MARK THE MUSIC: HEIDEGGER ON TECHNOLOGY, ART, AND THE MEANING OF MATERIALITY

A Thesis

by

JAMES TYLER FRIEDMAN

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

August 2012

Major Subject: Philosophy
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Chair of Committee, Theodore D. George
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ABSTRACT

Mark the Music: Heidegger on Technology, Art, and the Meaning of Materiality.

(August 2012)

James Tyler Friedman, B.A.; B.S., Miami University

Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Theodore D. George

This thesis attempts to follow one of the central paths through the thought of Martin Heidegger. This path sets out from the chief danger that Heidegger believes to be facing the contemporary world and then proceeds onward through one of the ways we are able to affect a shift capable of setting the world aright. We conclude by taking a step of our own by proposing a counterpart, in music, to Heidegger’s unpacking of the poetic dimension of art. Our notion of musical listening is meant to both clarify and extend the possibilities latent in Heidegger’s theory.

Through a reading of his important essay “The Question Concerning Technology” we begin by explicating Heidegger’s diagnosis of modernity as unknowingly under the influence of the interpretation of being that he names “modern technology”. Having secured an understanding of the problem we turn to several of Heidegger’s essays on art wherein we undertake to extract the meaning of Heidegger’s conviction that it is through art that we are able to overcome modern technology. We interpret several claims which, taken together, get to the heart of Heidegger’s phenomenological take on the ontology of art. We then explicate Heidegger’s
appropriation of Hölderlin’s notion of poetic dwelling that names the authentic utilization of art for existence, and ultimately in the overcoming of modern technology.

Finally, we depart from exegesis with our commentary on the role of materiality in the achievement of meaning. After dismissing some misconceptions which Heidegger’s theory of poetry gives itself over to, we seek to develop his latent account of the role of materiality in the meaningfulness of art. Through a consideration of music, wherein sheer sensuousness prevails, the constitutive function of non-signifying materiality in meaning is presented and inscribed back into Heidegger’s account of art as well as his later views on ethics. Just as poetry has an ontic and ontological sense in Heidegger’s thought, so does our account of music serve a dual function. In addition to the familiar ontic phenomenon, music comes to name all art’s transfiguration of materiality into manifestness.
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I am also grateful to my family for their indefatigable support. To my parents for inspiring my love of learning and tolerating – nay, encouraging – my idiosyncrasies, eccentricities, and excesses. To Zach without whom I never would have studied Latin, philosophy, or followed innumerable other pursuits. Your trail-blazing has made me who I am.

And finally I am thankful for the love and companionship of Jamie and Jo Calobrisi. Though we have endured unscrupulous landlords, inhumane weather, and hectic schedules, I consider our Texas adventure a resounding success. Without your patience and solicitude this thesis surely would have suffered.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Beginning with Thales, who stands at the head of the Western tradition, philosophers have been caricatured as blithely unaware of the conditions in which life takes place. Contemplating the cosmos, Thales was said to have fallen into a well, much to the amusement of a nearby Thracian maid. Socrates’ lampooning in Aristophanes’ comedy “The Clouds” was ostensibly as innocent, but we see in the Apology that his alleged interest in “all things in the sky and below the earth”\(^1\) is the beginning of his end. However, the idle talk of the public is more often than not as incorrect as it is superficial\(^2\). For as we also see in the Apology, if the philosopher’s eyes are turned toward the heavens, her mind is ever on the health of his fellow citizen’s souls. The philosophers of the subsequent twenty-five hundred years have all, in one way or another, engaged in speculation that can be brought to bear on life as lived. But for all their brilliant and sophisticated theories, where do we stand? The finest minds of the twentieth century undertook a critical assessment of not only the Western heritage in general but the modern age in particular and reached a consensus: modernity has failed to deliver what it promised. Where the Enlightenment project sought freedom they found servitude. Reason was supposed to be an instrument of perpetual peace, and yet these thinkers endured two world wars and the Holocaust. Technology was supposed to

\(^{1}\)This thesis follows the style of the Chicago Manual of Style.
bring about equality and liberation, but these thinkers saw that machines had become our masters.

And yet, irony of ironies, how it is with the world is rarely apparent on the face of things. The interpretive framework through which we view the world effaces itself in its efficacy. That is the trouble with being, that “simple governance of an unobtrusive nearness”. Since we do not see a problem, the philosopher must show us the problem. But what form is this showing to take? Apocalyptic preaching is too distasteful and arouses skepticism in its audience. What of art? What is art but the portrayal of things as they are? With this assertion we do not subscribe to a mimetic theory of art, which considers art to be merely a mirror manqué. To the contrary, the mimetic theory is often complicit in a Platonic worldview whereby what is most real, for Plato the Forms, is transcendent. When human access to ultimate being is intelligible, images cannot be otherwise than graven. The sensible realm becomes that of mere appearances, of untruth. Art then is consigned to falsity. No matter how uncanny the resemblance, the finest trompe l’oeil is merely a copy of something sensible, which is, in turn, a copy of something intelligible. Art is a copy of a copy.

But Plato and his epigones have neither had the final word on art nor on being. For Heidegger, the task is similar to Plato’s – prepare a proper relationship with being – but the evaluation of art is diametrically opposed. Heidegger believes that the wretched state of the modern world is due in no small part to an improper relationship to being, a failure to live in accord with the way things are. However, art per se is not complicit in our existential misalignment. Art is no swindle; it is rather one of the essential ways in
which truth *happens*. With this very formulation Heidegger distances himself from Plato, for whom truth *is*, that is, is eternal and unchanging. But, for Heidegger, truth is historical, which is to say, our sense of what is changes historically. And art is one of the means through which the changes of truth take place and are registered.

Heidegger diagnoses the modern age as being under the sway of what he names “modern technology”. Our natural inclination is to interpret “modern technology” with reference to computers, cell phones, airplanes, and the like. However, we shall see in chapter I that Heidegger’s use of the term “modern technology” actually refers to a *Weltanschauung*, a specific interpretation of being that characterizes the present age. Through the lens of this interpretation everything is seen as what Heidegger calls standing-reserve [*Bestand*]. Whereas Heidegger believes the world to be composed of a thoroughgoing relationality of human beings and things, modern technology, taking its point of departure from modern philosophy’s mistaken division between the subject and the object and consequent skepticism about of the possibility of unmediated acquaintance between the subject and external objects, fails to acknowledge the way in which human beings are conditioned by always already being bound up with the things of our world. In doubting the existence of external objects or at least their self-sufficiency, the subject views itself as achieving meaning without need for anything other than its rational faculty. Thus external objects are taken to be bereft of meaning outside of their being an object for some representing subject. Taken as inherently meaningless entities, human beings have no scruples about relentlessly using the objects according solely to their wills, whims, and desires. Under the dominance of modern
technology, what are, in truth, things – entities that have meaning based on the complex matrix of relations in which they exist – are reductively interpreted to be standing-reserve – entities that have meaning only insofar as they are able to temporarily satisfy the desires of human beings. But modern technology does not stop there, believes Heidegger. Eventually we reach the point where human beings begin to take one another as standing-reserve. The anthropocentric humanism that locates the nobility of man in his mastery of nature undergoes a dialectical reversal and gives rise to dehumanization.

Heidegger does not believe that we must resign ourselves to this troubling state of affairs. To the contrary, Heidegger believes we find in art a medium capable of changing the way that we interpret reality. But availing ourselves of art’s power means preparing the appropriate relationship with art, which requires that we secure a proper understanding of what art is. Chapter II will take as its task the explication of Heidegger’s concept of art and his notion of poetic dwelling, which, we shall see, names the authentic relationship between human beings and art. Chapter III will give further contour to Heidegger’s understanding of art by discussing some interpretive errors to which the theory is prone. Heidegger famously claims that art is the essential striving of world and earth, and also that the essence of all art is poetry. Our inclination in unfolding and unifying these two statements, which are at the heart of Heidegger’s philosophy of art, is to understand the disclosive power of art in terms of the linguistic significance that we encounter in our common conception of poetry. However, we shall see that not only is Heidegger’s concept of poetry different from its everyday
connotations, but his theory of meaning is more expansive than mere linguistic significance. Accordingly, we will supplement the notion of poetic dwelling with the introduction of what we shall call “musical listening,” which is meant to clarify the essential and easily overlooked role of materiality, or as Heidegger will call it, earth, in the achievement of meaning. Finally, we shall consider the ethical dimension of our foregoing remarks and their relationship to some themes in Heidegger’s later thought. Based on Heidegger’s and our concern for the truth-content of art, we can see that we are not in the realm of aesthetics, taken in its original signification as the science of sensation. Heidegger’s thought, as well as our commentary and development of it, belongs more properly within the heritage of the philosophy of art, which beginning with Plato, thinks about not only the nature of art but also of its relationship to the political, ethical, and historical dimensions of life. Heidegger’s turn to art in the 1930s was motivated by his conviction that the philosophical concepts and vocabulary handed down by tradition was not adequate to the task of responding to the challenges of the modern age. As a result, Heidegger turned from the philosophical word to the poetic word, where he found an alternative way of disclosing truth. In what follows I will propose turning away from the word entirely; for, I shall argue, by turning to music we are able to prepare a relationship to things that does justice to both the worldly dimension in which we dwell as well as the earthly dimension that supports and eludes its counterpart.
CHAPTER II
FRAMING THE DANGER: HEIDEGGER ON TECHNOLOGY

To adequately situate oneself with regard to technology one cannot simply take apart a computer and study its component parts. Nor can one, if the intent is to understand technology, expect to succeed by enrolling in technical school. Acquaintance with the design, construction, or application of technological equipment will not grant one access to technology per se. The essence of technology, urges Heidegger, is nothing technological. And the technological is no thing. How then are we to approach technology?

But first, why ought we to question technology? The needfulness of such a questioning does not immediately assail us. It seems apparent that technology has been a force of good in our lives. For most, the only question that needs to be raised about technology is how its development can be furthered: how it can better serve us and conduce to the improvement of quality of life world round. Heidegger sees things differently. Recognizing that, having become habituated to the pervasive presence of technology, modern society takes it for granted, Heidegger means to rend us from our complacency and to render technology questionable by laying bare its essence. For it is his conviction that modern technology, as a perversion of technology proper, harbors a native proclivity to close off access to being. It is then of uppermost importance that technology become questionable since this is a requisite of any counteraction. Heidegger’s aim is thus to “prepare a free relationship to [modern technology].”
intend to show that in order to establish this free relationship with technology it will be necessary to turn to art.

Returning to our initial question: how are we to question concerning technology? For reasons that will become clear in the course of the investigation, Heidegger maintains that we must interrogate ourselves. Accordingly, Heidegger penetrates the matter by asking how we typically understand technology. On one hand, we distinguish between nature and technology. Nature is in spite of us. Technology, on the other hand, is a product of human agency. This common conception Heidegger names the anthropological definition of technology. As the products of human agency, our technological productions are always conceived and executed with an end in mind. It is not by chance that cars, carts, wheelbarrows, and wagons all roll upon circles instead of triangles. Each of these creations was brought forth by a knowing creator in order to function in a preconceived way. This instrumental character – which, of course, is inextricably related to its anthropological character – Heidegger calls, appropriately enough, the instrumental definition of technology.

That these two definitions of technology are correct is beyond dispute. Nevertheless, believes Heidegger, they do not get at what is essential, and the essence of technology is what we seek.

**Revealing Technology as Revealing**

Heidegger maintains that, in its truth, technology is a mode of revealing. To reach this conclusion we must use the aforementioned correct definitions to pursue technology’s essence. We are forbidden to terminate our questioning with the
instrumental and anthropological definition because they rest upon unexamined ground –
ground in which we hope to discover the truth of technology. Accordingly, the
anthropological-instrumental definition itself must be submitted to scrutiny. We saw
that this definition presents technology as a human contrivance that serves as means to
an end – a cause. Heidegger believes that our common conception belies a questionable
foundation, which must, therefore, be questioned. He identifies our understanding of
causality as the bequest of ancient philosophy’s doctrine of the four causes, the classic
articulations of which are to be found in Aristotle’s *Physics* II.iii and *Metaphysics* V.ii.
The obscurity of causality is evinced by the fact that we find ourselves unable to give an
account of that which unites the four causes. Taken individually, what is it about each
cause that warrants membership in the exclusive club? Why are there four causes? Why
not two, five, or seventeen?

We must suspend the obviousness of our common conception of causality if we
hope to retrieve a more originary understanding of it. Heidegger traces the etymology of
cause back to the Greek “*aition*”: to be responsible for, or “that to which something else
is indebted.” To flesh out this unfamiliar way of thinking, he gives a brief
phenomenological account of the creation of a silver, sacrificial chalice. What becomes
clear in this analysis is the privileged place that the human being plays in being
responsible. The traditional concept of the *causa efficiens* proves to be wholly
inadequate to the role of the silversmith inasmuch as he is a cause of the silver chalice.
The silversmith is not merely one cause among the other three, he “considers carefully
and gathers together the three aforementioned ways of being responsible and
indebted…The three previously mentioned ways…owe thanks to the pondering of the silversmith for the ‘that’ and the ‘how’ of their coming into appearance and into play for the production of the sacrificial vessel.” Those three causes to which the silver chalice is indebted are in turn indebted to the *techne* of the craftsman. We should bear in mind this privileged place that the human being holds in revealing [*das Entbergen*].

Heidegger fears that we shall be inclined to understand responsibility and being indebted, without further ado, in terms of a moral lapse or effecting. Doing so would obviate our inquiry. Just as we bracketed out the ‘obviousness’ of causality, we must resist assuming that the Greek understanding of responsibility and being indebted have reached us in their original purity. Since, as Heidegger believes, the Greek experience of “*aition*” was lost in its translation into the Latin “*causa*”, if we are intent on not merely begging the question, we should determine a means of scrutinizing responsibility and being indebted that does not depend on the discernment of our often misleading ‘common sense’. Heidegger avoids this trap by again asking what unites the traditional four causes. By challenging ourselves to extract the cause-ness which is shared by each of the four we are forced to dig deeper than we would by simply translating the Greek term *aition* and resting content. The clarification of this unifying principle demands that we ask how the four causes are responsible instead of just stating that they are responsible. Upon consideration Heidegger determines that the four ways of being responsible “let what is not yet present arrive into presencing. Accordingly, they are unifiedly ruled over by a bringing that brings what presences into appearance.” Since the subtleties of this statement are important we should compare it with other
formulations he offers: “They let [something] come forth into presencing [An-wesen]. They set it free to that place and so start it on its way, namely, into its complete arrival.”¹¹ Letting, setting free, starting something on its way are, to be sure, active verbs, but there is something gentle, caring, avuncular about them. This is important, I believe, in light of Heidegger’s avowed unwillingness to interpret causality in terms of effecting. The silversmith does not wrest the silver chalice into presence, he “considers carefully and gathers together the three aforementioned ways of being responsible and indebted.”¹² The silversmith shepherds the chalice into presencing. He, in turn, is indebted to the other causes. For example, the ceremonial sacrifice on account of which the chalice is a uniquely meaningful entity prescribes certain conventions regarding the chalice’s aspect and proscribes other liberties that might be taken in the chalice’s creation. The silversmith does not create the chalice by giving carte blanche to his will, in his careful consideration and gathering it is incumbent upon the craftsman to listen, as it were, to not merely effect but to be affected.

