THE LOST SOUL OF THE BODY POLITIC

A Dissertation

by

JESSE ALLEN CHUPP

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 2012

Major Subject: Political Science
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Approved by:

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ABSTRACT

The Lost Soul of the Body Politic. (May 2012)

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The modern nation-state is the product of a gradual process in which the religiously concerned medieval political and ecclesiastical synthesis became more secular and centralized. Mirroring this external institutional development, the theoretical conception of the state changed from one of a natural organic unity of diverse corporate members, often described metaphorically as a Body Politic, to a consent-based compact among atomized individuals. This change can be traced in the Body Politic metaphor of four authors: John of Salisbury, Christine de Pizan, Johannes Althusius, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In this project, I argue that the Body Politic metaphor, particularly the inclusion or exclusion of a soul of the Body Politic, is uniquely appropriate for capturing the complexity of political life in general across differing levels of aggregation and for elucidating the political and religious commitments of the authors who employ it, as they critique their own contemporary political and religious institutions and describe their ideal societies. In the conclusion, I suggest that the loss of a strongly organic conception of the state has denied modern society and political theory a well established means for recognizing and integrating corporate entities and for explaining the existence of the modern nation-state in any kind of transcendental moral context, thus the lost soul of the Body Politic.
This work is dedicated to my Family,
whose love, patience, and sacrifices
made it possible.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my committee chair, Cary Nederman, for the manifold ways in which he provided this project with inspiration and guidance, and my committee members, past and present, Ed Portis, Robert Harmel, Judith Baer, and Leah DeVun, for their patience and thoughtful suggestions. Thanks also to the Department of Political Science office staff, especially Carl Richard, Carrie Kilpatrick, Lou Ellen Herr, and Dianne Adams, whose many helps were invaluable to this project and other situations over the years.

Thanks also go to my many colleagues and friends among the cohort of graduate students in the Department of Political Science at Texas A&M University and in other departments as well. Their professional and personal contributions to my graduate experience and this work are too numerous to list individually. However, special thanks are due to Phillip Gray for his mentoring me as a novice political theorist and to Robert Puckett, David Rossbach, Nathan Ilderton, and Tyler Johnson for putting up with the good and the bad from me for so many years.

Thanks to my parents, Greg and Ruth Chupp, for their love, help, and direction, and to my in-laws, Jim and Geri Elsberry, for their many considerate gestures of support. Many thanks are due as to all my siblings, my wife’s siblings, and their families, especially Robert and Jennifer Puckett, for their help and support during the time that
this work was completed.

Finally, thanks to my wife, Sarah, for her love and patience with me and this project, and to our children, James, Jack, and Caroline, for making my life so full of love and meaning.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The modern nation-state, the current dominant expression of the Body Politic, is the heir to the following development regarding the theory and motivation of political and religious institutions: the ancient Greeks and Romans ordered society towards political justice and virtue, and political religion and its officers were concerned primarily with inculcating civil allegiance; this social arrangement occurred first in the Body Politic of cities and then, later, in empires. Christian civilization, especially in Western Europe, retained some of the political institutions of the classical period but added an otherworldly teleology of the soul as the ultimate concern of human life and created a synthetic religious-political construct commonly called the Two Swords in which priests exercised a much more prominent position than they did in the classical institutional order. In this period, the Body Politic was thought to repose in local political sovereignties but also, even if only mystically, in the entire Christian community under the spiritual administration of the Chief Christian Pastor, the Pope. The Reformation nation-states, the precursors of the modern structure of the Body Politic, retained the Christian religious motivations of the medieval theory but collapsed the religious-political authority into the hands of national sovereigns, thus returning religious officials to a position of political subservience. These political sovereigns, after an initial phase of religious vigor and conflict, became so manifestly disinterested in the otherworldly

This dissertation follows the style of the *American Political Science Review*. 
element of Christian religion that the political theory of the modern nation-state came to repose its philosophical legitimacy upon the consent of the governed as political citizens only, instead of as Christians in political agreement, and sometimes conflict, while in pilgrimage to the next life. The secular modern nation-state, the modern Body Politic that abrogates any explicit positive religious commitments or concern for the destiny of souls, is the product of this historical and theoretical development. Thus, two of the main components of the original project of Western Civilization, concern for the soul and the public acknowledgment and promotion of human goods that transcend politics, have been lost to the life of the modern Body Politic.

The entirety of this political, cultural, and religious story is impossible to describe in the course of a dissertation, but the germ of this development can be seen in the medieval Catholic Christian political theories of the Body Politic of John of Salisbury and Christine de Pizan, the Reformed Protestant Christian political theory of Johannes Althusius, and the early modern secular political theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Specifically, I will argue: that John's medieval Body Politic metaphor represented the organic, and sometimes ambiguous, relationship of the political and religious realms that took seriously the Christian understanding of the soul’s origin and destiny; that Christine's removal of the soul, the clergy in John's designation, from the Body Politic metaphor and her French nationalism subtly weakened the medieval political and religious synthesis, even though her work displays a large degree of Catholic devotional piety and even an endorsement, though tepid, of the sacramental necessity of priests;
that the Reformed Christian political theory of Althusius, which can be understood as an analogue to the Body Politic metaphor, though stripped of its unifying principle, is Christian in name but not by necessity since its focus is ultimately secular as implied by his subjection of the ministers of religion to the civil power, his complete abrogation, as a Calvinist Protestant, of the hagiographic elements in John and Christine, and his severe diminishing of the sacramental life; and that Rousseau’s General Will theory, another conceptual device related to the Body Politic, is an attempt to recover the moral consensus that the organic medieval synthesis fostered minus any specific religious commitment other than a nod to the ability of religion to foster civic loyalty in the classical sense. Concern for the salvation of souls, so explicit in John's theory, is absent from Rousseau's. Before moving to the thinkers just mentioned, I will discuss the Body Politic metaphor generally, first by describing the political ambiguity that necessitates such conceptual devices and then by an examination of the actual use of the Body Politic metaphor by other scholars. In so doing, I will offer a brief historical interpretation of the classical and early medieval political circumstances in which these ideas and institutions were fleshed out. Following this introduction, which provides the conceptual and historical background for my first author, John of Salisbury, I will turn my attention to the textual development that I propose to trace in the four authors just mentioned. Finally, I will conclude with an appraisal of the future prospects of the modern nation-state, as a Body Politic with a lost, or at least problematic soul, in light of the foregoing analysis.
From the earliest attempts at its description, political life has resisted classification. Social relationships are ubiquitous and impossible to deny, but nearly every such relationship contains unique elements that make generalized, systematic descriptions difficult (Barnes 1924). The biological family of mother, father, and siblings is often thought to be pre-political or, perhaps better, more than political with its intense familiarity and emotional attachments (Lasch 1977). The small village and the large city have certain similarities, such as the contiguous proximity of neighbors, but cities have the added characteristic challenges of large absolute populations and increased population densities (Robson 1955). The ancient multi-city empires resemble modern nation-states in size but not in their self-conceptions of the rights of members and the legitimacy of their institutions (Wimmer and Min 2006). Additionally, every society, large or small, must have a principle of identity that works to promote cohesion and cooperation; while such identities have broad similarities, each specific society has its own that distinguishes it from others (Mackenzie 1978; Norton 1988). Finally, the general complexity of human interaction, taken by itself, makes exact description difficult to formulate and communicate; since each human relationship is unique, the act of communicating its attributes will be prone to introduce misunderstanding as each person has a unique frame of reference for such relations: “The meaning of a metaphor is the product of an interpretation of an utterance in a given context. Its meaning is thus inherently unstable given the variety of possible contexts” (Rayner 1984, 537). Thus, political theorists are in need of conceptual metaphors, like the Body Politic, capable of expressing the characteristics of complex social relations in parsimonious and
meaningful ways.

The Body Politic metaphor, in which a particular community is described as an analog to a discrete, living person is a powerful concept that can capture the political life of several social relations: the family, the city, and the larger, geographically distributed state, or empire. While these different levels of social aggregation require different institutions, the Body Politic ascribes an organic and teleological character to each that allows similarities to be compared while minimizing differences; a body has an origin, differentiation of function by part, and a goal, viz. to thrive. The origin of the body implies growth from simplicity and smallness to diversity and largeness and an urge to procreate: “Every state needs to reproduce itself biologically, materially, and spiritually” (O’Neill 1985, 82). But why do political theorists need to speak in such a tangential fashion about the nature and characteristics of the political community? The use of political metaphors, like the Body Politic, points to the difficulty of providing a simple and direct characterization of the political community.

The ability of the Body Politic metaphor to synthesize unity and diversity has been noticed by scholars (Goggans 2005; Barkan 1975). Less noticed has been the two main concrete political realities to which the Body Politic has been brought to bear: the shift from the tribal Hellenic civilization to the Greek polis and the transformation of the fracturing Roman Empire into sacramental Christendom. Plato and Aristotle used the Body Politic to capture the unity and diversity that made the nascent Greek polis,
although clearly different from the personal rule of tribal monarchy, difficult to characterize under a simple description. The imperial Greeks, under Alexander and his heirs, and the later Romans, in their consolidation of the Hellenistic Mediterranean civilization, sought to expand the conceptual category of the polis to an Empire of universal citizenship. The Body Politic suffered under this stretching as it was difficult to provide a unifying principle that could synthesize so broad a diversity of cultures and institutions, although Cicero and other Stoics made significant attempts at this extension. Finally, the Christian appropriation of the Body Politic, first for the Church and then for the Christianized Roman Empire, especially in papal-dominated Western Europe, provided a unity under the mystical Body of Christ that was capable of overcoming, and perhaps overwhelming, the superficial diversity of local customs and political institutions. In general, the use of the Body Politic metaphor was modest in early and late classical periods compared with its later explosion of meaning and application in the Christian civilization and its later appropriation by early modern theorists. I will trace this growth in social and conceptual complexity starting with the dispute between Aristotle and Plato about the character of the polis and its debt to the family relation.

The family, both in the nuclear form and its extension by biological development over generations into the consanguineous tribe, is a natural starting point for an investigation of the political relation. Aristotle describes tribes as a pre-political form of human association because he agrees that within tribes there are not the differing conceptions about the nature of human flourishing and the good life that exist across tribes, “who are
said to be suckled with the same milk” (Aristotle 2001, 1128), the milk signifying the common mind and goals of the tribe. Friendship forms the basis of human association for Aristotle (2000, 90). Agreement and shared understanding form the bases of friendship. Naturally, our families are our closest friends because of all people they are the ones with whom we have the most common understanding. In fact, the shared understanding in the family and tribe is so strong that Aristotle considers the fact of family friendship to be almost trivial or so obvious that it does not require a strong demonstration other than the strong one already provided by nature and obvious to every person from a family. For he says, “it is…more terrible to wound a father than anyone else” (Aristotle 2001, 1068), as if to imply that the bond of father to son is so strong and sacred that it is manifest injustice to injure or fail to help one’s father or parent. The polis and politics, for Aristotle, arise when a group of tribes or non-blood related persons find some common understanding that is capable of making them wish to associate permanently.

Although this mutual understanding is sufficient, for Aristotle, to form the polis, it is not sufficient to make the polis a family or tribe. Disagreement with Plato’s attempt to make the kallipolis a tribe or family forms the heart of Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s political ideal in Book II of the Politics. The polis arises out of the association of several families, tribes, and villages (Aristotle 2001, 1128). However, since, for Aristotle, justice is reduced by the lessening intensity of friendship, justice in the polis must be less than justice in the tribe: “and the demands of justice also seem to increase with the
intensity of the friendship, which implies that friendship and justice exist between the same person and have an equal extension” (Aristotle 2001, 1068). Since the degree of justice is reduced by lessening degrees of friendship, Aristotle does not expect a polis to exhibit perfect justice, unlike Plato, since its basis is a less intense friendship than the family and tribe. Plato remains committed to the family understanding of the polis and makes it the basis of his perfect city, the kallipolis.

Plato’s kallipolis, the perfect city of his Republic, has several enigmatic features: a rigid tripartite classification of citizen roles, common property, absence of marriage and parenting by biological parents, at least for the ruling class. In fact, Plato suggests that his city is not a city but rather a large family; speaking of the guardians of the city he says, “For everyone whom they meet will be regarded by them either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or daughter, or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with him” (Plato 1942, 351). Aristotle criticizes Plato’s construction as impractical and a logical error: he mistakes the city for the family and thereby destroys the natural character of each. For Aristotle, the family equips the citizen with certain necessities for entering the political relation: the material necessities of life, preparation for rule and command, and the human material for the next generation of citizens through procreation. The family is indispensable for the political association but it is not the political association. While Aristotle concedes that Plato is attempting to foster unity in the political association, he characterizes it as an excess of unity (Aristotle 1981, 107). I believe that Plato was indeed seeking to make a family of the city because it would
solve several difficulties of the political association that he characterizes later in the *Republic*. His familial citizen psychology will foster a strong patriotism; “and so, their country being their mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for her good, and to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers” (Plato 1942, 303). This use of the political as worthy of family devotion is not shocking to most political theorists; the very word patriotism implies allegiance to fathers and ancestors. Perhaps Plato’s boldest usage of the family dynamic in his city comes when he asserts that a community of children will obviate the jealousies and difficulties fostered by status and political inheritance. Plato recognizes that the traditional family expects its children to inherit or practice the same political status as the parents. However, Plato asserts that the progeny of his citizens are not guaranteed to occupy the same position as their parents; “and the species will generally be preserved in the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son” (Plato 1942, 303). By removing the traditional family relation for conception and child rearing, Plato means to make the harmony of the city the only test for citizen development. Since the city is now the family, every family member will have an equal dignity regardless of the functional role he plays.

Aristotle understands Plato’s motivation, namely, the strengthening of the political association, but he argues that the two are of different natures and the good of one is not identical with the other. In fact, Aristotle argues that, by making the polis a family and
by distributing the family relation throughout, Plato actually destroys both the proper function of the family and the polis in the training of citizens. “Whereas in a state having women and children common, love will be watery; and the father will certainly not say 'my son,' or the son 'my father’” (Aristotle 1981, 111). Far from inspiring a stronger love between citizens, Aristotle believes that Plato will destroy the necessary love and affection of the traditional family. Additionally, even if such a plan were effected, it would be impossible to prevent biological parents, children and siblings from discovering each other (Aristotle 1943, 84). Thus, Plato’s plan, according to Aristotle, is unworkable and contrary to nature. For Aristotle, citizens can only feel the bond of political affection for fellow citizens; they cannot and should not feel the same love for fellow citizens that they experience towards members of their families.

Although Plato and Aristotle had different conceptions of the meaning of the political relation within a city, they both were able to utilize the Body Politic metaphor to provide an heuristic unity (Goggans 2004, 532; Mussolff 2010, 81). Both understood that the state, in this case the city-state of the polis, must bring its diverse members into a coordinated whole. To them, the human body represented, in a singular way, the coordination and harmony necessary: “Is not that the best-ordered state...which most nearly approaches the condition of the individual – as in the body? (Plato 1942, 350). Additionally, Plato makes many arguments in the Republic relating health in the polis to health in a body: he uses the metaphor to describe the power of injustice: “Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever she takes up her abode,
whether in a city, in an army, in a family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin
with, rendered incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction; and does
it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and with the just?”
(Plato 1942, 249); to describe the normal state of health: “The creation of health is the
institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the body;
and the creation of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this
natural order?” (Plato 1942, 330); to describe the use of remedies: “Because, I said, our
rulers will often have to practise upon the body corporate with medicines. Now you
know that when patients do not require medicines, but have only to be put under a
regimen, the inferior sort of practitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when
medicine has to be given, then the doctor should be more of a man” (Plato 1942, 346);
and to describe the identity fostered by political unity:

And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest number of
persons apply the terms 'mine' and 'not mine' in the same way to the same
thing?...Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the
individual --as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the
whole frame, drawn towards the soul as a center and forming one kingdom
under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together
with the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his finger; and
the same expression is used about any other part of the body, which has a
sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the alleviation of
suffering...And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as
was implied in our own comparison of a well-ordered State to the relation of the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain? (Plato 1942, 350).

For Plato, the State can fall ill like a body:

In a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external provocation a commotion may arise within-in the same way wherever there is weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which the occasions may be very slight, the one party introducing from without their oligarchical, the other their democratical allies, and then the State falls sick, and is at war with herself; and may be at times distracted, even when there is no external cause (Plato 1942, 445).

And it can require drastic, health-restoring measures: “These two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are generated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good physician and lawgiver of the State ought, like the wise bee-master, to keep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in; and if they have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and their cells cut out as speedily as possible” (Plato 1942, 454). Even tyrants, says Plato, understand the means, analogically related, if opposite, to that used by doctors, to keep the State in the condition that they wish to achieve:

And the tyrant...must look about him and see who is valiant, who is high-
minded, who is wise, who is wealthy; happy man, he is the enemy of them all, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no, until he has made a purgation of the State...not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the body; for they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he does the reverse (Plato 1942, 458).

Aristotle agrees that the polis can be understood, analogically, as a living body: “The state has priority over the household and over any individual among us. For the whole must be prior to the part. Separate hand or foot from the whole body, and they will no longer be hand or foot except in name...” (Aristotle 1981, 60). And again when describing the elements of the political community, Aristotle compares the state to a living body while introducing the idea of the soul of the state, a concept central to this project: “A state is made up of unlike parts. As an animate creature consists of body and soul, and soul consists of reasoning and desiring, and a household consists of husband and wife, and property consists of master and slave, so also a state is made up of these and many other sorts of people besides, all different” (Aristotle 1981, 180). He further extends the idea of the soul and body in relation to the political community in his commentary on Plato's four-fold division of citizenship: “If the soul is to be regarded as part of the living creature even more than its body, then in states too we must regard the corresponding elements as being parts in a fuller sense than those which merely conduce to utility and necessity: I mean such things as the fighting force and all those connected with the judicial administration of justice” (Aristotle 1981, 247-248). For Aristotle, the
body metaphor helps to insure proper proportion: “The body consists of parts, and all increase must be in proportion, so that the proper balance of the whole may remain intact, since otherwise the body becomes useless, as would happen if feet four cubits long grew on a body two spans high, or if the body were to change into the shape of some other animal, because of disproportion in the kind of growth, not only in the amount. So too a state consists of parts, one of which may increase without being noticed” (Aristotle 1981, 303). And proportion is related to beauty:

A nose which deviates from the perfect straightness by being either hooked or snub is till a fine nose and looks good as well; but if the process is carried to excess, first it will lose the proportion which belongs to this part of the body, and finally it will not look like a nose at all, because of the extreme to which either the hook or the snub has been pushed at the expense of its opposite; and this is true of other parts of the body also. So it is with constitutions (Aristotle 1981, 330).

While not to the same degree as the later Christian conception of the Body Politic, Plato and Aristotle anticipate, to some extent, the importance of the soul to the human person and to the Body Politic, by analogy. Plato sees the soul as the director of virtue in the body: “Now my belief is...not that the good body by any bodily excellence improves the soul, but, on the contrary, that the good soul, by her own excellence, improves the body as far as this may be possible. What do you say?” (Plato 1942, 291). He understands the soul to learn in a matter comparable to the physical sight: “Our argument shows that the
power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good” (Plato 1942, 403). In Books IX and X of the Republic, Plato makes arguments strikingly similar to those of later Christian philosophers regarding the soul: “Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of the soul? ...And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?..What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real existence and is less real?” (Plato 1942, 470). In the last book of the Republic, in which he is arguing for the immortality of the soul, as he did in the Phaedo (Plato 1942, 104-110), Plato argues for an understanding of the soul and body that reminds the reader of the Christian injunction (Mark 8:36) against gaining the material world but losing one's soul:

What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and health, in proportion as the soul is more honourable than the body...To this nobler
purpose the man of understanding will devote the energies of his life. And in the first place, he will honour studies which impress these qualities on his soul and disregard others?...In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to attemper the body as to preserve the harmony of the soul? (Plato 1942, 475-476).

Although Aristotle does not directly assign an element of the political community the role of the soul, his compounding of the two in his discussion of the Body Politic is provocative, especially as he makes clear that the body exists for the excellence of the soul. This is evident in terms of the character of goods of the body and soul:

For, whereas external goods have a limit, like any other instrument, and all things useful are of such a nature that where there is too much of them they must either do harm, or at any rate be of no use, to their possessors, every good of the soul, the greater it is, is also of greater use, if the epithet useful as well as noble is appropriate to such subjects. No proof is required to show that the best state of one thing in relation to another corresponds in degree of excellence to the interval between the natures of which we say that these very states are states: so that, if the soul is more noble than our
possessions or our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either has a similar ratio to the other. Again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and goods of the body are eligible at all, and all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul, and not the soul for the sake of them (Aristotle 1943, 279-280).

And the same priority of the soul is emphasized by Aristotle in the provision for maintenance of the body and soul:

Now, in men rational principle and mind are the end towards which nature strives, so that the birth and moral discipline of the citizens ought to be ordered with a view to them. In the second place, as the soul and body are two, we see also that there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational, and two corresponding states- reason and appetite. And as the body is prior in order of generation to the soul, so the irrational is prior to the rational. The proof is that anger and wishing and desire are implanted in children from their very birth, but reason and understanding are developed as they grow older. Wherefore, the care of the body ought to precede that of the soul, and the training of the appetitive part should follow: none the less our care of it must be for the sake of the reason, and our care of the body for the sake of the soul (Aristotle 1943, 312-313).

Although powerful as a conceptual mechanism implying organic unity and diversity and
as a germ of the body and soul specification, the Body Politic reached only a small fraction of its development in the theories of Plato and Aristotle. It was not until the metaphor was appropriated by Christians that its complexity began to unfold:

“The equivalence between body politic...and generalized human body, which was so purely heuristic a device for Socrates, is real and concrete for Paul, at the same time as it remains a useful heuristic device. The generalized human body can be 'real' principally because it is specified and attached to Christ who, being human, had a human body. The body politic, which can be likened to the physical body of Christ...is not merely similar, it *is* the body of Christ” (Barkan 1975, 69).

Before examining this further development of the Body Politic, I will make the case that, like the difficulty Plato and Aristotle faced in describing the transition from the family/tribe to the polis, the Roman Empire was faced with a difficulty of uniting an abundant diversity to which Christianity offered the eventual, if ironic, solution.

The conquest of Alexander the Great brought the Greek theories of the polis to a larger context: “The polis was only a shadow of its former self after the conquests of Alexander...political thought entered a new era. The idea of the individual and the idea of humanity were developed to help men learn to live in a political unit larger and more impersonal than the polis” (Hale 1971, 24). As Roman philosophers recognized, the Greek philosophy of the polis was in need of an update; specifically, it needed a
universalizing norm:

By Cicero's time, the task of promulgating an international code of political and military ethics had become pressing: the Roman conquest had largely extinguished independent civic life and had sapped civil religion, melting the cities into a polyglot empire whose elite was suffused with the popularized philosophy or 'theology' of a wide variety of competing Greek sects (Epicureans, Stoics, Skeptics, Peripatetics, Old and New Academics and so on). Could Socratic political philosophy provide some qualified legitimation of, and thereby place some moral limits on, Roman imperialism? Cicero confronted a challenge that statesmen and theorists were to face time and again down through the ages: the possibility of genuine Socratic philosophy has to be kept alive, and the norms discovered and promulgated by Plato and Aristotle have to be applied, in conditions that are unmistakably decadent – in circumstances for which the Greek philosophers' writings provide insufficient guidance. In rising to the occasion, Cicero laid down some of the most influential, and surely the most oft-quoted, pronouncements ever made on the moral limits of war, on the duties of civil societies towards one another and on the obligations of citizens toward non-citizens (Pangle 1998, 239).

The Romans were able to build upon Greek Stoicism, and, under Cicero and others, they built a philosophy that suggested the inherent equal rationality of humanity and proposed
a form of political citizenship that could transcend the immediate context of a particular
city or polis. Cicero, as the Roman synthesizer of Greek thought, incorporated the
Platonic teaching on just rulers: “They care for the whole body politic, and not, while
they watch over a portion of it, neglect other portions” (Cicero 1887, 53-54); he also
described the dysfunction that injustice can introduce into the Body Politic:

For a man to take anything wrongfully from another, and to increase his
own means of comfort by his fellow-man's discomfort, is more contrary to
nature than death, than poverty, than pain, than anything else that can
happen to one's body or his external condition...As if each member of the
body were so affected as to suppose itself capable of getting strength by
appropriating the strength of the adjacent member, the whole body must
needs be enfeebled and destroyed (Cicero 1887,181).

This philosophy of universal Roman citizenship reached its zenith following the
remaking of the Roman political institutions accomplished by Augustus (Cochrane
1944). However, it was never a perfect unity, even conceptually, since the various sub-
cultures did not find enough in it to eradicate previous incommensurable differences:
“Cicero warns...against the mistake of supposing that a universalist ethic can ever simply
replace the insuperable divisions among peoples and nations” (Pangle 1998, 262). The
advent of the Christian gospel was to provide a conceptual identity capable of going
beyond the significant political unity accomplished by the Romans.
The replacement of the Roman Imperial ideal by Christianity stands as one of the great pivots of history. Cochrane (1944) suggests that the Romans, under Augustus and his successors, believed that they had achieved something of an eternal state: “The Augustan settlement was hailed with almost universal enthusiasm as marking the successful termination of a crisis...Despair and defeatism were succeeded by unbounded confidence and hope...that...nothing less than the golden age of Saturn would be restored” (Cochrane 1944, 27). Even Christians, like Tertullian, remarked at the genius of the Roman political administration to embrace reform and adapt to new circumstances: “What reforms has this age not witnessed! Think of the cities which the threefold virtue of our present sovereignty has built, augmented, or restored, God bestowing his blessing on so many Augusti as on one!...In very truth, this empire has become the garden of the world!” (Tertullian, De Pallio, ii. 8-9). Indeed, some historians, such as Gibbon (1932), see the embrace of Christianity, first as a tolerated religion and then as the state religion, as the ultimate species of such reform. However, the later history of public Christianity revealed that it was something novel rather than a reform of existing Roman political identity. Cochrane (1944) agrees that Christianity replaced the classical ideal of Rome rather than modifying it; for him, Christianity had solved the tension between excellence and fate that had plagued the classical mind: “Classicism...resolved the concept of power into a subjective and objective factor; the former, character (art and industry); the latter, circumstance (fate and fortune or the gods)...But...this was no solution at all. For, in this combination, no intelligible relationship could be established between the two component elements” (Cochrane 1944, 157). Christianity, with its concept of eternal
blessedness as the ultimate human destination, could explain virtue and suffering in a way that gave meaning to both as complementary rather than at odds; this argument finds perhaps its clearest expression in the writings of Augustine.

