutschen Interessen,” *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 15 February 1887, 125:b.

German economic imperialism in the Ottoman Empire never achieved the same success as British imperialism did. Rather, the Germans lagged behind the British in most areas of imperialism included in the model considered here. However, while the Germans trailed the British in both the amount of money loaned and the total quantity of goods traded, the Germans built more railroad track, appropriated more Ottoman artifacts (if Egyptian artifacts are not considered), and contributed significantly to the reformation of the Ottoman military. Consequently, while the Germans became one of the two most important imperial powers, together with the French, in the Ottoman Empire in the eighteen-eighties, British influence did not disappear completely, and tensions between the two powers remained until the conclusion of the First World War (as the fierce fighting in the Middle East during the First World War indicates²⁹⁹).

The extension of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, based on the British model, coincided with the accession of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) to the position of Sultan. Abdülhamid's credentials did not necessarily make him an attractive future Sultan; he was poorly educated and lacked knowledge of foreign countries (he had never traveled and he spoke only Turkish). However, Abdülhamid II became intensely interested in foreign affairs and approached them with a "deep sense of the Ottoman Empire's vulnerability to the European Great Powers."³⁰⁰ Further, he "believed that all Powers but Germany were hostile [to the Ottoman Empire], and that the British in

²⁹⁹ McKale, *War by Revolution*. McKale provides a detailed description of the many and varied efforts that both the British and Germans engaged in during the First World War to disrupt the activities of the other power. McKale's book emphasizes the importance and involvement of these two powers in the Middle East before the First World War.

³⁰⁰ Yasamee, 43.

particular were bent upon the Ottoman Empire's destruction.”³⁰¹ The new Sultan made the reestablishment of Ottoman autonomy his principal goal, but he recognized that this required further reforms, and likely necessitated that the Empire submit to the indignity of temporary Great Power protection. Abdülhamid II considered Germany the best possible candidate for a protective relationship with the Ottoman Empire.³⁰²

Although Abdülhamid II sought closer relations with Germany, he rejected any proposals for a formal protective (i.e. imperial) relationship.³⁰³ Germany appealed to the Sultan because it had no established ambitions in the Ottoman Empire (as the British, French, and Russians did) and the inclusion of such a power might lead to a reestablishment of the balance of power in the Near East,³⁰⁴ which had been compromised by the strong British position since 1838. Thus, while the Germans sought to establish themselves in the Ottoman Empire, the Porte and the Sultan encouraged informal German influence in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans believed the Germans would provide protection from the other Great Powers and permit the Empire to continue to institute domestic reforms, eventually becoming sufficiently strong to exist without

³⁰¹ Ibid., 44.

³⁰² Although held in Berlin, without an Ottoman delegation, the British disappointed the Porte and Abdülhamid more than the Germans (discussed in Chapter V). See: Akarli, 34-35.

³⁰³ Yasamee, 50-51. Abdülhamid is viewed in much western historiography as “anti-modernist” or “anti-western,” but such a categorization is inaccurate. He did seek to limit European intrusion and involvement in the Ottoman Empire, but he also recognized that such a goal would require the further advancement of the Ottoman financial, military, and educational systems. Thus, he could not isolate himself from Europe. He believed Germany posed the least threat to the Ottoman Empire of any of the Great Powers and thus fostered relations with the Germans. See: Akarli, 2-6.

³⁰⁴ Yasamee, 50-51.

Great Power protection. However, in spite of Abdülhamid's intention to reestablish the Ottoman Empire without Great Power *imperial* influence, German influence in the Empire accelerated between 1876 and the Young Turk Revolution (1908). During this period, in spite of the Sultan's efforts, the Germans became increasingly involved in Ottoman trade, became a major source of loans for the Porte, participated in the development of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, further reformed the army under German influence, and appropriated the Pergamon Altar and other Ottoman artifacts. Thus, by the early twentieth-century, the Germans, almost to the extent of the British between 1838 and 1875, imposed a strong imperial presence on the Ottoman Empire.

German Commercial Imperialism in the Ottoman Empire

On 6 October 1875, the Ottoman government published the following notice in local newspapers:

It is well known that the Budget shows a deficit exceeding £5,000,000. In order to be able to pay regularly the coupons of the various loans, the Government had hitherto been in the habit of obtaining fresh loans, thus paying one debt by contracting another. The result of this expedient was an increase of the deficit and a diminution on the confidence of holder of Turkish securities, which is proved by the constant depreciations which Ottoman stock daily undergo [sic.]...³⁰⁵

The announcement continued, explaining that the Ottoman government had suspended payment on its foreign debts. While the announcement did not explicitly repudiate the debts, it was “tantamount to a formal declaration of bankruptcy.”³⁰⁶ This event (hereafter

³⁰⁵ “Latest Intelligence,” *Times* (London) 8 October 1875, 3:a.

³⁰⁶ Owen, 108. For a discussion of the Turkish economic situation, see: Issawi, “Economic History of Turkey,” 361-365; and House, *Indebtedness of Foreign Countries: Letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, in Reply to A Resolution of the House of*

the Ottoman Bankruptcy), which developed partially from the general economic depression that began in 1873,³⁰⁷ transformed the relationship between the Powers and the Ottoman Empire. British investors became increasingly circumspect about future investments (but less so trade³⁰⁸) in the Ottoman Empire and, consequently, an opportunity developed for an assertion of further French and German economic influence in the Empire.

The Powers resolved the Ottoman bankruptcy principally through the Decree of Muhamarram (October 1881, also spelled Mouharrem) and the significantly less important Treaty of Berlin (1878, less important concerning the debt settlement, discussed in Chapter VI).³⁰⁹ The Ottoman Debt Administration (also referred to as the Public Debt Administration), which was included in the Decree of Maharram, became the instrument through which the European powers protected their investments in the Ottoman Empire, but it also became one of the principal tools of European economic imperialism in the Ottoman Empire.³¹⁰ The Ottoman Debt Administration (ODA) did not replace the Imperial Ottoman Bank, or even displace the latter's significant influence (see Chapter IV), but, rather, the ODA provided additional European oversight and control of Ottoman

Representatives, in Relation to the Public Indebtedness of Foreign Governments, 29 January 1881, 46th Cong., 3rd sess., 1881, Ex. Doc. 63, 34-40.

³⁰⁷ Pamuk, 60-61.

³⁰⁸ The promise of trade encouraged German colonial activity in the Ottoman Empire, the basis for this was partially the success of the British trade efforts in Egypt, see: “Dampfersubvention für Ostafrika,” *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 1 October 1887, 557-581.

³⁰⁹ Clay, “Gold for the Sultan,” 546-559.

³¹⁰ Blaisdell, 235.

finances.³¹¹ While the Decree of Maharram,³¹² which officially formed the ODA, extended substantial privileges and opportunities to the Powers, the Porte announced the Decree with a sense of relief, because the latter feared that the European Powers would use the bankruptcy as a pretext for formal occupation, as occurred in Tunis (1881) and in Egypt (1882).³¹³

The increased control provided by the Decree of Muharram was important because, until the First World War, the ODA operated simultaneously as the major conduit for Ottoman access to European finance markets (i.e. European loans)³¹⁴ and “the permanent guardian of the [financial] interests of foreign nationals in the Ottoman Empire.”³¹⁵ Without this guardianship, the European Powers (principally France and Germany) would have been hesitant to extend new loans to the Porte after 1875. Moreover, the ODA also represented (through the executive council, discussed below) the interests of all the European Powers, which became increasingly important as the Imperial Ottoman Bank, after 1875, became an instrument of French interests.³¹⁶ Before

³¹¹ Report, Beiberstein to Foreign Office, 31 July 1907, NARA/T-139/reel 352/Series I.

³¹² Issawi, “The Economic History of Turkey,” 363-365.

³¹³ Owen, 191-192. For information on the French occupation of Tunis, see: *DBFP*: I: B: VIII: 301-379.

³¹⁴ Donald Quataert, “Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia, 1876-1908.” Ph.D. diss, University of California-Los Angeles, 51.

³¹⁵ Blaisdell, 222.

³¹⁶ A French publication from 1918 refers to the Imperial Ottoman Bank as a French bank. See: Henri Hauser, *Germany’s Commercial Grip on the World: Her Business Methods Explained* trans. Manfred Emanuel (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1918), 62. The Imperial Ottoman Bank secured loans to purchase weapons in France, loans that were not

a specific understanding of German economic influence in the Ottoman Empire can be attempted, a basic understanding of the Ottoman Debt Administration and its relation to the Ottoman state must be considered.

Although economic powers had established protective organizations in foreign countries for decades, the Ottoman Debt Administration distinguished itself from similar contemporary organizations. The ODA did not function conventionally because the flexibility and the scope of its authority within the Ottoman Empire provided the ODA with an unusually influential position. The following characteristics of the ODA contributed to its unusually influential position: first, the ODA did not receive its authority from an international treaty or commercial agreement; rather, it claimed its authority from a decree issued by the Sultan, which provided a semi-legal status that afforded the ODA a large degree of flexibility.³¹⁷ Second, the Ottoman state provided the salaries for the ODA officials, which, by 1913, exceeded fifty-five hundred employees, more than the entire Ottoman Ministry of Finance.³¹⁸ Third, the Ottoman government

available to the Ottoman government when the weapons were purchased in Germany, see: "Turkish Armaments," *Times* (London), 21 December 1904, 3:d.

³¹⁷ Blaisdell, 7. While this assertion is correct in principle, the Powers and the Sultan negotiated over the components of this agreement. See Clay, "Gold for the Sultan," 544-547. The semi-official status of the ODA did not impair its ability to act, as such status might do, because the Ottoman Empire needed the ODA's support and recognized that the Powers relied on the ODA, often by placing important but unofficial delegates on it, such as officials from the Banking House of Bleichröder, whose connections to Bismarck will be discussed below, see: Blaisdell, 114 and Owens, 192. Indeed, Fritz Stern discusses Bleichröder and Bismarck's interest in the Ottoman Empire in a chapter entitled "The Reluctant Colonialist," in reference to Bismarck (discussed below), see: Fritz Stern, *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), 418-419.

³¹⁸ Owen, 194. Blaisdell's book was characterized in 2001 as "still the best source on the ODA." New research based on material from the bank archives and political archives

received no share of the revenues collected by the ODA, even if the revenues increased dramatically. Fourth, the Decree compelled the Ottoman government to enforce the monopolies granted to the ODA (i.e. prevent smuggling or illegal sales of goods on which the ODA had a monopoly, such as tobacco);³¹⁹ and, finally, the Ottoman government paid all of the ODA's expenses.³²⁰ These characteristics permitted the ODA to control (directly) at least one-third of Ottoman revenues, represent both the individual countries (chiefly: Britain, France, and Germany) and private bondholders, and advance European imperial interests in the Empire. While scholars disagree about the potency of the ODA, most agree that it represented a significant loss of sovereignty for the Ottoman government and concede that it "was a partner in [the European] imperialistic enterprise."³²¹ Indeed, the ODA conformed with the desires of the Powers so fully that the French, in their assertion of economic imperialism in China, sought "...an international debt administration...similar to that in Turkey..."³²²

from the major Powers as well as from Turkey would be a welcome addition to the historiography. See: A. Üner Turgay, "The British-German Trade Rivalry in the Ottoman Empire, 1880-1914: Discord in Imperialism," *Cultural Horizons* 5 (2001): 185-186ff.

³¹⁹ Owen, 194. Also see: "Tobacco Smuggling," *The Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 1 November 1882, 481; b, c; and "Affray with Smugglers," *The Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 1 November 1882, 484: a.

³²⁰ Blaisdell, 7 and, 108-109. The ODA acquired further responsibilities and powers, such as the collection of taxes on imports (after 1903) for the Ottoman Ministry of Finance, but it is not necessary to detail every new power that the ODA acquired. See: Owen, 193.

³²¹ Owen, 192; and, Blaisdell, 10. This has not been a topic that scholars have considered as fully as would be desirable, as mentioned in Chapter III; recent work by Christopher Clay is the chief exception.

³²² Dieter Brötel, "French Economic Imperialism in China, 1885-1904/1906," *Itinerario* 23 (1999): 57.

Although the ODA had many responsibilities in the Ottoman Empire, its primary purpose was “the furtherance of European imperialism.”³²³ The ODA principally asserted the imperialism of the Powers by facilitating loans and commercial agreements for the Porte (with the Powers). The ODA accomplished this partially through its critical oversight role, without which the European Powers would have been reluctant to make additional loans to the Porte (after 1875, as previously mentioned). The Powers, at least France and Germany, desired to provide loans and commercial agreements because they recognized them as a justification for the assertion of Great Power imperialism in the Empire,³²⁴ but also because the Powers benefited from these loans. Many of the loans made by the Powers were made for the construction of imperial railroads and other European projects in the Ottoman Empire; frequently, the materials for the construction of these projects had to be purchased from the country that provided the loan.³²⁵ Overwhelmingly, the Powers structured the ODA to introduce European railroads into the Ottoman Empire, and, consequently, a large proportion of the ODA’s delegates also represented companies involved in the development of railways.³²⁶ The importance of

³²³ Blaisdell, 235.

³²⁴ An example of this comes from the French investment in China. The Powers fought to provide concessions to the Chinese in the so called “Battle of Concessions.” The French came to dominate investment in China and used it as a platform for the advancement of their imperialist vision. While the British and Germans never equaled the French investment in China, they both provided loans and became imperial powers (even colonial powers). See, D. Gagnier, “French Loans to China 1895-1914: The Alliance of International Finance and Diplomacy,” *The Australian Journal of Politics and History* 18 (1972): 229-249.

³²⁵ Owen, 192; *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, vol. X, doc. 320, 287.

³²⁶ Quataert, “Ottoman Reform and Agriculture,” 54.

railway development to imperialism is not surprising and occurred throughout Germany's imperial territories in Asia and Africa.³²⁷ Indeed, the ODA delegates from Germany had an especially close relationship with domestic railroad companies.³²⁸

The ODA officially sought the support of the Sultan and the Porte in the construction of railways and other large capital projects,³²⁹ but "it was also made repeatedly clear that the Sultan and his government were expected to go along with European plans and that they [the Ottomans] would only receive further financial support if they did so."³³⁰ Not only did the ODA secure funding and permission for European imperial projects in the Ottoman Empire, but it also accepted responsibility for the collection of taxes and the payment of the Ottoman debt.³³¹ In so doing, the ODA controlled "the salt monopoly, the stamp and spirit duties, the fish tax, and the silk tithe from a number of districts, as well as the part of the Annual Tribute from several provinces...initially, the ODA also collected the tobacco tax,"³³² which, in total, as previously mentioned, constituted approximately one-third of regular Ottoman

³²⁷ Bertram L. Simpson, *The Re-Shaping of the Far East* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1905), 367-387.

³²⁸ Blaisdell, 147. Blaisdell attributes, almost wholly, German involvement in Ottoman railroads to the ODA.

³²⁹ "Turkey Under Abdul Hamid," *New York Times*, 14 October 1900, 16:6.

³³⁰ Owen, 192.

³³¹ For a description of Ottoman revenue, see: *DBFP* B:I:VIII, 142-162; and *DBFP* B:I:XVI, 348.

³³² Owen, 193. These are described in Blaisdell, 108-119. Also see "The Tobacco Regie," *The Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 20 December 1882, 564: b-c.

revenues.³³³ Based on this level of involvement, the European bondholders considered the ODA quite successful. Not only did it advance future imperial projects, principally the railroad which enjoyed enthusiastic construction after 1882,³³⁴ but it also provided regular debt payments, and powerful protective oversight for European interests in the Empire.³³⁵

The Decree of Muharrem, in Article XV, provided for an executive council to oversee the ODA. The council consisted of seven members, one each to represent the bondholders from the following countries: Netherlands, Britain, France, Germany, Austria, and Italy; a delegate from the Imperial Ottoman Bank was the committee's final representative. While these members could not be diplomats assigned to the Ottoman Empire, they received diplomatic status and protection,³³⁶ although the existing capitulations already provided extraterritoriality protection to foreigners in the Ottoman Empire already. In spite of the official limitations on the requirements for membership on the executive committee, the latter's delegates often maintained a close, if quiet, relationship with their respective government. Conventionally, "most members of the

³³³ Owen, 193 (Table 36). The ODA sold the monopoly on tobacco to a consortium that included the House of Bleichröder, increasing German influence in the Empire. Stern, 419. Also see: "Trade and Finance: The Tobacco Regie," *The Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 6 December 1882, 545: a.

³³⁴ Blaisdell, 125.

³³⁵ Owen, 193-194. The tobacco monopoly had a European heritage, see Moriz Mohl, *Denkschrift für eine Reichs-Tabak-Regie* (Stuttgart: K. Wittwer, 1878); "Paris Urged to Sell Monopoly," *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 November 1925, 3; Curtius, 2: 487.

³³⁶ Blaisdell, 94-95 and 99.

[executive] council were appointed with the active though usually covert, support of their respective national governments.”³³⁷

Among the countries to delegate a representative with the covert support of his national government was Germany. Thus, the delegates to the governing board of the ODA often had a close relationship with their respective government, and thus provided the European Powers a mechanism to exert imperial influence without establishing a formal imperial relationship.

According to the Decree of Muharrem, the German delegate to the ODA was to be selected from the syndicate of German banks, which constituted the principal Ottoman creditors in Germany (until 1895 the only German bank in the syndicate was the House of Bleichröder).³³⁸ The syndicate selected Herr Justizrath Primker (formerly legal counsel to the German Foreign Ministry) as the first German delegate to the ODA’s executive committee. Primker received the position based on the recommendation of Gerson von Bleichröder,³³⁹ whom historian Fritz Stern contends was “the German Rothschild,” and “the chancellor’s [Bismarck’s] banker.”³⁴⁰ However, Stern properly remarks that Bleichröder was more than simply Bismarck’s banker; rather, Stern contends “...he [Bleichröder] was given, and he sought, political assignments requiring

³³⁷ Owen, 192; for a list of the members, and how their characteristics changed, see Blaisdell, 226-228.

³³⁸ Blaisdell, 95 and 228. This is not to indicate that the German selection process differed (in the Decree) from any of the other powers. This is one of the strengths of Blaisdell’s book; he based his discussion of the process for deciding who would represent the Germans on interviews with officials from the German foreign ministry, *Deutsche Bank*, etc.

³³⁹ Grunwald, 46-47.

³⁴⁰ Stern, xvi; and, Blaisdell, 114.

his particular mixture of [economic] expertise and discretion. Europe knew him as Bismarck's secret agent...Bleichröder's career illuminates those aspects of Bismarck's rule previously slighted or ignored.”³⁴¹ Bleichröder's involvement in the Ottoman Empire is revealing. Bismarck's frequent public assertions that he, and, thus, Germany, had no interest in the “Eastern Question,” Turkish affairs, or the expansion of German influence abroad must be seen within the context of Bleichröder's participation in Ottoman affairs. The assignment of Bleichröder as Bismarck's principal representative to administer German affairs with the Turkish debt indicates that, while Bismarck did not want to be publicly associated with the extension of German influence into the Ottoman Empire, that this was an area of significance to him.³⁴²

Importantly, Stern begins his discussion of Belichröder's assignment to the ODA with a brief discussion of imperialism, concluding somewhat non-committally: “If the term ‘imperialism’ is extended to mean financial control by one nation or a group of nationals over the fiscal policy of another, then Bleichröder certainly participated in imperial ventures [in the Ottoman Empire].”³⁴³ This assertion of German financial control in the Ottoman Empire began earnestly in 1888, when *Deutsche Bank* became actively involved in the construction of capital projects in the Ottoman Empire,

³⁴¹ Stern, xvi; Bleichröder had established contacts in the Ottoman Empire when Bismarck began to use him to help with the Turkish debt, see: Gershom A. Knight, “The Rothschild-Bleichröder Axis in Action: An Anglo-German Cooperative, 1877-1878,” *Leo Baeck Institute Jahrbuch* 28 (1983): 43.

³⁴² As early as 1876, Bismarck worried about the British influence in the Ottoman Empire, see: *DBFP I:B:III*, 71. Also see, “German Enterprise in the East,” *Times* (London), 28 October 1898, 5:a.

³⁴³ Stern, 418.

principally, but not exclusively, railways and specifically, the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway; however, as early as 1883, the Germans, through Bleichröder, began to exert their influence. The Decree of Muharrem provided the ODA the right to maintain and collect revenues from the tobacco monopoly. The executive committee of the ODA sold this right (as was their prerogative under the Decree) to a company known as the Tobacco Regie, which consisted of the House of Bleichröder, Credit-Anstalt in Vienna, and the Imperial Ottoman Bank.³⁴⁴ The Tobacco Regie was the sole entity which could license farmers to grow the product or provide loans to support its cultivation; however, it was obligated to purchase all of the tobacco harvested.³⁴⁵ Bleichröder's early involvement in Turkish finances and imperialism permitted him to assume "the leading German role in the international supervision of Turkish finances."³⁴⁶

The assertion of German economic influence in the Ottoman Empire began in 1888, but it did so largely because of the British decision to provide fewer loans, but not to decrease direct trade, to the Ottoman government based on the Ottoman Bankruptcy of 1875.³⁴⁷ *Deutsche Bank* provided the first major German loan to the Ottoman Empire in 1888, the same year that Bismarck famously told the Reichstag that Turkey was not

³⁴⁴ Stern, 419; "The Tobacco Regie," *Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 6 January 1886, 10:c.

³⁴⁵ Owen, 204-205; Report, Deutsche Bank to Auswärtiges Amt, 28 June 1913, NARA/T-139/reel 354/series I/0123.

³⁴⁶ Stern, 421. A study of Bleichröder's involvement in the Ottoman Empire and a history of the Tobacco Regie would be welcome additions to the historiography.

³⁴⁷ Pamuk, 76. For example, the proposed Euphrates Valley Railway was never built, see: Jelavich, "Russian Acquisition of Batum," 55-56.

worth the bones of a healthy Prussian grenadier.³⁴⁸ The Ottoman government contracted this loan for thirty million Marks to pay an indemnity it owed to Russia from the most recent Russo-Turkish War, a loan the Imperial Ottoman Bank refused to make. However, the purpose of the loan, from the German perspective, was to facilitate the entrance of *Deutsche Bank* into Ottoman financial circles—specifically, the eventual construction of the Berlin to Baghdad Railway, which developed from the Anatolian Railway.³⁴⁹ According to historian Kurt Grunwald, “This [loan] was the beginning of Germany’s paramount position in Turkey’s economic and financial affairs. *Deutsche Bank* soon rose to a position equal, if not superior, to that of the Imperial Ottoman Bank.”³⁵⁰ However, the ascendancy of *Deutsche Bank* occurred only because of the pressure from the German government (chiefly the new Kaiser, Wilhelm II, 1888-1918) on the bank,

³⁴⁸ Kurt Grunwald, “Penetration Pacifique—The Financial Vehicles of Germany’s ‘Drang nach dem Osten,’ *Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte* 1975 (???), 87 (hereafter cited as Grunwald “Penetration Pacifique,”). The British dated the origins of German economic imperialism in the Ottoman Empire specifically to 3 October 1888, see: *DBFP*, B:I:XVI, 65.