The bringing-forth that unites the four ways of being responsible was known to the Greeks as poiesis. Although paradigmatically thought of in terms of art and handicraft, the Greeks also included physis, or nature, under the rubric of poiesis. What do the painting of a picture, the crafting of a silver chalice, and the blossoming of a flower share in common? Each, claims Heidegger, “has to do with the presencing [Anwesen] of that which at any given time comes to appearance in bringing-forth. Bringing-forth brings hither out of concealment forth into unconcealment.”¹³ The revealing [das Entbergen] of something in unconcealment was known to the Greeks as
aletheia. To this revealing we give the name truth. However we must be careful not to
confuse truth as unconcealment with the more familiar concepts of truth as
correspondence or truth as coherence. So as to bring out the important contrast, let us
remind ourselves of the meaning of these different theories of truth. Truth as
correspondence holds that “truth” is a property of an idea insofar as that idea “truly”
relates to its object. Historically, in the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna for
example, we find this theory summed up with the pithy definition adaequatio intellectus
et rei (the correspondence of the understanding and the thing)\(^{14}\). Now the
correspondence theory of truth is not without its ambiguities, the enumeration and
discussion of which, however, would take us too far afield\(^{15}\). The coherence theory of
truth maintains that the truth of an idea is determined by the extent to which it can be
assimilated into the body of known truths without conflict. And the more congenial the
new truth is to the existent body – the more it sheds light on ambiguities, the better it
serves as connective tissue between old truths – the more confident we may be that the
idea is indeed true. Truths cohere to one another, while non-truths conflict and slide
right off. The theory of truth as unconcealment, on the other hand, means to get to at the
primordial ontological ground upon which the (ultimately derivative) theories of truth as
correspondence or coherence find their foundation. Truth as unconcealment holds that
truth is primarily the existential phenomenon of discovery. The ability to ask about the
correspondence between an idea and its object, or to determine the coherence of known
truths with a truth-candidate requires that the object or truth-candidate be dis-covered,
un-concealed, dis-closed, brought forth into meaningful presence\(^{16}\).
Whether as unconcealment, correspondence, or coherence, the marriage of technology and truth is sufficiently strange to give us pause. Let us revisit the central points of the path we have taken. We have sought to question concerning technology in hopes that we might open our existence to its essence. Our access to the questioning came from a consideration of the definitions by which we typically understand technology. The inadequacy of the anthropological and instrumental definition provided the impetus for a more in depth consideration of instrumentality itself. Insofar as instrumentality is based on causality we made this our object of inquiry. Heidegger located the fount of our concept of causality within ancient philosophy’s doctrine of the four causes. Our word “cause”, whose form and meaning have been derived from the Latin causa, was shown to obscure the Greek understanding of aition, “that to which something else is indebted.” The inevidence of the four ways of being indebted – viz. what unites them and thus excludes any others – provoked a phenomenological analysis of the creation of a silver chalice. In this analysis we became aware of the fact that the human being, while interdependent with the other three ways of being indebted, nevertheless holds sway in a singular way. The human being “considers carefully and gathers together the three [other] ways of being responsible and indebted.” This is our first indication of why we interrogate ourselves about technology.

Probing the depths of causality has drawn back the curtain which has kept us ignorant of the essential relationship between technology and truth: “Technology is…no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing.” It is both right and expedient that we
find ourselves in perplexity, believes Heidegger. Now perhaps we shall be inclined to stay our prejudices and index our questioning to technology’s own uncanny terms.

**The Response to the Question**

If Heidegger has clarified the nature of technology by tracing our common conceptions of it back to the Greeks, he will find the essence unique to modern technology disclosed in the difference between the two. However it may be objected that the difference between technology as known to the Greeks and modern technology, which has taken us to the craters of the moon and the depths of the ocean, is a qualitative, not quantitative difference. That is, given the unprecedented technological advances of the nineteenth and twentieth century, the Greeks have nothing to teach us that will offer insight into the technological world we live in. Yet Heidegger avers that modern technology is, like its Hellenistic forebear, primarily a manner of revealing. The difference lies in the fact that modern technology is not a poietic bringing-forth *[Her-vor-bringen]*, but a “challenging *[Herausfordern]*, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.”

In the bringing-forth of technology proper, the revealing of the being is shaped by solicitude that takes care to heed the complex relations that grant the thing its meaning. By way of contrast, Dasein asserts its will in an inauthentic mode under modern technology, and because it ignores the web of meaning in which the thing is constituted, the challenging-forth of modern technology over taxes things and leaves them in a state of emptiness and exhaustion.
Under the governance of modern technology, the world appears differently than it has heretofore. Heidegger offers several brief examples that illustrate the difference between a modern technological and an authentic relationship to things, for example the Rhine River as the subject of a hymn by Hölderlin versus as a source of hydroelectric power. Although helpful and suggestive, we might give further contour to our understanding of how modern technology challenges-forth with a more extensive example.

Under the sway of modern technology a cow that once appeared as the center of a rural family’s consumptive life, providing milk, cheese, and calves, all of which could be bartered for other precious goods, now appears differently. The live creature, whose centrality made it the object of considerable solicitude, has become a dispensary. The cow is no longer tended to in the same way. The communion in which the farmer relieved the animal of its milk has been obviated and rendered inefficient. It is now modern technology that does the relieving, namely relieving the farmer of her responsibilities. A mechanized device that has been set upon the cow’s udder now extracts the milk. Milking the cow herself or hiring a farm hand to do it would be a waste of the farmer’s temporal or monetary resources. The farmer need not spend her time taking the cows out to pasture where they can exercise and prevent muscle atrophy. Nor must the farmer attend to the preservation of the delicate balance between her cows and the flora of her fields, from which the animals formerly gleaned all-important nutrients. Hormone injections can now provide these nutrients as well as stave off the atrophying of muscles. Thanks to modern technology the cows have no need of ever
leaving their small compartments, which in turn are sized to maximize the number of cows that can be stored, thus maximizing the amount of milk the farmer can extract, thus maximizing the profits the farmer can be assured of. The cow, which once appeared as a precarious living thing whose importance virtually made it a member of the family, now appears as an insentient, dispensable dispensary of profits.

Modern technology, in contradistinction to technology as understood by the Greeks and pre-moderns, is a challenging forth that exploits nature. A consideration of the motif of the will can help clarify this distinction. In our elucidation of the poietic bringing-forth of the silver chalice by the craftsman we stressed the significance of such words and phrases as: letting, setting free, and starting something on its way. In letting, setting free, and starting something on its way the craftsman allows the thing to show itself as it is. Here the being of the thing guides the craftsman’s work. This mode of being stands in stark opposition to a willful comportment, which Heidegger believes to be indicative of man’s relation to being in the epoch of modern technology. Instead of a bringing-forth of something in accord with its being, modern technology claims man in such a way that our will guides all revealing, leading us to run roughshod over the world in pursuit of the fulfillment of our desires and purposes. When our role in revealing ceases to be guided by the being of the thing being revealed, bringing-forth is replaced by challenging-forth. That which is challenged-forth into presence is stripped of its independence, of its propriety, it shows itself as mere material. Subjected to our will, that which is challenged forth appears as “standing-reserve [Bestand]”²¹. In using the
term “standing-reserve”, Heidegger means to suggest the abstractness, anonymity, and interchangeability, of everything as revealed by modern technology.

Modern technology is only able to challenge forth the energy of nature by challenging human beings to do so. Here we find the central indication as to why we question ourselves concerning technology: we ourselves are claimed, called upon, challenged by technology; we are its mouthpiece; we do its bidding. We have arrived at the essence of modern technology: “that challenging claim which gathers man thither to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve”\(^22\). Heidegger christens this essence Ge-stell. Translated as Enframing, Ge-stell is, as a recent commentator aptly put it, “a way in which [the human being’s] will orients itself.”\(^23\) Enframing, however, fails to capture the polysemic heft of the German term. On the one hand, we have the stell, from the verb stellen (to place, set, put)\(^24\). A number of other verbs are formed from this root: bestellen (to order, command; to set in order), vorstellen (to represent), sicherstellen (to secure), nachstellen (to entrap), verstellen (to block or disguise), herstellen (to produce, to set here), and darstellen (to present or exhibit)\(^25\). And just as the Ge- in Gebirg (mountain chain) gathers together the Birgen (mountains) into a unified entity, the Ge- in Ge-stell gathers the resonances of the verbs built on stellen together in the term Ge-stell. Heidegger suggests that herstellen and darstellen possess particularly important connotations: that of producing and presenting. These verbs preserve overtones of poiesis, reminding us that Ge-stell “lets what presences come forth into unconcealment.”\(^26\) A perversion it may be, but we must not forget that modern
technology is one of the ways – in our world perhaps the central way – through which truth happens.

**The Responding to the Question**

We have a response to the question concerning technology: *Ge-stell*. And yet we are not finished questioning. Let us return to Heidegger’s initial concerns to clarify what has not been accounted for. We began our reflection by asking why we ought to question technology. Recall that we have become so accustomed to the presence of technology and so adapted to the lifestyles that technology affords us that we have ceased to see what is questionable about it. Not only does Heidegger believe that we are “unfree and chained to technology”²⁷, but also that as long as we smother questioning by upholding the neutrality of technology (i.e. technology is neither good nor bad, the use we put it to is what warrants value judgment) we shall remain ignorant and helpless to do otherwise than the bidding of *Ge-stell*’s challenging claim. Consequently, merely answering the question “what is the essence of modern technology?” does not fulfill Heidegger’s aim. The answer itself is insufficient, for it does not bear on praxis; it does not open “our human existence to the essence of technology”²⁸, it only reveals to us what we must open our existence to. Thus, avers Heidegger, “to answer means to respond…to the essence of what is being asked about.”²⁹ The question concerning technology demands not only a response, but a responding.

Heidegger believes that it is decisive for our times to establish a free relationship with modern technology. In this context, freedom means establishing a knowing appropriation of technology as the destiny of modern man. It belongs to modernity to
embrace the possibilities and limits of modern technology as our destiny. Let us work this out in greater detail. To prepare a free relationship to the essence of technology, we should first have an understanding of freedom.

What, then, is freedom? In order to answer this question, we must lay some preliminary groundwork. For all our posturing as lords of the earth, there is much that lies outside our will’s reach. For example, the matrix of meaningful relationships in virtue of which things appear as they do is a function of a past that we were not a part of. This – the means by which we understand ourselves, the world, our role in it, our possibilities, and our limits – is not of our making, but is given to each and every one of us. This is, in no small part, being. Geschick (destining, that which has been sent) is “that sending-that-gathers [versammelde Schicken] which first starts man upon a way of revealing… It is from out of this destining that the essence of all history [Geschichte] is determined.”

The understanding of being that is our destiny dictates the possibilities for how things show themselves. Our non-contradictory condition of givenness and agency accounts for the fact that “revealing [does not] happen somewhere beyond all human doing… But neither does it happen exclusively in man, or decisively through man.” Ge-stell, the essence of modern technology, is an interpretation of reality. As a destiny, it governs revealing. “Always the destining of revealing holds complete sway over man,” but, adds Heidegger, “that destining is never a fate that compels. For man becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens and hears [Hörender], and not one who is simply constrained to obey [Höriger].”
Let us then return to the question: what is freedom? Apophatically, freedom is not self-creation or self-determination *ex nihilo*. Heidegger has claimed that a precondition of freedom is belonging “to the realm of destining”[^33], that is, being historical. Since destining shapes the way we understand reality, freedom is always already grounded in a historical epoch’s understanding of being. But the determinedness of freedom should not induce quietism. Heidegger, we have just seen, maintains that it is possible to become truly free, even if this true freedom is not the fantasy that has been pervasive in certain ages, creeds, and schools of thought. To restate Heidegger’s conviction: “[M]an becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens and hears [*Hörender*], and not one who is simply constrained to obey [*Höriger*].”[^34] Note that *we become* truly free. *We are not necessarily* truly free. And we need not become truly free. It is not a birth right, a divine dispensation, a logical necessity, or the inevitable consequence of experience. Achieving a free relation is to return to our ownmost possibility of being from out of inauthentic servitude to modern technology. Note also that one becomes free by acknowledging or knowingly affirming herself as belonging to a certain interpretation of being. In doing so, she does not shuffle off her destiny as a historical being. But the liberation of acknowledging one’s servitude allows one to reflect critically on the choices she is presented with. Thereby, new possibilities are opened up. In the context of our concerns, a free relationship with modern technology is one in which we recognize (listen to and hear) the challenging claim that modern technology makes on
us; one in which we recognize that the unconcealment of the real as standing-reserve is one possibility among others, not the ultimate and final reality.

What is the value of opening our existence to the essence of technology? All striving strives after something. That is, striving has as its purpose the appropriation of something proper to our existence or the avoidance of something improper, some danger. In the case of questioning about the essence of technology, this is not an exclusive either/or, but rather an inclusive one. We have just seen that by establishing a free relation with *Ge-stell* we prepare ourselves to exist authentically, in a manner that is in accordance with the measure granted by being. However, by considering the danger unique to the essence of modern technology we can give further contour to our understanding of why establishing a free relation to it is of such great importance.

**The Danger**

There are two ills that we are striving to avoid by questioning concerning technology. The first is what Heidegger identifies as the danger inherent in all revealing. The second is the supreme danger that is unique to modern technology.

Let us begin with the former. Heidegger in fact names two dangers at play, one following from the other, in every destining of revealing. We have seen that the understanding of being in which we find ourselves determines the way in which we understand the world into which we have been thrown. This destining “starts man on a way of revealing, man, thus under way, is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what it revealed in ordering, and of deriving all his standards on this basis.”³⁵ This possibility is characterized by a
forward movement: we are claimed by the destining, uncritically take up the path it presents us with, and push that path forward. Since everything has been ordered and prefigured, the path does not admit of significant possibilities for change and it therefore it seems to be inevitable. In deriving all our standards on the basis of what destining bequeaths us, the project becomes self-fulfilling and self-justifying. If we turn to examine the origin, the destining that has claimed us, its desirability is vindicated by criterion that have, unbeknownst to us, been derived on its very basis. What then could give the lie to this revealing’s contingency; its inessentiality? Nothing, for the question has been begged. In such a state, certain possibilities have become impossible. The answer has been unwittingly assumed, checked against itself for correctness, and from that point on obviated any need for further justification.