For Cochrane, Augustine stands as the critical thinker dividing the classical from the medieval. His importance owes partially to his environment:

Augustine was born into a world the perplexities of which have probably never been exceeded by any period, before or since in human history. Behind him lay more than a millennium of sustained endeavor, during which men had laboured to realize the classical idea of the commonwealth; and almost four centuries had elapsed since Vergil had declared that the problem had finally been solved by the genius of Rome. But for over a century prior to the birth of Augustine, Romanitas had been suffering from a chronic debility, and nothing which political activity could achieve seemed capable of restoring its original vigour (Cochrane 1944, 380).

The imperial power was crumbling, but more importantly, the attempt of classical philosophy to solve the problem, first noted by the poets and tragedians, of the interplay of human virtue and fate was failing. In Augustine's analysis, this was due to the essential similarity of the assumptions of the classical mind in its poetry, tragedy, and philosophy:

For Augustine...classical philosophy was, indeed, simply classical
poetry in cap and gown. For philosophy, like poetry, began by envisaging the “subject” as in some sense 'opposed' to the “object” world. It then proceeded to tell itself a story, the purpose of which was to establish and intelligible relationship between the two. But, from the very nature of the case, the relationship thus established could not possibly rise above the level of plausibility and attain to the character of necessary truth. In other words it remained inevitably mythical or hypothetical; and, from this point of view, there was little or nothing to choose between the work of Pindar or Aeschylus and that of Plato and Aristotle (Cochrane 1944, 430-431).

With the advent of Trinitarianism, in which a single God, in Three Persons possessed of every perfection, created the universe from nothing out of love and not necessity (Pelikan 1971), Christian thinkers, like Augustine, believed that they had found a solution to the classical dilemma:

Augustine thus discovers in the Trinity a fresh foundation for...the values of personality. And here the breach with Classicism was radical; what it involved was nothing less than a question of first principles. But, in this connexion, it should be noted that Augustine's revolt was not from nature; it was from the picture of nature proposed by classical science; i.e. from a cosmology and anthropology constructed in terms of form and matter as the basis for a 'formal' ethic and a 'formal' logic. This was to smash the kingdom of Jove and to unbind Prometheus, who was thus revealed as the
victim of nothing but his own obsessions, the obsessions of the 'scientific' understanding. It was also to dissipate the nightmare involved in the concept of nature as a closed system, determined by its own exclusive laws and, therewith, of the antithesis between human liberty and natural necessity which rendered mankind a stranger in his own household (Cochrane 1944, 410-411).

With these new principles, the Trinity and the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, Augustine was able to formulate the political teaching in the *City of God*. This teaching, upon which I will elaborate in the chapter on John's use of the Body Politic metaphor, was to play an enormous role in shaping the political theory of the Christian West: “Augustine is credited with having inspired, through the *De Civitate Dei*, conceptions underlying the Medieval Church and empire; in confirmation of which it is recorded that Charlemagne habitually slept with a copy of this work beneath his pillow” (Cochrane 1944, 377). In that work, the arguments for the essential unity of mankind, as God's creation, and the division of that unity into those who respond positively and negatively to God's gracious efforts to draw mankind to Himself, open the door to a theory of synthetic political and religious institutions that form the kernel of the medieval conception of the Body Politic with a Christian soul.

The Christian assertion that all of humanity forms a single community is perhaps the most profound conceptual addition to the Roman imperial ideal. The Romans, to be
sure, had conceived of their civilization as universal in law and benefit to mankind (Pangle 1998). However, there remained within the administration of that universal empire an accommodation to Roman particularity that Christian theory was to sweep aside with its claim of the true universality of the Gospel. The problem of universal empire and local particularity was evidenced in the ever expanding Roman pantheon: “The imperial pax deorum concealed a mass of moral and intellectual incongruities; it was not a hierarchy but a hotchpotch, symbolizing...the amazing congeries of races, customs, and traditions...which subsisted in the body-politic. The empire...was not so much a 'body without a soul' as an example of mutiple personality” (Cochrane 1944, 161). Christian Trinitarian monotheism removed such divine clutter and united the universal impulse for the divine in One God that had created all the world including mankind in His image (Acts 17). Additionally, when Christian missionaries came to new communities, they did not come merely with the message of Jesus Christ; they came with the Church and its sacramental religion (Pelikan 1971) and the literary and legal tradition of the classical world, a point that I will develop further in the transition from the Catholic John and Christine to the Protestant Althusius. The sacramental practice of religion was a point of integration for Christian communities; it inspired local social and political cohesion (Elwood 1999) and reinforced the conception of a universal Christian body (Gierke 1987). As I will discuss in the chapter on John of Salisbury's use of the Body Politic metaphor, the enigma of a local political community that partook of a universal identity, the Body Politic with a local political head and a universal soul, is the singular expression of a type of Christian political theory that stands apart from both
classical and modern conceptions.

While the classical world had a fairly wide usage of the Body Politic metaphor, its application was remade by Christianity, especially following the example of St. Paul, who was to revolutionize it, extending both its scope and meaning. St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians contains the following passage:

As a body is one though it has many parts, and all the parts of the body, though many, are one body, so also is Christ. For in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Greeks, slaves or free persons, and we were all given to drink of one Spirit. Now the body is not a single part, but many. If a foot should say, “Because I am not a hand I do not belong to the body,” it does not for this reason belong any less to the body. Or if an ear should say, “Because I am not an eye I do not belong to the body,” it does not for this reason belong any less to the body. If the whole body were an eye, where would the hearing be? If the whole body were hearing, where would the sense of smell be? But as it is, God placed the parts, each of them, in the body as he intended. If they were all one part, where would the body be? But as it is, there are many parts, yet one body. The eye cannot say to the hand, “I do not need you,” nor again the head to the feet, “I do not need you.” Indeed, the parts of the body that seem to be weaker are all the more necessary, and those parts of the body that we consider less honorable we surround with greater honor, an our less
presentable parts are treated with greater propriety, whereas our more presentable parts do not need this. But God has so constructed the body as to give greater honor to a part that is without it, so that there may be no division in the body, but that the parts may have the same concern for one another. If one part suffers, all the parts suffer with it; if one part is honored, all the parts share its joy. Now you are Christ's body, and individually parts of it (1 Corinthians 12: 12-27).

This passage, seemingly directed at the society of the early Church and with a spiritual sense, was to provide Christian societies in the centuries to come with an unending source for expansion and reinterpretation. But St. Paul's contribution, in this passage, was significant in itself as a great development from the classical understanding of the Body Politic: “Paul extends the analogy in several new directions: he understands its implications in new ways, and he uses it to promulgate sacramental, theological, and ecclesiastical doctrines...completely alien to pre-Christian authors” (Barkan 1975, 66).

Paul's unique contribution lies in his linking of the physical body with the mystical, yet real for Christians, body of Christ:

The equivalence between body politic...and generalized human body, which was so purely heuristic a device for Socrates, is real and concrete for Paul, at the same time as it remains a useful heuristic device. The generalized human body can be 'real' principally because it is specified and attached to Christ who, being human, had a human body. The body
politic, which can be likened to the physical body of Christ...is not merely similar, it is the body of Christ (Barkan 1975, 69).

With the rise of universal Christianity, the Body Politic metaphor was reinforced by the integrative theology and administration of the Church that I have already discussed. The analysis which follows will focus on four specific authors and their use of the Body Politic or a close analog, but these are a small sample of the great use of the metaphor that occurred in medieval and early modern Christian political thought (Nederman and Forhan 1993; Melamed 2009; Nederman 2007; Hale 1971). As I will discuss in John of Salisbury's conception, the medieval political theorists conceived of all of humanity as a single unity to be brought into communication through the Church (Gierke 1987). This unity makes the application of the Body Politic metaphor quite convenient as does the Christian use of the Body of Christ metaphor to describe the mystical, spiritual communion of the members of the Church with the Head of the Body, Jesus Christ (Colossians 1:18). The nascent European nation states, especially France and England, made extensive use of the Body Politic metaphor to define their separate political and religious identities (Hirst 2007), diagnose political problems (Shogimen 2008), and to work out juridical issues regarding the legal personality of the state (Baecque 1997; Gierke 1939). These more modern usages of the Body Politic metaphor, which do not have a direct bearing on my purpose in this work, suggest that it remains a potent means for describing the still difficult to capture political relation. In the chapters that follow, I will argue that the Body Politic metaphor, as it changed from John of Salisbury to
Christine de Pizan and then to Althusius and Rousseau, shows the shifting commitments and self-conceptions of that civilization. In the last chapter, I will discuss what I see as the implications of this change for the Body Politic as a conception and for the health of the civilization holding it.
John of Salisbury's use of the Body Politic metaphor is the first and most important of the authors under consideration. John was writing c. 1160 in the intensely mixed world of High Medieval ecclesiastical and civil politics (Nederman 2005, 1-39). In fact, I will argue that the intensity of this mixture corresponds to the medieval scholastic conception of the body as an inseparable combination of soul and physical matter; nearly all Christian authors agree with a dual physical and spiritual human nature, but the medieval theory of this synthesis was unique and productive of the political synthesis that John describes in the *Policraticus*. All of the subsequent authors under consideration owe something to the medieval theory of the religious and political associations since they were responding to the political and religious consequences of that theory and its practice. John's very life is a window into the world of medieval religious and civil politics: he was a churchman that served as the political secretary to the archbishop of Canterbury during the tumultuous period leading to the Beckett assassination (Brooke 1994). Before examining John's particular usage of the Body Politic language, I will turn to the origins and development of his contemporary religious and political institutions in light of my foregoing interpretation of the unique political arrangement that was produced by the introduction of the Church into the late classical world.

As I highlighted in my discussion of Cochrane (1944), the introduction of Christianity to
The late classical world revolutionized it. It produced two major political expressions: Eastern Byzantine Roman, and later Greek Orthodox, Christianity with its greater continuity with late classical imperial culture and political life and the more innovative Western Latin Christianity that developed as a synthesis of some elements of classical culture and politics but with a fuller exploration of the political implications of the Gospel and the assimilation of the Germanic tribal customs and institutions:

The political thinking of the period c. 500-1000 was primarily concerned with preserving philosophical and institutional aspects of pre-Christian antiquity, especially universal Roman law, combining these with the philosophical and theological writings of the church Fathers such as Augustine and Jerome, and then squaring this tradition with particularist and local, usually oral, customary practices of various barbarian peoples (Miller 2000, 329).

These two Christian institutional expressions reflected the exigencies of the period: the East was more insulated from institutional decline and tribal invasions than the West, and the East was thus able to protect the classical political philosophy and its institutions than was the West. In fact, the removal of imperial court to Constantinople was the final accession to this strategic reality. The Church in the Western Empire was its most significant repository of the classical culture and its literature, but it was given a freer hand, by the absence of imperial authority, to develop the ecclesiastical supremacy that became its hallmark:
Barbarism and interminable wars having effaced every principle, reduced the sovereignty of Europe to a state of fluctuation quite unparalleled, and made deserts everywhere, it was advantageous that a superior power should exercise a certain influence over this sovereignty. Now, as the Popes were superior by wisdom and knowledge, and as they had at their command, moreover, all the science of the times, the very force of thins gave them an undisputed title to that superiority which at the time was indispensable. The true principle, that sovereignty comes from God, strengthened besides those ancient ideas, and there came to be formed an opinion, almost universal, which attributed to the Popes a certain jurisdiction over questions in which sovereigns were concerned (De Maistre 1850, 185).

It was in Western Christianity that John of Salisbury developed his concept of the Body Politic with a clerical soul, and the clerical soul of Western Christianity resides in the supremacy of the Pope.

The papacy is the enigmatic characteristic of the Latin Christian synthesis and it is the lynchpin of the loosely formed “empire” of Western Christendom; while the Pope, as the successor of St. Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, claims a universal ecclesiastical jurisdiction, it was in the West that this power was most clearly felt and practiced. Paradoxically, the papacy’s role in the establishment of Western society is rarely
mentioned: “The history of the Church of Rome and that of the papacy are almost entirely left out of accounts of the origins of political and social systems in Europe” (Prodi 1987, 1). As discussed earlier, Christianity itself was an important political innovation on the classical model; humanity was no longer looking for its ultimate perfection in the polis or city but rather in the City of God (Augustine 1957; Cochrane 1944). Generally, religion’s contribution to the attainment of perfection, both temporal and eternal, was greatly increased by its adoption as the politically protected, authorized and enforced religion of the Roman Empire (Gibbon 1932, 321). But, the Roman Empire was in transition and its removal of administrative authority to the New Rome of Constantinople set the stage for the Latin Christian synthesis that was to develop over the next 1200 years. The Pope derived his authority from a spiritual claim, not a political one; the resistance of the Eastern Church centered in Byzantium to Roman papal authority gives evidence to this fact. In the alliance with Charlemagne, the Popes made formal their political independence from the East (Gibbon 1932, 746).

Although slow and gradual (Newman 1901 [1850]; Ullmann 1972), the growth of papal power was characterized by an increase in its monarchical authority and the bureaucratic offices of administration of that power. This growth in papal monarchy was attended by its insistence on autonomy from any temporal sovereign: “Within a framework which is still unclear, though profoundly universalistic, the affirmation of the need for monarchical power seems inseparable from the conviction that the independence of the two powers, spiritual and temporal, was a historical necessity” (Prodi 1987, 15). The
Investiture Conflict, the inevitable contest between the two Western heads of power, ecclesiastical and civil, illustrated the uniqueness of the Western Christian synthesis and the political and religious tensions that it contained.

In the Investiture Controversy, several movements within secular and ecclesiastical politics came to a head (Miller 2005; Blumenthal 1988). The Church hierarchy, having emerged as the remnant of the former classical society in the West, had been beset by two significant problems, simony and clerical marriage/concubinage. Both were attributable to the secular authority that bishops had been forced to assert following the breakdown of the Roman political system in the West. In many cases, bishops had to act as feudal lords with military duties as well as the chief pastors of the diocese. These demands led to men holding episcopal sees who did not see themselves, nor did they act, primarily as the successors of the apostles. Thus, civil lords often controlled the naming of bishops, and in many cases, sees were bought outright as a part of feudal patronage. Clerical marriage and concubinage were separate but related problems. Priests and even bishops had relaxed the discipline that came with their orders, and many dioceses had fairly long traditions of these behaviors. Both were aberrations from the purer practice of the early Church and spawned reform movements. Hildebrand, later Pope Gregory VII, was one of the reformers and his confrontation with Emperor Henry IV formed the crux of the Investiture Controversy. While a fascinating episode, this controversy, for my development, is significant mainly for its impetus for a return to a greater emphasis on clerical separation from secular authority and return to the apostolic emphasis on
evangelization and pure living for those in holy orders.

Following the Investiture Controversy, which on the whole decided the struggle between the civil and ecclesiastical spheres in favor of the latter (Blumenthal 1988; Miller 2005, 25), the papacy began an ambitious project of bureaucratic centralization. The popes realized that unless they exercised their rights under the resolution just discussed, they may lose them through disuse or confusion. Thus, the centralization and consolidation of papal authority began in earnest:

It introduced the first hierarchy of courts with positive written laws and uniform procedure in the West; it rationalized for the first time the system of imposing and collecting taxes, and initiated the practice of anticipating revenue by the sale of offices; it had the first foreign minister, the first diplomatic corps and the first standing mercenary army, and so forth (Prodi 1987, 3).

The papacy was at the zenith of its religious and administrative powers during the career of John of Salisbury, and protecting ecclesiastical privileges against royal abuses was one of John's major concerns (Nederman 2005, 20). As secretary to Theobald, the archbishop of Canterbury, John was charged with presenting the case for the prerogatives of the English Church, and especially those of its ancient primary See, against the creeping interferences of successive kings. Like the circumstances that led to the Investiture Conflict, the English kings believed that local custom gave them a greater
degree of control over ecclesiastical appointments and other administrative matters than Theobald was willing to concede. It is no surprise that John would use the Body Politic to formalize Canterbury's insistence on ecclesiastical sovereignty. Before examining John's use of the metaphor explicitly, I will analyze the means by which John accomplishes the primacy of ecclesiastical concerns, the Christian conception of the soul.

The Christian doctrine of the soul, so important to John's theory of the state, complements the dual institutional structure that developed in the medieval West; further, the rejection of this dual design, implicit at first, would later result in the purely secular politics of the modern nation state. I will trace this movement from John to Rousseau, and I will argue that the Body Politic described by John looks a lot more like the Christian understanding of humanity's essential nature and therefore protects a public function for religion, namely its ministration to souls and religious doctrine free from purely political considerations; but first I will present my interpretation of the novelty of the Christian doctrine of the soul and trace the implications of that concept for John's use of the Body Politic metaphor.

As I discussed in the first chapter, the concept of the soul, as the most basic and important principle of human life, was employed by Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle's placement of the rational human soul at the top of his hierarchy of living beings and Plato's argument for the human soul's immortality make its incorporation into the Body
Politic a natural one: the polis is the site of human perfection and the soul is the kernel of human perfectibility. Thus, the soul of the Body Politic stands for the transcendence and permanence of the Good. Christianity was able to take this concept to new levels of dignity and specificity:

We are carried far beyond Greek thought, whether it be Plato's or Aristotle's. For if the human soul is a substance and principle of substantiality, it is because it is an intellect, that is to say an immaterial being by definition and consequently incorruptible. After that, St. Thomas can turn to his own account, and does so unweariedly, the famous Aristotelian principle that the individual exists for the sake of the species; only, by a now inevitable reversal, the consequences that favoured the species in the Aristotelian system work out in favour of the individual in the Christian system. That to which the intention of nature now tends is much less the species than the incorruptible. If, sometimes, it looks to the good of the species rather than that of the individual it is only in those cases where the individuals are corruptible and the species alone endures; but in the case of incorruptible substances, it is not only the species that permanently endures, but also the individuals. And that is why the individuals themselves fall within the principal intention of nature...Now it is the soul that is the incorruptible part of man; and consequently we must admit that the multiplication of human individuals is a primary intention of nature, or rather of the Author of nature, Who is the only Creator of human
Thus firmly based henceforth on the substantiality of the intellect and the immortality it carries with it, the Christian individual is invested with all the dignity of a permanent being, indestructible, distinct from every other in his very permanence, and an original source of rational activity responsibly deciding his own future destiny... The whole interior life of the Christian man thus consists in gradually building-up, constantly rectifying, unweariedly perfecting a personality which will only attain its full stature in the future life (Gilson 1936, 202-203).

This understanding of the soul had very specific political consequences: no longer is maintenance of the physical or even moral virtue, temporally construed, enough for governance of human beings. Rather, the Christian political construct must provide for both the attainment of physical sustenance in this life and eternal beatitude in the next:

Perhaps someone has the responsibility of preserving something in its being, and someone else of having it achieve a higher perfection. This is completely apparent from the example of the ship, which shows the raison d'être of governance. The carpenter has responsibility for repairing anything in the ship that has fallen into ruin, but a sailor must be solicitous to conduct the ship to port. It is the same with human beings: a physician has the responsibility of preserving their healthful life, a steward of
supplying their necessities of life, a professor of taking care that they know the truth, and someone who institutes morality that they live according to reason.

If human beings were not ordained to another, external end, the responsibilities just mentioned would be enough for them. But there is a certain good extrinsic to human beings as long as we are in this mortal life, namely the final beatitude, to which we look forward after our death in the enjoyment of God. As Paul says: 'As long as we are in the body, we are absent from God.' For this reason, Christian persons, for whom Christ won that beatitude through his blood, and who accept the pledge of the Holy Spirit in order to pursue that beatitude, need spiritual care through which they may be directed to the port of eternal salvation. This care is shown to the faithful by the minister of the Church of Christ (Ptolemy of Lucca 1997, 97-98).

And this further end, in turn, argues for the superiority of the temporal, ecclesiastical administration:

Because by living to virtue human beings are ordained to a further end, which lies in divine enjoyment,...it is necessary for a human multitude to have the same end as one person. It is not, therefore, the ultimate end of a congregated multitude to live according to virtue, but through virtue to arrive at divine enjoyment.
If it could attain this end by virtue of human nature, the office of king would necessarily include directing human beings to this end...But because humans do not attain the end of divine enjoyment through human virtue, but through divine virtue, according to what Paul says: 'By the grace of God, eternal life,' to lead to that end will not pertain to human government, but to divine.

Therefore, government of that kind pertains to that king who is not only a person, but also God, namely our Lord Jesus Christ, who by making human beings children of God led them to heavenly glory. This is the government given to him 'which will not be corrupted', which is why the Sacred Scriptures call him not priest alone but also king...Therefore, a regal priesthood derives from him, and, what is more, all the faithful of Christ, insofar as they are his members, are called kings and priests

So that spiritual things might be distinguished from earthly things, the ministry of this kingdom was committed not to early kings, but to priests, and especially to the highest priest, the successor of Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff, to whom it is necessary that all kings of the Christian people be subject, just as to the Lord Jesus Christ himself. For those responsible for antecedent ends should be subject to and directed by
the command of him with responsibility for the final end.

Since the priesthood of the gentiles and their whole cult of divine beings only existed for seeking temporal goods ordained for the common good of the multitude, which falls under the responsibility of the king, the kings suitably subjected ther priests of the gentiles. Likewise, since in the old law the true God, not demons, promised that earthly goods would be delivered to religious people, we read that priests were subject to kings. But in the New Law there is another priesthood, through which human beings are led to heavenly goods; so, by the law of Christ, kings out to be subject to priests (Ptolemy of Lucca 1997, 99).

Under this theory, the spiritual authority is not only superior in inherent value but in practical action: “A temporal kingdom was appended to the spiritual kingdom of Christ, while the spiritual retained its vigor. The faithful of Christ ought to seek the spiritual in itself, and the temporal only in a secondary way, to assist the spiritual. Otherwise they act against Chris's intention” (Ptolemy of Lucca 1997, 194-195). And the history of Christian sovereigns gives witness to their submission to its tenets: “Justinian subjected himself to the Church and mandated that his people should obey it in all things, and he...confirmed in this same letter the holy sanctions or laws subjecting the people to ecclesiastical institutions, especially in matters of usury and matrimony, on which things civil life turns” (Ptolemy of Lucca 1997, 200). It is this theory and practice that John
brings to bear in his own description of the Body Politic.

John's Body Politic is the medieval conception of the human body, its essence and ends, made into a metaphor for the political community. John is asserting that a comparison of the political community with the human body, with its well developed medieval understanding, could alleviate the difficulties of understanding the varied and complex political community of his day. As mentioned earlier, the political community in the medieval period was in need of re-conceptualization for several reasons: the ancient political theories had dealt primarily with local government; the practical Roman imperial theory had collapsed in the West; the novel Christian understanding of the person challenged the assumptions and goals of classical politics; and, the geographical, physical, and cultural characteristics of early medieval Western Europe were quite different from those of the classical Mediterranean world. With his version of the Body Politic, John hoped to retain the best from previous cultural, social, and political forms and to meld them with new contemporary realities.

John's actual description of the Body Politic is fairly straightforward and innocuous in its metaphors for the civil institutions: “As many offices exist in the administration of the princely government, such are the number of members of the prince's body” (John of Salisbury 1990, 63). The prince, as the supreme civil magistrate, forms the head of the body; the Senate is the heart, or seat of wisdom; the nobles and courtiers form the flanks for strength and support; governors of distant provinces constitute the eyes, ears, and
tongue of the body since they see, hear, and tell things at the bidding of the head; the hands, armed and unarmed, of the body are formed by the soldiers, lawyers, bailiffs, tax collectors, and other officers of the law; finally, the laboring body of peasants, agricultural and mechanical, are the feet that provide the body its life of ordinary daily movement. John prescribes the virtues necessary for each of these members and gives a rather large catalog, replete with examples, of the various corruptions that can befall each class; except for the laboring feet, whom he suggests possess too much variety for specific advice and that it is their lot to obey and look to the public good generally (John of Salisbury 1990, 126). All of this could have been the advice of any classical philosopher to the prince aspiring to virtue; indeed, this section of the work is couched as a letter from Plutarch to Trajan (Nederman 2002, 54-55). However, sprinkled throughout the metaphor, in the choice of historical examples of political and Christian virtue, and especially in a noteworthy personal anecdote, John signals that this Body Politic has a purpose much greater than just the maintenance its physical members or even the education of citizens to temporal virtue.

Right from the outset of his use of the Body Politic metaphor, John makes clear its ultimate purpose:

By all means, that which institutes and moulds the practice of religion in us and which transmits the worship of God (not the 'gods' of which Plutarch speaks) acquires the position of the soul of the body of the republic.

Indeed, those who direct the practice of religion ought to be esteemed and
venerated like the soul of the body. For who disputes that the sanctified ministers of God are his vicars? Besides, just as the soul has rulership of the whole body so those who are called prefects of religion direct the whole body (John of Salisbury 1990, 66-67).

Given the previously described medieval Christian theory of the human essence as union of body and soul destined for blessed immortality, it is not surprising that this is the first task that John ascribes to the Body Politic, viz. the worship of God. Under this view, the purpose of human life is the attainment of the eternal beatific vision of God, which consists of ever deeper and more perfect experiences of love and knowledge, and the institutions of a Christian republic exist to provide individuals and the corporate body of believers the peace and purification necessary for such a task. Perhaps this understanding was so ubiquitous that John does not expound upon it at length, but rather turns to the temporal duties of the civil power, but for the modern reader such a design requires some elaboration so that one can realize what has been discarded in the progress of the centuries from John to Rousseau and then to us.