³⁴⁹ Walter Herman Carl Laves, *German Governmental Influence on Foreign Investments, 1871-1914* (New York: Arno Press, 1977), 102. This is a publication of his 1927 dissertation written at the University of Chicago. A study of Georg von Siemens’ activities in the Ottoman Empire would be highly desirable. Von Siemens’ activities in North America are well known, but less so his involvement in the Ottoman Empire. Also see: W.O. Henderson, “German Economic Penetration in the Middle East,” *Economic History Review* 17(1948): 58-60.

³⁵⁰ Grunwald, 87. *Deutsche Bank* eventually developed subsidiary companies including Haidar Pasha Port Company, the Anatolian Railway Company, *Actiengesellschaft der Orientalischen Eisenbahn* (Oriental Railway Company), Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company, and many others. See: Blasidell, 220; Senate “The German Great Banks,” 432-440; “The Deutsche Bank: The Bank’s Constantinople Interests,” *Times* (London) 28 March 1913, 18:c; and, “Railways in Asia Minor,” *Times* (London) 19 May 1923, 10:d.

hoping to compel the bank to become involved in the Ottoman Empire (based partially on the Sultan's interest in increasing German investment in his Empire).³⁵¹

The involvement of *Deutsche Bank* in the Ottoman Empire appealed to the Sultan partially because, by 1888, British loans had slowed considerably, and, consequently, his only avenue for access to European financial markets came through the Paris branch of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. While the Imperial Ottoman Bank officially maintained headquarters in both London and Paris, its authority had become concentrated in the latter. Thus, the refusal of the Imperial Ottoman Bank to extend loans to the Porte (in specific cases, such as the first loan that *Deutsche Bank* provided) was directed principally from Paris, with considerable assistance from the Quai d'Orsay.³⁵² This concentration of authority in the Paris branch of the Imperial Ottoman Bank permitted the French a brief period (1875-1888) of unchallenged economic supremacy in the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Sultan welcomed, even invited,³⁵³ the assertion of German financial interests (via the *Deutsche Bank*) into the Ottoman Empire, and the competition it provided, both economic and political, and that such involvement did not receive the Imperial Ottoman Bank's approbation.³⁵⁴ Complaints from the latter appeared in the *Times* (London) claiming (with mild exaggeration) that the Sultan's

³⁵¹ *Grosse Politik*, XIV, docs. 3958, 3959, and 3960; Laves, 99-100.

³⁵² Blaisdell, 221; Hamilton, 48; Pamuk, 76-77.

³⁵³ *Grosse Politik*, XIV, doc. 3959.

³⁵⁴ This disapproval existed as early as 1882. A meeting between Baron Hirsch and a representative of Austrian banks to build the Oriental Railway caused the French press to influence of other European Powers, see: "The Oriental Railways," *Eastern Express* (Constantinople) 31 May 1882, 203.

finance minister “planned the loan [the 1888 loan with *Deutsche Bank*] without them [the officers of the Imperial Ottoman Bank].”³⁵⁵ While the Imperial Ottoman Bank (essentially directed by the French) did not encourage German investment, the ODA proved more compliant and, in some cases, assisted the Germans.³⁵⁶ The rise in German economic influence in the Ottoman Empire developed not only from British hesitance to facilitate loans to the Porte, but also because the Sultan recognized the “political-territorial” ambitions of the British (and French) and, consequently, preferred to contact loans with the Germans whose position in the Near East was weaker than that of the other Powers.³⁵⁷ The confluence of these factors permitted the Germans to become a major factor in Ottoman financial affairs. *Deutsche Bank* became the principal instrument of German economic imperialism; however, a series of other German banks and companies (some of whom were subsidiaries of *Deutsche Bank*) also inserted themselves into the Ottoman financial markets, including but not limited to: *Die Deutsche Palästina-Bank*, the Ottoman Railway Company, *Diskonto-Gesellschaft*, *Dresdner Bank*, *Darmstädter Bank*, *Württembergische Vereinsbank*, and, of course, the House of Bleichröder.

³⁵⁵ “The Conclusion of a Fresh Loan a Fortnight Ago,” *Times* (London) 24 October 1888, 9:c. Apparently, by 1899 the Imperial Ottoman Bank had accepted the involvement of *Deutsche Bank*, and the other German banks, in Turkish affairs. Instead of fighting it, the Imperial Ottoman Bank began to involve themselves in the Baghdad Railway and other German endeavors, see: Blaisdell, 220.

³⁵⁶ Blaisdell, 7, 135, 198, and 222; Blaisdell states the ODA “discharged its duties to the *Deutsche Bank* with the same good faith and efficiency as it did those to the Imperial Ottoman Bank.” Blaisdell, 235. During the First World War, the ODA became a tool for the exclusive use of the Germans and Austrians.

³⁵⁷ Grunwald, 90; and *Grosse Politik*, XIV, docs. 3959 and 3960.

The German investment in the Ottoman Empire was part of a broader, and somewhat controversial, German economic policy entitled Export Capitalism.³⁵⁸ This economic philosophy facilitated the aggressive loaning of money from Germany to foreign countries, but in supplying loans to these foreign governments, the German banks were encouraged to apply pressure that would direct the foreign government to use the borrowed funds in Germany.³⁵⁹ Such a policy fit with the German (indeed European) concern about *Überproduktion*, as it provided a market for excess German goods. In the Ottoman Empire, this translated, overwhelmingly, into the construction of railways.³⁶⁰ This railroad construction brought “in its wake schools, factories, hospitals, and harbor works, all the recognized paraphernalia of imperialist expansion,”³⁶¹ which facilitated further loans from German banks. Thus, Export Capitalism became a powerful tool of

³⁵⁸ Export Capitalism was defined as “the investment of German capital in foreign enterprises, businesses, and securities, particularly the founding of subsidiary companies destined exclusively for over-sea business...” See: Senate, *National Monetary Commission: The German Great Banks and Their Concentration in Connection with The Economic Development of Germany*, 61st Cong., 2nd sess., 1910, Doc. 593, 420 (hereafter cited as Senate, *The Great German Banks*); also see, Jacob Riesser, *Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration* (Jena: G. Fischer, 1905), which provided much of the material for this congressional report.

³⁵⁹ Senate, *The Great German Banks*, 386; Laves, 9; and, Henderson, 59. Henderson indicates that the Frankfurt a/M company Holzman and Company built many of the railways in the Ottoman Empire. Research on the firm would be a welcome addition to our understanding of German economic activity in the Empire.

³⁶⁰ “Unsere Überproduktion an geistiger Arbeitskraft und praktische kolonisation,” *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, 16 June 1888, 185:a.

³⁶¹ Blaisdell, 209. The author is discussing the Baghdad Railway, but this would be true of most German railroads in the Ottoman Empire during this period. However, records relating to the construction of factories and even more so hospitals are limited. The factories that were constructed were usually quite small and “remained few in number.” See: Quataert, 898.

German economic expansion within the Ottoman Empire. Based on this economic philosophy, the Germans increased their ability to assert themselves in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

Such expansion fit within the tangled foreign policy that followed the departure of Bismarck and the arrival of *Weltpolitik* in 1897-1898.³⁶² During this transition period from Bismarckian foreign policy to *Weltpolitik*, German foreign policy lacked a guiding ideological principle, as the failure to renew the Reinsurance Treaty clearly exhibited. While the period from 1888-1899 was the most potent period in nineteenth-century German colonial expansion, the Germans, under Reichskanzler Georg Leo Count von Caprivi (1888-1892), also emphasized acquiring small strategic locations over larger colonial claims (the Heligoland-Zanzibar Agreement of 1 July 1890 is an example).³⁶³ German influence in the Ottoman Empire addressed strategic interests, such as providing a presence in the Suez Canal, while also conforming to the developing framework of *Weltpolitik* that the Kaiser, his court, the navy, and industrialists advocated.³⁶⁴

The use of Export Capitalism and the subsequent construction of railroads and the associated schools, factories, banks, etc. enabled Germany (in the form of private banks,

³⁶² Röhl, 343; Imanuel Geiss, *German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914* (Boston: Routledge, 1976), 60.

³⁶³ Geiss, 61. The Germans also hoped this would facilitate relations between England and Germany (following the decision not to resign the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia), which it did not.

³⁶⁴ “Der Schuß der überseeischen deutschen Interessen durch die Kriegsmarine,” *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, 18 August 1888, 257-258. The article indicates that the Mediterranean station was responsible for the Black Sea, and thus the stations were more than mere coaling stations, but were strategic as well. The other locations proposed were: East Asia, Australia, Eastern America (North, Central, and South America on the eastern side), Western America, and East and West Africa.

with governmental support and pressure) to become (rapidly) one of the Ottoman Empire's primary creditors. As late as 1888, the British maintained 56.2% of the Ottoman debt, with France controlling 31.7% and Germany merely 1.1%. However, by 1913, the British controlled only 15.2 % of the Ottoman debt and the Germans controlled 27.5%, with the French controlling the largest share at 50.4%.³⁶⁵ The specific terms of the loans³⁶⁶ are less important than the rapid increase in German influence in the commercial markets of the Ottoman Empire. The importance of German loans, proportionally and politically, encouraged the Germans to ask for (unsuccessfully, in 1913) an additional seat on the executive council of the ODA and for a German to enter the rotation for president of the council (which alternated between a British and a French delegate).³⁶⁷ The ODA refused the German request; however, this refusal was likely more related to contemporary political environment than to a failure to recognize German influence in the Ottoman Empire. The German interest in additional seats on the ODA executive council and inclusion in the revolving presidency emphasizes the importance of the ODA to German, and indeed European, interests in the Ottoman Empire.

German investment in the Ottoman Empire grew from £166,000 in 1888 to £20,653,000 in 1913. This investment included the construction of railways, ports, and

³⁶⁵ Pamuk, 65 and 66; Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 774. Also see, *DBFP*, B:I:XVI, 65-73. This document provides a good comparison between French and German loans to the Porte. Also see Harry D. White, *The French International Accounts, 1880-1913* Harvard Economic Studies, vol. 40 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933).

³⁶⁶ See: *DBFP*, B:I:XIV, 70-73 (table B) for a specific list of important German loans to the Ottoman Empire.

³⁶⁷ Turgay, 185ff.

utilities, as well as investments in banking, commerce, industry, and mining.³⁶⁸ Of these, German influence in railway and port construction (at 37% and 18.1% of the total foreign investment in each respective category) and banking (at 19.7% of the total foreign investment in Ottoman banks) were the greatest, with the others between six and eight percent of the total investment.³⁶⁹ The German investment in railways (as previously mentioned) was not surprising because of the importance railways had in the domestic development of Germany, but also because Germany had built railways in many of the world's peripheral areas, including Latin America, China, and the Near East.³⁷⁰ German railways in the Ottoman Empire, specifically the Oriental, Baghdad, and Anatolian Railways, served a dual purpose; they exerted German imperial influence and they brought profits to the German companies who built them.

The companies that constructed German railways in the Ottoman Empire were ensured a profit because Ottoman government secured profits through kilometric guarantees (a guaranteed payment *per* kilometer).³⁷¹ The first provision for a kilometric guarantee, which became one of the principal methods for financing railways,³⁷² was

³⁶⁸ Pamuk, 64 and 66.

³⁶⁹ Ibid., 66.

³⁷⁰ Herbert Feis. *Europe the World's Banker: An Account of European Foreignvestment and the Connection of World Finance with Diplomacy before the War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1930), 97; and, Simpson, 368-386.

³⁷¹ Report, Ambassador to Reichskanzler Bernhard von Bülow, 31 July 1909, NARA/T-139/reel 352/series I; Report, Beiberstein to Foreign Office, 31 July 1907, NARA/T-139/reel 352/series I; and Owen, 214. This became one of the principal methods for constructing railways, see: Barth, 118.

³⁷² Hurewitz, 503 for an example from a 1903 convention.

developed for the German construction of the Anatolian Railway. This financial instrument developed because the Sultan preferred for the railway to bypass commercially important areas in favor of military and strategic areas.³⁷³ Indeed, the 1903 Baghdad Railway Concession Agreement, in Article 45, required “the concessionaries [principally the Germans] to construct at their own expense...such military stations as may be deemed necessary by the Ministry of War.”³⁷⁴ Ottoman promises for payment (after 1875) would not have been sufficient, so the Ottoman government permitted the ODA to collect specific taxes and tithes to support the guarantees made to the German government and *Deutsche Bank*.³⁷⁵ In addition to the authority granted to the ODA for the collection of taxes and the enforcement of monopolies, the Germans exerted further political influence along the railways that they constructed in the Ottoman Empire. One example of this enhanced authority was the inclusion of police powers (within the scope of Ottoman law) for the companies, which constructed the railway along the tracks that they built.³⁷⁶ As previously stated, the concessions that granted permission for the construction of these railways also provided limited ownership rights as far as twenty kilometers on either side of the track.³⁷⁷ Further, the Germans began to establish

³⁷³ Quataert, “Ottoman Reform and Agriculture,” 52.

³⁷⁴ Hurewitz, 506.

³⁷⁵ Quataert, “Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia,” 53; Auswärtiges Amt, report (copy), 20 June 1913, NARA/T-139/reel 354/series I/0106. This document shows how with each additional concession the Ottoman government made for the construction of the railway they granted increasing authority to collect taxes through the ODA. The Porte did this as a deposit on the kilometric guarantees that the concessions carried with them.

³⁷⁶ Hurewitz, 500.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., 498 and 500.

consulates along their Ottoman railways. These consulates directed business toward Germany, but also offered a political presence in many Ottoman cities and territories.³⁷⁸ Finally, the development of railways, especially railways associated with specific European countries, such as the Berlin to Baghdad Railway, contributed to the sense that the Ottoman Empire was being partitioned into spheres of influence, or even imperial territories, especially as the German foreign office increasingly directed (in the twentieth-century) the affairs of the Baghdad Railway.³⁷⁹ Some scholars assert that the extension of German imperialism into the Ottoman territories occurred without undue tension between the Germans and the Ottomans; one scholar even contends that the Germans living in the Ottoman Empire, alongside the Ottoman railway workers, provided “[positive] experiments in intercultural living” as Germans and Turks shared accommodations.³⁸⁰ However, such assertions obscure the imperial significance of the German involvement in the Ottoman Empire.

German involvement in the construction of Ottoman railroads began with the Anatolian Railway. As previously mentioned, this railway had its origins with the Austrian Baron Wilhelm von Pressel; however, the Germans received the concession for

³⁷⁸ Turgay, 182. Scholars are only beginning to devote attention to Ottoman provincial history, but it is expected that a greater knowledge of this history will result in an increased recognition of a German imperial presence in the Ottoman interior.

³⁷⁹ *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, X, 901-902; “Early Partition of Asia Minor Now Seen,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 October 1913; Turgay, 181-183; and, Barth, 126-128.

³⁸⁰ McMurray, 1.

its construction (and it developed into the Berlin to Baghdad Railway).³⁸¹ Bismarck maintained an official policy of neutrality regarding the Anatolian Railway; however, eventually, both Wilhelm II and his ambassador to Constantinople Baron Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein (who had been the German Foreign Secretary from 1890-1897,³⁸² following the removal of Herbert von Bismarck) sought to advance German interests in the Ottoman Empire through railway construction.³⁸³ The Kaiser and his advisors pressed *Deutsche Bank's* reluctant leaders, especially Georg von Siemens, to finance, albeit with international support, the Anatolian and Baghdad Railways.³⁸⁴ However, as Bismarck's foreign policy faded, and Germany embraced the more militaristic *Weltpolitik*, the Baghdad Railway lost its international support and became an increasingly imperial project driven by the German government.³⁸⁵

The construction of the Anatolian railway conformed to the ambitions and desires of the German government because Anatolia (and other areas in Turkey) was seen as a

³⁸¹ Ibid., 13-28; the history of the Baghdad Railway is so well known that it does not seem necessary to repeat it here, except for specific points that are germane for this argument. *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, V, 175.

³⁸² John C.G. Röhl, *Wilhelm II: The Kaiser's Personal Monarchy, 1888-1900* trans. Sheila de Bellaigue (London: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 326-329.

³⁸³ Lothar Gall et al., *The Deutsche Bank, 1870-1995* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1995), 71.

³⁸⁴ Ibid., 76. The right to build the railway was not granted all at once, and the Powers competed with each other for the right to build each concession. However, this became an increasingly German project, but it almost always had some French (in the form of the Imperial Ottoman Bank) and sometimes British investors. For a listing of how much each invested, by 1908, see: Barth, 130.

³⁸⁵ Laves, 102-104.

seen as a territory from which large amounts of grain could be exported.³⁸⁶ Indeed, the British magazine *The Economist* lamented:

...[drawing] attention to the construction of railways in Asia Minor as a matter of much importance...Asia Minor is a country of vast extent, having an area of 729,000 square miles...Quite one-third of this enormous area...is by nature splendidly fertile, whilst the prevailing climate is magnificent; but the means of communication are so defective that crops cannot be brought to the sea, and a great reservoir of cereals is thus left untapped. It would surely be worth while for English capitalists to turn their attention to the construction of light railway from the interior of Asia Minor to various convenient points along the coast.³⁸⁷

Grain exports interested the Kaiser's government because Germany's industrialization, in the eighteen-eighties, resulted in an important change in German grain production; Germany shifted from being a net exporter of grain to a net importer.³⁸⁸ Although Anatolia produced large amounts of grain, the inability to move this product from the province to the world market meant that its grains essentially served a local market. The construction of the Anatolian Railway changed this immediately,³⁸⁹ and Anatolian grain began to be exported in significant quantities. However, in spite of the introduction of railways, Anatolia (and almost all of the Ottoman Empire) remained largely an area of small farmers. Consequently, the Anatolian Railway Company and the Ottoman

³⁸⁶ "Industrial Resuscitation in Turkey," *Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 20 December 1882, 563:a.

³⁸⁷ "Turkey as a Source of Cereal Supply," *The Economist*, 15 November 1890, 8.

³⁸⁸ Pamuk, 105; and, Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture," 186.

³⁸⁹ Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture," 189.

government began to introduce methods of scientific agriculture;³⁹⁰ these, however, had a limited effect on the general nature of Anatolian grain farming.³⁹¹

The first concession for the Anatolian railway went from Haidar to Angora (577 km), and it proved the least controversial of all three of its eventual concessions.³⁹² The second, and highly controversial, concession (official on 15 February 1893) ran from Eskishehr to Konia.³⁹³ This concession for the Anatolian Railway (which soon became the Baghdad Railway) terminated in Konia, which was already served by two British railways originating from Smyrna.³⁹⁴ The second concession for the Anatolian Railway

³⁹⁰ Ibid., 190-195; "A Present of Agricultural Implements to the Sultan," *Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 20 September 1882, 405:b. The agricultural machines necessary for this came from Sweden, which also sold weapons to the Ottomans.

³⁹¹ The Germans also invested in Russian railroads and purchased large amounts of grain from Russia (as the German tariff debates of the 1880s indicate), but these are insufficient to claim German imperialism Russia. Rather, German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire is predicated on not simply economic imperialism, but also political and cultural imperialism, which did not occur in Russia. See: Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Integration of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914* trans. Bruce Little (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 151; Gordon Craig, *Germany, 1866-1945*, Oxford History of Modern Europe, ed. Lord Bullock and Sir William Deakin, vol. 5 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 113-114.

³⁹² Although the duration of the concessions varied slightly, they were around ninety years, see: Hurewitz, 497. It is misleading to associate controversy with these railway lines merely to their construction. The German King of Bulgaria, Frederick (1887-1918) had important problems with the Baghdad Railway but he could not do anything about it, in spite of the fact that the Oriental Railway Company (whose chief investor was *Deutsche Bank*) was a private company. See: R.J. Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 119-121.

³⁹³ John B. Wolf, *The Diplomatic History of the Baghdad Railway* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1936), 16. For a listing of the specific concessions that created the Anatolian Railway, see: Auswärtiges Amt report (copy), 20 June 1913, NARA/T-139/reel 354/series I/0106.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., 16-17.

threatened the influence and the importance of two existing British railways, and following the Sultan's announcement that the Germans would receive the concession, the British threatened a naval demonstration off the coast of Constantinople.³⁹⁵ Although the demonstration never took place, the British objection to the perceived German intrusion into territory previously dominated by the British illustrates the importance that the Powers placed on "their" territory in the Ottoman Empire (the British believed that the Germans could have sent the railway through Sivas or Caesarieh and achieved the same end without injuring British interests in the area³⁹⁶). The British had reason to worry about being displaced by the Germans, as it became one of the principal German goals to irrigate the Konia Plain from Lake Karaviran to increase agricultural production along the German railways. The Sultan initially resisted this plan, but eventually acquiesced, and, by the end of 1911, the German company formed for the project (*Gesellschaft für die Bewässerung der Konia-Ebene*) had made considerable progress.³⁹⁷

Although the Germans acquired the second concession, Siemens and his *Deutsche Bank* officials expressed further concerns about the exposure that such a project had for them and even sought to decline the investment. However, Siemens' concerns mattered less by the eighteen-nineties, as Wilhelm II and his ambassador to Constantinople, Baron von Bieberstein, increasingly equated economic influence with political power.

³⁹⁵ *Grosse Politik*, XIV, 3970.

³⁹⁶ B. Barth. "The Financial History of the Anatolian and Baghdad Railways, 1889-1914." *Financial History Review* 5 (1998): 119.

³⁹⁷ R.I. Money, "The Irrigation of the Konia Plain," *The Geographical Journal* 54 (1919): 298; and, "The Emperor William's Visit," *Times* (London), 15 November 1907, 7:b. A study of this company and this plan might show an interesting "cold war" between the British and the Germans regarding who "had" what territory in the Ottoman Empire.

Consequently, when Siemens and *Deutsche Bank* sought to avoid further investment in the Empire, the Kaiser and his foreign office applied increased pressure, eventually “convincing” Siemens to fund the project. Siemens gained external financial support and backing through the development of the Anatolian Railway Company (composed of investors from *Deutsche Bank*, *Würtrrembergische Vereinsbank*, and the *Deutsche Vereinsbank*), which was incorporated under Ottoman law and thus formally an Ottoman company; however its profits were sent to Switzerland to the *Bank für orientalische Eisenbahnen*.³⁹⁸ Siemens and *Deutsche Bank* also sought international investors, and the French (through the Imperial Ottoman Bank) contributed to the early construction of the Anatolian (Baghdad) Railway. An agreement between the Germans and the French for the consolidation of the Ottoman debt under the ODA “enabled” the financing of the Baghdad Railway.³⁹⁹ In spite of Siemans’ concerns, the banks profited from the project, as did other German companies and investors (including Philipp Holzmann’s company, which built so many of the German railways in the Ottoman Empire, and Krupp & Company who provided the rails).⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁸ Gall et al., 69-70; Barth, 120. German companies considered railway investment in the Ottoman Empire as early as 1882, but decided against it, see: “Railways in Turkey,” *Eastern Express*, 24 May 1882, 195.

³⁹⁹ Barth, 136; and letter, unknown to Foreign Ministry, 10 February 1902, NARA/T-139/0267-0275.