Consequent to this danger follows another, namely that in the self showing of something “man may quail at the unconcealed and may misinterpret it.”36 This condition may be clarified by a colloquialism: when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail. When you have a way of interpreting the world, which precludes all others, everything will be viewed through the lens of that exclusionary interpretation. It matters less how things show themselves than how we see and determine them. Our relationship with things is not oriented by their being. We are not involved with the thing qua thing in all its relational richness, but as something objectively present, that is standing over and against the relational fabric that in fact grants it its meaning. In the case of modern technology, Ge-stell orients man in such a way that everything shows itself as standing-reserve, an even more radical perversion than objective presence. Sight is lost of the fact
that the world is capable of showing itself differently. A cow need not appear as an expected yield of milk. The Rhine River need not appear as a source of hydroelectric power. The unhappy upshot of this misinterpretation is the disenchantment of the world. A world of things that are enacted as what they are by virtue of their place within a complex nexus of relations and meanings becomes one dimensional and flat. We, in turn, fall victim to ennui, novelty drops out of our lives, our experience of the world is characterized by the words ‘if you’ve seen one ____ , you’ve seen them all.’ In a word, we become nihilistic.

Opposed to the danger of uncritical forward movement and its subsequent disenchantment of the world is the possibility that “man might be admitted more and sooner and ever more primally to the essence of that which is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order that he might experience as his essence his needed belonging to revealing.” The other possibility, then, is the way that leads man to an awareness of his essence – this is what is to be won by questioning concerning technology. But the stakes are high: to secure an authentic relationship with being, we must surmount the supreme danger of Ge-stell. We must consider, in greater depth, what this means, and how this possibility is realized.

It belongs to man to stand in relation to being. The understanding of being bequeathed to an epoch can be more or less conducive to the development and maintenance of this relationship. Heidegger sees Ge-stell as uniquely destructive in this respect. We have seen how under the sway of modern technology everything is revealed as standing-reserve. But we have not yet considered that as a consequence of this state
of affairs, “man…is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve…he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve.” Modern technology fosters dehumanization. In fact, in an earlier version of “The Question Concerning Technology” entitled “Das Ge-stell”, Heidegger equates modern technology’s agricultural industry with the “fabrication of corpses in the gas chambers” of Nazi death camps; though we would be remiss not to remember that any one theory – especially, perhaps, Heidegger’s – of the origin and nature of National Socialism is sure to be inadequate to explain the whole, horrendous phenomenon. Although Heidegger believes Nazism to be the exception rather than the rule, there are still ramifications of modern technology run less rampant, which announce the coming of widespread dehumanization. For example, man becoming the orderer of standing reserve and nothing else. The “nothing else” signifies that this take on man’s essence has become ossified and exclusionary. As the orderer of the standing-reserve, that is, nature, which is bent to his will, man “exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.” Insofar as everything shows itself as standing-reserve, as mere material for his projects, man sees himself as actualizing the essence of things by exploiting them according to his desire. Things receive their justification by their usefulness to man, and man realizes his essence in relentlessly availing himself of them.

But the essence of man is not to order standing-reserve, it is, Heidegger has told us, man’s “needed belonging to revealing.” This needed – or, essential – belonging gives expression to the fact that things are revealed in accordance with the interpretation of being that one finds oneself thrown into. There is no revealing without one for whom
and to whom the revealing takes place. That is to say, there is no revealing without human beings. But modern technology, in its supreme danger, “conceals revealing itself and with it That wherein unconcealment, i.e., truth, comes to pass.” The concealing of revealing veils the historical determinedness of the way in which things show themselves. Entities are not understood as revealed as standing-reserve, but simply as standing-reserve and nothing else. And being, wherein truth happens, is also concealed. Thus man becomes alienated from himself (his essence), from the world (of things, which are trivialized to the status of standing-reserve), and from being itself – the most severe form of alienation.

The Saving Power

Is all lost? Is the danger too dangerous? Should we resign ourselves to becoming standing-reserve? By no means, urges Heidegger, for in coming to understand the essence of technology as a destining of revealing, “we are already sojourning within the open space of destining…that in no way confines us to a stultified compulsion to push on blindly with technology or…to rebel helplessly against it and curse it as the work of the devil.” Or, in Hölderlin’s words, “…where danger is, grows the saving power also.” Heidegger provisionally accepts the wisdom of the poet and seeks this saving power. What, asks Heidegger, does it mean to save something? We speak of a doctor saving the life of a patient. We speak of saving leftovers for tomorrow’s lunch. Some God-fearing folk speak of being saved by accepting Jesus as their lord and savior. What, in light of its manifold usages, does it mean to save something? Heidegger contends that “to save”, properly conceived, is “to fetch something home into its essence, in order to
bring the essence for the first time into genuine appearing.”\textsuperscript{45} We should expect, then, that a confrontation with modern technology harbors the possibility for man to return to authenticity, to what is proper to us qua human beings. Although it is not discussed this way in “The Question Concerning Technology”, in other essays Heidegger will conceive of this proper manner of existence as living in accord with a measure granted by being itself.

As the destination of our fetching home, how are we to understand the familiar concept of “essence”? Heidegger offers a reinterpretation, or rather, a retrieval of the concept’s original meaning. His first claim is that the verbal sense of essence has priority over the more familiar noun, essence. Treating the noun as the leading term, the source from which the verb was derived, inclines us to conceive of an essence as a property or quality. However, if the verb takes the lead, then the noun derived therefrom becomes not stagnant presence, but a gerund. Something’s essence becomes shorthand for its essencing. The essencing of things concerns the way that they “hold sway, administer themselves, develop and decay”\textsuperscript{46} The whatness of a thing, its quidditas, is neither what shows itself to scientific investigation, nor the abstract universal under which all particulars may be gathered, it is the characteristic movement by which the thing is what it is. What it is is how it is.

Heidegger claims that the Greeks recognized that what essences is also what lasts or endures\textsuperscript{47}. However they misinterpreted the nature of the enduring. Here Heidegger takes up the torch to make good on the promise of their thought. What endures is not merely “that which remains, tenaciously persists throughout all that happens.”\textsuperscript{48} The
noun *Wesen* [essence] was shown to be secondary to the verb *wesen* [essencing]. The verb, in turn, believes Heidegger, is phonetically and semantically allied with *währen* [to last or endure]. The chain of meaningful relations must be taken a step further by connecting *währen* and *gewähren* [to grant]. In sum: “Only what is granted endures. That which endures primally out of the earliest beginning is what grants.” The granting-enduring structure is unselfconsciously circular. Enduring must be granted, but only what endures is able to grant. How is it possible to realize these odd conditions?

Let us consider Heidegger’s claim that “The way in which technology essences lets itself be seen only from out of that permanent enduring in which Enframing comes to pass as a destinying of revealing.” As the essence of technology, *Ge-stell* endures. This endurance, in turn, must be granted. What does this granting is being: “that permanent enduring” Being grants the essence of technology its enduring. From out of the generosity of being, *Ge-stell* is itself capable of granting. Granting to whom? Man. Granting what? It is the granting of this granted destinying of revealing that “first conveys to man that share in revealing which the coming-to-pass [*Ereignis*] of revealing needs.” This share is man’s share in revealing; his needed belongingness to the event of truth. Thus even the supremely dangerous *Ge-stell* is a granting: man is brought to encounter the “highest dignity of his essence…keeping watch over the unconcealment – and with it, from the first, the concealment – of all coming to presence on this earth.”

The granting that reintroduces man to his essence is the saving power. Man is thereby given to understand that he is not exclusively the orderer of the standing reserve and that this is merely one possibility among many for man, not to mention an
undesirable one at that. Recall that “to save” denoted fetching “something home into its essence, in order to bring the essence for the first time into its genuine appearing.” It is now apparent how contemplative thinking on Ge-stell brings man face to face with the appearing of his essence. With such an understanding, man may live – that is, realize his essence – in accord with the measure granted by being itself.

In what realm shall this reflection upon technology take place? We became aware, earlier in our questioning, of the kinship between the challenging-forth of modern technology and the bringing-forth of poiesis. We recognized physis as bringing-forth par excellence insofar as it has “the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth…in itself.” But we also acknowledged art under the rubric of poiesis. In other words, for Heidegger and the Greeks before him, art is a means of revealing, i.e. truth. And the bringing-forth of truth to shine forth is uniquely suited to lay bare the saving power that is to be found in Ge-stell. It is Heidegger’s conviction that our confrontation with Ge-stell must take place “in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it.” Fundamentally different in that the realm of technology itself will not suffice, seeing as the essence of technology is nothing technological. But the realm must also be akin to that of technology insofar as it must be capable of revealing the saving power that lies concealed. Such a realm is art.

**Conclusion**

Let us recapitulate some central points of “The Question Concerning Technology” in order to substantiate our thesis: in order to establish a free relationship with the essence of modern technology it will be necessary to turn to art. We may divide this task into
two parts. First, illustrating that modern technology severs our access to being. And second, showing that Heidegger believes a turn to art to be necessary to countervail the effects of modern technology; or, at any rate, that in art we find a means of twisting free of modern technology’s stranglehold.

Modern technology’s sundering of man from being is a function of its radicalization of the danger inherent in every destining of revealing; each of which harbors hegemonic tendencies. A particular interpretation of what it is to be occludes the ability of things to show themselves differently. The supreme danger of Ge-stell as a destining of revealing is twofold. On the one hand, man loses sight of his essence, “his needed belonging to revealing.”\(^57\) On the other hand, that which is revealed as standing-reserve “no longer even let their own fundamental characteristic appear, namely, this revealing as such.”\(^58\) Man-cum-orderer of the standing-reserve is barred access to the coming-to-pass of revealing since Ge-stell “conceals revealing itself and with it That wherein unconcealment, i.e., truth, comes to pass.”\(^59\) Not only is revealing concealed, but being is concealed along with it.

Heidegger, following Hölderlin, is of the conviction that “where danger is, grows the saving power also.”\(^60\) Where are we to seek the saving power? Since the essence of modern technology is itself nothing technological, our confrontation will not take place in the realm of technology. We will not be saved by becoming Luddites and ridding ourselves of all technological devices. The essence of modern technology is a form of revealing, that is, of truth. Art, insofar as it is a more primordial form of revealing and is not technological, is the ideal foil to Ge-stell. Art, believes Heidegger, is to serve as a
stent in the heart of revealing. Art shall also bring man home to his essence as one who serves a needed role in revealing, as illustrated in the example of the silversmith’s creation of a sacrificial chalice.

But it remains to be considered whether our relationship with art is such that it is still capable of revealing refulgent truth. Hegel, for one, spoke of the pastness of art; that, in respect to religion and philosophy, in our day and age the truth claims of art no longer obtain. In the Epilogue to his “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger recognizes the importance and unavoidability of addressing Hegel’s claim. However, for Heidegger, the claim constitutes a question, and an open one at that: “is art still an essential and necessary way in which that truth happens which is decisive for our historical existence, or is art no longer of this character?”

Insofar as art and technology both belong to the encompassing concept *techne*, I propose that their imbrications, and consequently the potential overshadowing of art by technology, has been a real possibility of their existence, not just in modern times, but for the Greeks as well. And I wish to demonstrate my hypothesis by way of a reading of an ancient myth: the contest of Marsyas and Apollo.

As it is told, Marsyas the satyr, having retrieved the discarded aulos of Athena, through assiduous practice, found himself to possess the preternatural ability to make beautiful music. Confident in his prowess, Marsyas challenged Apollo and his cithara to a musical contest. The stakes were high: the winner could do as he pleased with the loser. Apollo’s nine followers, the Muses, were called upon to serve as the judges. The contestants each wrought music, which we can only assume was sublimely beautiful,
from his instrument. The Muses declared Marsyas the victor. But dissatisfied Apollo
turned his cithara upside down and, to the awe of all, played the same tune as he had
before. Such a feat could not be replicated on the aulos. Though Marsyas protested, the
Muses sided with their leader. The satyr was hung from a tree and flayed alive. Titian’s
imagining of the scene shows Marsyas upside down, like Apollo’s cithara, and Ovid
mentions his bared sinews and pulsing veins, which one can imagine quivering like the
strings of a strummed cithara. Apollo’s prize was to make Marsyas an instrument upon
which he could improvise virtuosic cruelty.

What is most striking in this myth, to readers of Nietzsche at any rate, is the fact
that Apollo defeats Marsyas – consort of Dionysus – in a musical contest. The triumph
of the Apollonian in the artistic realm of the Dionysian clashes with our expectations.
Let’s listen more carefully.

Although it goes unstated, we can hear the criterion used by the Muses to
adjudicate the contest. What we hear are decidedly unmusical considerations
determining the victor. The Muses – may they forgive me for saying this – fail to listen.
As the story goes, on a purely musical basis, Marsyas first defeated Apollo. It was only
after Apollo delighted the Muses with the novelty of playing his lyre upside down that
they reversed their judgment. Notice that it was not by dint of his captivating
soulfulness or ingenious ornaments that Apollo won. It was not by extemporizing
elaborations on the tune that he had already played that the Muses declared him the
rightful recipient of the golden wreath. Musically speaking, Apollo did nothing
differently. And had the Muses been listening with their eyes shut (as, perhaps, all emphatic listening should be done) Marsyas would have kept his flesh.

We might say that Apollo won because vision had usurped the rightful place of listening. But a consideration of *techne* gives greater contour to how Apollo was able to prevail upon the Muses to reverse their decision. *Techne*, it will be recalled, belongs to *poiesis*; it is a bringing-forth. What is brought-forth in the playing of a cithara or aulos? Music. Insofar as they were artists, Apollo and Marsyas had as their object the *poietic* bringing-forth of music. But should the winner be determined on the basis of *what* was brought-forth, or *how* it was brought-forth? All signs point to the former, for it hardly seems just to fault Marsyas with the limitations of his instrument, especially when these limitations have no bearing on the bringing-forth that is proper to this instrument. In his decisive feat, Apollo demonstrated mastery of his cithara, albeit of a kind irrelevant to the ownmost possibilities of his cithara. I submit that we see in modern technology a kindred kind of indefinite deferral of the activity’s what-for. In modern technology there is a prioritization of the *how* – or, rather, *that* – something is being brought (challenged) forth over the *what* is being brought-forth and its concomitant what-for. As we have seen, in modern technology everything is revealed as standing-reserve and what is challenged-forth is abstract energy. Heidegger explains that “the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew…the revealing never simply comes to an end.”63
Mastery for mastery’s sake is indicative of both Apollo’s victory and the essence of modern technology. It seems, then, that the modernity of modern technology is perhaps not uniquely modern. Since the possibility of *Ge-stell* is inscribed in *techne* itself, it stands to reason that, here and there, it will present itself to careful listening at unexpected historical junctures.
CHAPTER III
RETAINING DAS RETTENDE: OF POETRY AND POETIC DWELLING

In the previous chapter we set out Heidegger’s understanding of modern technology. We determined that modern technology names the interpretative lens through which reality in the modern epoch is viewed. Modern technology leads human beings to understand the world not in terms of relationality, but piecemeal. By ignoring the meaningful relations of things, the being of things is revealed as relatively paltry and empty. We gestured at Heidegger’s belief that in art we find something capable of altering our relationship to being. In this chapter we will explore Heidegger’s concept of art in greater detail. We will also consider the notion of poetic dwelling in order to discover a relationship to art capable of overcoming modern technology. But first let us begin with a recapitulation of the problem and its potential solution.