Beliefs and doctrines are important to the differentiation of religions, but the life of any religion, its strength, vitality, and persistence, come from its practice, not its creeds. This is not to say that religious creeds are arbitrary and that creeds do not mirror the practical life of a religion. But, when one studies the history of religion, and especially that of Christian religion, it becomes clear that the organic practice of corporate worship
and personal piety formed the basis for the creeds and not vice versa. Certainly, there was an original message of Christianity, the atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ, but the daily life of Christians was the means by which a corporate theory, creed, or self-knowledge of Christianity developed: “When some great enunciation, whether true or false, about human nature, or present good, or government, or duty, or religion, is carried forward into the public throng of men and draws attention, then it is not merely received passively in this or that form into many minds, but it becomes an active principle within them, leading them to an ever-new contemplation of itself, to an application of it in various directions, and a propagation of it on every side” (Newman 1909, 36). The sacramental practice of Christianity, that reached its zenith in the West in the codification of the Council of Trent but was in full effect during John's life, is the means by which the doctrines of Latin Christianity are expressed in a public manner. The seven sacraments of baptism, confirmation, penance, the Eucharist, matrimony, holy orders, and last rights are the precisely the spiritual institutions that inculcated and reinforced the synthetic body and soul medieval understanding of the person that John makes into a metaphor for the state. He does not specify the sacramental system in the *Policraticus*, since he takes for granted that his readers have been immersed in such a practice from birth. Again, it is very difficult for the modern reader, especially those without a detailed historical knowledge of this period, to comprehend the profound effect that the medieval sacramental system had on political culture and political psychology. John Henry Cardinal Newman's description of this sacramental practice, in Milan during the mid 1840's, makes the Roman Catholic cathedral seem like a piazza:
I have expressed myself so badly that I doubt if you will understand me, but a Catholic Cathedral is a sort of world, every one going about his own business, but that business a religious one; groups of worshippers, and solitary ones—kneeling, standing—some at shrines, some at altars—hearing Mass and communicating, currents of worshippers intercepting and passing by each other—altar after altar lit up for worship, like stars in the firmament—or the bell giving notice of what is going on in parts you do not see, and all the while the canons in the choir going through matins and lauds, and at the end of it the incense rolling up from the high altar, and all this in one of the most wonderful buildings in the world and every day—lastly, all of this without any show or effort—but what everyone is used to—everyone at his own work, and leaving everyone else to his (Ward 1912, 140).

John himself had partaken of that sacramental life of the cathedral: first as one receiving instruction; then as a deacon in Salisbury and Canterbury; and finally as one administering the sacraments: John was ordained priest by 1175 (Millor et al. 1979, 737) and consecrated bishop in 1176 (Nederman 2005, 37). It seems natural to assume that his close contact with the sacramental administration played a role in his construction of the Body Politic with a clerical soul. The gradual erosion of the sacramental theory and practice, accompanied by a corresponding change in political culture and psychology, can be detected in the writings of Christine de Pizan, Althusius, and Rousseau. Before
making that case, viz. that the more sacramental form of Christianity encouraged under John's medieval clericalism was a more public and social form of religion, I return to John's work in the *Policraticus* for further examples of the profoundly synthetic relationship he envisioned for the civil and ecclesiastical authorities.

John draws upon many examples to argue for the proper relationship between those institutions charged with care of the soul and body. Unlike Christine, who prefers classical models of virtue for reasons I will discuss later, John draws heavily on Christian princes and clergy: Constantine's treatment of bishops and priests and the interaction between the Emperor Theodosius and St. Ambrose are useful for John's understanding of the proper relation of the sacred and secular powers. In each of these cases the civil and ecclesiastical powers are represented as separate but mutually reinforcing; the secular power provides the sanction and temporal circumstances necessary for the robust administration of the sacramental religion and maintenance and protection of its doctrine. While each of these cases contain elements that suggest the domination of either the clerical or secular actor over the other, the commitment to a mutually reinforcing, but procedurally separate, administration is the unique characteristic of the medieval conception found in John's metaphor.

Constantine occupies an important place in Christian history, and for John's argument, since he first legalized the practice of Christianity in the late Roman Empire as the first Christian emperor (Gibbon 1932, 303). Constantine oversaw the Council of Nicaea that
was the first Christian doctrinal council held under the auspices of the imperial authority; this council provided the first formal statements regarding the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, or the co-eternity and co-equality of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. John uses Constantine to provide a description of the civil authority's function relative to the promotion of spiritual flourishing and an example of the proper attitude for princes towards the ministers of the Church:

This sword [the physical] is therefore accepted by the prince from the hand of the Church, although it still does not possess the bloody sword entirely. For while it has this sword, yet it is used by the hand of the prince, upon whom is conferred the power of bodily coercion, reserving spiritual authority for the papacy. The prince is therefore a sort of minister of the priests and one who exercises those features of the sacred duties that seem an indignity in the hands of priests. For all the duties of sacred law are in fact the affairs of the religious and the pious, yet that duty is inferior which executes the punishment of crime and which seems to be represented by images of executioners. And for this reason, Constantine, the most faithful emperor of the Romans, when he had convened the Nicean Council of priests, neither ventured to take the foremost position nor allowed himself to mingle with the presbyters, but occupied the hindmost seat. The decisions which were heard to be approved by them were venerated by him, just as if he supposed them to emanate from the court of the divine majesty. And when written accusations involving the crimes of priests
were presented in their turn to the emperor, he accepted them and placed them unopened in the fold of his toga. After he called them back to charity and concord, he himself said that inasmuch as he was a human who was subject to the verdict of the priests, it was not allowed for him to examine divine cases which none except God alone could adjudicate. These rolls which he had accepted he consigned to the flames uninspected, fearful to publicise the crimes or abuses of the Fathers and to incur the same curse as Ham, the reprobate son, who did not share in the reverence of his forefathers (John of Salisbury 1990, 32).

In this passage, John makes a statement of extremely strong clerical supremacy: the prince is represented as the Church's executioner and jailer and dependent upon the judgment of priests for proper doctrine and the care of his own soul. However, the designation of supremacy can be true only if there be one practice of authority, but clearly this is not the case; there are two authorities: the spiritual and the temporal. If one of these two always make the final determination, viz. the civil authority in the remaining authors under investigation, then there is only one power and the other is subordinate to it; but, two mutually sustaining sovereign authorities must have instances of rule and submission. John maintains that, while the republic, like the person, is a unity, the soul and body form different functional portions of that body; this is the distinguishing characteristic of John's Body Politic that will separate it from those of the subsequent authors: while the others pay lip service to the Christian soul/body synthesis,
John is the only one that grants real sovereign authority to the ecclesiastical power. John gives the clerical authority a greater dignity since it pertains to the eternal state of the soul and the moral life of the republic, but he uses the same dignity, the grant of all authority from God, to baptize princely office: “As the image of the deity, the prince is to be loved, venerated and respected” (John of Salisbury 1990, 191).

John's use of the interaction between St. Ambrose and Theodosius is a further example of his preference for a clerical check upon the religious leadership of the civil power; while the practical lesson of this affair is less clearly stated by John than the previous example of Constantine, this famous case inside the history of Christian political theory carries a significant weight given the unique circumstances surrounding it. Again, as with the case of the sacraments, it is reasonable to suggest that John would have assumed a knowledge of this case and its traditional interpretation among his readers. John suggests the example in the following manner:

An what is to be said of Theodosius, whom the others cherished as the exemplar of virtue, and who is venerated by God's Church not only as an emperor but as a high priest, on account of venerable religiosity and widely known justice, as well as his still unsurpassed patience and submissive humility towards priests? How patiently he who produced laws bore the sentence of the Milanese priest! And lest one imagine that the sentence was made by a soft presbyter and one who had commanded the applause of princes, the prince was suspended from the use of his
regalia, excluded from church and was forced to discharge a solemn penance. But what subjected him to such a requirement? Only a will subjected to God's justice and obedient constantly to His law (John of Salisbury 1990, 43).

While significant on the surface of the tale, the use of this example becomes even more powerful when its various elements are investigated further; certainly John would have expected the mere case itself to say more than he did in writing.

The very invocation of Ambrose is significant given his biography: he was an educated man of the patrician class that, prior to his popular election to its bishopric, was the civil governor of Milan, the city that Diocletian had made capital of the Western portion of the Roman Empire two generations earlier. Ambrose embodies what was to become the Latin Christian aspirational model for clergy: highly educated, evangelical, and pugnacious towards secular authority; he contended with many civil rulers in his religious vocation including emperors and their mothers. Ambrose, as indicated by his popular election, was a defender of the popular faith, Catholic orthodoxy, against the creeping Arianism of the Eastern imperial court (Ramsey 1997, 1-54). Not to get bogged down in theological details, Arianism was an attempt to modify the mystical Catholic doctrine of the co-eternity and co-equality of the members of the Trinity into a teaching of divine hierarchy, which was more palatable to the rationalizing philosophers patronized by the Eastern Roman political elite; a social ethic was implicit within this theological dispute: the Catholic doctrine was favored by those with a
preference for social equality, while Arianism gave its proponents a theological justification for a more stratified society (Belloc 1938, 40-42).

John sheds particular light upon his unique institutional synthesis with an anecdote that relates a conversation with his sometime friend and ecclesiastical superior, Pope Adrian IV. This pope had been a fellow English clergyman and John suggests that the two were quite familiar both before and after his elevation to the papacy (John of Salisbury 1990, 132). The pope, knowing John's itinerant habits, asked what he heard from the people regarding Rome. John repeats a long list of abuses, corruptions, and excesses that he has heard laid to the Roman Church's account. While the anecdote portrays John as the messenger of the sayings of others, it is useful to note that he spends an entire chapter later in the work discussing his own charges against ecclesiastical tyrants, many of which are repetitions of the accusations that he relayed to the pope. These charges are hardly surprising; as papal monarchy increased in the Middle Ages, so did the resentment from the areas over which it consolidated its control (Prodi 1987). What is surprising is the rhetorical device by which John answers these charges in the pope's reply; no one can be sure whether this conversation is embellished if not wholly fictitious, and its importance for my argument lies in the implication that can be drawn from it for John's theory of the Body Politic. The pope tells the well known medieval proverb, thought to originate with Aesop and used by Livy (Nederman and Forhan 2000, 24), of the dispute between the stomach and the other members of the body (John of Salisbury 1990, 135-136): the members are tired of the insatiable requirements of the
stomach and they decide to starve it, only to find that they cannot exist without its continued normally voracious function. John's use of this well-known proverb of the necessity of centralized authority is astounding in its bald comparison of the similarity of secular and ecclesiastical hierarchy. John has already made the unique claim that the clergy acts as the soul of the republic, and here he reinforces that assignment with a physical appendage. But, it must be noted, the republic of which the Church is the soul and stomach is the universal Christian republic of Christendom; this anecdote was a commentary on the pope's jurisdiction as the supreme leader of the Roman Church, the “mother of all churches” (John of Salisbury 1990, 133). So, not only is there an explicit claim in John's work for the superior dignity of the Church's ministers as the moral soul of the Body Politic, but there is a corresponding superior jurisdiction implied for the pope over all of the rulers of Christendom who are sovereign merely within their own local territories. However, as John makes clear his harsh criticism to the pope's face in this account and in his chapter on the abuses of ecclesiastical tyrants, the purpose of the Church is eternal not temporal: the salvation of souls without respect to persons.

All of the foregoing leads me to a view of John's conception of the Body Politic as a natural synthesis of the Christian conception of the human person united to Christ, in the mystical sense first articulated by Saint Paul, with the political institutions that developed following the breakup of the Western Roman Empire. John allows for the supremacy of the Pope, as the chief element of the Body Politic's clerical soul, in spiritual matters and of the local sovereign, as the head of the Body Politic, in civil
affairs as long as the civil authority is doing its job of protecting the mission of the
Church. The other members of John's Body Politic correspond to the existing social
circumstances of High Medieval society: The feudal aristocracy that developed during
the early Middle Ages, both in its French and English types (Ganshof 1964), forms the
senate as the heart of the Body Politic, or center of council, and the provincial governors
and judges are its mouth, eyes, and ears. The minor nobility and knights make up the
soldiers, tax collectors, and magistrates that are the flanks, arms and hands, and stomach
and intestines of the Body Politic that carry out the directives of the head and provide its
nourishment. Finally, the medieval peasantry are the feet that support the Body Politic
by their agricultural and manual labor. Together, as long as the soul is uncorrupted and
the head is sane, the whole Body Politic proceeds toward temporal physical vigor and its
members, individually construed as members of the Body of Christ, to eternal beatitude.

I have sketched a strongly hierocratic interpretation of John's theory that argues for
coherent use of the clerical soul in the Body Politic. That interpretation finds support in
some authors, qualified support in others, and outright rejection in some quarters.
Nederman and Campbell (1991) note the primacy of the clerical function in John's Body
Politic: “The inferiority of temporal princes in comparison with spiritual authority rests
upon the differing functions appropriate to the soul and to the head of the organism. Just
as the soul gives life to flesh and exercise final authority over the movements of all the
bodily members and organs, so the priesthood must be obeyed as the source of the very
life of the political community” (Nederman and Campbell 1991, 574). But they qualify
the grant of authority to the clergy: “John did uphold the principle of ecclesiastical supremacy. But he derived from it no practical consequences, manifesting instead an awareness that the corruption of the church and its officials renders temporal submission to spiritual power un-desirable and unjustifiable” (Nederman and Campbell 1991, 575).

And they seem to find on balance that John is not a complete hierocrat: “…the *Policraticus* seems to embrace some idea of ecclesiastical supremacy, but…such a teaching remains fundamentally at odds with other features of the book’s argument” (Nederman and Campbell 1991, 575). The clear grant of power to the clergy as the soul is noticed by Struve (1994, 304): “But as the human organism was subordinate to the soul the body politic had to be subordinate to the clergy as it were the soul of the State.”

The ambiguities in John's conception have led some to question its coherence: “The author must realize that this is an analogy to be used with care” (Archambault 1967, 22).

Particularly, given the two primary locations of authority in John's Body Politic, the clerical soul and the royal head, sometimes his metaphor seems to suffer from bicephaly (Archambault 1967, 26). This problem could lead to several interpretations:

There were three possible responses to Papal claims of headship of the universal order. One could admit the Papal claims and then identify king or emperor with the heart and stress the importance of this organ to the head. Or one could define a secular body, a *corpus naturale* distinct from the *corpus mysticum* of the Church, which had its own head yet was not monstrously two-headed or schizophrenic. Finally, and most radically, one could maintain that only Christ, and not the pope, was the *caput*
Ecclesiae...the third leads to the Reformation and the establishment of national churches (Hale 1971, 38-39).

Part of the problem, indeed one that will become clearer with the transition to the Late Medieval Body Politic of Christine de Pizan, is that medieval Christendom was moving from a universal, if mystical, kingdom to one in which local sovereignties had definite identities, which often were in conflict with the clerical guardians of the larger unity and even, sometimes, divided the clerics themselves. True, “The great thinkers of the Middle Ages – Aquinas, Dante, John of Salisbury – all visualized a great world community, unified and at peace, striving for the salvation of men's souls” (Hale 1971, 38), but this universal community was experiencing significant internal division. John's difficulty in marrying a universal clerical soul with a local princely head gives witness to this problem.

Before moving to the next author, I want to notice another aspect of John's Catholic identity that marks his religious life and practice and that undoubtedly played a role in shaping his conception of the Body Politic: his devotional piety to the Virgin Mary and the saints and his veneration of relics. As will become evident in the remaining authors whom I include in my four-part typology, not only does the clerical soul disappear from the Body Politic after John, but the importance of the popular aspects of Catholicism, while remaining important to Christine and to my interpretation of her ideas of for replacing John's clerical soul in the Body Politic, disappear altogether in the last two
authors, Althusius and Rousseau, marking their hard break with medieval popular traditions as well as political and ecclesiastical theories. John displays in his work a normal devotion, for the mid 12th century (Pelikan 1996), to the Blessed Virgin; while he is not nearly as prolific in his praise of the Virgin as his contemporary, Bernard of Clairvaux (1978), his writing contains enough references to the Virgin's special dignity (Millor et al. 1979) and the miraculous power of her intercession (John of Salisbury 2009, 49) to recognize his own Marian devotion. More conspicuous, however, is his clear devotion to his martyred associate, Thomas Becket, and his belief in the power of his relics to work miracles. John, in one of his later letters, relates the story of the healing of a man who had been incapacitated after expressing incredulity regarding the power of Becket's relics:

The mute wretch was brought [to me] … and to the reliquary which contains the undergarment—that is, the chemise [i.e., the sancta camisia]—of the Blessed Virgin, which she wore when she bore the Savior. … I ordered the phial—in which I had placed (reposueram) the blood of saint Thomas [and] which I had brought with me to Chartres—and water, in which to bathe the phial, to be brought [to me]. We prayed a little before the relics, and, when we had finished, I handed the phial to the wretched man to kiss. Instantly, in a loud voice which could be heard by all the bystanders, [he cried out,] “St. Thomas, St. Thomas, have mercy on me.” He drank the water in which I had washed [both] the phial and the good martyr’s knife; at once, his former health returned (Millor et al. 1979,
John's devotion to relics were not restricted to those of Becket; he bequeathed several other relics upon his death at Chartres (Bollermann and Nederman 2011, 3). Additionally the specific contents of his collection seem to suggest that they reflected his own conception of the political role of the Church:

Finally, the deaths of the saints whose relics comprised John’s collection all occurred at the hands of an over-reaching secular power who sought to prevent them from acting in accordance with their faith. Gereon and his companions were martyred by Roman authorities who insisted upon the Christian troop’s obeisance to pagan gods. Ursula and her Virgins were engaged in a pilgrimage to various holy sites across Europe when they were prevented from visiting Cologne by the murderous actions of the besieging Huns. Crispin and Crispinian were reputedly ordered to die by the Roman Emperor Maximian on account of their successful Christian evangelizing. And Thomas Becket, as is too well known to require detailed recounting, succumbed to the wrath of King Henry II. Once again, this common theme uniting John’s relic collection reflects his intellectual, not to mention ecclesio-political, convictions. His writings, including the *Policraticus* as well as his letters and most of his other works, were consistently directed against the threats to the church and the faith posed by tyrants, both historical and contemporary. Indeed, he famously
proposed the legitimacy of committing tyrannicide, as the fulfillment of one’s duty to God and country, in order to rid the earth of an incorrigibly evil and irreligious rule. Hence, it is quite understandable that John would be drawn to saints whose own martyrdoms testified to the dangers posed to men and women of genuine faith by temporal powers who made war against true religion. These relics afforded John a constant reminder of the price that a faithful Christian must be prepared to pay when earthly lords raise themselves over God’s holy servants (Bollermann and Nederman 2011, 21-22).

Under this interpretation, that I find credible and complementary to the other official and literary aspects of John's life, his personal devotions reinforced and fed his theoretical formulations. And, as I will develop in my treatment of Christine's Body Politic, her attachment to many of the same popular elements of medieval Catholic devotional piety may have prevented her from making a more profound break with John's Body Politic.

John's work represents the the first pole of my proposed textual progression: the medieval religious and political synthesis with an implicit clerical superiority enforced by the socializing power of the fully sacramental Roman Catholic religion, which, in practice, included a separation of the spiritual and temporal authorities by function represented in designation of the soul and head of the Body Politic. Rousseau's theory of the Body Politic in the modern state, with its purely politically reinforcing civil religion,
will form the antipodal position. The two intervening authors, Christine de Pizan and Althusius, each will contribute incremental movements from the starting point to the finish. Christine's significance to the movement away from John, while noted in scholarly literature, has not been remarked upon enough given the disappearance of the most important member of the Body Politic for John, the soul. Additionally, while Christine speaks nearly the same medieval religious language as John in her allusions to the “the literature of the period...to Scripture, mystery plays, songs, liturgy and saints' lives” (Forhan 1994, xx) and in her obvious strong personal devotion to the Virgin Mary (Brown-Grant 1999; Adams 2009), I will argue that, while she certainly was not the only writer to do so, she had lost the soul of the Body Politic; Althusius and Rousseau merely expand upon the logical political and religious implications of her thoughts.
3. THE BODY POLITIC OF CHRISTINE DE PIZAN

Christine de Pizan, the second Body Politic theorist in my developmental typology, is the ideal transitional figure in the change that I hope to trace from the Christian medieval theory of the Body Politic seen in John to the later Protestant theory in Althusius and finally to the secular theory of Rousseau. She, like John in the 12th century, is a mirror of the political and religious circumstances of her time, late medieval France. Christine's significance to the development of political theory usually is ascribed to her novel position as a female political writer in the patriarchal world of the late medieval period (Bell 1976). Her unique biography, as a widow with young children in need of financial support and her knowledge of court life from her childhood and marriage, provided her with the incentive and opportunity to enter the world of public letters. She earned a living and reputation while writing serious philosophical reflections on the state of women and of the political affairs in late fourteenth century and early fifteenth century France. She lived contemporaneously to Joan of Arc and some of her political writing was in support of the French side against the English in the Hundred Years War (Forhan 1994, xvi). By this time, emerging nationalism, especially in France and England, and the centralization of power that accompanied this development made the disjointed and local system that was medieval feudalism difficult to maintain (Ganshoff 1964, 160-167); it also provided a conceptual challenge to the earlier theory, seen to some degree in John's Body Politic, that had held: “In all centuries of the Middle Age Christendom, which in destiny is identical with Mankind, is set before us as a single, universal
Community, founded and governed by God Himself...it needs One Law and One Government” (Gierke 1987, 10). Additionally, papal schisms were damaging the hub of Christian unity (Schimmelpfennig 1992) and were leading to new theories of the Church. Finally, increased urbanization, with its attendant economic realities that changed the demographics of medieval France, gave an increased pertinence to the problems of merchants and other city-dwellers. Christine is mindful of all of these factors in her description of the Body Politic. I will contend that Christine, although clearly attached to many elements of traditional Catholic piety, sacramental life, and devotion, in her remedy for the ills of the Body Politic, her greater emphasis on the mercantile character of society, her assignment of the clergy to a different bodily component than John, and her use of classical cases of virtue in replacement of John's Christian examples mark a clear departure from the purely medieval conception of the Body Politic presented by John. And hereby the Body Politic begins to lose its soul.

Before turning to Christine's use of the Body Politic, I will continue my interpretation of the development of Western religious and political institutions that culminated in the previous chapter with institutional arrangement contemporary to John of Salisbury. As with John, I contend that Christine's Body Politic reflects the realities of her day and gives her prescription for their amelioration.

By Christine's time, c. 1363-1430, the religious and political institutions of Western Europe had experienced significant development from the time in which John was
writing. The papacy, which was at the height of its religious and political power in John's day, was experiencing significant internal and external challenges and difficulties (Schimmelpfennig 1992, 198-236). The Avignon Papacy and the Great Schism that resulted following the papal return to Rome are keys to understanding Christine's opinion of the clergy and her decision to remove them from their place in John's Body Politic. The Avignon Papacy was a direct result of the increased ability of local sovereigns to dominate church politics. This attempt to influence the affairs of the Church was not new as the Becket case from John's time illustrates. However, the changing political circumstances in England and France had given their monarchs a stronger hand:

At the end of the thirteenth century...the rulers of France and England, the two most important countries for the papacy, were no longer as interested in expanding their kingdoms as they were in consolidating their rule at home. That consolidation included the desire to subjugate and tax the clergy under their jurisdiction. To this end, they were supported in part by ecclesiastics of their kingdoms, since many prelates, and especially the lower clerics, felt first and foremost a kinship to their native country and therefore wanted to reduce the possibility of papal interference – an important indication of the future collaboration between ruler and church (Schimmelpfennig 1992, 170-171).

This resistance of the popes to this imposition on the clergy and the prerogatives of
Rome was crystallized in two bulls promulgated by Pope Boniface VIII, Clericis Laicos and Unam Sanctam (Canning 1996, 137-139). As in the Investiture Controversy, the civil and ecclesiastical sovereigns were at loggerheads about the position of the Church relative to secular authority. Like Gregory VII, Boniface VIII took a strong position on ecclesiastical supremacy; unlike Hildebrand, however, Boniface VIII lost his struggle with the secular power, and his next two successors backpedaled in their interpretations of the controversial bulls: the Avignon Papacy, in which the Popes were French and resided nearly within the geographical dominion of the French Crown, was the final result.

Although the removal of the papacy to Avignon seemed to signal an unprecedented ascendancy of French power, the victory was to be relatively short-lived, at least in terms of papal history, and the period that followed, c. 1378-1417, which included both the Great Schism in the Church and the royal power vacuum left by the death of Charles V in 1380, had a profound effect on the circumstances contemporary to Christine's life and writings (Forhan 1994, xiv). Following the death at Rome of Pope Gregory XI, the last Avignon Pope, and during the formative period for Christine in which she changed from a happily married young mother to a widowed and somewhat disillusioned woman of letters, nine men were elected pope in some capacity, with at least two of them reigning simultaneously and three claiming the papal chair against the other two towards the end: four of these were later declared antipopes, two of whom resided in Avignon. Further confusing the issue, the French king Charles VI, under the direction of his
uncles, declared French disobedience to the Avignon antipope in 1798 (Schimmelpfennig 1992, 232).

