FPI (ISLAMIC DEFENDERS' FRONT):

THE MAKING OF A VIOLENT ISLAMIST MOVEMENT

IN THE NEW DEMOCRACY OF INDONESIA

A Dissertation

by

MUNAJAT

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 2012

Major Subject: Sociology

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ABSTRACT

FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front):

the Making of a Violent Islamist Movement

in the New Democracy of Indonesia. (May 2012)

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The current study is aimed at investigating the puzzle of why FPI (Islamic

Defenders' Front) has chosen to adopt violent strategies within the democratic context of

Indonesia. Much of literature on social movements suggests that democracy is inherently

nonviolent because it allows social movements to use a number of reasonable tactics to

pursue their goals. On the contrary, authoritarianism is considered to be the cause of the

emergence of violent movements. However, a violent movement is not necessarily

absent in the context of democracy. Using the language of Islam, justice and democracy,

FPI (Islamic Defender's Front) conspicuously committed at least 64 cases of violent

collective actions from 1998 to 2010.

Three levels of analysis are used in order to investigate this social puzzle, namely

the level of organization, individual characters and FPI's violent actions. Combining

these three levels of analysis, this study found that the making of the violent Islamist

movement (FPI) is complex and interconnected. First, there are at least four social

environments that have led FPI to the adoption of violent means. They are the historical context of Islamist movements in Indonesia (1945-1998), the timing of violence by FPI, social support for FPI's violent actions and low state capacity. Second, there are at least four factors that relate to individuals and organization of FPI. They are FPI's encounter with so-called justified violence, FPI's engagement in violence-prone activities, fundamentalism and FPI's framing of its violent actions. Combining these factors has made FPI's violence become more persistent in the new democratic context of Indonesia.

Consequently, despite the fact that democracy inhibits political violence, democracy may also allow the use of violent means by social movements. In doing so, democracy opens an opportunity for people, especially elites, to support the cause of violence. Therefore, this can undermine the government's will to fully suppress the violent movement. In addition, there are other significant factors, other than state repression, that also facilitate violence, such as a movement's choice to engage in violence-prone activities, low state capacity, a good timing of violence (cultural resources) and a good framing of violence.

DEDICATION

Dedicated to my wife Annisa, my daughter Leidena and whoever sacrifices her/his time to read this piece of work.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There is a pressing need to study a violent movement in the context of a new

democratic state. Current theories of political violence in the social movement studies

are mostly built on the non-democratic setting, while the studies of political violence in

the democratic setting are still rare. In fact, violent movements are not necessarily absent

in the context of democracy, such as FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front), a violent movement

that emerged in the setting of Indonesian democracy. Therefore, there is a need to

develop more comprehensive approach to look at the political violence in the context of

democracy. For this reason, this study is aimed at investigating the Islamist violent

movement, namely FPI that has adopted and continued to use violent strategies in the

context of Indonesian new democracy. Thus, this current chapter tries to provide the

background and how this study approaches this problem.

In Indonesia, the economic crises, the division of military elites, and the mass

uprising of the middle class in 1998, brought about the breakdown of the Indonesian

military authoritarian regime (the New Order regime) that had ruled for almost three

decades. This era marked the birth of democracy and the emergence of the civil society

of Indonesia. Since then, the state's control over public space has decreased, while the

roles of civil society have become stronger.

_____

This dissertation follows the style of *American Sociological Review*.

Since this time, not only has a number of political parties emerged in Indonesia, but also NGOs and social movements. Many of these groups, including those that had been previously suppressed by the authoritarian regime, emerged or reemerged as either political parties or social movements (Al-Zastrouw 2006). Benefitting from this opportunity, they used conventional and nonconventional means, which are mostly nonviolent, to pursue their goals. This is because democracy is inherently nonviolent, which allows social movements to use a number of reasonable tactics (Wiktorowicz 2004). Until this point, the collapse of the Indonesian military authoritarian regime and the emergence of nonviolent social movements aptly fit the political process theory (McAdam 1999; Almeida 2003; Tilly 2008). However, this was not the end of the story of the new Indonesian democracy.

Ironically, during the process of Indonesian democracy, an Islamist movement, FPI (Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders' Front) has adopted disruptive and violent strategies to pursue their goals. Since its establishment in August 1998, or three months after the collapse of the military authoritarian regime until the end of data collection for this study in 2010, FPI has committed at least 64 cases of violent actions. These activities have become the routine of FPI activities, even after some of FPI leaders were imprisoned by the government. Surprisingly, during its violent activities, FPI never hid its identity. In almost all its violent collective actions, FPI members always wore a white uniform with the green letter of "FPI (Front Pembela Islam)" and its emblem, so that they can be easily identified. Using the language of Islamic values, democracy and justice, FPI has conspicuously performed violence in the new democratic stage of

Indonesia. Therefore, many Indonesian figures from state and non-state institutions often consider FPI as the most visible organization that commits violent actions in Indonesia.

For example, at the end of December 2008, the Indonesian National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and the Union of Advocacy and Human Rights (the PBHI) released a report on human right violations in Indonesia. This commission reported that during 2008, it received 4,800 cases of human right violations. Then, the union reported that the five top cases that are often violated are the freedom of association (141 cases), the freedom of religion (138 cases), the right of peace (127 cases), the right to get proper protection (130 cases), and the right to be protected from hatred (68 cases). They agree that FPI (Islam Defenders' Front) is among the top perpetrators of those human rights violations. Similarly, in August 2010, the National Police Chief, General Bambang Hendarso Danuri reported that FPI and FBR (the Association of Betawi Community) have dominated the collective violent cases since 2007 ("Terjadi 4.800 Kasus" 2008; "Kapolri: FPI" 2010). Because of this intensive engagement in collective violence, FPI is considered to be the Indonesian hardliner Islamist movement.

These violent actions by FPI are similar to what Tilly (2003) calls "collective violence as contentious politics;" this is the type of violence, which this study refers to. First, it is *collective violence* because those actions immediately inflict physical damage on persons and/or objects, involve at least two perpetrators of damage, and result, at least in part, from coordination among people who perform the damage. Second, it is

contentious because both FPI and the government always make claims in relation to FPI

violent actions that affect each other's interest. Third, it is *politics* because the relations

between FPI and the government are always at stake.

In short, the overall goal of this study is to investigate the puzzle of why FPI has

chosen to adopt violent strategies under the democratic context of Indonesia, while other

movements, including some radical Islamist groups (such as, Majelis Mujahidin

Indonesia[1] and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia[2]), have avoided using violent tactics. In order to

get a more comprehensive understanding of this problem, this study will look at three

different aspects of FPI as a social movement, namely: its organization, activists and

violent activities. Each of these aspects is addressed in the following different research

questions:

1. What are FPI's organizational contexts that are associated with violence and how
   do they explain FPI's adoption of violent means?

2. What are the individual characteristics of FPI activists that might facilitate FPI's
   adoption of violent means?

---

[1] Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) was established on August 7, 2000. Two of its important leaders
are Abu Bakar Ba`asyir and Irfan S. Awas. The former is the *amir* (the head of consultative committee)
and the latter is the top leader (executive committee) of MMI. The goal for MMI establishment is to
struggle for the application of Islamic law, *shari`ah* in the real life of the Indonesian society. This group
is often associated with the Jemaah Islamiyyah (Indonesia), a Al-Qaeda's network in Southeast Asia
(Nashir 2007:392).
[2] Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is part of the Hizbut Tahrir transnational movement, which was
established in 1953 and is aimed at establishing a single Islamic rule or Islamic caliphate (*khilafah
Islamiyyah*) and applying *shari`ah* in the world. Even though HTI publicly appeared in Indonesia after the
collapse of the Suharto authoritarian regime, Nashir argues that it might be established a long time before
that time. He suspects that its embryo had been developed since the visit of Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, the
founder of Hizbut Tahrir, in Muslim countries in 1970s. Fealy assumes that Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia have
the most followers among Hizbut Tahrir in other countries, then followed by Hizbut Tahrir Uzbekistan
(Nashir 2007; Fealy 2007).

3. What are the patterns of FPI's violent actions and how these actions and their social contexts explain its adoption of violent means?

The first and the third research questions will be addressed with a qualitative approach, and the second research question will be addressed with a quantitative approach. Thus, combining qualitative and quantitative methods to examine the aspects of organization, individual and activities, the proposed study is expected to theorize the conditions under which social movements, especially religious movements, will become radicalized and adopt violent strategies in the context of democracy.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE RIVIEW

The current chapter tries to provide a literature review that sheds light on the topics of collective violence, or political violence, or, what Charles Tilly (2008) calls, collective violence as contentious politics. There are various perspectives of looking at political violence, and there is no single answer to the question of why this violence occurs. Therefore, based on the above research questions, this chapter focuses on the studies of political violence that look at the aspects of political environment, organization and actors to explain political violence. In doing so, it is expected that this chapter gives an overview of what has been done and needs to be done in the study of political violence. More importantly this study can benefit from the previous studies to guide the analysis of FPI's adoption of violent means and locate it in the wider study of political violence.

Political Environment: State-Centered Perspective

Several studies look at violence by focusing on the political environments. According to this perspective, social movements are both limited and empowered by exogenous factors, namely the socio-political environment, regardless of level of grievances, availability of resources and other internal factors. Therefore, social movement is understood to be a product of social forces and is not reducible to the preexisting psychological states of the individuals or the actors.

Some studies suggest that the characteristics of regimes or states are considered to be more determining of social movement's outcomes than other environmental factors, or more over the characteristics of the actors. In this light, authoritarianism or state repression is often considered to be the cause of the emergence of violent movements. This argument is embodied in the so-called theory of blocked opportunity. This theory contends that a group resorts to violence because the way and the process toward normal pacific competition have been blocked (Conteh-Morgan 2004). Harsh repression blocks moderate tactics and subsequently tends to radicalize the movement and pushes tactics toward violence (Shortell 2001; Wiktorowicz 2004; Steinhoff and Zwerman 2008; Almeida 2008).

For example, in the case of the massacre by the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA), the political environments were characterized by three conditions: first, state repression that created a political environment of bifurcation and brutality; second, insurgents that created exclusive organizations to shield themselves from the repression; and third, rebels that promoted anti-system frames to motivate collective action to overthrow agents of repression. Similarly, in the case of the Gama`a Islamiyya of Egypt, the repression produced violent responses when the movement was excluded from institutional politics and suffered from indiscriminate, reactive state repression (Wiktorowicz 2004). In short, Wiktorowicz argues that the pattern of violence can be best explained in terms of regime responses to challenger initiatives. Harsh regime responses that limited moderate tactics tended to radicalize the rebellion and make violence more legitimate.

Similarly, in his studies of revolutionary movements from 1945 to 1991 across countries in Southeast Asia, Central America and Eastern Europe, Goodwin (2001) argues that political violence is not simply a response to economic exploitation or inequality, but also a more direct response to political oppression and violence, typically brutal and indiscriminate. He also argues that the success of revolution will depend on incapacitation of states. This incapacitation, however, should be distinguished from expanding political opportunities which are necessary for the mobilization of movements. Goodwin concludes that political context is not the only factor that explains the revolutionary movements, but it is the most important factor (Goodwin 2001:31).

Similarly Tilly and Della Porta came to the same conclusion. Tilly (2008) argues that political environments are important factors that can explain the movements' adoption of violence. In his study, he classified six types of violence, namely: rituals, coordinated destruction, opportunism, brawls, scattered attacks and broken negations. Each type has different combination of recurrent causal mechanism. Nevertheless he argues that there are two important factors that are always prevalent in explaining those different types of violence, namely: democracy and the capacity of state.

Democracy is the extent to which the citizens maintain broad and equal relations with the government or state, exercise control over the government and enjoy protection from arbitrary action by the government. Capacity is the extent to which the government of the state controls resources, activities and citizens. In short, democratic states with high capacity tend to inhibit violence and vice versa (Tilly 2008:41).

Della Porta also argues that organized violence and the groups that specialize in violence develop gradually. The development of violent groups is often affected by state repression. State repression often creates martyrs and myths. For example, an individual activist who is hit or killed by the state can become a hero or holy person for his or her group. Then, this repression can motivate secondary deviance; the supporters or the people who are in the same group with this victim may also become radicalized by the state repression (Della Porta 2008).

In a slightly different way, some argue that state repression is not enough for the movement to launch the violent strategies. It depends also on the capability or strength of the movements. Therefore, Almeida (2003) argues that there is a connection between open opportunity and state repression (threats). A period of expanded political opportunity in authoritarian contexts also permits the survival of organizational infrastructure, which then enables the movement to become more independent and stable. However, when the transition from political opportunity to threat occurs, the movement will adopt new organizational forms and practices, like becoming radical and disruptive (Almeida 2003).

In short, the above studies suggest that state repression is the most important factor that explains the adoption of violent strategies by social movements. Repression provides necessary conditions for the movement to be violent, for example by blocking opportunities, creating sense of injustice and making a call to arms logical. These studies seem to adopt a state-centered approach, in terms of putting state at the center of the analysis. They do not ignore other significant factors that may facilitate political

violence, but they consider that state characteristics are the determinant factors that explain movement's outcome. Therefore, these studies do not take into account other factors that also predict political violence. In fact, political or collective violence is not necessarily absent from the context of democratic settings. Indeed, Tilly (2008) has already stated that democracy reduces the likelihood of violent movements, but this also means that the violent movements still can emerge in the democratic context. The question, then, is what can account for the violent movement, like FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front), in the context of democracy? In addition to that, the political process approach, which emphasizes on state, discounts many significant aspects that are close to violence, such as the actors and organizations of the movements.

Framing Aspect

Unlike the above studies that focus on exogenous factors to explain violent movements, several studies look at internal or endogenous factors of the movements, such as culture, meaning construction, ideology and other factors that relate to minds and emotions of the movement or actors. For example, many social movement scholars argue that political violence is mainly symbolic. Therefore, in analyzing violence, cultural and emotional effects are more important than the material damage caused by violence (Della Porta 2008).

Juergensmeyer (2003) explores the relationship between religion and violence through culture. He argues that violence is a form of public performance symbolizing ability to terrorize the community. Religion plays role in legitimizing the violence and

provides the cosmic war that makes the perpetrators believe that they are conducting a holy mission. Even though religion does not always provides moral justification for violence, this kind of alliance between religion and violence can be found in almost every major religious traditions, such as Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhism.

Juergensmeyer (2003) focuses on the role of culture that leads to violent action and justification. For him, culture includes the idea of episteme and habitus. Episteme is a world view or paradigm of thinking that defines the conditions of all knowledge. Habitus is a socially constituted system of cognitive and motivating structure. These are all what Geertz refers to as a cultural system (Juergensmeyer 2003).

Other studies look at ideology to predict political violence. In this case, ideology is treated just like the political environments that are able to limit as well as empower the movements. For example, Sewell (1994) argues that in the case of the French revolution, ideology is relatively autonomous, impersonal and cultural. Thus, it should be understood in structural terms. As a part of social structures, ideology possesses dual characters: constraint and enablement. It produces and reproduces actions, and at the same time it also blocks certain actions. Ideological structure also is also anonymous, or beyond the consciousness of any single actor (Sewell 1994).

Other studies prefer to look at political violence as part of the discourse in society. This is because political violence exists within the discourse. For example, in the case of radicalization of the religious movements in El Salvador, Shortell (2001) looks at the process of radicalization through the sermon of Romero. He looks at the

techniques of describing and explaining the rhetorical strategies by which meaning is deployed in the struggle against the state. Therefore, religious ideology or discourse in this case is not merely theological but it also represents the process of radicalization of movements in El Salvador (Shortell 2001).

In short, challenging the political process (political environments) approach, these studies suggest that, in addition to state repression, there are factors embedded in the movements that are also determinant to predict the movement's outcome. These factors can be ideological, cultural and organizational. In the studies of social movements, these factors may be close to framing analysis because most of them are about construction of meaning that make violence become more logical and feasible, and finally motivate the movements' members to participate in the political violence. However, these studies still ignore the socio-environmental aspects (exogenous factors) and the characteristics of individuals who perpetrate violence.

Characteristics of Individual

Several studies prefer to look at the characteristics of individuals to explain political violence. Some of the most challenging as well as convincing arguments are that generally the way people (movement activists) perceive their religions and their states or governments affect the movement's outcomes. More specifically, they are fundamentalism, political trust and political efficacy, which are explained as follows.

First, fundamentalism may be the most conspicuous factor that is often accused as the source of religious violence; even if the violence does not appear to be religious.

Even though some scholars disagree with this idea (Jahroni 2008; Al-Zastrouw 2006), many others still believe that the relationship between fundamentalism and religious violence is real (Altmeyer and Hunsberger 1992 and 2004; Moaddel and Karanbenich 2008; Rothschild, Abdollahi, and Pyszczynski 2009). For example, the study of Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) indicates that fundamentalism strongly associated with hostility towards homosexuality. Moaddel and Karanbenich (2008) found that the more fundamentalist people are, the more likely they are to be fatalistic and feel insecure. Similarly, Rothschild (2009) found that among Americans, fundamentalism is associated with greater support for significant military interventions.

Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) may be the first scholars that develop a measurement scale of fundamentalism. Initially, they created 20 indicators or items of fundamentalism. However, in their later study they revised and shortened those indicators into 16 items, which they consider as having more internal consistency and the same reliability as in the 20-item scale. For example, "*God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed*" and "*No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths about life.*"

In addition, these scales of fundamentalism were replicated and further developed by Moaddel and Karabenich (in the context of young Muslims in Egypt and Saudi Arabia), and Rothschild et al. (in the context of Americans and Iranian Shiite Muslims). Rothschild et al. (2009) use the old-version scale of fundamentalism by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992). Moaddel and Karabenich (2008) use the revised

scale of fundamentalism by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) with some adjustment of the question so as to be more appropriate to the Muslim context. For example, Moaddel and Karabenich (2008) add the following items:

1. Islam is the only religion on this earth that teaches, without error, God's truth.

2. Islam should be the only religion taught in our public schools.

3. Only good Muslims will go to heaven; people of other religions will not, no matter how good they are.

4. Non-Muslim religions have a lot of weird beliefs and pagan ways.

In the two studies of Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992 and 2004), both the old-version scale model and the revised scale model of fundamentalism produced high values of Cronbach's α from .87 to .98. Similarly, the study by Rothschild et al. (2009) also produced high values of Cronbach's α= .90 and .92. However, the study of Moaddel and Karanbenich (2008) produced the lowest Cronbach's α= .80 and .79.

Despite those high values of Cronbach's α in the above studies, there are two concerns that can be addressed to the above scales of fundamentalism, in terms of suffering from social desirability bias and theoretical dimensionality of fundamentalism. First, most of those above questions consist of something that is supposed to be followed by adherents of a religion. For example, answering the questions: "*Islam is the only religion on this earth that teaches, without error, God's truth,*" Muslims will potentially answer according to the expectation of the professed creed, rather than their actual belief. Similarly in other religions, adherent of a religion is supposed to believe that his/her religion the real truth. Therefore, people will tend to present themselves in a

favorable light. Second, the above scales of fundamentalism focus only on aspects of beliefs. In fact, current studies of fundamentalism suggest that fundamentalism should not be viewed merely from aspects of beliefs, but also aspect of cognition or belief's manifestation (Marty and Appleby 1997; Almound, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Frey 2007). Therefore, if fundamentalism entails both dimensions of belief and its manifestation, the above items of fundamentalism suffer from theoretical dimensions of fundamentalism.

However, even though the above scales of fundamentalism appear to be problematic, there are strong tendencies that fundamentalism (or a certain type of religiosity) is closely associated with violence. For example, Ginges and Atran (2009) do not discuss fundamentalism, but they acknowledge a certain type of religiosity (strong commitment) can affect violence. They argue that participation in violence is more a function of parochial altruism or collective commitment than selective incentives (economic gain). They collected data on seven hundred and twenty Palestinian adults from 14 university campuses across the West Bank and Gaza. The result shows that when people are considering between duty to go to war or to family, they are not making instrumental decisions but rather decisions based on moral commitment to collective sacred values. In short, the analysis shows no relationship between self-enhancement scores and willingness to attack Palestinians or Israelis, but shows a positive relationship between conservatism scores and willingness to participate in acts of political violence.

Similar patterns were also found by Ginges and Atran (2009) in the context of Indonesia. The respondents were 102 students attending four different Indonesian

madrasah (Muslim boarding schools) that are associated with social movements. The findings of this research confirm the relationship between religious violence and certain type of religiosity, and challenge the prevailing view that the choices of actors in political disputes are instrumentally rational, driven by a strict cost-benefit calculus.

In short, these arguments about fundamentalism imply that there is a need to revisit the relationship between fundamentalism and violence, to develop the scale of fundamentalism and finally to test whether this relationship can be used to explain FPI's adoption of violent means.

Second, in addition to fundamentalism, a number of earlier studies indicate that political discontent or trust in government and political efficacy are associated with violence and radicalization (Gamson 1968; Paige 1971; Craig et al. 1981, 1985, 1990; Zimmermann 1983). Miller (1967) and Zimmermann (1983) argue that the readiness to engage in violence will depend on the degree of trust in political authority. Similarly, Gamson (1968) distinguishes three types of political activities which are used to influence the state; persuasion, inducement and constraint (physical violence). All of these types relate to the level of trust in government. People who have a high trust in government would be likely to use persuasion; those who have a neutral position towards the government, would be likely to use inducement; and those who have a low trust, would be likely to use constraint or violence. However, he adds that those who use constraint should also have a high degree of efficacy.

Other scholars argue that the adoption of violent means will depend on the interactions between those above factors. They have different opinions on the type of

interactions that lead to the use of violent tactics. Some argue that people with low trust in government and low level of political efficacy are susceptible to radical or revolutionary appeals (Kornhauser 1959; Bell 1964; Ransford 1968). On the contrary, similar to Gamson (1968), others argue that people with high scores of political efficacy but low scores of trust tend to resort to violent political actions (Paige 1971). However, the latter argument seems to be more parallel to the current social movement theory. People who have low political efficacy will not likely join the social movements, let alone to engage in political violence. Nevertheless these two arguments can be tested at the same time by creating an interaction variable between the trust and political efficacy and then looking at the results of those interaction in relations to the dependent variable of violence. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the relationship between violence and political attitudes (trust in the government and political efficacy).

In summary, a number of studies have been done to investigate why movements engage in violent activities. Various approaches have been employed to look at this topic, such as political environments, organizational aspects and individual characteristics. However, much of the previous research needs to be further developed and tested. First, the studies that focus on political environments are still dominated by the state-centered approach to predict violence. Therefore, there is a need to investigate political environments, other than state repression, that may also lead to political violence. This is because political violence or violent movements also exist in the democratic settings. Therefore, this need can only be met by investigating violence in the context of non-repression or democracy.

Second, the studies focusing on aspects of organization show that ideology and culture of the organization give a valuable aspect in explaining violence because political violence is mostly symbolic, logical and legitimate to the actors involved and some part of the society. Lastly, in regards to the characteristics of individuals, there is a need to revisit the relationships between political violence (violent attitudes) and people's levels of fundamentalism, trust in government and political efficacy.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework for the current study can be divided into two sections: qualitative and quantitative. First, the qualitative theoretical framework is used to address the first and third research questions, which are about FPI organizational context and its violent actions respectively. Second, the quantitative theoretical framework is used to address the second research question, which is about testing the relationships among the latent variables of fundamentalism, trust in government, efficacy, violent attitudes and the dichotomous variable of type of group.

Qualitative Theoretical Framework

Political Process Theory

Political process theory may be the most dominant model in the study of social movements. This theory focuses on the political environment surrounding the group in order to predict the emergence and outcomes of social movements, including why a social movement adopts violent means (McAdam 1986, 1999; Tarrow 1998). The political environment can be widely interpreted as opportunity and/or threats (Almeida 2003). Opportunity is a condition that is beneficial for movements, such as political realignments, decline of state capacity to repress and opening new access. Threat pertains to conditions that intimidate movements, such as economic problems,

unfavorable laws and state repression.   In short, this perspective looks at social movements as a political process, not a psychological process.

Based on this, collective violence is often understood as a result of blocked opportunity. One of the common types of blocked opportunity is state repression of any institutions that challenge the state's authority. State repressions limit reasonable tactics that the movements use to achieve their goals. This condition leads social movements to adopt violent tactics (Shortell 2001; Wiktorowicz 2004; Steinhoff and Zwerman 2008).

However, repression does not necessarily radicalize a movement. The ability of the movement to engage in violent actions will depend on the readiness and strength of the movement. Therefore, opportunity and threat can sometimes be interconnected. For example, in the case of El Salvador, the radicalization of some movements resulted from the temporal sequencing of political opportunity and threat environments (Almeida 2003). The process of this radicalization is described by Almeida in the following Figure 3.1:

Source: Almeida 2003:355
Figure 3.1 Pathways to Protest Wave Outbreak in Authoritarian Settings

Therefore, this figure implies that repression (threat $\rightarrow$ radicalization in T_2) alone is not enough to explain the radicalization of the movement. There is a need to look back at the political environments (T_1), prior to repression (T_2) that bring about the readiness of the movement to engage in violent actions.

In short, the current study tries to use the political process theory as a framework to look at how socio-political environments –around FPI organizational context and its violent actions– shed light on FPI's adoption of violent means. However, this theory emphasizes socio-political process and regards violence as a result of social force. It ignores other aspects, such as ideological components, organizational bylaws, moral organization and actors. Therefore, complementing this approach, this study also uses the framing process theory to explain FPI's adoption of violence, as explained below.

Framing Process Theory

In addition to political process theory, framing process theory represents another important perspective that can be used to examine political violence. This is because violence by itself is risky, unpopular and usually avoided. Therefore, in the context of social movements, leaders or activists must construct norm violations, grievances, religious reasoning and social justification so that the violence becomes meaningful, which in turn also motivates movements' members to participate in the actions. Without framing, or meaning construction, collective violence will not likely occur.

Benford and Snow (2000) argue that there are four types of framing processes, namely frame bridging, amplification, extension and transformation. First, frame bridging is linking two or more similar ideologies that are, however, structurally unconnected regarding a particular issue. Second, frame amplification is the clarification or invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on particular issue, problem or set of events. Third, frame extension is an attempt to enlarge its adherent pool of participants by portraying its objective and activities as attending to or being congruent with the values or interest of potential adherents. Fourth, frame transformation involves changing old understandings and meanings (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000). Even though this perspective is general, it is insightful to look at how FPI gains support from either its members or other groups, and how FPI deal with its continuous adoption of violent means.

Another interesting framing concept, with which to look at FPI's violence, is the framing task. There are three key framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational

framing. Diagnostic framing includes identification of problem and the attribution of blame or causality. Prognostic framing includes suggestion of solutions to the problem and identification of strategies, tactics, and targets. Lastly, motivational framing includes calling for engagement in corrective action or movements. The success of the movement often depends on to which of these three framing tasks are fulfilled (Snow and Benford 1988).

In short, this study tries to combine political process and framing process theories into a single framework to examine how the socio-political environment around FPI's organizational contexts and its violent actions shed light on FPI's adoption of violent means. However, these two major theories ignore the psychological or individual characteristics of the movements' actors or activists. Therefore, in this study will also examine the individual actors to explain FPI's adoption of violent means.

Quantitative Theoretical Framework

As described in the literature review chapter, the characteristics of individuals that may explain political violence or collective violence are fundamentalism, trust in government, political efficacy, and the interaction term between trust and political efficacy. Therefore, the following discussion is about the theoretical framework of the theories to constructs items measuring those variables. Additionally, this study also adds the variable of violent attitudes in order to test the relationships between those variables and violence.

Fundamentalism

Originally the term fundamentalism referred to a group of conservative American Protestants in the early 1900s. They were fundamentalists in the sense that they considered themselves to be the people selected to preserve and protect the fundamentals of Christian faith from the liberal ideas, such as Darwinism and modernism (Numrich 2007:9). More recently, the term fundamentalism has been used to identify a type of religiosity that emphasizes a return to traditional values or a glorious past and an accompanying sense of restoration of religious traditions.

Therefore, the term fundamentalism is no longer confined to Christianity. It has been expanded into other religions, not only the Abrahamic religions but also Hinduism and Buddhism. Even though fundamentalists associated with every religion have different visions of the cosmos and of a just social order, they adopt similar attitude towards the processes of secularization, anthropocentric notions of progress and development (Marty and Appleby 1997).

Scholars have slightly different opinions on the definitions of fundamentalism, or what may constitute fundamentalism. That is may be the source of why scholars have different opinions about the relationship between violence and fundamentalism. Some emphasize their concepts on people's religious beliefs, like the truth of one's religion, the relationship with God, and treating religious texts; while others emphasize on the manifestations of people's attitude towards religion, such as how people look at the relationship between state and religion, the status of women, and modernity. These differences can be seen in how both groups define "fundamentalism" as follows.

First, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992, 2004) focus their concept on religious beliefs. They define fundamentalism as follows:

> One set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and those who believe and follow these fundamental teaching have a special relationship with deity" (1992:118).

Second, other scholars define fundamentalism in a broader way, not merely based on the religious beliefs. As Peter L. Berger argues, fundamentalism should be defined by its cognitive style. Both non fundamentalist and fundamentalist adherents share the same beliefs, but they affirm these beliefs in different ways; the former shows a flexible and moderate manner, and the latter exhibits an uptight and militant manner (Frey 2007:vi). Similarly, other scholars define fundamentalism as follows:

> An identifiable pattern of religious militancy in which self-styled true believers attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity by outsiders, fortify the borders of religious community and create viable alternatives to secular structures and processes (Marty and Appleby 1997; Almound et al. 2003:17).

As discussed in Chapter II, the first definition of fundamentalism, which only considers "belief" factor, is problematic. This study, therefore, uses the second definition of fundamentalism in order to develop a scale of fundamentalism. In addition, the second definition of fundamentalism does not ignore the aspect of belief, as can be seen in the following traits of fundamentalist.

Based on the above concept of fundamentalism, scholars identify the traits of fundamentalist as follows:

1. Reactivity means reactive attitudes towards something that is considered as degeneration of a tradition, or protective and defensive attitudes towards religion beliefs. Fundamentalists, therefore, perceive threat of their religion from other religions, ethnic groups, the state, or more liberal groups of the same religion. This defensive attitude often produces hostility and violence towards other (religious) groups.

2. Dualistic thinking means a black-white approach to life. Everything is considered as good or otherwise evil, or pure and contaminated. For example, political murders by fundamentalist groups in Islamic countries from eight century onward usually targeted Muslim rulers because fundamentalists did consider the rulers as not true Muslims, and thus evil.

3. Absolutist interpretation of scripture means strict reading of the holy books, or in some cases, accepted traditions. However, Frey (2007) argues the fundamentalists are not always "literalist" in interpreting the holy texts, but they consistently reject modern interpretations of their holy books.

4. An apocalyptic view means a belief that the sacred texts contain hidden mysteries, including historical secrets, such as the concept of the Messiah and Dajjal (the big impostor). For example, Muslim Fundamentalists view that the people of `Ad (the community that rejected God, and then destroyed by God) in the Quran as referring to the US, and Dajjal as referring to the US president.

5. Belief in chosenness means that Fundamentalists believe in their own specialness as the defenders of the religion. Despite the fact that most fundamentalist groups

consist of only a small number of people compared to the mainstream groups, they tirelessly pursue their goals, opposing what they believe to be the prevailing madness within the religion and within the world today.

6. Selective emphasis means that fundamentalists focus only certain parts of their religion traditions, and certain aspects of modernity as their target of attacks. For example, once Dwight L Moody, the founder of the Moody Bible Institute, argued that there are "four great temptations that threaten us to-day: attending the theater, failing to keep the Sabbath holy…, reading the Sunday newspaper, and teaching atheistic doctrines, including evolution."

7. Separation from the World, charismatic style of leadership, and strict behavior of controls are other Fundamentalist characteristic at the group level (Frey 2007).

In short, the concept of fundamentalism that is used in this study emphasizes not only the aspect of belief but also the manifestation of belief in social and political lives. In doing so, it is expected that the items used here describe a more meaningful concept of fundamentalism enabling classification of the types of religiosity among Muslims, particularly the Muslim leaders and activists. More importantly, these items also do not suffer from the social desirability bias. The following Table 3.1 shows the items used to measure the level of fundamentalism and their theoretical bases.

Table 3.1 Indicators (Observed Variables) of Fundamentalism and Theoretical Bases

Coding	Items	Theoretical bases
Q6a	We do not need to re-interpret what is clearly and literally stated in the al-Quran because it is flawless, for example the verses of the unequal proportion of inheritance between male and female (2:1).	Absolutism
Q6b	Whenever knowledge/science and al-Quran conflict, science must be wrong; and we do not need to compromise between them.	Absolutism
Q6c	Currently the activities of Christianization targeting Muslim in Indonesia have become a serious threat to our Muslim community.	Reactivity
Q6d	The Islamic liberal groups, like JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal) have gone too far from the real tenets of Islam and potentially harm the true beliefs of Muslim community of Indonesia.	Reactivity
Q6e	Muslims of Indonesia is in a state of serious danger because of the widespread of corruptions, pornography, prostitutions, drugs and other immoralities	Reactivity
Q6f	Currently, I feel that I am obliged to do something to protect Islam/Muslim society from such immorality because many Muslims tend to ignore such problems.	Feeling being Chosen
Q6g	To deal with these problems, the government should prioritize to solve moral problems rather than other problems because immorality (the moral problem) is the source of all problems.	Selective emphasis
Q6h	According to Islam, a woman cannot be a leader, such as president, governor and mayor.	Absolutism, Selective emphasis
Q6i	According to Islam, a woman cannot be a judge.	Absolutism, Selective emphasis
Q6j	A Muslim must not vote for female candidates for president or governor.	Absolutism, Selective emphasis
Q6k	The chronic problems of corruption, pornography and other widespread of immoralities as well as the continuous natural disasters in Indonesia are signs about the closeness of the end of the world.	Apocalyptical Views
Q6l	The Quran and the Hadith have already predicted the appearance of *Dajjal* (the imposter and damage carrier). I believe that the president of the USA and the prime minister Israel are the *Dajjal*.	Apocalyptical Views
Q6m	Indonesia is a secular state because its constitution is not based on a religion (Islam or the Quran and Hadith).	Dualistic thinking
Q6n	Muslims make up the majority of the Indonesian population. Therefore, state constitutions should be based on Islamic *shari`ah* (al-Quran and al-Sunnah).	Dualistic thinking

Note: The answers for these statements use 7 points of the Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree); and 7 indicate highest level of fundamentalism.
The coding number system (Q6a to Q6n) was adjusted to the question number in the questionnaire. For example, Q6a means "question" number "6" item "a."

Trust in Government

Trust in government is about citizens' effective orientation toward and evaluation of the government.   The scale of trust runs from high trust to low trust (high distrust or cynicism). High trust indicates that the government or public servants meet the expectation of the citizens, while low trust indicates that the government's functions and outputs do not meet the citizens' expectations or norms (Gamson1968 and Miller 1974).

There are at least two approaches used to measure trust in government. The first approach emphasizes people's self-identification of their trust in the government's work or in how the government functions. The second approach emphasizes people's self-identification on their trust in the government's institutions. For example, the question is "how much of the time can you trust the police institution" (Torney-Purta and Richardson 2004; Paige 1971).

In order to get a comprehensive dimension of trust, this study will apply both approaches. Therefore, the items of trust in government will contain people's self-identification of their trust in both the government's work and institutions. However, the questions or the statements and the scales of answers, especially from Miller (1974) and Torney-Purta and Richardson (2004), will be adjusted and added so that they will be more appropriate to the context of Indonesia, such as the questions about typical problems faced by the government. Based on all of these, the questions about trust can be seen in the following Table 3.2 and Table 3.3.

Table 3.2 Indicators (Observed Variables) of Trust in Government's Work

Coding	Items (Indicators)
Q7a	The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people.*
Q7b	People in the government waste a lot of the money.*
Q7c	Almost all of the people running the government don't seem to know what they are doing.*
Q7d	Many people running the government are a little crooked.*
Q7e	The government can deal with the problem of morality, like pornography, abortion and prostitution
Q7f	The government has effectively combated the problem of corruptions.
Q7g	The government/court will be successful in dealing with the case of Bibit-Chandra-versus Anggodo (or Gayus).

Note: The answers for these statements use 7 points of the Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree); and 7 indicate highest level of Trust in government's work.
The coding number system (Q7a to Q7g) was adjusted to the question number in the questionnaire.
The statements with * are scored in reverse, so that the higher score indicate higher trust.

Table 3.3 Indicators (Observed Variables) of Trust in Government's Institutions

Coding	Items (Indicators)
Q8a	How much of the time can you trust the SBY Administration?
Q8b	How much of the time can you trust the Provincial/Local Government?
Q8c	How much of the time can you trust the Police?
Q8d	How much of the time can you trust the Courts (Pengadilan)?
Q8e	How much of the time can you trust the Prosecutor General (Kejaksaan)?
Q8f	How much of the time can you trust the People of Congress/Parliament (MPR/DPR)?

Note: The answer for these questions will be 1 = never 2 = only some of the time 3 = most of the time 4 = always 0 = don't know. The score of 1 indicates low trust in government and 4 indicates high trust in government. The score of zero (0) is treated as a missing value and coded -9.
The coding number system (Q8a to Q8f) was adjusted to the question number in the questionnaire.

Political Efficacy

Political efficacy is often defined as the feeling that people can have an impact upon the political process. Thus, efficacious individuals will feel that they can influence the political process or how the government functions (Paige 1971). Currently, in the literature of political science, the dimension of political efficacy developed by a sociologist, William A. Gamson, has been expanded.   Efficacy is, therefore, not only a measure of beliefs about one's competence to participate or influence the political process, which is called "internal efficacy," but also beliefs about a government's

responsiveness to citizens' demands, which is called "external efficacy" (Craig and Maggiotto 1990).

For the purpose of this study, I will use the concept of efficacy proposed by Gamson based on two reasons. First, the later definition of political efficacy (internal and external) is developed in order to explain voting behavior or conventional political participation rather than more general socio-political participation. Second, the operational definition of external efficacy to some extent overlaps with the indicators of political trust used in this study. For example, one item of external efficacy is "under our form of government, the people have the final say about how the country is run, no matter who is in office;" this statement may overlap with the above indicators of trust. In addition to that, it is the Gamson's concept of political efficacy that more closely discusses the relationship between political efficacy, trust and violence.

The following Table 3.4 shows the items that are used to measure political efficacy (internal) adopted from the previous studies by Gamson (1968:42) and Craig and Maggiotto (1990).

Table 3.4 Indicators (Observed Variables) of Political Efficacy (Efficacy)

Coding	Items (Indicators)
Q9a	I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics (*Even though now you are not interested in*).
Q9b	I think that I am as well-informed about politics and government as most people.
Q9c	I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country right now
Q9d	Other people seem to have an easier time understanding complicated issues than I do.*
Q9e	I feel that I could do as good a job as people in the government of parliament.
Q9f	I often don't feel sure of myself when talking with other people about politics and government.*

Note: The answers for these statements use 7 points of the Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree); and 7 indicate highest level of Efficacy (political efficacy).
The coding number system (Q9a to Q9g) was adjusted to the question number in the questionnaire.
The statement with * are scored in reverse, so that the higher score indicates higher efficacy.

Violent Attitudes

The violence used in this study refers to the violent actions done by FPI. As discussed above, FPI's violence can be categorized under collective violence as contentious politics (Tilly 2008:26). Some also call this kind of violence simply political violence. Unlike violence in general, which is mostly random if not criminal, political violence is deployed for purposes like overthrowing a tyrannical regime and redefining social justice and equity (Apter 1997). Therefore, most of the time, the violence is justified by the perpetrators' group, such as in the case of FPI's violence.

Since it is not feasible to measure a violent behavior, such as asking people about their involvement in political violence, the present study will only measure violent attitudes. The scale of measuring violent attitudes is developed from FPI's violent actions. It measures how the Muslim activists (FPI, Muhammadiyah[3], MMI and Nahlatul Ulama[4]) justify the use of violent means for the socio-political or religious ends. Based on FPI's violent collective actions, there are several concerns that are associated with the use of violent actions, namely, immorality, blasphemy and illegal worship places. Therefore, the respondents will be asked about their opinions on using violent means against those places, as can be seen in the following Table 3.5.

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[3] Muhammadiyah is an Islamic moderate organization. It was established in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta. It is often considered to be the second largest Islamic organization after Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). According to its bylaw, the goal of Muhammadiyah is to enforce Islamic values in the life of Muslim community. In practice, most of its concerns are in educational and social activities. It owned about 7600 schools (including Islamic boarding schools), 176 universities, 457 hospitals and clinics and many other educational and social institutions (see www.muhammadiyah.or.id).

[4] Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is an Islamic moderate organization. It was established in 1926. It is often considered to be the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia or maybe all over the world with more than 40 million members. Its goal is to enforce the application of Islamic values, which accords to the teaching of *ahlussunnah wal jama`ah* in the Muslim community of the Republic of Indonesia. NU owned about 5500 schools and 67 universities and colleagues (see www.nu.or.id).

Table 3.5 Indicators (Observed Variables) of Violent Attitudes (Violence)

Coding	Items (Indicators)
Q10a	The Gay and Lesbian groups have publicly tried to conduct some activities like seminars and beauty contest for gay people. Therefore, it is normal for society to use force or any violent means in order to stop their activities.
Q10b	Any Muslims who bluntly declare that there is a prophet after Muhammad are considered to be infidels/apostates and the enemy of Islam; their blood is allowed to be shed.
Q10c	There have been some churches built without legal consent. Therefore, it is okay if some people force those churches to close, including with some necessary violent means.
Q10d	Prostitution has been legalized and localized in many cities. We have no other way out to stop prostitutions, but to stop them with the use of force, including some necessary violent actions.
Q10e	The problems of gambling and drinking have been growing in Indonesian society. We have no other way out to stop them except with the use of force, including some necessary violent actions

Note: The answers for these statements use 7 points of the Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree); and 7 indicate highest level of violent attitudes (Violence).

The coding number system (109a to Q10g) was adjusted to the question number in the questionnaire. For example, Q10a means "question" number "10" item "a."

Hypotheses

Based on the above theoretical framework of the quantitative part used in this study, the

hypothesized model and its hypothesized paths can be seen in the following Figure 3.2.

Note: Rectangle = observed variable, oval = latent variable and circle = error terms
The dashed lines are the interaction between two variables; Fungroup is the interaction between
Fundamentalism and Group, and Efftrust is the latent interaction between Efficacy and Trust

Figure 3.2 Hypothesized Model

The hypothesized paths are:

H1a: The more fundamentalist people are, the more likely they will justify violence. If this is true, then go to H1b and H1c.

H1b: FPI will be more likely to be fundamentalist than the moderate groups.

H1c: The relationships between fundamentalism and violence justification will be stronger for FPI than moderate Muslim groups.

H2a: People who have a lower trust in government will be more likely to justify violence. If this is true, then go to H2c.

H2b: People who have a low trust in government but high political efficacy will be likely to justify violence. If this is true then go to H2c and H2d.

H2c: FPI will be likely to have a lower trust in government than that of the moderate groups.

H2d: FPI will be likely to have a higher political efficacy than that of the moderate groups.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

The methodology for the current study is divided into two sections: qualitative

and quantitative. First, the qualitative methodology is used to address the first and third

research questions, which are about FPI organizational context and its violent actions

respectively. Second, the quantitative methodology is used to address the second

research question, which is about testing the relationships among the latent variables of

fundamentalism, trust in government, efficacy, violent attitude and the dichotomous

variable of group, as described in Figure 3.2.

Qualitative Methodology

Data

The data used in this study can be divided into three groups: FPI organizational

documents, previous research or documents that relate to the historical contexts of FPI

and Islamism in Indonesia, and newspapers. They are explained as follows.

1. The organizational documents include FPI bylaws, the results and reports of the

    official meetings, flyers and so forth. Fortunately, most of these data have been

    collected and published by Habib Rizieq Syihab, FPI top leader, and most of

    them also have been published in the official FPI homepage. This data is

    primarily used to answer the first research question, or about the organizational

context of FPI.

2. The previous research and general documents include all general documents that do not relate directly to FPI's adoption of violence, but rather relate to the context of FPI historically and ideologically, such as research about the emergence of radical Islam in Indonesia by Martin van Bruinessen and Haidar Naser. These data are primarily used to investigate the historical context of the emergence of FPI and to examine how this context relates to FPI's adoption of violent means.

3. The newspapers include all news of FPI collective activities, violent or not, reported in *Antara* (national news agency), *Kompas* (leading national newspaper and the most widely read newspaper), *Republika* (Islamic national newspaper), *Tempo* (widely spread around the capital city of Jakarta), *Sindo* (spread around the capital city of Jakarta), *Solopos* (circulated around Central Java) and other local newspapers. However, most of the data are primarily collected from *Antara* (approximately 520 articles), *Kompas* (412 articles) and *Republika* (123 articles). Additionally, approximately 150 articles were collected online from various homepages of local newspapers. The articles from *Antara* and *Kompas* were bought from their database office. The *Republika* was collected from its office or library for free of charge. The form of the data from these newspapers is in a digital format. Therefore, the data collection from newspapers took relatively a short period of time.

Analysis

All of the data were analyzed using standard qualitative data analysis techniques, such as by marking or coding, commenting and categorizing the information in the texts. Coding and categorizing the data were based on theoretical frameworks and what the suggested beyond the scope of these frameworks. The coded texts were then shorted and categorized into bigger theme. The common method of finding differences and similarities or communalities of the data was used to categorize and draw inferences from the data.

I used two different strategies to analyze the data based on the type of the data (printed or digital). For the printed data, such as FPI documents, the analysis was done manually. For example, the data were highlighted, typed into the computer (Microsoft Word) and categorized. For the digital data (newspaper articles), the analysis was done by Atlas.ti qualitative software. The process of analysis followed the standard process of qualitative analysis. The software provides a more convenient means of coding and categorizing the data. For example, each FPI collective action was coded by its date, such as "19981103" (occurred on 11/03/1998), and then it also coded "violence" if it involved violence and "nonviolence" if it did not. In doing so, it would be easily detected if there was overlap or similar information from other articles, or there was information that could complement existing information. Therefore, the software makes it easier for the researcher to find similarities and differences among the coded information from the text. In addition, the software works best in handling data that are not structured, as in the cases of newspaper articles or unstructured interviews.

Therefore, this study used the qualitative software to analyze approximately 1,200 articles from different newspapers.

Quantitative Methodology

Data

The data for this study was collected from December 2010 to July 2011from activists in the Islamic movements in Indonesia. The reason for choosing the activists, rather than ordinary members of a movement, is that activists are the dynamic elements in movements. They are the agents that have accesses to a movement's resources and take a control over movement activities. Ordinary members may be powerless and have no ability to mobilize resources unless the elites, or the activists, support them (McAdam 1999). In short, by targeting the activists, the data is aimed at representing not only the people in the movements but also the inner dynamics of those movements, which then can be used to explain the movements' actions, as to whether they are violent or nonviolent.

FPI activists are the primary target of the study, and the other activists will be used as control groups. Initially the control variable consists of two groups. The first group represents the moderate groups, namely Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The second group represents the so-called the "nonviolent" Islamist movements, namely Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indoneisa (HTI). The attribute of "nonviolent" of these latter groups means that they officially do not adopt

violent strategies, but they often advocate the use of violent means by other Islamist movements outside Indonesia. However, these two groups declined to participate in the study. In short, there is only one group that is compared to FPI in this study, namely the group representing the moderate movements (Muhammadiyah and NU).

The desired sample size for this study was about 300 respondents. In general, in SEM (Structural Equation Modeling), a sample of N < 100 is considered small; an N between 100 and 200 is considered medium; an N > 200 is considered large. However, a Montecarlo simulation in Mplus software shows that a sample size of 200 is not sufficiently large for the hypothesized model (not including the interaction) in this study. Some of the hypotheses paths have power of < .80. Therefore, this current study targeted a total sample size > 300 in order to achieve statistical power of > .80 in each of the hypotheses path.

The activists were selected from two different sampling methods. In the first method, the activists in the first two groups (Muhammadiyah and NU) were selected using a random stratified sampling method. In general, these two organizations are more open and are well-administrative systems; they possess lists of organizational committees and office addresses at both the local and national levels. Therefore, the sampling frame was taken from their official lists of the organizational office addresses. By default, the lists of these activists' addresses have been stratified into 4 sections: national (Pusat), provincial (Provinsi), city (Kabupaten/Kota) and district (Kecamatan). Based on this, initially, I randomly selected 160 members (80 from Muhammadiyah and 80 from NU); about 20 percent are from the national and provincial lists, and 80 percent

are from the city and district lists. In the first round, 50 questionnaires were sent via mail, most of them, addressed to the top leaders of the groups. However, after two weeks, only three to five of them returned back.

Considering this low response rate, the lists of activists of Muhammadiyah and NU, were then edited. For example, some of the unclear addresses were deleted. In short, about 400 addresses were selected from the lists. It was 230 questionnaires were sent to the respondent addresses via mail. The rests were delivered in person to the respondents. In this second attempt to collect data, most of the questionnaires were addressed to the second tier of the leaders, like the secretary, treasurer or head of a department instead of the top leaders. In addition, I also sent about 15 questionnaires to the activists of foreign branches of Muhammadiyah and NU via electronic mail. This resulted in 206 valid responses. Using this sampling method, the respondents are expected to represent the targeted population, the activists in the moderate groups (Muhammadiyah and NU).

Turning to the second method, the other activists, namely from HTI, MMI and FPI were selected by using a non-probability sampling method. The nature of these organizations, which are closed and stigmatized, made it impossible to select the sample through probability sampling methods. These organizations possess organizational structures, such as the vision, mission and programs that are well described, but the list of their activists' names are not clear (Al-Zastrouw 2006 and Nashir 2007). In addition, pressures by the government on these groups have made it impossible for them to openly declare the identity of their members. For example, HTI and MMI are accused of having connections with terrorist organizations, Jemaah Islamiyyah and Al-Qaeda. Many top

leaders of MMI and FPI have been jailed by the government because of their Islamic activism (Nashir 2007).

Therefore, the most likely way to get the respondents of these activists is by using the snowball technique. At the initial stage, there are two methods to reach the respondents. In the first method, the respondents are selected from a few prominent figures or activists of these three groups that are known (based the media coverage and previous studies). Using the second method, the interviewers come to the offices of these organizations, especially after Friday prayers and congregations, the time when usually Muslim activists meet.

Using either of these initial methods, the interviewers ask these known activists to refer other activists in their groups after they complete the questionnaire. Therefore, the only way to reach the respondents is by delivering the questionnaire in person to them. As a result, 135 valid responses from FPI, 3 valid responses from HTI and 27 responses from MMI were obtained. However, in the middle of this data collection, HTI and MMI declined to participate in the study. As a result, the interviewers stopped collecting data from these two groups and the 30 responses were dropped from the analysis.

In addition, as described in the previous chapter, this study consists of items regarding trust in government, political efficacy and violence. All of these questions are sensitive and prone to social desirability bias; for example, the questions about trust in the police and justification of violence. In dealing with this, all the questionnaires are designed to be completed by the respondents (self-administered questionnaires). No

questions about personal backgrounds were asked. Therefore, it was expected that the respondent could freely and accurately answer the questions.

Analysis: SEM (Structural Equation Modeling)

In order to test the hypothesized model and hypothesized paths (see Figure 3.2), this study employs the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. SEM is a statistical technique that can incorporate regression analysis, confirmatory factor analysis and path analysis.

Compared to the regression analysis, SEM is relatively young. It started to appear in the 1960s. However, the origin of the SEM can be traced back to the history of factor analysis and path analysis, which developed in the early 1900s. In the 1970s, three scholars: K. G. Joreskog, J. W. Keesling and D. E. Wiley integrated factor analysis (measurement model) and path analysis (structural model) into a single framework, so-called JKW (Joreskog-Keesling-Wiley) model (now called SEM). Then, Joreskog and D. Sorbom developed statistical software package for this model and named it LISREL (Kline 2005). Currently, number of software packages has been developed to deal with SEM, such as AMOS (SPSS), STATA and Mplus.

According to Kline (2005), there are, at least, seven characteristic of the SEM:

1. SEM is a priori. Researchers need to formulate the model before analysis, such as the directionality of the variables. However, it does not mean that SEM is merely confirmatory.

2. SEM consists of the explicit representation of the distinction between observed and latent variables.

3. The basic statistic in SEM is the covariance.

4. SEM can be applied to non-experimental and experimental data.

5. SEM includes many standard statistical procedures. Statistical procedures, such as Anova, Manova and multiple regressions, are special instances of SEM. Therefore, Kline (2005) argues that SEM is "one of the most inclusive statistical procedures used within the behavioral sciences."

6. SEM requires a large sample size. In general, a sample size > 200 could be considered large.

7. In SEM, it is possible to estimate statistical tests, but the role of statistical tests in the overall analysis is often less important compared with more traditional techniques.

In summary, because the model in this study consists of both the measurement model (confirmatory factor analysis) and the structural model (path analysis), including group comparison within the measurement model, this study used the SEM technique to estimate the model. In doing so, there are, at least, four steps to perform SEM before interpreting the results of estimations, namely: model specification, estimation and evaluation (Kline 2005), as can be explained below.

Model Specification

In this study, the SEM technique is used as a confirmatory technique of the hypothesized model. Therefore, the relationships have been specified in advance in the model based on previous studies and theories. These relationships are categorized into two groups: measurement and structural models. The measurement model specifies the relationships between observed variables (indicators) and latent variables. This measurement model is assessed using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). In CFA the relationship between the observed variables and the latent variable is interpreted as "factor loadings" (regression coefficients). In order to scale the latent variable, one of the factor loadings should be fixed to one (1).

The structural model specifies the relationships among latent variables and/or observed variables. This structural model is assessed using a multi-regression technique. Therefore, the interpretation of the coefficient of the relationship is interpreted like the regression coefficient, such as: holding other variables constant, with one unit increase in x, y increases by certain (the value of regression coefficient) units.

In the measurement model, the hypothesized model of this study consists of four latent variables, namely: Fundamentalism (14 indicators), Trust (14 indicators), Efficacy (6 indicators) and Violence (6 indicators). Additionally, it also has two latent interactions, namely the interaction of Fundamentalism-Group (Fungroup) and Efficacy-Trust (Efftrust).

In the structural model, the hypothesized model consists of path relationships between the independent latent variables of Fundamentalism, Trust, Efficacy, Fungroup

and Efftrust, and the dependent latent variable of Violence. Furthermore, it includes

assessments of the differences between FPI and the moderate groups in the conditional

means of the four latent variables: Fundamentalsim, Trust, Efficacy and Violence (see

Figure 3.2).

Estimation

In SEM, the estimation is done by fitting the actual covariance matrices and the

covariance matrices predicted by the model. This means that SEM tries to minimize a

discrepancy function (fitting function) of those two covariance matrices. Maximum

likelihood (ML) is the most common estimation method to minimize this discrepancy

function. The ML assumes that the population normal distribution for the endogenous

variables is multivariate normal (Kline 2005). However, if the normality cannot be

assumed, the researcher cannot use the ML method. In Mplus, the software that is being

used in this study, if the multivariate normality is not assumed, the MLM (maximum

likelihood parameter estimates with standard errors and a mean-adjusted chi-square test

statistics) or the MLMV (maximum likelihood parameter estimates with standard errors

and a mean- and variance-adjusted chi-square test statistics) can be applied (Muthen and

Muthen 2010). However, this study uses the ML since the normality assumption is met.

In dealing with the missing values, this study does not put any imputation

strategies in the estimation process, which is the default in Mplus. Therefore, it does not

impute values for the data that are missing. All available data are used to estimate the

model using full information maximum likelihood.

Additionally, in the hypothesized model of this study, there are two specific estimation strategies that are being used to deal with the group comparisons (FPI and the moderate groups) in the latent variables and the interaction between two variables (Efftrust and Fungroup). First, in dealing with group comparison, this study will use the MIMIC (Multiple Indicator Multiple Causes) approach. In dealing with the latent interactions, this study will use LMS (Latent Moderated Structural) equations approach.

The MIMIC approach is an extension of CFA, where the model contains one or more latent variables simultaneously identified by multiple indicators and multiple causal variables; or in other words, these latent variables are regressed on the group variable (Kline 2005). For example, in this study, the latent variable of fundamentalism, which has 14 indicators, is regressed on the dichotomous cause indicator, Group (the moderate groups = 0 and FPI = 1).

Unlike a multi-sample approach, MIMIC does not need to partition the total sample into subsamples. Therefore, MMIC is best for the small sample size, like the current study which only has 341 samples. Additionally, in the MIMIC model, there is no need of a special identification of the measurement invariance. It is because, in this model, the factor loadings between groups are assumed to be equal, or the measurement model is assumed to be invariant over groups. Some scholars also suggest that if the measurement is not completely invariant, the MIMIC model can be improved by adding the direct effect from a dummy, or group variable, to the measures or indicators of the latent variable being compared (Thompson and Green 2006; Muthen and Muthen 2010).