⁴⁰⁰ Gall et al., 70; Barth, 119, Barth indicates that Holzmann AG contracted to build the line to Konia for 50.8 million French francs, but completed the contract using only 31.473 million francs (including the purchase of seventeen million francs worth of German equipment), the remainder was profit for the company, and the investors. Also see: Hans Meyer-Heinrich, *Phillip Holzmann Aktiengesellschaft, 1849-1949* (Frankfurt a/M: Umschau Verlag, 1949): 249-264.

A modification of the Ottoman Land Code of 1866, which, in its amended form, permitted foreigners to own land in the Ottoman Empire, contributed to a series of international efforts to establish agricultural colonies (largely unsuccessful) in the territories that bordered the railway (sometimes purely Ottoman territory and other times under the direction of European powers or companies). The purpose of these agricultural colonies was to concentrate the territorial agricultural production on a single commercial crop that could be exported,⁴⁰¹ as opposed to the conventional practice in which small farmers produced small amounts of varied foodstuffs, which produced no predictable product or yield. Although most of these efforts (and there were not that many) were British, evidently the Germans also attempted to establish such colonies.⁴⁰² Evidence indicates that all such efforts failed, both by Germans and by the other Powers. Historians have argued that the failure of the Powers to establish such colonies (because the Powers could not acquire sufficient labor, because the local labor could not be coerced into working for the Powers) is a distinguishing feature that keeps the activities of the Powers in the Ottoman Empire from constituting colonialism.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰¹ The establishment of large agricultural colonies appealed to those invested in the Ottoman Empire because the Ottoman Empire (for various reasons, including its diversity and size) exported a huge variety of agricultural products, with no agricultural product (excepting animal products) constituting more than twelve percent of total Ottoman exports. Consequently, if the Ottoman Empire could be transformed into a huge grain producing area under the control or influence of a specific European power then that Power would have an important economic and strategic advantage, see: Pamuk, 85. Also see, *FRUS*, 1892, doc. 284, for problems with this new policy.

⁴⁰² Pamuk, 102 and 243ff; also see: “Germany in Asia Minor,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 23 March 1900, 3:4.

⁴⁰³ Pamuk, 102. This is clearly a position that this dissertation disagrees with.

The construction of the Anatolian Railway not only permitted the European Powers to assert their imperial ambitions for the Ottoman Empire, but it also altered trade patterns within the Empire, as well as between the Empire and the world. Although little is known about commerce within the Ottoman Empire, it is clear that the Anatolian Railway became one of the principal instruments used to deliver grain from the provinces to Constantinople and to the Ottoman Army. While nineteenth-century Ottoman statistics are suspect, it appears that approximately twenty-five percent of the grain shipped on the Anatolian Railway was consumed in Constantinople, providing approximately two-thirds of the annual grain needs for the capital city, and that another ten percent went to the Ottoman military.⁴⁰⁴ Apparently, the Germans recognized the value of the domestic Ottoman market, and they began to challenge the British and French for control over the latter; in some cases (such as Damascus) the value of German trade exceeded that of the other Powers.⁴⁰⁵

While the Germans extended their commercial influence into the interior of the Ottoman Empire, they also traded in bulk with Ottoman merchants and government officials in the Empire's principal ports. While Ottoman statistics are unreliable, confidence may be extended to parallel statistics collected by the German government (at least for a general consideration of German trade with the Ottoman Empire).⁴⁰⁶ Based on

⁴⁰⁴ Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 836.

⁴⁰⁵ Turgay, 175. Also see: John Bowring, *Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria* (New York: Arno Publishers, 1973).

⁴⁰⁶ Most of the statistics included here have come from Kaiserlichen Statistischen Amt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich* (Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht Verlag) (hereafter cited as *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, year, page), which was published annually. The statistics included in this dissertation largely come from this source

the latter, it clear that between 1880 and 1914 German trade with the Ottoman Empire increased, both in value and in comparison to the other Powers. This trend accelerated in the twentieth-century,⁴⁰⁷ with the number of German ships visiting Constantinople increasing from thirty five in 1881 to four hundred fifty-nine in 1913,⁴⁰⁸ and the ratio of the value of goods imported from Germany to the value of goods imported from Britain fell from 1: 3.41 in 1901 to 1: 1.688 in 1910. More dramatically, the ratio of the value of German goods exported to the Ottoman Empire to the value of British goods exported to the Ottoman Empire improved from 1: 4.06 in 1901 to 1: 1.49 in 1910.⁴⁰⁹ It is important to note that this trade never became statistically important in Germany, and that the Germans never had the capacity to challenge the British in the Ottoman Empire (i.e. the British always traded more with the Ottomans than the Germans did).⁴¹⁰ However, while British exports to the Ottoman Empire always exceeded those of the Germans, the Germans exported a much wider variety of goods and materials, many of which were manufactured goods as well as refined materials such as steel for railways. Consequently, while the Germans never traded as much (in value or real numbers) with

whether the *Statistisches Jahrbuch* is cited directly or whether a secondary source is cited (the secondary literature uses this source overwhelmingly).

⁴⁰⁷ Owen, 214.

⁴⁰⁸ Turgay, 181ff.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., 176; *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1906, 98-187; *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1897, 100-118.

⁴¹⁰ While scholars have devoted themselves to considerations of the development of the German navy, little attention has been devoted to the German merchant marine under the Kaiserreich. The Germans recognized the importance of trading vessels and developed plans, in the nineteenth-century, to disrupt trade with England in the case of a war. See: David Harold Olivier, “*Staatskaperei*: The German Navy and Commerce Warfare, 1856-1888” (Ph.D. diss., University of Saskatchewan, 2001). Also see: “British and German Trade,” *Times* (London), 6 October 1891, 3:c.

the Ottoman Empire as the British did, the Ottomans came to rely on the Germans for a greater variety of goods.⁴¹¹

One of the products that the British and the Germans (as well as the French and the Americans) traded with the Ottoman government was weapons. While the British provided the Ottomans with the ships that became the Ottoman Navy, without much competition,⁴¹² the sale of guns and artillery provided more potent competition. Eventually, as German economic imperialism exerted itself, the Ottomans increasingly relied on Krupp to supply weapons; as this occurred, the *Times* (London) wrote:

The British Embassy has made serious representations to the Porte concerning the treatment accorded to English firms which competed for the supply of guns. These firms were asked to send tenders, but as soon as they had tendered and before their offers had been examined they were informed that the military authorities had decided to “stick to the old firm [Krupp]” and buy from Krupp all the guns and ammunition required.⁴¹³

The purchase of weapons became a major commercial undertaking for the Ottoman Empire and, after the First World War, the Italians (seeking to exert themselves in Turkish affairs) sought to sell weapons to the newly established Turkey, because “they

⁴¹¹ Turgay, 174; Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 832; and, “The German Man of Business,” *Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 7 October 1885, 371:b-c.

⁴¹² The Krupp Company purchased the German shipmaker Germania, and supplied torpedoes to the Ottoman government. See: “German Enterprise in the East,” *Times* (London), 28 October 1898, 5:a. However, by the first decade of the twentieth-century, German sales of ships to the Ottoman government had increased, see: “Turkey seeks German Ships,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 August 1910; and “Turkey,” *Times* (London) 13 August 1900, 4:c. The British also supplied weapons, see: “Dampfersubvention für Ostafrika,” *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 1 October 1887, 580; the Swedish also sent naval weapons to the Ottomans, see: “Torpedoes,” *Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 27 September 1882, 411:b.

⁴¹³ “Turkish Armaments: The Treatment of British Firms,” *Times* (London), 14 April 1905, 5:e.

concluded that the supply of arms was a tested great power method of gaining economic, political, and military influence in Turkey.”⁴¹⁴ The Italians came to such a conclusion quite reasonably, as the British, French, and Germans competed with each other to sell weapons to the Ottoman government and used this as a platform to advance their imperial ambitions in the Empire.⁴¹⁵

The difficulty experienced by the British arms manufacturers in their efforts to sell to the Ottomans likely derived out of the reticence that the British banking houses had developed about loaning money to the Ottoman government. The purchase of weapons from Krupp usually occurred through a loan provided by *Deutsche Bank* or some other German bank (and this fit within the idea of Export Capitalism). For example, a loan between *Deutsche Bank* and the Ottoman government in 1905 provided approximately £2,400,000, of which the Porte received £350,000, the Anatolian Railway received £500,000, and Krupp received the remainder for the purchase of new weapons.⁴¹⁶ Further, when the Porte considered French weapons, it contracted a loan through the French-dominated Imperial Ottoman Bank.⁴¹⁷ Thus, as the British banks loaned less to the Ottoman government, the opportunity for British arms sales decreased

⁴¹⁴ Dilek Barlas and Serhat Güvenç, “To Build a Navy with the Help of Adversary: Italian-Turkish Naval Arms Trade, 1929-1932,” *Middle Eastern Review* 38(2002): 150; also see, Letter, Assistant Secretary Leland Harrison to Department of State, 16 February 1926, NARA, R.G. 59, 883.34/1.

⁴¹⁵ See: Werner Zuerrer, “Geschäft und Diplomatie: Der Fall Griechenland, 1905-1908,” *Südostforschungen* 33 (1974).

⁴¹⁶ “Turkish Armaments,” *Times* (London), 24 April 1905, 3:e. The Ottomans also purchased weapons and ammunition through the Mauser company.

⁴¹⁷ “Turkish Armaments,” *Times* (London), 21 December 1904, 3:d.

proportionally. The sale of weapons not only facilitated economic imperialism by extending new loans to the Ottoman government, but it also coincided with an established nineteenth-century German effort to modernize the Ottoman military, which the Italians, after the First World War characterized as “[a] long established great power practice to exert military influence on the Ottoman Empire through military/naval advisors (discussed in Chapter VI).”⁴¹⁸

Ottoman trade with the Powers represented a critical market for the former because the Powers accounted for approximately seventy-five percent of all imports to the Empire and consumed between sixty and seventy percent of Ottoman exports.⁴¹⁹ The importance of this trade permitted the Powers to exert a political influence in the Ottoman Empire. The *Times* (London) remarked on the connection between economic investment in the Ottoman Empire and political influence in an 1893 article concerning the increase in the scope of German trade, “...the remarkable expansion of German trade with Turkey which has [been] followed upon [by] the growth of German political influence on the Bosphorous [*sic.*]...”,⁴²⁰ and, regarding arms sales that favored the Germans, the *Times* (London) wrote “...[the Ottomans] are not exempt from political influences. Within the last ten years, Germany has almost exclusively furnished Turkey with torpedoes, rifles,

⁴¹⁸ Barlas, 150.

⁴¹⁹ Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 828 and 833. In terms of global trade, this placed the Ottoman Empire above Asia and below Latin America, see: Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 830.

⁴²⁰ “Germany,” *Times* (London), 16 October 1893, 5:c; also see: “The Past Financial Year,” *Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 6 January 1886, 8:b.

and cannon.”⁴²¹ The position held by Germany due to its economic relationship with the Porte advanced further following the British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 (following the Congress of Berlin, discussed in Chapter VI) and the occupation of Egypt in 1882, as the Porte became increasingly concerned about British ambitions in the Empire. However, Wilhelm II’s visit to Constantinople (discussed in Chapter VI), the first by any European monarch, also contributed to this. However, the construction and growing importance of the Anatolian Railway (as discussed above in relation to grain deliveries to Constantinople and to the Ottoman Army, as well as the railway’s military importance) cannot be denied.

The ascension of Wilhelm II marked an important change in the relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Instead of Bismarck’s public disinterest in involving Germany in Ottoman affairs, the new Kaiser sought to make Germany a powerful force in the Ottoman Empire and he often used his personal authority to advance this position. The most famous of his personal efforts to extend German influence in the Ottoman Empire came with the Kaiser’s official visit to Constantinople (discussed in Chapter VI). However, while the Kaiser’s visit to the Ottoman Empire catalyzed German activity in the territory, this was only the grandest of his efforts to extend German influence in the Levant. More commonly, the Kaiser used his personal influence to pressure private businesses, such as *Deutsche Bank*, to become involved (often by extending loans) in the Ottoman Empire, even when the bank’s director, Georg von Siemens, was reluctant to do so.⁴²² The Kaiser pressured *Deutsche Bank*, more than

⁴²¹ “Turkish Armaments,” *Times* (London) 26 January 1892, 6:a.

⁴²² Laves, 105.

any other entity, claiming that if the *Deutsche Bank* did not make the investment (or loan), another European power surely would and Germany would lose its position in the Empire.⁴²³ The strength of the German banking position in the Empire encouraged the British to develop the National Bank of Turkey (1909), which had the support of the Foreign Office, and contrary to its name was a British-owned bank. In fact, the first director for the bank resigned his position as Secretary of the British Post Office to head the bank.⁴²⁴ Thus, the Germans (through *Deutsche Bank*), the English (through the National Bank of Turkey), and the French (through the Imperial Ottoman Bank) exerted a powerful collective and individual economic influence in the Ottoman Empire. Although formal colonies did not develop in the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire in the pre-war period, the Powers, using intermediaries which they could control, exerted their national interests in the Levant through economic imperialism.

This German economic investment in the Ottoman Empire is particularly impressive given the meager German resources between 1870 and 1900. During this period, Germany suffered three economic depressions (1873-1876, 1883-1888, and 1891-1895⁴²⁵) and transformed its society from an agrarian nation to an industrial nation, requiring major domestic investment and thus leaving less money for foreign investment.⁴²⁶ The aggressive expansion of German financial influence in the Ottoman

⁴²³ Ibid.

⁴²⁴ “The National Bank of Turkey,” *Times* (London), 9 August 1909, 9:b; Barth, 131.

⁴²⁵ Senate, *National Monetary Commission: The Reichsbank*, 61st Cong., 2nd sess., 1910, Doc. 408, 7; “The Financial Position of the German Empire,” *The Economist* 19 July 1890, 923-924.

⁴²⁶ Feis, 60.

Empire developed from an intentional policy, directed by the central government, that intended to extend German influence into the Ottoman Empire by providing loans to the Ottoman government, which, in turn, would use that money to purchase German manufactured goods (Export Capitalism). Further, the extension of German commercial influence into the Ottoman Empire occurred concurrently with the extension of German influence in Ottoman trade, government, and military affairs, as well as German cultural and political imperialism.

The extension of German economic imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, as previously mentioned, modeled itself on the model established by the British. This model called for private banks (often with government connections) to invest, and for the Foreign Office to support the banks in their endeavors. Such activities fit within the broader pattern of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century imperialism. The German activity in the Ottoman Empire was not substantively different from French efforts to assert economic influence in China,⁴²⁷ or even German efforts to sell weapons from the Krupp factory for imperial gain in China.⁴²⁸ Further, just as opposition to the imperial activities in China exhibited themselves in the Boxer Revolution, the Ottoman citizens threw bombs at the Crédit Lyonnais and the Tobacco Regie.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁷ Brötel, 52-61; although the author singles out economic imperialism, it is well known that the French (as well as the rest of the European powers and the United States) also developed their own protectorates in China, so this “economic imperialism” was merely a component of a broader French imperial effort in China.

⁴²⁸ William Francis Mannix, *Memoirs of Li Hung Chang* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913), 156-168.

⁴²⁹ “Turkey’s Sultan Warned,” *New York Times*, 31 August 1896, 5:3. Other examples of nationalist opposition towards the imperialism of the Powers are discussed below.

Of all the aspects of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire considered in this dissertation (economic, political, and cultural), economic imperialism has received the greatest attention from scholars. However, while a consensus of scholars would likely concur that this was imperial, such a consensus would not be universally accepted. Some historians have contended that the economic imperialism (through the PDA and the European railways) promoted a general European imperialism without advancing the imperial interests of any specific country.⁴³⁰ Others have contended that the railways were not imperial at all,⁴³¹ and were rather merely an aggressive investment strategy that used a system of financial guarantees (the kilometric guarantees) that were detrimental to the Ottoman state. However, other historians have argued that the economic imperialism of the Powers was a precursor, as in the case of Egypt, to colonialism.⁴³² Indeed, the famous Pan-German League (which advocated for colonialism) asserted a German claim to portions of the Ottoman Empire.⁴³³ This dissertation contends that the cumulative consequence of the German economic involvement in the Ottoman Empire was economic imperialism. However, this economic imperialism operated within (and in many cases accelerated) the broader context of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire. This included German political and cultural imperialism. Considering a history of the Baghdad Railway without the context in which it existed is inappropriate, rather,

⁴³⁰ Quataert, “Ottoman Reform and Agriculture,” 60.

⁴³¹ Barth, 121.

⁴³² Grunwald, 88; Hamilton, 48.

⁴³³ Henderson, 57.

historians must consider German economic imperialism within the context of the broader German imperial practices of the period.

CHAPTER VI

GERMAN POLITICAL IMPERIALISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1877-1908

Following the 1875 Ottoman bankruptcy, the commanding British position in Ottoman financial affairs collapsed, and the Germans became increasingly influential, eventually building the principal Ottoman railways and becoming the Porte's second largest source of foreign capital. Predictably, the Germans also secured a strong political position for themselves. Although the decision to become involved in economic imperialism occurred because of the ascension of Wilhelm II, German involvement in the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire predated German economic imperialism. While German political interests in the Ottoman Empire first developed under Bismarck, the circumstances of international politics and diplomacy catalyzed the German political position in the Ottoman Empire in 1888, the year that Wilhelm II came to power.

Wilhelm's ascension to the position of Kaiser coincided with a series of international events that ultimately limited the ability (or interest) of both the Russians and the British to exert continued political influence in the Ottoman Empire. Although the French remained actively involved in Ottoman affairs, they were generally content to constrain their efforts to particular portions of the Empire (Tunisia, Syria, etc.). But, after 1888,⁴³⁴ the Germans became one of the principal (if not the most important) political powers in Constantinople. This position increased dramatically as Wilhelm II made a personal visit to the Empire (the first ever by a European head of state, 1898), sent increasingly important military advisors and missions, and did not oppose the Turkish genocide

⁴³⁴ Geyer, 83-85. Geyer concludes that the Congress of Berlin revealed a Russian “...Emperor without clothes...”, Geyer, 85.

against the Armenians as the other European Powers did. Thus, the Germans, beginning with the Treaty of San Stefano (1878, and its revision at the Congress of Berlin) and concluding with the First World War, became the principal political power in the Ottoman Empire.⁴³⁵

The origins of German political influence in the Ottoman Empire came from the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Although the specifics of this war are not important to the argument presented here, the treaty that resulted from it, the Treaty of San Stefano (1878), compelled the Germans to become directly involved in Ottoman political affairs. While the “Eastern Question” (the question about what would happen when the Ottoman Empire collapsed) had vexed the European Powers for more than a century, affairs in the Balkans had been relatively quiet for the twenty years since the conclusion of the Crimean War (1856).⁴³⁶ This relatively peaceful situation deteriorated as the forces of nationalism, religious conflict, poverty, and dissatisfaction with the Ottoman government began to become manifest in the Balkans.⁴³⁷ Ultimately, the Near Eastern crisis that developed in the Balkans in the 1870s threatened the security Bismarck sought for

⁴³⁵ A resurgence of British influence occurred following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. However, this was short lived and German influence regained its strong position within the Empire quickly.

⁴³⁶ Otto Pflanze, *The Period of Consolidation*, vol. 2 of *Bismarck and the Development of Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 415-416. There had been other revolts in the European territories of the Ottoman Empire, such as the one in Crete in 1867-1869; however, with the Bosnian and Herzegovinian revolt of 1875, scholars contend that the “status quo” changed, generally from a quiet area of the Ottoman Empire to a dangerous one. See: Geyer, 68.

⁴³⁷ Pflanze, II: 416. For more on the general condition of the Balkans, see: Mihailo Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1939).

Germany through his European foreign policy (the so called “Kissingen Dictation,” in which Bismarck sought a political environment in which all the European powers, except France, needed the Germans and were thus prevented from forming coalitions against the Germans⁴³⁸). Consequently, Bismarck’s decision to become involved in the Ottoman Empire and, specifically, the Balkans, originated as a component of his European policy rather than as an aggressive imperialistic policy. However, after 1888, the Germans advanced their political influence in Constantinople for more imperialistic reasons.⁴³⁹

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 began with predictable Russian victories over the Ottoman armies; however, following a brief period of Russian success, the Ottoman forces stiffened at Plevna⁴⁴⁰.⁴⁴¹ Eventually, military and domestic circumstances made the continuation of this war mutually undesirable and the two powers agreed to the Treaty of San Stefano (1878). Although this treaty was overwhelmingly a victor’s peace, its most devastating terms concerned the creation of a “greater Bulgaria” in the Balkan Peninsula. This “greater Bulgaria” established the boundaries of Bulgaria that accorded with those of the greatest Bulgarian nationalists. Officials in London, Berlin, and Paris viewed such a large Bulgaria, which the former understood as a major advancement of Russian imperial interests in the Ottoman Empire,

⁴³⁸ Pflanze, II: 418; and *Grosse Politik*, II, 153-154.

⁴³⁹ Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “The Concert of Europe,” in *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition* (London: Oxford University Press, 1988), 152-153.

⁴⁴⁰ Geyer, 81.

⁴⁴¹ Many Russian officials sought to avoid this war, see: Geyer, 69-70.

as a threat to their Ottoman interests.⁴⁴² Although the Powers, as well as the Ottoman Empire, recognized that Russia would dominate the new Bulgaria,⁴⁴³ the treaty did not technically sever this new Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire. Rather, Bulgaria became an autonomous principality, with a Christian ruler elected by the Bulgarians from candidates proposed by the Powers, within the Ottoman Empire. Although the Bulgarians were to elect their own king,⁴⁴⁴ the treaty required the Porte to approve this candidate before he could officially become the Bulgarian ruler. Further, the Bulgarians had to pay a portion of the Ottoman debt, guarantee that its new government would not revoke the capitulation rights granted to foreigners by the Sultan, and make annual tribute payments to the Sultan.⁴⁴⁵ While the Treaty appeared to keep Bulgaria firmly within the Ottoman Empire, broad agreement existed that this new state constituted a major assertion of Russian imperial influence into the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴² Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878-1918: A History*, East European Monographs, vol. 138 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 22. Crampton provides a description of the specific boundaries of the “greater Bulgaria;” however, they are not relevant here, it is sufficient to recognize the size of this state.

⁴⁴⁴ The Bulgarians elected Prince Alexander of Battenberg, a German, to become their leader. However, he was also a nephew of the Tsar and received the latter’s approval. See Crampton, 91, and Craig, 124.

⁴⁴⁵ Crampton, 23.