All of this confusion led to an increased enthusiasm for Conciliarism, the theory that papal authority was limited by councils, which had been growing in some quarters of the Church since the time of Boniface's difficulties (Canning 1996, 174). This movement drew at least the moderate support of Christine's friend, the Parisian churchman and preacher, Jean Gerson, who argued that the Church functioned best as a type Aristotelian mixed constitution, embracing monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements (Oakley 2006, 187) as opposed to a purely monarchical view of the papacy that had reached its zenith near the time of John's writing. Concilliarists held that, in the event of papal incapacity, councils could overrule his decrees; this was a controversial theory as it had always been the understanding of the Church that ecumenical councils themselves could only be declared such with papal approval (De Maistre 1850, 62-67). The Concilliarists were ascendant at the Council of Pisa and their election of Antipope Alexander V was their most important action. Christine's approval of this election is evident in her writing:

I beg once more for Thy holy Catholic Church, from which it has seemed for a long time that Thou has withdrawn Thy hand, that Thou may give to Thy servant Alexander, newly elected Thy vicar, and to those who may follow him judgment, power, strength, and good will so to govern the holy papal office that it may be to the profit of their souls and the furtherance
and augmentation of Thy holy faith, for the health of Christianity, and the restitutuion of its past ruin. Protect them in particular from the evil spirit of pride, vainglory, and greed. I beg this likewise for all prelates, priests, and those who have charge of souls, and indeed for all clergy. And mark me with the virtue of pity, so that I may be inclined to help, as I am able, all those who are in need (Christine de Pizan in Willard 1994, 331).

Although this episode finally was resolved in the uncontested election of Pope Martin V at the Council of Constance, called for this purpose by the assembled bishops with the agreement of the later-acknowledged Pope Gregory XII (Canning 1996, 181-182), it seems reasonable to assume that Christine's confidence in the clergy, especially those of her day, was never solid in the same way as was John's, even when one considers the implicit caveats that John provides about human weakness and his explicit warnings regarding ecclesiastical tyrants (John of Salisbury 1990, 194-201). Christine's lack of confidence may explain her reticence to assign the clergy the same importance in the Body Politic that John did. And, as I will develop in the next chapter on Althusius, the Schism, although healed internally by the reestablishment of papal unity, was a determining factor in the later break with Catholic unity and its political/religious theory accomplished in the Protestant Reformation (Belloc 1928, 33-36).

Christine's actual description of the Body Politic appears in the first chapter of Part One of the Book of the Body Politic. After specifying that her work is divided into three
parts, reflecting the division of her contemporary society into the Prince and his household, knights and nobles, and the universal people, Christine nearly recapitulates John's account (Nederman 2004, 74) of the Body Politic:

These three types of estate ought to be one polity like a living body according to the words of Plutarch who in a letter which he sent to the Emperor Trajan compared the polity to a body having life. There the prince and princes hold the place of the head in as much as they are or should be sovereign and from them ought to come particular institutions just as from the mind of a person springs forth the external deeds that the limbs achieve. The knights and nobles take the place of the hands and arms. Just as a person's arms have to be strong in order to endure labor, so they have the burden of defending the law of the prince and the polity. They are also the hands because, just as the hands push aside harmful things, so they ought push all harmful and useless things aside. The other kinds of people are like the belly, the feet, and the legs. Just as the belly receives all that the head and the limbs prepare for it, so, too, the activity of the prince and nobles ought to return to the public good...Just as the legs and feet sustain the human body, so, too, the laborers sustain all the other estates (Christine de Pizan 1994, 4).

Christine clearly is using John's Body Politic as described in the *Policraticus*, even mentioning the probably fictitious trope devised by John of a letter from Plutarch to
Trajan: it is likely that Christine, whose Latin proficiency is debated (Nederman 2007, 1), was working from a French translation of John's work, possibly the one authorized by Charles V, Christine's hero (Forhan 1994, xx).

Even though Christine employed John's device, she made some important updates and changes. First, as I mentioned earlier and will elaborate subsequently, Christine fails to mention the clergy in her Body Politic. This is a deviation from John and from classical antiquity, for John says in the *Policraticus*, “By all means, that which institutes and moulds the practice of religion in us and which transmits the worship of God...acquires the position of the soul in the body of the republic...just as the soul has rulership of the whole body so those who are called prefects of religion direct the whole body...Augustus Caesar himself was constantly subject to the sacred pontiffs” (John of Salisbury 1990, 66-67). She also does not mention the senate (Mussolff 2010, 95-96) that John (1990, 67) calls the heart of the republic nor does she refer to ears, eyes, and mouth that John designates the “judges and governors of provinces” (John of Salisbury 1990, 67). These two omissions reflect changes in the characteristics and conception of later medieval government: a fourteenth-century French monarch could not style himself a universal emperor (Ganshof 1964), and thus Christine would not have use for provincial governors; neither would she refer to a senate as the lack of a French republican tradition, evidenced by the weak and infrequently called estates-general, and the increasing trend toward French monarchical absolutism made the concept of such advisory bodies marginal if not superfluous. She mentions the belly of the Body Politic
in a more profound way than does John; this is reflection of the greater dignity that she assigns the merchant class, which was developing a desire for representation in the politics of the rapidly urbanizing later Middle Ages: “Merchants, students, and artisans...are beginning to be recognized as having a separate political and economic role in society” (Forhan 1994, xxiii).

Christine's description of the Body Politic has several profound implications for the practice of religion and the interplay between the religious and secular authorities. In some ways she is similar to John, but really she is the most important of the remaining authors that I survey, since she makes the critical break with the medieval balance that existed between universal religion, centered in the papacy, and local political control. She maintains the sacramental religion prescribed by John but in a way that seems to suggest its usefulness as a moral educator rather than as a means of efficacious and mediating grace; this tendency to make the religion a support rather than the principle of vitality, as it was for John, is present throughout her work: “Clearly, her organic model disposes her to count the priestly function as essentially a civil office, contributing to an idea of public welfare in which salvation and moral rectitude were not the sole aims of government” (Nederman 2007, 4). Her program for the education of the head of the Body Politic, the prince, suggests “he ought to take care that he rises early; that he hears Mass, says his Hours,” (Christine de Pizan 1994, 8), and that “theologians ought to speak to him about the law of the commandments and what one ought to hold and believe as a Christian, an sometimes he ought to hear sermons and reflections by clerics”
(Christine de Pizan 1994, 10). By this means and other practical engagements, the prince will be molded into a virtuous ruler.

For Christine, Charles V of France was the example of the virtuous Christian king. He made prudent use of the clergy in his deliberations:

For the adornment of his conscience, it was pleasing to him, who was circumspect in all things, to hear often in his conferences the masters of theology and divinity from all the orders of the Church, to listen to their words and to have around him these men whom he honored so much. He also greatly rewarded his spiritual father, a wise, just person of salutary learning whom he held in great respect (Christine de Pizan in Willard 1994, 235).

Charles' religious devotion, at least Christine's portrayal of it, is manifest in the following excerpt from Christine's posthumous biography, *The Book of the Deeds and Good Customs of King Charles V*, of the beloved French ruler, undertaken at the request of Charles' family:

He requested that Our Lord's crown of thorns be brought to him by the Bishop of Paris, and also the kings' coronation crown by the Abbot of Saint Denis. The one of thorns he received with great piety, tears, and respect and had it placed high above his head; that of coronation he had placed at his feet.
Then he began his prayer to the holy crown: 'O precious crown, diadem of our salvation, so sweet and honeyed is the satisfaction that you give, from the mystery that was embodied within you at our redemption; in truth may that One, with whose blood you were sprinkled, be favorable to me, as my spirit rejoices in the visitation of your holy presence!' And he said a long prayer very devoutly.

Afterwards, turning his words to the crown of France, he said, 'O crown! How inestimable you are and inestimably how very vile. Inestimable considering the mystery of justice, that you enclose within you and that you carry with such force, but vile and the vilest of all things considering the labors, deeds, anguish, torments, and pains of heart, body, conscience, and the perils of the soul that you give to those who wear you on their shoulders, an he who might truly see these things would rather leave you lying in the mud than lift you to be placed on his head.' There the king said many notable words, full of such great faith, devotion, and gratitude towards God, that all hearing them were moved to tears and great compunction (Christine de Pizan in Willard 1994, 244).

Christine's admiration for Charles V is also useful for examining her attitude toward the clergy. As discussed in the opening to this chapter, the Church at this time was torn
between rival popes in the Great Schism, with the French backing the prelates at Avignon and other nations, e.g. England, swearing allegiance to the popes reestablished in Rome. Although Christine seems to have a profound respect for some of the earlier popes, especially Pope St. Gregory the Great, as evidenced in her writing in the Book of the City of Ladies, her lack of confidence in contemporary prelates leads her to prescribe civil oversight of the clergy in the Book of the Body Politic:

He should examine carefully the promotions of the ministers, that he does not grant a request for a prebend, no matter how much affection he has for the individual who requests it, unless he knows him to be a good and prudent cleric and fit to serve God and his service. And so the prince ought to examine carefully whether he should give the office or not, or else it will be a heavy burden on his conscience and the cause of the damnation of those he promotes, when given to those who do not deserve it, rather than as is described by decree (Christine de Pizan 1994, 12).

Christine sees the direct oversight of the appointment of ecclesiastics as necessary, since:

But at present this rule is not followed, which is a pity, because God knows if sufficient worth and a just life are now the reason clerics are promoted. Certainly not; but rather promotions are given because of flattery, adulation, and other wickedness, by the requests of lords. Because of this, the ship is buffeted by the wind and ruined, because greed is the reason for their promotion. And even those in detestable and blind error are
promoted, which continues even today in the church (Christine de Pizan 1994, 12-13).

In the last portion of the above, Christine seems to grant doctrinal probity to the prince; this is an astounding deviation from the medieval ecclesiastical protocol and one that anticipates the Protestant principle of secular supremacy in religion, which Christine signals by calling the prince “the vicar of God on earth” (Christine de Pizan 1994, 12); this is a point that I will more fully describe in the next section on Althusius. One can only imagine that John would have been further scandalized by her vesting of such power in civil magistrates; John himself does not even mention such an idea, and the only discussion of questions of doctrine in his writings are those that occur in the ecclesiastical synods that he chronicled in his letters and Historia Pontificalis. Christine's departures from such medieval norms make her conspicuous in the political theory of the time:

Christine's use of the organic metaphor extends medieval precedent by imputing to it a noticeably secular orientation. Unlike her immediate source for the analogy, John of Salisbury's Policraticus, she makes no reference to the 'soul' of the body (that is, the priesthood), nor does she draw upon standard medieval depictions of the supremacy of the church to the temporal sphere. Of course, she expects that the king will honor God, and care for the churches within his jurisdiction. But the Corps de policie reverses conventional expectations by, for instance, asserting a corrective
role for the good ruler...This is consistent with Christine's conception of
the king as the ordainer and regulator of all the estates within the realm,
including the priesthood, and her identification of the clergy within the
body politic as one of the three branches of the common people. No other
late medieval thinker, with the exception of Marsiglio of Padua, was so
disposed to count the priestly function as essentially a civil office,
contributing to an expansive and secularist idea of public welfare in which
salvation and moral rectitude were not the sole aims of government
(Nederman 2000, 389).

Christine's general tepidity for the spiritual efficacy of sacramental religion, at least in
any public manner, and her preference for classical examples both give evidence to a
profound shift away from John's conception of the construction of a Christian Body
Politic to the point that she seems to assign them a mundane role:

To the modern reader this may appear unexceptional, but by comparison
with John of Salisbury's political “physiology,” it must have seemed
shocking. In his work, the clergy are the soul of the body politic, without
which the body is dead. The position of the clergy among the lower
“limbs” by Christine reveals her view that the clergy's role is a functional
one. They provide masses and prayers in the way that a baker provides
bread – important to society but not essential. Her society, both real and
ideal, has become much more secularized (Forhan 1994, xxii).
This failure to assign some positive analog to the human soul in her metaphor is perhaps the most startling element of her conception of the Body Politic. As I mentioned earlier, medieval religious philosophy understood the soul as the form of the body and the determinant characteristic of that body's life and end; John represented the soul's importance in his Body Politic by giving it the first place in the purpose of the republic and thereby assigning primary dignity to the clergy. Christine is simply silent on the soul of the Body Politic. She uses the word “soul” several times in her work; each time she represents the soul as the repository of virtue in the human essential form: “The good prince who loves the universal good more than his own should be liberal...it is good for the soul” (Christine de Pizan 1994, 26), and “There is no evil that sensuality will not attract the human spirit to do. It is that which extinguishes the judgment of reason and blinds the human soul, and it has no affinity nor connection with virtue (Christine de Pizan 1994, 37). Additionally, most of her uses of the term are in the context of advice to the prince for the promotion of his personal soul's health: “But when he (the prince) studies the law of God...he will warn himself about the perils of...gifts for the soul, that is, if he does not use them properly, he is lost” (Christine de Pizan 1994, 12), and “The good prince who loves God will carefully observe and keep the divine law and holy institutions in everything that is worthy and devout...to believe firmly that God will guard, defend, and increase him in virtue of soul and body” (Christine de Pizan 1994, 15). Since Christine clearly sees the prince as the model of virtue for the Body Politic, one may understand that she implicitly assigns the prince the role of the soul of
the Body politic. However, since she has already made him the head, it seems strange, especially given the clear distinction in John between the head and the soul, that she would not make an explicit argument for a metaphorical soul of the Body Politic.

Not only does Christine remove John's clerical soul from the Body Politic, but she also leaves the reader with the impression that virtue was the exclusive possession of pre-Christian rulers. Christine's work in the Book of the Body Politic is full of classical allusions and Valerius Maximus is the most often used source of exempla (Forhan 1994, xxi). While medieval writers, including John, were wont to use classical references and sources, there is a classical proclivity in Christine that overwhelms the reader and suggests an important negative lesson: Christian rulers, with rare exceptions such as Charles V, are not worthy of emulation. This is similar to the negative treatment of Christian women in Boccaccio's De Mulieribus Claris in which he seems to indict Christian women by leaving them conspicuously absent from his biographies of feminine virtue (Quilligan 1991, 194). Unlike John, whose inclusion of Constantine and other Christian rulers formed an important part of the lesson for the Body Politic in his Poliorcicus, Christine seems determined to steer her readers away from the example of past Christian princes.

With this negative treatment of past Christian rulers and her omission of John's clerical soul and senatorial heart, Christine's soulless, classical Body Politic seems prone to dissolving into some type of monarchical absolutism: "The Livre de Corps de
Policie...marks an important step in the secularization of the concept of political headship” (Musolff 2010, 96) in a way that would lead to figures like Henry VIII of England and the later development of the theory of the King's Two Bodies (Kantorowicz 1957). Althusius and Rousseau, I will argue later, would agree, and they make sure to assign the collective people the role of the soul in the Body Politic via the conception of popular sovereignty, thus preparing the way for modern republicanism. Although I agree with the absolutist implication, if not predilection, in Christine, some have argued for a notion of modern interest-based government in Christine's Book of the Body Politic:

Prior to Christine's work, only two solutions to the problem of good government had been proposed: the modified classical view in which the cultivation of idealized virtues would culminate in the good prince, or philosopher-king; or the medieval view that ordered institutions well administered by a virtuous and often clerical caste would ensure a just government.

Christine de Pizan rejects both of these views. Through her writings, she attempts to motivate the prince to consider pragmatic self-interest in governance so that his kingdom will be administered by non-clerics who are experts in their own fields, respected for their specialized knowledge, and rewarded appropriately, even if they are foreigners or women (Forhan 2002, 100).
But this move towards self-interest could be criticized, even if it may have limited implicitly monarchical absolutism, for removing the very classical virtues that Christine hoped to instill:

The subversion of the idealized virtues of the prince into something less glorious, whether termed prudence, expediency or self-interest, has often been remarked on in the work of that other Italian political writer and courtier Niccolo Machiavelli. Christine's subversion is less naked...but is nonetheless real...By contrast...John of Salisbury...stress(es) that governing out of self-interest is one of the hallmarks of the tyrant, not the good prince (Forhan 2002, 108).

In the end, perhaps Christine's attachment to monarchy, like the modern preference for democracy, owed more to contemporary familiarity than anything else: “Kingship in the Middle Ages had the kind of positive general associations that democracy does for us...Like democracy today, its implementation was riddled with implications and fraught with contradictions” (Forhan 2002, 76). Whatever Christine's reason for promotion of princely power, French monarchy was moving historically towards a more absolutist expression:

It is fitting that the first and most thoroughly argued medieval doctrines of royal absolutism were formulated on French soil, since it was in France that the myths and symbols of kingship that helped to give weight to these claims came to prominence. In the late medieval period France developed
its own “royal religion” to articulate the ties binding the nation and its
sovereign to God, creating for it a sacred office and destiny, and making of
its people a “holy race.” France's kings were not alone in having bestowed
upon them the title “most Christian,” but by the later Middle Ages they had
transformed the appellation from an occasionally employed honorific to
the regular defining designation of the monarch, the dynasty, and the
nation. But the use of the title, by itself, merely points to the ambitions of
French monarchs to assert their supremacy over all other European
powers, including the power of the church (Elwood 1999, 23).

The preference for monarchy and its tendency to absolutism, especially as divorced from
the limiting power of the papacy, will become more important in my analysis of the
Body Politic of Althusius and Rousseau, both of whom try to limit executive authority
without the remedy of the Catholic Church.

Christine's deviations from John's Body Politic may leave one with the impression that
she had broken completely with the Catholic tradition of the Middle Ages. In many
ways, I find that, by separating the clerical soul and its papal kernel from the Body
Politic, she has done just that as will become clearer with Althusius, whose break with
Catholic tradition was much more radical; but rather than leaving Christine's Body
Politic without a soul altogether, I find that she may have replaced, at least implicitly,
John's clerical soul of the Body Politic with the feminine soul described in the Book of
the City of Ladies and the Book of the Three Virtues.
Christine's literary autobiography, the *Vision of Christine de Pizan*, presents a detailed description of an image that she uses to describe the Kingdom of France:

Likewise, this said image can be taken for each individual human being according to the manner of language of the philosophers who called man the image of the microcosm. He is great in regard to creation because formed by God. He has his head in heaven; this is his spirit which comes from there and must strive for there. The stars with which his head is adorned are the virtues of the soul, such as understanding, knowledge, memory, and the others. His belly represents the exterior operations necessary to his life. His feet, which pace the depths, represent hell, to which he will fall if he is not careful. He has two conduits; these are the two natures, earthly and heavenly, or body and soul...

Similarly, the body of this image can be taken for the kingdom of France, which is large and forms a single body [politic]. His head, which is in the heavens, represents the Catholic faith, which from the early days has flourished and grown and been more honored in this realm than in any other spot. The stars around his head can signify the noble princes and barons. He has two openings, which signify the temporal and the spiritual. He paces the abysses, which indicate the abyss of the Scriptures and the sciences that are studied in schools, on which his fair government was
In light of the foregoing analysis of the *Book of the Body Politic*, one may find her strongly Catholic and religious language surprising. But in her autobiography, she explains her own religious journey from youthful frivolity and skepticism to mature faith (Willard 2005), and she gives a more comprehensive view of the life of the individual religious person than she does in *Book of the Body Politic*. Perhaps, as I have argued above, Christine simply did not trust the religious authorities of the day (Forhan 2002, 7), and she could not bring herself to counsel the Prince to turn to them as the guardians of the soul of the Body Politic in a work designed to give practical advise to the contemporary ruler, the young Charles VI, and as a guide for the training of his son, Louis de Guyenne (Forhan 1994, xvii). Clearly, as seen in the quote above, Christine generally endorses the Catholic faith as the necessary source of France's flourishing. However, she finds that the men of her day, especially the clergy, are not capable of promoting Christian virtue. Thus, she must turn to a feminine source of virtue, and naturally she finds the summit of that feminine virtue in the Blessed Virgin Mary, whom she makes Queen of her City of Ladies.

Although written at nearly the same time (Forhan 1994, xxvii), the *Book of the City of Ladies* is remarkably better than the *Book of the Body Politic*. In it, Christine clearly is more inspired: she seems exultant in her enthusiastic use of classical and Christian exempla, the latter so conspicuously absent from the *Book of the Body Politic*. She has
been described as returning Christian literature to its religious roots and drawing on sources such as Dante (Quilligan 1991, 194) to put before the reader inspiring tales of classical feminine virtue and Christian charity (Quilligan 1991, 198). She seems freer as an author in this work because here she finds an opportunity to vindicate a position for women for which she had been arguing since her experience in the Quarrel of the Romance of the Rose (Blumenfeld-Kosinski 2006), which represented everything that she and others believed was wrong with the contemporary treatment of women and conception of femininity generally. In that conflict, she and several other public voices, notably Gerson again (Anderson 2006), had been calling Christian society back to a more noble understanding of the worth and estimable place of women. She starts her book with a flurry of such arguments:

In the opening passages of the *The Book of the City of Ladies*, Christine repeatedly stresses how her experience and the experience of other women directly contradict the testimony of the authors regarding the character and conduct of women. This argument pitting women's experience against received tradition – an absolute first for a woman writer...represents a new twist on the questioning of the *auctoritas* of received writers that began with the rise of science in the twelfth century. It also points to the critical, experimental spirit, what Christine called the pioche d'inquisition, that is always present beneath the seemingly so conventional and staid surface of Christine's work. When one moreover recalls that Christine later cites the personal experiences of the very women most likely represented in this
scene, one begins to realize how Christine exploited convention to new ends (Richards 1998, 10).

Christine saw her argument in this work not as a pure novelty but as a restatement of Christianity's original message, since “Christine saw in Christianity a means of overcoming oppression” (Richards 1982, xxix). As such a restatement, Christine was reaching back to classics of Christian literature for support and authority: “Christine's title for The Book of the City of Ladies alludes directly to Augustine's City of God. By juxtaposing the two cities Christine did not intend that her City of Ladies rival the City of God, but that her political vision be understood as participating in a Christian tradition of political philosophy” (Richards 1982, xxix). Christine's descriptions of her City are remarkably close the traditional descriptions of the Church made by Augustine and others: “Thus your City will be extremely beautiful, without equal, and of perpetual duration in the world...this City...will never be destroyed, nor will it ever fall, but will remain prosperous forever, regardless of all its jealous enemies. Although it will be stormed by numerous assaults, it will never be taken or conquered” (Christine de Pizan 1982, 11). This is a clear parallel to the promise of Christ (Matthew 16:18) that His Church founded on the Rock of Peter would never fail though the gates of Hell should assail it. Christine even gives explicit statements that suggest a replacement of the clerical soul of John's Body Politic by her feminine soul of the City of Ladies: “God created the soul and placed wholly similar souls, equally good and noble in the feminine and masculine bodies” (Christine de Pizan 1982, 23). Of course this comment has a
superficial meaning that justifies the inherent moral equality of men and women in the sight of God, but as a conceptual key to understanding her omission of a soul in the Body Politic and her construction of such an analog as the City of Ladies is invaluable to the discriminating reader; and this squares with Christine's normal technique of including revolutionary ideas within seeming innocuous literary devices (Richards 1998, 10).

Throughout the Book of the City of Ladies, Christine provides readers with examples in which women have achieved dignity equal to men. Most striking for my thesis, that she is replacing John's male clerical soul with a feminine analog, are those times when she suggests an equal or even superior religious dignity for women as the instruments of God's grace and action. Her first such assertion concerns the prophecies of the ancient sibyls: “Foremost among the ladies of sovereign dignity are the wise sibyls, most filled with wisdom...What greater honor in revelation did God ever bestow upon any single prophet...than He gave and granted to those most noble ladies...They even spoke more clearly and farther in advance of the coming of Jesus Christ...than all the prophets did” (Christine de Pizan 1982, 99-100). For Christine, these women prophets sometimes had clearer visions than did the canonical male prophets of the Old Testament:

Among the sibyls, Erythrea had the greatest prerogative of wisdom...she described and prophesied several events to come so clearly that it seemed to be Gospel more than prophecy...for she foretold and clearly revealed the secret of God's powers, which had not been revealed by the prophets
except in figures and in obscure and secret words, which is to say, the profound mysteries of the Holy Spirit of the Incarnation of the Son of God in the Virgin...as well as all about His life and works, the betrayal, the capture, His being mocked, His death, resurrection, victory, and ascension, the coming of the Holy Spirit to the Apostles, His coming on the Day of Judgment. In this way she seemed to have expressed and composed in brief the mysteries of the Christian faith (Christine de Pizan 1982, 101-102).

Christine locates an instance of the salutary effect of feminine intercession and evangelization that would have had a singular effect on her French readers, the actions of Clotilda:

As for the great benefits brought about by women regarding spiritual matters...was it not Clotilda, daughter of the king of Burgundy and wife of the strong Clovis, king of France, who first brought and spread the faith of Jesus Christ to the kings and princes of France? What greater good could have been accomplished than what she did? For after she had been enlightened by the Faith, like the good Christian and holy lady she wasa, she did not cease to prod and beg her lord to receive the holy Faith and be baptized...She prayed so much that our Lord took pity on her affliction inspired King Clovis...he was baptized, along with all the barons and then all the people. From that hour on, thanks to the prayers of this good and
holy queen Clotilda, God has so generously bestowed His grace that the
Faith has never been defeated in France, nor than God, has there ever been
a heretic king – which has never been the case with other kings or with
many emperors – and this fact should be a source of great praise for the
French kings who are, for this reason, called “most Christian” (Christine
de Pizan 1982, 151-152).

The Virgin Mary is the summit of the feminine virtue for Christine, and as such she
rightly is Queen of the City:

'Christine, to tell the truth, it seems to me that you have worked
extraordinarily well at building the City of Ladies, according to your
capacities and with the aid of my sisters which you have put to excellent
use. Now it is time for me to undertake the rest, just as I promised you.
That is, to bring and to lodge here the most excellent Queen, blessed
among women, with her noble company, so that she may rule and govern
the City, inhabited by the multitude of noble ladies from her court and
household, for I see the palaces and tall mansions ready and furnished, the
streets paved to receive her most excellent and honorable company and
assembly. Let princesses, ladies, and all women now come forward to
receive her with the greatest honor and reverence, for she is not only their
Queen but also has ministry and dominion over all created powers after the
only Son whom she conceived of the Holy Spirit and carried and who is
the Son of God the Father. And it is right that the assembly of all women beg this most lofty and excellent sovereign princess to reside here below in her humility with them in their City and congregation without disdain or spite because of their insignificance compared to her highness. Yet, there is no need to fear that her humility, which surpasses all others, and her more than angelic goodness will allow her to refuse to inhabit and reside in the City of Ladies, and above all, in the palace already prepared for her by my sister Rectitude, which is constructed solely of glory and praise. Let all women now accompany me, and let us say to her:

"We greet you, Queen of Heaven, with the greeting which the Angel brought you, when he said, *Hail Mary*, which pleased you more than all other greetings. May all the devout sex of women humbly beseech you that it please you well to reside among them with grace and mercy, as their defender, protector, and guard against all assaults of enemies and of the world, that they may drink from the fountain of virtues which flows from you and be so satisfied that every sin and vice be abominable to them. Now come to us, Heavenly Queen, Temple of God, Cell and Cloister of the Holy Spirit, Vessel of the Trinity, Joy of the Angles, Star and Guide to those who have gone astray, Hope of the True Creation. My Lady, what man is so brazen to dare think or say that the feminine sex is vile in beholding your dignity? For if all other women were bad, the light of your
goodness so surpasses and transcends them that any remaining evil would vanish. Since God chose His spouse from among women, most excellent Lady, because of your honor, not only should men refrain from reproaching women but should also hold them in great reverence."