The LMS (Latent Moderated Structural) equations model is perhaps the newest approach in dealing with the latent interactions. Besides the LMS model, there are many approach to deal with the interaction between two latent variables, or the interaction where one of them is a latent variable, such as constrained approach, GAPI (Generalized Appended Product Indicator) approach, unconstrained approach and multi-group approach. In MPlus, the LMS approach maybe the simplest estimation in dealing with latent interaction. It does not need to create a product term of the interactions, and the interpretation is the same as that of the interaction between two observed variables in the multiple regression analysis. That is why this study employs the LMS equations model to deal with the latent interaction between Efficacy (latent) and Trust (latent), and the interaction between Fundamentalism (latent) and Group (observed). LMS uses the estimation maximation algorithm to estimate the interaction. This estimation can produce parameter estimates that are consistent, unbiased and efficient. In addition, the LMS is also robust to non-normal distribution (Klein and Moosbrugger 2000; Kline 2005; Marsh, Wen, and Hau 2006). However, in Mplus, LMS does not produce standardized estimates and several fit indices, like chi-square and RMSEA fit tests. Therefore, in the analysis, first, I estimate the hypothesized model without interaction (without applying LMS). It is because the LMS equations approach does not give comprehensive fit indices, so it is difficult to evaluate the fit of the model. After the good model is achieved, then I estimate the full model (with the interactions). The model without interactions and the model with interactions are compared using the AIC (Akaike's Information Criterion) test. The model with less value of AIC is the better fit.

Model Evaluation

As mentioned above, the basic statistic in SEM is the covariance. Therefore, model evaluation means comparing the observed (data-based) covariance matrix with the model-implied covariance matrix. If the two matrices are consistent, or fit, then the researcher's model can be considered a good; then, the researcher can move to look at the statistical tests of the specific hypotheses in the model. In SEM, the estimation that is used to compare these two matrices is called fit test. In general, the fit tests measure how far or close the distance between these two matrices. Researchers always expect that the two matrices are as close as possible.

There are a number of fit tests that can be used to evaluate the models. This study uses the following model fit tests to evaluate the hypothesized model.

1. Chi Square is the most basic fit test. It is a function of the sample size and the difference between the observed covariance matrix and the covariance matrix of the hypothesized model. The null hypothesis for this test is that the observed covariance matrix is the same as the model covariance matrix ($H_0: \Sigma = \Sigma_0$). Therefore, it is expected that the test fail to reject the null hypothesis (higher *p*-value). In other words, we expect that the value of chi-square as small as possible. Therefore, this test is also called a badness-of-fit because the higher value of chi-square indicates the worse the model will be. However, the chi-square test is overly sensitive to sample size and multivariate deviations of normality. Therefore, this study renders the chi-square value less important for the model evaluation.

2. RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation) is another badness-of-fit index. It means that the higher value indicates the worse the model. The value of zero (0) indicates the best fit. The value < .05 is considered to be a good fit; the value of < .08 is considered to be a fair fit. Some factors that influence this value are sample size and degree of freedom. The RMSEA value decreases as the sample gets larger and the model has more degree of freedom. In short, we expect that the value of RMSEA should be as small as possible.

3. CFI (Comparative Fit Index) is the percentage of observed measure covariance explained by the hypothesized model. Therefore, we expect the greater value of CFI. The value > .95 is considered to be a good fit.

4. Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) is the fit index that can be used to compare two different models. These two models do not need to be nested. The model with the lower value of AIC indicates the better fit. This fit index will be used in this study because the LMS equations that estimate the hypothesized model with the interactions do not produce chi-square test and other common fit indices. Therefore, the hypothesized models, with and without interactions, are compared to know which model better fit the data, or in other words if the hypothesized model has less AIC's value, it indicates that this model is better than the model without interactions.

CHAPTER V

ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUNDS:

HISTORICAL CONTEXT, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, IDEOLOGY

AND FPI'S ADOPTION OF VIOLENT MEANS

The current chapter is aimed at investigating organizational contexts that may explain FPI's adoption of violent means. This includes (1) the socio-historical context of the Islamist movements in Indonesia, (2) FPI's organizational structure and ideology, and (3) lastly, FPI's formal justifications of its collective violence. First, regarding the socio-historical context, this chapter discusses the genealogy of Islamist movements throughout the history of Indonesia and then locates FPI within this historical context. Second, regarding the organizational structure, it addresses some aspects of the organization that may relate to FPI's adoption of violence, such as basic organizational principles, the concept of jihad, martyrdom and *amar ma`ruf nahi munkar* (AMNM). Finally, the last part of this chapter discusses how FPI officially explained itself in its adoption of violent means.

Towards Radical Islamist Movements: the Early Tensions of Islam-State Relations in Indonesia

The radicalization of Islamist movements is often a result of severe tensions and irreconcilable conflicts between the movements and their states. This problem often lies in their differences about the status of the sovereignty and ideology of the state. Most

governments of Muslim countries adopt the principles of democracy which hold the belief that sovereignty belongs to the people. However, most Islamists believe that sovereignty belongs to God, and thus the state should be based on the principle of *shari`ah*, the law that is made by God (Ayoob 2007; Wicktorowick 2003). Therefore, the different belief in the status of sovereignty have become an important factor fueling conflicts between Islamist movements and states, and even has led to the radicalization of Islamist movements in Muslim countries, including in Indonesia. Therefore, it is necessary to trace FPI's adoption of violent means to the dynamic of the state-Islam relations and the waves of the struggles to apply *shari`ah* in Indonesia. After all one of the organizational goals of FPI is the placement of *shari`ah* into the Indonesian constitution.

The Tensions of State-Islam Relations during the Early Years of Indonesia (1945) and the Sukarno Regime (1945-1966)

In Indonesia, the current tensions between Islamist movements and the state can be traced back to the birth of Indonesia as an independent state in 1945 and its first regime, the Sukarno regime (1945-1966). After the collapse of Japan ending World War II, the Japanese government promised independence for Indonesia by setting up the first committee for this purpose in March 1945. The committee was called *Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (BPUPKI), or the Committee for the Investigation to Prepare for Indonesian Independence. During the first meeting of this committee, held from May 28 – June 1, 1945, there appeared an irreconcilable issue

regarding whether Indonesia would be "a national" or "an Islamic" state. This conflict led to a major division among BPUPKI members, namely, the so-called "nationalist" and "Islamic" factions (Noer 1987).

The nationalist faction wanted Indonesia to be a secular national state. For example, Sukarno (nickname: Bung Karno), the primary proponent of the nationalist faction and who later became the first president of Indonesia, said, "We want to establish a state that is one for all…so the first principle is nationality; we will establish a national state." He also argued that a national state was not in contradiction with the idea of an Islamic state, as he said: "Open and look at my heart; you will see Islam; and the heart of Bung Karno (he pointed to himself) will defend Islam through the principle of general agreement and mutual deliberation; through this principle, we will safeguard religion" (Bahar, Kusuma, and Hudawati 1995).

By contrast, the Islamic faction demanded that the new state of Indonesia be based on *shari`ah* or God's law. Its proponents mostly argued that the ideology of an Islamic state was logical and fair because Islam was the religion of the majority of the Indonesian population. For example, Sanoesi, a proponent of the Islamic faction, said: "an Indonesian state should be led by an *Imam* because 95 percent of Indonesians are Muslims" (Bahar et al. 1995).

In short, these two factions were not able to reach an agreement about the new state's ideology. Thus, BPUPKI's committee formed a smaller committee to deal with this debate about state ideology. This small committee was named "the Committee of Nine" because it consisted of nine members of BPUPKI: four people from the nationalist

faction and five people from the Islamic faction. This committee ultimately was able to reach an agreement and formulated it in the document known as the *Piagam Jakarta* (the Jakarta Charter). This document was also intended to be the preamble of the Indonesian constitution. The compromise between these two factions was reflected in the sentence: *dengan kewadjiban mendjalankan sjari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknja* (with the obligation for Muslim adherents to practice the Islamic *shari`ah*), or the so-called Seven Words (Bahar et al. 1995: 96).

Even though the appraisal of other members of BPUPKI the Committee of Nine had settled the dispute between the nationalist faction and the Islamic faction, many proponents of those two factions were not satisfied with the Jakarta Charter. For proponents of the Islamic faction, this agreement was considered as a failure as it did not establish a state under the rule of God. For example, Ki Bagus Hadikoesoemo (of the Islamic faction) rejected the Jakarta Charter and demanded that the committee clearly state its view about the relationship between the state and Islam and suggested a vote on this idea. By contrast, some proponents of nationalist ideology considered the Jakarta Charter as the failure because it did not establish a state for all Indonesians. Djajadiningrat (of the nationalist faction) was afraid that the Seven Words in the Jakarta Charter would produce Islamic fanaticism. However, Sukarno rejected those arguments and insisted on using the Jakarta Charter as the introduction to the Indonesian constitution because it was the only solution that could unify the two factions in the committee of BPUPKI (Bahar et al. 1995).

Soon after that, a second committee for Indonesian independence, the PPKI (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*) was establised in the mid of August 1945. Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta were appointed as the chairman and the vice chairman respectively. Surprisingly, during the first meeting of the PPKI, on August 18, 1945, when Sukarno and Hatta introduced the Indonesian constitution, they deliberately ignored the Jakarta Charter and removed all Islamic symbols remaining in the Constitution. As the spokesman of the Committee, Hatta argued that in order to safeguard the unity of all Indonesians, the controversial articles had been removed from the Constitution. First, the term "*Mukaddimah*" (the Arabic word for introduction) was replaced by the term "*Pembukaan*" (the Malay or Indonesian word for introduction). Second, the sentence "the state based on belief in God with obligations for the Muslim adherents to practice *shari`ah*" was replaced by the sentence "the state based on belief in God." Third, the sentence "the president must be a native Indonesian who is a Muslim" was replaced by the sentence "the president must be a native Indonesian." At the same time, Sukarno and Hatta were also announced as the first president and vice president of Indonesia (Bahar et al. 1995:414-16; Boland 1971:34-35).

This arbitrary decision by Sukarno and Hatta created frustration and anger among the proponents of the Islamic faction. Most members of the Islamic faction considered this decision as betrayal as it appear to accept the Jakarta Charter, or the agreement between the nationalist and the Islamic members of the committee. Responding to this situation, the proponents of Islamic ideology divided into two groups. Some preferred the use of conventional ways of struggling for the establishment of a state that was based

on Islam and God's law. In doing so, they then established a political party, the

Masjumi. The second group preferred the use of radical means in order to establish an

Indonesian Islamic state or a separate independent Islamic state. Both groups are

explained as follows.

First, the political party of Masjumi was established on November 7, 1945. It was

established by Muslim leaders, particularly by formers members of the Islamic faction

that served on the Committee of Indonesian's Preparation for Independence, namely

Kahar Moezakir, Wachid Hasyim, Soekiman and Ki Bagoes Hadikoesomo. The goals of

this political party were to establish the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia and to

implement the ideals of Islam in the state. One of its efforts included proposing in the

Constituent Assembly the general idea of an Islamic state or a state based on Islam.

In addition, Masjumi also proposed a draft of an Islamic constitution, namely the

Konstitusi Republik (Islam) Indonesia (the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of

Indonesia). Among the important concepts in relation to the Islamic ideology of this

draft was that the foundation of the state should be based on Islam (Article One). In

Article Three, it was also stated that sovereignty was vested in the hands of the

Indonesian people as a mandate from God; and the people are eligible to occupy all state

positions, except the positions of the presidency and the vice-presidency, which must be

held by Muslims. In short, Masjumi's concepts of the state were the same as those of the

Islamic faction.

Thus, Masjumi position often contradicted that of the Sukarno Regime. Finally,

the government considered Masjumi a threat to nationalist ideology. Some of Masjumi's

top leaders were jailed. For example, Muhammad Natsir was jailed for being involved in the rebellious movement of the PERMESTA in Sumatra; and Kasman Singodimejo was sentenced to three years for his speech criticized Sukarno on August 31, 1958. In 1959, Sukarno abolished Masjumi. This was the end of the Muslim struggles for the establishment of an Islamic state through conventional means during Sukarno's regime.

However, the second group supporting Islamic ideology used radical non-conventional means to struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state. For some this included the formation of a rebellious movement to overthrow the nationalist government and the establishment of an independent Islamic state separate from Indonesia. For example, under the name of *Darul Islam* (an Islamic state), Kartosuwiryo led a rebellious movement in Java; Daud Beureuh led a rebellion in Aceh; and Kahar Muzakar led a rebellion in the Southern Celebes . However, many of these Islamist rebellious and separatist movements could be handled by the government. The government was even able to use the issue of Islamist rebellious attempts as propaganda and agitation in order to suppress Islamist movement and political parties that supported the Islamic ideology, such as Masjumi (Noer 1987:256).

In short, tensions between Islam and the state have appeared since the early stages of Indonesia as an independent state. The manifestations of these tensions often appeared in the conflict between "an Islamic state versus a nation state," or "a state based on God's law versus a state based on human's law" (using the language of Islamists), or "Islamist versus Nationalist." However, the Islamists failed to introduce Islamic ideology into the center of the state.

In August 1945, Indonesia was declared as a nationalist state. Soon after that, several Islamist rebellious and separatist movements appeared across the country. Under the banner of Islam, these movements wanted to establish an Indonesian Islamic state and an independent Islamic state separated from Indonesia. At the same time, some Islamists (the proponents of the Islamic faction) preferred to establish a political party, namely Masjumi, to continue struggling for the creation of an Indonesian Islamic state. However, later Sukarno considered Masjumi as a threat to the unity of the Republic of Indonesia and abolished Masjumi in 1959. Therefore, in the late years of the Sukarno regime, the position of the Islamic ideology was completely on the periphery of the state. Islamic ideology indeed existed, but it was maintained and promoted by radical Islamist movements. This situation persisted into the Suharto regime, as explained below.

The Tensions of State-Islam Relations during the Suharto Regime (1967-1998)

In 1966, intense elite and military conflicts occurred. These were critical years for the Sukarno Regime. This condition culminated with the coup attempt by the self proclaimed group, the *Gerakan 30-September* (the September-30th movement), made up of Indonesian army forces and the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party or Partai Komunis Indonesia). At least six top army generals and several other military personnel were assassinated. Sukarno was unable to control the situation, and he was also forced to give a mandate in March 11, 1966 to Lieutenant General Suharto to take any actions necessary in order to restore the order and security. This mandate gave Suharto a powerful political role in the state. Led by Suharto, the army was able to restore peace

and put down the September-30 movement in just one day (March 12, 1966). Suharto

blamed the Indonesian communist political party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) as

the culprit behind this coup d'état. He also abolished the communist party, a party that

had strongly supported the Sukarno regime. As Sukarno's power got weaker, Suharto's

political power became stronger. Finally in March 1967, Sukarno was forced to resign,

and Suharto was officially appointed as the second president of Indonesia. This was the

beginning of the Suharto regime, or the so-called New Order regime.

Under this new regime, Suharto militarized the government. All strategic

positions of the state, from the central to the local governments, such as ministers,

governors, and mayors, were occupied by elite military personnel. In addition, Suharto

also homogenized the ideology of the state by declaring that Pancasila [5](the Five

Principles) was the only ideology that should be embraced by all groups in Indonesia.

Most Islamic organizations, which mostly declared the Quran and the Hadith as the

highest organizational references, had to replace their Islamic ideology with the

Pancasila. Under this strategy, Suharto possessed full control over the state and created

an absolute authoritarian military regime.

In the early years of the Suharto regime, the leaders of Masjumi who were jailed

by Sukarno were released. However, like Sukarno, Suharto regime continued to monitor

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[5]Pancasila (the Five Principle) was introduced by two figures of the nationalist faction, Muh Yamin and
Sukarno during the meeting of the Committee for the Investigation of Preparation of Indonesian
Independence, in June 1945. During the Sukarno regime, Pancasila was the symbols of the nationalist
ideology. However, unlike Suharto, Sukarno did not enforce the non-state organizations to embrace the
ideology of Pancasila. These five principles of Pancasila are 1) Belief in the one and only God, 2) Just and
civilized humanity, 3) The unity of Indonesia, 4) Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity
arising out of deliberations amongst representatives and 5) Social justice for the all of the people of
Indonesia.

their activities and prohibited them from engaging in political activities. It appeared that

the Sukarno regime's fear of Islamist oppositions and Islamist rebellions carried over

into the Suharto regime. Suharto suppressed all Islamist political activities.

Consequently, this forced many former leaders of Masjumi to exit the political sphere

and enter socio-religious activities, like *da`wah* (propagation and missionary) activities.

For example, Natsir, a former leader of Masjumi used Masjumi networks to establish a

religious organization, the DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia*/Indonesian Islamic

Council of Missionary). Their mission was simply to purify the Islamic practices in

Muslim society rather than to "islamize" the state. The DDI was fully supported by the

government of Saudi Arabia (Bruinessen 2002).

Similar to Masjumi, other Islamic groups, such as NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and

Muhammadiyah tended to compromise with the military government by accepting the

Pancasila as the ideology of their organizations, and tended to avoid political conflicts

with the government. Both focused more on education and social welfare rather than on

political activism. NU focused more on Islamic education (*madrasah* and *pesantren*),

while Muhammadiyah focused on secular educations. For the most part, both

Muhammadiyah and NU maintained a good relationship with the government.

Formally the Suharto regime also allowed Muslim participation in political

activism, such as the establishment of an Islamic political party, PPP (*Partai Persatuan*

Pembangunan). However, its existence was also controlled by the government. At that

time, only three political parties were allowed to participate in the political process,

namely Golkar (Golongan Karya), PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and PDI (Partai

Demokrasi Indonesia). Golkar was the biggest party and the two others were the small minority parties. Golkar was the party of the government and it was under the control of Suharto. Muslims' interests were symbolically represented by the PPP. PPP was the fusion of four Muslim parties, NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), PSII (Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia), PERTI (Persatuan Tarbiyyah Islamiyyah), and PARMUSI (Partai Muslimin Indonesia).

In addition, during the Suharto regime, there were some Islamist movements that continued to struggle to establish an Islamic state or at least demand the re-inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the state constitution. Many of them were radical underground movements, such as Komando Jihad, Teror Warman, and Jemaah Islamiyyah (Bruinessen 2002). However, the scale of these radical Islamist movements were too small and their scope was very local. Therefore, their efforts did not significantly affect the supremacy of the Suharto regime.

In conclusion, the discourse of Islamic ideology was completely forbidden by the Suharto regime. The government refused to tolerate any expression of political Islam that challenged the nationalist ideology of the regime. Therefore, the expression of political Islam was only introduced by a few small, radical, underground movements.

There were no options for Islamist movements to openly express their beliefs in more moderate ways. Until the early 1990s, the Suharto regime was still able to fully control and suppress radical Islamist movements. The Suharto military regime made it difficult for the Islamists to develop and for Muslims in Indonesia to support Islamist movements.

In short, from 1966 to 1998 the position of Islamist movements, or the movements that demanded the application of *shari'ah* in Indonesia, were kept in a marginal position; this was similar to what happened during the Sukarno regime. Thus, Islamic political activism consistently opposed the state, and most of Islamist groups became radical underground movements. Later, this inharmonious relationship between Islam and the state (Islamist movements and the government) during the Suharto and Sukarno regimes may have also affected the relationship between new Islamist movements and the state after the collapse of the Suharto regime, as will be explained in the following discussion.

The Emergence of New Democracy

Beginning in 1997, the Asian monetary crises weakened the Suharto regime. The crises caused social and economic lives to collapse. The value of Indonesian currency, the rupiah (IDR), dropped drastically; the exchange rate, which was roughly 2600 rupiah per 1 USD, plunged to 8000-14000 per 1 USD.   The prices of basic goods soared. The Suharto regime could not control the monetary crisis. Thus, friction between the military elites and Golkar (government party) increased. Mass demonstrations condemning the Suharto regime became wide spread across the country. On May 21, 1998, forced by public pressure, Suharto resigned his presidency. This date marked the collapse of the Suharto authoritarian military regime and started of a new era of democracy, which is often called the era of reformation.

During this new era of democracy, all social, religious and political expression was tolerated by the state and was often beyond control of the state. The military attempted to show neutrality regarding politics, and, therefore, created a distance between the state and themselves. Many groups, especially Islamist groups that had been suppressed during the Suharto military regime, re-emerged either as political parties or social movements. Several radical Islamist movements, such as Laskar Jihad, MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) and HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), openly declared their existence.

The emergence of MMI in August 2000 and HTI in 2000 aptly describes a case of so-called "blocked opportunity." Some leaders of MMI were the former members of the rebellious movement of Darul Islam and were closely linked to the terrorist movement of Jemaah Islamiyyah. However, under the new Indonesian democracy, MMI presented itself to the public as a nonviolent Islamist organization. MMI indirectly opposed the ideology of democracy because it called for the voice of the people (not God) to be supreme. However, MMI also supported the new democratic system and benefitted from it because it allowed MMI to pursue its goals. For example, MMI has publicly campaigned for Islamic ideology and had proposed the application of *shari`ah* to local (*kabupaten/kota*), regional/provincial (*propinsi*), and central governments.

Similarly, HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), which is often considered as a radical and a terrorist organization in several other Islamic countries, also appeared in Indonesia to be an ordinary conventional organization. HTI proposes and promotes the idea of one single Islamic state. It publicly has opposed the democratic idea, but it has not advocated

violence. Therefore, these two groups demonstrate that when the political opportunities are unblocked, social movements tend adopt nonviolent means.

However, open political opportunity, which de-radicalized Islamist movements, is not a single story of the new democracy in Indonesia. Many conflicts that were previously suppressed by the military regime also reemerged as more severe conflicts in some parts of Indonesia. Some of those conflicts specifically victimized Muslim communities, such as the conflict in Ambon, Moluccas and the Ninja-secreat killing that targeted Muslim scholars in Eastern Java. These were among the events that created historical context claimed by FPI founders to be the reason for the establishment of FPI.

For example, the Muslim-Christian conflict in Ambon caused thousands of both Muslims and Christians to be killed, mosques and churches to be destroyed, and thousands of people to lose their homes, especially the Muslims. For some Muslims outside the Ambon islands and some Muslim military elites, this conflict was often portrayed as (1) Christian's effort to banish Muslims from a predominantly Christian island of Moluccas and (2) efforts of the separatist movement, the RMS (the Republic of South Moluccas), to establish an Independent state. Therefore, not only several Muslim groups, like Laskar Jihad, but also some military personnel were involved in those conflicts.

The emergence of a radical Islamist movement, Laskar Jihad, was a response to this conflict; or using its language, the formation of Laskar Jihad was a reaction of Muslim solidarity towards their Muslim fellows who were victimized by Christians on the predominantly Christian island, Ambon. Laskar Jihad was officially established in

Januari 2000 by Ja'far Umar Thalib, an alumnus of the Afghan War and a graduate of

the Maududi Islamic Institute in Lahore, Pakistan in 1987. He declared a holy war

against Christians in Ambon Moluccas. Backed up by a *fatawa* (religious promulgations)

from the Muslim leaders in the Middle East, Thalib pronounced that waging war against

Christians in Ambon was an obligation for every Muslim. Laskar Jihad soon gained

enormous support among Muslims, including from the top army personnel, who

sympathized with the cause. Laskar Jihad dispatched approximately seven thousand

militia members to fight the Christians in Ambon (Hasan 2006:215-21).

However, after the religious conflict in Ambon was relatively finished, Ja'far

Umar Thalib declared the dissolution of Laskar Jihad via a *fatwa* (a religious

promulgation) from Rabi` ibn Hadi al-Madkhali. The *fatwa* demanded the dissolution of

Laskar Jihad because it had deviated from its original aims. These aims, which involved

helping Muslim victims in Ambon, had become mixed with political interests in

Indonesia. Thalib also argued that the presence of Laskar Jihad in Ambon was no longer

necessary as the conflict could now be controlled by the government (Hasan 2006). Of

course, there are many factors that led to the dissolution of Laskar Jihad. Most

importantly, this case supports the argument that the violence by a social movement

drops as the capacity of the democratic state becomes stronger (Tilly 2008).

In conclusion, the collapse of the military authoritarian regime in 1998 soon

resulted in two important conditions that related to the birth of FPI: several bloody

chaotic incidents across Indonesia and an open political opportunity. The chaos occurred

because the government no longer possessed strong control over much of Indonesian

society. Some of these incidents victimized the Muslim community. Therefore, the

incidents were often depicted as religious conflicts, such as the Christian-Muslim

conflict of Ambon and the "Ninja Killing" targeting Muslim leaders in Java.

However, open political opportunity attracted many elements of Indonesian

society to formally establish associations within their communities. Therefore, some

Islamist groups that previously had been suppressed by the military government emerged

or reemerged as open social movements, such as MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia)

and HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia). Similarly, under these social conditions, FPI also

emerged.

The Birth of FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front)

As discussed above, two major conditions that facilitated and shaped the

emergence of FPI. They are the fall of the Suharto military authoritarian regime and the

emergence of new conflicts and chaos across Indonesia that specifically victimized the

Muslim community. For FPI, the fall of Suharto was an opportunity for Habaib

(Hadrami Family)[6], Ulama and Muslim preachers to freely form an Islamist movement

called FPI. The conflicts that victimized Muslims united these Muslim leaders on the

importance of the establishment of an organization defending Islam and Muslim

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[6] Hadrami refers to the community of Muslims in Indonesia who are descendants of Muslim Arab who migrated to Indonesia from Hadramawt, the ancient region in Yemen, around eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The people from the Hadrami community can be divided into two groups: *sayyid* or *habib* (plural=habaib) and common Hadrami. The sayyid or habaib are the Hadrami people who has direct descendant with the prophet, Muhammad. Therefore, they enjoyed special status among the Muslims of Indonesia. People in this community usually identify them by using the word *sayyid* or *habib* at the beginning of their names, such as Habib Rizieq Syihab, FPI founder (Jacobsen 2009).

interests. These conditions were also reflected in FPI's documents and statements, such

as:

> The establishment of FPI was motivated by 1) the suffers of Muslim in Indonesia caused the weaknesses of the civil and military government, and in turn they also committed several human right violations and injustice, and 2) the Islamic obligation to take care and defend the dignity of Islam and Muslims (Syihab 2008:589).

> The emergence of Islamic movement (read: FPI) is because of (1) the injustice that is undergone through the Muslim society and (2) local and global movements that threaten the moral and belief of Muslim society. The effort to defend the Muslim society in more systematic and organized is urgent (Syihab 2007).

Based on these reasons some Muslims leaders –led by Habib Muhammad Rizieq

Syihab– declared the establishment of Front Pembela Islam (FPI) or Islamic Defenders'

Front in the *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) of al-Umm, Kampung Utan Ciputat,

Jakarta Selatan on August 17, 1998. Among those leaders were K.H. Cecep Bustomi,

Habib Idrus Jamalullail, K.H. Damanhuri, Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab and K.H.

Misbahul Anam. Initially, members of FPI were the only followers of these FPI

founders. Most the founders are well-known charismatic preachers in their community.

Some of them also ran Islamic boarding houses and schools. Their followers vary from

hundreds to thousands of people (Jahroni 2008).

From the beginning, FPI was designed not only as a social religious organization

but also a political group, not in the narrow sense of a political party. Syihab argues

that FPI should function as a group that pressures the government to actively improve

morality and to develop a social, political and legal structure that obeys the values of the

Islamic *shari`ah* (Syihab 2007). In doing so, the Islamic concept that is adopted to

achieve these concerns is AMNM (*Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar*)*,* or Enjoining the Good

and Forbidding the Evil, as will be elaborated more in the next sub chapter (Syihab

2008:126). These FPI's concerns are also reflected in the name of FPI (*Front Pembela*

Islam):

1. *Front* means that FPI is expected to be the front line of society in the fight

   against injustice and immorality. Therefore, the orientation of FPI is to do things

   that are real or physically obvious in implementing AMNM.

2. *Pembela* (defenders) means that FPI will always defend the values of

   righteousness and justice.

3. *Islam* means that FPI organization is based solely on Islamic tenets. Combining

   all of this, FPI will be ready on the front line to defend and struggle for the

   application of Islamic *shari`ah* in Indonesia (Syihab 2008:129).

At this point, there are two important ideological concepts of FPI that relate to

the previous discussion of Islam and state relations, namely: the Islamic *shari`ah* and

AMNM. The application of *shari`ah* is the main goal of FPI's struggle and AMNM is a

means to achieve that goal. In general, what FPI means by the application of *shari`ah* is

the application of law, which is based on God's laws to replace the law made by men,

such as those in the Indonesian constitution. This is exactly the same idea held by the

Islamist faction and Islamist movements during the Sukarno and Suharto regimes.

As discussed earlier, during these two previous regimes (1945 to 1998) the

position of Islamist movements was always politically marginal, in opposition to the

state, and was mostly radical. In other words it can be said that over the past 53 years,

the position of the movements that demanded the application of *shari'ah* was marginal and in opposition to the government. Therefore, when FPI emerged as a movement that carried the Islamist ideology, FPI situated itself in conditions that made it likely to play the same role as the older Islamist movements that had adopted radical strategies and maintained opposition with the nationalist government. Thus, FPI became less likely to cooperate with the nationalist government. Similarly, the government was likely to find it more difficult to co-opt FPI. Therefore, even though FPI received considerable support from several military elites, FPI still maintained its distance from the government.