⁴⁴⁶ The Powers viewed this as an assertion of Russian influence, and imperialism, into the Balkans because of the close relationship between the Bulgarians and the Russians. For example, the Bulgarians were enthusiastic about the 1867 Moscow Slav Conference, which was a symptom of pan-Slavism. See: Michael Boro Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 202. Also during the 1860s, a Russian interest in Eastern European Slavs grew with the work of scholars like Nil Popov, who wrote of his travels through Eastern Europe and returned to Russia advocating for intensified Slavic studies and for Slavic causes. Further, the Russians held an ethnographic exhibit of Slavic culture in Moscow in 1865. See: Petrovich, 199-200. However, other Russians called for the defeat of Turkey and the

Although the new Bulgaria, the so-called “Greater Bulgaria” (for reasons already described), officially remained part of the Ottoman Empire, the Powers correctly perceived this new state as a major intensification of Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire. One reason that the European Powers perceived this new state as a declaration of Russian interests was that the Treaty of San Stefano required the Ottoman military to leave the new Bulgaria and for the establishment of a Bulgarian militia (a euphemism for army), which the Russians would train and likely dominate. In addition, the Russians expected that Bulgarian gratitude for the assistance provided from St. Petersburg (in securing Bulgarian “independence”) would result in deference to Russia.⁴⁴⁷ With a loyal and trained Bulgarian militia under Russian influence, the Russians threatened to become the dominant power in the Balkans and possibly the Ottoman Empire. Such a position threatened the interests of almost every other European Power, but it posed a particular threat to Bismarck’s strategy for the Orient. This intensification of Russian imperial interests threatened the Bismarckian policy of maintaining peace in the Ottoman Empire because conflict in the Orient could, potentially, upset the balance he sought to secure between Britain, France, and Russia (in Europe).⁴⁴⁸

creation of a Slavic federation, see: David MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), 112.

⁴⁴⁷ Craig, 124-125.

⁴⁴⁸ Marchand, “Down from Olympus,” 92.

Following the Treaty of San Stefano, Russia pressured the European Powers to push for an international conference to address the Eastern Question.⁴⁴⁹ This conference met in Berlin and it inaugurated Germany's political influence in the Ottoman Empire. The principal issue addressed at this conference was the status of Bulgaria, the status of which was the subject of more than one-third of the eventual articles in the Treaty of Berlin (twenty-two of sixty-four articles).⁴⁵⁰ However, Bulgaria was not Bismarck's chief interest at this congress; rather, he sought to assuage the threats that the Near Eastern Crisis posed to European stability. Specifically, Bismarck intended to repair relations between the British and the Russians, which had deteriorated considerably during the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) and even further because of the resulting treaty (San Stefano).⁴⁵¹

Bismarck evidently recognized that the Treaty of San Stefano and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 marked a significant departure from established European (specifically, British) policy for the Ottoman Empire. Since the Crimean War in 1854, the British had insisted on maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and, ordinarily would have supported the Ottoman Empire in its war with Russia. However, with Lord Darby's departure from Whitehall and the subsequent appointment of Lord Salisbury as Foreign Secretary, the English policy towards the Ottoman Empire

⁴⁴⁹ Imanuel Geiss (ed.), *Der Berliner Kongreß, 1878: Protokolle und Materialien*, Schriften des Bundesarchivs, vol. 27 (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Vold, 1978), 15-21 (hereafter cited as Geiss, *Der Berliner Kongreß*).

⁴⁵⁰ W.A. Gauld, "The 'Dreikaiserbundnis' and the Eastern Question, 1877-1878," *The English Historical Review* 42(1927): 567. For the text of the treaty see: Hurewitz, 414.

⁴⁵¹ Hurewitz, 413.

began to shift. The Powers could no longer be certain that the English would intervene to prevent an invasion of the Ottoman territories.⁴⁵² Seeking to restore European harmony and consensus towards the Ottoman Empire, Bismarck consented to host the Congress of Berlin. Bismarck had a special reason to fear that increased tensions (specifically between Austria-Hungary and Russia) in the Balkans would threaten German security. The principal reason for this concern was that Russia and Austria-Hungary had conflicting ambitions for imperial influence in the Balkans, and that if the two Powers became involved in a Balkan war, they would both expect German assistance, due to secret treaties that Germany had with both.⁴⁵³ The untenability of such a position catalyzed Bismarck's decision to host the Congress of Berlin. To secure European involvement in this, he had to overcome established French reticence to recognize Germany as a major European power (the recent Franco-Prussian War diminished French desires to do so) as well as British and especially Russian concerns about the terms of the proposed conference.⁴⁵⁴ Generally, the terms of the agreements required to secure Great Power participation in the congress are not important, except to note that the British

⁴⁵² *Grosse Politik*, VIII, 89, 130-133; and Craig, 237.

⁴⁵³ Craig, 111. As previously mentioned, Bismarck's goals following German unification emphasized the development of the state, and, consequently, he sought to avoid involvement in wars or foreign affairs. The Congress of Berlin occurred concurrently with his efforts to reorganize the German and Prussian governments, his efforts at tax and tariff reform, etc. See: Pflanze, 435. Also see: Alexander Novotny, *Österreich, die Türkei und das Balkanproblem in Jahre des Berliner Kongresses*, vol. 1 of *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Berliner Kongresses 1878* (Köln: Hermann Böhaus Verlag, 1957), 51-68.

⁴⁵⁴ DBFP, I:B:IV, 309-317.

required a promise of colonial possession of Cypress, for strategic reasons, if the Russians retained any of the Ottoman Asiatic provinces.⁴⁵⁵

Representatives of the Powers met in Berlin from 13 June until 13 July 1878. The most important consequence of the Congress, and its subsequent treaty, was the redefinition of Bulgaria. The Powers altered the Bulgarian borders so that the size of the state went from 172,000 km² to 64,500 km², thus reducing the state to thirty-seven percent of its size under the Treaty of San Stefano.⁴⁵⁶ This new Bulgaria remained an autonomous province under the Ottoman Empire and the process for the selection of its ruler did not change (i.e. the Sultan still had to approve whomever the Bulgarians selected). The Bulgaria established by this treaty was to be administered by a Russian Provisional Authority (nominally under the Sultan) in “consultation with the Porte and consular representatives.”⁴⁵⁷ While the Berlin Treaty diffused much of the international tension over the status of Bulgaria (and therefore Russian influence in the Balkans), the treaty was not universally successful. For example, it failed to adequately address the problems of the Greeks (who sought independence from the Ottoman Empire). Although the Congress of Berlin marked the final meeting of the Powers regarding the Ottoman

⁴⁵⁵ Pflanze, II: 437. The Congress of Berlin marks the beginning of a period of colonization of the Ottoman Empire, including: Cyprus (1878), Egypt (1882), Tunis (1881), etc. See, Ersi Demetriadou, “Contested Visions: Colonialist Politics in Cyprus under British Rule, 1878-1890” (Ph.D. diss, New York University, 1998). The British and Russians were also competing for imperial influence in Central Asia, particularly Afghanistan. See: Thomas L. Hughes, “The German Mission to Afghanistan, 1915-1916,” in *Germany and the Middle East, 1871-1945* Wolfgang Schwanitz (ed.), (Princeton: Markus Weiner Publications, 2004), 25-63.

⁴⁵⁶ Crampton, 23.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

Empire before the First World War, subsequent international agreements included provisions regarding Ottoman affairs. In one such agreement, Bismarck eventually acknowledged Russian interests in the “lesser” Bulgaria through a secret article attached to the Reinsurance Treaty signed by the two Powers, Germany and Russia, which pledged neutrality if one or the other went to war.⁴⁵⁸ Although the Berlin Congress did not resolve all of the outstanding Ottoman issues, it did resolve much of the tension over Bulgaria, and, the individual Powers generally recognized the danger in asserting themselves too aggressively in the principal territories of the Empire. However, in spite of the recognition that strong assertions of imperialism could result in conflict between European states, in the years immediately following the congress, the Empire lost much of its European territory, as well as Cyprus, Egypt, and within a few years a significant portion of North Africa.⁴⁵⁹

The critical German concern addressed though the Congress of Berlin was not, however, the status of Bulgaria, the Balkans, or even the Ottoman Empire; rather, the Germans (through Bismarck) sought to repair the fractures in European politics that threatened the European peace and therefore German security. Although the Congress of Berlin addressed this question, concerns about European stability remained throughout Bismarck’s term as chancellor. Bismarck believed that the best strategy for preventing a breech of the European peace due to Near Eastern affairs was to try to guarantee the

⁴⁵⁸ Craig, 131.

⁴⁵⁹ This reflected an important change (discussed below) in which the Ottoman government, supported by a reformed Ottoman army (under German influence), focused on maintaining the Asiatic territories of the Ottoman Empire and recognized that its European and African territories were likely unsustainable.

status quo. This policy resulted in two agreements (20 October 1887 and 12 December 1887) between the Powers (excepting Russia) that bound the signatories to preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and forbade the Sultan from granting formal sovereignty to any power over Bulgaria or the Straits. Further, if the Ottoman Empire faced a legitimate threat to its continued existence due to encroachments from other foreign powers, the signatories (Germany, Britain, and Italy⁴⁶⁰) would partition and occupy the Empire. However, these agreements also recognized that the best way to avoid such a circumstance was to bolster the position of the Sultan within his Empire.⁴⁶¹ Consequently, it became a feature of both Bismarckian and Wilhelmanian policy towards the Ottoman Empire to provide the latter with resources (railways, military supplies, military training, loans, formal state visits to increase prestige, etc.) to assist the Sultan in his ability to administer his Empire.⁴⁶² However, through the resources provided by the Germans, the latter were able to extend an imperial influence into the Ottoman Empire.

The Bismarckian involvement in the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire, specifically through the Congress of Berlin, but also through other agreements, originated out of a concern that Near Eastern affairs might upset the delicate balance of power that Bismarck sought to secure within Europe. Consequently, while German involvement in the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire remained until the conclusion of the First

⁴⁶⁰ The Italian interest in the Ottoman Empire originally developed from their imperial ambitions for Ottoman territory in North Africa. Following French successes in Tunis and other North African territories, an animosity between the French and the Italians developed regarding Ottoman affairs.

⁴⁶¹ Norman Rich, *Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II*, vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 214; *Grosse Politik IV*, 345-350.

⁴⁶² Ibid., 214-215; *Grosse Politik IV*, 345-350.

World War, it is possible to categorize this involvement into two periods, the Bismarckian period and the Wilhelmine period. While the former emphasized involvement in Ottoman affairs to maintain the security of Germany, the latter encouraged involvement in the Near East for strategic and imperial reasons. Thus, beginning with the crowning of Wilhelm II (1888), German influence in the Ottoman Empire became increasingly imperial. Importantly, this increasingly imperialistic German involvement in the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire coincided with events in international politics that precluded the English and the Russians from continuing to assert themselves in Ottoman political affairs. Consequently, beginning in 1888, a confluence of German interest in increased involvement in the Ottoman Empire and a parallel decrease in the activity of Germany's rivals created an opportunity for the Germans to assert themselves (politically) in the Near East.

Bismarck's resignation in March 1890 precipitated a crisis in German government;⁴⁶³ specifically, his immediate successor, Leo von Caprivi (1890-1894), had limited knowledge of foreign affairs,⁴⁶⁴ and from 1890 until the start of the First World War, foreign policy decisions and direction came increasingly from Kaiser Wilhelm II. Bismarck's departure from the Chancellorship in 1890 was quickly followed by an end to his foreign policy system, which expired when the Germans failed to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in April 1890. Historian Gordon Craig contends that

⁴⁶³ Conventionally, when historians write about a crisis following Bismarck's departure they mean the constitutional crisis that Germany suffered. Although the debate about who was to direct foreign policy was part of that crisis, the issues of foreign policy are considered here without considering the whole constitutional crisis.

⁴⁶⁴ Craig, 231; Röhl, 732.

following this decision, “...the old Bismarckian diplomatic system became a thing of the past.”⁴⁶⁵ While Wilhelm II was criticized (properly) by his contemporaries⁴⁶⁶ for his mercurial foreign policy, his “New Course” for German foreign policy and the subsequent *Weltpolitik* produced a principled and directed foreign policy for the Ottoman Empire.

Although *Weltpolitik* emphasized the development of colonial and imperial territory around the world, German involvement (as noted in Chapter V) in the Ottoman Empire did not await the arrival of such a policy to begin to exert its influence. As previously noted, beginning in 1888, the Germans began to extend loans to the Ottoman Empire and to construct railways, ports, and roads as assertions of their influence. While *Weltpolitik* represented a change in the relations between the Germans and the rest of the world, aspects of Bismarck’s policy towards the Ottoman Empire remained in Wilhelm’s new foreign policy. Among the most important components of both the Bismarckian policy and the Wilhelmine policy towards the Ottoman Empire was the principle that the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire was desirable. The preferred method for securing such an existence was to provide support to the Sultan by supplying him with the mechanisms necessary to bolster his ability to administer his empire (railways, roads, military reform, protection from the other Powers, etc.).⁴⁶⁷ While large capital projects are the most visible of such German efforts in the Empire, they are not necessarily the most dramatic.

⁴⁶⁵ Craig, 232.

⁴⁶⁶ Röhl, 343.

⁴⁶⁷ Rich, 214; *Grosse Politik*, volume IV, 345-349.

Wilhelm's dedication to building railways and other related projects is well known (such as ports, as discussed in Chapter V), and is properly seen (among other things, such as a market for excess German industrial production) as a continuation of the Bismarckian policy of supporting the Sultan and bolstering his ability to control his empire. However, Wilhelm dramatically enhanced the Bismarckian policy (and thus the German political position in the Ottoman Empire) by making an official state visit to the Ottoman Empire in 1898, the first such visit by a sitting leader from one of the European Powers.⁴⁶⁸ Recalling Wilhelm's visit, Bernhard von Bülow (Foreign Secretary, 1897-1900; Chancellor 1900-1909) wrote that Wilhelm "...[had a] predilection for the Sultan and all things Turkish..."⁴⁶⁹ However, Wilhelm's decision to visit Constantinople in 1898 rested less on his interests in "all things Turkish," and more on his imperial and foreign policy ambitions.⁴⁷⁰

The timing of the Kaiser's visit to the Ottoman Empire, following the first major Ottoman massacre of the Armenians (1894-1897) and the resulting European indignation towards the Sultan and his subjects, cannot escape a political context. While most of the European Powers protested the treatment of the Armenians, Wilhelm II made a historic,

⁴⁶⁸ Although Wilhelm's visit was the first from a sitting European leader, other European countries had sent important delegates (even members of the royal family, usually with the goal of securing concessions). See: "Swedish Princes in the Levant," *Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 11 March 1885, 9:a. Other visits occurred but the press (outside of Constantinople) did not cover them, and they are difficult to document.

⁴⁶⁹ *From Secretary of State to Imperial Chancellor*, vol.1 of *Memoirs of Prince von Bülow* trans. F.A. Voigt (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1931), 292.

⁴⁷⁰ Wilhelm was not ignorant of the implications of foreign visits. See: "The Political Results of the German Emperor's Journey," *The Economist* 27 October 1888, 1342-1343.

highly public, and supportive visit to the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁷¹ Further, the other European Powers (specifically Britain and France) simultaneously began to support anti-Ottoman organizations and movements within their borders. For example, the Anglo-Armenian Committee met in London (with the approbation of the English government) and made public calls for the arrest of those involved in the earliest of the Armenian massacres.⁴⁷² Additionally, the First and Second Congresses of Ottoman Opposition Parties met in Paris in 1902 and 1907, respectively.⁴⁷³ Consequently, the Kaiser's decision to visit the Ottoman Empire, which remained under a cloud of general European disapproval for its actions against the Armenian Christians, cannot be separated from the probability that this visit was intended to facilitate the German position in the Empire.

Surprisingly, Wilhelm's dramatic visit to the Levant has received less scholarly attention than other aspects of the German relationship with the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁷⁴ The Kaiser began his trip to the Near East in October 1898, and, following brief stops in

⁴⁷¹ The European indignation is well recorded, see: Peter Marsh, "Lord Salisbury and the Ottoman Massacres," *The Journal of British Studies* 11 (1972): 63-82.

⁴⁷² "The Sultan and the Powers," *Times* (London), 5 June 1895, 6:g.

⁴⁷³ Dikran Mesrob Kaligian, "The Armenian Revolutionary Federation under Ottoman Constitutional Rule, 1908-1914," (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 2003), 1-3. Kaligian provides a succinct but informative explanation of the origins of the Ottoman-Armenian conflict in the first pages of his dissertation. Both the Anglo-Armenian Committee and the meetings of Ottoman opposition parties were marginally covered in the contemporary press. It would be valuable to know the relationship of these parties to the British and French governments. It is quite possible (indeed likely in the French case, and somewhat less likely in the British case) that these movements received support from the European governments, if this is the case, the German position as the Ottoman protector becomes even stronger.

⁴⁷⁴ Julius Waldschmidt, "Rückschau und Rückbesinnung," in *Der Kaisers Reise in den Orient 1898, Gesellschaft—Geschichte—Gegenwart*, vol. 27 (Berlin: Wolfgang Weist: 2002), 10.

Saxony and Vienna, he arrived in Constantinople on 18 October.⁴⁷⁵ Initially, the Kaiser intended to visit Constantinople, Palestine, and Egypt; however, threats to his security, which subsequent scholars have contended was a ruse for a British disinterest in Wilhelm visiting, precluded him from visiting Egypt.⁴⁷⁶ The purpose of such a trip is difficult to ascertain; however, coming as it did following the massacre of the Armenians (1894-1897), the Fashoda Incident (in which imperial tensions between the French and British intensified), and the beginning of the Boer War, the visit appeared to some contemporaries as an attempt to advance German political influence in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the *New York Times*, in October 1898, speculated that the visit “will have a political significance [and that a formal] German colony may be planted.”⁴⁷⁷ Although a formal German colony did not develop from this visit, Wilhelm did little to disguise the political significance of this trip, and the *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* devoted a series of seven articles to the Kaiser’s activities in the Ottoman Empire, calling for intensified German imperial involvement there.⁴⁷⁸ Speaking to the German colony

⁴⁷⁵ Evans Lewin, *The German Road to the East: An Account of the “Drang nach Osten” and of Teutonic Aims in the Near and Middle East* (New York: George H. Doran and Company, 1917), 104; “Emperor William in Turkey,” *New York Times* 20 October 1898, 7:3.

⁴⁷⁶ “Turkish Escort for the Kaiser in the Dardanelles,” *The Chicago Tribune* 17 October 1898, 1:6.

⁴⁷⁷ “Emperor William’s Trip,” *New York Times* 9 October 1898, 17:3.

⁴⁷⁸ These articles began on 29 September 1898 and ran through October. For an example, see “Der deutsche Kaiser im Orient,” *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 29 September 1898, 348. However, this newspaper also carried articles on other aspects of the Ottoman Empire, for example, see: “Muhammedanisches Recht,” *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* 29 September 1898, 349-350. The *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* also included a significant number of articles on Enver Paşa, see note 515.

(which, as previously discussed, does not mean a formal colony, but rather a group of German nationals living in a foreign country, under the law and rules of that foreign country), Wilhelm said:

You yourselves are best able to judge the benefits of such a policy [Wilhelm's Eastern Policy]; and I am exceedingly glad you have been able to profit by it and to acquire so respected a position in this country [Turkey]. My satisfaction is greater because, in acting thus, you have been an honor to the German Empire. I hope that you will continue in the same paths. You may be certain that I will continue to display an interest in you and to extend to you my protection.⁴⁷⁹

More famously, the Kaiser inflamed the other Powers when he addressed the Muslims of the world, declaring them under his protection.⁴⁸⁰ Wilhelm's antagonism of the other Powers did not conclude with his declaration of protection for the world's Muslims; he also accepted, as a gift from the Sultan, the Virgin's Abode, a Catholic religious artifact that the French government had tried to secure from the Sultan for years.⁴⁸¹

While much of Kaiser Wilhelm's activities in the Ottoman Empire displeased the other European rulers, the Kaiser's declaration that he was the protector of the "three hundred million Muslims around the world,"⁴⁸² created significant dissent within the British government. At the time of Wilhelm's statement, German colonial territories contained a small number of Muslims, especially when compared to the large Islamic

⁴⁷⁹ "The German Emperor in Constantinople," *Times* (London) 20 October 1898, 3:b.

⁴⁸⁰ Hughes, 28.

⁴⁸¹ "The Kaiser in Turkey," *New York Times* 6 November 1898, 7:1. This was part of the conflict for influence in the Ottoman Empire. The Germans and the Ottomans were concerned about the French influence with the Catholic Church and the relations between the Catholics and the Ottoman government, see: *Grosse Politik*, XII, 594-597 and 604-605.

⁴⁸² Hughes, 28.

population in British India and Egypt. An important reason, especially considering later events in the First World War, why the British objected to this assertion so strongly (even if the reaction was somewhat restrained in public statements) was that the British feared a pan-Islamic movement. The British worried that such a movement would, without regard for political boundaries, challenge the position of the Europeans in the Ottoman Empire, and, most importantly, India. This British fear of a pan-Islamic revolt lasted until the conclusion of the First World War.⁴⁸³ Further (as previously discussed), one of the established methods used to assert political influence in the Ottoman Empire was to claim to be the protector of a specific religious group.⁴⁸⁴ For example, in the Treaty of Küçhük Kainardji (1774), the Russians became the protector of the Sultan's Orthodox subjects, and, later the French established the right to be the protector of the Sultan's Catholic subjects. Consequently, while the specific intent of Wilhelm's statement cannot be reconstructed, the European powers reacted to it with concern, especially as German political influence in Constantinople had grown considerably in recent years.

While the threat of formal German colonies in the Ottoman Empire displeased many in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, the Kaiser's trip was more than an effort to advance German imperial interests in the Ottoman Empire. A principal motivation for the Kaiser's visit was to secure the final concession for the Baghdad Railway to reach the Persian Gulf, which the Sultan granted immediately after the conclusion of the trip. A

⁴⁸³ Donald M. McKale, "'The Kaiser's Spy:' Max von Oppenheim and the Anglo-German Rivalry Before and During the First World War," *European History Quarterly* 27(1997): 199-201 (hereafter cited as: McKale, "The Kaiser's Spy,").

⁴⁸⁴ As noted above, the French influence with the Catholics and with the Vatican vexed both the Ottoman government and the Germans, see: *Grosse Politik*, XII, 594-597 and 606-608.

secret provision of the treaty that permitted the Germans to finish the Baghdad Railway also permitted them to “keep half of the antiquities found at any authorized excavation.”⁴⁸⁵ However, the interests of maintaining “German colonial neutrality” prevented the Germans from enforcing this article as fully as they might have.⁴⁸⁶ Moreover, the Kaiser’s visit also encouraged the Sultan to meet with German industrialists interested in investing in the Ottoman Empire (such as those trying to electrify Constantinople, against the wishes of the Sultan).⁴⁸⁷ Based on these meetings, the Kaiser’s Foreign Secretary, Leo von Bülow, recalled the potential that the Ottoman Empire presented for German investment.⁴⁸⁸ German, American, and British papers reported that the concessions granted to the Germans during the Kaiser’s visit came at the expense of a promise from the Kaiser to the Sultan that the former would guarantee the “...support of the integrity of the Sultan’s Asiatic possessions...”⁴⁸⁹

Thus, beginning with Bismarck and continuing through the Wilhelmine period, the Germans recognized the importance of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire’s Asiatic territories. While the Germans were willing to permit the Ottoman European territories to be partitioned among the Powers (provided that these territories remained, formally, under the jurisdiction of the Porte), maintaining the integrity of the

⁴⁸⁵ Shaw, 120, 133.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid. 120. Although it is clear (as explained in Chapter VI) that the Germans had little trouble appropriating those artifacts that interested them most.

⁴⁸⁷ Bülow, I: 291-292; McKale, 14.

⁴⁸⁸ Bülow, I:294.

⁴⁸⁹ “Sees Armed Alliance between Germany and Turkey in the East,” *Chicago Tribune* 6 November 1898, 13:2.