The Virgin replied as follows: 'O Justice, greatly beloved by my Son, I will live and abide most happily among my sisters and friends, for Reason, Rectitude, and you, as well as Nature, urge me to do so. They serve, praise, and honor me unceasingly, for I am and will always be the head of the feminine sex. This arrangement was present in the mind of God the Father from the start, revealed and ordained previously in the council of the Trinity' (Christine de Pizan 1982, 217-218).

Christine's devotion to the Virgin is notable in her other works, especially as she uses such devotion to express political messages: “Christine's prayer to the Virgin...is interesting because it reveals not personal but political piety, since each stanza pleads for a particular public figure” (Forhan 2002, 8). Perhaps this owes to Christine's understanding of a proper moral disposition for politics: “Like the Virgin, purity and erudition are the key elements of Christine's freedom, authority, and experience” (Richards 1998, 7).

In sum, although Christine's use of established stories of Christian women is not novel in itself, the Book of the Body Politic, shocking for its lack of soul and anti-clericalism, and
the *Book of the City of Ladies*, with its pervasive feminine virtue capped by the Virgin Mary, can be read together as suggesting a replacement of John's “masculine” clerical soul, which was debauched with the corruption that Christine describes, with a “feminine” soul based on virtue. Christine retains the priesthood for the sacramental administration necessary for eternal life, but she denies them the political function of promoting virtue. I believe that she meant for her readers, especially women, to understand that women, even without direct ordination, could fulfill the role of the clergy that John had given them: the dissemination and promotion of virtue in the Body Politic. This interpretation is supported further by Christine's use of examples in the *Book of the Body Politic* and the *Book of the City of Ladies*: As mentioned earlier, in the Body Politic, Christine focuses almost exclusively on pagan princes as paragons of virtue, while in the City of Ladies she uses both pagan as well as Christian women. In fact, the overwhelming inclusion of Christian women, especially virgin martyrs, and the assignment of the Virgin Mary as the Queen of the City of Ladies, imply a feminine hierarchy of didactic efficacy: a feminine magisterium, if you will, that is charged implicitly with instilling virtue into the Body Politic. Additionally, the use of these saints, including the Virgin Mary, is a much more significant construct than any mere literary device since the medieval, and current, Catholic devotion to the saints holds that they intercede for and protect those who call on them, and others (Quilligan 1991, 241) have argued that Christine literally is invoking the saints in the third part of the *Book of the City of Ladies*. Christine is reminding her readers that the Virgin Mary, as the Mother of God, is the greatest saint and that she stands as the example for all women,
virgins and mothers. One could push this argument further and assert that Christine's City of Ladies, with its recalling of men to a Christian treatment of women as part of their devotion to the Virgin, anticipates the Marian piety and works of mercy towards women displayed by later saints, such as Louis de Montfort, Maximilian Kolbe, and others. In any case, Christine, as a Christian in the later Middle Ages, certainly knew what she was doing by bring the Virgin Mary to her aid:

Mary was central to the identification and lives of medieval people in many different ways. There was the monk whose life of liturgical action and inner struggle found solace and inspiration in the Virgin Mary. There were nuns whose devotions were particularly attached to Mary as Christ's bride, and as Virgin, and other nuns who favored the fantasy of motherhood through immersion in Mary's own. There were dynasts who saw in Mary exalted royalty, and the promise of dynastic fecundity and health; and there was neighborhood Mary, at street-corners and in parish churches. This loving mother reminded people of the code of Christian life to which they must adhere and in which they so often failed. So much of the Christian story was told through the life of Mary that she became the quintessential symbol of Christian life: this meant that her enemies were those of every Christian (Rubin 2009, 46-47).

Her readers could hardly have missed the message that Christine was trying to convey: that dishonor to women is a stain on the Church and a disability in the Body Politic in
need of a remedy, which Christine seeks to provide in the *Book of the City of Ladies*. Her benediction to the City of Ladies, “Of it may be said, 'Gloriosa dicta sunt de te, civitas Dei’” (Christine de Pizan 1982, 254) leaves little doubt about its importance to her.

If the idea of a feminine analog to John's clerical soul of the Body Politic is implicit with the *Book of the City of Ladies*, it is overwhelmingly explicit and practical in the *Book of the Three Virtues*, also called the *Treasury of the City of Ladies*. This work, which is the natural expansion of ideas from the *Book of the City of Ladies* and is an advice book similar to the *Book of the Body Politic* (Willard 1989, 70), reads almost like a papal encyclical, which would begin by addressing prelates, bishops, priests, and the laity, and contain exhortations calling its readers to works of virtue and charity on behalf of the public:

'Blessed be those who will inhabit our city and swell the number of its virtuous citizens. May all of this College of Women learn Wisdom's lesson. Our first students must be those whose royal or noble blood raises them above others in this world. Inevitably, the women, as well as the men, whom God establishes in the high seats of power and domination must be better educated than others. Their reputations will lead to great worthiness in themselves and others. They are the mirror and example of virtue for their subjects and companions. The first lesson, therefore, will be directed at them – the queens, princesses, and other great ladies. Then,
step by step, we will begin to explicate our doctrine for women of the lower degrees, so that the discipline of our College may be useful to all' (Christine de Pizan 1989, 70).

In the same manner as the *Book of the Body Politic*, Christine begins by giving advice to members of the princely household, but this time it is the princess who is counseled:

Through charity, this great lady will be the advocate of peace between the prince, her husband (or her son, if she is a widow), and her people, those to whom she has a duty to offer her assistance. If the prince, because of poor advice or for any other reason, should be tempted to harm his subjects, they will know their lady to be full of kindness, pity and charity. They will come before her, humbly petitioning her to intercede for them before the prince (Christine de Pizan 1989, 84-85).

Similar to her advice to princes in the *Book of the Body Politic*, Christine advises princesses to frequent often the sacraments of the Church and to have intercourse with members of the clergy and religious persons:

The noble lady who takes pleasure in remembering or in speaking good words likewise will be pleased to listen to them; above all, she will delight in the words of God...Consequently, she will invite good, notable clerics to deliver sermons on feast days, sharing these with her daughters, ladies, and her whole family, desiring the refinement of her own knowledge of our
faith's articles, commandments, and ideas on Salvation (Christine de Pizan 1989, 93).

The wise princess will go to chapel to hear morning Mass either as often as her devotion dictates or her time allows (Christine de Pizan 1989, 94).

Remaining thus until the hour of Vespers, she will hear the service in her chapel if it is a feast day and if no other business detains her. In any case, she certainly will say prayers with her chaplain...After supper, toward bedtime, her thoughts will return in prayer to God. So will conclude the order of ordinary days for the prudent princess engaged in good and holy activity (Christine de Pizan 1989, 97).

In order to attend to his soul she will win the confidence of his confessor, to whom she can turn if she sees in her lord any indication of sin whose practice could lead to his perdition (Christine de Pizan 1989, 98).

The wise princess governing her affairs with Prudence’s guidance cultivates honor. This fifth teaching requires her to be in the good standing and good graces of the clergy, the religious orders, the prelates, the counsellors, the monks, the doctors, the bourgeoisie, and even the people...
Therefore she will learn which clerics, masters, and people in religious orders are the most capable and highly regarded, and which are the most respected for what they say. On occasion she will send for them, sometimes one, sometimes another, and converse with them amiably. Not only will she seek their advice but she will follow it. Inviting them to dine at her court, she will ask them to join the company of her confessor and other members of her chapel, themselves distinguished people, and will honor these guests, expecting her entourage also to render honor to them. Homage, after all, is fitting; those ennobled by knowledge should be venerated (Christine de Pizan 1989, 107-108).

While, again, this advice is similar to that given to princes in the *Book of the Body Politic*, it is noteworthy that Christine's advice here is much more detailed and voluminous, suggesting a greater importance to her as she is instructing the more important members of her feminine soul of the Body Politic. She even descends to minute details regarding the training of young princesses:

To teach and train the young princess the better for the salvation of her soul and her conscience, a good priest ought to be appointed for her, one knowledgeable in theology, prudent in habits, and inherently dependable in judgment – in short, an admirable man of impeccable character (Christine de Pizan 1989, 125).
First advice of all is to arise early. Then she will teach the young princess some good, short prayers which she will urge her to say upon getting up, hailing at the beginning of day Our lord and the Virgin...Then directing her to attend mass, she will have her say her Hours devoutly and attentively (Christine de Pizan 1989, 127-128).

Christine also affirms her Catholic faith by counseling princesses to establish institutions that can do good works and offer prayers for them and their loved ones, both now and after their deaths, thereby reducing their stays in Purgatory:

Not only will she entertain them but, according to her financial potential, she will make gifts to their communities and to their monasteries. Although alms normally should be given secretly so that the donor will not be encouraged in the mortal sin of vanity, nevertheless if the lady does not have undue pride in her heart, such gifts are best given openly rather than in secret. Overt giving sets a good example for others. Whoever so inspires other to give performs not only a good deed but doubles her own merit. Free of vanity, the lady would wish her important gifts and alms to be known and noticed publicly. Major benefactions include the reconstruction of churches, convents, or other religious necessities; and donations for memorials, paintings for the churches, and prayers to God on her behalf (Christine de Pizan 1989, 107-109).
The good princess becoming a widow will grieve and cry for her spouse, as good faith dictates. After the burial service she will follow custom's requirements and withdraw for a time in dim light, in piteous and mournful costume and headdress. Ever mindful of her lord's soul, she will pray and will have prayers said devoutly in masses. She will organize services, alms offerings, and oblations, and will recommend his memory to all devout people, requesting their prayers. Such remembrances and good deeds will not be limited to a brief period but will continue as long as she lives (Christine de Pizan 1989, 119).

After instructing princesses, whom one might consider her analog to prelates and bishops, Christine turns to the advising of those women who attend princesses and great ladies, perhaps as analogs to the priests assist bishops and extend their rule and influence:

Equally for ordinary women and great mistresses, it is important always to have the love and fear of Our Lord before their eyes in all their undertakings and ever in their memories. This will remind them of the blessings they receive from Him: the soul created in His image will possess the Kingdom of Heaven forever, if only they expend a little effort and care. God gives many gifts: the ability to know Him and to know what is good and evil; bodily strength to put the good into effect; health; and many other good graces. Women should be grateful for the the love they
owe Him. As the first Commandment says: 'You will love God above all things.' Women must never forget this love, nor the fear of the Lord, nor the grievous punishment from his justice, which imperils any creature who does not follow the straight path. This love and fear will protect them from vice and lead them to virtues, vanquish pride and enthrone humility, destroy anger and stimulate patience, eliminate avarice and substitute charity, root out envy and plant instead true love for neighbors. This love and fear will discourage idleness and encourage care and diligence to do good, and will make women despise gluttony and love sobriety, banish luxury and invite chastity. So it will endow these ladies with all virtues helpful to the soul while driving out vices which could harm it. Likewise, Worldly Prudence must order the manner of life of all ladies and demoiselles in a suitable fashion, each according to her estate. May they love honor, good reputation, and excellent praise as much as the princesses (Christine de Pizan 1989, 149-150).

Like priests, such serving women should guard the spiritual welfare of their superiors: “First of all she must love the good of her mistress's soul, encouraging her to do good and not giving her occasion to do the contrary” (Christine de Pizan 1989, 151). And like their mistresses, serving women are counseled to partake of the sacraments of the Church, in much the same manner that priests are counseled to say the Mass daily:

This wise mistress of the household will arise early; having heard mass,
said prayers, and returned home, she will give orders to the servants according to the requirements of the day...For the good of her soul and the virtue of charity, she will not limit her gifts to only these castoffs, but often will give wine and meat from her own table to poor women in childbed, to invalids, and to her poorer neighbors. Wisely, as her resources permit, she will realize that the virtue of this almsgiving is the only treasure she can take with her from this world (Christine de Pizan 1989, 188).

What can the good servant do to be worthy to be saved? Rightfully, she should go often to church and there say her prayers. But certainly she must remember that God, who knows and sees all, asks only for the heart. And whoever gives her heart to Him will not fail to prosper. But even the one whose heart is imperfect still can save herself by avoiding all ugly, damaging sins; by remaining loyal in deed and word to her master and mistress; by serving them with diligent care; and by saying her Pater Noster and other prayers, even while performing her duties. Therefore, she who cannot be in church in person can have her heart there through her good intentions. Nevertheless, hardly anyone is so busy that if she really want to arise early she will not have time to hear a Mass on most days, commending herself to God, then returning to her household tasks. By so conducting herself, and with other good works, a good servant certainly will assure her own salvation (Christine de Pizan 1989, 212).
Finally, Christine turns her attention to the lowest members of society, the feet of the Body Politic, peasants and laborers. But here, instead of merely mentioning their physical labors, like in the *Book of the Body Politic*, Christine is instructing the female members of this class to act as guardians of virtue and thus can be considered her deaconesses in the City of Ladies; they have a more modest knowledge of Christian virtue, but their job, like male deacons of the Church, is to serve its most needy members:

Humble women living in the village, on the plains, or in the mountains!
You often cannot hear what the church preaches about salvation except from your priest or chaplain in his brief Sunday instruction...

Know, first of all, that there is a single God: all powerful, completely good, just, wise, from whom nothing is hidden, and who rewards every being for good or evil according to what she deserves. He alone should be perfectly loved and served. Because He is so good, He holds agreeable all the service laid before Him with good heart. Because He is so wise, He recognizes everyone’s potentialities; if the heart is in it, it is enough for each to do for Him with pure devotion whatever she is able. Some among you, by whose labor the world gains its sustenance and nourishment, have neither leisure nor ability to serve Him through fasting, saying prayers, or attending church, as do the women in the larger towns. Yet you have as
great a need of salvation as they. You must serve Him in another manner...

Whole-heartedly and willingly, as you love Him, you must be sure that you do not do unto your neighbors or others what you would not have them do unto you. You must admonish your husbands to do likewise...

Go to church whenever possible, pay tithes to God faithfully (and not with the worst things), and say Pater Nosters. Live in peace with the neighbors, without perpetual lawsuits over trifles – as has become the habit of many villagers who seem never happy unless they are in court. Believe in God, and pity those in trouble. By following these paths, all good people can ensure their salvation, men as well as women (Christine de Pizan 1989, 219-221).

Christine is an enigmatic character in the history of political thought and in my typology. She is a woman who both accepts and rejects convention and tradition. She rejects John's clerical male soul of the Body Politic, but she does not yet seem to abandon the religious objectives of that arrangement. Although her support for the papacy is unorthodox at best, she keeps the Catholic sacramental religion, even while harrowing its male administrators. Her construction of a female soul of the Body Politic in the Book of the City of Ladies and the Book of the Three Virtues, even if it is not an explicit replacement of the male clergy, is revolutionary, and the popularity of these works, even
in modernity (Forhan 19994, xvii), marks them as perhaps her greatest literary achievements. For my analysis, Christine stands as a pivotal figure, for with her the papacy begins its disappearance from the political synthesis that was the hallmark of the Middle Ages, and her implicit censure of priests, as incapable of promoting the virtue necessary in the Body Politic, marks the beginning of their removal from the Body Politic in the greatly restricted sacramental practice of Althusius and completed in their abject rejection by Rousseau. And with their departure, the Body Politic further loses its soul and indeed, as I will argue in the next chapter on Althusius' Body Politic, its clear identity as a living body with a naturally coherent form.
4. THE BODY POLITIC OF JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS

Johannes Althusius, the early 17th century Calvinist political writer most known for his activities as Syndic of Emden, is the third author in my development of the Body Politic. Althusius’ conception of the Body Politic differs from those the previous two authors and signals an important theoretical shift from the medieval to the modern: the preference for individuality and diversity to unity as “the epoch of medieval Christian universalism was ever more rapidly coming to an end, giving way, albeit not without considerable resistance, to the rise of the European territorial state system” (Hueglin 1999, 29). His politics can be hard to characterize. Indeed Althusius did not even describe the state explicitly as a Body Politic, at least not in the clear way that John and Christine did. Among the conceptual arguments that I must make in this chapter, the assertions that his theory, while not using the term Body Politic, can be understood as such, and that it is the natural consequence of that metaphor stripped of so many of its Christian and medieval essentials, are of signal importance to my development in this work. After establishing that Althusius is in fact a Body Politic theorist, I will examine the religious and political consequences of his description of the Body Politic. As I mentioned in the ending of the last chapter, Althusius, in my typology, marks the end the medieval and the beginning of the modern; but there were enough remnants of the medieval system, including a scaled-down but still Christian theory of the state, to reserve to Rousseau, among my four authors, the designation of a purely modern and secular theory of the Body Politic. However, before entering into the two conceptual
tasks just described, I will continue my sketch of the religious and political institutions of Christendom that had continued to break apart and develop following the resolution of the Great Schism discussed in the last chapter.

To this point in my historical interpretation of the religious and political institutions of Christianity, the papacy has played the preeminent role. This owes to the primacy it achieved following the showdown of Pope Gregory VII with the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV in the Investiture Controversy and the bureaucratic innovations that eventually allowed the active administration of papal monarchy in the Christian West (Ullmann 1972; Pennington 1984). By the time that John of Salisbury was writing, the popes had reached the zenith of their prestige and ability to affect the temporal affairs, especially as they related to the Church, of the princes of Christendom. But, as I described in the last chapter on Christine, the kings of England and France gradually were able to wear down their disadvantages with Rome and the Avignon Papacy and the Great Schism that followed the papal return there greatly weakened the perceived authority and stability of the institution. Perhaps it is not surprising then that within one hundred years of the election of Martin V at the Council of Constance as the solution to the Great Schism, Christendom entered into the trial that eventually shattered Western Christian unity until the present, the Protestant Reformation. With this epochal event the papacy as a political actor ended a mode that it had assumed in the West for approximately 1000 years: “It was a Leo who by the principles he evolved set the medieval papacy on its triumphant career, and it was a Leo [X] in whose pontificate the papacy ingloriously
ended the phase initiated by the Great Leo” (Ullmann 1972, 326).

The Reformation, like the later World War I that removed the last vestiges of the political system built up during medieval Christendom, was one of those historical events that was so consequential and multifaceted that it evades an easy explanation of its causes, and it even defies a single name. Additionally, again like World War I, the Reformation had many historical precursors but exceeded them in magnitude and outcome; in both cases, the world was a different place after their occurrences. In reality the Reformation, as I will discuss subsequently, was characterized by several different doctrinal positions and institutional expressions, but these variants found common cause in their rejection of papal primacy, which some have argued (De Maistre 1850, 304) always is the characteristic of schismatic groups in Christian history, even when they seem widely theologically divergent. Following the Reformation, it became difficult for Christians in large parts of Europe and later America even to conceive of the Church as a visibly united entity in the same way that it was in every prior age, at least in the West, subsequent to the advent of the Gospel; instead Christendom became a patchwork of confessions under the political doctrine of the cuius regio, eius religio formulation in the Augsburg Treaty of Religious Peace in 1555 (Hueglin 1999, 29). Since I will discuss the political implications of Althusius' theory later in this chapter, I will start with an examination of the nature of the religious differences between Catholic religion and its reinterpretation by the Protestant Reformers. While these changes are doctrinal at root, the practical changes in liturgy and the everyday conception of the Church for its
adherents mark a social revolution that had profound impacts on the way in which people conceived of the Body Politic since persons of this period often “expressed themselves more readily in rite and symbol than in word and argument” (Morris 1973, 842).

The Protestant Reformation, although united in its rejection of papal authority, was not really a single, coherent historical movement but rather a conceptual amalgamation of actions (Belloc 1928, 9-63) that resulted in three major alternative types to the religious and political synthesis of the Middle Ages: the Anglican, the Lutheran, and the Calvinist (Spitz 1985). The Anglican and Lutheran retained a greater degree of the sacramental practice and theology and their institutions require the use of priests; the sacramental priesthood in these two variants was accompanied, both in Luther's advice to princes (Hopfl 1991) and especially in the Anglican case, by the political principle of divine monarchy (Hanson 1970; Bloch 1973). Calvinist theology rejects the sacramental priesthood (Belloc 1928, 126) and Calvinist politics reject divinely instituted monarchies as the only means to rule a Christian people, even though the second rejection is less explicit than the first. This tripartite typology represents the political exigencies of the period: the British monarchy and the German princes would never have endorsed theologies and religious practices critical of princely rule, while Geneva was a fertile ground for republican political ideas (Monter 1967). In reality, Calvin himself initially was not opposed fundamentally to princely government, as can be seen by his recommendation of his theology to King Francis I of France in the dedicatory epistle
(Calvin 1975, 1-19) to the *Institutes of the Christian Religion* and in his later discussion of the variety of forms, including monarchy, which God has ordained for the benefit of humanity (Calvin 1975, 284-311). But by the time of Althusius, a generation or so after Calvin's death, the anti-monarchical tendency inherent in Calvinist religion (Walzer 1965; Skinner 1980) and politics had become manifest. The Dutch states had used Calvinism and Calvinist political principles in their dispute with the Spanish monarchy. The presbyterian principle of church polity adopted by early Calvinist congregations gives witness to its republican character (Belloc 1928, 138). Presbyterianism rejects the more monarchical idea and tradition of episcopacy with its hierarchy of bishops, priests, deacons, etc. To some degree or another, each variant of Protestant religion rejects some element of Catholic religion and its sacraments. It is the rejection of the sacramental principle that leads to the rejection of episcopacy and the vesting of religious and political sovereignty in the individual. As I will expand upon subsequently in this chapter and later in the chapter on Rousseau, once the sacramental religion of medieval Catholicism, with its doctrine, institutions, and practice protected by a theory of papal primacy, was rejected, Christian religion dissolved quickly into either a state-established set of doctrines and institutions or an anarchy of private opinion: “The bond of unity being once broken, there is no longer a common tribunal, nor consequently an invariable rule of faith. Everything resolves itself into private judgment and civil supremacy…” (De Maistre 1850, 304). This development made it very difficult for Althusius and Rousseau to construct a soul of the Body Politic that had any transcendental character capable of producing an enduring theory of the institutions of the state as something
other than a temporary accumulation of parts for Althusius and individuals for Rousseau.

The sacramental principle is bound up with the idea of physical mediation of grace by certain positive rites performed by ministers of those rites (Pelikan 1971, 162). To this extent, Calvin himself would agree, for to him a sacrament is “an outward sign by which the Lord represents and attests to us his good will toward us to sustain the weakness of our faith” (Calvin 1975, 118). And Calvin did not reject the sacramental principle wholesale; he retained a partially sacramental teaching on the rites of baptism and the Eucharist (Elwood 1999, 56-76). But his rejection is profound, both in the nature of sacramental mechanics: “It is not because the gifts have been endowed with the natures of things set forth to us in the sacraments, but because sealed by God to this signification” (Calvin 1975, 118). In practice, in comparison with that of the priestly retention of the Anglican and Lutheran Protestant variants, and especially with the original Roman Catholic understanding of the interconnectedness of the various sacramental expressions, his system lacks almost all of the following:

The Incarnation is the antecedent of the doctrine of Mediation, and the archetype both of the Sacramental principle and of the merits of Saints.

From the doctrine of Mediation follow the Atonement, the Mass, the merits of Martyrs and Saints, their invocation and cultus. From the Sacramental principle come the Sacraments properly so called; the unity of the Church, and the Holy See as its type and centre; the authority of Councils; the sanctity of rites; the veneration of holy places, shrines, images, vessels,
furniture, and vestments. Of the Sacraments, Baptism is developed into Confirmation on the one hand; into Penance, Purgatory, and Indulgences on the other; and the Eucharist into the Real Presence, adoration of the Host, Resurrection of the body, and the virtue of relics. Again, the doctrine of the Sacraments leads to the doctrine of Justification; Justification to that of Original Sin; Original Sin to the merit of Celibacy. Nor do these separate developments stand independent of each other, but by cross relations they are connected, and grow together while they grow from one. The Mass and Real Presence are parts of one; the veneration of Saints and their relics are parts of one; their intercessory power and the Purgatorial State, and again the Mass and that State are correlative; Celibacy is the characteristic mark of Monachism and of the Priesthood. You must accept the whole or reject the whole; attenuation does but enfeeble, and amputation mutilate. It is trifling to receive all but something which is as integral as any other portion; and, on the other hand, it is a solemn thing to accept any part, for, before you know where you are, you may be carried on by a stern logical necessity to accept the whole (Newman 1909, 93-94).