In the new era of democracy, FPI had more freedom to act and even to put pressure on the government. At its early months, FPI utilized moderate means to pursue their goals, such as 1) sending a humanitarian mission to help Muslim victims in the conflict of Ambon and 2) establishing an independent group to investigate the case of "Ninja Killing" that victimized many Muslim leaders on the island of Java. FPI provided recommendations to the government in order to resolve the problems and to push the government to respond more quickly and properly to the problems that victimized Muslims.

However, after the Ketapang-Jakarta incident in October 1998, FPI started using violent means. From its establishment in 1998 to 2010, FPI has committed or has been involved in more than 64 cases of violent activities, especially around the capital city of Jakarta. They targeted night clubs, brothels, churches, Ahmadiyah group, the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender) community, the American embassy and

consulates on the grounds of defending Islam and Islamic moral values, as discussed more specifically in Chapter 7.

In addition, FPI has kept using moderate means. Most of the activities that are associated with the demand for the application of *shari`ah* have been peaceful. Similarly, when the direct targets have been government's institutions, FPI has used moderate and conventional strategies. FPI has also been involved in many social activities, such as sending humanitarian aid to the victims of Tsunami in Aceh in 2005 and the victims of the Merapi volcano eruption in Yogyakarta-Central Java in 2010. In its routine activism, FPI also has regularly conducted some social activities, especially around the capital city of Jakarta, like helping the victims of annual flood in Jakarta.

Organizational Structure

FPI registered its organization with the Department of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia on November 14, 1998. FPI also declared that its organization was legal and that it fulfilled all the state requirements for such organizations. This implies that FPI formally supports the nationalist ideology of the state, namely the Pancasila (the Five Principles). Even though FPI has routinely adopted violent strategies and has been threatened with abolishment several times, FPI has been able to maintain itself as a legal organization.

Similar to other modern organizations, especially modern Islamic groups, the organizational structure of FPI generally consists of two parts: a consultative assembly (*majelis syura*) and an executive committee (*majelis tanfidzi*). The consultative assembly

is the highest position in the organization that advises the executive committee concerning the general policies and activities. This consultative assembly consists of five boards: the Syari`ah, Honorary, Supervisory, Advisory and Supervisory Boards. All of these positions are usually held by the older respected members or founders of FPI (Syihab 2008:195).

The executive committee is the body of the organization that runs the daily activities of FPI. Since its establishment, the executive committee has been chaired by Habib Rizieq Syihab. The chairman of the executive committee is assisted by several deputies, a secretary general and treasurer. In order to run its programs, FPI also formed twelve departments, four specialized agencies, four autonomous bodies, and four organizational wings, as explained below (Syihab 2008:194-202).

1. The twelve departments are the Department of Religion, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, State Defense and Jihad, Socio Politics Law and Human Rights, Education and Culture, Economics, and Research and Technology.

2. The four specialized agencies (*Badan Khusus*) are the Investigation Front (*Badan Investigasi Front*), the Anti-terror Front (*Badan Anti Terror*), the Recruitment Front (*Badan Pengkaderan Front*) and the Expert Front (*Badan Ahli Front*).

3. The four autonomous bodies (*Lembaga Otonom*) are the Immorality Watch Front (*Lembaga Pemantau Ma`siyat*), the Propagation Front (*Lembaga Da`wah Front*), Economics Front (*Lembaga Economics*), and the Advocacy Front (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum*).

4. The four organizational wings are the Paramilitary Islamic Defenders (*Laskar Pembela Islam*), the Women`s Paramilitary of Islam Defenders (*Mujahidah Pembela Islam*), the Labor Union Front (*Serikat Pekerja Front*) and the Islamic Students Front (*Front Mahasiswa Islam*).

Among these divisions of organizational structure, only the Paramilitary Islami Defenders, or LPI (*Laskar Pembela Islam*), is the most visible in relation to FPI's violent activities. LPI consists of the young, male members. It is intended to be the front line of FPI's physical activities in doing AMNM (*Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar*). Most of the violent activities were committed conspicuously in the name of FPI and/or LPI.  There are also some divisions of the organization that seem to relate to FPI's violence, such as the Department of State Defense and Jihad, the Immorality Watch Front (*Lembaga Pemantau Ma`siyat*), and the Women's Paramilitary of Islam Defenders (*Mujahidah Pembela Islam*). However, their involvement and role in FPI's violent activities is invisible to the in public.

In general, based on previous studies by Jahroni (2008) and Al-Zastrouw (2006), the organizational structure of FPI is traditional and its scope is limited, especially in comparison to NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah. The divisions in the organizational structure seem to follow the standard format and the trends of a modern organization. In addition, its activities are still centralized by a few elite leaders, like Habib Rizieq Syihab, Ahmad Sabri Lubis, Munarman, KH. Misbahul Anam and Habib Salim Bin Umar Al-Attos. This may be because FPI, as a nonprofit and non-political organization, still depends on these top leaders who have wide-spread networks and are

able to obtain resources for organizational activities. Additionally, age of FPI is still relatively young and it often receives consistent pressure from some elements of society and the state. Therefore, the organizational structure of FPI has not developed as well as it could have, especially in comparison to other movements, which have no issues regarding political and social problems.

According to Jahroni, the development of FPI has been much determined by the networks of its leaders, namely the *hadrami* or *habaib* networks. Some of FPI top leaders are from *hadrami* or *habaib* families. Many leaders of FPI local branches also come from the *hadrami* families, such as branches in the city or district of Brebes, Tegal, Pemalang, Bogor, Depok and Sukabumi. However, Syihab rejected the idea that FPI is dominated by the persons from *habaib's* family because they only made up five percent of FPI's committee members (Syihab 2008).

Despite the clear hierarchical structure of the organization, communication and coordination in FPI tend to be loose and open. Syihab argues that, financially, all FPI's branches are independent from each other and from the central committee. The central committee gives freedom to FPI's branches to establish their own policies (Syihab 2008). FPI in Surakarta have even claimed to be completely independent from the central FPI in Jakarta (Jahroni 2008). Nevertheless, this study still treats FPI of Surakarta as part of FPI's central organization, as they have been involved in similar activities and possessed the same concerns, such as pro *shari`ah,* anti-communism and anti-immorality.

In another example, when an interviewer on this study gave the questionnaire and consent information to one of FPI leader and founder, he declined to be interviewed and did not want to fill the questionnaire. He suspected that this survey research was being done in order to spy on FPI; and it had to be part of an American plan. However, when the interviewer visited another of FPI's founders, that person accepted the interviewer warmly and answered all his questions. However, he reminded the interviewer to be objective in his writing about FPI and not to blindly trust FPI's coverage in the media. In addition, he gave his personal card and suggested to use the book written by Syihab as the main reference in describing about FPI. These examples indicate that FPI's organizational structure is less coordinated, loose and more open.

Similarly, the membership of FPI is also open and loose. Any Muslim can become a member of FPI without going through specific rituals (*bai`at*) and formal organizational procedures. Therefore, if someone joins the activities of FPI and shows his or her enthusiasm, he or she can be regarded as a FPI member. According to Al-Zastrouw, FPI does not systematically recruit potential members. Many Muslims joined FPI because their religious leaders joined FPI. The loyalty of members towards their religious leader binds them to FPI (Al-Zastrouw 2002).

Syihab acknowledged that at the beginning, members of FPI were followers of FPI leaders, or the members of Islamic circle led by FPI leaders. However, after the incident of Ketapang Jakarta, FPI started to formally recruit its membership. He also said that FPI even recruited former hoodlums; they often became the front line during AMNM operations that targeted immoral places (Jampanx 2007).

Al-Zastrouw divides FPI members by four social characteristics: *awam* (ordinary people), *intelektual-akademisi* (higher educated people), *mantan preman* (former hoodlums) and *ulama-habaaib*. First, *awam* are members who are followers of FPI leaders (*ulama* and *habaaib*). Second, *intelektual-akademisi* are members who are students or faculty members of a university; but most of them are from secular universities. Third, *mantan preman* are former hoodlums who usually take part in violent activities. Fourth, the *habaib* and the *ulama* make up the brain of the organization and mostly hold important positions in the organization (Al-Zastrouw 2006).

Syihab (2008) also claims that FPI is a traditional, moderate Islamic organization. Traditional means that FPI is respectful of local culture, not anti-*mazhab* (Islamic Schools) and honors classical and modern Ulama (Muslim scholars). Moderate means that FPI does not focus on Islamic rituals only, or follow a certain *sufi* order. FPI emphasizes the balance between the "world" and the "hereafter." Syihab (2008) also rejects some claims that FPI is more a sectarian and Arab oriented organization, for example through the domination of *habaib* (the decedents of Muhammad) in FPI organizational boards and Arab-style clothing (white dress with white turban for the leaders and white cap for the common members) worn by FPI members. He argues that *habaib* leaders only make up five percent of FPI committee. FPI's white Arabic uniforms are also used during the official activities of FPI. Other than that FPI gives freedom to its members to wear whatever clothes or fashion styles they like (Syihab 2008). Syihab's argument seems also to be a response to the accusation that FPI is part

of the Indonesian Wahabi (puritan) movements. Wahabi movements in Indonesia are usually identified by their Arab oriented culture, anti-*mazhab* and anti-local culture.

Finally, in general, the organizational structure and culture of FPI are very similar to other Islamic moderate organizations in Indonesia, such as NU and Muhammadiyah. For example, FPI's organizational structure is open, and it has a paramilitary division but it is not prepared for military action. Therefore, there is little indication that the organizational structure of FPI has inspired its adoption of violence. Nevertheless, there are several ideological components of FPI that need to be discussed further. They are the concepts of *shari`ah,* AMNM (*Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar*) and jihad. The last two concepts were often mentioned by FPI when it adopted violent means. Additionally, in the study of Islamic political violence these concepts are often associated with violent Islamist movements.

The Demand for the Application of *Shari`ah* (Islamic *Shari`ah*)

As described above, the struggle for the application of *shari`ah*  by Islamist movements has fueled the tensions between state and Islam relations, which in turn sometimes radicalized Islamist movements. The application of *shari`ah* is one of FPI's core goals. FPI wants the Islamic *shari`ah* to be applied in all aspects of life. However, unlike the other Islamist groups, such as MMI, HTI and Darul Islam, that are politically oriented and wish to establish an Islamic state, FPI does not insist on the establishment of an Islamic state of Indonesia. According to FPI, the Quran and the Hadith, the two primary sources of Islam, do not command Muslims to establish an Islamic state. Both

holy sources order Muslims only to follow the laws of God; the law of God can be followed and implemented in either an Islamic state or a non-Islamic state (Syihab 2008).

What FPI intends by the application of Islamic *shari`ah* is the implementation of God's laws in society and by the state. In society, for example, it can be done by ensuring the practice of fasting and five-time-a day prayer (for Muslims) and preventing drug's consumption, prostitution and gambling. At the state level, FPI has conducted many activities for 1) the re-inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the Indonesian constitution, 2) the application of *shari`ah* in the local regulations and 3) the enactment of anti immorality acts in the national and local governments. Therefore, for FPI, the application of *shari`ah* does not mean overthrowing the state, because FPI contends that the status of national government of the Republic of Indonesia is legitimate and is not in contradiction with the Quran and the Hadith (the two primary sources of Islam).

According to FPI, the root of many problems faced by Indonesia is that the government does not totally apply the Islamic *shari`ah*. Therefore, *shari`ah* is the real answer to these problems. Many of the Indonesian regulations are still based on Western concepts, especially Dutch law, which is man-made-law. That is why these laws are so weak and have produced many problems. However, Syihab argues that not all Indonesian state regulations are bad. Many state regulations are in concordance with the values of *shari`ah* and therefore, all Muslims are obliged to follow those laws. But, if the state regulations are in contradiction with the *shari`ah*, Muslims must reject them without violating state laws (Syihab 2008).

According to FPI, another important reason for the need to apply *shari`ah* in Indonesia is that historically *shari`ah* was officially agreed upon by the founding fathers of Indonesia. In the original document of the Jakarta charter, they agreed to mention Islamic *shari`ah* as part of the Indonesian constitution. However, this agreement has been betrayed and taken from the Indonesian constitution. Therefore, this agreement should be returned in the current constitution, especially the sentence "with the obligation to apply Islamic *shari`ah* for Muslims" (Syihab 2008).

Therefore, a blending of the ideology of Islamism and nationality shaped FPI concept of *shari`ah*. According to Jahroni (2008), who also lives in the same city as the central FPI offices, the nationalism of FPI is not questioned. For example, during the celebration of FPI's birthday which coincides with the Indonesian celebration of Independence Day, FPI members always bring two symbols: green-white (the colors of FPI uniforms and flags) and red-white (the colors of the Indonesian flag). In addition, on its official website, FPI has also put the Indonesian flag on its homepage, www.fpi.or.id, together with FPI's logo. This scene is very different from other Islamist movements, such as HTI and MMI that seem to never demonstrate their symbolic loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia.

In relation to democracy, many Islamist movements used the concept of *shari`ah* (God's law) to oppose the principles of democracy. Many Islamists see that democracy contradicts with principle of *shari`ah* because it believes that sovereignty belongs to the people not God. In contrast, FPI does not oppose the concept of democracy in relationship to the concept of *shari`ah*. Instead, FPI looks at democracy as a process to

gain an agreement based on people's power, or the majority. Therefore, FPI accepts the principles of democracy, and even demands that democracy should be applied correctly in Indonesia. FPI sees that democracy provides a feasible road to the application of *shari`ah*. Once, Syihab argued that the government should conduct a referendum on whether or not *shari`ah* could be applied nationally. If the results of the referendum showed support for the application of *shari`ah*, then the government should apply it nationally. However, if the result showed the opposite, the government should give the opportunity for the local governments to implement *shari`ah* if their people wanted *shari`ah*. This is what Syihab calls democracy (Jahroni 2008).

However, Syihab argues that the application of democracy in Indonesia is still far away from the ideal concept of democracy. For example, according to the principles of democracy, which are based on the voice of majority, the political policies should be applied proportionally. Therefore, the interests of Muslim majority should be heard. In fact, efforts of Muslims to implement *shari`ah* continue to be ignored by the state (Jahroni 2008).

In short, FPI has tried to show that its concept of Islamic *shari`ah* does not contradict with the Indonesian ideology; it also does not necessarily mean the establishment of an Islamic state is necessity. Instead, it is about the implementation of God's law in state and society. At the state or political level, FPI has consistently engaged in activities demanding the application of *shari`ah*. For example in August 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004, demanding the application of *shari`ah*, FPI rallied in the capital city of Jakarta and in front of the office of the People's Representative Assembly

(MPR). Similarly, in August 2002, FPI signed the *shari`ah* petition to demand the re-inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the Indonesian constitution. However, FPI has not demanded the removal of the nationalist ideology from the constitution. In addition, these activities targeting the state level have been generally peaceful.

At the societal level, FPI has also consistently forced Indonesian Muslim communities to implement and obey the Islamic *shari`ah*, such as the campaigns against anti-immorality in the hotels, night clubs and brothels. However, unlike the activities of struggling for the implementation of *shari`ah* at the state level, the activities at the societal level included force and violence. FPI used the so-called AMNM strategy to apply *shari`ah* to the life of the people, as explained below.

AMNM (*Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar*): Definition and Procedures

Defining the concept of AMNM, Syihab argues that AMNM consist of two elements: *amar ma`ruf* and *nahi munkar*. First, *amar ma`ruf* means an order or call to something that is good according to the Islamic *shari`ah* and is able to bring people closer to God. Second, *nahi munkar* means avoiding something that is against the Islamic *shari`ah*. Therefore, in general, AMNM means every systematic effort to ask Muslims to implement all Islamic teachings in total and to prevent them from engaging inany activities that can destroy the morals and beliefs of Islam (Jahroni 2008; Syihab 2008). This concept is based on the sayings of the Quran: "Let there become of you a community shall call for righteousness, enjoin justice and forbid evil" (The Koran 3:104).

According to FPI documents, AMNM is an absolute tool and method to implement the Islamic *shari`ah* in Indonesia. Syihab argues that the application of AMNM is the only solution in order to remove all types of destruction (*zalim*) and corruption (*munkar*). Without AMNM, it is almost impossible to end destruction and corruption. Then, its goal is to create a good society within a prosperous country filled with the blessings and love of God (Syihab 2008). Of course, this concept of AMNM – except in relation to the implementation of Islamic *shari`ah* in Indonesia– is not an exclusive interpretation of FPI. Most Islamic organizations in Indonesia have similar ideas about AMNM. However, they differ in implementing the concept.

Theoretically, based on the above definition, AMNM can be any social, religious activities, such as calling Muslims to go to the mosque, building Islamic schools, giving scholarships to the poor and punishing criminals. However, in relation to FPI, AMNM is associated with activities of enforcing religious and moral values in society, such as raiding night clubs, discotheque and brothels. Therefore, when FPI explains how to implement AMNM, FPI confines itself to how to actively end immorality within society (Syihab 2008).

Based on this concept, there are two different ways to apply AMNM, namely by doing AM (*amar ma`ruf* or enjoining good) and NM (*nahi munkar* or forbidding evil). First, AM (enjoining good) is done by calling and spreading what is considered good by God's law (*shari`ah*) and logic (*akal*). The targets of the *amar ma`ruf* are people in the community who live around immoral places and who are permissive towards the presence of immorality in their area. According to FPI, those people should be taught the

proper knowledge of Islam and science in relation to the danger of prostitution.

Therefore, in doing *amar ma`ruf*, FPI prioritizes the use of wisdom (*hikmah*) and good

advice (*mauizah hasanah*) (Syihab 2008).

Second, NM (*nahi munkar* or forbidding evil) is done by preventing any religious

destruction (*munkar*) or anything that is considered evil by God's law and logic, using

any means necessary. The targets of NM are brothels, night clubs and other immoral

places, where the surrounding community rejected the presence of those immoral places

(Al-Zastrouw 2004; Jahroni 2002). Syihab argues that according to the Hadith

(Muhammad's sayings) NM can be done through three steps: 1) using physical force to

prevent injustice and corruption, but if force cannot be applied, then 2) words or writings

will be used, but if words cannot be used, 3) the last thing can be done is to personally

reject that corruption. However, in practice, FPI used the opposite steps, namely by

sending letters to their targets and government authorities requesting the closure of

immoral business operations. Then, if their targets do not comply with this written

demand, FPI will force the targeted immoral places to close (Syihab 2008:249).

Syihab divides places of immorality into two types: illegal (such as hidden

brothels and unlicensed nightclubs) and legal (such as discotheques). First, regarding

illegal places, the steps required to close them are sending a letter of protest to the owner

of the immoral place with a copy to the chief of the village (Lurah), the chief of the sub-

district (Camat), the chief of the Sub-district Department of Religious Affairs

(Kakandepag), the chief of the Sub-district Police Department (Kapolsek), the chief of

the Sub-district Army (Danramil), and the local Ulama (religious leaders). If they do not

respond to the letter and the owner does not comply with the demand, then FPI along with the community surrounding the place will force the closure the illegal immoral place with the coordination of LPI (the paramilitary wing of FPI) and local authorities.

Second, regarding the legal places of immorality, the steps required to close those places are almost the same as those of targeted illegal places. The only differences is that the letters of directly send to the chief of the village (Lurah) with a copy to the owner and to all above institutions. In addition to that, the letters are sent to the authorities at the provincial level, including the Provincial People's Representative Asembly (DPRD Tingkat I). If they do not respond to it, then FPI will use any necessary to close those places with the coordination of LPI and local authorities (Syihab 2008, p. 253-55).

Even though, it is difficult to verify how FPI has implemented these official procedures, there are strong indications that FPI applied the general guidelines of AMNM, in the sense that it tried to communicate with the government officials and the owners before its collective actions.

Jihad, the Extension of AMNM (*Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar*)

In addition to the concept of AMNM, another important concept that often identifies FPI is jihad. FPI has used the word jihad as a marker for its movement. As an example, the word jihad can be found in the lyrics of FPI anthem. The following is the translation of its lyrics from the Arabic and the Indonesian versions:

Title: Let's go Jihad

Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest (2X)

Allah is our God, He is our destination

Muhammad, the messenger of God, is our example

Al-Quran is our guidance

Jihad is our struggle

Being a martyr is our expectation

Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest (2X)

Let's go jihad (2X)

To defend Islam and Muslims

Let's go jihad (2X)

To defend Islam and Muslims

Live with honor or die as a martyr (4X)

Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest (2X)

Muslim scholars have various interpretation of Jihad. Some argue that jihad is a physical struggle against adversaries, which is called a lesser Jihad, while others argue that the real jihad is an inner struggle against oneself, which is called a bigger Jihad.[7] FPI leaders, who are mostly educated in Islamic studies, do understand the debates regarding the concept of jihad. Syihab acknowledges that jihad can mean any struggle

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[7] Some scholars of political Islam, such as Peter (1996), Cook (2005) and Bonner (2006) see that the interpretation and manifestation of jihad varies during the history Islam. In the classical doctrine, jihad is interpreted in more armed ways (the lesser jihad) because the situation of war was prevalent during the first century of Islam (Peter, 1996). Then, in the 8th and 9th century, the interpretation of jihad started to move to the peaceful interpretation (the bigger jihad) as Muslim conquest began to move to more distant regions and many Muslims were unable to abandon their homes and families to go to fight. However, since 19th century when most Muslim worlds were colonized by the West or non Muslim countries, the interpretation has started to radicalized. In 1967, the idea of lesser jihad became more popular, when the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian armies were defeated by the Israeli army. Thus, understanding social contexts is crucial to the understanding of jihad (see Cook 2005).

for the sake of God. However, in the context of Islamic law (*fiqh*), he argues that jihad is about a fight with or a war against the enemy of Islam in order to defend the Words of God (Syihab 2008:151).

In 2002, 2005 and 2006, FPI declared to recruit jihadist volunteers to be sent to Palestine and Lebanon. In each recruitment, FPI was able to collect volunteers ranging from hundreds to thousands. However, there is no information how many of these volunteers were sent to Palestine and Lebanon. The only information available is that they were only sent about 20 people to join Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestine in 2006 because it had limited funding ("Jihad Fighters" 2006).

Several times the members of FPI were also accused for their involvement in terrorist attacks, such as FPI members of Aceh, Lampung and Pekalongan. However, none of them were proven. For example, FPI leader of Aceh argued that if his members was involved in a terrorist group, it was not because of FPI but because that person is involved in Jema`ah Islamiyyah ("FPI Aceh" 2010). In addition, FPI leader of Lampung, Habib Hasan Al-Jufri was also suspected for the bombing of the Bethany Church in Bandar Lampung. He was even charged with causing death by the general attorney ("Simpati Berdatangan" 2002). However, because of lack of evidence, Jufri was acquitted ("Ketua FPI" 2003).

Although many FPI leaders admire Osama bin Laden, FPI does not consider several terrorist attacks in the name of Islam as part of jihad. For example, responding to the Bali bombings, Syihab argues that those attacks cannot be considered as jihad

because the perpetrators victimized innocent people and harmed themselves, and he

considers the attacks as criminal and stupid actions ("FPI Akui" 2005).

In practice, however, FPI sees that jihad is concerned with the implementation of

AMNM. According to Syihab, this more specific interpretation of jihad is based on the

Hadith or Muhammad traditions as follows:

> Abu Bakr (Muhammad companion) said to Muhammad: "the messenger of God, is there any other jihad besides the fight against infidels?" Muhammad then answered: "Hi Abu Bakr, indeed God has people (*mujahid*) that are better than the martyrs. They make a living and walk on earth. God is proud of them in front of His angels; and the heaven is decorated for them, just like Ummu Salama dressed up for her husband (Muhammad)." Abu Bakr responded: "The messenger of God, who are they?" Muhammad answers: "they are the people who are doing AMNM (enjoining good and forbidding evil), they love because of God and hate because of God" (quoted by Syihab 2008:152).

In addition to the meaning of jihad, another important element that makes jihad

important in FPI's organization, and generally in the Muslim lives, is its extraordinary

rewards and status. For example, in two Hadith quoted by Syihab, it is said: first, "Once,

a man came to Muhammad; he said: the messenger of God, could you teach me an action

that can emulate the jihad. Muhammad answered: none," and second, "Whoever does

not do a jihad, he/she will not experience the happiness of the world and hereafter"

(Syihab 2008:153-54). Similarly, as it is stated in FPI's anthem and is commonly

believed by Muslims, that the *mujahid* (the person doing jihad) will always be successful

in his or her life. If he/she is alive, he will live with honor, but if he/she dies, he/she will

die as a martyr.

Finally, these all imply that the concept of jihad has been used by FPI to

empower doing AMNM. On one hand, the concept of AMNM has provided guidance for

FPI on whom or what are the targets of the operations and how to get rid of them. On the other hand, jihad provides encouragement for FPI members to participate in AMNM. In practice, many of AMNM activities have resulted in violence. Partly, this may be because not all FPI's demands, like closing legal nightclubs, are well responded to by the government and the business owners. At the same time, according to FPI's procedure of AMNM, if its demands, like closing places of immorality, are not responded to, then FPI will use force to close those places. Consequently, many of FPI's AMNM operations ended in violence. Additionally, the spirits of jihad, as understood by FPI's members, also give them support to continue to adopt violent strategies.

As will be discussed in chapter 7, during 1998 to 2010, FPI has been involved in at least 64 cases of violent collective actions. Because of this, since its first violent actions in 1998, FPI has been bombarded with some harsh criticisms from many different elements of the community. Criticism of FPI's violence has been part of its development. Therefore, in many occasions, like in FPI's documents, official homepage, and public media, FPI continues to explain why it has chosen to use violent means, as it is shortly discussed below.

Justifying Violence

According to FPI, violent and peaceful strategies are parts of AMNM. Both have religious bases and reasoning. Violence is not necessarily bad, as long as it is used at the right place and time. Syihab argues that violence is a manifestation of two possible characteristics: toughness and brutality. The first one is the acceptable violence.

Additionally, it is aceptable if the violence does not contradict the values of Islamic

shari`ah* and is aimed at implementing the Islamic *shari`ah. Syihab gives some religious

reasons of why violence is allowed in Islam:

1. Once, Muhammad ordered his companions to burn a mosque because it was built

   not as a place to worship but a place to divide the unity of Muslim community.

   The logic is that if a place having a good connotation is allowed to be destroyed,

   so should a place of immorality, such as a nightclub or brothel.

2. Once, Muhammad ordered his companions to burn the house of a Muslim who

   did not want to gather with the group.

3. Muhammad ordered his companion, Abu Tholhah, to dump the liquor and

   destroy its containers.

4. Muhammad destroyed the statues around the Ka`bah in Mecca and ordered his

   companions to destroy them too (Syihab 2008).

Syihab also acknowledges that the Islamic *shari`ah* also order to use a peaceful and wise

strategies in doing AMNM. He also mentioned several verses of the Quran and the

Hadith on the importance of using peaceful strategies. For example, he quotes the Quran:

> Call men to the path of your Lord with wisdom and kindly exhortation. Reason
> with them in the most courteous manner. Your Lord best knows those who stray
> from His path and those who are rightly guided (The Koran 16: 125).

Therefore, FPI prioritizes the use of peaceful and wise means to do AMNM. However,

in practice, not all peaceful means work well to do AMNM operations. So, according to

Syihab, in this situation, there is a need to move from peaceful means to the right use of

violence, as explained above in the procedure of AMNM.

Moving towards FPI's Adoption of Violence

In summary, there are two important factors that might facilitate FPI's adoption of violence. They are the structure of the political process and the framing factor. *First*, the history of Indonesia began with a huge debate over whether the new state would be based on Islamic or nationalist ideology. Both proponents of these ideologies competed to dominate the state. However, from the beginning of Indonesian independence in 1945 to the fall of the Suharto military authoritarian regime in 1998, the proponents of nationalist ideology were able to control the state. On the other hand, the proponents of Islamic ideology were always in a marginal position. Most of them existed as rebellious and clandestine radical Islamist movements rather than as legal groups that openly opposed the nationalist state. During this 53 year period (1945-1998), the government fully suppressed these Islamist movements.

After the collapse of the Suharto military authoritarian regime (1998), the government no longer possessed significant control over society. Consequently, this created an open political opportunity for the Islamist movements to emerge or reemerge, including FPI. FPI declared its establishment and identified itself as a proponent of the Islamist ideology (*shari`ah*). This means that FPI actually situated itself in a condition similar to previous Islamist movements, which were radical and in opposition to the state. Therefore, FPI's choice to support Islamic ideology made it more prone to emulate radical Islamist movements; in turn this made it difficult for FPI to create a harmonious relationship with the government.

Second, as will be discussed in the next chapter, since its establishment in 1998, FPI has aggressively raided night clubs, brothels and other targets or places which it considers as sources of immorality. According to its organizational documents, FPI used the concept of AMNM (*amar ma`ruf nahi munkar*) and jihad to explain its major programs, including some activities that used violent means. Additionally, FPI also formulated its social and religious justifications for why it chose to adopt violent means in some of its activities.