Asiatic territories was an important component in preventing a European war. A method for advancing this goal was to provide the Ottoman government loans with which the latter could hire German companies to build large capital projects, but the Germans also made a formal state visit to the Ottoman Empire when the latter was suffering internationally for its slaughter of the Armenians. However, the Germans also began a program of restructuring and retraining the Ottoman military (particularly its army). Through this program, the Germans formed an Ottoman army which could control much of the interior of the Empire as well as permit the Germans to exert political influence in the Empire, both in Constantinople and in the interior provinces, because there was no real distinction between civil and military responsibilities in the Ottoman state. However, this restructured army also permitted the Ottoman government an opportunity to protect itself from further European incursions into their territory, while facilitating the ability of the Germans to influence Ottoman political affairs.

German Military Relations with the Ottoman Empire

The specifics of the three major German military missions to the Ottoman Empire (Helmut von Moltke (1800-1891, in Ottoman service 1835-1839), Baron Colmar Frieherr von der Goltz (1843-1916, in Ottoman service 1883-1895), and Otto Limon von Sanders (1855-1929, in Ottoman service, 1913-1918)) are generally well known. The renowned associated with these particular missions (and there were other German military missions to the Ottoman Empire) developed not only from the eventual importance of these individuals to German military history, but also from the extensive publications that each

of these advisors produced regarding their time in the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁹⁰ Based largely on this volume of publications (and the efforts of historians to explain the origins of the First World War), scholars have devoted significant attention to the activities of these German military advisors in the Ottoman Empire. However, historians have focused predominantly on the contribution that these advisors made to the origins of the First World War and the Ottoman involvement in it, instead of the German imperial ambitions in the Empire. Among the most established arguments to develop from this focus is the contention that German involvement, specifically that of General Limon von Sanders, in Ottoman military affairs propelled a reluctant Ottoman Empire into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. However, the most recent and careful scholarship on this topic, rejects such a claim.⁴⁹¹ Indeed, a very recent dissertation contends that the

⁴⁹⁰ Helmuth von Moltke, *Der russische-türkische feldzug in der europäischen Türkei 1828 und 1829 dargestellt im Jahre 1845* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1877); Helmuth von Moltke, *Unter dem Halbmond: Erlebnisse in den alten Türkei 1835-1839* (Tübingen: Erdmann, 1979); Helmuth von Moltke, *Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835-1839* (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1876); Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, *Generalfeldmarschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz Denkwürdigkeiten* (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1929); Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, *The Nation at Arms: A Treatise on Modern Military Systems and the Conduct of War* trans. Phillip A. Ashworth (London: Hugh Rees Press, 1913); General Liman von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey* (Nashville, Tennessee: The Battery Press, 2000). There are many others but these books provide a sample of the memoirs published by these military leaders.

⁴⁹¹ Akksal, iii, 1, 5; Trumpener, “Germany and the Ottoman Empire,” 12-13; Ulrich Trumpener, “Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 1(1966): 181. The controversy exists, partially, because so many of the German records were destroyed in the Second World War, see: F.A.K. Yasamee, “Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the Rebirth of the Ottoman Empire,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 9(1998): 91 (hereafter cited as Yasamee, “Rebirth of the Ottoman Empire”) Yasamee does indicate that a further study of the Ottoman resources would yield more information on this but indicates that scholars have generally not used Ottoman resources very fully. Akksal did use Ottoman resources extensively and concluded that the general historiographic contention was incorrect.

Ottomans entered the First World War specifically to secure their autonomy from the Great Powers and they believed that the Central Powers offered them the greatest opportunity to achieve that goal.⁴⁹² The general historiographic contention that German military influence propelled the Ottomans to join the Central Powers likely developed from the strong position that the Germans held in the Ottoman military (including economic, political, and military influence), but, without considering such activity in a broader imperial context, scholars have failed to study one of the most critical aspects of the German military relationship with the Ottoman Empire.

Although these German military missions officially involved themselves only with military affairs,⁴⁹³ they increased international concern about the German imperial influence in the Empire. Although the military assignments were technically non-political, the appointment of Limon von Sanders, in 1913, was accomplished, at least partially, to “check British influence”⁴⁹⁴ and resulted in the “Russian government taking umbrage [over the significance of this assignment].”⁴⁹⁵ This resentment from the other Powers concerning the activities of German military advisors in the Ottoman Empire probably developed from the recognition that, in addition to the reorganization and

⁴⁹² This is the general argument of Akaksal’s dissertation, but a summary of this may be found in Akaksal, 6-13.

⁴⁹³ “Germany Resents Entente’s Protest,” *New York Times*, 21 December 1913, 6:1.

⁴⁹⁴ Following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the British enjoyed a brief period of resurgence in the Ottoman Empire. There was a nationalistic reaction against the German position in Turkey, and the British (temporarily) benefited from it. However, the Germans never completely lost their position (indeed, it remained, in many ways, strong), and reasserted themselves after 1910.

⁴⁹⁵ von Sanders, 3 and 5. For more on the von Sanders’ military mission, see: Wallach, 108-125, but this is a well known mission and there are many publications that address it.

training of the Ottoman army, these advisors had a political significance. This recognition likely originated from the established pattern in which the Powers sent advisors to territories in the Ottoman Empire in which the Power maintained an interest; for example, Russian military officials “in the service of the Ottoman Imperial Government” were dispatched to Macedonia to reorganize the Turkish gendarmerie stationed there.⁴⁹⁶ However, because Russian interests in the Balkans were well known, the assignment of Russian troops to Macedonia was perceived as an assertion of Russian imperial ambitions (a similar statement could be made about Russian troops in Bulgaria or British military advisors in Egypt). Indeed, the Italians considered it (in the early twentieth-century) “established [G]reat [P]ower practice to exert military [and political] influence on the Ottoman Empire through military/naval advisors.”⁴⁹⁷ Consequently, accepting the official assertion that the German missions remained purely dedicated to helping the Ottoman Empire restructure its military forces obscures a necessary consideration of the imperial consequences of these German military missions.⁴⁹⁸ However, before considering the imperial implications of these missions, it is important to review (briefly) the activities of these military missions in the Ottoman Empire. The specific details of this German involvement in the Ottoman military are generally

⁴⁹⁶ Edwin Maxey, “The Turkish Question,” *Forum*, March 1910, 296; *DBFP*, I: B: XIX, 189-205.

⁴⁹⁷ Barlas, 150.

⁴⁹⁸ “Germany Resents Entente’s Protest: Will go to Extremes Rather than Withdraw Officers from Turkish Army,” *New York Times*, 21 December 1913, 6:1. Even as late as 1913 the Germans claimed that these military missions had no imperial components.

unimportant (and reasonably well known);⁴⁹⁹ however, a basic understanding of these activities can contribute to an appreciation of the scope of the German-Ottoman military relationship.

Although von Moltke is perhaps the most famous German general to operate in the Ottoman Empire, his work concluded before Germany existed as a nation and, thus, had limited consequences for imperialism. More important than the von Moltke mission (for considerations of German imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire) was the mission of General von der Goltz, who began his term in the Ottoman Empire under General von Kaehler in 1882; von der Goltz accepted responsibility for the mission in 1883 and maintained that position for the next twelve years.⁵⁰⁰ During that time he, among other things, served as the inspector for the Turkish army, became an instructor at the Ottoman war college, forged relations with some of the Ottoman Empire's most important eventual leaders, trained countless officers (many of whom reached the highest levels of the Ottoman military),⁵⁰¹ formed a formal staff college, and established important political contacts. Based on these and other activities, the relationship between the German officers sent to the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman military became quite close, and, eventually, the Ottoman government permitted its army to be completely

⁴⁹⁹ One of the best resources for this is Jehuda L. Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe: Die preußisch-deutschen Militärmisionen in der Türkei 1835-1919* publication of *Des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte Universität Tel Aviv* vol. 1 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1967).

⁵⁰⁰ Goerlitz, 97. Indeed, Ottoman military reforms reached into the eighteenth-century, see: Shaw, "The Origins of Ottoman Military Reforms," 291-306.

⁵⁰¹ Among the leaders trained by von der Goltz and his mission was Pertev Bey, with whom von der Goltz developed plans for the invasion of British India., see: Yasamee, "Rebirth of the Ottoman Empire," 98; for a fuller accounting, see: Wallach, 64-107.

reorganized along German lines (this began, hesitantly, around 1844, but accelerated and was sustained after the appointment of General von Kaehler in 1882 and von der Goltz the following year⁵⁰²). Based on this influence, the Germans divided the Empire into seven military districts each of which contained an army. Further, the Ottoman infantry was reorganized on the German model, the system of schools that trained Ottoman officers (and assigned Germans to teach in them) was expanded, the Ottomans adopted a German system for of conscription, and an Ottoman General Staff, based on the Prussian model, was developed.⁵⁰³ Although von der Goltz initially had little faith in the ability of the Ottoman armies, by the end of his twelve years in “Ottoman service” (as the leader, he served one year before heading the mission), he believed the Ottoman armies were prepared to assist the Germans in a war, as well as insure the survival (if not revival) of the Ottoman state.⁵⁰⁴ Ultimately, von der Goltz and the remainder of the German Military Reform Commission⁵⁰⁵ “exercised enormous influence over the reorganization

⁵⁰² Goerlitz, 97. Indeed, Ottoman military reforms reached into the eighteenth-century, see: Stanford J. Shaw, “The Origins of Ottoman Military Reforms: The Nizam-I Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III,” *The Journal of Modern History* 37(1965): 291-306.

⁵⁰³ Edward J. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 12-13; also see, McGarity 31-49.

⁵⁰⁴ Yasamee, “Rebirth of the Ottoman Empire,” 93-94, and 96. To some degree the First World War affirmed this position as Ottoman troops defeated the British at Gallipoli. See: Edward Erickson, “Strength against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915,” *The Journal of Military History* 65(2001): 981-1011 (hereafter cited as, Erickson, “Strength against Weakness”). Von der Goltz believed that war between Britain and Germany was inevitable, due to irreconcilable economic concerns.

⁵⁰⁵ Additional research on the German Military Reform Commission as a total unit would be welcome, especially studies treating the general public awareness of this commission and its activities.

and modernization of the Sultan's military forces,”⁵⁰⁶ which permitted the Germans to advance their imperial activities in the Ottoman Empire (explained below). Indeed, this reorganization went so far that the *New York Times* considered the Ottoman-Macedonian conflict of 1903 as a test of the “value of German military instruction and Krupp guns.”⁵⁰⁷

The German Military Reform Commission used, regardless of who was in charge, the Prussian model for military organization, which had been adopted for all of Germany after 1871, as the basis for reforms in the Ottoman Empire. This method for developing and maintaining an army originated following Prussia’s defeat at Jena in 1806, and it became a model that most of the western European states embraced.⁵⁰⁸ This model required short term commitments to the military (one to three years, versus the French system which committed conscripts to a military career) and then service in the *Landwehr* and the *Landsturm* militias. Because this system trained a considerable proportion of the male population but allowed industry and agriculture to continue without significant interruption, it became enormously popular throughout Europe.⁵⁰⁹ To reorganize and retrain the Ottoman armies, the Germans sent a significant number of

⁵⁰⁶ Erickson, 11.

⁵⁰⁷ “The Attitude of Germany,” 29 August 1903, *New York Times*, 2:1; also see: G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1928), vol. 4, 34-43.

⁵⁰⁸ Goerlitz, 97. For a professional military assessment of the Turkish army in 1909, see: R.H. Wilson, “The Army of Turkey,” *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States* 48(1911): 279-290.

⁵⁰⁹ Zürcher, 9-10; Goerlitz, 97; in the Ottoman Empire the equivalent militias were the *Müstafiz* (home guard) and the *Redif* (first reserve), see: Erickson, 12.

German officers to the Ottoman Empire.⁵¹⁰ Further, the German military influence in the Ottoman Empire extended beyond the reformation of the Ottoman; the Ottoman government relied upon German loans to purchase weaponry (especially artillery, which was an important component of the new military doctrine) from the Krupp company⁵¹¹ (from which the Ottoman government purchased increasingly large numbers of weapons,⁵¹² as previously mentioned in Chapter V).

In spite of the Ottoman decision to adopt the Prussian or German military model (and to purchase German weapons), it would be incorrect to consider this as unqualified evidence of German imperialism. Part of the reason that the adoption of the German military system (and weapons) cannot simply be equated to imperialism is that so many of the European countries (as well as many countries outside of Europe) adopted this model. In the vast majority of the countries in which the German military model was adopted, German imperialism did not exist. However, unlike most of the other countries in which the German military model was adopted, a German imperial presence developed in the Ottoman Empire. This imperial presence manifested itself through the influence (discussed below) that the Germans asserted in their military relationship with the Ottoman Empire (beyond the “simple” reorganization of the Ottoman force along German lines).

⁵¹⁰ “The German Officers in Turkey,” *Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 22 July 1885, 212:b; “The German Officers in the Turkish Service,” *Eastern Express* (Constantinople), 5 August 1885, 234:c.

⁵¹¹ “Current Influences on Foreign Politics,” *Littell’s Living Age* 4 January 1890, 28.

⁵¹² Wallach, 100-108.

One of the principal avenues by which the German domination of the Ottoman army permitted the former to assert an imperial influence in the Ottoman territories was the resulting change in the relationship between the Ottoman government in Constantinople and the vast interior territories of the Empire (which had not been under the control of the central government for more than a century). The freshly reformed Ottoman military (along with the railways constructed by the various European Powers, recall that one of the reasons that the kilometric guarantees developed was the diversion of the railways through militarily significant areas resulting in promising commercial markets being bypassed) permitted the Ottoman government to assert itself in territories that it had not governed for decades. Because this newly formed army could not arrest territorial (especially in the European provinces) losses, the Ottoman government, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, increasingly concentrated its attentions on its Asiatic provinces and began a program of tribal pacification and internal control.⁵¹³ This program extended the authority of Constantinople into territories conventionally controlled by guilds, tribes, or nomads. Although not all of the tribes came under the central government's direct political control, those that did not (such as the Kurds of eastern Anatolia) existed in increasingly isolated areas.⁵¹⁴ This increased control over areas previously governed by tribes, guilds, or nomads, permitted the government in Constantinople to develop agricultural programs. These programs offered land in exchange for a promise to farm the land, in the interior provinces, and further extended

⁵¹³ Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 768.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid., 769.

the central control of the government.⁵¹⁵ A leading historian contends that these military improvements permitted the Ottoman government to govern its interior territories in a manner almost unprecedented in recent Ottoman history and resulted in “revolutionary changes in Ottoman land use and transformed the face of the countryside.”⁵¹⁶

The Germans recognized the transformation of the Ottoman state and they sought to capitalize on it. One example of the German effort to expand and assert influence in the Ottoman interior territories comes from General von der Goltz, who served (simultaneously with his military duties) as the president of the German-Asiatic Society. The organization advocated for increased German commercial and cultural relations with the Ottoman Empire, and specifically, the Empire’s Asiatic provinces that he viewed as its future.⁵¹⁷ Further, a contemporary British observer argued that German influence in Constantinople was “developing” because the Germans were “opening it [the Ottoman Empire] up to civilization.”⁵¹⁸ Although the central government, through the use of its German trained and organized army, extended its influence into the interior, and began to exercise centralized political authority, it had to compromise with local elites who remained in charge of tax collection (via tax farming) and thus remained wealthy and influential.⁵¹⁹ Thus, while the Ottoman government did not have unqualified control over

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid.

⁵¹⁷ Yasamee, “Rebirth of the Ottoman Empire,” 104. This assignment also questions the assertion that the German mission was “purely military” and had no political or economic agenda. Although this researcher could not locate these records, if these records could be located they would likely prove quite useful.

⁵¹⁸ “Germany’s Influence at Constantinople,” *The Living Age* 10 June 1899, 722.

⁵¹⁹ Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 769.

its interior provinces, the changes that resulted from the reorganization of its military (based on the German model) permitted the Porte greater influence in these remote lands than it had enjoyed for decades. The Germans recognized this, and through their simultaneous construction of railways (and the connected developments, such as the development of German banks in the Ottoman interior, the proposed development of German agricultural colonies, increased trade, archaeological discoveries, etc.) began to exert an imperial presence in many of the Ottoman territories.

An important reason that the reformed Ottoman army could facilitate the ability of the central government to project its influence into the provinces was the new class of officers that had been developed to function in the adopted German military model. This new class of officers had a close affiliation with their German instructors and the latter gained significant influence (both political and military) in the Empire. The reason that the close relationship between the Germans and the Ottoman officers permitted the former to assert their imperial ambitions was that, in the Ottoman Empire, “no distinction was drawn between the civilian and military arms of the state, since both functions were frequently combined in the duties of a single individual.”⁵²⁰ Predictably, if no distinction was established between civilian and military duties, it is not surprising that contemporaries considered the Ottoman army to have been “from its earliest origins...a political entity.”⁵²¹ Thus, by becoming the dominant foreign power in the Ottoman army, the Germans simultaneously gained important political influence.

⁵²⁰ Hale, “Turkish Politics,” 2.

⁵²¹ Erickson, 21. The position of minister of war, which German influenced (and even dominated) politicians held frequently, between its introduction and 1918, was particularly closely connected to Ottoman politics, see: Erickson, 22. The most notable

The principal method that permitted the Germans to extend this influence was the training, and resulting loyalty, of the new Ottoman officer corps. Recent historians have emphasized the importance of this by considering the general Ottoman “conviction that the officer corps was the vanguard of a new enlightenment, based on the adoption of Western techniques and thought patterns [principally German].”⁵²² For example, between 1873 and 1897, a period in which the Germans had strong influence, especially after 1882, the Ottoman Harbiye War Academy graduated 3,918 officers,⁵²³ many of whom had been instructed by Germans and had an affection for Germany (von der Goltz assigned German officers to teach at the academy,⁵²⁴ the school was founded as a technical school but under von der Goltz it became a modern military staff college⁵²⁵). Moreover, many Turkish officers traveled to Germany, where they (and some of those perceived as the most talented⁵²⁶) participated in further training and education in

example of this was Enver Paşa, who served during the First World War. Much of the conventional historiography on the Ottoman decision to enter the First World War contends that Enver Paşa pressured a reluctant Ottoman state to join Germany, as previously described more recent scholarship had rebutted this claim.

⁵²² Hale, “Turkish Politics,” 2. Indeed, the Ottoman army became an important factor in the Young Turk revolt, see: Dankwart A. Rustow, “The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic,” *World Politics* 11(1959): 517.

⁵²³ Erickson, 12. The officer corps had long been neglected in the Ottoman military. Marshal de Saint-Arnaud, the French commander at the beginning of the Crimean War contended that “the Ottoman army had a high command and common soldiers, there was not much in between.” Quoted in David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions in the Extra-European World, 1600-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 62.

⁵²⁴ Erickson, “Defeat in Detail,” 12.

⁵²⁵ Ibid., 34ff 15; also see: Hale, “Turkish Politics,” 29-30.

⁵²⁶ “Turkish German Entente,” 19 July 1908, *Washington Post*, 14:6.

German military doctrine.⁵²⁷ When the implications of this new military (with a decidedly German orientation) are considered concurrently with the control that it permitted the central Ottoman government to exert in its provinces and the development of German railways in the Ottoman provinces, it increasingly appears that the Germans had the ability to exert control over much of the Ottoman interior.⁵²⁸

The establishment of German influence in the Ottoman army, and the subsequent ability of the Germans to assert their imperial ambitions, resulted in the Germans developing into the role of Ottoman protector. Since the British decision to end the Crimean System, which directed them to go to war to prevent the partitioning of the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire (after the 1875 Ottoman bankruptcy), the Germans (first under Bismarck and then Wilhelm) insisted on maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.⁵²⁹ This policy originated as a Bismarckian effort to maintain the European balance of power,⁵³⁰ but, by the mid eighteen-nineties, the

⁵²⁷ A study of these Turkish officers (specifically who they were and the success of their careers) would be especially welcome. Of particular interest would be a memoir or diary that illustrated how these officers related to Germany and their thoughts about it.

⁵²⁸ Much remains to be written about the interior Ottoman provinces, and Ottoman records appear to be poor. New scholarship on the Ottoman Empire is beginning to include increasingly detailed information on these remote provinces.

⁵²⁹ This became an increasingly important aspect or rationale for German activity in the Ottoman Empire. For example, affairs in Morocco increased European interest in North Africa. This resulted in an agreement among the European Powers regarding Egypt and Morocco; however, Germany did not sign it. See: E.T.S. Dugdale, *German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1969), vol.3, 219-222; and *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, vol. 3, 152-158.

⁵³⁰ Craig, 131.

Germans (and the other Powers) recognized their strong position in the Empire,⁵³¹ and began to act as the Ottoman protector—not to assure the European balance of power but to protect their position in the Empire. Indeed, this became a public rationalization for increasing the size of the German navy.⁵³² The Germans advanced this policy by accepting responsibility (from the French who held it into the early twentieth-century) for Ottoman subjects conducting business in China.⁵³³

The German dominance of the Ottoman army became a source of understandable concern for the other Powers, especially the British and the French. The *Times* (London) asked, in 1914, “Have [sic.] the Turkish Government told their Army to expel the 3,000 German officers and men who have audaciously gained control of Turkey and are turning the country into a German province?”⁵³⁴ However, before the First World War began, British concern about the German influence in the Ottoman military was sufficient for the British to permit the latter to reconcile themselves to some friction with Russia to gain influence in the Ottoman navy. British influence in the Ottoman navy was weak because Sultan Abdülhamid II intentionally let the Ottoman navy collapse. When the Ottoman Navy was rebuilt, its highest officers came from the army and were thus oriented towards Germany. The 1907 Entente made Britain and Russia allies, but the British practice of

⁵³¹ “Germany’s Influence at Constantinople,” *The Living Age* 10 June 1899, 723; “The Attitude of Germany,” *New York Times*, 29 August 1903, 2:1; “Germany Friendly to Turkey: The Emperor Reluctant to Assist the Other Powers in a Coercive Move,” *New York Times* 18 November 1895, 5:3.

⁵³² “Germany Needs more Fighting Ships,” *Chicago Daily Tribune* 4 December 1896, 6:6.

⁵³³ “Turkish Subjects in China: German Protection,” *Times* (London) 18 July 1908, 7:a; “Ottoman Subjects in China: The Porte’s Oversight,” *Times* (London) 22 July 1908, 9:e.

⁵³⁴ “The Betrayal of Islam,” *Times* (London) 3 November 1914, 7:a.

supporting the Ottoman Navy angered Russia, which wanted a weak Ottoman Navy in the Straits. A British official wrote: “Turkey means to have a fleet whether we assist or not...[it would be] advantageous that the [assisting] power should be Great Britain and that the Turkish Fleet *should not become Germanized like the Turkish army* (emphasis added).”⁵³⁵ Thus, even at the expense of antagonizing their Entente partner, Russia, the British sought to strengthen, and, thereby exert influence, in the Ottoman navy. However, the British recognized that the Ottoman army had a much stronger position in the Empire, and, thus, even through the assertion of British interests in the Ottoman navy that the German imperial position (relative to the military) remained superior.⁵³⁶ Moreover, the British had to constantly fight to prevent German interests in the Ottoman navy from becoming paramount. As previously mentioned, many of the Ottoman naval officers transferred from the Ottoman army and were inclined towards Germany, but, more importantly, the British tried to limit the type and strength of ships sent to the Ottomans. The Germans proved more willing to sell battleships (and possibly even a Dreadnought) to the Ottomans.⁵³⁷

Thus, the imperial relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire (in regards to the military) resulted less from the Ottoman military adopting a German model for organization and more from the training and association of the Ottoman military officers (including some of the highest officers in the country) with the Germans, and the

⁵³⁵ Quoted in, Chris B. Rooney, “The International Significance of British Naval Missions to the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 34 (1998): 8.