Calvin rejected nearly the whole of the Roman Catholic sacramental religious institution, but amazingly he retained, and was able to enforce in Geneva during his lifetime, the formal commitment to a Christian polity. I argue that Calvin's success in maintaining a public Christian form can be attributed to two main characteristics of his contemporary
Calvin differed from some of the more radical Reformed thinkers in his sacramental theology. He maintained that the sacraments that he retained, baptism and the Eucharist, although signs, do work to communicate God's grace to the recipient: “The signs are efficacious not because of an inherent capacity but in the sense that they are the instruments God has chosen to attest the genuine operation of the Spirit's power to unite believers with the body of Christ” (Elwood 1999, 71). As I have already mentioned, the Calvinist segment of the Reformation was part of the anti-clerical faction that rejected the ministry of the priest; but within that portion of Reformation thought, Calvin's sacramental theory is amazing close to requiring a sacramental priesthood. For if the sacraments be efficacious instruments of grace, who may dispense them? Calvin certainly did not conceive of the ubiquitous administration of the Eucharist by any person wishing to declare it; his own liturgical prescriptions for the worship that he oversaw in Geneva maintained a strict discipline regarding the performance of communion by the authorized minister of the word (Calvin 1957, 503). Due to this unique position, he had to walk a fine line between defenders of the medieval sacramental understanding and those that radically rejected it: “Over against the Catholic and Lutheran emphasis on the 'objective' efficacy of the sacrament, Calvin pointed to the efficacy of the Spirit and the necessity of believing reception; over against Anabaptists and spiritualistic 'subjectivism' he stressed the instrumentality of the sacrament” (Janse
While Calvinism had a unique sacramental teaching, it was united, as I mentioned above, with the other branches of the Protestant Reformation in its rejection of papal government of the Church and especially antagonistic towards papal claims to temporal jurisdiction. Calvin's treatment on the papacy in the *Institutes* basically is a long critical commentary on Gratian's *Decretum* and the other formal statements by the Church that had accrued in the long accumulation of administrative centralization that had made possible the papal monarchy in John's time. He holds that whatever legitimate authority was exercised initially by the bishops of Rome as the successors of the apostles, the papacy as a monarchic institution was created by the connivance of ambitious popes such as Leo and Gregory (Calvin 1957, 374). While Calvin may have been supported in this argument by other critics of papal monarchy, such as conciliarists, he had a great difficulty: he had to prove that the original grant of authority to the bishops that succeeded the apostles was based on a strict adherence to the original doctrine, or word of God, as gleaned from the Bible by himself. Otherwise, he would not have been able to justify their replacement by himself and other ministers that he judged faithful to the original doctrine of scripture. And he did make this argument explicitly: “But if this power of the church which is here described be contrasted with that which spiritual tyrants, falsely styling themselves bishops and religious prelates, have now for several ages exercised among the people of God, there will be no more agreement than that of Christ with Belial” (Calvin 1957b[1559], 395-396). But again, the problem presents
itself: who will declare Calvin a minister of the word and give him the institutional authority to try his scheme? The town council of Geneva answered that call, and Calvin's sacramental and ministerial theories were best tried by their institution at Geneva; there they set the model for later Calvinist political theories, like that of Althusius.

Calvinism was not just a new means of practicing Christianity; it was a new way of life: “What Calvin did was to produce a church, a creed, a discipline, which could be set over against...the native church, creed, and discipline of Christian civlisation” (Belloc 1928, 120). Debates on Christian doctrine during the Reformation period were so bitter because the practice of religion during this time had immense social and political implications: “The reason that men combat heresy is....that the heresy, in so far as it gains ground, will produce a way of living and a social character at issue with, irritating, and perhaps mortal to, the way of living and the social character produced by the old orthodox scheme” (Belloc 1938, 8). Calvin's experience in Geneva sheds light on the stakes involved, for “he made of Geneva another Rome. He provided a pole of energy and a nucleus for the struggle that was opening against orthodoxy; but he did it by making a new orthodoxy” (Belloc 1928, 125).

Calvin arrived in Geneva in 1536 as a religious refugee from France, fleeing the the official persecutions ordered in 1535 (Hueglin 1999, 30). He had planned to stop only briefly there, but he was persuaded by the Reformer Farel to stay and assist Geneva's
implementation of a Reformed religious practice. His eloquence in oration and writing made him quickly popular, but his reforms were resisted by the town council and he was asked to leave after only a brief stay. After a peaceful several years in Strasbourg, he was begged to return as the council was desperate to repair a swiftly deteriorating religious establishment that had lacked direction following his departure. He returned triumphant and was able to institute nearly all of his religious program even though the council was not completely docile in every respect and prevented some marginal requests such as weekly celebration of the Lord's Supper. Calvin, upon his actual return, insisted upon the recognition of the officers of the church as directors of an organization distinct from the city council: “The Ordinances defined the functions of the four officers of the church (pastors, teachers, elders, and deacons) and prescribed the method of their election and correction. This ecclesiastical constitution divided the city into parishes, and provided for systematic worship, discipline, sacraments, religious and intellectual training of children...” (Foster 1908, 422). The Genevan Council resisted this separation of power and, for a long time, continued to refer to the elders as “deputies of the council;” these men and the pastors formed the consistory that was to exercise religious discipline, at least in theory, without political interference: “The Ordinances indicate a growing emphasis on the distinction between church and state...here once more we find the sane combination of liberty and law which characterizes Calvin and the Puritan states where Calvinism took root and bore fruit” (Foster 1908, 423).

Once established in Geneva, Calvin's program had a chance to set the example for a total
religious, political, social system. The religious aspect focused on a high degree of
citizen piety with education of the young in his catechism and monitoring of adult
morals by his group of elders. Religious attendance was compulsory several times per
week. The essence of the service was austere and focused on the sermon. The political
life of the town reflected Calvin's later preference for an aristocratic/democratic mixture
with an emphasis on the aristocratic element represented by the several town councils.
While the council had a voice in religious matters via the consistory, the political
authority was not to interfere with religious decisions of the ministers. Socially, the well
noted Puritan disdain for entertainment and most aesthetic pursuits and its preference for
productive labor was reenforced by ordinances against theater and mandatory work laws.
Calvin's views on money-lending were also important for later Calvinist or Puritan
states: “Calvin declared that interest-taking was right and not unscriptural...the effect of
such an interpretation was of great economic importance, for it gave Calvinists who
accepted it, including the two great commercial nations, the Dutch and the English, a
decisive economic advantage over Catholics...who still clung to the canon law
prohibiting interest-taking” (Foster 1908, 426). Calvin's influence in Geneva was
profound and most of his program remained intact for at least a generation as it was
continued by Beza.

While Calvin's Geneva gave a practical example for later Calvinist thinkers, the attitude
that he helped introduce into the European religious and political controversy was
perhaps his greatest addition to it: “Calvin's ultimate contribution lay not so much
The temper of mind has survived the dogma. Calvin's searching examination of premises and his unflinching drawing of conclusions inevitably tended, in religion and education, to develop a spirit of re-examination and eventually a denial of premises. A like spirit in the domain of law led to enforcement, to repeal or to revolution” (Foster 1908, 395). The revolutionary character of Protestant sacramental teaching is especially noteworthy in the case of its rejection of the Catholic meaning of the Eucharist:

The eucharist, the sacrament of the body and blood of Jesus Christ, was the focus of more theological controversy in the sixteenth century than any other item of Christian confession and practice. It provoked dispute in print, public speech, and popular songs; among professional theologians and ordinary men and women. In the cities and towns of France, people rioted, fought, killed and died over theological definitions of the eucharist. But this symbol was no simply the site upon which political struggles were concentrated. To a large extent, it served as the catalyst for those struggles. The eucharist and the meanings attached to it created particular habits of thought and action that shaped the political understanding and commitments of men and women in the sixteenth century. In its Calvinist interpretation, the eucharist created the environment that made social and political revolution possible (Elwood 1999, 3-4).

The power of the Eucharistic teaching was not only negative, destroying the
previous social behaviors that revolved around the sacraments generally and the chief sacrament in particular, rather, it “created a conceptual framework for the new, revolutionary modes of social and political thought and activity that convulsed European societies at the dawn of the modern age” (Elwood 199, 5).

The Catholic sacramental system was not only the cornerstone of formal religious service; it was also the catalyst of the popular culture that grew in connection with it. Feast days for local saints increased the pious religious observance of locals while strengthening their commitment to the universal Church that sanctioned and declared such saints. Events, such as processions of the sacred Eucharist about the common areas of the city, illustrate the power of the sacramental system to spawn cultural auxiliaries:

The real focal point of Corpus Christi, as far as the great masses of the laity was concerned, was not so much the celebration of the Mass as the procession in which the sacred host was carried out of the church and through the main streets of the city or town. The entire community was expected to participate in this event. For common folk this meant, at a minimum, decorating the route of the procession with appropriate hangings and tapestries, and appearing to witness the spectacle and show reverence for Christ's body. For people of means it meant participating in the procession itself. Members of guilds and confraternities, as well as municipal magistrates, all joined in the cortege, usually in positions that
reflected and reinforced the established hierarchy. The mood in many cases was celebrative and boisterous...Bells were rung, and hymns praising the mystery of Christ's body were sung (Elwood 1999, 16-17).

The religious institution of the Catholic liturgy and its social auxiliaries, such as religious houses and public festivals, required an enormous material support. By the later Middle Ages, some estimates place the financial worth of the combined European religious institution at perhaps 1/5 of the total wealth of Christendom (Belloc 1928, 208). Calvin's religious ideas, with their great reduction in liturgical aids, ornamentation, and rejection of monasteries, chanteries, etc. provided a lucrative financial inducement for their acceptance: if Calvinism was to replace Catholicism, all of that accumulated wealth had to go somewhere. The English example of Henry VIII's dissolution of the monasteries and the distribution of the proceeds to the nobility and a similar seizure of religious endowments by the Lutheran princes of Northern Germany had provided the continental aristocracy a powerful incentive for at least considering a religious change (Belloc 1928, 154). Perhaps it is no surprise that Calvinism in France and the Netherlands tended to concentrate itself among the nobility and merchant classes.

Taken together, the rejection of papal authority, much of the sacramental doctrine and practice of Catholicism, and the revolutionary zeal that spilled over into the political arena, Calvinism was a powerful force for social and political change that was suggested itself to communities and thinkers looking for theories of separation from previous
norms:

Given in the first place a great leader of men tending toward a more representative form of government in both church and state, second, an unflinching system of re-examining premises and drawing conclusions, and it is not difficult to foresee that such followers of such a leader and system would inevitably tend to develop liberty and self-government far beyond the leader's personal plans for his own generation (Foster 1908, 395-396).

Althusius' Calvinist theological and political education would provide him with the material to construct the political theory in his *Politica Methodice Digesta* that led to his installation as Syndic of Emden in its struggle against imperial Spain. This theory forms the third instance of the Body Politic in my development.

The city of Emden provided a unique opportunity for Althusius to put some of the political ideas I will examine into action. It was an area touched profoundly by the political and religious circumstances of the early Reformation. It had a Lutheran provincial lord, a Catholic emperor, and a significant Calvinist population (Carney 1995, xi). As a seaport, it was in close communication with England as it was experiencing its vicissitudes in and out of the Catholic fold that followed the reign of Henry VIII and the succession crisis following his death that resulted from his multiple marriages that produced heirs of differing competencies and religious confessions. Emden had been a
hotbed of Reformation thought as many Dutch Protestant intellectuals had fled there, and
with the cities of the northern Low Countries, Emden was on the front lines of the
religious and political conflict that formed the strategic crux of the Reformation (Belloc
1928, 128). The town council of Emden recognized Althusius' theory in the Politica as
potentially beneficial and he was invited there as Syndic not long after its publication in
Herborn in 1603; Althusius' theory has been called the “only theory of the Dutch Revolt
ever written” (Kossmann 1977, 45). It was there that, much like Calvin's religious
theory was in Geneva, Althusius' Body Politic was tried with practical consequences.

Althusius' use of organic language in describing the political association in the Politica
is perhaps the greatest argument for considering him a Body Politic theorist. As I
discussed in the introduction, the Body Politic metaphor suggested itself to its first users
since it was a tangible means for expressing an organic unity and diversity that exists for
the sake of functional utility. Additionally, it has been suggested by scholars that the use
of organic descriptions of the state imply an understanding of body-like unity (Goggans
2005, 533). Althusius, in many places, describes political life as a means for
harmonizing diversity into a coherent whole. He begins to use language remarkably
similar to the Body Politic in his discussion of rulership and the origins of the political
association:

The ruler, prefect, or chief directs and governs the functions of the social
life for the utility of the subjects individually and collectively. He
exercises his authority by administering, planning, appointing, teaching,
forbidding, requiring, and diverting. Whence the ruler is called rector, director, governor, curator, and administrator. Petrus Gregorius says that just as the soul presides over the other members in the human body, directs and governs them according to the proper functions assigned to each member, and foresees and procures whatever useful and necessary things are due each member – some useful privately and at the same time to all or to the entire body, others useful publicly for the conservation of social life – so also it is necessary in civil society that one person rule the rest for the welfare and utility of both individuals and the whole group...

Government by superiors considers both the soul and the body of inferiors: the soul that it may be formed and imbued with doctrine and knowledge of things useful and necessary in human life, the body that it may be provided with nourishment and whatever else it needs...

Thus the needs of body and soul, and the seeds of virtue implanted in our souls, drew dispersed men together into one place. These causes have built villages, established cities, founded academic institutions, and united by civil unity and society a diversity of farmers, craftsmen, laborers, builders, soldiers, merchants, learned and unlearned men and so many members of the same body. Consequently, while some persons provided for others, and some received from others what they themselves lacked, all came
together into a certain public body that we call the commonwealth, and by mutual aid devoted themselves to the general good and welfare of this body (Althusius 1995, 20-23).

While the above quote contains many elements of the Body Politic argument, Althusius later characterizes the nature of universal association in a manner almost identical to John and Christine's descriptions of the Body Politic:

In this association many cities and provinces obligate themselves to hold, organize, use, and defend, through their common energies and expenditures, the right of the realm in the mutual communication of things and services. For without these supports, and the right of communication, a pious and just life cannot be established, fostered, and preserved in universal social life.

Whence this mixed society, constituted partly from private, natural, necessary, and voluntary societies, partly from public societies, is called a universal association. It is a polity in the fullest sense, an imperium, realm, commonwealth, and people united in one body by the agreement of many sybiotic associations and particular bodies, and brought together under one right. For families, cities, and provinces existed by nature prior to realms, and gave birth to them....
The members of a realm, or of this universal symbiotic association, are not, I say, individual men, families, or collegia, as in a private or a particular public association. Instead, members are many cities, provinces, and regions agreeing among themselves on a single body constituted by mutual union and communication. Individual persons from these group members are called natives, inhabitants of the realm, and sons and daughters of the realm. They are to be distinguished from foreigners and strangers, who have no claim upon the right or the realm. It can be said that individual citizens, families, and collegia are not members of a realm just as boards, nails, and pegs are not considered parts of a ship, nor rocks, beams, and cement parts of a house. On the other hand, cities, urban communities, and provinces are members of a realm, just as prow, stern, and keel are members of a ship, and roof, walls, and floor are essentials of a house...

The bond of this body and association is consensus, together with with trust extended and accepted among the members of the commonwealth. The bond is...a tacit or expressed promise to communicate things, mutual services, aid, counsel and the same common laws to the extent that the utility and necessity of universal social life in a realm shall require. Even the reluctant are compelled to comply with this communication...For the promise of so many different men and orders has as its purpose that the
diverse actions of the individual parts be referred to the utility and
communion of one commonwealth, and that inferiors be held together with
superiors by a certain fairness in the law...

Such are the members of the realm. Its right is the means by which the
members, in order to establish good order and the supplying of provisions,
throughout the realm, are associated and bound to each other as one people
is one body, and under one head...

The people, or the associated members of the realm, have the power of
establishing this right of the realm and of binding themselves to it...And in
this power of disposing, prescribing, ordaining, administering, and
constituting everything necessary and useful for the universal association
is contained the bond, soul, and vital spirit of the realm, and its autonomy,
greatness, size, and authority. Without this power no realm or symbiotic
life can exist. Therefore, as long as this right thrives in the realm and rules
the political body, so long does the realm live and prosper. But if this right
is taken away, the entire symbiotic life perishes, or becomes a band of
robbers and a gang of evil men, or disintegrates into many different realms
or provinces.

This right of the realm, or right of sovereignty, does not belong to
individual members, but to all members joined together and to the entire
associated body of the realm. For as universal association can be
constituted not by one member, but by all the members together, so the
right is said to be the property not of individual members, but of the
members jointly...Whence it follows that the use and ownership of this
right belong neither to one person nor to individual members, but to the
members of the realm jointly. By their common consent, they are able to
establish and set in order matters pertaining to it. And what they have
once set in order is to be maintained and followed, unless something else
pleases the common will. For as the whole body is related to individual
citizens, and can rule, restrain, and direct each member, so the people rules
each citizen.

This power of the realm, or of the associated bodies, is always one power
and never many, just as one soul and not many rules the physical body.
(Althusius 66-70).

While similar in language and object, the synthesizing of diverse political
relationships into a coherent whole, Althusius' description of the Body Politic has
important differences with those of John and Christine that indicate that something
significant has been lost in the metaphor. The length of this description of the
universal association is the first noticeable difference. Explicit assignment of
members of the Body Politic as appendages and members of an actual human body allow John and Christine a concise description of the Body Politic that eludes Althusius. As discussed in the previous chapters, the early medieval unity of Christendom gave John the freedom to employ this metaphor. Although in my argument I hold that Christine had given something essential away in jettisoning John's clerical soul, her metaphor still holds together since she was able to capitalize on John's work, the persistence of Catholic religious unity, and the unifying power of the French monarchy to propose another version. Althusius is bereft of such aids and has to try to build a body from its parts. He ends with the head while the John and Christine were able to start with it: John's assignment of the secular princely head, with a somewhat ambiguous relationship with his clerical soul, and the more unified royal head of Christine's prince, who has a much greater authority than John's over the Church, which was still universal if struggling to maintain such unity.

In addition to the length differences, Althusius assigns the members of his Body Politic without the benefit of functional differentiation implied by the different human appendages in John and Christine's Bodies Politic. Presumably the chief magistrate is the head, and his discussion of the role of ephors in the universal association (Althusius 1995, 92-119) make sense as an analogue to John's senatorial heart. Additionally, the equal position of the various municipal members of Althusius' Body Politic make it seem more like an octopus than a
human body since each of these appendages would contain within themselves the
class structures that John and Christine captured with their assignment of arms,
hands, flanks, bellies, legs, and feet. Here Althusius may be showing his
reluctance to subscribe to the static medieval social relationships based on feudal
agrarianism, and he is offering this cephalopodic structure, with its equality among
appendages, as an endorsement of the merchant class whose growth was noticed in
Christine's Body Politic. His nearly omnipresent concern with “communication”
suggests a circulatory system, to offer a more concrete Body Politic metaphor,
and, again, reinforces the interpretation that his polity is designed with a heavily
merchant purpose in mind. However, his inclusion of a section on the rights of
provinces, a later addition to his original design (Hueglin 1999, 36), incorporates
an element of hierarchy that was implied in John and Christine by the progress
from head to feet in their Bodies Politic. And, as a jurist, one can only wonder if
he would not have endorsed John's assignment of judges as the eyes, ears, and
mouth of the Body Politic, always alert to threats to its health and ready to
proclaim them, much as he was in the various incidents of his active resistance to
his provincial lord and the oration that was necessary to apologize for those
actions (Hueglin 1999, 35-36).

Althusius' use of popular consent for a soul is another difference from the two
previous authors and one of importance to my development of the vanishing soul
of the Body Politic. Although he obviously has concern for the public flourishing
of religion, Althusius does not propose a religious soul for the universal association. Instead, he attempts to come to the rescue of Christine's soulless Body Politic by reintroducing an explicit soul, but this soul is the popular consent of the members of the Body Politic, the cities, urban communities, and provinces. This assignment has the benefit of providing an animating principle where Christine, at least explicitly did not, but it seems in danger of splitting instantaneously into many bodies with their corresponding souls since, presumably, the consent of the members could be withdrawn at any moment. Once started, it is hard to stop the devolution of sovereignty and political rights until the ultimate principle of the individual as the only logical center of political rights is attained. This difficulty was felt by Rousseau as well, as I will discuss in the next chapter. Both Althusius and Rousseau suffer from the lack of a transcendental identity that can manifest itself in concrete institutions unlike John's princely/papal head/soul and Christine's monarchic head.

Althusius does not go the full way to individual rights like Rousseau because his theory is closer in this regard to medieval corporatism than to modern democratic theory. Although a Protestant he is still affected, like Calvin in religion, by the Catholic medieval theory of corporation and universality. Theoretical innovators usually retain some measure of their conceptual foils, and it remains for those who follow them to work out the fuller logical implications of the original germinal innovation. Calvin, while rejecting papal authority and much of the sacramental
doctrine and practice, retained the idea that the Church is one and did not advance to a full theory of private religious conscience and a corresponding theory of toleration; that was left for Locke, Rousseau, and other modern religious thinkers. Althusius, while an opponent of overbearing imperial control, especially as manifested in the actions of provincial lords, could not vest a full right of sovereignty in the people; that too was left for Locke, Rousseau, and other modern political thinkers. In both cases, Calvin and Althusius represent a middle ground between medieval unity and modern pluralism. Before turning to Rousseau, who does take the Body Politic to the logical conclusion begun by Christine's removal of the clerical soul as a counterweight to the princely head from John's Body Politic, in the rest of this chapter I will expand on the religious and political implications of Althusius' theory as it both affirmed and updated the Calvinist theory discussed earlier in this chapter and as it stands as the logical expansion of ideas discussed in my analysis of the Body Politic of Christine de Pizan.

Althusius' religious convictions make universal, transcendental institutions very difficult to construct. His Protestantism is the first and fundamental fact about him that will color every aspect of his treatment of religion in the Body Politic. As a Protestant, Althusius cannot comfortably ascribe to the universal theories of the purely medieval period since these were based on the papacy, either in its full monarchic form or moderated by councils. Medieval Catholic writers like John and Christine start with unity and move to the specifics: “Political Thought when it is genuinely medieval starts from the Whole,
but ascribes an intrinsic value to every Partial Whole down to and including the
Individual” (Gierke 1987, 7). On the other hand, Althusius, while still conceiving of the
political association as a whole, prefers to construct that whole from the bottom as a
productive of aggregated levels of sovereignty. As he says regarding sovereignty as a
concept, “For this right of sovereignty is not the supreme power; neither is it perpetual or
above law” (Althusius 1995, 71). This definition, although palatable to papal partisans
regarding the status of temporal princes, would have been anathema to the medieval
mind in religion, especially to those that held the full argument of papal monarchy and
infallibility in doctrine and morals (De Maistre 1850). But as a Calvinist in theology and
an Aristotelian in political science (Hueglin 1999, 56-70), Althusius wanted to hold that
the word of God in religion and natural reason in politics were superior to the will of a
single person, even if he were the supreme magistrate. The problem here, as I discussed
with Calvin's determination of the qualifications for the ministry, is that someone must
act as the executor of the sovereign authority wherever it may lie theoretically.
Althusius cannot escape this conclusion and goes on to vest practical religious
sovereignty with the supreme magistrate.

I argue that Althusius' vesting of religious sovereignty with the supreme civil magistrate
is the natural consequence of the change that I noticed in Christine: the relegation of the
religious office to a body part under the direct regulation of the temporal head of the
Body Politic for Christine that becomes the supreme magistrate for Althusius. Once this
happens, real temporal sovereignty, in a way unimaginable under the papal/political
medieval tension, is possible. The state itself now becomes both the soul and the head of the Body Politic: “The sovereign power of the State, as Bodin rightly holds, is like the soul in the physical body, strictly one and indivisible” (Gierke 1939 [1880], 40). Under the medieval system, no local temporal power could be held sovereign, since the unity of the mystical body of the universal Church made true sovereignty an attribute of God alone as executed by His vicar, the pope.

Althusius could not be more explicit in his vesting of religious supremacy in the civil power:

The ecclesiastical administration is performed chiefly through two duties. The first is the introduction of orthodox religious doctrine and practice in the realm. The other is the conservation, defense, and transmission to posterity of this doctrine and practice. The former duty is employed in seeing that God is rightly known and worshiped, and the latter that the true understanding or comprehension of God thrives throughout the realm, and the right worship of God is maintained freely and publicly by each and all in the whole realm, without any fear or peril. By these two duties of the magistrate, the kingdom of God is raised up and preserved among men in this political society (Althusius 1995, 162).

He then proceeds to describe the practical means for achieving these objects:

In constituting this ministry, the first office of the supreme magistrate is to
set forth by public edicts a system of penalties concerning the true
acknowledgment and worship of God according to sacred scripture, and to
promulgate, at whatever time seems best to him, penal decrees for
violators of these edicts throughout the entire realm and the provinces
thereof, according to the example of pious kings. Secondly, the magistrate
should legally validate orthodox canons of faith, or what are called the
solemn confession and formula of true religion. These canons pertain to
church doctrine and administration, that is, to the performance of
ecclesiastical ceremonies and offices according to the norm of sacred
writings. ...The third responsibility that falls to the magistrate is to
constitute regular ecclesiastical jurisdictions, presbyteries, synods, and
consistories, and to legislate through them concerning the call,
examination, and ordination of bishops and pastors, and their direction,
judgment, and removal from office. ...The fourth function of the magistrate
is to provide that the individual ephors and provincial heads of the realm
undertake the local responsibility for this ministry in their provinces. In
each district of his province, the provincial head should constitute a
presbytery by the election and consent of the church, and confirm it by his
own authority. This presbytery is a senate drawn from the ministers of the
church and from other pious, holy, upright, and prudent men elected by the
people to guide the church, to conserve it, and to build it up in Christ. The
fifth office of the magistrate is to see that the ministers of the church are
legitimately – inwardly and outwardly – called, elected, and confirmed, and that those so called put forth, teach, and explain the doctrine of the law and the gospel. ...In connection with this fifth office, he shall also provide that the ministers rightly administer and dispense the sacraments or tokens of faith; that in their presbytery they offer prayers, good counsel, and admonitions; that they direct its actions by proposing issues to be discussed, by gathering opinions on these issues, and by carrying through with matters of special importance; and that they, together with other presbyters, rightly exercise church discipline, and do anything else that has been assigned to them (Althusius 1995, 166).