These FPI concepts of AMNM, jihad and its reasoning for violence can be understood in two contexts. First, these concepts can be understood as means for FPI to justify its violent actions rather than as direct source violence. This is because most of these concepts were developed and internalized in FPI after it was involved in violent activities. Second, more than a means of justification, these concepts can also be understood more generally as means for FPI to frame its overall activities, so that FPI was able to launch its activities and continue to adopt violent means.

As discussed in the previous chapter, framing is closely related to social movements' activities, which means that successful collective actions also depend on the soundness of framing strategies. Snow and Benford (1998) also provide three core framing task that can be used to assess the soundness of the framing, namely: 1) prognostic framing, or problem identification and attributions, 2) diagnostic framing, or strategies and solution for the problem, and 3) motivational framing, or calls for action.

The concepts of *shari`ah*, AMNM, jihad, martyr and religious justification for violence fulfill these three core framing tasks.  For example, the *shari`ah* has shaped

how FPI identifies the problems of the society and who is responsible for these problems

(diagnostic framing). FPI's understanding of *shari`ah* lead to its perception that the

Indonesian constitution, night clubs and brothels were the sources of these problems.

AMNM provides FPI the means for solving these problems, such as by sending a letter

to the government and owners of immoral places and/or directly attacking these immoral

places (prognostic framing). Lastly, FPI's concept of jihad and martyrdom provide

religious encouragement and rationale for FPI members to engage in AMNM

(motivational framing). Finally, by combining these three framing tasks, violent

collective actions have become more feasible, relevant and rational for FPI. Thus, FPI

continues to adopt violent means in it collective actions.

CHAPTER VI

CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIVISTS

IN RELATION TO VIOLENCE

The current chapter is aimed at investigating individual characteristics of FPI's activists that might facilitate FPI's adoption of violence. Previous research on social movements and political violence suggests that there are, at least, three individual characteristics, which allegedly account for violent collective actions. They are fundamentalism, lower trust in government and the interaction between trust in government and political efficacy. Using a quantitative approach, these theories will be used to look at the characteristics of FPI activists in relation to FPI's adoption of violent means.   In doing so, the main focus of this chapter is to test the following hypotheses.

First, the more fundamentalist people are, the more likely they are to justify violence (H1a). If this is true, then FPI will be likely more fundamentalist than that of the moderate groups (H1b) and the relationship between fundamentalism and violence justification will be stronger for FPI than the moderate groups (H1c). Second, people who have lower trust in government will be more likely to justify the use of violent means (H2a); people who have low trust in government but high political efficacy will be likely to justify violence (H2b). If H2a and/or H2b are true, then FPI will be likely to have a lower trust in government than that of the moderate groups (H2c), and FPI will be likely to have a higher political efficacy than that of the moderate groups (H2d). The following discussion is the result of the analysis.

Data Description

The total valid returned questionnaire is 371. However, 30 of the respondents (27 from MMI and 3 from HTI) are dropped from the analysis because in the middle of data collection, these two organizations declined to participate. Therefore, only 341 respondents are used to analyze the hypotheses. This total number of 341 consists of 135 FPI respondents (the violent group) and 206 respondents of moderate activists (142 are NU activists and 64 are Muhammadiyah activists). All of these respondents are male because all these organizations are dominated by male activists.

The following Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics of all measured variables for the two groups (FPI and the moderate groups), which includes mean, range, standard deviation and test of normality (skewness and kurtosis). All of the values of the measured variables are treated as approximately interval.

In general, most of the measured variables are normally distributed. All of the skewness values are between -3 and 3. Many of them have values close to zero. Similarly, most of the kurtosis values are between -3 and 3. However, there are four items of the measured variables that have values above 3. Three of them are under the latent construct of trust in government's work, namely items Q7b, Q7c and Q7d, and one of them is under the latent construct of fundamentalism, namely item Q6e. Therefore, this can be a sign of potential problems. However, the kurtosis values are within the acceptable range for the normality assumption. Some argue that the data will be problematic if the absolute value is greater than 8.0 (extreme kurtosis), and others argue

it is problematic if the absolute value is greater than 10.0 (Klein 2005). Therefore, the

following items can be assumed to be normally distributed.

Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Observed Variables

Variable	Mean	Range	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis
Fundamentalism					
• Quran absolute (Q6a)	4.90	1-7	2.03	-.74	-.91
• Quran right, science wrong (Q6b)	4.78	1-7	1.81	-.69	-.78
• Threat of Christianization (Q6c)	5.45	1-7	1.59	-1.18	.65
• Threat of liberalism (Q6d)	5.15	1-7	1.65	-.74	-.34
• Threat of immorality (Q6e)	6.07	1-7	1.06	-1.71	3.93
• Must protect Islam (Q6f)	5.78	2-7	1.10	-1.20	1.39
• Immorality source of problem (Q6g)	5.61	1-7	1.30	-1.49	2.15
• No female leader (Q6h)	4.33	1-7	2	-.25	-1.28
• No female judge (Q6i)	4.59	1-7	1.90	-.39	-1.16
• Not vote for female candidate (Q6j)	4.28	1-7	1.94	-.22	-1.17
• Signs of end of world (Q6k)	5.05	1-7	1.61	-.75	-.20
• US President: Dajjal (Q6l)	4.48	1-7	1.71	-.19	-.75
• Indonesia a secular state (Q6m)	4.47	1-7	1.73	-.44	-1.02
• Indonesia based on *shari`ah* (Q6n)	4.91	1-7	1.78	-.82	-.40
Trust in Government's work					
• Gov. runs by few big interest (Q7a)*	2.42	1-7	1.26	1.60	2.49
• Gov. wastes money (Q7b)*	2.09	1-7	1.07	2.25	6.88
• Gov. incompetent (Q7c)*	2.26	1-7	1.08	1.61	3.69
• Gov. corrupts (Q7d)*	2.27	1-7	1.21	1.77	3.63
• Gov. handles immorality (Q7e)	3.40	1-7	1.47	.40	-.47
• Gov. handles corruption (Q7f)	3.20	1-7	1.40	.36	.26
• Gov handles corporate mafia (Q7g)	2.96	1-7	1.47	.60	-.53
Trust in Government's Institutions					
• Trust president (Q8a)	1.87	1-4	.52	.24	2.45
• Trust provincial government (Q8b)	1.80	1-4	.61	.47	1.2
• Trust local government (Q8c)	1.85	1-4	.60	.32	.88
• Trust policy (Q8d)	1.58	1-4	.56	.40	-.15
• Trust court (Q8e)	1.60	1-4	.61	.84	1.37
• Trust prosecutor general (Q8f)	1.57	1-4	.57	.46	-.08
• Trust legislative institution (Q8g)	1.85	1-4	.51	.21	2.67
Political Efficacy					
• Well-qualified (Q9a)	3.99	1-7	1.61	-.10	-1.18
• Well-informed (Q9b)	4.74	1-7	1.34	-.67	-.26
• Well-understanding (Q9c)	4.91	1-7	1.31	-.91	.35
• Others understand better (Q9d)*	3.60	1-7	1.31	.67	-.15
• Self-confidence (Q9e)	4.25	1-7	1.41	-.14	-.70
• Unsure (Q9f)*	3.22	1-7	1.47	.80	-.41

Table 6.1 Continued

Variable	Mean	Range	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis
Violent Attitudes					
• Against LGBT groups (Q10a)	4.82	1-7	1.78	-.81	-.63
• Against blasphemous groups (Q10b)	5.21	1-7	1.90	-.95	-.47
• Against illegal churches (Q10c)	5.23	1-7	1.65	-1.10	.26
• Against prostitution (Q10d)	5.16	1-7	1.71	-1.03	-.06
• Against gambling-drinking (Q10e)	5.17	1-7	1.69	-1.09	.14
• Against immorality (Q10f)	4.85	1-7	1.83	-.71	-.74

The variables with * are scored in reverse

Reliability and Validity

In SEM, factor loadings and fit indices can also indicate reliability and validity of the measurement and structural models. However, in order to get initial assessment of the quality of the data, the following is a brief discussion regarding reliability and validity of the measurement model.

First, concerning the reliability (internal consistency) of items Q6a to Q6n that measure fundamentalism, the values of Cronbach's alpha is .913 (excellent). This value indicates high reliability or internal consistency. Additionally, it suggests that these fourteen items (Q6a to Q6n) are closely related as a group, and they may measure the latent construct of fundamentalism well. In relation to the validity, the values of the observed variables seem to be as expected by the theory. For example, the means of the moderate groups are around four (neutral position), and its standard deviations are also higher than those of FPI. Theoretically, the moderates are expected to respond to the questions moderately. Similarly, the variability (standard deviations) of religious opinions of the moderate groups is also expected to be higher than that of FPI because the leaders and activists of the moderate groups (NU and Muhammadiyah) are usually

more independent from each other. Additionally, they also get used to having different religious opinions within and outside their groups.

Second, concerning the reliability of items Q7a to Q7g, which measure trust in government's work, the value of Cronbach's alpha is .693. This value indicates that those items are less consistent, or not homogenous. Therefore, they indicate a problem in measuring the latent variable of trust in government's work. In general, the cut-off for the alpha value should be greater than .70 or even .80.

One of the problems that may cause this lower value of alpha is an inaccurate strategy in designing the items of Q7a to Q7g, which made them confusing for the respondents. Based on the answer's direction, these items (Q7a to Q7g) are divided into two groups. In group one (Q7a to Q7d), the answers tell that the "lower scores" indicate a "higher trust." On the other hand, in group two (Q7e to Q7g) the answers tell that the "lower scores" indicate a "lower trust." Many respondents might have been confused with the directional shift of answering these similar questions (from group one to group two). Therefore, the Pearson correlations of the items within "group one" (or group two) are mostly high. On the contrary, the Pearson correlation between an item in "group one" and another item in "group two" are very low. For example, the values of Pearson correlation between item Q7a (group one) and Q7b (group one) is .556, but the correlation between item Q7a (group one) and Q7e (group two) is only -.016(see appendix).

Finally, considering this low value of reliability caused by the ineffective design of the questionnaire, this study drops all of these items from the analysis. Even though

there is an alternative to only drop some of the unreliable items (such as items Q7e to Q7f), this study chose not to do so. It is because retaining some items, such as Q7a to Q7d, and dropping some other items (Q7e to Q7f) also can hurt the dimensions of the latent concept of trust in government's work, which exist in Q7e to Q7f. Especially, these latter questions are about corruption, which is very important indicators in measuring trust in government and is relevant to the current context of Indonesia. In addition to that, combining items Q7 and Q8 still produces the low value of Cronbach's alpha of .642.

In short, as discussed in the previous chapter, scholars used two different strategies in measuring trust in government, namely: questioning about people's trust in government's work and people's trust in government's institutions. Initially, this study combined both strategies to measure trust in government. However, because of the problem on the data of items measuring trust in government' work, this study only used the items measuring trust in government's institution to measure the latent variable of trust in government.

Third, concerning the coefficient of reliability, the value of Cronbach's alpha for items Q8a-Q8g that measure trust in government's institutions is .79 (or .81 if item Q8g is deleted). However, in the next analysis, this item was not deleted because it did not significantly affect the alpha, and the value of .79 is still acceptable. Additionally, deleting item Q8g can reduce the dimensionality of the latent construct of trust in government's institutions.

Forth, concerning the coefficient of reliability, the Cronbach's alpha for items

Q9a to Q9 that measure political efficacy is .74, which is acceptable. Therefore, this

indicates that items Q9a to Q9f are closely related and consistent. It is also evidence that

these items measure the same latent construct of efficacy.

Fifth, concerning the coefficient of reliability, the values of Cronbach's alpha of

items Q10a to Q10g that measure violent attitudes is .93 (excellent). Therefore, this

indicates that these items are closely related and consistent. It is also evidence that these

items measure the same latent construct of violent attitudes. In addition, in relation to the

validity, the values of the observed variables seem to be as expected by the theory. FPI

shows its tendency towards violent attitudes and the moderate groups shows their

tendency towards moderate attitudes. As it is also expected, the variability of FPI is

lower than that of the moderate groups and the variability of the moderate group is also

higher than FPI. This indicates that, assuming normal distribution, some respondents of

the moderate groups also tend to be violent, and some of them tend to be anti-violent.

Preliminary Analysis: Mean Differences of the Observed Variables

Table 6.2 shows that, in general, there are statistically significant differences in

the means of the observed fundamentalism variables between FPI and the moderate

groups. The only exception was found in the item Q6e (threat of immorality); here the

case of difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, this is an initial indication

that FPI are more fundamentalist than the moderate groups.

Table 6.2 Means (or Proportions) and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the Observed Variables Measuring Fundamentalism by Groups

Variable	Moderate	FPI	Mean Difference p-Values
Quran absolute (Q6a)	4.07 (2.12)	6.15 (.96)	.000
Quran right, science wrong (Q6b)	4.20 (2.02)	5.65 (.89)	.000
Threat of Christianization (Q6c)	5.20 (1.73)	5.83 (1.28)	.000
Threat of liberalism (Q6d)	4.89 (1.78)	5.54 (1.34)	.000
Threat of immorality (Q6e)	6.02 (1.01)	6.15 (.98)	.273
Must protect Islam (Q6f)	5.58 (1.18)	6.07 (.91)	.000
Immorality source of problem (Q6g)	5.38 (1.56)	5.97 (.64)	.000
No female leader (Q6h)	3.47 (1.94)	5.63 (1.28)	.000
No female judge (Q6i)	3.81 (1.9)	5.76 (1.16)	.000
Not vote for female candidate (Q6j)	3.36 (1.79)	5.67 (1.18)	.000
Signs of end of world (Q6k)	4.62 (1.71)	5.70 (1.2)	.000
US President: Dajjal (Q6l)	3.89 (1.65)	5.38 (1.4)	.000
Indonesia a secular state (Q6m)	3.85 (1.76)	5.41 (1.16)	.000
Indonesia based on *Shari`ah* (Q6n)	4.17 (1.83)	6.04 (.9)	.000

Table 6.3 shows that in general, the difference of the means measuring trust in government's work between FPI and the moderate groups are not consistent. For example, in item Q7a, the mean of moderate groups is significantly higher than that of FPI, but in the items Q7e, Q7f and Q7g, the means of the moderate group are significantly lower than those of FPI. Additionally, there are no significant mean differences between those two groups in items Q7b, Q7c and Q7d. These indicate that there is no difference between FPI and the moderate groups (Muhammadiyah and NU) regarding their trust in government's works.

Table 6.3 Means (or Proportions) and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the Observed Variables Measuring Trust in Government's Work (Trust One)

Variable	Moderate	FPI	Mean Difference p-Values
Gov. runs by few big interest (Q7a)*	2.69 (1.49)	1.98 (.62)	.000
Gov. wastes money (Q7b)*	2.15 (1.21)	2.01 (.82)	.193
Gov. incompetent (Q7c)*	2.30 (1.23)	2.21 (.802)	.459
Gov. corrupts (Q7d)*	2.25 (1.31)	2.31 (1.05)	.644
Gov. handles immorality (Q7e)	3.17 (1.53)	3.76 (1.28)	.000
Gov. handles corruption (Q7f)	2.94 (1.47)	3.59 (1.19)	.000
Gov handles corporate mafia (Q7g)	2.61 (1.44)	3.46 (1.39)	.000

The variables with * are scored in reverse, so that the higher score indicate higher trust.

Table 6.4 shows that there are statistical differences between FPI and the moderate groups in the means of items (Q8a to Q8f) measuring trust in government's institutions. FPI members have lower trust in the government's institutions than that of the moderate groups, except for item Q8g (trust in legislative institution). Generally, this indicates that FPI and the moderate groups are different in their level of trust in government's institutions. However, in reality the differences are not that great because the scores of both FPI and the moderate groups are concentrated in the lowest range, or between 1 = never and 2 = sometimes and the pattern of differences is not consistent.

Table 6.4 Means (or Proportions) and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the Observed Variables Measuring Trust in Government's Institutions (Trust Two)

Variable	Moderate	FPI	Mean Difference p-Values
Trust president (Q8a)	1. 95(.56)	1.77 (.43)	.002
Trust provincial government (Q8b)	1.90 (.67)	1.66 (.47)	.001
Trust local government (Q8c)	1.95 (.66)	1.70 (.46)	.000
Trust policy (Q8d)	1.68 (.59)	1.44 (.50)	.000
Trust court (Q8e)	1.71 (.67)	1.46 (.50)	.000
Trust prosecutor general (Q8f)	1.66 (.82)	1.46 (.56)	.003
Trust legislative institution (Q8g)	1.79 (.60)	1.93 (.35)	.014

Table 6.5 shows that there is no pattern in the means of efficacy based on the group's affiliation, namely the moderate groups and FPI. For example, the means of FPI and the moderate groups of items Q9a and Q9e are not statistically different. Furthermore, in the case of items Q9b and Q9c, the means of FPI members are significantly higher than those of the moderate group members, but in items Q9d and Q9f, the means of FPI members are statistically lower than those of the moderate group

members. Therefore, there is no consistent difference between the moderate groups and

FPI with regard to self-reported political efficacy.

Table 6.5 Means (or Proportions) and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the
Observed Variables Measuring Political Efficacy

Variable	Moderate	FPI	Mean Difference p-Values
Well-qualified (Q9a)	4.03 (1.68)	3.92 (1.51)	.518
Well-informed (Q9b)	4.59 (1.53)	4.96 (.93)	.011
Well-understanding (Q9c)	4.62 (1.51)	5.35 (.71)	.000
Others understand better (Q9d)*	3.84 (1.49)	3.24 (.87)	.000
Self-confidence (Q9e)	4.21 (1.52)	4.30 (1.21)	.601
Unsure (Q9f)*	3.35 (1.54)	3.02 (1.33)	.042

The variables with * are scored in reverse, so that the higher score indicate higher efficacy.

Table 6.6 shows that the means of the items measuring violent attitudes (Q10a to

Q10f) of FPI members and the moderate groups are statistically different. FPI are more

violent than the moderate group members, as expected. Therefore, there is strong

indication that they are different. Additionally, the scores of those groups are

concentrated in different places. FPI tends to be concentrated in the values between 6

and 7, which indicate the agreement on the use of violence and force in collective

actions. On the other hand, the moderate groups tend to concentrate in the values

between 4 and 5, which indicate their neutrality.

Table 6.6 Means (or Proportions) and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the
Observed Variables Measuring Violent Attitudes

Variable	Moderate	FPI	Mean Difference p-Values
Against LGBT groups (Q10a)	4.09 (1.88)	5.93 (.73)	.000
Against blasphemous groups (Q10b)	4.44 (1.99)	6.39 (.88)	.000
Against illegal churches (Q10c)	4.62 (1.78)	6.17 (.76)	.000
Against prostitution (Q10d)	4.48 (1.86)	6.19 (.59)	.000
Against gambling-drinking (Q10e)	4.47 (1.81)	6.24 (.54)	.000
Against immorality (Q10f)	3.90 (1.75)	6.29 (.56)	.000

Model Results

Based on the aforementioned preliminary results of data collection, especially the low

value of reliability in questions 7 (Q7a to Q7g), the hypothesized model is reformulated

in the following Figure 6.1:

Figure 6.1 Hypothesized Model after Deleting Items Q7a to Q7g Measuring Trust in
Government's Work.

Using LMS (Latent Moderated Structural) approach (or XWITH in MPlus), the model was estimated in two steps in order to evaluate the goodness of fit. First, the model was estimated without including the latent interactions (trust-efficacy and fundamentalism-group) or the dashed paths (Model 1).   The analysis with maximum likelihood (ML) estimation converged to an admissible solution. Values of the selected fit indexes for this model are Akaike (AIC) = 30909.695, Chi-square or χ^2 (475) = 1093.353 with $p < 0.000$, RMSEA = 0.062 (fair fit), CFI = 0.912 (fair fit), and SRMR = 0.080 (fair fit).

The high value of Chi-square, which is not desired, may indicate that the hypothesized model and observed covariances are statistically difference with $p < 0.000$. However, the chi-square is overly sensitive to sample size and multivariate deviations of normality; in fact, the sample size of 341 in this study is relatively high, which is larger than 200. Therefore, this study renders the chi-square value less important for evaluation of model fit. Instead, this study uses RMSEA, CFI and SRMR values to evaluate the model; they indicate that the hypothesized model and observed covariances are about the same.

Second, the full model (with the interactions or Model 2) was estimated. The result of the second estimation did not produce Chi-square, RMSEA and CFI. Instead it reported the Akaike (AIK) value to evaluate the model. The value of AIC is 30862.417. This value is smaller than the value in the previous model by 47.278 (30909.695 - 30862.417). As it is commonly accepted, the model with the smaller Akaike (AIC) is

considered as a better model. Therefore, the second model with interactions (Model 2) is better than the model without interactions (Model 1).

In addition, the estimations of Model 1 and Model 2 are almost similar, or their parameter estimates are stable in that their factor loadings, path coefficients and p-values are relatively the same. Those indicate that the estimations are good and consistent. However, Model 2 may give more precise parameter estimates than that of Model 1 since it gives a lower AIC value. Therefore, the following interpretations and the hypothesis analyses are based on Model 2.

Model 2 shows that most observed variables measure their four latent variables very well. First, all the factor loadings of fundamentalism are statistically significant. For example, the coefficient of Fundamentalism $\rightarrow$ Q6g (.82) can be interpreted that holding other variables constant, with every one unit increase in the latent variable of fundamentalism, the value of Q6c will increase about .82 units, and it is statistically significant with $p < .000$.

Second, all the factor loadings of Trust in Government are also statistically significant. For example, the coefficient of Trust $\rightarrow$ Q8g (1.58) tells that holding other variables constant, with every one unit increase in Trust, the score of Q8g will increase about 1.58 units.

Third, four of five factor loadings of Efficacy (political efficacy) are statistically significant. Only one of them, namely item Q9d, is not statistically significant, which means that item Q9d is different from the other items measuring Efficacy, or it does not measure the latent variable of political efficacy. Lastly, all factor loadings of Violence

(violent attitudes) are statistically significant. For example, the coefficient of Violence

→ Q10d (.94) tells that holding other variables constant, with one unit increase in the

latent variable of Violence, the Q10d will increase by .94 units. It is statistically

significant with $p < .000$.

As for the relationships between Violence (violent attitudes) and other variables,

Model 2 shows that Fundamentalism and Fungroup are significantly associated with

Violence. However, Trust, Efficacy and Efftrust are not significantly associated with

Violence. Additionally, the group differences in the latent variable of Fundamentalism,

Trust and Violence are vary inconsistently between FPI and the moderate groups. The

coefficients of these relationships are interpreted as follows.

The coefficient of 1.053 (Fundamentalism → Violence) tells that, holding other

variables constant, with every one unit increase in Fundamentalism, Violence will

increase about 1.05 units. It is statistically significant with $p < .000$. The coefficient of

1.61 (Group → Violence) tells that holding other variables constant, FPI will have a

higher mean of about 1.61 units for Violence than that of the moderate groups. It is

statistically significant with $p < .000$. The coefficient of the interaction between latent

variable Fundamentalism and Group (or Fungroup) is statistically significant with a path

coefficient of -.918. It cannot be directly interpreted. Therefore, the coefficient of -.918

should be put in the formula as follows:

$\text{Violence} = b_{\text{violence.group}} + b_{\text{violence.fundamentslim}} + b_{\text{violence.fungroup}}$

$\text{Violence} = 1.61 + 1.053 + (-0.918)$

1. For the Moderate Groups (Group = 0)

Violence = 1.61(0) + 1.053 - 0.918 (0)

Violence = 1.053

2. For FPI (Group = 1)

Violence = 1.61(1) + 1.053 - 0.918(1)

Violence = 1.745

Thus, this significant interaction effect indicates that, holding other variables constant, the more fundamentalist people are, the more likely they are to have violent attitude. However, this relationship is moderated by Group, which means that FPI has steeper slope than that of the moderate groups (the slope for the moderate = 1.053 and FPI = 1.74), or in other words, fundamentalism among FPI members have a stronger effect on violence than for the moderate group members.

The coefficient of .592 (Trust → Violence), .072 (Efficacy →Violence) and .183 (Efftrust → Violence) are statistically insignificant. The first two values tell that trust in government (Trust) and political efficacy (Efficacy) are not associated with violent attitudes (Violence). Similarly, the insignificant interaction between Efficacy and Trust (or Efftrust) also tells that a person who has low trust in government and higher political efficacy is not likely to be more violent.

In relation to the differences between FPI and the moderate groups in the latent variables Fundamentalism, Trust and Efficacy, the coefficient of 1.976 (Group → Fundamentalism) tells that FPI tends to be more fundamentalist by about 1.976 than that of the moderate groups. It is statistically significant with $p < .000$. The coefficient of -.036 (Group → Trust) tells that FPI is likely to have less trust in government by about

.036 than that of the moderate groups. It is statistically significant with $p < .05$. Lastly, the coefficient of -.003 (Group → Efficacy) tells that FPI is likely to have less political efficacy than that of the moderate groups by about .003 but it is statistically not significant. This means that FPI and the moderate groups have the same level of political efficacy.

Finally, based on this result, this Hypothesized Model (Model 2) may be modified by dropping the latent variables of Trust, Efficacy and their interactions (see Model 3). As suggested by Kline (2003) at least, there are two reasons that should be fulfilled for dropping variables from the model: empirical and theoretical reasons. First, empirically based on the estimations in Model 1 and Model 2, the latent variable of Trust and Efficacy fail to explain the latent variable Violence (violent attitude). Second, theoretically most social movement studies suggest that social movement is about "collective challenges" and it is mostly about outside state institutions seeking to forward or halt social change. Therefore, whether or not a social movement adopts violent strategies, social movement actors will be likely to have a high political efficacy and a low trust in government. In short, the interaction between political efficacy (high) and trust in government (low) may explain only the emergence of social movements, not the adoptions of violent strategies by social movements. The following Table 6. 7 are the summary of the maximum likelihood estimation of the Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3.

Table 6.7 Maximum likelihood Parameter Estimates of the Models

Parameter	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE
Fundamentalism → Q6a	1[a]	0	1[a]	0	1[a]	0
Fundamentalism → Q6b	0.79***	0.054	0.785***	0.042	0.785***	0.043
Fundamentalism → Q6c	0.922***	0.089	0.905***	0.088	0.896***	0.087
Fundamentalism → Q6d	0.822***	0.081	0.838***	0.088	0.831***	0.087
Fundamentalism → Q6e	0.268***	0.054	0.277***	0.073	0.271***	0.072
Fundamentalism → Q6f	0.308***	0.042	0.315***	0.053	0.316***	0.053
Fundamentalism → Q6g	0.377***	0.049	0.372***	0.057	0.375***	0.058
Fundamentalism → Q6h	1.117***	0.075	1.116***	0.055	1.124***	0.056
Fundamentalism → Q6i	0.957***	0.071	0.964***	0.058	0.968***	0.059
Fundamentalism → Q6j	1.14***	0.072	1.139***	0.056	1.147***	0.057
Fundamentalism → Q6k	0.897***	0.078	0.905***	0.068	0.91***	0.069
Fundamentalism → Q6l	0.793***	0.064	0.796***	0.057	0.8***	0.057
Fundamentalism → Q6m	0.697***	0.065	0.698***	0.072	0.702***	0.073
Fundamentalism → Q6n	0.967***	0.067	0.959***	0.054	0.962***	0.054
Trust → Q8a	1[a]	0	1[a]	0	–	–
Trust → Q8b	2.809**	1.007	2.613**	0.889	–	–
Trust → Q8c	2.998**	1.075	2.78**	0.996	–	–
Trust → Q8d	5.053*	1.983	4.63**	1.715	–	–
Trust → Q8e	7.114*	2.808	6.54**	2.327	–	–
Trust → Q8f	6.9*	2.733	6.287**	2.34	–	–
Trust → Q8g	1.567*	0.654	1.441*	0.593	–	–
Efficacy → Q9a	1[a]	0	1[a]	0	–	–
Efficacy → Q9b	0.597***	0.061	0.6***	0.072	–	–
Efficacy → Q9c	0.587***	0.056	0.59***	0.06	–	–
Efficacy → Q9d	0.076	0.06	0.078	0.076	–	–
Efficacy → Q9e	0.894***	0.074	0.9***	0.085	–	–
Efficacy → Q9f	0.376***	0.067	0.378***	0.078	–	–
Violence → Q10a	1[a]	0	1[a]	0	1[a]	0
Violence → Q10b	0.983***	0.056	0.983***	0.049	0.988***	0.046
Violence → Q10c	0.876***	0.048	0.873***	0.044	0.881***	0.042
Violence → Q10d	0.941***	0.047	0.956***	0.041	1.007***	0.039
Violence → Q10e	0.893***	0.049	0.91***	0.052	0.984***	0.054
Violence → Q10f	0.849***	0.055	0.879***	0.06	1.079***	0.047

Table 6.7 Continued

Parameter	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE
Fundamentalism → Violence	0.803***	0.072	1.053***	0.095	0.979***	0.095
Trust → Violence	-1.62	1.042	0.592	0.942	–	–
Efficacy →Violence	0.089	0.049	0.072	0.058	–	–
Fungroup → Violence	–	–	-0.918***	0.127	-0.893***	0.095
Efftrust → Violence	–	–	0.183	0.934	–	–
Group → Fundamentalism	1.973***	0.167	1.976***	0.149	1.963***	0.149
Group → Trust	-0.032*	0.016	-0.036*	0.018	–	–
Group → Efficacy	-0.005	0.162	-0.003	0.158	–	–
Group → Violence	0.227	0.165	1.61***	0.198	1.717***	0.129

Note. Model 1: hypothesized model without interactions, Model 2: full hypothesized model and Model 3: modified model.
Fungroup is the interaction between Fundamentalism and Group; in the model, it appears in the dashed line.
Efftrust is the interaction between Efficacy and Trust; in the model, it appears in the dashed line
[a]Not tested for significance; *$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed tests)

Summary of Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis 1a: The more fundamentalist people are, the more likely they are to justify violence.