⁵³⁶ Ibid., 14-15.

⁵³⁷ Ibid., 5.

inclination that the former developed for the latter. This new Ottoman military permitted the central government to project its influence and authority in the interior provinces, as it had not been able to do in its previous history. The Germans recognized the importance of this and began to assert their influence in these interior territories (through railways, the establishment of banks, agricultural colonies, archaeological discoveries, etc.). As the Ottoman military came to rely on German trains to transport them and the Ottoman government directed the location of railway tracks in areas of military significance instead of commercial (leading to the kilometric guarantees described in Chapter V) the imperial relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire grew.

In addition to the use of military officers and training to assert German political influence in the Ottoman Empire, the German government employed other less visible experts to assist in the assertion of German political interests in the Ottoman Empire. The most famous of these individuals was Max Freiherr von Oppenheim, who has been characterized as “enigmatic and controversial,”⁵³⁸ by a very careful scholar. The enigma and controversy that scholars associate with Oppenheim developed from his varied positions in the Ottoman Empire. Oppenheim’s family was an established banking family in Cologne⁵³⁹ and he entered the German civil service in 1883, but “soon thereafter began a career as an Orientalist and an archaeologist.”⁵⁴⁰ The controversy around Oppenheim is directed by the question of whether or not he was a spy. He served

⁵³⁸ McKale, “The Kaiser’s Spy,” 199.

⁵³⁹ To my knowledge a link between Oppenheim’s family and German investment in the Ottoman Empire has not been made, but this could be because scholars have not looked for it.

⁵⁴⁰ McKale, “The Kaiser’s Spy,” 199.

as a German consular official in Egypt (where he spent much of his pre-World War I time), but he was also a knowledgeable archaeologist with apparently genuine interests in the scholarship of the field.⁵⁴¹ The controversy that surrounds Oppenheim is whether or not he was a spy.⁵⁴² The importance of Oppenheim is that the German government used (to varying degrees) the archaeologists and other scholars who went to the Ottoman Empire to advance their political ambitions. As the subsequent chapter will show, a close (even official) relationship between archaeologists and the German government enhanced the concern of the other Powers that individuals such as Oppenheim were engaged in espionage in the Ottoman Empire. Further, the artifacts that German archaeologists appropriated from the Ottoman Empire became manifestations of German imperial influence in the Ottoman Empire.

⁵⁴¹ McKale, “The Kaiser’s Spy, 199; and, Max von Oppenheim, *Tell Halaf: A New Culture in Oldest Mesopotamia* (London: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1933); and Max von Oppenheim, *Die Beduinen: Unter mitbearbeitung von Erich Bräunlich und Werner Caskel* (Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1939), he has other publications as well.

⁵⁴² There is a dense history associated with Oppenheim and this dissertation does not propose to resolve the controversy; however, it does seem that a consensus exist that at some point he did provide intelligence to the German government. Oppenheim, thus, at times acted as an intelligence agent for the Germans and other times a Foreign Service officer, and other times simply an archaeologist.

CHAPTER VII

GERMAN CULTURAL IMPERIALISM AND THE CULTURE OF IMPERIALISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Scholarly attention on the activities of German archaeologists in the Ottoman Empire has focused, principally, on Max von Oppenheim and Heinrich Schliemann. Ironically, however, these two iconic symbols of German archaeological interests in the Ottoman Empire were already anachronisms in the early 1880s. The period in which archaeological activities could be carried out by a single individual had ebbed (although Bismarck certainly tried to extend its life⁵⁴³) and been replaced by what the most important historian of German archaeology in the Ottoman Empire has called *Großwissenschaft* (or, big scholarship, a term borrowed from Theodor Mommsen).⁵⁴⁴ This large scale archaeology became one of the most important methods employed by the Germans in explaining their imperial relationship with the Ottoman Empire to the citizens of both Germany and the world. Although (for reasons already explained) the Germans could not formally claim large sections of the Ottoman Empire as “their” territory, through the appropriation and display of archaeological artifacts, the Germans illustrated their imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire. The most significant element in this effort was the Pergamon Altar, for which a special museum was built in 1899 on Berlin’s *Museumsinsel*. The construction of the Pergamon Museum (hereafter, the Pergamon) on *Museumsinsel* provided a political context in which to understand the importance of the

⁵⁴³ Marchand, 86.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid., 75.

artifacts displayed there. However, to appreciate the imperial significance of the Pergamon Altar it is necessary to go beyond the political context of construction of the Pergamon on *Museumsinsel* and to consider the specific manner in which the Germans elected to display the “Pergamon Altar” within the Pergamon Museum itself.⁵⁴⁵

The German appropriation and display of archaeological artifacts conformed to the imperial model established by the British and the French (as previously mentioned, famous examples included the Elgin Marbles, the Code of Hammurabi, etc.). The appropriations of artifacts from the Ottoman Empire, by the British and French (displayed most famously in the Louvre and the British Museum, but also in a myriad of other smaller museums in these countries, especially the *Musée d’Egypt* in Paris), became well known and the museums housing these artifacts developed into some of the most popular destinations for visitors to London and Paris. However, to construct such a museum, the Germans had to have an obviously magnificent artifact that would justify the museum’s development. Although the Germans had secured artifacts from Egypt, by the time German influence in the Ottoman Empire became recognizable, it was impossible for the Germans to claim to have influence in Egypt (as it was already under British control). Further, Germany’s early colonial efforts in Africa and the South Pacific had not produced a major imperial treasure that could be displayed in Berlin (as a corollary to the imperial treasures displayed in London and Paris). The appropriation of the Pergamon Altar eventually satisfied the requirement of a magnificent imperial artifact

⁵⁴⁵ As discussed below, it is not precisely clear that the artifact in the Pergamon Museum has much coloration to the original historical structure. Instead, it is possible to view the construction of the Pergamon Altar in Berlin as a statement of German imperial strength in the Ottoman Empire.

around which a museum could be built, and its museum quickly became a national museum that resembled those of France and Britain.

Although the Pergamon Altar clearly represented Germany's imperial position in the Ottoman Empire, it will also be argued that a principal reason for the German enthusiasm for the Pergamon Altar was a desire to overcome the established stigma of the Germans as "artistic barbarians."⁵⁴⁶ Many Germans believed that to defeat this perception they required an obviously magnificent piece of art; the first effort to meet this requirement was the Cologne Cathedral, the second was the Pergamon Altar. Based on the bogus claim that the Germans invented Gothic architecture, the Germans completed, in the late nineteenth-century,⁵⁴⁷ the Cologne Cathedral, which many hoped would become a unifying symbol for the newly formed German state (during the *Kaiserreich*, the Germans fiercely debated issues of national identity).⁵⁴⁸ However, the long-term political consequences of Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* (1871-1878) prohibited a Catholic church from becoming an important national symbol. The failure of the Cologne Cathedral to serve as a tool of artistic unification encouraged the Germans to display the Pergamon Altar as a "national" treasure. As an answer to this perceived artistic inadequacy, the display of the Pergamon Altar permitted "Berlin...to boast that it had

⁵⁴⁶ Hans Belting, *The Germans and their Art: A Troublesome Relationship*, trans. Scott Kleager (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 41.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid., 50.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid., 46.

won this masterpiece of the antique equal only to the Parthenon frieze in London.”⁵⁴⁹ Consequently, the desire to appropriate and display imperial artifacts (and specifically the Pergamon Altar) pandered not to a warmongering German public or government seeking to exhibit its “place in the sun.” Rather, this appealed to a German sense of artistic inadequacy as well as temperate German imperial ambitions, which remained well within the established model of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire.

The complicated and often antagonistic relationship between the German government (especially under Wilhelm II) and art meant that any public display of art between 1871 and 1914 constituted a political statement.⁵⁵⁰ Thus, the importance accorded to the Pergamon Altar by the German government requires that the political ramifications of this monument be considered. Further, the display of imperial objects from the Ottoman Empire (particularly the Pergamon Altar) also occurred within a European political context that provided a framework within which the Germans could announce their imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire, while remaining within the established model for imperialism in the Ottoman Empire. Although the display of artifacts in Berlin occurred in the context of nineteenth-century imperialism, as well as German unification, and an attempt to overcome the stigma of being an “artistic barbarian,” the most accomplished historian (of only two or three such historians) of

⁵⁴⁹ Thomas W. Gaehtgens, “The Museum Island in Berlin,” in *The Formation of National Collections of Art and Archaeology Studies in the History of Art*, vol. 47 (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1996), 68.

⁵⁵⁰ Imperial Germany had a sustained debate about what constituted art and the German government consistently tried to block the introduction of modern art from France, especially impressionism. Importantly, as noted below, sculpture was seen as one of the few art forms in the late nineteenth-century not adulterated by the influence of modernism.

German archaeological efforts in the Ottoman Empire, has concluded that these efforts were only “quasi-imperialist.”⁵⁵¹ This chapter intends to show that the German archaeological efforts in the Ottoman Empire were more than “quasi-imperialist,” and, rather, were a recognized component of the established model of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire.

An important reason that the German display of the Pergamon Altar may be understood in an imperial context is the familiar relationship between imperialism and archaeology in the nineteenth-century.⁵⁵² In Germany, this relationship became increasingly evident after the founding of the German Reich (1871). Evidence of this relationship developed as university trained and government supported scholars replaced independent archaeologists. Employing the methods of *Großwissenschaft*, the Germans, with the active support of the German government, excavated some of the most important archaeological sites in the Ottoman Empire. These new excavations led to the discovery, appropriation, and display of artifacts such as the Pergamon Altar, the Ishtar Gate (excavated between 1903 and 1914, but it was not displayed immediately, and thus is not considered here), as well as artifacts from Olympus and other important ancient sites. Writing about the excavations at Olympus (the first site to be excavated in this manner) a contemporary scholar explained the importance of *Großwissenschaft* compared with the earlier excavations led by single archaeologists: “The excavations at Olympia can be

⁵⁵¹ Marchand, 93; Marchand eventually refers to German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire as “informal imperialism,” see: Marchand, 200.

⁵⁵² A. Jose Farrujia de la Rosa, *Imperialist Archaeology in the Canary Islands: French and German Studies on Prehistorical Colonization at the End of the 19th Century*. British Archaeological Reports, no. 1333 (London: Archaeopress, 2005).

called the academically most highly accomplished in the entire history of archaeology; they established new standards of discipline. The achievement was possible only on the basis of state support.⁵⁵³ However, what made the discoveries under this new policy of government support for archaeological research in the Ottoman Empire significant for a study of imperialism was that the accomplishments made by the team of archaeologists became German accomplishments instead of individual accomplishments.⁵⁵⁴

What differentiated these larger excavations from those of “archaeologists” like Schliemann was that these later excavations occurred with the German government’s approbation, funding, and, most importantly, diplomatic support. Indeed, in 1871, with the founding of a unified Germany, the Prussian *Istitut für archäologische Korrespondenz* became a *Reichsinstitut* and was simultaneously renamed *Der Kaiserlich Deutschen Archäologischen Institut* (DAI, although the former was a governmental institute under the Prussians, the Prussians resisted making it such and its status increased dramatically under the new Germany).⁵⁵⁵ Moreover, its General Secretary, Alexander

⁵⁵³ Gaegtgens, 70-71. It should not be assumed that this policy met with universal approval in Germany. Many times Bismarck and the Reichstag tried to curb German support of the archaeological digs. Wilhelm II often circumvented this by providing money from his own reserves.

⁵⁵⁴ It would be valuable to know where else the German government supported archaeological excavations, and possibly where they elected not to support such work.

⁵⁵⁵ Marchand, 94. Conventionally, historians (only a very few have written about this institute, and Marchand was the first and the most effective) refer to this as the German Archaeological Institute or the *Deutschen Archäologischen Institut*; however, I believe it is important to emphasize the fact that its formal name begins with *Kaiserlich* (imperial, referring to Imperial Germany not German imperialism). This emphasis is important to stress the relationship between the DAI and the German government. See: Alexander Conze and Paul Schatzmann, *Mamurt-Kaleh: Ein Tempel der Göttmutter Unweit Pergamon* Publication of the *Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts* vol. 9 (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1911).

Conze, became an employee of the *Auswärtiges Amt* (Foreign Office, as Oppenheim would be some years later).⁵⁵⁶ The close relationship between the German government and archaeology eventually permitted the British to accuse the Germans of using archaeological expeditions as covers for espionage (most specifically espionage in the Ottoman Empire); Oppenheim was only the most famous of many such examples.⁵⁵⁷ Thus, using the methods of *Großwissenschaft*, the DAI (whose director was an employee of the German foreign office) became the chief mechanism through which the Germans discovered and appropriated thousands of pieces of Ottoman, Byzantine, and other ancient history while asserting their influence in the Ottoman territories.⁵⁵⁸

Originally founded in April 1829 as the *Istitut für archäologische Korrespondenz*, the DAI included both Leopold von Ranke and K.F. Schinkel as members, and its stated goal was to “gather and make known all archaeologically significant facts and finds.”⁵⁵⁹ Although the DAI eventually became the most important state mechanism for the discovery and appropriation of artifacts from Ottoman territories, initially, the organization limited its interests to Greece and Rome;⁵⁶⁰ only after 1871 did the Ottoman

⁵⁵⁶ Marchand, 101-102.

⁵⁵⁷ Peter Hopkirk, *Like Hidden Fire: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire* (New York: Kodansha International, 1994), 18-19.

⁵⁵⁸ Although much credit must go to the DAI, there were other methods for appropriating artifacts. For example, the construction of railways led to the discovery and appropriation of many artifacts. See, Shaw, 133.

⁵⁵⁹ Quoted in Marchand, 55.

⁵⁶⁰ Marchand, 56. There were other organizations, such as the *Deutsche-Orient Gesellschaft* (DOG), which although a private organization received support from the German diplomatic corps. It is worth noting that Georg von Siemens, the director of

Empire became an important focus of this organization.⁵⁶¹ However, the DAI's early finds, even those made in Greece, including the finds in Olympia, "failed to find much in the category most prized by state bureaucrats, the *Gymnasium*-educated public, and even the archaeologists themselves: monumental sculpture of the high classical era."⁵⁶² This "failure" in Greece was eventually compensated for by discoveries in the Asiatic territories of the Ottoman Empire, especially the three digs at Pergamum (1881-1886, 1901-1915, and 1933-1934)⁵⁶³ which resulted in the appropriation of the Pergamon Altar, whose "magnificence"⁵⁶⁴ received international attention.⁵⁶⁵

Deutsche Bank was on the board of DOG. See: Blisel, 86. Other private and semi-private groups (like the DAI) existed, but the DAI was the largest and most important.

⁵⁶¹ Even when the artifacts from the Ottoman Empire became the most important artifacts exhumed by the DAI, the most "important" artifacts were perceived to be those from ancient Greece and Rome.

⁵⁶² Ibid., 87. Instead of "monumental sculpture" they found 1,328 sculptures, 7,464 bronzes, 2,094 terra-cottas, 696 inscriptions, and 3,035 coins.

⁵⁶³ The Germans had archaeological interests beyond Pergamon, but because the latter became so important to German imperial interests in the Ottoman Empire it is the focus of this section. It is worth noting that they also dug in Mesopotamia.

⁵⁶⁴ As will be explained below, this is somewhat controversial. The German reconstruction of the Pergamon Altar (although it is not well known, either in scholarship or in the popular mind) adhered to nineteenth-century German interests more than historical reality.

⁵⁶⁵ Lucy M. Mitchell, "Sculptures of the Great Pergamon Altar," *Century Illustrated Magazine* 25 (1882): 87-100; Charles Brassler, "The Pergamon Marbles in the Pergamon Museum of Berlin," *Scientific American* 93 (1905): 442-444; L.R. Farnell, "The Works of Pergamon and their Influence," *The Journal of Hellenistic Studies* 7 (1886): 251-274. Farnell's publication was part of a series of three articles he wrote for this journal, but outside of the series he published other articles on the discoveries at Pergamon (in this same journal, and likely published elsewhere as well); Arthur Milchhöfer, *Die befreitung des Prometheus: Ein fund aus Pergamon* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1882). As discussed below, what constituted the Pergamon Altar was a German vision of the Pergamon Altar more than a historical reality.

The Germans began receiving artifacts from the Pergamon digs with Carl Humann's discoveries (Humann was in the Ottoman Empire to plan and construct railways) in eighteen-seventy two, but it was not until Humann convinced the DAI and Alexander Conze (Secretary General of the DAI) to assist him that German activity in Pergamum became regularized.⁵⁶⁶ Although regularized, the Germans intentionally concealed their discovery from the Ottoman officials, and, thus, secured for themselves a greater proportion of the artifacts.⁵⁶⁷ While the formal digs, under the supervision of state archaeologists, did not begin until 1881, "by 1880, two large fragments of the *Gigantomachia* [an important frieze] were on view in the Royal Museums."⁵⁶⁸ Although a "permanent"⁵⁶⁹ museum for the Pergamon artifacts did not exist until 1899, the Germans found many opportunities to use Pergamon to exhibit their imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire. One such example occurred at the Berlin Fine Arts Exhibition (1886), an international exhibition intended to celebrate the centennial of the Berlin Academy of Arts, where the German presentation of Pergamon overwhelmed the

⁵⁶⁶ Indeed the earliest segments of the Pergamon Altar did not receive attention in Berlin and were not even displayed, see: Gaehtgens, 68.

⁵⁶⁷ Marchand, 94. Ottoman law divided such findings in the following way: one-third of the artifacts went to each of the following, the state, the group or individual who discovered them, and the land owner. The Germans (including the German government) purchased the land to acquire two-thirds of the artifacts, without telling the Ottomans what the land contained. However, it may not have been necessary for the Germans to do this as they acquired almost all the artifacts they wished with only limited interference from the Ottoman government.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid., 95. Humann had already sent to Berlin 462 crates weighing 250 tons.

⁵⁶⁹ As discussed below, the first permanent museum for the Pergamon Altar was later designated as "interim" and the construction of the new museum began before the start of World War I.

exhibition. Displayed in the imperial context of a simulated Egyptian temple in the British section, the Germans exhibited “the hugest [sic.] picture in all the exhibition—namely, a panoramic view of Pergamon as it is judged by artists and archaeologists to have looked...In front of the [painting of the] Olympian Temple [Pergamon Altar] stands a tall obelisk, looking like a Cleopatra’s Needle, inscribed with the words...to ‘Kaiser Wilhelm the Victorious.’”⁵⁷⁰ Consequently, although the Germans could not display the artifacts from Pergamon in a permanent exhibit until 1899, paintings and other substitutes were presented frequently in an unmistakably imperial context.⁵⁷¹

A significant reason that the German discoveries in the Ottoman Empire (among them the Pergamon Altar) received such approbation and attention was the manner in which the Germans eventually displayed them, both before and after the construction of the Pergamon. Understanding the display of German artifacts from the Ottoman Empire necessitates an appreciation of the context in which the Germans built the Pergamon. As discussed previously (Chapter IV), in the post-revolutionary period (1815-1914), state sponsored museums became increasingly popular throughout Europe. Indeed, these museums were created to “represent and celebrate the nation.”⁵⁷² These museums maintained a close relationship to the European monarchs and, in some cases, the new museums “helped fill the spaces” left by the power that had been removed from the royal

⁵⁷⁰ “The Berlin Arts Exhibition,” *Times* (London) 29 May 1886, 6:d.

⁵⁷¹ As discussed below, the symbolic presentation of artifacts, especially the Pergamon Altar was important.

⁵⁷² Gwendolyn Wright, “Introduction,” 9.

prerogative during the revolutionary periods.⁵⁷³ In Germany, and more specifically Berlin, these museums populated Spree Island, which eventually received the designation *Museumsinsel*. Germany's *Museumsinsel* ultimately contained five museums: *Die Altes Museum* (originally called the Royal Prussian Museum⁵⁷⁴), *Die Neues Museum*, *Die Nationalgalerie*, the Kaiser Friedrich Museum, and the Pergamon Museum (which was the last one built, started in 1907 and completed in 1930; however, as previously noted, an “interim” Pergamon Museum was completed in 1899⁵⁷⁵) (the island also hosts the Berliner Dom, constructed between 1894 and 1905, which was the official church of the Hohenzollern family and contained, and does so to this day, the royal family’s crypt).⁵⁷⁶ Although the Germans began construction of these museums in 1832, three of the five were completed after Germany unified in 1871. This acceleration of building, between 1871 and 1918, attests to the relationship between these museums and the new German state, which attempted to use them to bring further unity to the German people and to

⁵⁷³ James Sheehan, *Museums in the German Art World: From the End of the Old Regime to the Rise of Modernism* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 101. Thus although monarchs frequently lost political power they often retained authority over cultural and artistic matters. A reason for this was that it was difficult, in many cases, to determine if the art belonged to the royal family or to the state.

⁵⁷⁴ Bilsel, 21.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid., 51. The Germans built the interim building (intended to be permanent) between 1897 and 1899 and opened it to the public in 1901, see: Bilsel, 136. Structural integrity was the reason given for destroying the “interim building” and raising a new museum; however the genuine motivation remains unclear, especially since the problems with the museum’s integrity resulted from its location. Recent scholarship speculates that the original museum (the so-called “interim building”) inadequately presented the Pergamon artifacts and thus failed to “represent the glory of the German Reich,” see: Bilsel, 139.

⁵⁷⁶ A church had been on this location for centuries, but starting in 1894 it became a central focus of the state. The Berliner Dom, was so large that its height exceeds one-hundred meters.

define “German culture.” Recent scholarship has emphasized Wilhelm II’s use of architecture and large building projects, and concluded that the Kaiser “sought to consolidate his authority through building projects.”⁵⁷⁷ Although this scholarship does not adequately address the construction of museums, the latter’s construction, between 1871 and 1918, accords with the author’s argument.

The construction of the Pergamon Museum on *Museumsinsel* is best understood in the context of the existing four museums on the island. The construction of each of the four earlier museums had a political significance and was constructed to meet specific political ends; the Pergamon was no different. The first museum constructed on the island was the *Altes Museum*, designed by the famous Prussian architect Frederick Schinkel. The Germans created the museum specifically to resemble the *Musée Napoléon* in Paris, which housed imperial artifacts and treasures from the lands conquered and looted by Napoleon.⁵⁷⁸ The popularity of the Parisian museum led to the construction of museums throughout Europe that glorified the specific state through the

⁵⁷⁷ Douglas Mark Klahr, “The Kaiser Builds in Berlin: Expressing National and Dynastic Identity in the Early Building Projects of Wilhelm II,” (Ph.D. diss. Brown University, 2002), 1 and 13. Also see: Uta Lehnert, *Der Kaiser und die Siegesalle. Réclame Royale* (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1998). Lehnert claims that the *Siegesalle* was “an advertisement for the dynasty.” See: Klahr, 14. This contention fits with the Kaiser’s efforts (and those of others) to make Sedan Day a national holiday.