What distinguishes human beings from other beings? The fact that we are featherless bipeds? Having plucked a chicken and presented it before the Athenians, Diogenes demonstrated the insufficiency of Plato’s definition. We might instead try asking: what distinguishes human being from the being of other beings? According to Heidegger it belongs to human beings to relate to being in a manner unique from all other beings. Our relation to being makes us what we are. Thus when this relation is endangered so is our very being as human beings. What is this relation in virtue of which we are what we are? What is the danger that could sever our essential relationship with being?
Human beings diverge from other beings not, pace Plato, in having broad nails or thumbs. Rather, we learn from *Being and Time* that human being, Dasein, is singular in that it is concerned about its being. We must not confuse this concern about being, pace Spinoza, with the *conatus essendi*, striving to persevere in being, the drive to continue mere biological life. For Heidegger, to be concerned about being means to be temporal in a special way: to project future possibilities that lead one to interpret the past in a certain manner which in turn colors the present. This temporal structure separates human beings from all other beings. Elephants and poodles do not make decisions about who and what they want to be that then lead them to conceive of past experiences in such a way as to determine how they exist in the present. Indeed, beings other than human beings do not *exist* in the etymological sense of standing outside of oneself. The relationship of human being to possibilities is our distinguishing characteristic.

The manner of our relationship to being oscillates between what Heidegger calls authenticity and inauthenticity, between what is proper and improper to us as the types of beings that we are. Amongst the innumerable possibilities that belong to human being there is the capacity to be in such a way that covers over our temporally-conditioned existence as possibility. The inauthentic and authentic manner of being of human beings respectively distorts or brings into focus our relation to being. And while we bear the burden of the responsibility to choose authenticity, certain interpretations of being into which we are thrown are more or less conducive to this end. Particularly dangerous is the modern epoch’s regnant interpretation of being, which Heidegger terms “modern technology”. The signal characteristic of modern technology is its effacement of the
differences between the being of different beings. Everything under the sway of modern technology is interpreted as what Heidegger calls standing-reserve [Bestand]. This term suggests the anonymity, interchangeability, and extreme paucity of meaning of everything as revealed by modern technology. Claimed by modern technology, human action is guided by the blind desires of the will. Nothing is permitted to have a say regarding what it is. Human beings do not let things be what they are, we determine their being according to our will. Through this willful comportment, human beings close off the accessibility of the being of things. Modern technology harbors the possibility that at some point human beings begin to treat one another as standing-reserve. These pernicious developments sever human being’s access to being itself. Heidegger fears that such a state of affairs would be irreversible.

But he is not without hope, for Heidegger shares Hölderlin’s conviction that “where danger is, grows the saving power [Das Rettende] also.” This saving power is art. We shall see in the course of our reflections that art only opposes modern technology when it trickles down into our very being, the way that we exist. The resultant comportment Heidegger names poetic dwelling. Our present aim is to explicate the nature of poetic dwelling and in doing so to make clear that this manner of existence is made possible by a form of listening.

In order to accomplish our task we must not be guided by the understanding of art passed down by received wisdom. Heidegger avowedly aims to provide “a new content for the word ‘art’ and for what it intends to name” Thus we cannot rely on
common notions of what constitutes art, we must be attentive to Heidegger’s new content.

**Art: World & Earth**

Heidegger maintains that art must be understood in terms of world and earth. His most extensive discussion of this new content of art is found in his celebrated essay “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Therein he claims that his description holds only for “great art”\(^6^6\) Suppose, in good phenomenological fashion, we wanted to submit a great work of art to scrutiny, where would we turn? Probably to a fine art museum. However Heidegger maintains that, cordoned off in a museum, art is dirempted from its context and dies. What then is a work of art’s proper context? What are the conditions for the flourishing of a work of art?

The concept of world should be familiar to readers of *Being and Time* and Heidegger’s lecture courses of the 1920s. Attempting to define such a large and dynamic concept by way of extracting a sentence or two from texts would no doubt do violence to Heidegger’s meaning. But we might suggest a proper understanding of world through differentiation and appeal to certain common usages. In the context of our concerns world is not the container and content of everything that can be encountered. Contra Kant, for Heidegger, world is not “the mathematic whole of all appearances and the totality of their synthesis in the great as well as in the small”\(^6^7\). In Heidegger’s idiom, these understandings of world are examples of the “ontic concept…[that] signifies the totality of beings which can be objectively present within the world.”\(^6^8\) The concept of world that we have in mind is of an ontological order; it is
that used when we discuss, say, the world of the ancient Greeks. This phrase denotes neither the state of Planet Earth between the 6th century B.C.E. to the advent of the medieval period nor the specific geographic surroundings of the Athenians or Spartans. Rather, the world of the ancient Greeks is the totality of meanings, references, contexts, practices, rituals, and beliefs that were constitutive for an understanding of normalcy, conformity, and therefore also heterodoxy. To exist in the world of the ancient Greeks would be to possess the know-how to maneuver life among the Athenians or Spartans. The dogs buried by Vesuvius in 79 A.D. were born and died in the world of Roman Pompeii, but only if world is understood ontically. These dogs did not speak Latin, they did not participate in political life, they had no concept of the need to and ritual of making sacrifices to the gods. Ontologically speaking, the owner of the dog existed in the world while his dog was merely objectively present or innerworldly.

As for the relationship between work and world, Heidegger believes that the work of art plays an important role in the illumination, maintenance, and propagation of a world. As he explains it in the context of a Greek temple,

> It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all governing expanse of this open relational contest is the world of this historical people.

According to Heidegger, there is an interdependent relationship between world and the work of art. Earlier we posed the question concerning the proper element of the work of art. “The work belongs,” claims Heidegger, “…uniquely within the realm that is opened
The work opens up a world. The work is only authentically a work when it is within the world that it opens. The work owes its work-being to its world.

In what way is the world dependent on the work? The work’s opening of the world is not tantamount to the creation of the world that it opens. Thus it would be incorrect to claim that without works there would be no world. But the work is something of a portal of access to a world. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger suggests that world only comes into view for everyday Dasein by way of failure. For example, the head of the hammer falls off the body while I am engaged in trying to hang a picture on the wall and as a consequence the referential structure that comprises the worldliness of the world suddenly becomes accessible. The unreliability of one thing discloses a wider web of things, practices, and purposes that allowed me to become meaningfully involved with the broken thing in the first place. Returning to our example, the broken hammer throws a wrench into my plans. Suddenly I am wrested from mindlessness acting and must make a decision: what now? We can see that answering this question requires that I become aware of why I am doing what I am doing. I am able to recognize that I have been wielding the hammer in order to hang the picture in my apartment, for the sake of realizing the possibility of creating a cozy living space. Do I give up on my endeavor? Do I run to the hardware store to procure a new tool? Do I seek out some blunt object to serve as an ersatz hammer? Whichever possibility I choose to enact – and our list is certainly not exhaustive – sheds light on what I take to be important and meaningful and thus in some small way, who I take myself to be. Am I someone for whom one’s living conditions define the person? Or do I disdain material possessions? At any rate, the
terminus a quo for this exponentially proliferating series of questions and decisions that
discloses world was the malfunction of an innerworldly thing.

In his later thought, such failure and disappointment are not Heidegger’s focal points concerning the appearance of world. In “The Origin of the Work of Art” the work not only opens up a world, which is what we saw the Greek temple do, it also “keeps it abidingly in force.” In holding open the space in which a particular world obtains, the work opens a space for decision and development. The work is not a mere mimetic representation of a world, this would require that a world was a stagnant and unchanging nexus of meanings. But to the contrary, the meanings and relations that constitute a world are dynamic. Accordingly, the work is a means through which a world undergoes change. Heidegger expresses the idea that the work is the locus of development by claiming that it is where “the battle of the new gods against the old is being fought.”

There is another sense in which a world is dependent on the work. More accurately, the work is singularly disclosive of an element upon which a world depends. Up to this point we have overlooked the most obvious aspect of the work. Consider the canonical forms of art – painting, sculpture, music, poetry – they are all sensible presentations of some sort. They are made of something, comprised of some material, be it pigment, bronze, tone, stone, or language that allows them to appear sensuously. Once the world has decayed and therefore ceased to grant the work its ownmost meaning, there is something about the work that allows us to still stand in relation to it. To be sure, we do not experience the Greek temple as the Greeks themselves did, but we are still able to encounter it, if only in the light of the meaningfulness granted by our
own world. The sensuous materiality of the work, that from which it is set forth, endures even once the world has decayed. This element of the work of art Heidegger christens *earth*.

But it is when we turn to this most obvious of the work’s aspects that our discussion becomes the most questionable. For earth is not illumined by the meaning granting of a world. Earth is precisely that which resists all historical determination. The work of art is constituted by, “setting up a world and setting forth the earth” The fact that world takes an indefinite article while earth gets a definite article is particularly revealing. *A world* suggests that there is more than one world. Indeed, in a non-Leibnizian sense, there are an infinite number of possible worlds. Earlier we mentioned in passing the world of the ancient Greeks. But within this world there was also the world of slaves, of women, of autochthonous men, each of which allowed individuals to navigate life in such a way as to assume their respective roles and function within society as a whole, within the world of the ancient Greeks. While ‘a world’ implies ‘worlds’, ‘the earth’ admits of no such variety. Because the earth resists the historical meanings of particular worlds, it is non-historical. Consequently, explication of the concept must resign itself to generalities and an ineradicable share of ambiguity.

If earth is not subsumed under a world, is the reverse true? Is a world a function of the earth? Manifestly not, for then that which confers meaning would be granted by the essentially non-meaningful. Earth and world must stand over and against one another. What is the nature of their relationship? “The opposition of world and earth,” claims Heidegger, “is a striving.” But we must not impute a merely negative meaning
to this strife. It is, to the contrary, an essential striving in which “the opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of their natures.” That is to say, it is a strife, such that in the happening of the striving, the essence of each opponent is disclosed. World, in its tendency to bring things into the open, brings earth to presence as ineluctable concealment. The earth, in its self-foreclosing resistance to the lighting of world, shows itself as that which a world is set back upon and brings to light the lighting of world. Through their striving, the essence of both world and earth come into view.

By virtue of this essential striving of world and earth, the work is the sight of the happening of truth. We must recall that Heidegger does not subscribe to familiar theories of truth such as the correspondence theory or the coherence theory. Rather, Heidegger understands there to be a more primordial meaning of truth, without which the correspondence and coherence theories would not be possible. Heidegger’s theory of truth, we recall, is a retrieval and unpacking of the Greek term *aletheia*, which he translates as “unconcealedness.” Consider propositional truth, a term implying that a written or spoken utterance of the form *P is Q* is the locus of truth. Take such an utterance, say, “The rose is blossoming”. We determine the veracity of this proposition by turning our attention to the rose. Are its petals emerging from the bud, from their concealedness? It is only on the basis of unconcealedness that we may recognize the truth of something. But it is only on the basis of concealedness that something may become unconcealed. Thus, truth requires the irresolvable tension or interplay between concealedness and unconcealedness. Heidegger maintains that the truth of a work pertains to making “unconcealedness as such happen in regard to what is as a whole.”
That is to say, reduplicated in the work of art is the movement, constitutive of all happenings of truth, of concealing-unconcealing, which in the work of art takes place as the strife of the self-opening of a world and the self-seclusion of the earth.

**Art and/as Poetry**

The earth and a world are the two essential features that constitute the work-being of a work of art. Through the essential striving of world and earth, the work of art becomes the site of truth. This description of art should presumably hold irrespective of the form of art. Thus it must be squared with Heidegger’s conviction that “All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry.” Just as we took into consideration Heidegger’s task of giving a new content to the word “art”, we must not assume that the familiar concept of poetry is what he has in mind. Our aim in this section is to work out Heidegger’s understanding of poetry and in what respect all art is poetry.

All art is essentially poetry. At first blush one will, without a doubt, object. All art is clearly not poetry. Architecture is architecture. Music is music. Painting is painting. One might try to lessen one’s confusion by reading the “essentially” as a qualification of the claim. “All art is essentially poetry” would then be read to say “all art is more or less poetry”. Yet we do better when we read “essentially” as “in its essence”. All art, then, is, in its essence, poetry. We come closer still to Heidegger’s meaning when we differentiate, as he does, between poetry and poesy. Conflating the two is what led us to bridle at the claim that all art is poetry. Poesy is the artful use of language; “Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day?” “Gather ye rosebuds while ye may…” and the like.
But Heidegger maintains that there is a more expansive and more original sense of poetry.

Whereas language is only one aspect of Dasein’s disclosedness in *Being and Time*, in Heidegger’s later philosophy it is absolutely central, for “[only] where there is language is there world”\(^{81}\). The concept of world, we saw earlier, is one way to mark the singularity of human beings. We are world-forming beings whereas animals are poor in world and rocks and plants are worldless. Thus we are human insofar as language allows us to dwell in the disclosedness of being. And with language comes not only world, but also, it would seem, poetry.

“Poetry,” avers Heidegger, “is a founding by the word and in the word.”\(^{82}\) Founding is the granting of meaning. The poet, in naming something and granting the thing its meaning, allows that thing to come into presence as what it is. Let us turn to the dawn of poetry for an example, namely the fragment of Sappho that reads: “Eros once again limb-loosener whirls me sweetbitter, impossible to fight off, creature stealing up”\(^{83}\). The poetic naming of Eros as sweetbitter, *glukupikron*, allows what was previously an inarticulate yet imperious drive to come into presence as what it is. Phenomenologically speaking, the term ‘sweetbitter’ is more accurate than the familiar ‘bittersweet’ as it does justice to the temporality of desire. Who has not been beatifically intoxicated at first sight? Who would question the characterization of this first state as “sweet”? Yet, once the situation plays out only to reveal that the beloved is spoken for, who would dispute the bitterness of unrequited love (or lust)? Sappho carries out the poet’s task with regard to Eros: “the poet’s naming first nominates beings to that which they are. Thus they
become known as beings.” Thereafter Eros became available for further discussion, for example in Plato’s *Symposium* and Freud’s *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

Let us take a closer look at the relationship between language and poetry. Earlier we discussed world and earth as the two essential components of the work of art. We equated earth with the materiality of the work. Indeed, Heidegger tells us that poetry utilizes “the ‘material’ of language.” But why the scare quotes? They do not suggest an alternative meaning of ‘material’, but rather a revision of the relationship between poetry and language. If poetry takes language as its material, then because poetry requires language, the latter must have logical and temporal priority. Yet Heidegger claims the reverse: “poetry never takes language as a material at its disposal, but instead first makes language possible.” (And therefore only where there is poetry is there world). This claim, however, is only intelligible if we understand poetry to be “the founding of Being in words”. We have already seen that poetry “is a founding by the word and in the word.” We took this to mean that poetry founds beings, granting them their meaning and allowing them to be recognized as what they are. This is correct, but we must now come to terms with the wider reaching claim that poetry – the essence of poetry – is “the founding of Being in words”. For it is only as a consequence of founding being that poetry may found beings, or as Heidegger puts it “Being must be opened so that beings might appear.”