This hypothesis is supported by the data. There is a significant relationship between fundamentalism and violent attitude with a path coefficient of 1.053. This relationship indicates that people who are more fundamentalist are more likely to justify the use of violent means.

Hypothesis 1b: FPI will likely be more fundamentalist than the moderate groups.

This hypothesis is supported by the data. There is a significant difference between FPI (coded 1) and the moderate groups (coded 0) in fundamentalism with a

coefficient of 1.976. This indicates that FPI is more fundamentalist than the moderate groups.

Hypothesis 1c: The relationship between fundamentalism and violence will be stronger for FPI than moderate groups.

This hypothesis is supported by the data. There is a significant interaction between latent variables fundamentalism and group on violence with a path coefficient of -.918. Computing this number in the model, the path coefficient of fundamentalism on violence for the moderate groups (coded 0) is 1.053 and the path coefficient for FPI (coded 1) is 1.745. This indicates that FPI has a steeper slope in the relationship between Fundamentalism and Violence than that of the moderate groups.

Hypothesis 2a: People who have lower trust in government will be more likely to justify violence.

This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The relationship between Trust and Violence with a path coefficient of 0.592 is statistically not significant. This indicates that people with lower trust in government are not more likely to justify the use of violent means.

Hypothesis 2b: People who have low trust in government but high political efficacy will be likely to justify violence.

This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The interaction effect between the variables Trust and Efficacy, or Efftrust, with the coefficient of .183 is statistically not significant. This indicates that people who have low trust in government and high political efficacy will not be likely to justify the use of violent means.

Hypothesis 2c: FPI will be likely to have a lower trust in government than that of the moderate groups.

This hypothesis is likely supported by the data. There is a statistically significant difference of the conditional mean of Trust between FPI and moderate groups with the coefficient of -.036. This indicates that FPI will be likely to have a lower trust in government than that of the moderate groups. However, in reality, the difference is not that great. First, it is because their difference value is very small (.036 point) and the mean of each observed variable of Trust for both FPI and moderate groups are concentrated in the value between 1.4 and 1.95. This indicates both of them have very low trust in government (see also Table. 6.4)

Hypothesis 2d: FPI will be likely to have higher political efficacy than that of the moderate groups.

This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The relationship between the observed variable Group and the latent variable Trust with the coefficient of .003 is not significant. This indicates that the scores of political efficacy for FPI and moderate groups are about the same.

Conclusion

The present study confirms that fundamentalism is associated with violence (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992, 2004; Moaddel and Karabenich 2008; Rothschild et al. 2009; Ginges and Atran 2009). This association clearly depicts the positive relationship between FPI and violence. This means that FPI activists are more

fundamentalist than the activists of the moderate groups (Muhammadiyah and NU). Therefore, they are also more prone to violent attitudes than that those moderate groups.

However, the measurement of fundamentalism in this study is somewhat different from the previous quantitative studies of fundamentalism, which merely focus on the aspect of beliefs (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992, 2004; Moaddel and Karabenich 2008). The current study takes into account both aspects of belief and its manifestation in social and political life, which are based on the theoretical concept developed by Marty and Appleby (1993), Almound et al. (2003) and Frey (2007).

On the other hand, this study does not support the argument regarding a relationship between trust in government and violence (Zimmermann 1983). This is because most of respondents have very low trust in government but at the same time they vary in their tendency on the use of violent means. This means that both respondents, who are violent (FPI) and not violent (the moderate groups), have low trust in government. Even though the group comparison on the latent variable of Trust between FPI and the moderate groups is statistically significant, this study contends that they have very low trust in government. The scores of both groups are concentrated in the range of one (1 = never) and two (2 = rarely), where FPI scores lie in the lower range and the moderate groups' score lie in the upper range (see Table 6.4).

In short, in the context of social movements, trust does not relate to movements' adoption of violence. This may be because by definition a social movement is a challenger of authority, and therefore, activists in social movements, whether they adopt violent means or not, should have low trust in government.

Similarly, the latent interaction between trust and political efficacy is not supported by the data (Kornhauser 1959; Lipset 1960; Bell 1963; Ransford 1968; Gamson 1968; Paige 1971). This means that the respondents who have low trust in government and high political efficacy will be unlikely to justify the use of violent means. This may be because both FPI (the violent group) and the moderate groups have the same level of distrust in government and mid-levels-political efficacy (see Table 6.5).

Last but not least, only the latent variable fundamentalism sheds light on FPI's adoption of violent means. This indicates that types of religiosity, such as fundamentalism, moderation and liberalism, of the activists shape the dynamics of religious social movements.

CHAPTER VII

THE SOCIAL MECHANISM OF FPI'S VIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the pattern of FPI's violent actions, and socio-political environments surrounding those actions, in order to explain FPI's adoption of violent means. In doing so, this chapter examines the general picture of FPI collective actions, the pattern of its violent actions and the nature of its socio-political environment, including Islamic culture that might facilitate FPI's violent actions.

Locating FPI's Violent Collective Actions

Based on the data that I collected from *Antara* (the state national newspaper agency), *Kompas* (the secular national newspaper), *Republika* (the Islamic national newspaper) and other newspapers from the period of 1998 to 2010, FPI collective actions can be divided into four types: violence, nonviolence with physical threat, nonviolence with verbal threat and nonviolence. Violence consists of about 27 percent (64 cases) of FPI collective activities; nonviolence with physical threat consists of about 14 percent (34 cases) of the activities; nonviolence with verbal threat consists of about 8 percent (18 cases) of the activities; and pure nonviolence consists of about 50 percent (118 cases) of its collective activities, as can be seen in the following Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 The Classification of FPI's Collective Actions

Types of Actions	Frequency	Percent
Violence	64	27.5
Nonviolence with Physical Threat	33	14.2
Nonviolence with Verbal Threat	18	7.7
Nonviolence	118	50.6
Total	233	100

There are some definitions that I used to categorize the above FPI collective actions. First, "violence" in this study means any FPI's collective actions that immediately inflicted physical damage on persons and or objects, regardless of the level of damage. Therefore, causing a person to die or merely breaking windows and tables are both categorized as violence.

Second, "nonviolence with physical threat" means any FPI's collective actions that made persons or groups comply with FPI demands by using forceful means but without inflicting damage. For example, hundreds of FPI members with wooden sticks and any simple weapons came to a night club and coerced the manager to close the business operations during the holy month of Ramadan but without damaging the club.

Third, "nonviolence with verbal threat" means any peaceful collective actions that entail an oral threat to the target groups. For example, during the protest in front of state offices, FPI leaders said "if the government did not order the night clubs to be closed during the holy Ramadan, FPI would close them with any necessary means" ("Judi Akan" 2005) and "if the Government did not abolish the blasphemous Ahmadiyah sect, FPI would sweep and expel Ahmadiyah's followers from the land of Indonesia" ("Surat Terbuka" 2008).

Fourth, "nonviolence" means any peaceful collective actions without physical force and threat, such as signing petitions and conducting dialogues with authorities.

Looking at the above four categories of FPI collective actions, two categories may be considered in between violence and nonviolence, namely, nonviolence with physical threat (33 cases) and nonviolence with verbal threat (18 cases). Both are neither violent nor peaceful in nature. However, those collective actions (total: 51 cases) are prone to violence, in terms of their potentiality to inflict damage. Therefore, it is important to note that beside the 64 FPI violent actions; there are still about 51 FPI collective actions, which are close to violence. In most cases, the collective actions that used force or coercion did not result in violence because of the massive presence of security forces and or the targets' compliance with the demand of FPI. In addition, many cases of violence were preceded by nonviolent actions that consisted of threat. Threat was often the implicit message for FPI's violence. Therefore, about 51 cases of FPI collective actions reported by the media are prone to be violent. The adjacency of those two types of nonviolent actions to violence can be seen as follows.

First, two different examples of collective actions with physical threat are can be seen in the case of Peta Magazine and the occupation of the provincial offices of Jakarta. On February 6, 2006, hundreds of FPI members of Bekasi tried to attack the office of Peta Magazine after its re-publication of the Muhammad cartoon, which FPI considered as blasphemous towards Islam. However, before they arrived in the office of Peta Magazine, hundreds of police officers blocked the way to the office, and none of FPI members could approach the office. Instead, FPI only held a demonstration condemning

the Peta magazine and other parties that published and re-published the Muhammad cartoon. In short, this action likely did not result in violence because of the massive protection of the police officers ("Ratusan Warga" 2006).

Another example of the use of force is FPI's occupation of the provincial offices of Jakarta. About 2,000 FPI members came to occupy the complex of provincial offices of Jakarta in the early morning of December 14, 1999. It was too early and only a few security personnel guarded the provincial office complex, so that FPI members could enter the area easily. They blocked and locked all gates leading to the office. A few hours later, about 1,000 provincial staff started to arrive in front of the office complex, but FPI did not let the employees enter their offices. FPI demanded a dialogue with the governor of Jakarta, Sutiyoso, and questioned the governor's concern in dealing with the proliferation of immoral places of entertainment in Jakarta. In short, after Sutiyoso complied with FPI demands and promised to enforce the law towards the places of entertainment, FPI then opened the gates and let the provincial employees enter their offices. Thus, FPI left without vandalizing facilities of the offices or committing violence ("Kantor Gubernur" 1999).

Second, two different examples of nonviolent actions with verbal threat can be seen in the case FPI demonstration in the office of Provincial People's Representative Assembly (DPRD) of Banten and the meeting of Anti-Ahmadiyah group in Banjar West Java. On January 3, 2002, about 200 members of FPI gathered in front of the office of DPRD. FPI demanded that the DPRD passed anti-immoral legislation. After having the dialogue with the members of DPRD Banten and receiving a promise from the DPRD to

follow up on FPI demands, the head of FPI's branch of Banten then said to the DPRD

members: "FPI will watch the works of the DPRD Banten; and by the end of this year if

the DPRD will not enact the acts of anti-immorality, do not blame us. We, FPI, will take

all necessary actions to stop immorality. We have done all legal procedures" ("FPI

Unjuk" 2002).

In another example, at the meeting of Anti Ahmadiyah Sect in Banjar, West Java,

on February 18, 2008, one top leader of FPI said in front of thousands of people: "if the

government does not abolish Ahmadiyah, we will call Muslims to fight against the

followers of Ahmadiyah, kill them wherever they live… Kill them… It is because you,

the Ahamadiyah, hurt our beliefs. Their blood is allowed to be shed."[8] In short, even

though this case did not result in violence, these cases were closely related to the later

prosecutions of the Amhadiyah's members, especially in Java.

During the period from August 1998 to the end of 2010, or from FPI's

establishment to the end of data collection in 2010, FPI's use of violent means (including

the use of force and threat) occurred at a stable rate. This means that FPI has continued

to adopt violent means over this time period. The police responses to FPI's violent

actions and pressure from elites seem to not significantly affect how FPI used violence.

For example, the arrest of more than 150 FPI leaders and members by the police from

1998 to 2010 did not significantly reduce the rate of violence.

Similarly, this can also be seen when FPI received probably the most severe

criticism and pressure in 2008. After FPI's attack against the interreligious community

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[8] The video of this meeting has been widely spread in internets, especially in youtube.com (see Wongnews 2008).

(AKKBB) in the National Monument in July 2008, at least 60 members of FPI were arrested, including its two most important leaders, Habib Rizieq Syihab and Munarman. Many elements of the society, such as ministers, members of the People's Representative Assembly, leaders of the two biggest Muslim groups (Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) and other religious activists demanded the abolition of FPI. Many branches of FPI were even forced to dissolve by the members of Nahdlatul Ulama. However, FPI continued to use violent means after 2008.

In short, as can be seen in Figure 7.1, FPI kept using violent means and other two disruptive means (nonviolence with physical threat and verbal threat) during the new democracy of Indonesia. FPI's use of violence, nonviolence with physical threat and nonviolent with verbal threat grew from the period of 1998 to 2002; it decreased in 2003 but it then grew again from the period of 2003 to 2010. The government's efforts to stop FPI's violence did not significantly affect FPI's use of violence. However, FPI's number of collective actions declined in 2003, and I do not have enough information to explain why all four types of FPI actions declined in that year.

Figure 7.1 FPI's Collective Actions from 1998 to 2010

Another way of looking at FPI's violent actions and its other nonviolent collective actions can also be seen from the point view of motivation. Based on this, the motivations and concerns of the above 233 cases of FPI collective actions can be simplified into nine categories. They are morality (45.5 percent), blasphemy (13.3 percent), anti-US and its allies (10.7 percent), brotherhood (9.4 percent), state policies (7.3 percent), anti-communism (5.2 percent), internal interest (4.3 percent), anti-Christianization (2.1 percent) and demands of *shari`ah* or Islamic law (2.1 percent).

In dealing with this categorization of these actions, there are several collective actions that might come together as multiple motivations in each action. However, for

the purpose of differentiating and patterning FPI's concerns, each case of collective action is assigned into one category of motivation based on the most visible concerns reported by the media. For example, FPI attacks on Danish Embassy and American Embassy in Jakarta can be considered as either "blasphemy" or "anti-US and its allies." Based on the media report, the main reasons for FPI's protests were because of the publication of Muhammad cartoon by the Danish newspaper and the depiction of Muhammad in the Supreme Court in Washington DC. Therefore, those violent actions are categorized under "blasphemy."

A collective action falls under the category of "anti-immorality" if it relates to religious moral issues, such as the protest or attack on the LGBT (Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender) community and places associated with gambling, prostitution and drugs. A collective action falls under "blasphemy" if it relates to the issues of blasphemy against Islam, such as the protest against the publication of the Muhammad cartoon by the Danish newspaper, Jylland-Posten, in front of the Danish Embassy of Jakarta, Indonesia. The action falls under the category of "anti-US and its allies" if it is associated with perceived anti-hegemony of the West in Islamic countries. The action falls under the category of "brotherhood" if it relates to the issues of victimization of Muslims in Indonesia or solidarity towards Indonesian Muslims, such as the rally for the conflict that occurred in Ambon, Moluccas that victimized thousands of Muslims. The action falls under the category of "state policy," if it is aimed at supporting or rejecting the policy of the government, such as FPI's rally to support the regulation of SKB Tiga Mentri (the Act of Three Ministers) regarding "the Act of Neighborhood's Consent for

the Establishment of Places of Worship" and FPI's protest against the plan of
government to take blood samples and finger prints of every student in *pesantren*
(Islamic boarding schools). The action falls under the category of "internal interest" if it
relates to the internal interests of the organization, such as demanding the police to free
FPI leaders and taking revenge against its rival groups. The action falls under the
category of "anti-Christianity" if it is against Christian or Catholic interests, such as
FPI's attack on the Catholic school of Sekolah Sang Timur in Jakarta. Finally, the action
falls under the category of "*shari`ah* demand" if it is aimed at demanding the application
of *shari`ah* (Islamic Law) at the state (national or local levels) and or the re-inclusion of
Piagam Jakarta (the Jakarta Charter) in the Indonesian constitution.

In addition, combining these nine categories of concerns and the four types of
FPI's collective action, those actions can be seen in Table 7.2. This table shows that
FPI's actions are mostly dominated by religious issues, particularly the problem of
immorality, and usually at met with violent action (see the percentage of the first line).
For example, about 40 percent of FPI's violence was related to the issue of anti-
immorality.

Table 7.2 Cross Tabulation of Frequency and Percentage of the Four Types of FPI's Collective Actions and the Nine Concerns

Concerns	Types								Total	
	Nonviolence		Nonviolence with Verbal Threat		Nonviolence with Physical Threat		Violence			
Anti-immorality	40	(33.9)	10	(55.6)	17	(51.5)	39	(60.8)	106	(45.5)
	(37.7)		(9.4)		(16)		(36.8)		(100)	
Blasphemy	16	(13.6)	1	(5.6)	2	(6.1)	12	(18.8)	31	(13.3)
	(51.6)		(3.2)		(6.5)		(38.7)		(100)	
Anti-US and Allies	16	(13.6)	5	(27.8)	4	(12.1)	0	(0)	25	(10.7)
	(64)		(20)		(16)		(0)		(100)	
Brotherhood	19	(16.1)	0	(0)	0	(0)	3	(4.7)	22	(9.4)
	(86.4)		(0)		(0)		(13.6)		(100)	
State Policy	12	(10.2)	2	(11.1)	3	(9.1)	0	(0)	17	(7.3)
	(70.6)		(11.8)		(17.6)		(0)		(100)	
Anti-communism	6	(5.1)	0	(0)	2	(6.1)	4	(6.3)	12	(5.2)
	(50)		(0)		(16.7)		(33.3)		(100)	
Internal Interest	4	(3.4)	0	(0)	1	(3)	5	(7.8)	10	(4.3)
	(40)		(0)		(10)		(50)		(100)	
Anti-Christianity	0	(0)	0	(0)	4	(12.1)	1	(1.6)	5	(2.1)
	(0)		(0)		(80)		(20)		(100)	
Shari`ah Demand	5	(4.2)	0	(0)	0	(0)	0	(0)	5	(2.1)
	(100)		(0)		(0)		(0)		(100)	
Total	118	(100)	18	(100)	33	(100)	64	(100)	233	(100)
	(50.6)		(7.7)		(14.2)		(27.5)		(100)	

Notes:

☐ : Frequency

▨ : Percentage of the Nine Concerns based on the Four Types of actions

▨ : Percentage of the Four Types based on the Nine Concerns

FPI's collective action can also be viewed from the direct target or whom FPI wanted to meet in order to pursue its goal. For the most part, I identified the direct target using the type of place where the collective actions occurred and whom FPI wanted to talk to or with. For example, if the collective action occurred in the police office area, then the case will be categorized as "law enforcement;" if the action occurred in a hotel but the target was an LGBT community conducting a program in the hotel, then the case will be categorized as "socio-religious-political groups." From this point of view, about 33.8 percent of FPI's collective actions occurred in state related institutions, namely the

offices of the DPR-MPR, or the legislative institution (15.5) percent; the offices of the government, or the executive institution (9 percent); offices of law enforcement such as police office and judicial institutions (19.3 percent). In addition, 18 percent of collective actions occurred in the places of entertainment, which FPI called as the place of *maksiyat* (immorality); 20.6 percent cases occurred in and against other socio-religious-political groups (such as the church community and the National Liberation and Union Party); and 6.9 percent cases occurred in the foreign embassies or consulates.

However, in relation to FPI's violent collective action, the targets of the actions are dominated by the place of entertainment and socio-religious-political groups. Almost all of the actions against the places of entertainment resulted in violence (33 out of 42 cases); and the other 9 cases resulted in nonviolence but with the use of force. Similarly, in the case of the violence against socio-religious-political groups, about 23 cases (47 percent) resulted in violence and 13 cases (27 percent) resulted in nonviolence with physical threat (see Table 7.3). This table shows that FPI's nonviolent action is more or less about contentious politics. However, looking at the violence, FPI actions are more associated with religious domain or contentious religion. This is because both the targets of places of entertainment and socio-religious-political groups are related to the issues of religion, or something that is considered against Islam.

Table 7.3 Cross Tabulation of the Four Types of FPI's Collective Actions based on Target Places

Target or Place of Actions	Types				
	Nonviolence	Nonviolence with Verbal Threat	Nonviolence with Physical Threat	Violence	Total
Public	17	4	1	3	25
DPR-MPR (Legislative)	29	4	3	0	36
Government	16	4	1	0	21
Law Enforcement	35	5	4	1	45
Places of Immorality	0	0	9	33	42
Socio_Rel_Pol Groups	11	1	13	23	48
Foreign Embassy	10	0	2	4	16
Total	118	18	33	64	233

In addition to the targets, it is also important to look at the geographical areas where the collective actions occurred, especially in relation to violent action. More than half of FPI's collective action occurred in the capital city of Jakarta, while the rest of the action occurred across the areas of FPI branches. Similarly, in the cases of violent action, many of them (34 cases) occurred in the capital city of Jakarta, 11 cases occurred in the cities surrounding the capital Jakarta (Bandung, Bekasi, Bogor, Depok and Tangerang), and the remainder (19 cases) occurred in other cities or branches of FPI, such as Ciamis, Cirebon, Pekalongan, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Surabaya, Jember, Pamekasan, Lampung, Samarinda and Singkawang.

In summary, the data from various different newspapers used in this study show that the level of FPI's engagement in violent activities seems to be very intensive. FPI continuously launched violent actions every year despite the social and political pressures to terminate FPI, such as the arrest of many FPI leaders and members and the massive demand of many elite figures and religious organizations to abolish FPI. FPI's violence is dominated by religious issues, namely anti-immorality and blasphemy, which

is about 80 percent of its violent actions. Similarly, based on the target or place where the action took place, most of FPI's violent actions (including nonviolence with physical threat) also relate to the religious domain, such as immoral places of entertainment and other socio religious groups, while pure nonviolence actions are related to the state institutions (politics). In addition to this, even though about half of the cases of collective violence occurred in Jakarta, FPI violence was not dominated by the central committee of FPI. Violence is systematically adopted by other FPI branches across Indonesia, especially the violence that relates to religious issues, such as blasphemy and morality.

The facts about these FPI violent activities, then, raise some questions: why does FPI choose to intensively engage in violence, or why does FPI continuously adopt this violent strategy with those above mentioned patterns? How do the social factors facilitate the use of violent actions?

The following discussion then tries to answer the above questions by seeking similarities and differences of each pattern of violence, or by investigating the communalities and uniqueness of social factors of each case that led to FPI adoption of violence. In doing so, first, all of the violent cases are clustered into five categories based on the nine concerns or motivations of the actions. This categorization into five groups, instead of nine, is because some of the actions under concerns contain no violent actions, such as the categories of "State Policy" and "Shari`ah Demand." Also, the "Anti-Christianity" category consists of only one incident, so this category is grouped with other similar group, which possesses the same pattern. Then, the patterns of violent

scenarios are investigated in each category, including the scenarios or situations preceding, during and following the violent actions.

The Scenario of Violence Based on Brotherhood

Among 64 cases of FPI's violent collective action, there are only three cases that are categorized under "brotherhood" or Islamic brotherhood. Even though the number of the case is only a few, these three violent cases are important enough to get special attention. This is because one of those cases is the first FPI violent collective action and that is the only FPI violent action that caused people to die. Before discussing those cases, it is important to mention the concept of brotherhood in Islam in order to get further explanation of how this value has fueled FPI's violence in combination with other social factors.

Islamic brotherhood, or a social bond on the basis of Islam as a religion, is one of the common doctrines in the Muslim society. Most of Muslim organizations in Indonesia, such as FPI, mention the values of brotherhood as part of their organizational doctrines. The concept of Islamic brotherhood can be seen in the following examples of phrases from the Quran (the sayings of God): "The believers are a band of brother" (The Koran 49:10) and the Hadith (the sayings of Prophet Muhammad): " A believer to another is like a building whose different parts enforce each other. The Prohet then clapsed his hands, with the fingers interlaced, while saying that (Bukhari 1981:374).

FPI concept of brotherhood is often manifested as the sense of solidarity with the Muslim victims in Indonesia, Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, the

manifestation of the concept of brotherhood may also have resulted in the sentiments of being anti-US and its allies. However, as discussed above, the concept of brotherhood in this study will be confined to FPI's collective activities that relate to the solidarity of victimization of Muslim in Indonesia.

Islamic brotherhood is among the most important doctrines in the history of FPI. FPI was established as a reaction to the victimization of Muslims in Indonesia by governments and other parties that FPI claimed disrespected Islam. Interestingly, brotherhood was also the concept that forced FPI to be involved in violent activities.

From these three cases of violence under the category of "brotherhood" there are two different patterns. The first is in the case of the Ketapang incident (1998) and the Mbah Priok's shrine incident (2004), and the second is the attack of Komnas HAM (the Indonesian National Commission of Human Rights).

In the first pattern, both the Muslim group, whom FPI considered as victims, and its rival parties were initially in a situation where the violent conflict was occurring or most likely to occur. Then, FPI took part in this conflict on the grounds of defending their Muslim brothers. The violence seems not to have been premeditated by FPI, but rather it was more random acts of violence, or spontaneous reactions of FPI at the scene.

For example, in the case of the Ketapang incident –a conflict between the Muslim residents of Ketapang and Ambones gangsters (the bodyguards of entertainment clubs around Ketapang)–, FPI took part in this conflict, and even became a central party in the conflict. Similarly, in the incident of Mbah Priok's shrine, the people from the PT PELINDO (Indonesian Port Company) and JICT (Jakarta International Container

Terminal) were involved in conflict with the Muslim residents around Tanjung Priok

concerning the ownership of the area of Mbah Priok's shrine. PT PELINDO and JICT

tried to take over the land around the shrine, and the Muslim residents and the

descendents of Mbah Priok tried to defend this area. Then, FPI took part in this conflict

by joining the Muslim residents of Tanjung Priok.

In the second pattern, however, the violence was more premeditated. FPI and the

target group had been interacting for relatively long period of time. For example, in the

case of FPI's attack on Komnas HAM (the national commission of human rights), FPI

had already used moderate means to protest Komnas HAM, which they considered as

discriminating against Muslims. The violence occurred after FPI felt that their criticism

was not acknowledged by Komnas HAM. In order to get a clear understanding of these

patterns, the following are the stories of these two FPI violent actions that were

motivated by the sense of Indonesian Islamic brotherhood.

Brotherhood: The Incident of Ketapang

On November 21 and 22, 1998, the Muslim community of Ketapang

commemorated the religious day of Islam, *Isra Mi`raj*, which was led by Habib Rizieq

Syihab, the founder and leader of FPI at the mosque of Ketapang village. At the same

time, on the evening of November 22, some residents of Ketapang were involved in

conflict with the Ambones bodyguards of the Kino entertainment and gambling club.

One version of the stories indicates the action was provoked by a fight for parking

spaces in Ketapang (KPI 1998); and another version, which is more popular, suggests it

was because several Muslim residents of Ketapang requested that the gambling club to close. However, the bodyguards of the Kino club rejected their request and punched one of them. Some residents of Ketapang, especially the family of the person who was punched planned to get revenge. This situation then created tension between the residents of Ketapang and the bodyguards of Kino. Hearing that this conflict potentially could escalate, the local officials (*Muspida*) and some community leaders tried to reconcile the Ketapang residents and the bodyguards of the club. In short, both parties agreed to end the conflict (Forum Warga Ketapang 1998; "Aparat Diminta" 1998).

However, several hours later approximately four hundred bodyguards, mostly from Ambones and Batak ethnic backgrounds who were also known Christians, unexpectedly attacked the village of Ketapang. They threw some stones and wooden sticks at the residents' houses and a small mosque (*musola*). They created fear and anxiety for the residents of Ketapang. Two people were reported to have been critically injured. According to the reports of Ketapang Forum, some of those Ambonese bodyguards said: "Where are the people of Betawi (the indigenous people of Jakarta) and Muslims? We will destroy them." A bodyguard, who was captured by the residents of Ketapang, told that the four hundred bodyguards were ordered by the owner of the gambling club to attack the residents of Ketapang (Forum Warga Ketapang 1998).

The news of the attacks, along with the rumors, spread quickly in the Muslim communities around the capital city of Jakarta. Some of the triggering rumors were that the "Christian Ambones" gang burned one mosque in Ketapang and killed one *ulama* (Muslim leader) using a sword. Within hours, thousands of people, from around the

Jakarta city (Tambora and Tanjung Priok) including FPI members, brought simple weapons and gathered in Ketapang. They gathered with the Muslim residents of Ketapang and FPI members, who were celebrating the commemoration of the *Isra Mi`raj*. According to Syihab (2008), FPI leader, there were at least 300 members of FPI that were ready to fight back against the Ambones bodyguards.