⁵⁷⁸ Gaehtgens, 55; Andrew McClellan, *Inventing the Louvre: Art, Politics, and the Origins of the Modern Museum in Eighteenth-Century Paris* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 198. Both authors emphasize the popularity of the new French museums; this popularity, as Gaehtgens contends, encouraged monarchs outside of France to be constructing museums with international artifacts and treasures in them. Also see: Porterfield, 3-12

display of “war booty” and other such imperial treasures.⁵⁷⁹ Indeed, the architecture of Schinkel’s museum intentionally mirrored that of the other great European museums, employing “a long frontal colonnade”,⁵⁸⁰ and Classical columns. The second museum erected on the island arose from the debate about the relationship between art and the state. Specifically, Frederick Wilhelm IV (1795-1861, ruled 1840-1861) commissioned it to “attest to the fact that the state did not want to relinquish control over the arts.”⁵⁸¹ Frederick Wilhelm IV, who participated in the development of the museum, intended for the museum to be didactic and to emphasize “education [for what a Prussian or even a “German” should aspire to be] by historic example.”⁵⁸² The third museum constructed on *Musuemsinsel, Die Nationalgalerie*, overtly emphasized its political function in its famous inscription: “*Der deutschen Kunst MDCCCLXXI*” (to German art), which hung above the figure *Germania* and an equestrian statue of Kaiser Frederick Wilhelm IV. Historian James Sheehan contends that the inscription was intended to “proclaim its [the museum’s] dedication to German art and the link between national art and political unification,”⁵⁸³ which had been an issue in Germany since the 1848 Revolution.

⁵⁷⁹ Gaehtgens, 56. Gaehtgens contends that “Frederick Wilhelm III finally agreed to Schinkel’s plans [for the museum] in 1832 for political reasons.” Indeed, he continues and points out that the thematically similar Alte Pinakothek (Munich) was constructed around the same time. See: Gaehtgens, 56.

⁵⁸⁰ Wright, “Introduction,” 9.

⁵⁸¹ Gaehtgens, 56.

⁵⁸² Ibid., 58.

⁵⁸³ Sheehan, 113. Also see: Françoise Forster-Hahn, “Museum moderner Kunst oder Symbol einer neuen Nation? Zur Gründungsgeschichte der Berliner Nationalgalerie,” in *Der deutschen Kunst: Nationalgalerie und Nationale Identität, 1876-1998* (Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers Association, 2000), 30-43.

Moreover, rather than establishing the museum (*Die Nationalgalerie*) as an independent (or even autonomous) entity, its director Max Jordan (1874-1895) reported to the *Kultsministerium*, and the Prussian dominated *Landeskunstkommission* directed purchases.⁵⁸⁴ Construction on the National Gallery began in 1866 (the year of Prussia's victory over Austria in the first war of German unification) and concluded in 1875. Consequently, appreciating the expectation that the museum would contribute to Germany's artistic unification, as political unification had just been completed, is uncomplicated;⁵⁸⁵ this expectation existed throughout the Second Reich. The most famous illustration of the expectation that the museum should contribute to Germany's artistic unification occurred when the museum's second director, Hugo von Tschudi (1851-1911, administered the museum 1896-1909), attempted to introduce modern French impressionist art to the museum's collection; Wilhelm II forced him to resign.⁵⁸⁶ Karl Scheffler, in 1921, wrote "The *Nationalgalerie* served dynastic interests quite intentionally...,"⁵⁸⁷ by presenting "an oppressive mass of bombastic battle scenes," which

⁵⁸⁴ Sheehan, 113.

⁵⁸⁵ The "problem" of German particularism is well known and treated thoroughly by Mack Walker. See: Mack Walker, *German Home Towns, Community, State, and General Estate, 1648-1871* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971); for a discussion of the questions relating to the artistic unification of Germany, see: Belting.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid. There are other reasons for the infamous "Tschudi Affair," and a solid scholarship exists on it. The role of modernism in German art and politics, which contributed to this, is discussed below. For more on Tschudi, see: Peter Paret, "The Tschudi Affair," *The Journal of Modern History* 53 (1981): 589-618.

⁵⁸⁷ Quoted in Gaehtgens, 60-61.

glorified German military victories and history.⁵⁸⁸ Consequently, the construction of museums on *Museumsinsel* occurred within a political context, and the Pergamon Museum⁵⁸⁹ was not an exception.

Although the development of *Museumsinsel* began during the period between the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars and the unification of Germany, it accelerated after 1871; indeed (as previously mentioned), it began its most intense period of construction after 1871, with three of its five museums being completed following German political unification. Although the pace of development increased, the relationship between the museums and the government remained the same, museums (especially those on *Museumsinsel*) were political tools. Under the Kaiserreich, the museums were to “reflect the status of the empire, [and] to testify to the empire’s global and imperial claims;”⁵⁹⁰ the Pergamon fit within this requirement—indeed it did so better than any of the other museums. The German government could have constructed a museum of antiquities,

⁵⁸⁸ Françoise Forster-Hahn, “Shrine of Art or Signature of a New Nation? The National Gallery(ies) in Berlin, 1848-1968,” in *The Formation of National Collections of Art and Archaeology Studies in the History of Art*, vol. 47 (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1996), 93.

⁵⁸⁹ The history of the building is interesting as an interim building was constructed and then replaced by a permanent structure, and it took until 1930 to complete the process, but “a” Pergamon Museum existed no later than 1899, see: Gaehtgens, 65 and Marchand 288. The fourth museum opened on *Museumsinsel*, the Kaiser Friedrich Museum (1904) opened with a special collection of Oriental art given to the Kaiser by the Sultan. Wilhelm II hoped that this museum would encourage young German artists to look to the past (especially the classical period) for inspiration and training, see: “Opening of the Emperor Frederick Museum: The Kaiser on Modern German Art,” *Times* (London), 19 October 1904, 3:d-e. The issues of German modern art are discussed (briefly) below.

⁵⁹⁰ Gaehtgens, 64. Indeed the politics of art and display became so important that the museums situated on *Museumsinsel* bickered with each other regarding construction and display. This became known as the “Museums War,” see: Marchand, 288-289.

ethnography (which was constructed in Berlin, but importantly not on *Museumsinsel*), or even of Egyptian artifacts, which were held in the *Neues Museum*; however, it decided, in 1897, the year before the Kaiser made his first trip to the Ottoman Empire, to build a museum dedicated to the Pergamon Altar⁵⁹¹ and the recently established Department of Islamic Art—also referred to as the Museum of Islamic Art, although it has been housed within the Bode Museum and the Pergamon and it never stood alone.⁵⁹² The decision to emphasize the German involvement in the Ottoman Empire went beyond a German belief in the magnificence of the Pergamon Altar—although that was a contributing factor. Rather, the decision to construct a museum around the Pergamon Altar represented a public statement of German imperialism in the Ottoman territories as well as German artistic achievement (through the altar's acquisition and display). However, it also contributed to the internal unification of Germany by providing a symbol (or tradition) that the Germans could see as a visible manifestation of “German” artistic accomplishment.⁵⁹³

The relationship between the Pergamon Altar and German involvement in the Ottoman Empire is illuminated not only by the particular space on *Museumsinsel* that Pergamon Museum, in its varied forms, occupied, but also by the physical structure of the

⁵⁹¹ As mentioned earlier, the Pergamon Museum was not one building but rather a succession of buildings beginning with what is presently referred to as the “interim building” and concluding in 1907 with the present museum, see: Gaehtgens, 65 and Marchand, 289-290.

⁵⁹² State Museums of Berlin Prussian Cultural Property, *Museum of Islamic Art*, trans. R. Hughes Barnes (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2003), 1.

⁵⁹³ The completion of the Cologne Cathedral failed in this purpose because of the *Kulturkampf*. Clearly, a Catholic church, regardless of its magnificence could not become a unifying symbol during this period of persecution. See: Belting, 46-47.

Pergamon Altar itself. The reconstruction and display of the “Pergamon Altar” is one of the most significant elements that permits an imperial message to be discerned from the language of display. A significant reason that the specific display of the Pergamon Altar conveys imperialism is that the Germans did not uncover the Pergamon Altar as a whole, nor could they have. Rather the Germans “reconstructed” the altar, from ruins that had been manipulated (eleven centuries earlier) into a new structure, to fit nineteenth-century German imperial ambitions. Originally, the last Attalid king (who died in 133 B.C.) commissioned the altar,⁵⁹⁴ but it eventually fell into ruin, and, by the eighth-century A.D., its ruins had been incorporated into a Byzantine wall,⁵⁹⁵ where they remained for eleven centuries. Thus, when the Germans discovered the “Pergamon Altar,” it was not as a unified whole or even an unadulterated ruin; rather they “discovered” the “Pergamon Altar” in the form of a Byzantine wall. Consequently, the location of the ruins discovered by the German archaeologists did not provide guidance for the altar’s reconstruction. Further, in reconstructing the altar, the Germans had almost no direction from ancient literature, which provides modern scholars with only one certain reference; it reads: “At Pergamon is a great marble altar, forty feet in height with colossal sculpture. It also contains the battle of the gods and the Giants.”⁵⁹⁶ Moreover, although the

⁵⁹⁴ Renee Dreyfus and Ellen Schraudolph (eds.), *Pergamon: The Telephos Frieze from the Great Altar* (San Francisco: Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco, 1996), 13.

⁵⁹⁵ Bilsel, 119.

⁵⁹⁶ Dreyfus, 11, this quote comes from a Roman citizen, Lucius Ampelius, who described the altar in his book: *Liber Memorialis*.

Pergamon Altar is conventionally presented as an altar dedicated to Zeus,⁵⁹⁷ scholars cannot even be certain that the altar was used for the worship of gods (much less any specific god).⁵⁹⁸ Consequently, a recent scholar concluded that based on the condition of the ruins when the Germans discovered them, and the limited secondary knowledge available to scholars, that even an assessment of “its [the Pergamon Altar] date, program, and [principal] function (or functions) [is]...deeply problematic.”⁵⁹⁹ Thus, beyond the fact that the ruins excavated from a Byzantine wall originated from an altar and a consensus on the general dimensions of the structure, modern scholars cannot, with certainty, support any other claims. In spite of this uncertainty (which is rarely addressed by scholars, even the most careful and precise scholars), newspapers, journals, books, and other publications make emphatic claims about the function and appearance of the altar (among other things, like the idea that the present altar resembles the ancient one and that the alter was indeed dedicated to Zeus).⁶⁰⁰

An important reason for the broadly accepted belief that the structure presented in the *Pergamonsaal* (Pergamon Hall, the actual room in which the altar is displayed) was

⁵⁹⁷ “Museum Festival in Berlin: Altar of Zeus on View,” *Times* (London), 6 October 1930, 8:e. There are many such examples.

⁵⁹⁸ Stewart points out that the Latin word *ara* does not necessarily mean religious altar, it could also be for hero-worship, see: Stewart, 32.

⁵⁹⁹ Andrew Stewart, “Pergamo Ara Marmorea Magna: On the Date, Reconstruction, and Functions of the Great Altar of Pergamon,” in *From Pergamon to Sperlonga: Sculpture and Context*, eds. Nancy T. de Grummond and Brunilde S. Ridgway (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 32.

⁶⁰⁰ “Museum Festival in Berlin: Altar of Zeus on View,” *Times* (London), 6 October 1930, 8:e; Antonio Paolucci, *Great Museums of Europe: The Dream of the Universal Museum* (Milan: Skira, 2002), 178.

an altar dedicated to Zeus, and that it resembles the original structure, is that there has never been any broad public indication to the contrary. This intentional deception is accentuated by the central presentation of Zeus and Athena on the modern version of the Pergamon Altar, which attentive scholars concur, is inaccurate.⁶⁰¹ Although the German architects who constructed the Pergamon Altar in Berlin placed these depictions (Zeus and Athena) in the most prominent location on the “monument,” they were most likely originally on the monument’s eastern façade (the present representation of the Pergamon Altar has “only” one façade).⁶⁰² Furthermore, while the presentation of the altar gives (and gave, when speaking of its earlier exhibition) the viewer the perception that the display includes the whole altar, the Pergamon Museum contains no more than a representation of a third of the original structure. Moreover, the structure that is displayed as the “Pergamon Altar” (which visitors are encouraged to touch and climb on) is an amalgamation of original pieces and elements added (without distinction from the originals) by nineteenth-century German architects. Among the many elements added by the Germans is the staircase that comprises a large proportion of the center of the “altar.”⁶⁰³ Thus, it cannot be claimed that the nineteenth-century elements in the “altar” are peripheral; rather, they provide the altar with its essential shape and structure. Not only did the Germans (as opposed to the original or even Byzantine artists) determine the

⁶⁰¹ Very few scholars have considered this. The statement “attentive scholars” should not indicate that a large number of scholars have made this claim. Rather most scholars accept the Pergamon Altar, as it is presently presented, as a reasonably accurate representation of the original, both in appearance and function.

⁶⁰² Bilsel, 114 and 127.

⁶⁰³ Bilsel, 108. There other examples; indeed it seems most of the “Altar’s” principal structure was built in the nineteenth-century.

location of specific statues and friezes without considering their original placement (such as those of Zeus and Athena), but the Germans also constructed the entire present form of the Pergamon Alter to fit their nineteenth-century imperial ambitions, desires, perceptions, and goals.⁶⁰⁴ That the whole architecture of the “monument” came from nineteenth-century German architects and museum curators (and German imperial desires) is evident by recognizing that “radically different” models were proposed as a basis for the nineteenth-century “reconstruction” of the “altar.”⁶⁰⁵

The German motivation for the reconstruction and display of the Pergamon Altar, was not historical fidelity, rather, the principal German intention in the decision to display the Pergamon Altar as they did was imperialism. The “reconstruction” of the “altar” in the most grandiose manner (both in its principal structure and the central depiction of gods like Zeus and Athena) was done to emphasize the magnificence of this monument and, thus, the German accomplishment in recovering it. Further, by appropriating such an important structure from the Ottoman Empire, the Germans illustrated their imperial position. This display of imperialism fit within both the established model for imperialism in the Ottoman Empire and the broader German policy of *Kulturpolitik* towards the Ottoman Empire. The appropriation of the ruins that

⁶⁰⁴ The difficult question that has not been answered, and this dissertation does not fully do, is to what degree did the Germans understand this or care. It must have been well understood by those who discovered and “reconstructed” the monument that there was no way to determine its original appearance, but how widely know that fact was is very uncertain.

⁶⁰⁵ Bilsel, 129-130 and 132. For an example of the German perception of Pergamon, see: *Pergamon: Pläne der Unterstadt und des Stadtberges*, in *Altertümer von Pergamon*, vol. 9 (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1914). This is a map of Pergamon, and it is less important than the series of maps that it is a part of.

composed the Pergamon Altar did not conflict with the policy of *Kulturpolitik*, because the Germans received “official” permission to excavate the site where they discovered the altar and they generally complied with the Ottoman laws on antiquities.⁶⁰⁶ However, German influence in the Ottoman government permitted the Germans to “accept not only sculpture and...jewelry”⁶⁰⁷ but to appropriate the entire altar without considering Ottoman objections.

In spite of its obvious imperial appeal, the Pergamon Altar was more than an effort to illustrate German imperialism to the German people and the world; it was also a symbol of German accomplishment that contributed to the unification of the newly formed country. Historian Eric Hobsbawm has explained the importance of such “invented traditions” to the development of a modern state, and the Pergamon Altar conforms to his model.⁶⁰⁸ Importantly, the Germans were not the only Power to use Ottoman artifacts in such a manner. The placement of the Luxor Obelisk at “the center of Paris’s most important urban axis, the Place de la Concorde”⁶⁰⁹ in 1836 (appropriated in

⁶⁰⁶ Although the Germans received permission, they did not (as previously noted) disclose the significance of their discovery to the Ottoman government, nor did they adhere to Ottoman law regarding the appropriation of antiquities. Further, German influence in the Empire (including the visit of the Kaiser) permitted them to appropriate the treasures without significant interference from the government.

⁶⁰⁷ Gaehtgens, 71-72. According to the established Ottoman law on the recovery of antiquities, some of the artifacts would have to remain in the Ottoman Empire, especially if the artifacts were of particular importance. The Germans successfully sought to appropriate the whole of the altar.

⁶⁰⁸ Michael R. Orwicz, “Nationalism and Representation, in Theory,” in *Nationalism and French Visual Culture, 1870-1914* (eds.), June Hargrove and Neil McWilliam, in Studies in the History of Art, vol. 68 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2005), 21.

⁶⁰⁹ Todd Porterfield, *The Allure of Empire: Art in the Service of French Imperialism, 1798-1836* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 13 and 104. Recall that the

1831) provides an example of how other imperial Powers used Ottoman artifacts didactically, and, eventually, created tradition while asserting their imperial presence in Ottoman territories. Recent historical literature has emphasized this point by contending that the placement of the Luxor Obelisk “[at] the center of Paris’s most important urban axis” was to “substitute France’s ‘revolutionary passion’ with a ‘national passion’ founded on imperial expansion in the East.”⁶¹⁰ Thus, the German display of the Pergamon Altar conformed to the established model for imperialism in the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the specific display of the Pergamon Altar emphasized German imperialism and national accomplishment (all the more so because of the specific manner in which the Germans constructed it), without upsetting the European balance of power.

However, in spite of the imperial nature of German activity in the Ottoman Empire, Edward Said famously asserted that Germany did not have a “protracted, sustained *national* interest in the Orient, and thus [had] no Orientalism of a politically motivated sort” (emphasis original).⁶¹¹ As previously explained (Chapter IV), Said’s principal contention was that a tradition of Oriental scholarship (be it literature, scholarly books, paintings, or some combination there of), established a basis for the assertion of imperialism and then colonialism in the foreign territory. He argued that while “the main battle in imperialism is over land, of course...when it came to who owned the land, who

French (and the Russians), until the signing of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention (1836) were the strongest imperial powers in the Ottoman Empire.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid., 15.

⁶¹¹ Said, *Orientalism*, 19. Said limited his consideration, almost exclusively, to the period of the nineteenth-century before Germany existed, while that limitation explains Said’s contention, it does not excuse later scholars from recognizing German interests in the Ottoman Empire.

had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it back and who now plans its future—these issues were reflected, contested, and even for a time decided” in Oriental scholarship.⁶¹² Said eventually conceded a German intellectual and scholarly interest in the Ottoman Empire, but maintained his contention that the Germans failed to connect this to an imperial policy. This dissertation has exposed a national German interest in expanding into the Ottoman Empire, which permitted the Germans (as well as other European Powers) to assert themselves into the Ottoman territories without challenging the established balance of power. This assertion of German national interests in the Ottoman Empire answers the question that scholars have asked about Said and German orientalism (and the point that Said never conceded). “Can this [German] tradition of scholarship be assessed in a way that productively connects it to histories of [German] imperialism and the exercise of power?”⁶¹³ Thus, the remaining task here is not to show the German national interest in the Ottoman Empire (which I hope was shown in Chapters V, VI, and VII), but rather to provide a minimal context in which to appreciate (the already well recognized) German scholarly and artistic interest in the Ottoman Empire.⁶¹⁴

⁶¹² Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, xxii-xiii; Said is principally discussing literature, but his argument could (and has been) be applied to paintings or other forms of expression.

⁶¹³ Jennifer Jenkins, “German Orientalism: Introduction,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 24 (2004): 97.

⁶¹⁴ The German artistic interest in the Ottoman Empire is reasonably well documented and certainly the least contentious part of Said’s assessment of German orientalism. Nevertheless, it is worth introducing some aspect of the German artistic and intellectual interest in the Ottoman Empire.

The use of visual art to explain the German imperial position in the Ottoman Empire was particularly effective due to the contemporary conflicts that existed between the German government and the art world (especially under Wilhelm II).⁶¹⁵ Wilhelm attached a special significance to the use of classical art (such as the Pergamon Altar) because he considered it a model for the type of art the Germans should be producing. For example, in 1901, Wilhelm II “made a sweeping claim of the supremacy and authority...of classical forms of art.”⁶¹⁶ In this speech, Wilhelm exhibited his preference for classical art and, particularly for sculpture, which he considered one of the last unpolluted forms of artistic expression. Contemporaries contended artistic expression had been polluted by modernism, and impressionism, which he and others considered particularly “un-German.”⁶¹⁷ Thus, the display of the Pergamon Altar in Germany had multiple functions. It explained the imperial relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire, which became the model that the Kaiser hoped future German artists would adopt, and it facilitated the unification of the German state through “the invention of tradition.” However, it accomplished all of this without upsetting the European balance of power, because the Germans conformed to the model of imperialism

⁶¹⁵ For a discussion of the trends and events influencing German art in the Wilhelmine period, see: Peter Paret, *German Encounters with Modernism, 1840-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 65-91 (hereafter cited as Paret, *German Encounters with Modernism*).

⁶¹⁶ “The Kaiser’s Speech on Art,” *Times* (London) 24 December 1901, 3:f. Wilhelm continued to claim that there were other important examples of art, which included “the sublime Germanic genius of Rembrandt.”

⁶¹⁷ Belting, 61-68. Also see: Paret, *German Encounters with Modernism*. Most of Paret’s book is germane, but his discussion of the increasingly strong influence of modernism and foreign art in the post-1888 period is especially informative. See: Paret, *German Encounters with Modernism*, 65-66.

established for the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, Imperial Germany's developing *Kunstpolitik* emphasized the German connection to classical art (most notably the Pergamon Altar) and rejected influences from modern art.

Although Germany never established a formal colonial relationship with the Ottoman Empire, German artists and writers illustrated the imperial relationship between the two countries for the German people. This mirrored the use of art in other European countries to explain (and even prepare the country for) an imperial relationship with the Ottoman Empire (before the country formally became involved in imperialism there).⁶¹⁸ The visual representations of the Ottoman Empire in Germany consisted of both paintings and photographs.⁶¹⁹ Among the most notable painters to embrace themes from the Ottoman Empire were August Macke (1887-1914, killed in the First World War) and Paul Klee (1879-1940), who traveled together in Tunisia before the start of the First World War (Klee also spent time in Egypt and other Ottoman territories before the war). These artists were part of the German artistic movement *der Blaue Reiter*, one of the principal proponents of German Expressionism (*die Brücke* is the other). However, depictions of the Ottoman Empire were not the private reserve of modernist artists. Wilhelm Gentz, as early as 1876, painted a conventional portrait of Crown Prince Frederick's 1869 visit to Jerusalem (a visit made during his trip to celebrate the opening of the Suez Canal); importantly, Gentz received support for his work from the new

⁶¹⁸ Porterfield, 4. Although this quote was written about France the same is true of Germany and of Britain.

⁶¹⁹ This dissertation does not cover photography, but for more information, see: Annetta Alexandridis and Wolf-Dieter Heilmeyer, *Archäologie der Photographie: Bilder aus der Photothek der Antikensammlung*, (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2004).

German state.⁶²⁰ Thus, through the works of German Expressionist painters, as well as court portraits, the German population began to acquire the familiarity with the Ottoman Empire that Said considered essential to the eventual establishment of imperialism.