What does it mean to found Being? To approach an answer let us consider Hölderlin, whom Heidegger takes as a paradigmatic example of the poet’s founding of being. According to Heidegger, Hölderlin determines the modern age as “the time of the
gods who have fled and of the god who is coming.” Through the unconcealment of the poetic word Hölderlin allows us to see the present as it is. After one undertakes a serious engagement with his poetry things no longer appear the same, the world presents itself as godless and wanting. The true poet does not have carte blanche to say whatever she fancies. Rather, with her preternatural sensitivity, the poet is able to recognize how things are and to wield language in such a way that grants readers access into the authentic situation. To take another example, not unrelated to Hölderlin, Nietzsche’s madman poetically names the present as unwittingly godless. This brief aphorism has the capacity to color the way that one sees the world. Suddenly pharisaical tendencies of the putatively god-fearing seem more numerous and obvious. Suddenly the religious texts that used to seem so powerful become flat and questionable. The Eucharist no longer appears as the body and blood of Christ, only as a cracker and wine. One begins to interpret natural phenomena such as hurricanes by way of scientific explanations instead of as indications of God’s anger. To found Being is to determine an interpretation of the way things are at a historical epoch (e.g. the death of God or the absence of the gods) such that particular things are understood in light of that far-reaching interpretation (e.g. we come to favor scientific explanations and justifications over religious ones).

We are now equipped to understand Heidegger’s claim that “All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry.” The plurality of the arts is unified by their common essence: poetry. Poetry, as the founding of being and the nomination of beings to their being, is an originary happening of truth,
that is, “the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is”\textsuperscript{93} The poetic dimension of all art is responsible for the fact that art is not only the happening of truth, but also its becoming. It is because it has poetry as its essence that art acquires the potency to play a part in the ever-developing movement of the world. Only because of poetry is the work a site where “the battle of the new gods against the old is being fought.”\textsuperscript{94} In sum, as used by Heidegger, the word “poetry” names the capacity of art to bear an essential relationship to truth.

**Poetic Dwelling**

Heidegger believes art to harbor the capacity to oppose modern technology’s destructive interpretation of reality. This does not entail aestheticizing our lives. That is to say, the proper utilization of art does not call for topiaries in every yard, Picasso prints in every dining room, and haute couture on every body. These uses trade on the vulgar conception of art that Heidegger seeks to overcome. Instead, the authentic and needful juncture between art and our existence Heidegger refers to as poetic dwelling.

The term “poetic dwelling” is taken from Hölderlin’s poem “In Lovely Blueness”, and Heidegger unpacks the concept with reference to its context within the poem. In fact, the presentation of poetic dwelling takes place as an explication de texte, albeit translated into Heidegger’s idiom.

The unfolding of what is named by poetic dwelling hinges on several inversions. Dwelling is not, as common parlance would have it, living in some particular location. Dwelling is not the \textit{where} of existence, but rather the \textit{how}. Additionally, the poetic does not rest upon the foundation of dwelling, but “poetry first causes dwelling to be
Instead of formulating a vocabulary comprised solely of neologisms, Heidegger often prefers to reappropriate common terms and reinvest them with what he takes to be their original meaning. Heidegger believes that if we bracket the everyday signification of the terms and hearken to their deeper content – usually by way of an etymological or phenomenological route – we may disclose a truth more compelling than that of formal logic or meanings bandied about as common sense.

Poetic dwelling concerns the proper manner of existence for human beings. One way this proper manner has typically been thought of is in terms of living in accord with a measure. Kant, for example, counsels a life lived in accord with reason and the moral law. For Aristotle, human beings ought to take the golden mean between excess and renunciation as the measure for proper action. Christianity preaches that a life guided by God’s will, that is, God’s word, is most appropriate for human beings. Heidegger can be understood within this heritage, albeit he diverges in important ways from his predecessors in terms of what the proper measure is and how it is determined.

According to Heidegger, poetry is the taking of the measure for dwelling. The measure is the godhead, or God. Again, as usual, we must leave our baggage at the door and not impute familiar meanings to these saturated terms. God/the gods is that which, while never appearing, nevertheless is manifest. Like Heidegger’s concept of the earth which is drawn into the open as essentially self-secluding, God is manifest as that which remains unknown and mysterious. It is helpful to note a correspondence between language of the divine (e.g. the gods, the heavenly) and Being that runs throughout Heidegger’s works. Thus, the claim that the poet “names the gods and names all things
with respect to what they are.”⁹⁶ is elsewhere formulated as “the poet’s naming first nominates beings to that which they are…Poetry is the founding of Being in words.”⁹⁷ The naming of the gods is the poet’s recognition and putting into language of the interpretation of reality which claims human beings at a particular historical juncture. In other words, the measure for our proper existence is taken from the gods; stated differently, being grants normativity.

How are we – or at any rate, the poets among us – to take hold of this measure? We cannot hope to know the unknown by “seeking to wrest what is concealed out of its concealedness, but only by guarding the concealed in its self-concealment.”⁹⁸ The omnipotent posturing and guidance by the will that characterizes our comportment under modern technology stands diametrically opposed to poetic dwelling. The manner of existence required to take the measure granted by the gods “takes it in a concentrated perception, a gathered taking-in, that remains a listening.”⁹⁹ The receptiveness of poetic dwelling is also described as “a letting come of what has been dealt out.”¹⁰⁰ The poet, the poetic dweller par excellence, recognizes the unknown as unknowable and lets it be as such. The poet “brings the unsayable as such into a world.”¹⁰¹ The poet knows that “there is much in being that man cannot master. There is but little that comes to be known. What is known remains inexact, what is mastered insecure. What is, is never of our making.”¹⁰² In sum, the poet understands human finitude and lives in accord with its consequences.

In light of Heidegger’s belief that modern technology holds sway in our age, the conditions for poetic dwelling are best formulated negatively, that is, in terms of how
they differ from our current manner of existence. We have already intimated that poetic
dwelling consists in part of a letting be. I maintain that another word that Heidegger
uses for “letting be” is listening. Recall that the measure taking of poetic dwelling is
marked by “a concentrated perception, a gathered taking-in, that remains a listening.”
This comes out not only in Heidegger’s explication of poetic dwelling, but also in
Heidegger’s method. For example, it is revealing that Heidegger transitions between
several of the guiding phrases of “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” by advising that
we “listen to” the next phrase. Listening suggests a receptivity to what is present or
being presented, but is not necessarily apparent on the face of things. Whereas hearing
in phrases such as the exasperated “I hear you” connote that one has understood what
was intended to be understood, listening, in spite of the fact that the two are frequently
conflated, has an essentially different meaning. The hortatory “listen closely” asks that
the listener meet the material on its own terms. “You’re not hearing me,” means “you
have failed to understand me.” “You’re not listening to me,” means “you have failed to
put forth the effort required to understand me.” Hearing is tied to material that is heard.
Listening is a manner of existence, a readiness to hear. Consequently, to “remain a
listening” is to comport oneself such that an interpretation is always open to
reinterpretation, to constantly be on the qui vive, to let things be such that one does not
determine what they are but is determined by what they are. Poetic dwelling bears more
than a passing kinship to what Wordsworth called “wise passiveness”: “Nor less I deem
that there are powers, which of themselves our minds impress, that we can feed this
mind of ours in a wise passiveness. Think you mid all this mighty sum of things forever speaking, that nothing of itself will come but I must still be seeking?"[106]

Thus to live in accord with the measure granted by Being or the gods – that is, to dwell poetically – requires of us that we engage in authentic listening. This is more difficult than it may seem. For just as we “never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in the appearance of things…rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen.”[107] it would be equally mistaken to hold that we are ever able to listen to things without some reference being made to previous experience, or, more decisively, the interpretation of reality that claims us. That is why the poet and she with poetic sensibilities does not receive the word of the god with indubitable clarity, but rather by way of “hints [which] are, From time immemorial, the language of the gods.”[108] This is also why the reception of these hints is “a new giving”[109] whereby the poet prognosticates and fleshes out the hints which are fragmentary and merely suggestive. And this is perhaps where the poet and one with poetic sensibilities diverge insofar as the latter remain receptive but mute. But whether one is a poet or one with poetic sensibilities either distinction rests upon a form of listening that is a letting be.

We can see that listening, although underexplored in discussions of poetic dwelling, is essential to the mode of being. Considering the importance afforded to poetic dwelling as an alternative to modern technology it warrants further thought. But before we investigate listening per se, we would do well to examine exactly what is being
listened to. As we have seen, Heidegger believes that art is able to teach us to dwell poetically. To derive this important benefit from art requires that we listen to art.

Above, we attempted to explicate two of Heidegger’s claims about art: that it is the essential striving of world and earth, and all art is essentially poetry. Before turning to a more in depth examination of listening, I would like to further clarify Heidegger’s understanding of art by addressing a misunderstanding that I believe his theory easily gives itself over to.
CHAPTER IV
MARK THE MUSIC

One would be hard-pressed to dispute the status of poetry as an art. From the start the art of language has occupied a position of privilege within the domain of the arts. To adduce but one example of this fact we need only to consider that five of the nine muses were benefactresses of poetry: Calliope for epic poetry, Erato for love poetry, Euterpe for elegiac poetry, Melpomene for tragic poetry, and Polyhymnia for sacred poetry. Consequently, any understanding of art that, intentionally or not, calls into question poetry’s qualification will be, if not suspect then at least worthy of careful scrutiny. It is for this reason that I maintain that Heidegger’s elucidation of art as the essential striving of world and earth, and his subsequent privileging of poetry must give us pause. Meaningful at every turn, the worldliness of poetry – its capacity to disclose particular things in accordance with their ownmost significance – is beyond question. But upon what is the worldliness of language set back? Recalling the nature of Heidegger’s concept of the earth, its explication would require that we overcome the claim that language alone is the seat of all meaning. This, then, is the enigma: what is the earthen component of poetry?

In order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding we must recall that “poetry” operates on two levels in Heidegger’s thought. In one sense, what we might characterize as the ontic or narrow sense\textsuperscript{110}, poetry is understood as the familiar art of language. But in an ontological register “poetry” is also used as a name for the essence of all art to bear
an essential relationship to truth, to “give to things their look and to humanity their outlook on themselves.”\textsuperscript{111} That is to say, art is one of the signal means for determining what things are (i.e. giving things their look) and for reinforcing what is important in life (i.e. giving humanity their outlook on themselves). It is because Heidegger believes that poetry in the narrow sense is the closest relative of poetry in the wider sense that the former, the art of language, is privileged above sculpture, painting, music, and the other arts. Our investigation requires that we move at times from one sense to the other, and so as not to mistake what is at stake, it behooves us to keep in mind whether we are discussing ontic or ontological poetry.

Heidegger’s claim that all art is poetry might mislead one to believe that he associates the meaningfulness of art solely with linguistic significance. However, we shall see that Heidegger’s is an expansive understanding of poetry whose meaningfulness encompasses what he calls the strife between world and earth, or roughly, the relationship between meaning and materiality. But if all art is poetry, then how, precisely, are we to understand not only worldly, linguistic meaning, but, more fundamentally still, the materiality in virtue of which that meaning becomes manifest at all? What is the ultimate condition of the manifestness of art as such? We shall see that musicality is a name that indicates this condition, namely, the condition of the transformation or movement of materiality to manifestness. Because poetry, at least as it is commonly and reductively understood, is ineluctably wedded to world, a turn to music is the most apt avenue through which we can consider the sheer materiality not only of art, but also as the ground of bringing things to appearance, and therefore
meaningfulness. The claim that all art is poetry may too easily miss, even cover over, Heidegger’s insight because it is not the poetic nature of poetry that grants access to radicality of earthenness, but rather its musicality. As we shall see, in music we find an exemplary example of the transformation of materiality to manifestness achieved by art. Encounters with music harbor the possibility of preparing an unfamiliar relationship between Dasein and things, such that things are disclosed otherwise than in an everyday manner. Consequently, music, and art in general, is a means of reenchanteding a world made one-dimensional through its reductive modern technological interpretation. In harkening to the musical aspect of something, that thing’s materiality becomes manifest as such and is seen to form the ground of worldly meaning. Thus musicality becomes a powerful metaphor for thinking about what is at stake in the artistic experience of materiality.

Reading with and against Heidegger my aim will be twofold: first, to enumerate two common misunderstandings that Heidegger’s concept of poetry’s is prone to; and second, to suggest that the introduction of a particular conception of music can both help us avoid the errors as well as see the radicality of Heidegger’s insight. I shall conclude with some reflections on the nature of listening, as conceived by Heidegger, and its ethical significance. In what follows it is not my intent to merely usurp poetry’s throne and crown music the queen of the arts. Nor is my aim to dispute the capital importance that Heidegger affords to poetry and language. Rather, by turning an attentive ear to Heidegger, I seek to demonstrate the conditionedness or groundedness of poetry upon music. The turn to music naturally leads to a consideration of the sense modality
through which it is received. We shall find in Heidegger’s later thought some important reflections on the nature of listening, which will have ethical significance for how we relate to the things we encounter in our everyday lives.

**The Word In Its Everydayness and Historicity**

Heidegger holds an expansive notion of poetry, which cannot be confused with language considered in its everyday use or its historicity. In this section we will look into the everyday conception of words and language in its historicity in order to prepare ourselves to refine our grasp of the singularity of poetry. In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger makes it clear that he considers language to be the material of poetry. Turning to the second essential feature of the work-being of a work of art, the earth, Heidegger points out that when “a work is created, brought forth out of this or that work-material – stone, wood, metal, color, *language*, tone – we say also that it is made, set forth out of it.”\(^{112}\) (my italics). But does language, inasmuch as it is material, function in the same manner as, say, tone or stone? I contend that the reason to conclude negatively is belied by the impossibility of separating words from linguistic meaning while continuing to regard them as words. To use Heideggerian terminology, words qua words are worldly. That is to say, for the most part, our use of and encounters with words concern their capacity to point beyond themselves, to disclose things and structures of the world so as to expand the realm of our know-how. In the exigencies of our everyday practical use of words we tend to take their sensuous appearance for granted. Conversely, in art at least, one may marshal stone, tone, wood, metal, and color such that their sheer materiality comes to the fore. Their material is also their
materiality. By contrast, the materiality of language is not properly linguistic. We shall have to look elsewhere to explain the occurrence of materiality that attends language especially when writ large in poetry, but at this point let us try to make the problem clearer by fleshing out the incongruity between the materiality of words and, to take but one counterpoint, paint.