Thousands of people then came to the Kino gambling club and other clubs. At the beginning, they only attacked and burned two of them. The fire from those two buildings spread burning a church that was located near the burning gambling clubs. Hundreds of the bodyguards and the workers of the clubs were trapped in those buildings. Six or seven people died because of breathing carbon dioxide and/or being burned by the fire. Ambones bodyguards who could escape the fire were trapped in the middle of the crowd and became the target of an angry mob. Syihab, a FPI leader, argued that his members, along with the people of Ketapang, and the Ambones bodyguards attacked each other. The military commander of Jakarta was injured by the sword of an Ambones bodyguard. However, FPI members were able to repel the bodyguards and kill 15 of them.

Syihab along with 19 *ulama* (Muslim leaders) came into the middle of the crowd. They tried to control the crowd and negotiated with the military and police commanders in the field. They requested that all the remaining bodyguards be saved and arrested by the police and/or the army. However, they felt that their request was ignored. Therefore, some of those leaders left the scene conflict.

Consequently, the angry crowd got out of control. They burned the Kristus and Pantekosta churches. After that, the crowd was divided into two groups in order to find the remaining Ambones gang members left in the area. They also attacked churches, a Catholic school, any places of entertainment and business offices they encountered.

The extended attack on churches and Catholic schools may be because the idea of the conflict had spread from merely Muslim residents of Ketapang versus Ambones bodyguards of the Kino club into Muslims versus Christians. The logic from the Muslim side was that the bodyguards were Ambones, and the Ambones were Christians. Therefore, something related to Christianity also became the target of FPI and the Muslim crowd.

The presence of the police and army could not stop the angry crowd. They localized the chaos by blocking off the location of conflict, so that it would not spread. The conflict started to decrease after the Air Force sent its special squads to the location of conflict. However, the crowd had devastated most of the business places and churches in Ketapang. The Department of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia reported that the incident in Ketapang caused the death of 16 persons; all of them are the bodyguards. In addition, 81 people from both Muslim and Ambones parties were critically injured, 427 people from both sides were injured, one mosque was destroyed, 16 churches were burned or damaged, three Christian/Catholic schools were burned, 15 bank offices were damaged, seven houses were damaged, 32 cars and trucks were burned, three motorcycles were damaged, one gas station was destroyed, six government buildings were damaged and one local army office building was damaged.

After the incident the police captured 187 people from both sides. However, only 28 of them were processed by the court, while the others were released due to the lack of evidence (Forum Warga Ketapang 1998; "Aparat Diminta" 1998; SiaR 1998).

This story implies that the Ketapang incident was not the intended product of FPI. The conflict between the residents of Ketapang and the Kino entertainment forced FPI to get involved in the intense conflict. This was because from FPI's point of view, the conflict appeared in a fight between Muslims of Ketapang and the bodyguards of immoral places. At the onset, the Muslims of Ketapang were considered the victims of the Ambones bodyguards. Therefore, the value of Islamic brotherhood had led FPI's leaders to sent about three hundred members to help their Muslim brothers of Ketapang to deal with the Christian bodyguards. Finally, this conflict turned into bloody incident that killed 16 people and caused massive damages around the Ketapang area.

In addition, the quick reaction of FPI was because during the initial days of the incident, FPI and the Muslim residents of Ketapang were gathering to celebrate the day of Isra' Mi`raj. This means that they were having intensive contact and emotional bonding during the days of the conflict. Therefore, when the rumors of victimization of Muslims in Ketapang, or the burned mosque by Ambones bodyguards spread, FPI members became the target of the rumors. In turn, they could be mobilized quickly; they also could spread the rumors to the Muslim communities around Ketapang, Jakarta. Therefore, soon after the conflict began, thousands of Muslim sympathizers, including other FPI members, came to Ketapang.

The presence of another thousand Muslims from around the capital city of Jakarta might also be perceived by FPI as considerable support from the Muslim community in Jakarta toward FPI's involvement in the conflict. In addition, the response of military and police institution, which did not fully enforce the law during the incident of Ketapang or preferred more conciliatory social approach to deal with the problem, gave significant incentives to FPI about their tendencies towards violence in the future. In short, these all might lead to FPI's perception that its involvement in the bloody Ketapang incident was justified by either government or society. Therefore, FPI leaders, such as Syihab, proudly argued that their members along with the Residents of Ketapang killed several Ambones bodyguards (Syihab 2008).

Brotherhood: The Attack on Komnas HAM (the National Commission of Human Rights)

A different pattern of FPI's violent action can be seen in its attack on the office of the National Committee of Human Rights, or Komnas HAM. On January 10, 2000, about 200 members of FPI conducted a nonviolent protest in front of the office of Komnas HAM. They yelled at Komnas HAM and carried some posters condemning this top national commission of human rights in Indonesia.

FPI demanded that Komnas HAM be abolished. Some FPI representatives, including Hafidz Lukman and Alawi, met the vice chief of Komnas HAM, Djoko Soegianto, and his staff member, Soegiri. FPI addressed several questions: 1) why did Komnas HAM ignore human rights violations of Muslims, such as in the cases of the Muslim-Christian conflicts in Ambon, the massacre of Tanjung Priok and the military

operation in Aceh? 2) Why did Komnas HAM only focuse on the human rights abuse in the case of East Timor, and why did they only suspect the Muslim top military generals? In short, FPI argued that Komnas HAM discriminated against Muslims. FPI also demanded that five members of Komnas HAM to be removed, namely: Munir, Asmara Nababan, T Mulya Lubis, Alber Hasibuan and BN Marbun on the grounds that they were the sources of the problem ("FPI Minta" 2000).

At that time, FPI was not the only group that criticized Komnas HAM. The Islamic political party, PBB (the Party of Moon and Star) also endorsed the demands of FPI. In their press release and dialogue with FPI, four elite politicians of PBB, Ahmad Sumargono, Hamdan Zoelva, Amanullah and Mawardi Abdullah, argued that Komnas HAM discriminated against the interests of Muslim *ummah* and was not responsive towards human rights violations that victimized Muslims. Ahmad Sumargono argued that the reorganization of Komnas HAM, as demanded by FPI, was urgently needed ("FPI Minta" 2000; "Menanti Sang" 2000; "Front Pembela" 2000).

Similarly, the Forum of Muslim Brotherhood of MUI (Indonesian Muslim Scholars' Council or *Majlis Ulama Indoneisa*) also supported FPI cause. In their official statements on January 12, 2000, they also demanded the abolition of Komnas HAM and NGOs that were proved to be using double standards in dealing with law enforcement. In short, in protesting Komnas HAM, FPI received considerable support from several important political and social groups, such as from the Islamic political party of PBB and MUI, the official Muslim organization funded by the government ("Front Pembela"

2000). Until early 2000, FPI still used moderate strategies in dealing with their hatred against Komnas HAM.

However, on June 23, 2000, FPI members' anger turned into violence after Komnas HAM reported the massacre of Muslims in Tanjung Priok by the army on September 12, 1984. On June 2000, Komnas HAM reported its investigation that the number of casualties was 23 people and put the blame on the people of Tanjung Priok for this incident. Most of the non-government reports estimated that the total death casualties in this tragedy were in the hundreds. For example, the report of *Lembaran Putih* (the White Book's report), a source that is believed by some of FPI leaders, mentions that the deaths were about 400 to 500 hundred people (PSPI Partai Bulan Bintang 1998; Syihab 2008).[9]

Yet, on June 23, 2000, about 300 people with white and green shirts, typical of FPI uniforms, conspicuously attacked Komnas HAM's office in Jakarta. In broad daylight they threw some stones into the office and damaged some office facilities. Consequently, some windows, doors and the booth of the security office were damaged. The police could not stop the large number of angry people of FPI members from causing destruction in the office of Komnas HAM.

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[9] Komnas HAM's report was almost the same as that of military government in 1984. At that time, the General Army LB. Moerdani reported that the death victims were less than 20 people. Up to day, there is no clear estimation about the casualties of the Tanjung Priok massacre. People believe that the New Order government or the army lied about the tragedy and also still hide the information about where they buried the Muslim casualties of Tanjung Priok. The tragedy of Tanjung Priok also has stimulated a religious sentiment because the incumbent general army, LB Moerdani was Christian. Some Muslims believe that Mordani was a bloody Christian who was intolerant against Muslims' interest. So, sometimes the discourse of Tanjung Priok appears as a conflict between Muslim groups sympathizing for the Muslim victims and the Christian, LB. Moerdani.

While attacking the facilities of Komnas HAM's office, some people wrote graffiti in the office buildings condemning Komnas HAM. Others made orations in the front of the office and distributed flyers. In these flyers, FPI members mentioned the reasons why Komnas HAM should be abolished. These included 1) Komnas HAM discriminated against the interests of Muslim society, 2) betrayed the truth about the incident of Tanjung Priok, 3) ignored the prosecution of Muslims in Moluccas and Posso, and 4) finally had been contaminated by the idea of the Christian general, LB Moerdani. Similarly, in their orations, FPI leaders criticized the works of Komnas HAM and demanded its abolishment. For example, Alwi Utsman said: "How could Komnas mention only 23 people died without digging the tomb" ("FPI Mengamuk" 2000).

This disruptive action finally stopped after two members of Komnas HAM, Benyamin Mangkoedilaga and Soegiri met with FPI protestors. Benjamin than stood up on the car and talked to this group stating that he personally agreed with FPI's demand that Komnas HAM should be abolished; and he promised to pass these demands to the executive head of Komnas HAM. After that, FPI members left Komnas HAM. However, on the way home they passed some cafes and nightclubs. They broke many advertisements for beer and threw stones into the cafes. The places that FPI attacked were New Cafe, Kafe Salsa, Warung Kemang and Cafe Jimbani; all of them are located in the capital city of Jakarta. However, none of these cafes' personnel fought back with the angry FPI demonstrators and therefore none of these attacks caused casualties.

Soon after the attacks, much criticism began to flow from the state apparatus, politicians, and religious leaders regarding the collective violent action by FPI.

However, this does not mean that FPI stood alone in justifying its violence against

Komnas HAM, as can be seen in the *Kompas*'s interviews with some activists of

religious student associations, such as the HMI (Association of Islamic College Student),

the PII (Association of Islamic High School Student), the PMKRI (Association of the

Catholic College Student of the Republic of Indonesia) and PMII (Association of the

Indonesian Islamic College Students). The student activists from these groups generally

disagreed with the violent mean used by FPI. However, they supported FPI's demands

by showing that they understood the reasons why FPI attacked Komnas HAM.

Therefore, instead of criticizing FPI, they tended to criticize the work of Komnas HAM

which they considered unjust and unprofessional.   For example, the general secretary of

HMI argued that the report by Komnas HAM did not reflect justice at all and it hurt the

victim families. Djayadi Hanan (PII) argued that the violence was a spontaneous because

of Komnas HAM's failures. Facruddin (HMI) argued that FPI could not be totally

blamed because the substance of the problem was that the public did not receive justice

from the top national human rights institutions in Indonesia. He also argued that as long

as the law had not been changed, there was still need to resort to mass mobilization to

remind the government that it needed to change the law ("Budaya Kekerasan" 2000).

Another interesting response came from Munir, the head of KONTRAS (the

Commission for the Missing Person and the Victim of Violence). Munir was one of the

well-known human right activists in Indonesia. He suggested that Komnas HAM recant

their report about Tanjung Priok. He found that there were too many fundamental

mistakes in the report. For example, Komnas HAM did not refer to the convention of

human rights violations engaged in by the state. This indicated that the investigators of

Komnas HAM did not understand the concept of human rights. These mistakes finally

led to the fatal conclusion that the violation of human rights in Tanjung Priok was

perpetrated by the civilians. Even though, Munir's arguments did not directly support

FPI, FPI received leverage through Munir's harsh criticism of the top national human

rights commission of Indonesia ("Komnas HAM" 2000).

In short, this scenario regarding the attacks against Komnas HAM tells of two

important factors that may help to explain FPI's adoption of violent means. First, the

violent action during the protest resulted from the failure of communication between FPI

and Komnas HAM. Second, FPI had received considerable support in fighting against

Komnas HAM. This may be because FPI was in a position of sharing the same opinions

of many members of society, especially in the case of the Tanjung Priok incident. This

second factor might also continue to give FPI the leverage and confidence to adopt

violent means.

The Scenario of Violence Based on Anti-Immorality

FPI is committed to issues of anti-immorality. Its organizational documents

mention repeatedly the importance of enforcing Islamic moral values (Syihab 2008).

Since its early years, FPI has campaigned for *Gerakan Nasional Anti Maksiyat* (the

national movement of anti-immorality). FPI's commitment to moral issues can also be

seen in Table 7.2. It shows that within the four types of FPI's collective actions

(nonviolence, nonviolence with verbal threat, nonviolence with physical threat and

violence) anti-immorality related actions dominate FPI's collective actions. In the case

of violent actions, about 61 percent (39 out of 64) are categorized as "anti-immorality."

In general, there are two slightly different patterns of these actions under the

category of anti-immorality. In the first pattern the targets were identified by FPI before

action was taken. In most cases, FPI members investigated their targets before they

attacked them in order to make sure that those places obviously violated the law or

religious values (Syihab 2008). These targets include, for example, the attack on houses

of prostitution in Salembaranjati (2000) and Cipendawa Bekasi (2009), Sahabat

discotheque (2001), MMI or Magnum Metropolitan Indonesia (2004), the office of

Playboy magazine (2006), Mrs. Man Contest by LGBT community in Depok (2010),

and the statues of Three Female Dancers (*Tiga Mojang*) in Bekasi (2010). The primary

goal of the actions was to enforce the values of morality on these targets.

In the second pattern, the targets were usually less specific. FPI members

seemingly did not investigate their victims before they took the action. These targets

were more or less random victims. However, this does not mean that the violence was

random, because during these actions FPI members always brought simple weapons,

such as wooden sticks. So, there might have been some expectation of FPI members that

they would use violent means.

FPI's attacks were usually a consequence of its collective activities that entailed

potential violence. This had potential for violence because FPI participants always

engaged in confrontation with security guards of the entertainment facilities. FPI called

these actions as the "*safari of anti-maksiyat* or campaign of anti-immorality" targeting

hotels, nightclubs, bars and places of prostitution in the city or town.

The victims of actions were usually not a single group or place. During one

night, FPI might attack two or three places of entertainment. In addition, FPI randomly

selected the places that could be considered as immoral, contaminating the holy day or

month of Islam and/or violating the laws. For example, these included the campaigns of

anti-immorality in the capital city of Jakarta (2000), Lampung (2001), Pamekasan

Madura (2001), Bandung (2002), Cirebon (2007), Samarinda (2007) and Surakarta

(2009).

Despite the above differences, there are some general patterns of the scenario of

the violent actions under "anti-immorality." First, FPI was more active and aggressive

than the target groups. For example, FPI came to a night club, forced the workers or their

employer to close the club and then damaged the club's facilities.

Second, FPI engaged in damaging facilities, buildings and other material things.

FPI did not attack persons but often created fear among the guests of the target group or

place. For example, when FPI attacked entertainment clubs, they usually brought simple

weapons, such as wooden sticks, and forced the guests to leave the club while damaging

club facilities.

Third, in most cases, FPI often sent letters of reminder or threat to the officials

and/or the target groups. Fourth, interestingly, the timing of the actions were usually

during the Islamic holy days, such as Ramadan, *Isra Mi`ra* (Muhammad's travel and

meeting with God), *Maulid Nabi* (Muhammad's birthday) and Islamic New Year. This is

very similar to other cases of religious violence which typically take place during the special or sacred days of the group.

Juergensmeyer (2003) argues that many incidents of religious violence have occurred in a special holy time. According to him, religious violence is a "performance or theater." Therefore, timing (in addition to location) is an important element in the ritual of religious violence. The date or season or hour of day the religious violence took place has a symbolic meaning and importance. For example, the case of a Jewish attack on Muslims in Hebron by Goldstein during the day of Ramadan and the Jewish celebration of vengeance against Amalek did signify a symbolic meaning.

Based on the Juergensmeyer's study, the case of violence under "anti-immorality," might be interpreted in the same way. FPI may intend to deliver a symbolic meaning and a message on these sacred days. For example, FPI wanted for Muslims to return to their Islamic traditions and sent the message to the owner of entertainment clubs and brothels not to debase Ramadan or any other sacred days of Islam.

However, this interpretation may not be true in the case of FPI violence. Looking at the stories or scenarios of FPI's violent actions, the timing of the violence may imply more about the strategy of mobilization rather its symbolic meanings and messages. The logic of this can be explained as follows.

In Indonesia, the sacred days of Islam are often acknowledged by the state. Most of the sacred days in Islam are also the official state holidays, such the day of *Isra' Mi`raj* and *Muharram* (Islamic New Year). Many institutions in Indonesia often give additional holidays during the early days of Ramadan and allow the employees to leave

work early during the days of Ramadan. Therefore, generally Muslims have more free time during the Islamic holy days, which are also the state holidays. Many Islamic organizations often also take advantages of these special holidays as time for coordination, such as by conducting meeting or outreach events while celebrating the Islamic traditions.

In addition, more Muslims usually go to, stay in, and even pass time in the mosque during sacred days of Islam, especially during the month of Ramadan; and at the same time, mosques often become a central location for the activities of Muslim organizations. In short, religious holy days are the time for Muslims to gather, meet each other and celebrate those days, and these are useful times to engage in organizing.

Considering the facts regarding the Islamic sacred days in Indonesia, the timing of violence may consist more of availability of social resources for the movement to mobilize. Religious sacred days made it possible for FPI to gather hundreds to thousands members, and then launched its campaign of anti-immorality. These huge numbers of participants also made FPI actions, which were prone to violence, change into a real violence.

To get a better understanding of this type of violence and how FPI adopted violent means in dealing with issues of anti-immorality, the following are some examples of the above scenarios.

Anti-Immorality: The Attacks on Specific Targets

On August 21, 2002, about three hundred FPI members, along with the people of PT Jakarta Pertindo (JP) Corporation, came to the nightclub complex of Lucky Star around 6: 00 pm. Lucky Star was allegedly used not only for serving alcoholic beverages, but also for gambling and prostitutions. They forced the guests of Lucky Star to leave the club. After that, several heavy machines, such as backhoes, destroyed the main building of Lucky Star, while hundreds of FPI's people were trying to destroy other buildings and club facilities, such as lamps, sound systems, windows, alcoholic beverages and glasses. Consequently, in only a couple of hours, buildings at the front of the complex were completely torn down and others were greatly damaged.

The JP (Jakarta Pertindo) is a corporation that belongs to the provincial government of Jakarta. The JP took part in this action because they wanted to take over the property of the provincial government that was being used by Lucky Star. Before this action, a staff member of the JP argued the JP requested that the manager of Lucky Star remove its businesses from the JP properties. However, Lucky Star did not respond to it. Therefore, the JP, in cooperation with FPI, used necessary violent means to take back the properties of the state.

One of FPI activists said that the JP staff came to FPI's office asking help from FPI to retake the land occupied by Lucky Star management. Afterwards, JP provided transportation for FPI to come to Lucky Star club. However, FPI leaders, such as Alawi, rejected the information that this action was funded by the JP. Instead, the attack was a pure action to fight against immorality. Alawi also said that Lucky Star was built on the

state property; and therefore, it should be used for the betterment of the people of Jakarta, not to intoxicate them with immoral activities, such as prostitution and drinking alcohol. Similarly, the manager of public relations of the JP Corporation claimed that JP did not utilize FPI to attack Lucky Star ("PT Jakpro" 2002; "Masa Hancurkan" 2002).

Similar action against a specific target group can also be seen in FPI's attack on illegal prostitution in Cipendawa Rawalumbu Bekasi. On May 2, 2009, hundreds of FPI members, dominated by women, forced the closing of an illegal prostitution facility in the middle of the residential areas of Cipendawa Rawalumbu. They attacked the houses and small restaurants that they suspected to being used for prostitution and gambling. They damaged alcohol containers and pornographic VCDs. Again, FPI did not attack persons.

Idris Abdul Rahman, a local FPI leader, argued that this action had to be taken because the government failed to respond FPI request for government action. FPI tried to start a dialogue with the local government to deal with the problem of prostitution in residential areas. However, Rahman argued that the dialogue did not solve the problem because the government was too weak. Therefore, FPI, along with the Muslim communities around Rawalumbu, initiated action to close this illegal prostitution ("Ratusan Warga" 2009).

Anti-Immorality: The Safari of Anti-Maksiyat

On June 14, 2000 (*Maulid* or the Birthday of Muhammad) about a thousand FPI members rallied across the capital city of Jakarta. They called this the Safari of *Anti Maksiyat* (the campaign of anti-immorality). Wearing white clothes with the green letter "*FPI: Front Pembela Islam,*" they rode trucks, busses and motorcycles to police some places that they accused to be the places of immorality. The Safari started at 11:00 pm and ended at 4:00 am the next day. They mostly traveled around areas of the capital city of Jakarta, such as Blora, Lokasari, Mangga Besar, Kota, Monas and Tanah Abang. Some police guarded the rally and followed FPI group from behind.

On that day, most of the night clubs, karaoke clubs, bars and other places of entertainment were closed because they had heard about FPI plan's to sweep these entertainment places. Many clubs were still guarded by private security groups and young people from the surrounding clubs. Most of them had already prepared with wooden sticks, swords, stones and many simple weapons to welcome FPI ("Seribu Anggota" 2000; "Jakarta Terbebas" 2000; "FPI Lampung" 2000).

FPI members stopped in many places or clubs of entertainment around Jakarta. They often used force to enter the clubs. They took all the alcoholic beverages they found, yelled and asked people to stop and refrain from immoral deeds, such as drinking alcoholic beverages, gambling and dealing with prostitutes. However, not all of the private security guards of the clubs complied with the demands of FPI; some of them insisted on preventing FPI members from entering their clubs. Therefore, the encounter

between FPI and private body guards often inflamed the tensions between them. However, on this particular day the tensions did not result in physical conflicts.

A similar story occurred for FPI's branch in Samarinda. On September 29, 2007 (the month of Ramadan) between hundreds and thousands of FPI members of Samarinda rallied across the city. They targeted city parks, hotels, motels, bars and other places of entertainment. In the street they spoke using loud speakers, requesting people to honor the Ramadan and keep the holiness of the month. The rally, which was guarded by police, was initially peaceful. However, when FPI members found a group of people having an alcoholic drinking party, FPI members got out of control. Many people then got off the cars and motorcycles; and then they attacked the people having party, such as, by destroying the tent used for the party and punching some of those party attendees who appeared drunk. The head of the police district of Samarinda was also accidently hit by a FPI member when he tried to rescue a victim. FPI members left after they flattened the tires of motorcycles and cars of the party attendees. They continued the campaign of anti-immorality across the city of Samarinda. An FPI leader from Samarinda argued that this FPI collective action was intended as a reminder for the people of Samarinda to appreciate the holy month of Ramadan. He also argued: "FPI did not intend to do violence but because we, FPI, saw the immorality and we had to stop them" ("Konvoi Ratusan" 2007).

A similar story occurred in the town of Cirebon, West Java. On September 8, 2007, hundreds of FPI members rallied across the city of Cirebon, demanding all places of entertainment and prostitution to be closed. They mostly stopped at every hotel and

place of entertainment they encountered, such as in the Apita Hotel, Kharisma Hotel,

Atlanta Pub, and Ayano Karoke. Some of them spoke outside the buildings using a

sound system in a car to force the owners of the places of entertainment to close their

places during Ramadan, otherwise they would use any means to close them. No violence

occurred until they passed the central bus station of Cirebon, where they found two

prostitutes with their customers. They then came into the place, and broke broke

windows and alcoholic containers. Then, they continued the rally across the town of

Cirebon ("Massa FPI" 2007).

In short, in comparison to the scenario of the effort against anti-immorality, the

scenario of violence against the specific immoral places is only slightly different. The

only difference between them is that the former involved more random targets and the

latter involved more specific targets. Neither involved random acts of violence; they still

can be categorized as premeditated violence. In addition, the types of the targets are the

same, namely the places FPI considers as immoral, such as night clubs, bars,

discotheques, gambling clubs, brothels and other places of immoral entertainment.

The Scenario of Violence Based on Blasphemy

After anti-immorality, blasphemy is another important reason used by FPI to

justify its violent collective actions. Similar to concept of blasphemy in other religions

or religious groups, for FPI activists, blasphemy is understood as any actions insulting

the fundamental beliefs of Islam, including any actions of a person who claims to be a

Muslim but disagree with the fundamental tenets of Islam, such as rejecting the belief of

Muhammad as the last prophet and believing that the five-time-prayer can be performed in languages other than Arabic.

On the basis of this concept, FPI defines its concept of tolerance and pluralism. Tolerance means mutual respect among different thoughts or religions, but without sacrificing the fundamental beliefs of Islam. Therefore, FPI is against the Ahamdiyah sect because Ahmadiyah followers consider themselves as Muslim but believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet. In fact, one of the basic tenets in Islam is a belief that there is no prophet after Muhammad. Therefore, tolerating the existence of Ahmadiyah sect in Indonesia can also be meant sacrificing one of the most fundamental beliefs of Islam (Syihab 2008). This concept of blasphemy suggests that FPI wants to indicate that its actions against blasphemy do not necessarily mean that FPI does not uphold the values of tolerance or mutual respect.

Among the 31 cases of FPI's collective actions under "blasphemy," 12 cases (38.7 percent) are violent (see Table 7.2), while in comparison to the total number of violent actions (64 cases), 12 cases of them (18.8 percent) are under the category of blasphemy. Among these 12 cases: three cases are associated with Ahmadiyah; three cases relate to the publication of the Muhammad cartoon by the Danish newspaper, Jylland-Posten; two cases relate to the depiction of Muhammad at the Supreme Court of the United States in Washington DC; and the other 5 cases relate to the Islamic religious cults, such as the Wahidiyah in Tasikmalaya (2007), Nurul Yakin in Tangerang (2007), Sapta Darma in Yogyakarta (2008) and ar-Raudhah in Jakarta (2009).

For the most part, the pattern of these violent cases is the same as the pattern of violent actions under the category of brotherhood and anti-immorality, in which the targets were identified and the violence was semi-premeditated. There were some expectations from FPI participants that they would probably use violent means. This was because during these actions, FPI members usually brought simple weapons, at least the wooden sticks. However, there was a case that appeared to be random violence, namely the conflict between FPI and AKKBB (*Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan* or the Nationalist Alien for Freedom of Belief and Religon). In order to get a better understanding of these patterns of FPI's violent actions under the category of "blasphemy," the following are some examples from the stories.

Blasphemy: Muhammad Cartoon and Sculpture

On September 30, 2005, the Danish Newspaper Jyllands-Posten published a controversial cartoon of Muhammad. Periodically this publication had aroused anger among Muslim groups around the world and especially in predominantly Muslim countries, as Muslims believe that drawing a picture of Muhammad is forbidden. Moreover, those cartoons tended to insult Muhammad, one of the most sacred profiles in Islamic beliefs. This cartoon, therefore, was considered as blasphemous. Several months later, the news about the Muhammad cartoon widely spread across Indonesia. Many Muslim organizations protested against this publication. Most of them used various kinds of nonviolence means, such as holding nonviolent rallies or protests and making

petitions against the Jyllands-Posten and the Danish government, and only few of them used light violent actions and force, such as in the following actions of FPI.

On February 3, 2006, hundreds of FPI members, along with other organizations, rallied in front of the Danish embassy in Jakarta. They protested against the publication of Muhammad cartoon in the Jyllands-Posten and its re-publication in other newspapers in France, Norway and especially in the newspapers of Rakyat Merdeka Indonesia. FPI condemned the publication and republication of the Muhammad cartoon. They also requested that the Danish Government be responsible for the blasphemy and ask the Jyllands-Posten to make an apology to Muslims. One of FPI speakers argued that this blasphemy could no longer be tolerated; this was not the first time, the West tried to insult Islam. FPI members, along with others in the crowds, approached the balcony of the Danish embassy. However, the security forces were able to move them away from the embassy. In response, many FPI members threw stones and rotten eggs at the embassy ("FPI Menyusul" 2006).

Three days after that, or on February 6, 2006, hundreds of FPI's members of East Java protested against the publication of the Muhammad cartoon in front of the Danish Consulate of Surabaya, the capital city of East Java Province. About ten FPI representatives were allowed to talk with the staff of Danish Embassy. However, because they were disappointed with the dialogue, some of them tried to damage the Danish consulate. Whereas other FPI members outside the Danish consulate threw stones, rotten tomatoes and rotten eggs at the Danish consulate, and thus caused some damage and foul odors around the building of the Danish consulate.