Once this ecclesiastical administration is established, Althusius assigns the civil magistrate the task of preserving doctrine:

The conservation of religion and divine worship is the process by which the purity of heavenly doctrine and the orthodox consensus are maintained and transmitted to posterity. This is to be attended to by the magistrate by two means. First, he will announce and hold ecclesiastical assemblies and visitations in every province of the the realm, and if necessary in the realm itself. They are composed of faithful and pious ministers of the church of the realm. Through these assemblies and visitations the pastors and governors of the church are held to their duty, and any controversies concerning religion and defects in church management are recognized,
corrected, and removed. Secondly, he will distribute suitable reward to pious worshipers of God...(Althusius 1995, 168).

Although the above grant of procedural religious powers to the supreme civil magistrate seem enormous, Althusius, as a Calvinist, would likely have argued that the supreme civil magistrate would be constrained by the word of God as interpreted by orthodox ministers; these ministers presumably would be those trained in the Calvinist schools of Geneva and Herborn, for example. However, it strains the imagination to believe that Althusius did not even detect the potential for abuse of such powers by the magistrate. Perhaps he would have answered that such a tyrannical magistrate would therefore forfeit his authority and be constrained by the ephors and other mechanisms of popular consent for checking his authority, but this seems a recipe for contestation, disagreement, and revolution rather than permanence and stability. Like the argument I made above about the propensity of the Althusian Body Politic to shatter into many bodies, his religious scheme seems prone to the same splintering; the history of Protestant sectarian proliferation affirms this weakness.

Althusius, in the *Politica*, not only sketched his theoretical ideal for political and religious institutional realization, he also provided a concrete example from history. However, the Roman Catholic political and religious expression was the dominant Western historical example of a Christian political entity. Althusius, even though his theory contained a moderate theory of religious toleration that proscribed religious
coercion (Hueglin 1999, 38), speaks of “papist superstitions” and “idolatry” that could not be tolerated in his ideal polity (Althusius 1995, 171). Thus, Althusius had to reach back to a pre-Christian biblical model for reform: Old Testament Judaism. “In Althusius this goes so far that he heaps up everywhere texts and historical examples taken from the Bible, emphasizes even in the preface the political application of the Decalogue, proposes to himself as a life-work the introduction of the Jewish law into all the branches of jurisprudence, and even declares that the ancient Jewish State was the best approximation of his ideal State that ever existed” (Gierke 1939 [1880], 69). Additionally, Althusius cites the kings of Israel as worthy models: “What is just is known from the second table (of the Decalogue), and ruling in fear of God is understood according to the first. Both are of concern to the magistrate, as can be demonstrated by examples of pious kings, namely, of David, Solomon, and others who followed them” (Althusius 1995, 159-160). Althusius' reluctance to draw on prior Christian political arrangements displays his somewhat novel and contentious idea that political science can be decoupled from religious concerns, at least partially, as he implies in his splitting of the Decalogue into the two halves of the above quote; this was a break even with some aspects of Reformed political ideas such as “federal theology” and caused him some trouble when he was a professor of law in Herborn (Hueglin 1999, 32-33). Perhaps the paucity of prior Christian political examples that fit his theory and the timidity he sensed among his academic contemporaries were factors that contributed to his decision to accept the role of Syndic of Emden where, as I mentioned earlier, he could put some of his ideas to a practical test.
Althusius' place in my development is important since Althusius' relation to John, in their understanding of the place of religion in the Body Politic, is one of nearly symmetrical inversion. As I argued above, while the bulk of John's work in the *Policraticus* is directed toward political advice, there is plenty of evidence in this work and especially in his other writings, explicit and implicit, that John endorsed the medieval Roman theory of the universality of the power of the Church in general and the Pope in particular. The anecdote of the stomach and the members of the body that John relates from his conversation with Pope Adrian illustrates that, under this theory, the religious administration centered at Rome was the real center of authority and importance. The local political offices were important but almost accidental in comparison to the fundamental and eternal importance of the ministry of the clergy, the very soul of the Christian Body Politic. John's theory, in my interpretation, vests civil and ecclesiastical sovereignty in the Pope, but the civil power carries out the civil administration, always with the understanding that the mandate of heaven could be withdrawn. Althusius vests civil and ecclesiastical sovereignty nominally in popular consent and the word of God, respectively, but practically he cedes both to the supreme civil magistrate; the ecclesiastical officials, the ministers of the word, carry out the religious duties, preaching and the sacramental administration retained under Calvinism under the supervision of the supreme civil magistrate. In John's theory, the bishops in communion with the Pope extend the authority of the universal Church to the farthest reaches of its administration. Althusius makes the provincial governors analogous to
bishops in extending the reach of the chief magistrate. But a difficulty arises here: John's theory rests upon the universal claims of the Pope's authority as the Vicar of Christ over all mankind, while Althusius can only extend the sovereignty of the civil power as far as the chief magistrate can enforce his rule or as far as the members of his commonwealth, the provinces and cities, accept it. In other words, for John, the Pope claims authority over all Christians, and indeed over all mankind; Althusius would be hard pressed to make such a claim for his chief magistrate unless he wished to argue that there could only be one political commonwealth of Christians, a claim that his contemporary history prevented him from making. John is not constrained by such a difficulty since the Pope's universal dominion is spiritual, mystical, and aspirational, and he can allow that there would be a variety of political administrations within the fold of such a transcendental kingdom. Put simply, Althusius' political theory is incapable of incorporating the simultaneous universal spiritual claims of Christianity and the particular political claims of secular administration. In addition, as I discussed in my examination of the Calvinist removal of enormous portions of the sacramental and devotional practices of religion, the state becomes demystified and lacks a firm place in a coherent transcendental order.

In the final analysis, Althusius stands as a bridge between the medieval and the modern: “Althusius...wanted to create with his political theory...a blueprint of political organization that was neither just the old order of disjointed dynastic union, unable to move forward into the new age, nor a new order of centralized statehood that would rob
the particular political communities of initiative and self-determination, but a compound
polity which would combine both, local autonomy and universal coordination, Greek
polis and Roman Empire, in a confederal system of political accommodation” (Hueglin
1999, 41). In other words, as a Calvinist and a proponent of the freedom of merchant
cities and also a defender of many of the medieval corporate social institutions,
Althusius found himself in a very difficult place. He wanted Christian unity without the
papacy. He wanted the relative freedom of cities provided by the medieval political
hodgepodge with a more concrete constitutional theory. In reality, Althusius and his
theory were matchsticks in the way of a flood. The medieval synthesis, captured in large
degree by the above quote, was built on the tension of papal universal religious
sovereignty and shifting, particular temporal politics. The contest between the
strengthened and centralizing temporal lords and the papacy that grew from a squall in
John's time and theory to a gale in Christine had broken the dam, or flooded the dykes,
by the time of Althusius. Once the papacy was out of the way, there was no stopping the
inevitable domination of centralized territorial power in the persons of early modern
monarchs and princes. Althusius knew this trend, but his theory, though it was radical
for its time (Hueglin 1999, 8), was not nearly radical enough, with its continued reliance
on medieval ideas and institutions that were disappearing quickly. The soul that he
attempted to bring to his aid, popular consent as mediated by the remnants of medieval
institutions, failed to check the powers unleashed, both in Emden and elsewhere. It
remained for others to try again with a theory of the popular consent, centered in
individuals, as the soul of the Body Politic. I turn in the next chapter to Rousseau's
attempt with his Social Contract and General Will.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau is the fourth and final author in my development that traces the disappearance of John's clerical soul of the Body Politic and its implications for the political and religious institutions of Western civilization. In some ways, that development could be understood to end with Althusius. With Althusius, the religious soul, which John had lodged in the medieval priestly hierarchy presided over by the pope and which Christine had failed to mention but included in some fashion by implication, was replaced by Althusius with popular consent although mediated by local political bodies and corporations. This replacement has led some (Gierke 1939, 71) to suggest that Althusius' theory, even though it has an explicit component of religious administration, is really a secular theory. Additionally, as I asserted in the conclusion to the last chapter, Althusius' theory, whatever its abstract merits, was overcome by the circumstances of the early modern transition to territorial sovereignty in the persons of monarchs and princes. Once that transition had taken place, so little was left of the medieval social institutions that new theories had to be developed for constraining the absolutist tendencies of these new territorial sovereignties. Rousseau provided one of these theories by extending the idea of popular consent all the way down to the individual. However, as I will argue, although Rousseau was modern in a way that Althusius was not, these two still make an interesting segue from the medieval to the modern, and there are concrete reasons for using them in tandem. But before considering this duo, I will complete my sketch of the development of Western political
and religious institutions subsequent to Althusius and reaching to the time of Rousseau.

In the last chapter, I focused the attention of this part of my model on Calvinism and its institution in Geneva, which may be called the early institutional fruits of the Reformation. In this chapter, I will examine the later fruits of that movement that had had greater time and opportunity to ruminate on its theories and consolidate control of its institutional and territorial holdings. After a period of doctrinal confusion and religious crisis, Europe settled down into two general opposing camps, Catholic and Protestant. Before this time, the idea of Christian unity, while struggling, was still the norm (Belloc 1928, 72). By the middle of the 16th century, the new Reformed ideas, so cogently synthesized by Calvin in his *Institutes*, had started to produce a definite organized form.

As I alluded to at the end of the last chapter, while Calvinism argued in theory for the autonomy of the church under the leadership of its ministers, in practice the rush to territorial sovereignty by the monarchs and princes freed from the restraints of the papacy led nearly everywhere to political control of religious institutions. In fact, this effect was so profound that it even affected Catholic countries like France where the religious sovereignty of the papacy was recognized in principle (Belloc 1938, 222). In other places, notably England, the monarchy had simply set itself up as the supreme religious authority. This purely political control of religion led to two enormous political dysfunctions, one external and the other internal.

Externally, the proliferation of religious difference by polity meant that the usual wars of
political rivalries that had occurred regularly throughout the medieval period now took on a religious aspect. Soldiers were now fighting men of a different confession. It was as if the internal wars of medieval Christendom had been transformed into the clash of civilizations that were the Crusades. Obviously, the stakes of war greatly increase when each side lives in fear that its religion would be forfeit along with its surrender. With this understanding of the new character of inter-Christian warfare, it is not surprising that the Religious Wars that began with the civil wars in France between the Catholic Crown and Huguenots and culminated in the Thirty Years War were so destructive (Holt 2005). Some have argued that these wars, more than anything else, erased the world that Althusius knew and rendered his theory obsolete within his lifetime (Hueglin 1999, 37). The Treaty of Westphalia then cemented the territorial arrangements with their religious and political boundaries (Hueglin 1995, 5). This peace meant that the newly defined states could turn inward to examine their own political and religious practices.

Following that external settlement of the religious conflict, the territorial sovereign states were faced with their own internal religious differences. In France, the nominal toleration of Huguenots formalized in the Edict of Nantes was undermined by a fairly persistent harassment of Protestants until it was finally revoked in 1685, causing many religious dissenters to flee to formally Protestant portions of Europe, especially England and Holland (Baird 1895). In England, Catholics similarly were marginalized and persecuted and Puritan England made a military campaign out of Catholic eradication in Ireland (Belloc 1938, 211). In both cases, after the official state persecutions of the
internal religious-others had been accomplished, a more significant problem of sectarian dissenting groups grew up to further trouble the newly sovereign states. English Protestant dissenters continued the Protestant principle of private judgment to form their own sects that demanded freedom from state control (Routley 1960). French intellectual skeptics, like Voltaire and Rousseau, arose to ridicule organized religious belief in general and to propose replacement systems:

With the decline of clerical power in the eighteenth century, a new kind of mentor emerged to fill the vacuum and capture the ear of society. The secular intellectual might be deist, sceptic or atheist. But he was just as ready as any pontiff or presbyter to tell mankind how to conduct its affairs. He proclaimed, from the start, a special devotion to the interests of humanity and an evangelical duty to advance them by his teachings. He brought to this self-appointed task a far more radical approach than his clerical predecessors. He felt himself bound by no corpus of revealed religion. The collective wisdom of the past, the legacy of tradition, the prescriptive codes of ancestral experience existed to be selectively followed or wholly rejected entirely as his own good sense might decide. For the first time in human history, and with growing confidence and audacity, men arose to assert that they could diagnose the ills of society and cure them with their own unaided intellects: more, that they could devise formulae whereby not merely the structure of society but the fundamental habits of human beings could be transformed for the better.
Unlike their sacerdotal predecessors, they were not servant and interpreters of the gods but substitutes.

One of the most marked characteristics of the new secular intellectuals was the relish with which they subjected religion and its protagonists to critical scrutiny. How far had they benefited or harmed humanity, these great systems of faith? To what extent had these popes and pastors lived up to their precepts, of purity and thoughtfulness, of charity and benevolence? The verdicts pronounced on both churches and clergy were harsh (Johnson 1988, 1-2).

In both cases, Protestant England and Catholic France, the huge price of external religious conflict and the annoyance of religious dissent and undermining led to a general policy of religious toleration (Murphy 2001, 209-244) and a disinterest in public religion (Hueglin 1999, 171). Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the religiously skeptical theory of Rousseau. However, before examining it, I want to return to my institutional development with a look at the political side of the question.

By this time, for reasons discussed in the previous chapters and above, the political institutions of what had been Christendom were becoming increasingly centralized and secular. In my development, I located this change in the rising nationalism that displayed itself in the theory of Christine de Pizan. In my first author, John of Salisbury,
the political authorities of Christendom were still operating at a disadvantage in their dealings with the papacy, which was at its zenith following its successful conclusion of the Investiture Controversy and the bureaucratic innovations that had made possible papal monarchy in the West. The two Body Politic theories of these authors shed light on these realities: John's clerical soul of his Body Politic reflects papal dominance and the Christine's relegation of the clergy to the subordinate portions of her Body Politic illustrates the weakening power of the popes and Church following the Avignon Papacy and Great Schism. In Althusius, the Catholic clergy had disappeared altogether in his organic model that I characterized as a version of the Body Politic metaphor. Although Christian in language, with Althusius the Body Politic had been secularized in function; even though Calvinism continued to call for an authorized ministry, the greatly reduced sacramental practice and lack of an analogue to the papacy greatly reduced the institutional power of this element of the Body Politic. This secularization was a dominant fact of early modern European governments (Belloc 1928, 218). However, these governments were the direct ancestors of political institutions that had been tasked officially with promoting Christian religion for hundreds of years. Now that they had abdicated that mission, it seems a natural question to ask them what their purpose was and to further question if they were suited to carry on whatever job they now believed was theirs. Rousseau does just that with his withering satire of the absolutist arrangement as he found it: “I make a convention with you which is entirely at your expense and entirely to my profit, which I shall observe as long as I please, and which you shall observe as long as I please” (Rousseau 1997, 48). I turn now to his actual
theory of the Body Politic, starting with a comparison of his theory with that of
Althusius.

Althusius and Rousseau are an apt pair for making the transition between the medieval
and modern ideas of the Body Politic. Althusius may be considered a transitional figure,
lodged somewhere between the medieval and the modern. It has been remarked that
“...the middle ages, whose political theories, in a manner not yet fully appreciated, laid
the groundwork of the modern idea of the State by fusing the reproduced ideas of
antiquity with various elements taken from the medieval system of thought, whose
organic unity was thereby dissolved” (Gierke 1939 [1880], 15). Althusius, while not
nearly as well known to modernity as the more celebrated Rousseau, was significant for
the systematic conceptualization of the state in a manner that was distinct from the
purely medieval formulation that John's description represents in this argument: “He
(Althusius) laid the groundwork of his theory in a broader and more rigorous fashion
than anyone before him; he above all expounded the absolute inalienability of the
sovereign rights of the people, as well as the nature of the underlying social contract, in
terms which are reproduced with an often striking similarity in Jean Jacques Rousseau”
(Gierke 1939 [1880], 16). The similarity between the two is so strong that an explicit
knowledge of Althusius' work has been imputed to Rousseau: “In fact the Contrat Social
shows a remarkable agreement with the Politics of Althusius in respect to several
fundamental and salient ideas which do not occur at all in any of his predecessors, or at
any rate in such precise terms. This argues a high degree of probability that Rousseau
had read and made use of the book, well-known as it then was even in France” (Gierke 1939 [1880], 18). In purely theoretical terms, sovereignty, vested in the people as the soul of the Body Politic, is the link between Althusius and Rousseau. Like Althusius, who holds that “as sovereignty always belongs to the people, all distinctions of forms of the State are merely distinctions of administrative systems” (Gierke 1939 [1880], 47), Rousseau maintains that the General Will, his conception of popular sovereignty, exists prior to any administrative system of magistracy.

There exist concrete historical reasons for the connection between Althusius and Rousseau as well as their theoretical similarities.

Rousseau...did refer to Althusius explicity, albeit only in an aside in the *Lettres ecrites de la Montagne*. The affinity between Rousseau and Althusius should not be altogether surprising: the political thinking of both was strongly influenced by their personal experiences in the Calvinist city of Geneva. It is once more the striking similarity of formulations that has led to the assumption that Rousseau must have known and consulted Althusius' book. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that Althusius had indeed postulated some 150 years before the author of the Contrat Social that the right of sovereignty belongs to the organized body of the people, and that what the people thus decide by common consent cannot be changed unless “something else pleases the common will.’ As has been pointed out, these similarities are even more striking in the Geneva draft
manuscript of the Social Contract, where Rousseau noted, for example, that 'general society' was conceived on the 'model of our particular societies,' thus developing initial thoughts about a 'federation of the world' which he later elaborated further in his critical comments on the European peace plan of the Abbe de Saint-Pierre (Hueglin 1999, 17).

Whatever similarities exist between Althusius and Rousseau, there are many differences that become clear upon an examination of Rousseau's theory that I will characterize as a Body Politic stripped of almost everything from the previous three authors.

In the first two authors of my development, John and Christine, the existence of the entire polity was taken as natural and amenable to description by the Body Politic. For Althusius, while the universal association required inductive construction, giving it a strange form that I described as cephapodic, there remained natural elements like the collegia and family that could be taken as natural members without need for abstract justification. For Rousseau, while the Body Politic deserved reverence, it was not natural: “The social order is a sacred right, which provides the basis for all the others. Yet this right does not come from nature; it is therefore founded on conventions” (Rousseau 1997, 41). Even the family is not a permanent natural member of the Body Politic:

The most ancient of all societies and the only natural one is that of the family. Even so, children remain bound to the father only as long as they
need him for their preservation. As soon as that need ceases, the natural bond dissolves. The children, exempt from the obedience they owe the father, the father exempt from the cares he owed the children, all equally return to independence. If they remain united, they are no longer so naturally but voluntarily, and even the family maintains itself only by convention.

The family is, then, if you will, the first model of political societies; the chief is the image of the father, the people are the image of the children, and all, being born equal and free, alienate their freedom only for the sake of utility. The only difference is that in the family the father's love for his children repays him for the cares he bestows on them, and that in the State the pleasure of commanding takes the place of the chief's lack of love for his peoples (Rousseau 1997, 42).

With this assertion, Rousseau was left with only one permanent possible natural member on which to base his Body Politic, the individual: “Rousseau had in mind primarily a social contract among individuals, not the Althusian notion of a pact among federated communities” (Hueglin 1999, 18).

Rousseau was hardly alone in this attempt to base the legitimacy of the state on theory that viewed the individual as the only indispensable member.
By early modern times the holistic perception of a universal order was disintegrating, and with it the holistic view of the political structure. Replacing it was the modern mechanistic-atomistic liberal perception, which defined society as an aggregation of individuals with different interests to be defended and realized by entering into a social contract. Thus the organic analogy lost its relevance and to a great extent disappeared from political thought in modern times (Melamed 2009, 121).

Hobbes and Locke were also working to construct civil society on the basis of consent in the form of a social contract (Morris 1999), with Hobbes and Rousseau occupying opposite points of view regarding the nature of the sovereign (Hueglin 1999, 170) and Locke somewhere between them. While the organic metaphor was well known, the existing governments seemed poor fits for its application although some still tried:

“Although the idea of the body politic can be traced back to antiquity, the early modern jurists and political theorists transferred to the prince and state the most important social, organic and corporational elements normally serving to explain the relationship between Christ and the Church” (Neocleous 2003, 13). Rousseau and others felt contempt for the ancient system that had been described by the Body Politic: “As for the private wars authorized by the ordinances of King Louis IX of France and suspended by the peace of God, they are abuses of feudal government, an absurd system if ever there was one, contrary both to the principles of natural right and to all good polity” (Rousseau 1997, 46). And he and other modern political philosophers were focused on the relationship between the individual and the state: “In the feudal body politic the head was superior to
the other organs. In the early modern body politic, organic reciprocity replaced organic hierarchy” (Peacock 2000, 216). Along with Locke and Hobbes, Rousseau was writing and thinking with the spirit of his time. Just as Hobbes was not really using the Body Politic in the same way as medieval authors when he constructed his Leviathan as an amalgamation of individuals as depicted in the cover-art to his work (Harvey 2007, 35), neither was Rousseau, since for him “the body of the people is conceived of as nothing more or less than the social body” (Neocleous 2003, 25). When Rousseau wrote that, “When I walk toward an object, it is necessary...that I will to go to it...The body politic has the same motive causes; here, too, a distinction is drawn between force and will: The latter being called legislative power, the former executive power” (Rousseau 1997, 82), he was making a mechanical rather than an organic comparison: “What he is comparing to the body politic is the body as a mechanism rather than the body as an organism” (Harvey 2007, 37). This focus on individuality and mechanism was quite common for the period.

Rousseau at times does seem to use the language of the Body Politic in ways that suggest a fuller, organic meaning for the term. For example, when describing the first convention of the state he says, “There will always be a great difference between subjugating a multitude and ruling a society. When scattered men, regardless of their number, are successively enslaved to a single man, I see in this nothing but a master and slaves, I do not see in it a people and its chief; it is, if you will, an aggregation, but not an association; there is here neither public good, nor body politic” (Rousseau 1997, 48).
He seems to hold the Body Politic as an apt metaphor for describing a natural
association. But in other places in the *Social Contract* he seems to confuse the issue by
including both meanings, the pure accumulation of individuals and the natural
association that comes closer to the medieval meaning, in the same passage: “In place of
the private person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and
collective body made up of as many members as the assembly has voices, and which
receives by this same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will. The public
person thus formed by the union of all the others formally assumed the name of City and
now assumes that of Republic or body politic” (Rousseau 1997, 50-51).

Perhaps the most explicit use of the term Body Politic in a manner that suggests its older,
organic form takes place when Rousseau discusses the life and death of the Body Politic.
Regarding its life he writes, “By the social pact we have given the body politic existence
and life” (Rousseau 1997, 66); but, even with this organic quality of life, he ties it to the
artificial convention of the social compact. His description of the death of the Body
Politic is by far the strongest similarity with the natural, organic usage in the the earlier
authors of my development:

The body politic, just like the body of a man, begins to die as soon as it is
born and carries within itself the causes of its destruction. But either body
can have a constitution that is more or less robust and suited to preserve it
for more or less time. The constitution of man is the work of nature, that
of the State is the work of art. It is not within men's capacity to prolong
their life, it is within their capacity to prolong the State's life as far as possible by giving it the best constitution it can have. Even the best constituted State will end, but later than another, if no unforeseen accident brings about its doom before its time.

The principle of political life resides in the Sovereign authority. The legislative power is the heart of the State, the executive power is its brain, which give movement to all the parts. The brain may become paralyzed and the individual still live. A man can remain imbecile and live: but as soon as the heart has stopped to function, the animal is dead (Rousseau 1997, 109).

Here Rousseau has not only used the organic qualities of life and death, he has also made parts of the State, the legislative and executive powers, into parts of the human body, the heart and brain respectively. And he has prioritized the relation between the two; the heart is more important since the body can live with a non-functioning brain but not a stopped heart. This assignment is especially important for my project since, for Rousseau, the heart, the legislative power, is the representative of the soul of the Body Politic, the Sovereign or General Will.

Rousseau lays the groundwork for his conception of the General Will with his discussion of the Sovereign. “The body politic or Sovereign...is thus united in one body...(and)
since it is formed entirely of the individuals who make it up...has no need of a guarantor towards the subjects, because it is impossible for the body to want to harm all of its members” (Rousseau 1997, 52). He then provides that the Sovereign, or General Will, is inalienable and indivisible (Rousseau 1997, 57-59), both qualities that would fit with the Christian understanding of the soul (Pasnau 2002, 73-99). He also holds that the General Will cannot err (Rousseau 1997, 60), hearkening back to the papal theory of infallibility in doctrine and morals, argued by decrétalists for centuries and defined dogmatically at the First Vatican Council that ended in 1870 (Tierney 1972, 273). Rousseau then makes his most explicit comparison of the General Will or Sovereign to a human soul: “The public force therefore has to have its own agent which unites and puts it to work in accordance with the directives of the general will, which serves as a means of communication between the State and the Sovereign, which in a sense does for the public person what the union of soul and body does in man” (Rousseau 1997, 82). Thus, the soul is the moral conscience of the State and puts its will into the Body Politic and motivates its actions.

To this extent, John and Rousseau would agree, since in both cases the soul gives meaning to the actions of the Body Politic and directs them to a moral end. However, John would disagree with the way in which Rousseau constitutes the representative of the General Will, the legislative power or heart as Rousseau does not invest that soul with any means for guiding the members of the Body Politic to a transcendental end. Instead Rousseau makes the soul, according to John's view, something like half-human:
it can make rational decisions about temporal objects, or the “common good” (Rousseau 1997, 57), thus distinguishing it from the soul of a beast devoid of reason, but it cannot direct itself or its members toward what John and the medieval Church saw as man's ultimate end, union with God. In fact, this secularization of the term “general will” may have been a very explicit de-sacralization of a explicit theological term since before this usage it was used primarily in theological discourse to refer to the grace that God implanted in human souls for salvation and that had been used by Pascal and Calvinists in their discussions of predestination (Riley 1978, 486-487); and it has been argued (Scott 1994) that Rousseau was quite intentional in his wish to substitute politics for the divine. Additionally, by constructing the soul of the Body Politic in such an artificial and ahistorical fashion (Hueglin 1999, 181), Rousseau was denying that any of the previous institutions that had been seen as natural by John, Christine, and Althusius, to varying degrees in their Bodies Politic, could be useful for directing the moral will or soul of the Body Politic. In doing so, he denies himself a powerful group of historically tested mechanisms and replaces them with “a fictional pact among individuals” (Hueglin 1999, 222).