Determinative of a work of art, in contradistinction to the equipment of everyday use, is the fact that the work’s work-material is not used up but is rather transfigured such that it is able “to come forth for the very first time and to come into the Open of the work’s world.”¹¹³ We can clarify the distinction with a simple example. The paint of a car disappears into pure color. Indeed, we are livid when the very fact that our cars are painted is brought home to us by some untoward scratch revealing the steel beneath. But the agglutinated daubs of Van Gogh, to be sure, take on the appearance of sunflowers yet never relinquish their, for lack of a better expression, paintiness. Van Gogh’s brush strokes do not vanish into verisimilitude. Similarly, the airy, variegated pastel dots of Seurat’s A Saturday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte remember themselves to the viewer who, in her approach, experiences the scene’s transformation from bourgeois recreation to painted fields of color. To borrow the language of metaphysics we would say that in the case of everyday equipment the paint is an accidental attribute of the entity. Painted or not, a car, house, or fingernails remain what they are. With works of art, however, the paint is an essential attribute. The subject painted is not more important than its paintedness. One cannot be reduced to the other. Nor is the paintedness of the painting typically a pudenda origo, for example a concession to
technology’s inability to record the subject more accurately. If this were the case then the whole endeavor of painting would have been superannuated by the invention of the daguerreotype in the first half of the nineteenth century. To the contrary, the paintedness of the painting is in no small part what is noteworthy, valuable, and occasionally contentious about the painting. The controversy instigated by Fauvism or Cubism, for example, did not concern the subject matter of the paintings, which more often than not fell well within established norms. The “what” of the paintings was responsible neither for the awe nor ire that surrounded them; it was the “how” of the rendering of the same still lifes that had occupied artists for centuries. The experiments with clashing colors, with twisted perspectives, with compressing the time-space continuum: these elements—absolutely essential to the paintings inasmuch as they are painted—were not subservient to the subjects that were presented so garishly, so oddly, so challengingly.

In its everyday use, the sensuousness aspect of language resembles the paint of the car more than the paint of the Van Gogh. That is to say, the sound of the language is typically inessential and unacknowledged. What we experience through the use of everyday language is meaning, not sensuous materiality. Language itself is ‘used up’ not ‘used into appearance’. For example, the quotidian request “hand me that pen” disappears into sheer comprehensibility. Its material, the sounds “hand,” “me,” “that,” “pen,” is used up. The recipient of my request need not reflect on its grammatical structure, for the meaning that the request itself is immediately presents itself.

Heidegger’s focus on poetry also cannot be confused with words in their historicity. To illustrate this, consider one of Heidegger’s own favorite philosophical
tools, etymology, which points to the inherently historical nature of language. Earth, however, resists historical determination. As undisclosable, or disclosable only as undisclosable, it “shatters every attempt to penetrate into it.”¹¹⁴ This native resistance is attested to by the fact that “earth” always takes an indefinite article. It is the earth. It is not an earth, or the earth of so and so. World, on the other hand, always refers to some particular world. As the web of relationships, meanings, and norms that obtain for some group of people somewhere and somewhen, world is ineluctably historical.

A closer examination of Heidegger’s use of etymology suggests that, while it serves an indispensable function in his thought, the etymological attitude towards words still privileges significance over non-signifying, albeit meaningful, materiality. Heidegger’s etymological investigations examine the sedimented layers that constitute the history of a given term. In doing so he tries to get at the experiences that form the ground of the saturated terms that are nowadays taken for granted. According to Heidegger, it is not the case that preexisting meanings are simply adhered to words. Rather, the authentic use of language first brings meaning to presence. The poet, for Heidegger, is one who has such an authentic relationship with language. Thus, as we have already mentioned, the poet’s “naming does not consist in something previously known being merely furnished with a name; rather, by speaking the essential word, the poet’s naming first nominates beings to that which they are.”¹¹⁵ In other words, in her act of naming, the poet renders something meaningfully present and therefore available for everyday use. But the history of a given term is typically not characterized by the poet’s careful application. Thus it belongs to the thinker to scrub away the veneer of
obviousness that prevents a word from becoming questionable since the habituation of our ear often leads us to erroneously assume that we understand the experience that a word points to. For example, as we have seen, in “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger tracks the term cause back to its Greek roots. As he sees it, the Greek word aition was translated into Latin as causa without due regard for retaining its corresponding experience. Since causa eventually became the English cause, we are the inheritors of the violence done to the Greek experience of causality as being indebted (sans moralistic connotations). We think of causality as an unaffected affecting that originates in the will of the human being and is realized upon some object external to us. The aberrant heritage of aition is ultimately complicit with the baleful worldview of modern technology. This subversive gesture, of which the aition-causa-cause examination is but one example, in no small part constitutes Heidegger’s plan for a destruction of Western metaphysics whereby a “loosening of the sclerotic tradition and a dissolution of the concealments produced by it”¹¹⁶ is to be effected. By returning to drink from the “original ‘wellsprings’ out of which the traditional categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn”¹¹⁷ we shall secure the possibility of grounding our historical Dasein in an authentic relationship to being. Clearly, etymology and the task in whose service it is used are of great importance in Heidegger’s thought. But here, again, we see the significance characteristic of linguistic practice predominate and ignore the sensuous materiality of words.

We miss the earthenness of the poetic word if we confuse it with the everyday word or the word considered in its historicity. With the everyday word, its worldliness
comes to dominate its earthenness. With the historical word, its worldliness comes to obviate its earthenness. What is it about the poetic word that differentiates it from the everyday word and the word in its historicity?

**The Music of Poetry**

I will not be the first to notice that the difference between the poetic word and its everyday and historical counterparts lies in musicality. Indeed, there is a venerable heritage that has explored this idea. Despite Plato’s censure and strict restriction of the arts in the *Republic*, music and poetry never cease to play an indispensable role in the education of the ideal citizenry. And for Greek culture in general there was a much less sharp demarcation between music and poetry; instead, the two were intimately bound up with one another. This intimacy is well documented in Warren D. Anderson’s study “Ethos and Education in Greek Music” wherein he explains,

The civic theaters were places not of the spoken word alone but of the word sung – of hymn, paean, and dithyramb given added dimension by sounding instruments...All well-omened ritual, whether of the temple or of ordinary life, had its musical element. As the consort of poetry, music was at once the vehicle and determinant of cultural patterns. Through it the Hellene encountered both tradition and innovation from childhood onward, for singing, dancing, and the use of strings or reed pipes gave much of Greek poetry its indispensable setting. To cite another example, one might consider the full title of Nietzsche’s first book: *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*. But what is the nature of this musicality? How are we to come to an understanding of it? Shall we turn on our radios? No, for just as “poetry” assumes a more expansive meaning in Heidegger’s thought, so must an ontological understanding of music be differentiated from its everyday, ontic connotations. But this unfamiliar understanding of music and its everyday
understanding are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary, I believe that the central idea comes out in phenomenological description. We will then proceed by considering the nature of ontic music as well as its relationship to ontic poetry, meaning, and being understood. Then we shall ascend from the ontic to the role that music, construed in a more expansive sense, plays with respect to ontological poetry, which is to say, art.

What is it like to listen to music? Presumably, we all have. It is hard to imagine someone never having heard music. So we all ought to be able to answer the question concerning what it is like. Yet when we try, words prove to be so very inadequate to the task. It is not that nothing can be said. And what can be said is often not inaccurate. But however we end up characterizing our experience, the formulations always seem to lack the touch of definitiveness that we strive for in verbal expression. We find ourselves unable to reduce the experience of listening to music to language. Following Vladimir Jankélévitch, we shall refer to music’s meaningful evasiveness as its ineffability, the fact that music “cannot be explained because there are infinite and interminable things to be said of it”.

Let us motivate this point with an example. Take, for instance, Beethoven’s Moonlight Sonata. Perhaps the first thing we notice is that the piece seems to suggest limits and boundaries to our description, “interpretation,” or “explanation” of it. One could not, we can agree, credibly characterize the music as joyful. And other descriptors would seem to be inappropriate descriptors for any music, for example “sarcastic”. But we would not be surprised to find someone who thought that the Moonlight Sonata was expressive of melancholy and another who judged it to be meditative. Moreover, if we
were a disinterested third party, not only would we be unable to adjudicate the putative conflict, it is all the more likely that we wouldn’t recognize a conflict at all. That is to say, we are not shocked that music is evocative of different affects to different people. We do, however, demand that the accounts given of a particular piece recognize certain elements of them. For instance, in listening to *Moonlight Sonata*, we register as significant the brief modulations into a major key. But again, the precise “meaning” of the shift is deeply ambiguous. Typically major keys are associated with happiness, so one might conclude that departing the dolorous minor key for the major key betokens optimism or redemption. Then again, the modulation can also be experienced, as I for instance experience it, as an intensification of the prevailing mood of the minor key. We can see that, as Jankélévitch nicely puts it, “Music has broad shoulders. In the hermeneutics of music, everything is possible, the most fabulous ideologies and unfathomable imputed meanings. Who will ever give us the lie?”

Music manifestly does not, as words do, tend towards the univocal. But to conclude that because music cannot signify with the precision of words then, on that account, music is not meaningful would be a mistake. Linguistic significance is not the sole seat of meaning. Music too is meaningful, and, as we just saw, this is borne out in our experiences of music. Regardless of whether *Moonlight Sonata* makes me melancholy or meditative, any affective shift is meaningful insofar as it alters the way that I experience the world. Film music is a perfect example of this. Take the most heart-wrenching scene ever committed to celluloid and watch it without sound. The emotional impact is vitiated without the expressive swells and climatic crescendos that
give us subconscious cues concerning how to feel about what we are watching. Other uses of music also indicate its meaningfulness. For example, the capacity of music to alter affect has been noted at least since Pythagoras. And although ancient contentions that certain musical modes, rhythms, and instruments effect individuals in highly specific and predictable ways no longer has much purchase, we still notice the same phenomenon. Athletes psychologically prepare themselves for action with loud, fast, high-energy music. Infants are soothed to sleep by their parent’s gentle, lilting lullabies. Music is also meaningful insofar as individuals come to build a self-image based on what they listen to. Their favorite artists and genres become ballast for their personalities. The beliefs, practices, and lifestyles that we associate with figures such as the Emo high school student, the hippie, and the zoot suit wearing jazz cat have all entered public consciousness.

While the emotional, psychological, and image-creating uses of music are fascinating and point to the meaning that it has for our lives, they are not the aspect of music that I am primarily concerned with. Harkening back to our consideration of *Moonlight Sonata*, I am interested in the fact that music, non-signifying sound, seems to carry meaning that always slips away in our level-headed attempts to pin it down. Thus by “music” I mean non-linguistic sonority that possesses an enigmatic intelligibility. Borrowing terminology from Kant’s *Critique of Judgment*, we might suggest that this intelligibility derives from the appearance of purposiveness that resists definitive determination and yet continually calls out to be determined\(^{122}\). Music is the inchoate, sonorous emergence of sense from sensuousness. As earthy through and through, music
is sound that demands to be listened to as sound. True: a note is itself by differing from other notes. But a note is not, as a word is, a sign, that is, deferred presence. In music, difference may be operative, but *différance* is not. Whereas an assertion is a collection of words that point outside themselves, a piece of music is the self-referential play of pure sensuousness.

Above we discovered that one of the ways in which poetry differs from arts such as painting, sculpture, and music is that the material of poetry is not consubstantial with its materiality. In the sculpted work of art, the stone-ness of the stone obtrudes in its strife with the sculpture’s subject matter. We imagined the paintiness of the Van Gogh and Seurat that accompany our experience of the paintings. But we also conceded that the sensuousness of the language that comprises a poem is not a function of the wordiness of the words. It is rather the musicality of words that impels us to luxuriate in their sensuousness. Those aspects of poetry which are construed as sensuous, or giving expression to its pure materiality— we are thinking here of rhyme, alliteration, assonance— are traces of the musical in the poetic insofar as they concern words not as words (that is, not as signifying entities) but as units of sound. And even poetry that eschews the devices that have traditionally distinguished poetry from everyday language cannot negate the fact that poetry is, at least in part, the valorization of the non-utilitarian, aesthetic dimension of language. Moreover, our inflection, the musicality of our speech, has the power to change the meaning of words. Consider the meaningful difference of the inquisitive “It’s okay?”, the impatient “It’s okay!”, the relieved “It’s okay!”, and the nonchalant “It’s okay.” Poetry, we might say, is part meaning and part music.
We can deepen our understanding of what we have been calling music’s enigmatic intelligibility with resources derived from Heidegger’s thought, namely from his account of the auditory receptivity of human beings. In *Being and Time* all auditory openness – be it listening, hearing, or hearkening – is reliant on understanding. As proof of this conviction Heidegger reminds us of our own experience, namely, that we never hear mere sensations, but when we hear, we always hear *something*. We hear a knock at the door or a jingling of tags announcing the dog’s approach. Even when we mishear, the “hermeneutical as” is still present. I may mistake cats fighting for the sound of a baby crying, but the sensation is always received understandingly. While Heidegger concedes that it is possible to hear sound purely as sound, he notes that this “requires a very artificial and complicated attitude”\(^\text{124}\). Assuming this attitude would then be a mode of being that must be conceived of as both derivative and privative.

Since it belongs to the constitution of Dasein to hear understandingly, when there is nothing to understand we cannot help but impute a specific meaning where, strictly speaking, there is none, supposing, that is, that we take the kind of meaning found in language as the paradigm. I submit that two other factors contribute to meaning’s musical doppelgänger: 1) the internal logic of a piece’s structure, cognized through a recognition of repeated elements, themes and variations upon those themes, and dynamics (which allow for the theme-variation relationship between iterations of the same tone); and 2) as Jankélévitch explains “force of habit, of association and convention, will consolidate…[the] fascinating suggestions [of titles, programmatic associations, and historical imputations] and end by making the plausible meaning
proposed by the composer [or, we should add, the listener] into something that is organically necessary and almost normative.” Thus the enigmatic intelligibility of music is really only the adumbration of intelligibility. Predictability through familiarity or simplicity put a listener’s mind at ease and the sense of inevitability with which the piece is received grants a sense of intelligibility that is isomorphic to that which attends language and visual imagery. But as we saw above, if we were called to give an account of what exactly the music was conveying, the diversity of answers received would give one the impression that each answer was deeply subjective or arbitrary.

How can we contrast the intelligibility of the other arts with intelligibility’s adumbration in music? We might be inclined to make the contrast with the familiar opposition of representational and non-representational art. Yet this oppositional is hierarchical and, as such, surreptitiously carries with it a conception of what art is and does. Representational art carries the baggage of the mimetic theory of art. Art, it tells us, recreates or re-presents what something looks like. Non-representational art simply defines itself as the negation of this theory. We have already familiarized ourselves with Heidegger’s phenomenological rethinking of the nature of art as the essential striving of world and earth. If we are to take Heidegger’s theory seriously and to suss out its adequacy for the explanatory tasks facing the inquirer of art, then it behooves us to work within the conceptual framework that we inherit from Heidegger. All works of art set into work the strife of world and earth. But, while Heidegger does not seem to mention this, the weight placed on each element in different works and different mediums is not
the same. Heidegger’s examples emphasize the worldly aspect of art, but we can imagine a different example where earth predominates: music.