Although the works completed by these artists (especially Klee and Macke, Gentz might be an exception) cannot be specifically connected to an overt assertion for German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, these works contributed to an increased awareness of German influence in the Ottoman Empire (which Said considered essential). This art, both in Germany and in other European countries, created an increased awareness that permitted European artists to “provide [a] rational for the imperial project” before their specific government established a formal imperial or colonial presence.⁶²¹ Thus, although specific domestic incidents (such as the protection of the Suez Canal, and the “overland route”) provoked European governments to establish a formal imperial or colonial presence,⁶²² artists and their works “created the sense that it [imperialism in the Ottoman Empire] was a national endeavor.”⁶²³ Although Macke spent only a short time in the Ottoman territories, his paintings, including *Turkish Garden* and *Turkish Garden Two*, as well as the thirty-seven watercolors that he produced, contributed to the idea that Germany had an imperial or colonial presence in the Ottoman Empire.

⁶²⁰ Forster-Hahn, 91-92.

⁶²¹ Porterfield, 4.

⁶²² A point that supports Robinson and Gallagher’s “free trade of imperialism.”

⁶²³ Porterfield, 4-5. Porterfield contends that the development of Weberian nationalism in Europe received a critical contribution from intellectuals and in particular artists. This nationalism encouraged by intellectuals permitted isolated events to move towards formal imperialism or colonialism because the country had possessed an inclination towards imperialism because of the work of artists.

One way in which Macke presented a claim for German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire was through the use of the depiction of “paradise,” in which “the traditional iconography of Adam and Eve in Eden was transformed to an exotic Arab setting and to a modern urban paradise.”⁶²⁴ The connection between imperialism and the idea of the imperial territory being a “paradise” originated in the earliest of European colonial and imperial endeavors and should require no further explanation, except to emphasize the conventionality of German imperialism. Consequently, while the art of Klee, Macke, and the other German expressionists does not make an overt statement for German imperial expansion into the Ottoman Empire, it contributed to the intellectual context that Said considered essential to the establishment of formal imperialism.

Much as the paintings and photographs of the Ottoman Empire contributed to the familiarity with the imperial territory that eventually facilitated the establishment of imperialism and colonialism,⁶²⁵ nineteenth-century German literature (especially between 1870 and 1908) also introduced the Ottoman Empire to the German people. Scholars have “only rarely” considered German orientalist texts in the context of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire.⁶²⁶ Indeed, the whole field of German orientalist

⁶²⁴ Janice Mary McCullagh, “August Macke and the Vision of Paradise: An Iconographic Analysis,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, 1980), vi.

⁶²⁵ Although the Germans never established a formal imperial or colonial presence in the Ottoman Empire, this was due to the international circumstances. It is argued that had the Germans won the First World War, they would have acted much as the French and British and established a stronger position in the former Ottoman territories. However, this failure to establish formal colonialism and imperialism does not (as previously argued) diminish the importance of the German artists in the Ottoman Empire, and the formers’ contribution to any eventual imperial or colonial activity.

⁶²⁶ Nina Berman, “Orientalism, Imperialism, and Nationalism: Karl May’s *Orientzyklus*,” in *The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonization and its Legacy* eds. Sara

literature has just begun to develop. A particularly promising genre, the *Professorenromane* (or more specifically, *archäologischer Professorenromane*, archaeological scholarly novel, which often used copious footnotes in spite of the fact that the novel's plot was fictional), may provide this field with an important perspective on German intentions in the Ottoman Empire.⁶²⁷ Indeed, German interest in the Ottoman Empire existed in both scholarly and literary spheres. The nineteenth-century German Oriental scholars “surpassed all other European Orientalists [through] their valuable contributions to Arabic and Islamic Studies.”⁶²⁸

Without attempting to review the entirety of German orientalist literature, this dissertation briefly considers the work of one author, Karl May,⁶²⁹ and contends that May’s work accords with the model for imperialism established by the British and explained by Said. Although the dissertation treats only Karl May, his enormous

Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Susanne Zantop (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 51.

⁶²⁷ Kathrin Maurer, “Representing History: Literary Realism and Historicist Prose in Nineteenth-Century Germany,” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2002), 113. This genre has not considered these books in relation to the Ottoman Empire yet.

⁶²⁸ Serajul Haque, “German Contribution to Arabic and Islamic Studies,” *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh* 19 (1974): 35. These contributions included things like translations of the Koran but also the development of departments and professorships in Oriental Studies. Further, scholars began to learn and teach Arabic, Persian, and other such languages. Haque’s article provides a succinct list of the major German Orientalists in the nineteenth-century.

⁶²⁹ Karl May was one of Germany’s most widely read authors. See: Colleen Cook, “Germany’s Wild West Author: A Researcher’s guide to Karl May,” *German Studies Review* 5 (1982): 67-82. Other authors could be considered here including: Wilhelm Freytag and Gustav Flügel, see: Haque, 33-47.

popularity and the attention devoted to his works makes him one of the most important conduits of information about the Ottoman Empire.

Karl May wrote no less than five novels (some of which are six volumes long) situated in the Ottoman Empire, these include: *Durch das wilde Kurdistan, Von Bagdad nach Stambul, In den Schluchten des Balkans, Durch das Land der Skiperaten* and *Orientzyklus* (which he originally published, significantly, in serial form in “*Deutscher Hausschatz in Wort und Bild,*” between 1881 and 1888).⁶³⁰ Although a specific study of May’s books is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is important to note some of the themes he addressed in his works. Among the ideas addressed by May was the role of German arms and military instruction in the Ottoman Empire; specifically, he wrote of the superiority of German weapons (meaning the Krupp weapons) and the sloppiness of Ottoman soldiers, whose lines were not straight.⁶³¹ His novels also addressed the reality of the Turks as the “Sick man of Europe,” and sometimes proposed that Germany (in some unspecified way) would provide the Ottoman Empire with its salvation.⁶³² Lastly, recent scholars have used post-colonial theories to contend that May “transferred [the heterosexual model of domination and submission] onto the relationship between Europe and the Middle East: Kara Ben Nemsi [the German protagonist in May’s *Orientzyklus*] as the representative of Europe and Halef [an Arab] as the representative of the Middle East

⁶³⁰ Berman, 55; and Nedret Kuran, “The Image of the Turk in Karl May’s Novel *Von Bagdad nach Stambul*,” *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 5 (1995): 241.

⁶³¹ Berman, 62 and 64.

⁶³² Kuran, 243.

personify[ing] the colonial paradigm.”⁶³³ Thus, through even this brief consideration of one of nineteenth-century Germany’s most popular authors, it is possible to appreciate the presence and significance of the Ottoman Empire to German literature.

Consequently, through the use of visual arts and literature, the German artistic community contributed to the imperial relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. These examples of the artistic depiction of the Ottoman Empire, including the Pergamon Altar, Expressionist art, and the work of Karl May placed the Ottoman Empire within many of the periods most significant and popular artistic movements. Although Said has acknowledged the German cultural interest in the Ottoman Empire, it is worth emphasizing its breadth. Further, this contribution accorded with the model of imperialism developed by the British, which permitted the Germans to expand into the Ottoman Empire without upsetting the European balance of power.

⁶³³ Burman, 59.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Article one hundred and fifty five of the Treaty of Versailles, which required Germany to adhere to all decisions made by the victorious powers regarding Turkey and Bulgaria, followed articles obliging Germany to surrender its colonial territories (articles 119-127). Although the subsequent articles in the Treaty obviously required Germany to surrender its formal colonies, these articles also required the Germans to relinquish their territory in China (articles 128-134), influence in Morocco (articles 141-146), and to recognize British authority in Egypt (articles 148-154). Indeed, the section of the Versailles Treaty that included article 155 (the article concerning German-Ottoman relations) specifically concerned German colonial and imperial influence. While other articles in the treaty regulated affairs between the Ottoman Empire and Germany (specifically those regarding the return of specific artifacts, article 246, and the articles addressing the Porte's outstanding debts, articles 231-242), the inclusion of Turkey in the section devoted to German colonial territories is significant. While Germany never had formal colonial territories in the Ottoman Empire, through the model of imperialism conceived by the British in the mid-nineteenth-century, the Germans had a recognized and effective imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire for more than twenty-five years.

Regrettably, historians have failed to consider German imperial interests beyond the fact that the Germans failed to establish colonies in the Ottoman Empire, and this omission has created a distortion in the historiography of German imperialism/colonialism. The German decision not to establish formal colonies accorded with the principles of imperialism for the late nineteenth-century. Indeed, both the

Russian control of the “Greater Bulgaria” (however brief) and the British occupation and control of Egypt (between 1882 and 1914) emphasize the Powers’ reluctance to establish formal colonies in the Ottoman territories (an argument could be made that European imperial activity in China may also fit this principle). Although French activity in North Africa and Syria deviated from this pattern, the general reluctance to establish colonies (and even more so colonial empires) is of central importance in understanding international relations between 1880 and 1914.⁶³⁴ Thus, that the Germans sought to extend their influence into the Ottoman Empire without the formal establishment of colonies should not preclude German activity in the Ottoman Empire from being considered in the imperial historiography of Imperial Germany.

The inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in the historiography of German imperialism/colonialism has significant implications for the historiography of German imperialism/colonialism as well as German foreign policy. The most important factor in this consideration is the idea that German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire was quite moderate and well within the established pattern of imperialism. At no point in the period between 1880 and 1908 did the Germans attempt to repudiate the established model of imperialism by seeking colonies or a more significant imperial influence. Indeed, in many circumstances, the Germans never surpassed the British or the French (and in other circumstances they surpassed one but not the other), content to be the second largest lender or trading partner. When the Germans did finally surpass the

⁶³⁴ One of the complicating issues in this consideration is that the Powers did establish colonies. The establishment of German colonies in the Pacific and in South-west Africa is an example. However, most of the colonies established between 1880 and 1914 had little strategic importance. At the minimum, it must be recognized that the establishment of formal colonies was no longer the only way in which to assert influence.

British or the French in specific aspects of Ottoman imperialism, it was often because the former elected to decrease their involvement in Ottoman affairs more than a German desire to increase their participation. The most important exceptions to this are Kaiser Wilhelm's 1898 visit to Constantinople and the German appropriation of Ottoman artifacts. Beyond these two activities, the Germans usually remained behind either the British or the French. Consequently, German imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire cannot be considered militaristic or unusually aggressive. Rather, as this dissertation has contended, the German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire may even be characterized as tepid.

The model of imperialism developed for the Ottoman Empire originated out of a confluence of European balance of power politics and British concerns to maintain access to India. Initially, this model developed following the invention of steam ships that could travel reliably and safely in the Red Sea. The establishment of an oceanic route from London to India that did not require the circumnavigation of Africa made access to Suez, Morocco, and Bab el Mandeb (the strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden) a national strategic concern for Britain. However, the British had little interest in formally colonizing (which would have greatly increased their responsibility to these areas and might have provoked the other European Powers to object to British expansion) these areas.⁶³⁵ Rather, the British "merely" established themselves as the hegemonic imperial power in the strategic territory and protected their influence there. This policy emphasized regional stability and was predicated on the continued existence of the

⁶³⁵ Gibraltar was an exception to this. Recall that under the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), the British gained access to Gibraltar in perpetuity from the Spanish. However, the British only included it in their Empire in 1830 (just as the development of steam ships made travel in the Red Sea feasible and thus the "overland route" became a possibility).

Ottoman government. The British predicated their policy on the continued existence of the Ottoman government, because, if the Ottoman government fell, then it was probable that the competing European interests in the Ottoman territories would threaten the strategic positions that the British already held.

The British (and indeed the other Powers) had credible reasons to believe that the Ottoman government might collapse (or be destroyed). Such a circumstance would have threatened the newly established “overland route,” and British security interests. Thus, it became a British policy, between 1856 and 1888, to defend the governmental and territorial (particularly the principal Asiatic areas of the Ottoman Empire) integrity of the Ottoman Empire. While the Ottoman Empire was already frequently considered to be moribund by the 1830s,⁶³⁶ the treaty of Hünkiâr İskelesi (1833) (between the Ottomans and the Russians) intensified concern about the future of the Empire, as the treaty provided the Russians a pretext to occupy Constantinople. This treaty coincided with intensified British interest in Ottoman territories (for the establishment of the “overland” route), and thus was a (perhaps the) critical component in the development of the British imperial system for the Ottoman Empire. The British preference for imperial influence in Suez and along the Red Sea represented a strategic decision not to establish a precedent that the other European Powers (most specifically Russia) might use to occupy, and partition, the Ottoman territories. Consequently, the model of imperialism developed by the British, and adopted by the Germans, originated out of a need to secure strategic locations within the Ottoman Empire without providing a pretext for the other European

⁶³⁶ Earlier chapters provided references that indicated that the European Powers developed no less than two-hundred (and likely many, many more) contingencies and plans for the division of the Ottoman territories.

Powers (originally Russia) to seize colonies in the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire. From 1838 until 1908, this model permitted the British, and then the Germans, to become important imperial powers in the Ottoman Empire (a fact well recognized in Ottoman and Turkish historiography, as mentioned below) without upsetting the European balance of power.

The model for the assertion of imperialism in the Ottoman Empire (as developed by the British) allowed the imperial power to assert themselves in the Empire's economic, political, cultural, and military affairs without providing the other European Powers a pretext to seize Ottoman territories. This influence in the Empire eventually encouraged the European Powers (chiefly Britain and then Germany) to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman territories. The maintenance of the Empire's territorial and governmental integrity was essential to the British model because, any colonization (by other Powers) in the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire would threaten the established British (and after 1880, the German) position. The reason why such a partition represented a threat to the Powers (Britain and then Germany) was that: 1) the British had the territories they sought and thus any conflict over the Ottoman Empire could only reduce their position and, 2) the Germans had a profitable and important relationship with the Ottoman Empire and a war could only reduce that influence. Thus, the model of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire permitted both Germany and Britain to maintain their positions within the Empire without provoking the other European Powers.

Although British activity in the Ottoman Empire (between 1838 and 1888) did not resemble conventional British imperialism, scholars have subsequently recognized this activity as imperial. One (conservative) test for the presence of British imperialism is

John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson's Imperialism of Free Trade. Although this test has been criticized, it remains a reliable measure of imperial activity. Although previously mentioned, it is worth reconsidering the components of this test, which include:

- 1) The exertion of power or diplomacy to impose and sustain free trading conditions on another society against its will;
- 2) the exertion of capital or commercial attraction to bend economic organization and direction of growth in directions complementary to the needs and surpluses of the expanding economy;
- 3) the exertion of capital and commercial attraction directly upon foreign governments to influence them toward cooperation and alliance with the expanding country;
- 4) the direct intervention or influence of the export-import sector interests upon the politics of the receiving country in the direction of collaboration and political-economic alliance with the expanding power;
- 5) the taking over by European bankers and merchants of sectors of non-European domestic economies under cover of imposed free trade without accompaniment of large capital or export inputs from Europe, as in China.⁶³⁷

Robinson and Gallagher envisioned one of these aspects to be sufficient to show imperial activity; however, in the case of the British (and later the Germans) in the Ottoman Empire, at least four of these were present. Further, while most scholars expect for colonialism to precede imperialism, Edward Said has argued that, in the Middle East, imperialism preceded colonialism. However, the imperial incubation period, which ended after the First World War, has confused scholars who anticipate a colonial presence in Ottoman territories as a test for German imperialism.

Although the historiography of German colonialism does not include a treatment of German relations with the Ottoman Empire, Turkish and Ottoman historiography readily recognizes the imperial influence of all the Great Powers, including Germany. The historiography of Turkey contains many references to the influence of the European

⁶³⁷ Louis, 3-5.

Powers in the final days of the Ottoman Empire. Some representative statements from this Turkish historiography include the following: “At this time, their purpose [the Powers] ...was to maintain the unity of the Ottoman state, which had been *invaded by the great powers of Europe*;”⁶³⁸ “The destructive effects of western imperialism...,”⁶³⁹ and lastly “Turkish historians have readily accepted the notion not only that western economic and political imperialism prevented the Ottoman state from implementing effective reforms for the empire’s recovery...”⁶⁴⁰ Thus, although German imperial historiography does not include a consideration of Germany’s imperial activities in the Ottoman territories, scholars should not conclude that such a position is universally accepted.

The failure to include German imperialism in the historiography of German imperialism has led to distortions in the scholarly understanding of German imperial activity. The principal scholarly interest in German imperial affairs has been devoted to German activity in Africa, but also in the Pacific Islands as well as in China. However, if the German imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire is considered, the dynamic of German imperial historiography changes in important ways. Historical considerations of German imperialism have often treated nineteenth-century German imperialism as a

⁶³⁸ Ayşegül Aydingün and İsmail Aydingün, “The Role of Language in the Formation of Turkish National Identity and Turkishness,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10(2004): 419.

⁶³⁹ Mustafa Aksakal, “Not ‘by those old books of international law, but only by war:’ Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 15(2004): 508. Aksakal’s article discusses historiography and this specific quotation comes from the most influential and important book (five volumes, in Turkish) on the end of the Ottoman Empire.

⁶⁴⁰ Aksakal, 509.

predecessor to the Nazi expansion within Europe.⁶⁴¹ Further, even those historians who have not made an explicit connection between nineteenth-century German imperialism and the Nazis distort the reality of German imperialism. For example, historian Hartmut Pogge von Strandamm wrote “[the] announcing of Germany’s interventionist intentions *for the entire globe did not satisfy expansionist ambitions [within Germany]*” (emphasis added).⁶⁴² Although the logical imprecision of claiming that German “interventionist intentions for the entire globe” failed to satisfy German expansionist desires requires no further comment, the implications for the understanding of German imperialism are almost as troubling.⁶⁴³ Even the Fischer thesis contends that “...the annexationist aims of the Imperial government not only predated the outbreak of the war but also showed a remarkable similarity to the plans made by the Nazis...”⁶⁴⁴ Although these are not Fischer’s words they represent his argument fairly. The inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in the historiography of German imperialism, German foreign policy, and the origins of

⁶⁴¹ Richard J. Evans, “From Hitler to Bismarck: ‘Third Reich’ and Kaiserreich in Recent Historiography” Part II,” *Historical Journal* 26 (1983): 1000-1001. This is a two part review article covering more than twenty books on German imperial history. The connection made between twentieth-century Nazi expansion within Europe and nineteenth-century German imperialism is not made by Evans, but rather commented on by Evans in his review of German imperial historiography.

⁶⁴² Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann and Richard J. Evans (eds.), *The Coming of the First World War* (London: Clarendon Press, 1988), 109.

⁶⁴³ This is especially troubling because it is in a text intended to explain the origins of the First World War and is apparently not intended for specialists in German imperial history, thus those who read this may not recognize the distortions.

⁶⁴⁴ Ruth Henig, *The Origins of the First World War* (London: Routledge, 19XX), 45. The imprecision of this statement is troubling. Of course all activities in the Imperial period preceded those of the First World War and the Nazi period, but Fischer does imply a connection between Imperial expansion and the Nazis.

the First World War might temper the seductive but misguided attempt to connect Imperial Germany (and specifically the government policies) to the Nazis.

Although this dissertation rejects a connection between the foreign policy of the Imperial German government and the Nazis, it does not absolve the *Kaiserreich* of its responsibilities in the nineteenth-century. However, the policies of the Kaiser's government should be interpreted within a comparative context. Fischer's principal contention that Imperial German sought to expand throughout the world is, generally, correct. However, this expansion has been distorted and viewed as aberrant. This dissertation contends that in the Ottoman Empire, as well as other places, the German expansion was well within the established imperialism for the nineteenth-century. Rather than considering German imperial expansion within the context of the distant Nazis, it seems appropriate to compare the German expansion to that of the other Powers. Indeed, between 1888 and 1914, the major Powers asserted an imperial presence in most of the strategic areas of the world. This is the context in which German expansion in the Ottoman Empire occurred, and this historical environment should be taken into consideration when assessing German imperial activity.

Published in 1890, Alfred Thayer Mahan's (1840-1914) famous book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* encouraged the construction of large navies and global expansion, at least far enough to establish secure global coaling stations. In the spirit of the new doctrine that developed from this book, the Powers began to assert themselves around the world and in so doing secured strategic positions. For example, the United States between 1890 and 1914 established an imperial presence (often without formal colonies) in: Hawai'i (1898), Cuba (1898), the Philippines (1898), Puerto Rico

(1898), Guam (1898), Haiti (1903), and Panama (1903). Further, through doctrines such as the Platt Amendment (1903) and the Roosevelt Corollary (1904) the United States established (and informed, formally, the other Powers to remain out) “American imperial territory.” Similarly, in addition to French interest in North and West Africa, the French established themselves in Indochina no later than 1893. Although not all of these territories became colonies (at least before 1914), it is without question that the period between 1888 and the beginning of the First World War was a period of imperial expansion (often without colonies) for the Powers. Further, in this period there was an importance on strategic locations, and it cannot be questioned that the Ottoman Empire contained many strategically desirable positions. Thus, nineteenth-century German expansion (or desire for “world power”) should be understood in the broader pattern of contemporary Great Power expansion. This German desire to expand has more to do with the doctrinal and strategic interests of the nineteenth-century than it does the gas chambers and crematoriums of twentieth-century Poland.

The connection of nineteenth-century German imperialism to the Nazis and to some degree even the causes of the First World War, represents a problem with the historiography of German imperialism, but also German foreign policy. The primacy of the First and Second World Wars in German history has inclined many historians to consider nearly every significant political, economic, and social event from 1871 (and sometimes earlier) as a cause of these wars. The consideration of these events is not inappropriate; however, the focus on these wars has precluded historians of German imperialism and foreign policy from considering these policies in a broader context. Consequently, historians of German imperialism and foreign policy have devoted less

attention to issues such as German-American relations than they have relations between Germany and the rest of Europe. The Euro-centric focus of these studies has narrowed (artificially) the study of German foreign policy and imperialism. Although seductive, the First and Second World Wars have thus distorted our understanding of German foreign policy (which should include imperialism). Rather than reconsider German expansionist desires, it seems that a comparative study of German imperialism would be of great benefit. Instead of beginning with the assumption that German imperialism was aberrant, a comparative study of German imperialism might be of real importance.

Thus, this dissertation contends that the Ottoman Empire should be considered part of Germany's imperial history. The specifics of imperialism in the Ottoman Empire prohibited the establishment of colonies, but this is not the same as claiming that German did not have an imperial presence there. Indeed, historians of British, French, and to a lesser degree Russian imperialism recognize the imperial activities of these powers in the Ottoman territories. The inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in German imperial historiography may serve to moderate some of the more dramatic conclusions that have been made about it. Although significant, the Germans rarely surpassed the influence of the British or the French, and when the Germans did so they remained solidly within the established model for imperial expansion in the Ottoman Empire. This German expansion in the Ottoman Empire was not particularly aggressive or assertive. Consequently, the inclusion of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire indicates that German imperialism was not universally aggressive, a hint of the Nazi ambitions to develop in the 1930s and 1940s, or even an aberration. Rather, by including the Ottoman

Empire in the historiography of German imperialism it is possible to consider that latter restrained and conventional.

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