Rousseau's disdain for the transcendental goals of religion is apparent, as I will discuss subsequently, in his theory of the Body Politic, and, with Rousseau, the end of the progression that I traced from John has reached its conclusion: John's soul that explicitly directed humanity toward its transcendental end was discarded by Christine even if she kept the sacramental practice directed toward that end in a less prominent place in her
Body Politic while not trusting it to instill moral virtue; Althusius encouraged a religious practice but did not connect religion and politics in a manner that suggests a correspondence of the ends of the two, as was evident in his splitting of the Decalogue into first and second tables. As argued earlier, Althusius cloaks a state religion in the forms of a liturgically and sacramentally stripped-down Christianity, but it remains, by its institutional design and utility for this part of his argument, a state religion advertised for its ability to instill civic virtue:

For a sound worship and fear of God in the commonwealth is the cause, origin, and fountain of private and public happiness. On the other hand, the contempt of God, and the neglect of divine worship, are the causes of all evil and misfortune. Moreover, the Christian religion not only subordinates the bodies and goods of pious subjects to the magistrate, but even lays their souls and consciences under obligation to him, and shapes them to obedience. It nourishes peace and concord, disapproves all scandals, and makes men pious and just. ...Furthermore, the advantages that derive to the entire commonwealth from these subjects who are worshipers of God – and on the other hand, the evils and perils into which the commonwealth is precipitated by the ungodly – ought to lead the magistrate to a love and zeal for ecclesiastical administration (Althusius 1995, 161).

But once Christianity has been rendered a political aid only, the political philosopher
may ask himself whether Christianity is the best such aid; Rousseau did not think that it was. He gives a long critical account of Christianity in chapter 8 of the *Social Contract* that covers civil religion; this is the last chapter but for a paragraph of general conclusion, included almost as an exclamation point to remove any doubt that his Body Politic is an avowed opponent of medieval religion. In these passages, the fruits of the gradual alienation of the sacramental integration of the soul in John's Body Politic are fully ripe.

In the end the Romans having extended their cult and their Gods along with their empire, and often having themselves adopted those of the vanquished by granting them as well as their Gods freedom of the City, the peoples of this vast empire insensibly found that they had multitudes of Gods and of cults, more or less the same everywhere; and this is how paganism eventually became but one and the same Religion throughout the known world.

It was in these circumstances that Jesus came to establish a Spiritual Kingdom on earth; which, by separating the theological from the political system, led to the State's ceasing to be one, and caused the intestine divisions which have never ceased to convulse Christian peoples. Now since this idea of a Kingdom of the other world could never enter the pagans' head, they always looked upon Christians as true rebels who, under [cover of] a hypocritical submission, were only looking for the opportunity
to become independent and the masters, and craftily to usurp the authority which they pretended to respect as long as they were weak. This was the cause of the persecutions (Rousseau 1997, 144).

Christine's preference for classical examples of political virtue are here endorsed as Rousseau affirms that Christianity is anti-political since it divides humanity's attention between a more important sacred world and less important secular one.

What the pagans had feared came to pass; everything then changed in appearance, the humble Christians changed their language, and before long this supposedly other-worldly kingdom was seen to become under a visible chief the most violent despotism in the world.

However, since there has always been a Prince and civil laws, this dual power has resulted in a perpetual conflict of jurisdiction which has made any good polity impossible in Christian States, and no one has ever succeeded in settling the question of which of the two, the master or the priest, one is obliged to obey (Rousseau 1997, 145).

As will become clear later in Rousseau's remarks, he finds the institutional consolidation of Christianity that occurred following the conversion of Constantine under the direction of popes, especially those such as Leo and Gregory, a distortion of the moral virtue of Christianity. Here he suggests
Althusius since, as a Calvinist, he too rejected the centralization of ecclesiastical administration that had resulted in papal monarchy. Rousseau's characterization of the papacy as “the most violent despotism in the world” and his railing against priests are remarkably close to several passages in Calvin's *Institutes*; one can only imagine that he had been imbued with these arguments while raised in Geneva. He continues his critique by examining the growth of the papal Church:

> Yet several peoples, even in Europe or near it, have tried to preserve or to restore the ancient system, but without success; the spirit of christianity has come to pervade everything. Holy worship always remained or reverted to being independent of the Sovereign, and without the necessary tie to the body of the State. Muhammad had very sound views, he tied his political system together well, and as long as the form of his Government endured under the Caliphs who succeeded him this Government was strictly unitary, and in this respect good. But once the Arabs had become prosperous, lettered, polished, soft and cowardly, they were subjugated by barbarians; whereupon the division between the two powers began anew; although it is less apparent among Muslims than among Christians, it is nevertheless there; especially in the sect of Ali, and there are States, such as Persia, where it never ceases to make itself felt (Rousseau 1997, 145).

Rousseau, in much the same way that Machiavelli (1965, 228-229, 330-331) despaired about the continued persistence of the Church, is complaining about the
ability of the medieval Church to prevail in its confrontations with the pagan tribes of Europe during the spread of the Church in its earliest ages, its resistance to political domination by local secular powers seen in the Becket affair and many others, and its success in stamping out heresies prior to the Reformation. His use of Mohammed, who specified a religion in which the state and religious authorities are identical (al-Mawardi 2000), is especially keen since he later will argue that the Church was able to provide good soldiers for the Crusades that resisted Islam's advance only by becoming any earthly power (Rousseau 1997, 149). Here, as in many other places, Rousseau does not let logical consistency get in the way of a spirited polemic (Johnson 1988, 1-27).

Among us, the Kings of England have established themselves as heads of the Church, and the Tsars have done the same; but with this title they have made themselves not so much its masters as its Ministers; they have acquired not so much the right to change it as the power to preserve it; they are not its lawgivers, they are merely its Princes. Wherever the Clergy constitutes a body it is the master and lawgiver in its realm. There are therefore two powers, two Sovereigns, in England and in Russia, just as everywhere else. (Rousseau 1997, 145).

He clarifies, in a footnote (Rousseau 1997, 145), that the hallmark of an organized clergy is that which retains the power of excommunication. Since John, Christine, and Althusius all recognize this right, all of their religious institutions in their
Bodies Politic would be unacceptable to Rousseau. It is only with modern writers that Rousseau begins to find some appropriate advice for managing the officers of religion:

Of all Christian Authors the philosopher Hobbes is the only one who clearly saw the evil and the remedy, who dared to propose reuniting the two heads of the eagle, and to return everything to political unity, without which no State or Government will ever be well constituted. But he must have seen that the domineering spirit of Christianity was inconsistent with his system, and that the interest of the Priest would always be stronger than that of the State (Rousseau 1997, 146).

As Hobbes (1999, 338-339) directs and Rousseau endorses in principle without advocating Hobbes' other arguments, the secular Sovereign should be the interpreter of dogma as well as the nominal head of the local church. This is the difficulty that I suggested that Christine and Althusius' theories of the Body Politic tend toward: even if the original theological consensus holds for a long time, eventually the secular head will be convinced, as happened in England when Reformed ideas later made a greater inroads following the death of Henry VIII, or will for its own reasons decide, to make fundamental changes to the doctrine and practice of religion (Newman et al. 1840, 73-81). Rousseau endorses this and laments that the areas separated from the medieval unity of doctrine under papal supervision have been so timid in exercising these powers.
I believe that by examining the historical facts from this point of view it would be easy to refute the opposing sentiments of Bayle and Warburton, one of whom contends that no religion is useful to the body politic, and the other of whom maintains to the contrary that Christianity is its strongest support. One would prove to the first that no State has ever been founded without Religion serving as its base, and to the second that the Christian law is at bottom more harmful than useful to a strong constitution of the State (Rousseau 1997, 146).

While Rousseau here endorses religion, as he has made abundantly clear, it is only useful insofar as it works to promote the unity of a particular state for its temporal ends and that, for this task, Christianity is uniquely unsuited. Perhaps he does not see that his remark that every state has been formed on a religious basis says something about humanity's need for something greater than the temporal goals of politics. Religion generally offers an identity, even if not a specific doctrine of life after death or eternal union with God, that lifts persons out of their individual conceptions of self. While this certainly does work for group cohesion, such cohesion is an accident, even if it is a proper accident, to use the Scholastic phrase, of the main purpose of religion, contact of some kind with the divine transcendence (Maclean et al. 2004).

Rousseau's open rejection of the medieval form of Christianity as a political religion is a
backhanded confirmation of the argument that I made regarding John's conception of the
Body Politic: medieval Christianity under the Roman primacy was a civilization that saw
itself as a spiritual unity that suffered accidental, local, and temporal powers to exist, but
only to the extant that they did not interfere with the spiritual mission of the civilization
guarded by the papal supremacy. This religious and political synthesis that Rousseau
above called the most violent of earthly despotisms “is so clearly bad, that it is a waste
of time to stop to prove it such. All that destroys unity is worthless; all institutions that
set man in contradiction to himself are worthless” (Rousseau 1997, 147). Again, he is
concerned with religion's unifying function for the temporal goals of political life.

Rousseau does endorse, for moral purposes, a form of Christianity; or, perhaps more
precisely, he recommends the laudability of a certain Christian feeling: “There remains,
then, the Religion of man or Christianity, not that of today, but that of the Gospel, which
is altogether different. Through this saintly, sublime, genuine Religion, men, as children
of the same God, all recognize one another as brothers, and the society that unites them
does not dissolve even at death” (Rousseau 1997, 147). This good feeling of
brotherhood is that which leads Rousseau to suggest that men are not naturally enemies
but brothers (Hueglin 1999, 87), and it provides a basis for his belief in the inherent
equality of individuals and his distaste for slavery: “From whatever angle one looks at
things, the right to slavery is null, not only because it is illegitimate, but because it is
absurd and meaningless” (Rousseau 1997, 48). But this idealized Christianity does not
have any political content or utility, according to Rousseau, for the Body Politic:
But this Religion, since it has no particular relation to the body politic, leaves the laws with only the force they derive from themselves without adding any other force to them, and hence one of the great bonds of particular societies remains without effect. What is more; far from attaching the Citizens' hearts to the State, it detaches them from it as from all earthly things. In know of nothing more contrary to the social spirit (Rousseau 1997, 147).

Although this assertion contradicts many biblical passages, Romans 13 for example, and the assertions John, Christine, and Althusius, Rousseau is determined to make the point like Gibbon (1891) that Christianity is unsuited to a real state-theory and that previous apologies for it have been sketches of a false utopia:

We are told that a people of true Christians would form the most perfect society imaginable. I see only one major difficulty with this supposition; which is that a society of true christians would no longer be a society of men.

I even say that, for all its perfection, this assumed society would be neither the strongest nor the most lasting: By dint of being perfect, it would lack cohesion; its very perfection would be its fatal vice.

Everyone would fulfill his duty; the people would obey the laws, the
chiefs would be just and moderate, the magistrates would be honest and incorruptible, the soldiers would despise death, there would be neither vanity nor luxury; all this is very well, but let us look further.

Christianity is a wholly spiritual religion, exclusively concerned with things of Heaven; the Christian's fatherland is not of this world. He does his duty, it is true, but he does it with profound indifference to the success of failure of his efforts. Provided he has nothing to reproach himself for, it does not much matter to him whether all goes well or ill down here on earth. If the State prospers, he hardly dares to enjoy the public felicity, he fears taking pride in his country's glory; if the State declines, he blesses the hand of God that weighs down on his people

For society to be peaceful and harmony preserved, all Citizens without exception would have to be equally good Christians: But if unhappily there is a single ambitious man among them, a single hypocrite, a Catiline, for example, or a Cromwell, that man will most certainly very easily get the better of his pious compatriots. Christian charity does not allow one readily to think ill of one's neighbor. Once he has discovered by some cunning the art of imposing on them and of seizing a part of the public authority, there behold a man vested in dignity; God wills that he be respected; soon behold a power; God wills that he be obeyed; does the
repository of this power abuse it? he is the scourge with which God
punishes his children. Driving out the usurper would trouble one's
conscience; it would require disturbing the public repose, resorting to
violence, shedding blood; all this accords ill with a Christian's mildness;
and after all what does it matter in this vale of tears whether one is free or
a serf? the essential thing is to get to paradise, and resignation is but one
more means to that end (Rousseau 1997, 148).

As I will elaborate further in the conclusion to this chapter, with this passage, Rousseau
has started to form a significant dichotomy that will cause his attack on Christianity, as a
force incapable of causing concern about institutions in this world, some problems. The
history of the Catholic Church to his day had been one in which, after the conversion of
Constantine and following, the Church was very much concerned with worldly affairs.
His Calvinism will come to his aid and say that this was an error of the papal Church,
but it seems that he wants to problematize Christianity both for being too spiritual in
document and then for being too worldly in practice for the previous fifteen hundred years
or so until his day. This difficulty becomes clearer when he moves to his discussion of
Christianity and warfare:

- Does a foreign war break out? Citizens march to battle without hesitation;
not one of them thinks of fleeing; they do their duty, but without passion
for victory; they know better how to die than to win. What matter whether
they are victors or vanquished? Does not providence know better than
they what they need? Imagine how a proud, impetuous, passionate enemy can take advantage of this stoicism! Pit against them those generous peoples who were consumed by an ardent love of glory and of fatherland, suppose your christian republic confronting Sparta or Rome; the pious christians will be beaten, crushed, destroyed before they have time to realize what is happening to them, or they will owe their salvation solely to the contempt their enemy will conceive for them. In my view the oath the soldiers of Fabius took was a fine oath; they did not swear to die or to win, they swore to return victorious, and they kept their word: Christians would never have taken such an oath; they would have believed they were tempting God.

But I am mistaken in speaking of a Christian Republic; each one of these terms excludes the other. Christianity preaches nothing but servitude and dependence. Its spirit is too favorable to tyranny for tyranny not always to profit from it. True Christians are made to be slaves; they know it and are hardly moved by it; this brief life has too little value in their eyes (Rousseau 1997, 149).

Again, Rousseau is speaking of a brand of Christianity, totally spiritualized Protestant Christianity, that he learned in Geneva. His characterization of Christian armies weak before the enemy and prone before domestic tyrants hardly does justice to the medieval
history of the Crusades and the many political conflicts in which the popes resisted the temporal despotism of Christian rulers. This point becomes clear when Rousseau feels forced to rebut it in the next passage:

We are told that christian troops are excellent. I deny it. Let me be shown some that are. As for myself, I know of no christian Troops. I will be referred to the Crusades. Without discussing the Crusaders' valor, I will point out that far from being Christians, they were soldiers of the priest, they were Citizens of the Church; they were fighting for its spiritual country, which it had made temporal, one knows not how. Strictly speaking, this belongs under the heading of paganism; since the Gospel does not establish a national Religion, a holy war among Christians is impossible.

Christian soldiers were brave under the pagan Emperors; all Christian Authors say so, and I believe it: it was in emulation for honor with the pagan Troops. As soon as the Emperors were christians this emulation ceased, and once the cross had driven out the eagle, all Roman valor ceased (Rousseau 1997, 149).

Here is a manifest contradiction. Rousseau already said above that Christianity makes make timid and uncaring about the honors of this world; then he says that the Christian soldiers imitated the pagan troops of the Emperors, presumably out of fear of
punishment or love of honor, but no Christian, according to his characterization, would bow to such impulses.

Perhaps the solution to this contradiction and the dichotomy that I noticed earlier is that these first Christians and the later Crusaders were operating under the same doctrine and practice of Christianity that made hardy soldiering possible with an expectation of eternal rewards and punishments. However, what is the difference between the moral Christianity that Rousseau admits as a builder of brotherhood and the religion of the priest that he so despises? Certainly, the moral teaching of Christianity that Rousseau approves was universally taught under the medieval conception; John's *Policraticus* is rife with such maxims. The difference is the sacramental principle, the rejection of which I argued was the formal break the medieval conception of the Body Politic propounded by John. The religion of the priest is necessitated by the sacramental life they dispense. That sacramental theory and practice as an actual avenue of bringing the goal of life, eternal union with God, into physical contact with the present bridges the Manichean gap suggested by Rousseau between the contemplation of the eternal blessed destination and the nasty realities of the temporal, physical political world. Without that sacramental principle, weakened by Christine and Althusius, the Manichean gap appears and Rousseau is only logical in dispensing with Christianity for any political purposes. Although the textual progression of my argument ends with Rousseau, the continuing trajectory of this argument suggests that the idea of the transcendent soul itself was becoming superfluous, and the subsequent development of modern political theory on
much less metaphysical lines was a natural result. Indeed, the lost soul of the Body Politic seems an apt metaphor for modern political theory and its difficulties of positive self-description and purpose.

Rousseau's primary argument in the *Social Contract* is that the early modern state, as he found it, was nearly an arbitrary tyranny. While he claims not to know why this is (Rousseau 1997, 41), he also asserts that government in the past has been universally so. Whatever the justice of this claim, the development that I have sketched in this project gives an answer to the problem: the institutions that had existed for centuries for the primary purpose of preparing people for the afterlife by making them loyal sons and daughters of the Church were now exercising power without any reasonable claim for utility. If the state were to reply that it was still charged with preparing its citizens for living the best possible temporal existence, then Rousseau is prepared to present a scheme that does so with, what he judges, a much great justice. That justice is to be determined based on the decision of individuals. Of course, to avoid perpetual confusion caused by actual objections from individuals, Rousseau constructs the General Will as the permanent symbol of the original consensus. With this argument, the Body Politic has been reduced to an atomized compact without any of the features of the Body Politic as conceived by John and Christine and to a lesser extent by Althusius. The soul of the Body Politic is not just ignored like it was in Christine or replaced by corporate institutions representing an underlying transcendent social permanence as it was by Althusius. Now, with Rousseau's General Will, a soul that exists only for temporal
reasons and does not add any transcendental reason for the Body Politic, since for him
even the family is a natural but temporary association, the transcendental soul is just
gone. Soul, as a transcendent moral teacher, and Body, as anything organic and natural,
disappear together and the modern state has been searching for an organic theory that
can convince its members of a moral argument for its natural existence and transcendent
reason for it to continue to live ever since.
6. CONCLUSION

The Body Politic bereft of a transcendent moral soul is the legacy of the shift from medieval to modern political philosophy. The loss of this soul was the product of a long, gradual rejection of the political/religious elements that had formed the synthetic medieval conception of the Body Politic that I described in John of Salisbury's work. In my analysis of the three authors representative of this removal of the soul, I located the beginning of its loss in the silence about the soul in the Body Politic of Christine de Pizan, despite her obvious personal Catholic piety and devotion, and her relegation of the clergy to the laboring limbs of that body. In essence, one may say that the soul was lost almost at the beginning of my analysis and that what remained to my three authors, subsequent to John, was a fleshing out of the implications of that loss. However, even if the essential soul of the Christian Body Politic was rejected so early, the utter rejection of its conceptual cogency, even if residual and not logically necessary to the polity, and its institutional support, a Church supported by the State but nominally independent, did not occur until my last author, Rousseau. In the foregoing chapters I have traced the implications of this gradual loss for the political theory of my authors; in this chapter, I turn my attention to the long term effects that this loss of the Body Politic's soul has produced in modern political theory and I investigate whether some return to a re-souled Body Politic seems likely or possible. In general, I will argue that such a return is necessary to deliver modern political theory from its difficulties in addressing ideas of group-oriented politics and the political contemplation of transcendental goods.
The loss of elements from the medieval traditions of culture and politics has not gone unnoticed in modern scholarship. Some (Tierney 1982) argue that the process was one of emancipation as the positive features inherent in the medieval civilization were retained, while non-progressive elements, such as a fairly static social hierarchy and lack of religious pluralism, were discarded during the turbulent breakup of that civilization that occurred during the late medieval and early modern periods. Others (Pocock 1975; Fasolt 2004) argue that to judge the medieval civilization in this manner is to project our moral values onto another period and thereby misunderstand the way in which that civilization thought of itself and to confuse the process by which the elements that came down to us were retained; and, therefore, the attempt to recognize modern intellectual concepts in pre-modern works is wholly impossible. Perhaps the best approach would be a more modest one in which elements of continuity and difference are both noted and contextualized with a reasonable presentation of historical context and the conceptual difficulties of such a project (Nederman 2009, xx-xxiv).

Whatever the academic debate on the ability of medieval works to influence modern scholarship, perhaps the most important consequence of the loss of contact with the medieval civilization has been the disappearance of a practical knowledge of its institutions. Most modern political institutions tend to be based on the idea of the individual as the only natural member of the Body Politic, but """"to more and more of those who seek the philosophical foundations of a free society, it has become apparent
that the solitary individual is a precarious and insecure foundation for freedom and rights” (Nesbit 1982, 186-187). Even when modern political theorists or practical politicians want to argue for some kind of communitarian or corporational scheme, they encounter the conceptual difficulties engrained by the long tradition of individuality endorsed by Rousseau and others: “Operating from a Rousseauist position of the individual as the sole source of political will, there can be no recognition of plural political communities as that sole source” (Hueglin 1999, 22). Thus, modern politics, even when it wants to be communitarian or organic, lacks a recent tradition of well known and established usage on which to draw.

Perhaps reintroducing older, organic traditions of politics into modern political theories is the best that can be done to provide for the possibility of a reconceptualization of modern politics. And the attempt is being made in some quarters:

Direct lineage...can be discerned in pluralist theorists of the early twentieth century...As Althusius before them, they insisted that because societies are composed 'composed of different partial societies with distinct objectives and beliefs...power should as far as possible be distributed to distinct domains of authority, and that administration within such domains should be devolved to the lowest level consistent with the effective governance of the affairs in question.'

Obviously, this type of thinking challenges the extreme individualism
inherent in the prevalent modern social contract tradition. For Althusius, writing at the dawn of the modern age of individual liberalism and still committed to the communitarian heritage of the old order, individuality is inextricably linked to the immediately surrounding structures of organized social life and culture. Individual citizens contribute to the shaping of these structures, but they are also recursively shaped by them (Hueglin 1995, 8).

But, if the attempt to reach back is going to be made, why stop at the early modern period with somebody like Althusius? In reality, as I mentioned in my chapter on Althusius, he himself was reaching back to the medieval: under the medieval synthesis of political and ecclesiastical quasi-sovereignties, “all groups including the state...are understood as natural categories of social life, as is the case with Althusius” (Friedrich 1975, 114-115). Asking this question about how far to reach back to find a workable theory of social cohesion that respects groups and individuals brings one into contact with the main point made in the opening of this project: the modern world started as a rejection of the organic, medieval synthesis that developed as an interaction between a centralized religious authority in the papacy and the primitive governments with which in came into relationship in Western Europe following the collapse of the Western Roman Empire and its institutions and the spread and consolidation of the Church. This synthesis, given its organic nature, the logistical difficulties it faced due to the primitive technological character of the period that presented extreme linguistic and transportation
challenges, and the great time over which it developed, had a very loose and varied structure. However, it did give rise to a certain way of life. But, given the primarily religious nature of the civilization's origins, the social institutions that it spawned are better understood by examining its ecclesiastical, liturgical, and sacramental practices, which focused its members on a transcendent view of the purpose of human life as a journey towards eternal union with God, rather than by examining its political offices, constitutions, or records of citizen participation, which it saw primarily as useful for caring for the temporal needs of the physical bodies of its members on their way to this destination. The common good of the Body Politic served as a means for providing a flourishing temporal home for this project. At the very least, one needs a presentation of its religious theory and practice along with its political counterpart to gain a more complete picture of this period.

Over time, as the papacy and the political institutions of Western Europe became more centralized and stronger, they increasingly came into conflict and with uneven results. As I detailed in this project, the Investiture Conflict marked a significant moment in the development of papal monarchy and its bureaucratic and administrative growth, and the Avignon Papacy and Great Schism were events that weakened its place in Western civilization. While these events were by no means isolated and really just the most significant of a nearly continuous tension, it is not necessarily clear that the resolution of this conflict had to be the total breakup of its institutions and theories and their replacement by the modern, secular, individualistic state. Rather, this may have been the
result of several determined choices that may need to be revisited. Perhaps this view is captured in the following:

Have we, under the 400-year-old spell of national sovereignty, unwisely neglected other sectors of Western thought...Should we derive an alternative curriculum in political thought that would stress Althusius over Bodin, Montesquieu over Rousseau, Gierke over Hegel, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer over Marx and Engels? In short, have we been studying the wrong thinkers, and even the wrong centuries? (McRae 1979, 685-686).

Of course, a wider study of theories from the early modern and medieval periods does not necessarily imply an either/or choice. Given the limited time available for the study of political thought in undergraduate and even graduate settings, certain pedagogical decisions have to be made. But, even with this consideration, the current near-absence of these alternative theories in political theory courses is difficult to understand as something other than conscious aversion:

There is no field of study within the broad tradition of Western political theory that has been so grossly underrepresented in recent English-language scholarship as the Latin Middle Ages. Numerous reasons may be adduced for this fact, but I suspect that many of them can be traced to a deeply ingrained pedagogical prejudice that is reproduced each semester in classrooms throughout the English-speaking world...Academic discomfort with a millennium of theory has effectively achieved canonical status:
shunned in graduate as well as undergraduate curricula, the topic is likewise disregarded in textbooks and anthologies, a situation that only exacerbates the ignorance of another generation of students of Western political philosophy about the Latin Middle Ages (Nederman 2009, xiii).

Perhaps with the recovery of study of the political, religious, and cultural institutions of the Middle Ages and an increased focus on aspects of that study, such as the medieval sacramental practice of religion with its transcendental orientation and ability to foster social cohesion, that have been given short shrift even when attempted and their reconsideration for forming the basis of practical social and political institutions, the modern Body Politic can start its journey, which is certain to be long and penitential, to recover its soul.
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