Here we transition from the ontic to the ontological dimension of art. Through the essential striving of world and earth a clearing is secured in which things are able to appear as what they are. This clearing, the Open, is not purely altruistic, for in order to remain open the Open requires that something take up residency in its openness: “there must always be some being in this Open, something that is, in which the openness takes its stand and attains its constancy.”126 (my italics). We can thematize openness as such, but so far as we encounter openness, this encounter is predicated on the openness of some being. This being, whatever it may be, is what we come to understand in our interaction with works of art. We will permit ourselves this simplification127 so as not to become mired in unnecessary details: according to Heidegger, art brings beings to presence as what they are, in accordance with their being. This is the ontologically poetic nature of art. At this point we would entangle ourselves in difficulties were we to think in terms of representationality. Doing so, however, would not only blithely ignore Heidegger’s idiom, it would also confine the meaningfulness of art to the model of linguistic significance.

Music does not bring something of the order of Van Gogh’s peasant shoes or C.F. Meyer’s Roman fountain as shoes or a fountain into the Open for the first time. Music manifestly does not bring any definitive thing to presence. It is the play of pure sensuousness. Then, in what respect does the poetic essence of art exercise its authority on music? What, if anything, is music responsible for bringing into the openness of
meaningfulness? While he never answers this question in full, Heidegger makes an important suggestion in his 1939 lecture course “On the Essence of Language”. His claim, to use our terms, seems to be that music is that which transfigures sound (pure sensuousness) into speech (meaningfulness). Music, as non-representational, does not bring any being into appearance, but it is rather the condition of appearance itself. In “On the Essence of Language” Heidegger describes sound as the “in-between of the there-” that is announced in hearkening, as well as “keeping that preserves – earth of the world”\textsuperscript{128}. Sound is on its way to, but has not arrived at, the openness and meaningfulness that constitutes the there [\textit{Da}] of human being [\textit{Dasein}]. Earlier we noted Heidegger’s conviction that the poet does not merely append a name to an existing being, but rather that in the poet’s naming the being comes into the open for the first time. In “On the Essence of Language” we find a nuanced reevaluation of this position in the claim, “Sound not added to meaning, rather the meaning sounds”\textsuperscript{129}. Here the intermediary of sound finds its interpolation into the process. The being/meaning first comes to presence in the word, but the word first comes to presence as sound. Thus meaning cannot be conceived as secondarily externalized by means of sound. To the contrary, meaning cannot be reductively bound to words, for it is no less sound-bound. Existing as the in-between of the there, and therefore outside of the openness that the there is, it is due to the earthenness of sound that it is able to serve as the foundation of the house of being, language, and consequently for that which is. Or in Heidegger’s words, “Therefore ‘sounding’ is at first a \textit{self-showing as a being, an appearing}, that \textit{lets} appear, but non-objectively.”\textsuperscript{130} ‘Sounding,’ what we have been calling music, appears,
and is therefore meaningful since all appearing is appearing to Dasein and Dasein everywhere encounters the meaningful. But as a non-objective appearing, the meaningfulness of music cannot be reduced to the variety of meaning found in linguistic significance. Heidegger’s claim about the self-showing of sounding also justifies our putting aside of the terminology of representational/objective art and non-representational/non-objective art. Heidegger’s thinking of art in terms of world and earth reaches down to a more primordial level of meaningfulness that prepares the way for thinking in terms of representation or objectivity.

Much like Aristotle’s texts, “On the Essence of Language” comes down to us in an “esoteric” form. That is to say, we only possess Heidegger’s fragmentary notes, not the “exoteric” lecture transcripts. As a result anyone wanting to make sense of the lecture must engage in considerable interpretive work. Due to its merely suggestive form I believe we can explicate Heidegger’s account with an excerpt from Plato. In The Sophist, Plato claims through the mouthpiece of the Eleatic Visitor that “It’s the sign of a completely unmusical and unphilosophical person…To dissociate each thing from everything else [for this] is to destroy totally everything there is to say. The weaving together of forms is what makes speech possible for us” (259e). The weaving together of “names” and “verbs” is constitutive of speech, such that a sequence of unalloyed names (i.e. “lion stag horse [262b]) or verbs (i.e. “walks runs sleeps” [262b]) is not properly speech, but rather “sounds” (262c). We observe, then, that the mark of a musical and philosophical person is not to dissociate everything from everything else, but rather to associate them in such a way as to amount to speech. The role of music in
the constitution of speech is to serve as the ground of meaning, to provide the sounds that, when appropriately woven, give rise to meaning. Departing from Plato, we might develop this line of thought further by proposing that the poetic person, building upon the foundation of her musical know-how, has as her domain the creative marshalling of speech so as to, as Heidegger puts it, bring “what is, as something that is, into the Open for the first time.” In this regard it would be the case that poetry is beholden to the musical as a condition allowing for the possibility of its enactment. It is thanks to musicality that things can be brought to appear at all.

Musicality is our name for, because music is an exemplary case of, the transfiguration of materiality to manifestness that is an indispensable prelude to something’s arrival at meaningfulness. This sense of musicality can be extrapolated to an ontological level. Just as all art is poetry insofar as it brings something into the open of meaningfulness as what it is, all art is also musical in that it effects the transfiguration of materiality to manifestness that allows for appearance, which is to say, meaningful appearance. All art, Heidegger tells us, is the striving of world and earth. Poetry, when ontologically construed, accounts for the striving of the world that presents some being. But the meaningfulness of ontic and ontological poetry inclines to the covering over of the earth’s striving. The introduction of the ontological musicality of art is not some idle addition to Heidegger’s theory. To the contrary, it is latent in the theory, but is all too easily covered over and ignored. Heidegger’s concept of poetry is not mere linguistic signification with musical adornment, rather its essence is constituted by the essential striving of not just world, but no less essentially, earth. By naming the functioning of
the earthen element, as the poet would have it, we shall be less inclined to let it go by unnoticed and we shall be better equipped to acknowledge the constitutive role of materiality in the work of art.

**Listening to the Earth**

As we saw in chapter I, Heidegger is deeply concerned with the contemporary interpretation of the world that he names modern technology. Through the lens of modern technology everything shows itself as mere material. Stripped of meaning, the material entity does not resist our utilization of it according to our will, instead of the thing’s being or meaning. Modern technology reduces something’s meaning to its being material. Consequently the meaning of the thing becomes to stand by and to idly wait for its utilization. But modern technology does not respect the essential self-secluding of the sensuous materiality of things, the fact that earth “shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained.” Despite the fact that modern technology will not countenance the notion that anything, by its very nature, falls outside its purview, Heidegger believes that our attempts to force the earth to show itself are impotent. Given that the behavior encouraged by the modern technological interpretation of the world is improper, what is the proper comportment? In the first and second chapter, we saw that Heidegger believes art to be a means of opposing modern technology. Letting art “save” requires that we come to a proper understanding of what art is, which has been our task in chapter II and so far in chapter III. At the end of chapter II we suggested that what is at stake in poetic dwelling could be unpacked through the motif of listening. And thus far in chapter III we have attempted to clarify the constitutive, and easily over-looked,
role of materiality in the essence of art. In what follows we shall gather together our previously explored themes in order to put forth a provisional solution to the question concerning the use of art in the overcoming of modern technology. We shall suggest that the addition of musical listening to the notion of poetic dwelling both aids in bringing forth the strength and uniqueness of Heidegger’s account of art as the essential striving of world and earth, and also adds to our understanding of the proper Heideggerian mode of relating to things, and more generally, being in the world.

The recognition of the concept of the earth presents an interesting problem. Our encounters with works of art give us to understand that the element of openness in which Dasein exists is inseparable from that which allows for this openness and at the same time threatens it as its negation. The earth is perhaps the most radical otherness that one finds in Heidegger’s thought. It thus becomes a pressing matter – especially for those interested in or skeptical about the ethical dimensions of Heidegger’s thought – to inquire into the limits and possibilities of our relationship with the earth. In a manner of speaking, the earth is what is not our own. We do violence to the earth when we reckon with it on our own terms. When we foist meaning onto it, we deny to the earth its essential self-secluding. But granting to earth what is proper to it requires foreswearing what is proper to us. For, as creatures that are always already understanding, it seems to go against our nature to allow for something to exist out of our grasp. How ought we to relate to the earth given the tragic insufficiency that appears to attend all manners of relating? To simply turn our back on the difficulty is a refusal to confront the problem, not a viable solution.
Any ethical relationship will doubtless have to be one of openness. *Being and Time* distinguishes three existential structures that constitute the openness of the there that Dasein is: attunement, understanding, and discourse. Our foregoing discussion has demonstrated the impropriety of understanding in the domain of the earth inasmuch as the earth essentially resists the worldly illumination that understanding affects. And it will be recalled that while one’s attunement is disclosive of how one bears the burden of the world, we are so affected in spite of ourselves. We do not attune ourselves, we are attuned. Given such impotence our rightful relationship to the earth will not be a matter of proper attunement. That leaves discourse. Naturally our suggestion will not be that we initiate ethical discussions with the earth. But discourse has more to offer us than everyday conceptions of communication, for “Listening...[is a possibility] belonging to discoursing speech.” What, then, would it mean to listen to the earth? To answer this question we must first become clear about what it means to listen at all. Let us begin our consideration of listening with the account found in *Being and Time* before turning to the way Heidegger develops the notion in his later work.

In *Being and Time*, understanding circumscribes the openness of audition: “Dasein hears because it understands.” Earlier we reminded ourselves of Heidegger’s phenomenological justification for this position, that we “hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds.” We also noted that Heidegger admits of the possibility that we hear “acoustical sensations or even mere sounds” but that this requires assuming an artificial and abstract stance. One could argue that this possibility does not even pose a counterinstance to Heidegger’s theory insofar
as the hermeneutical *as*, that mark of Dasein’s incorrigibly interpretive bearing, has only been modified, not effaced: we hear something *as* sound. As a consequence of understanding undergirding auditory openness, pure sensuousness is everywhere sublated by meaningfulness. World remains regnant.

Whereas the scanty discussion of listening, hearing, and hearkening in *Being and Time* centers on the role of understanding, in later works, for example *Logos* (*Heraclitus, Fragment B 50*), Heidegger emphasizes a comportment that grounds the possibility of understandingly hearing. He begins with some characteristic destructive moves, first explaining what hearing is not before turning to what it is. We have heard not at the “activation of the body’s audio equipment”\(^{138}\). Such physiological explanations of hearing, Heidegger believes, result in rarefied accounts that fail to do justice to the phenomenological experience of hearing. Nor have we heard when we “only listen to the sound of a word, as the expression of a speaker”\(^{139}\). So far we have been told what hearing is not, and *Being and Time* informed us of the form that hearing ineluctably takes, but we are still ignorant of the conditions for successful hearing. Heidegger develops his account of the nature of auditory receptiveness by way of some characteristic word plays. “We have heard \([gehört]\),” he explains, “when we belong to \([gehören]\] the matter addressed.”\(^{140}\) Hearing \([Hören]\] is hearkening \([Horchen]\], which, in turn, is to be thought of as being attentive \([Hörchsam]\]. For Heidegger, in order to listen to \([zuhören]\] it is necessary to belong to \([zugehören]\]. Hearkening takes place when we gather ourselves out of the dispersion of the everyday to focus our attention on, to give ourselves over to, to belong to, the matter at hand. Doing so “establishes
[something] as itself,“ it lets something come into presence as what it is by way of this poetic listening.

Based on Heidegger’s account of auditory openness, what would it mean to listen to the earth? Considered from the point of view of *Being and Time*, the question does not seem to admit of an answer. How can what is in its nature un-understandable be understood? The most we could do would be to understand the earth as that which cannot be understood. While this insight brings us to the doorframe of the ethical, it does not take us inside. The active-passivity of listening, as a prelude to hearing, in the *Logos* essay may take us further. Here listening is a matter of comporting ourselves in a certain way. And I think the nature of this comportment may come out the clearest by contrasting it with what it is not.

There is an opposition between two forms of human being that run throughout Heidegger’s thought, all of which are ways of thinking the proper and improper manner of existence for a human being. In *Being and Time* the distinction is between *Eigentlichkeit* and *Uneigentlichkeit*, authenticity and inauthenticity. Note that the German terms center on what is one’s own, *das Eigene*, understood as what is fitting for one as the type of being that one is. After *Being and Time* Heidegger largely drops the terms authenticity and inauthenticity, but never drops what is at stake in them. He is concerned from first to last with thinking through these ethical considerations. In Heidegger’s reading of *The Anaximander Fragment* the opposition is cast in terms of the “defiant man” who, under the sway of modern technology’s enframing gaze, seeks to “arrogate to himself in forms of energy the concealed powers of nature, and to submit
future history to the planning and ordering of a world government.”¹⁴² What is the defiant man defying? He defies being’s subtle call to attend to the event that it is such that one does not become mired in the sheer presence of things or of one’s own existence. By turning a deaf ear to being’s address, the defiant man cannot but live improperly. He will exist unaware of his conditionedness and dependency on things outside himself, and consequently will not think twice about submitting them to the whims of his will. Contra the defiant man we are presented with Kalchas, the seer of Homer’s Iliad. The seer is characterized not just by seeing what is presently present, but “that which will be…and also the being that once was.”¹⁴³ Such vision allows the seer to understand beings as participating in a presence that is shot through with absence, that is, as arriving into unconcealment from out of concealment and, after lingering awhile, passing back into concealment. The seer is cognizant of the ecstatic temporality that is the condition for the possibility of the presence of things and any encounter with them.

In The Anaximander Fragment, Heidegger suggests that the proper comportment towards being takes place through the sense modality of vision. By contrast, in Heidegger’s reading of Heraclitus’ Logos, the ears come to the fore. Here it becomes a matter of maintaining oneself in, as opposed to momentarily assuming, a hearkening attunement [Gehören] that should be conceptualized as belonging to or being attentive to what lies before us. This proper hearing occurs as homologein, Übereinstimmung, accord, agreement, or sympathy. Our response to the call of being, bound up in the proper hearing of the call, is a matter of correspondence.
Listening is a matter of receptivity and correspondence to what is addressed and what is doing the addressing. It stands in stark opposition to the overweening posturing that Heidegger believes to prevail in our contemporary technological attitudes towards nature, things, one another, and most devastatingly, being itself. Given this explication of the meaning of listening, what would it be to listen to the earth? It would mean corresponding to the earthen aspects of existence in the sense of sheltering and guarding earth as earth. It is not a matter of simply not foisting oneself onto things, but rather taking an interest in the maintenance of things as they are. In other words, it is a matter of solicitude and care.

It must be acknowledged that our gloss on the meaning of listening to the earth is not foreign to Heidegger’s own thought. In fact the odd marriage of activity and passivity that listening effects is also contained in Heidegger’s notion of *Gelassenheit*, letting-be. Having one’s hair cut, for example, can ontically illustrate what is at stake in letting-be. *Ich lasse mir die Haare schneiden.* But it is not I who am cutting my hair and therefore having one’s hair cut involves a share of passivity. Similarly, listening can be understood to require the active cultivation of a state of passivity, or the preparation of an availability to being affected. If listening to the earth shares its essential characteristics with *Gelassenheit*, what do our considerations of music and musicality add to the above reflections on ethics?

If Heidegger sees art as a means of correcting the pernicious workings of modern technology then our relationship with art cannot be merely casual, cultural, and
bourgeois. To the contrary, art must be brought to bear on our very existence.

Heidegger’s name for this manner of existence, we saw in chapter II, is poetic dwelling. Poetic dwelling concerns existing in accord with measure derived from the gods. What this ultimately boils down to is taking the directive for our lives from being, as opposed to some derivative and improper source such as our wills. Poetic dwelling, in its concern for the being of things and for being itself, leads us to treat things such as they are in their ownmost meaning. The notion of poetic dwelling is extremely rich and suggestive, but falls prey to our tendencies, discussed above, to reduce the meaningfulness of things to their worldly significance. We have taken pains to demonstrate, however, that Heidegger upholds a theory of meaning that is more expansive than the sort of significance we find in language and visual representation. Meaning, for Heidegger, is reliant on the earth, on the materiality of things, which both suggests and limits possibilities for our use of the thing. In its suggesting and limiting, earth reminds us that what something is cannot be reduced to what we decide or desire it to be. Consequently, the supplementation of poetic dwelling with the idea of musical listening strengthens and clarifies latent elements in Heidegger’s thought. Musical listening requires of us that we attend not only to the being of things. Although, to be sure, Heidegger’s thought demands of us that we be attentive to the proper meaning of things. This is to dwell poetically. Musical listening goes further by asking us to recognize that we are indebted to the earthen materiality of things for their meaningful presence. Musical listening discloses the fact that bringing something forth into meaningful presence requires that one derive the measure for this bringing forth by listening to the earth.
To cultivate musical listening is then one of the ethical demands of our age, the age of modern technology. Instead of viewing ourselves as the lords of the earth, for whom everything exists and waits to be utilized, we ought to comport ourselves differently. To be musical means to let a thing’s materiality show itself as exceeding all meaning. Becoming ontologically musical entails becoming attentive to materiality as materiality, to the musicality of things. Doing so will inure us to the contingency, fragility, and mutability of the meanings that cloak things. This perspective is one of humility. It is true: for Heidegger, Dasein is the seat of meaning, things become meaningful on account of Dasein’s projection of its possibility to be. But Dasein is still dependent, for the realization of her proper dignity – the shepherding of being, the bringing into existence new meanings and heeding those already existent – requires that we be attentive to way that things push back and resist our meanings. One of the ways that things resist us is in their more-ness. The meaning of a thing is not exhaustive of that thing in its material presence. A failure to see this fact cannot but lead to a forgetting of ontological difference. This forgetfulness and the resultant conflation of the thing’s meaning and the thing itself is the origin of modern technology’s failing. Our model, when compared with that of modern technology, has the strength of proceeding from materiality to meaning, thus avoiding the error of taking the two contemporaneously and conflating them. We recognize that materiality undergirds meaning and consequently is excessive. A thing’s materiality stands apart from meaning and therefore is not subservient to it.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

In his controversial 1966 interview with Der Spiegel, Heidegger claims that “technology increasingly tears humans away from the earth”\(^\text{145}\). The statement has both an ontic and ontological dimension. Concerning the former, it is only in the past two and a half centuries that human beings, with the aid of technology, have been able to leave the earth for longer than a leap. What began as brief hot air balloon flights developed into intercontinental journeys in airplanes and reaches its apotheosis in space travel. Heidegger, interestingly enough, claims to have been alarmed by the recently published photographs of the earth as seen from the moon\(^\text{146}\). In addition to our physical distancing from the earth, Heidegger also laments the fact that technology is tearing human beings away from an authentic relationship with nature. As evidence of the fact that we are losing respect for the natural world, Heidegger informs the interviewer that rocket bases are being built in the countryside of Provence. Based on our foregoing reflections, we can also discern an ontological or existential consequence in the claim that humans are being torn away from earth. Technology, the modern technological interpretation of the world, leads human beings to run roughshod over the earthen dimension of things. For how can we care for what we no longer stand in relation to, what we have been torn away from? Art, on the other hand, as the essential striving of world and earth that wrests us from our everyday relation to things is able to serve as a reminder that meaningfulness is a function not only of the openness of world, but no less
of the self-secluding of earth. We saw in chapter II that poetic dwelling requires of us that we interact with things guided by a measure derived from the things themselves, not from our wills. Poetic dwelling leads us to treat things in accord with their meaning. But we also saw in chapter III that our everyday experience of meaningfulness, which understands meaning out of the paradigm of linguistic significance, tends to cover over the more expansive sense of meaningfulness that Heidegger finds in the work of art. Consequently, we have called for the cultivation of musical listening, a comportment that attends to the material dimension constitutive of meaning. Musical listening also contributes to the overcoming of modern technology insofar as it reminds us that there is an inexhaustible more-ness to the materiality of things that cannot be reduced to the sheer presence of standing-reserve.

The notion of musical listening raises questions for further research, especially, and not surprisingly, in the domain of the philosophy of music. For example, what existential insights can different types of music disclose to us? Above all I have in mind the question of what can be learned from improvised music that cannot be gleaned from composed music. My suspicion is that insofar as improvisation shows itself to be a condition for the way that human beings interact with the world and one another, it will contain a wealth of potential ethical insights. Here I shall merely gesture towards the ontic space in which such an investigation would take place. The Western musical tradition has privileged the composed over the improvised, the law-abiding over the putatively lawless. As such, the rules that govern the interaction of musicians have customarily been strictly laid out and have mediated interaction by way of musical texts
such as the symphonic score. In reading from a score, the mass of musicians whose collective playing results in the realization of a symphony have before them, in advance and in pain-staking detail, their every move. The melodic, rhythmic, and dynamic dimensions of music making are decided for them, leaving the individuals with few decisions to make and consequently little freedom. But improvised music reduces the number of rules that guide interaction between the musicians. Consider, for instance, a jazz quartet. Someone calls a tune, a key, and in counting it off indicates the tempo at which it will be played. The musicians are bound by the harmonic framework that constitutes, for example, *All the Things You Are*. But while jazz improvisation is not lawless it does call for self-legislation, for even with a determined tune, key, and tempo, professionals are at liberty to throw in chord substitutions or even reharmonize vast stretches of the tune, and whichever musician is responsible for presenting the tune’s melody may liberally insert flourishes and digressions that serve no indispensable role in making the melody recognizable. Not only does improvisation figure into the relatively determined aspects of jazz performance, the lion’s share of a performance is dedicated to “pure” improvisation. At that point, closeness of listening – here musical listening reenters – and quickness of response become the paramount virtues. We can see that the greater the element of improvisation, which translates to the degree of ambiguity, in a musical event the more of a role that individual’s judgment plays. Life, especially ethical life, it seems to me is distinguished by this very need to act and continually adjust *en passant*.
Our work also calls for inquiry into the other roles of music in the disclosedness of art. As we have seen, the role of music is most conspicuous in poetry and our investigation has by no means exhausted the possibilities. We could still look into the role of rhyme in the truth revealed by poetry. We might consider in greater depth the way in which pronunciation is able to shed light on unrecognized dimensions in the meaning of words, as scholars who try to reconstruct historical pronunciations are now discovering with respect to Shakespeare’s œuvre.

We have claimed that music exemplifies the disclosedness belonging to the materiality of art, insofar as it is the art form in which earth is the most emphasized. But do different materials each have something unique to disclose? Does our discussion of music fall prey to the same reductive tendencies that we worried interpretations of poetry do? We might follow this thread by turning to the French phenomenologists who composed penetrating studies of individual painters, for example Maurice Merleau-Ponty on Cezanne or Michel Henry on Kandinsky. Or we could continue with Heidegger by considering his notes on Paul Klee.

Finally, our work contributes to contemporary discussions about the meaning of *ethos*. The notion of musical listening calls for nothing less than a new ethic of existence. While this ethic seeks to affect a shift in the way that we relate to things, the implications are further reaching. We have seen that the overcoming of modern technology requires of us that we not relate to things as standing-reserve with no higher purpose than yielding maximum benefits for the minimum cost. Coming into relation with entities not as standing-reserve, not as objects, but as *things* is the beginning of the
project of overcoming modern technology. We have shown that this ethical task is in no small part created by the musicality of material life. The goal, to become less alienated, is consanguine with other contemporary schools of thought that see the present as wanting.
NOTES


2 For the precise Heideggerian significations of “idle talk” and “publicness” cf. §35 and §27, respectively, of *Being and Time*.


4 In the German tradition, this heritage includes Hölderlin, Schelling, and Hegel before Heidegger; and Gadamer and Adorno after Heidegger.


7 Ibid., 4-5.

8 Ibid., 7.

9 Ibid., 8.

10 Ibid., 10.

11 Ibid., 9.

12 Ibid., 8.

13 Ibid., 11.

14 Cf. *Being and Time* §44(a).


16 For Heidegger’s rich and fascinating account of truth as unconcealment cf. *Being and Time* §44(a) and (b).


18 Ibid., 8.

19 Ibid., 12.

20 Ibid., 14.


24 The word “stell” is also found, albeit rarely, in English. For example, take the first two lines of Shakespeare’s Sonnet 24:

Mine eye hath played the painter and hath stelled
Thy beauty’s form in table of my heart…

The word appeared as “steel’d” in the First Quarto before being altered by, Shakespeare editor, Edward Capell in the 18th century (he thought it more accurately captured the message). The thrust of my example remains unshamed, although it is admittedly disappointing that the Bard himself did not call upon the verb. Cf. William Shakespeare, The Sonnets, ed. Jonathan Bate and Eric Rasmussen (New York: Modern Library, 2009), 199.


26 Ibid., 21.

27 Ibid., 4.

28 Ibid., 3.

29 Ibid., 23.

30 Ibid., 24.

31 Ibid., 24.

32 Ibid., 25.

33 Ibid., 25.

34 Ibid., 25.


36 Ibid., 26.

37 Ibid., 26.

38 Ibid., 27.


41 Ibid., 14.

42 Ibid., 27.


44 Ibid., 28.
Heidegger very well might have included Descartes as one who inherited and renewed the ascendency of thinking essence as that which persists. This discussion can be found in §19 of *Being and Time*.

This myth is often read as a cautionary tale: Marsyas’ hubris in challenging a god to a contest results in his being flayed. I beg to differ. As we shall soon see Marsyas was indeed the superior musician. His estimation of himself in relation to Apollo’s ability was accurate. Marsyas’ hubris was disregarding Athena’s warning that whoever picked up her discarded aulos would be severely punished.


69 Cf. *Being and Time* page 65 for the precise meaning of “innerwordly”. In “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger actually claims that “Plant and animal...have no world; but they belong to the covert throng of a surrounding into which they are linked.” (43). However in his lecture course “The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics” (1929-30) Heidegger makes the less extreme claim that animals are poor in world, whereas stones (and presumably, plants) are worldless.


71 Ibid., 40.

72 Heidegger treats the disclosure of the worldliness of the world in *Being and Time* §16 on “The Worldly Character of the Surrounding World Announcing Itself in Innerworldly Beings”.


74 Ibid., 42.

75 Ibid., 48.

76 Ibid., 47.

77 Ibid., 47.

78 Cf. above p. 18-19 for a discussion of Heidegger’s concept of truth.

79 Ibid., 54.

80 Ibid., 70.


85 Ibid., 119.

86 Ibid., 125.

87 Ibid., 124.

88 Ibid., 124.

89 Ibid., 124.

90 Ibid., 123.

91 Ibid., 128.

93 Ibid., 70.
94 Ibid., 42.
96 Heidegger, “Hölderlin,” 123.
97 Ibid., 123-124.
99 Ibid., 221.
100 Ibid., 222.
102 Ibid., 54.
103 Heidegger, “Poetically,” 221.
104 Heidegger, “Hölderlin,” 119, 123.
105 Heidegger, “Poetically,” 221.
109 Ibid., 127.
111 Ibid., 42.
112 Ibid., 44.
113 Ibid., 45.
117 Ibid., 20-21.
It is an open question whether it would be possible to develop a satisfactory, or at least more satisfactory, vocabulary capable of giving better expression to our experience of music. Minimally, this vocabulary would have to be less indebted to terms that are properly visual and spatial.

Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Music and the Ineffable*, trans. Carolyn Abbate (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 72. It is important to distinguish Jankélévitch’s concept of ineffability from Heidegger’s. For Jankélévitch, to be ineffable means to be incapable of being exhausted by language. For Heidegger, on the other hand, that which is ineffable seems to be what cannot be spoken of. However, by Heidegger’s account, ineffability is not the final word, as it were, on something. As the Guide from the “Triadic Conversation” of Heidegger’s *Country Path Conversations* notes “For us much is often ineffable, but only because its name has not yet come to us.” This is Iain Thomson’s translation from his “Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 20 fn. Recall that, for Heidegger, the poet is one who brings something into being by naming it. The poet would then be the one who makes what was ineffable effable. We might add that the proper realm of the musician would be the realm of ineffability, without pretense or desire to bring the ineffable into effability.


For Kant on purposiveness, cf. the Third Moment in the Analytic of the Beautiful from the *Critique of Judgment*.

We would betray a misunderstanding of Heidegger, though, were we to claim that music is what separates the poetic from the prosaic. According to Heidegger, there is no necessary distinction considering that “Language itself is poetry in the essential sense [from which poetry in the narrow sense – poesy – is derived].”

Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 158.


It would be a mistake to reduce works of art to the presentation of some being. Consider Heidegger’s claim that works of art make unconcealedness as such happen, cf. “Origin,” 54


Ibid., 94.

Ibid., 95.

As Thomas Sheehan puts it, “human being is pan-hermeneutical…We can make sense of whatever we meet (even if only interrogatively), and if we cannot make any sense of something, we cannot meet it.” Cf. Thomas Sheehan, “Astonishing! Things Make Sense!” *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual*, 1 (2011): 16.

133 Ibid., 71.


135 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 156.

136 Ibid., 158.


139 Ibid., 66.

140 Ibid., 66.

141 Ibid., 66.


143 Ibid., 34.


146 “I do not know if you were alarmed, but I was just recently alarmed when I saw the pictures of the earth taken from the moon. We do not need an atomic bomb at all; the uprooting of human beings has already taken place.” Ibid., 325.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


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