Subsequently, they rallied at the US consulate of Surabaya, which is not very far from the Danish consulate. Apparently, the issue of the Muhammad cartoon revived the issue of the Muhammad sculpture on the US Supreme Court building. Even though the depiction of Muhammad was intended to honor him as a prominent lawgiver in history, FPI considered the depiction of Muhammad as an insult to Islam. FPI members forced their way to the US consulate. However, the police halted them. FPI protesters then attacked these police officers and the US consulate. A small police station was damaged and the US state symbol in the front of the embassy was broken. In addition, two police officers were seriously injured and brought to the nearby hospital. The police then fought back against FPI. The protest finally was dissolved by the police. Six FPI activists were arrested. Two of them were FPI leaders, Ali al-Habsyi and Alwi al-Habsyi. Ali argued that he was not afraid of being investigated by the police because his actions were about enforcing the law of God not the law of the state ("Unjuk Rasa" 2006; "Konsulat Kehormatan" 2006).

Several days later, on February 19, 2006, hundreds of FPI members protested in front of the US embassy in Jakarta. They condemned the depiction of Muhammad in the Supreme Court building, and especially the depiction of Muhammad holding the Qur`an in his left hand and a sword on his right hand, which implied that Muhammad is a man of war rather than a man of peace. They also requested that the depiction of Moses in the floor of the Supreme Court be erased. A large number of police officers guarded the area of the US embassy so that FPI could not approach the area. However,

FPI protestors were able to approach one of the embassy gates and damaged the area around the gate. They also threw stones and pavement blocks at the embassy.

Responding this attack on the US consulate and embassy, the US government urged the Indonesian government to deal with FPI demonstrators. A US Congressman who was visiting Indonesia reminded the Indonesian government should compensate the damaged in the US embassy. An Indonesian Police Chief, General Sutanto responded by saying that the police would take legal action against those FPI members that attacked the US embassy ("Ratusan Anggota" 2006; "FPI Lempari" 2006).

Blasphemy: the Attack on AKKBB

The following scenario describes FPI attack on AKKBB (Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan or the Nationalist Alliance for Freedom of Belief and Religion), which appeared to be random act of violence. However, it is worthwhile to describe AKKBB and context behind this conflict.

The formation of AKKBB was initiated by several activists of socio and religious organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama, interfaith NGOs, church communities, and other religious organizations. The establishment of AKKBB was intended to help the minority group that often become the target of violence, especially Ahmadiyah sect. At the beginning there was no previous conflict between FPI and AKKBB. The conflict suddenly occurred in June 1, 2008, as explained below.

The Juni 1st is the Indonesian commemoration day for the birth of Pancasila, the state ideology. Many social organizations usually use that moment to voice their

concerns while celebrate day of the birth of Pancasila. On June 1, 2008, at least four organizations were demonstrating around two nearby strategic places: the Monas (National Monument) and the Presidential Palace. These organizations were FPI, HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), PDIP (Struggle of Democratic Party) and AKKBB. FPI and AKKBB were conducting their demonstrations near each other around the Monas. Munarman, the head of LPI (Laskar Pembela Islam), the paramilitary wing of FPI, argued that AKKBB started to ridicule FPI. He also said that AKKBB activities were also aimed at supporting Ahmadiyah's cause.[10] Because of these, FPI's members reacted by attacking the gathering of AKKBB.

Hundreds of FPI members wearing white clothes penetrated AKKBB gathering, damaging appliances and supplies of AKKBB and hitting some of the participants. This situation created fear among AKKBB, which also consisted of many women and children. Many of them ran away to avoid FPI's members. Many elite national activists who joined AKKBB meeting also became the target of FPI's attacks. Some of them were severely injured. For example, Guntur Ramli (the director of the Journal of Woman magazine) got a broken nose and cracked temple, and Safi'i Anwar (the director the Islamic and Pluralism International Conference) recieved injury to his head. In total, 12 people of AKKBB were badly injured; possessions brought by AKKBB and one of their truck were damaged (Kebhinekaan Dicederai" 2008; "Aksi Kekerasan" 2008; "Dugaan Kekerasan" 2008; "Polda Beri" 2008).

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[10] Ahmadiyah is the group that considered by major Islamic organizations in Indonesia, including FPI, as blasphemous against Islam. One them is because the Ahamadiyah teaches that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. In fact, most Muslims believe that there is no prophet after Muhammad. FPI have consistently demanded that the government abolish Ahmadiyah group.

The attack that victimized several top Indonesian activists soon received national attention. This forced many members of the state apparatus, politicians and especially leaders of the affiliated organization of the victims, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, to respond to the incident of Monas. For example, the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Abdurrahman Wahid (the former president and the former head of Nahdlatul Ulama), Din Syamsuddin (the head of Muhammadiyah), Agung Laksono (the head of the People's Representative Assembly), and Jimly Asshiddiqie (the head of the Constitutional Supreme Court) condemned FPI's attack on AKKBB. Many elite figures also demanded that the police seriously enforced the law to deal with FPI's actions, and some of them even demanded the dissolution of FPI ("Aksi Kekerasan" 2008).

In response to FPI violence, the head of the general police of Indonesia, then warned all FPI members, who were involved in the incident, to surrender to the police by June 3rd. However, Syihab responded to this ultimatum by demanding the President to produce a decree that disbanded Ahmadiyah sect; if not then FPI would sue the President. He also announced that FPI paramilitary wing, LPI, was ready to wage war against Ahmadiyah sect ("Massa FPI" 2008; "Kebinekaan Diciderai" 2008).

During the last hours of June 3, approximately 800 police officers and security forces blocked off FPI's central office in Petamburan, Jakarta, while about 200 FPI members were gathering in the central office. Approaching the end of the day, the police sent its highest ranking police officers to negotiate with Syihab, the leader of FPI. After negotiation, Syihab met his FPI members and requested that all FPI members not fight back or impede the police officers from doing their job. The police officers then took 59

FPI members in the police office for investigation. However, the head of LPI, Munarman chose to run away from the police but promised to surrender after the President disbanded Ahmadiyah sect ("Negara Tidak" 2008; "Ketua FPI" 2008).

Several days after the Monas incident, many came to think that the existence of FPI was near the end. Pressure towards FPI from elite politicians and the media was very strong. For several weeks, the media repeatedly showed the Monas incident that portrayed the barbaric side of FPI and presented elite politicians who condemned the incident. Consequently, soon after that, many branches of FPI, especially in Cirebon, Surabaya and Banyuwangi were forced to dissolve by the proponents of the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama). It was because many of the victims were NU members.

However, surprisingly, on June 9, 2008 or eight days after the incident, the government produced an official decree to disband Ahmadiyah, which was signed by the Minister of Religious Affairs Muhammad M. Basyuni, the Attorney General Hendarman Supandji and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mardiyanto. This document is the so-called "SKB-3 Mentri" (the Joint Document of Three Ministers). This document indeed gave the leverage to FPI in its fight against the massive demand for its dissolution and its efforts to legitimate the reasons it used to attack AKKBB.

In addition to that, in some other areas of Indonesia, the names of two FPI's leaders, Syihab and Munarman, came to symbolize the Muslim community, which stood against Ahmadiyah sect. In short, despite criticisms and pressure from the state and various elements of the society, FPI received considerable support and endorsement

from many social and religious communities. Consequently, this could have led FPI to view more positively the utility and feasibility of violent strategies.

The Scenario of Violence Based on Anti-Communism and Anti-Christianity

Unlike the violence based on anti-immorality, blasphemy and brotherhood, which can be connected to FPI's organizational documents, the violence based on anti-communism and anti-Christianity is hard to trace from the organizational documents of FPI. Based on its official documents, FPI is neither anti-communism nor anti-Christianity. However, FPI committed about four cases of violent actions under the label of "anti-communism," and only one case was under "anti-Christianity" label.

The reasons that FPI used to justify these attacks were that the ideology of a communism (including the ideology of Marxism and Leninism) has been rejected for long period of time in Indonesia. This was because communism threatened the beliefs of Muslim community in Indonesia by spreading communist claims regarding the danger posed by religion ("Massa FPI" 2007). While in relation to FPI's attack on the Catholic Schools of Sekolah Sang Timur (or anti-Christianity) was because the school illegally used the sporting facilities for religious services, as if they were a church.

In general, the scenario of FPI's attacks under the category of anti communism and anti-Christianity is the same as the violence under the category of brotherhood, anti-immorality and blasphemy. The target groups were already identified, and there might have been some level of expectation by FPI's members that violent means were likely to be used. Therefore, FPI members usually brought some simple weapons, like wooden

sticks, to these collective actions. Thus, the violence might be semi premeditated, or not random. In order to get a better understanding of the pattern of violence under the category of anti-communism and anti-Christianity, the following are some examples of the stories.

Anti-Communism

On March 29, 2007 the National Liberation and Union Party or *Partai Persatuan dan Pembebasan Nasional* (Papernas) declared the establishment of its party. At the same time, FPI and other social organizations that identified themselves as an anti-communist group rallied across the capital city of Jakarta. These groups regarded the Papernas as a new manifestation of communism, and thus a threat to the Indonesian constitution ("Massa FPI" 2007).

FPI, along with these anti-communist groups, encountered the Papernas members at various places around the capital city. Around 10 am, a group of Papernas members riding on two small buses and four regular buses encountered FPI members in the area of Patung Proklamasi Jakarta. They threw stones at each other.   The Papernas group then fled. But soon after that, another three busses with Papernas members passed by the same area. FPI group blocked their way. Once again, the two attacked each other. The fight between members of FPI and Papernas was very visible. It happened during the daylight and the distinction between FPI and the Papernas was quite sharp. As usual, FPI's members and its supporters mostly wore the so-called *koko* clothes: white shirts with white scarf and white hats, while the Papernas side mostly wore red t-shirts. FPI

group was more ready for conflict in comparison to the Papernas's proponents. FPI group consisted of mostly young men, while the Papernas supporters consisted of not only young men but also women and children ("Bentrokan, Kepala" 2007; "Massa FPI" 2007).

At the same time, a group of Rakyat Miskin Kota (the Union of City Poor People), who were going to demonstrate against poverty, were stopped by FPI members in Duku Atas. FPI suspected that they were part of the Papernas organization. Their uniforms were red in color, similar to that of the Papernas uniforms. This group brought about 3800 people on 49 busses; most of them were women and children. About fifty FPI members with motorcycles blocked their way; they attacked the busses. People inside the buses ran away in order to save themselves. At least 20 buses were damaged because of stones thrown by FPI. The police then came to separate two different groups in conflict and evacuated the people of Rakyat Miskin Kota. Then, around 12:30 pm, the masses of FPI group headed towards the building of People's Representative Assembly (DPR/MPR) to continue their anti-communist protest.

The central secretary of FPI, Irwan, argued that the purpose of FPI rally was to support the anti communist societies against the Papernas. He argued that FPI, along with other anti-communist organizations, would continue to fight against any new forms of communism. Beside FPI, the organizations involved in this anti-communist protest were FBR (the Forum of Betawi Society/*Forum Betawi Rembug*), GNPI, AAK (Aliansi Anti Komunis/Anti Communist Alliance), Forum Komunikasi '66 (Communication Forum of the 1966), Taruna Muslim (Muslim Cadets), Front Pembela Merah Putih (the

Defenders of Red-White), Mimbar Pemuda Islam (the Association of Muslim Youth)

dan Komando Pemuda Anti Komunis (Kompak). Irwan argued that FPI sent 700 people

and the FBR sent 1,200 people to participate in the protest ("Bentrokan, Kepala" 2007;

Mass FPI" 2007).

Several days later, many criticisms of FPI arose. One of them came from

Abdurrahman Wahid, the fourth president of Indonesia. He condemned FPI attack on the

Papernas. He argued that FPI had violated the constitution. Therefore, the government

should take up the case of FPI's attack on the Papaernas and enforce the law regarding

perpetrators of violence.

Regardless of the harsh criticism of FPI, it still continued to protest the Papernas

establishment. For example, a month later, or on April 29, 2007 FPI branch of Sukoharjo

(about 500 km/310 miles from Jakarta) also attacked the Papernas, which was

conducting the meeting to prepare the establishment of the Papernas organization. With

less than 50 people, FPI members forced the meeting to dissolve. The committee holding

the meeting told FPI representatives that their meeting was legal and approved by the

police. However, FPI members insisted that the meeting should be dissolved on the

grounds that the Papernas was associated with communism; and communism could not

be allowed to be growing in Indonesia. The mayor of Sukoharjo, accompanied by the

head of Grogol police, came to mediate the conflict between them. In a closed meeting,

FPI and the Papernas reached an agreement that the Papernas meeting would be

dissolved after FPI left the area ("FPI Bubarkan" 2007).

Anti-Christianity

In 2004, the Catholic community of Paroki St. Bernadette planned to build a church, which was close to the Sang Timur Catholic School in Cileduk, Tangerang Banten. This was because this Catholic school and the Catholic community in this area did not have a church. For almost ten years, the Catholic community in this area "illegally" used the school hall (or sports building) for religious services.[11] However, the Sang Timur School was unlucky. The news of Paroki community's plan to build a church led the Muslim community to realize that the school had been "illegally" using the sports hall for religious services for almost ten years. This news finally reached FPI.

On October 3, 2004, several hundred FPI members wearing white clothing and carrying some simple weapons arrived at the school in the early morning. FPI members contended that the Catholic community did not have the permission to build a church beside the Sang Timur School. In addition, FPI argued that this school abused the use of the school hall for religious services and accused the school of attempting to convert Muslims to Catholicism. Several FPI's member yelled at nuns and staff members at the Sang Timur School that they should stop using the school hall for religious services and stop the plan to build the Catholic church in the area. They damaged some building and facilities at the school. In addition to that, they also blocked the road to the school with a permanent concrete. Therefore, no vehicle could enter that area after that day. Several FPI's activist also met with the nuns and the staff of the school, and forced them to sign

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[11] The building of the place for religious services, such as a church or mosque, is required to have members at least 90 people and gets a support of at least 60 people from the neighborhood. This regulation is commonly violated. Most of the mosques in Indonesia do not have an official permission from the government. Therefore, in practice, this regulation is only applied for the minority religious group (see SKB Dua Menteri No. 1/1969 and PMB No. 9/2006 tentang Pendirian Rumah Ibadah).

a document stating that the school would never again use the school hall for religious services. The police, who arrived later did not remove FPI members from the school area. The police tended to let FPI's members to do what the group whished.

Several days later, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gusdur), the fourth President of Indonesia, came to the Sang Timur School to show his support for the school. Many religious leaders and politicians condemned FPI action against the Sang Timur School. However, it seems that their criticism of FPI had no effect on the conditions at the school. As of 2011, the concrete blockade, which was erected in 2004, remains making the road to the school impassable by a vehicle (Interview with a school staff, on May 11, 2011). This experience of lack of police interference may have given FPI confidence that it could use violence to achieve its goals.

The Scenario of Internal Interests

As discussed above the category of "internal interests" refers to FPI's violent actions that took place as a result of conflict between FPI and other groups. Such violence occurred because of organizational ego rather than the religious values upheld by FPI organization. These values include Islamic brotherhood, anti-immorality (*anti-ma`siyat*), and the application of *shari`ah*. Among these violent actions, five cases (9 percent) are associated with internal interests of the organization.

In general, the pattern of violence due to internal interests is similar to other categories of violence. However, there is a small difference between this category of violence and other categories, especially, the violence associated with anti-immorality.

In the case of violence based on internal interests of both FPI and opposition parties involved more aggression. Two examples are the case of the conflict between FPI and the supporters of AKKBB (The Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief) in 2008 and the conflict between FPI and the athlete group in Samarinda in 2010. In order to get a better understanding of the violence based on the internal interests, the following provides one example of this scenario.

Since the incident of Monas June 2008, the conflicts between FPI and AKKBB had expanded. Many branches of the Banser (the paramilitary wing of NU) and the Ansor (the youth wing of NU) declared to stand behind AKKBB and fight against FPI. The reason for this conflict was no longer based on blasphemy or AKKBB's support for Ahmadiyah sect, but was a matter of revenge between FPI and AKKBB supporters (NU members).

The initial physical conflict between them occurred during the trial of seven members of FPI in the court of Central Jakarta on September 22, 2008. One of FPI leaders argued that the conflict was provoked by the actions of Guntur Romli, AKKBB activist who stared at a FPI witness, kicked his chair, and mocked FPI. After the end of trial, FPI members, both inside and outside the court room, tried to attack Guntur who was guarded by the police. Some people were able to reach Guntur and punched him. Police officers in the court room were able to separate Guntur from his attackers ("Persidangan: Sidang" 2008).

Several days later, or on September 25 or at the trial of the two FPI leaders: Habib Rizieq Syihab and Munarman, the conflict between FPI and AKKBB escalated.

At this trial, AKKBB was backed up by a large number of the members of Banser, the paramilitary wing of NU. A leader of Banser said that he sent his people to protect Guntur Romli (AKKBB) from FPI. From the beginning of the trial, there had been tensions between the members of FPI and Banser. Finally, the conflict took place after the judge announced the break of trial. Romli reported that FPI started the attack, and then they attacked each other. The conflict spread beyond the court room, and produced a traffic jam on the streets near the court. Some people from both sides, FPI and Banser-AKKBB, were severely injured and taken to the nearby hospitals. The conflict did not last long, because a large number of police officers could separate the two masses. After this incident, the police arrested twelve members of FPI and one member of Banser-AKKBB ("Bentrokan FPI-AKKBB" 2008; "12 Laskar" 2008).

Moving towards the Social Mechanism of Violence

In conclusion, FPI's violent collective actions can be divided into several categories based on concerns, targets of the actions and the geographical areas in which the incidents took place. This classification helps to create a general picture of how FPI engaged in violence. Using these categories, data from several media sources show that there is a tendency for FPI's violence to be associated with religious issues, namely anti-immorality and blasphemy. FPI mostly attacked targets that appeared to violate religious norms and state regulations, such as night clubs, brothels, "illegal" church buildings and social groups that appeared to adopt communist ideology. For the most part, violence was most likely to occur when the targets were places of immoral entertainment, or what

FPI considered as places of *maksiyat* (immorality). From 1998 to 2010, FPI continuously launched these patterns of violent actions every year.

In addition to that, FPI's collective violent actions can be divided into two categories: random and nonrandom. About 95 percent of them are nonrandom; only a few of them appeared to be random. However, these few random actions, especially the incident of Ketapang, are essential in order to explain FPI's violence.

These nonrandom acts of violence were usually systematic or coordinated. Some indications that show these actions are systematic are: 1) the violence appeared to be prepared and, therefore, could be expected; 2) what was done by the central office of FPI was also adopted by other local branches of FPI; 3) prior to violent actions, FPI usually performed the processes of negotiation or requested permission of collective action the government, police and/or informed to the target groups; and 4) for the most part, FPI also did not target people, even though they also often injured people.

The typologies, patterns and the intensity of FPI's violent collective actions then raise some questions: why did FPI chose to intensively engage in violence? What are some of the social factors or conditions that facilitated the use of violent actions and how did they explain the violence? Because most of violence was closely related to religious concerns, how did the Islamic system of beliefs take part in shaping this violence?

Based on the above data, the following are some salient social factors that might have facilitated and shaped FPI's violence, and therefore, may also help to answer these questions and concerns. They are the incident of Ketapang, the choice of engaging in

prone-violent activities, outsider support for the cause and low state capacity, as is explained below.

The Incident of Ketapang

As discussed above, this incident is different from the general trends of FPI's violent actions. Most of the violent actions were non-random acts and only damaged non-human targets. The incident of Ketapang was more a random act and victimized not only material things but also humans; at least sixteen people died. However, it does not necessarily mean that the incident is insignificant in explaining the overall trends of FPI's violence.

There are, at least, two important reasons that make the Ketapang incident an important case that explains later violence by FPI. First, through the Ketapang incident, FPI was exposed to violent means and became aware of its significance for FPI movement.

The incident occurred because after the collapse of the authoritarian military regime, the new government lost its ability to exercise its power in order to manage the state, including its ability to control violence-prone situations in Ketapang. The incident happened quickly and caused devastating damage in the Ketapang area. FPI might not have expected that its involvement in the Ketapang incident would cause a bloody incident because when FPI's members first came to Ketapang, they planned on celebrating the day of Isra' Mi`raj, which was led by the top leader of FPI, Habib Rizieq Syihab.

The inability of the new democratic government to control violence-prone situations in Ketapang created an opportunity for FPI to be exposed to so-called "justified" violence. It was religiously justified because the incident was often portrayed as the fight between good (FPI) and evil (Ambones Christian bodyguards). In this light, religion (Islam) provided a means to create a divide between "We" (Islam or FPI) and "You" (Ambones Christian bodyguards and the night clubs) and later also provided reasons to justify the violence in the Ketapang incident. In addition to that, FPI was able to defeat its enemy by killing several bodyguards and damaging some churches and night clubs without any significant legal responses from state authorities. In turn, this could have affected how FPI viewed at violent means as an effective strategy for pursuing its goals.

Second, despite some criticism of FPI's violence during the incident of Ketapang, FPI received considerable support from Muslims in the capital city of Jakarta. After this incident, there seems to have been increasing interest by Muslims around the capital city of Jakarta regarding FPI. At least, it attracted thousands of young Muslims who were involved in the incident at Ketapang. Therefore, after the incident, FPI formally recruited members for the first time and started to build its financial foundation. In summary, the Ketapang incident provided two things in relation to FPI's violence; a positive view towards the use of violent means and the readiness of FPI to engage in violence.

The Choice of Engaging in Violence-prone Activities

FPI chose to involve itself in violent risky activities, such as policing and enforcing Islamic values, especially against what FPI consider "immoral places." About 52 percent of its violent actions were related to immoral places of entertainment, such as night clubs and brothels. About 36 percent of these actions were against social groups, such as Ahmadiyah sect, which FPI considered as blasphemous against Islam, and Papernas, which FPI considered a new face of communism. Many activities that related to these places and groups resulted in violence. Even all FPI collective actions that targeted the places of immorality resulted in either violence or nonviolence with physical threat; none of them involved pure nonviolence.

The violence likely occurred because FPI possessed a direct physical contact with the group that they considered the problem. In this light, religion (Islam) played an important role in marking a boundary of "we versus you" between other groups and itself. For example, FPI members may consider themselves as representing Islam while seeing the target groups, such as brothels, places of entertainment and churches as representing evil. The religious concepts that were used to mark this boundary and to legitimize the violence were immorality or *ma`siyat* and blasphemy.

In addition, most of the night clubs and brothels were usually guarded by the bodyguards. Therefore, this created a perfect condition for violence because both FPI and the target groups were basically ready to engage in violence. On the one hand, hundreds to thousands of FPI members, who were mostly young men, wanted to enforce the religious moral values at these places of immorality. On the other hand, the security

guards of those places were also trained and paid to protect the night clubs and places of prostitution.

The Sacred Days of Islam

As many other cases of religious violence, most of FPI's violence took place during the holy days of Islam, such as the month of Ramadan, the birthday of Muhammad and the first day of the Islamic calendar (1 Muharram). In Indonesia, a country with a Muslim majority, most of the sacred days of Islam are also official state holidays. Muslims usually gather on these sacred days, especially in mosques in order to celebrate them. Many Islamic groups often organize these kinds of religious celebrations because at these times it is usually easier to mobilize people. During the "holidays" people have more free time and during the "holy days" people are more likely to engage in religious activities.

FPI has used these moments to conduct some activities, including efforts to close night clubs, brothels and other immoral places. Because of the nature of these holy days of Islam in Indonesia, FPI was often able to gather hundreds to thousands of people when FPI launched its activities during these days. Consequently, these large numbers of people made FPI's collective activities, which were also prone to violence, becomes really violent. In short, the sacred days of Islam (religion) has provided cultural resources for FPI to mobilize its members and launched its collective actions in more massive ways.

Significant Support for the Cause

FPI has been condemned and threatened with disbandment because of its continuous adoption of violent means. However, not all elements of Indonesian society, and especially Muslim society, disagreed with FPI's violent actions. In almost each action, FPI received significant support from various elements of society, ranging from elite politicians to religious leaders and many Islamic groups.

For example, in the case of FPI's attack against Komnas HAM (the Indonesian National Commission of Human Rights), many influential elites directly and indirectly supported FPI's causes, such as Munir (a famous human right activist), the members of the legislative institutions (DPR-MPR), and HMI (the Association of Muslim Students).

In relation to the support from Islamic groups, FPI did not only gain supports from the Islamist movement (the *shari`ah* movement), but also from many moderate groups, including MUI, the official state body of the Council of the Indonesian Muslim scholars and even from the organizational wings of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), the group that were often in confrontation with FPI.

For example, in Pekanbaru Riau, a number of Islamic organizations declared their support for FPI in the case of the Monas incident, which victimized many NU members. Even some of those organizations were the group that affiliated with NU: a provincial branch of NU, Pagar Nusa Riau (the paramilitary wing of NU) and GP Ansor (the youth wing of NU). In relation to the state, there were at least four institutions that often supported FPI, namely MUI (Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars), PKS (Party of Justice), PBB (Party of Moon-Stars), and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, especially

during tenure of ministers Maftuh Basyuni (2004-2009) and Surya Dharma Ali (2009-now).

There were many ways in which people supported FPI. Some obviously stated their support to FPI; for example, the statement of the head of MUI (the Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars) of Lampung: "FPI actions of sweeping entertainment clubs and damaging alcoholic beverages should be appreciated because it is part of religious tenets" ("MUI Lampung" 2001). Some supported FPI in indirect ways, such as showing their neutrality between FPI and its rival groups or victims, but at the same time defending what FPI did. For example, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Suryadharma Ali argued: "If the radical group [FPI] was sanctioned because of violating the law but the actors of immorality did not receive any sanctions, it was not just. A violence perpetrated by members of a group cannot be arbitrarily connected to the group, such as the incident of Monas by FPI members."

This FPI significant support from several Indonesian elites indicates that the new democracy of Indonesia have split people in the governments. In turn, this support might have undermined the legitimacy of some elites in the government, such as the former president Abdurrahman Wahid, who wanted to crack down FPI or to fully suppress FPI violent activities.

Low State Capacity

As described by Tilly (2008), the state capacity is about the extent to which a state controls resources, activities and citizens. Similar to non-democracy, low state

capacity also promotes violence. The state capacity can be measured in many ways. One of them is by looking at to what extent the state has responded to FPI's violent activities.

Even though several cases of FPI violence were responded to well by the state, such as by bringing those cases to the court and jailing perpetrators and FPI leaders, most violent cases by FPI were not handled well by the state, in terms of anticipating the potential violence, responding to violence that was occurring and following a violent incident up.

For example, in the case of the Ketapang incident, the state failed to respond to the initial conflict between several residents of Ketapang and the bodyguards of the Kino nightclub; the state failed to detect and respond to the deployment of approximately 300 Ambones bodyguards to Ketapang and the movements of thousands of people from around Jakarta to Ketapang. Therefore, the conflict escalated and turned into a bloody incident.

In the case of FPI attacks on Komnas HAM (the National Commission of Human Rights) office and the Catholic School of Sekolah Sang Timur, the police tended to be passive and did not stop the violence which was occurring. Similarly, in the case of FPI's campaigns of anti-immorality, or the so-called *safari anti-ma`siyat*, the state, especially the police and intelligence agency, failed to respond to these violence-prone activities. Almost every year, FPI conducted the campaign of anti-immorality; most of them resulted in violence. However, the state always failed to deal with these regular violence-prone activities.

In short, these all indicate that the state capacity is low. This low capacity of the state might have also prompted FPI's engagement in violence-prone activities to become real violence.

Conclusion

In summary, the combinations of the above factors have created enough conditions for FPI to adopt violent means and to continue to use them. The belief system of Islam within Indonesian settings also provided cultural resources for FPI to gather and mobilize large numbers of its members. In turn, this huge number of members participating in the collective actions was able to transform the violence-prone settings into real violence. The Islamic beliefs also helped to create a sharp divider between "we versus you," so that the division between FPI members and the target groups became clear in the eyes of FPI; and they also helped to justify FPI violent actions. In addition, the low state capacity created more opportunity of violence to occur.

These conditions might have neutralized the other factors or conditions that should have inhibited or deterred future violence, such as law enforcement and social pressure towards FPI. For example, based on the data from media coverage, at least 150 FPI activists were arrested by the police and/or the attorney general. Even some of its leaders, like Syihab, were arrested several times. However, the law enforcement in deterring collective violence might have been neutralized by some of the factors discussed earlier.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

Summary

Since the collapse of the Suharto military authoritarian regime in mid 1998, Indonesia has experienced a new phase of democracy. The fundamental rights of democracy, such as the freedom to speak and to form an association have become available since that time. Individuals and groups have been able to express their views without being scrutinized by the government. Benefitting this opportunity, number of political and social movements emerged and reemerged. Most of these movements used conventional nonviolent means to pursue their goals because democracy is inherently nonviolent, which allows movements to use a number of reasonable tactics.

Ironically, in the new Indonesian democracy, an Islamist movement, FPI (Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders' Front) also emerged and adopted disruptive and violent strategies to pursue their goals. Using the language of Islam, justice and democracy, FPI committed at least 64 cases of conspicuous violent collective actions from 1998 to 2010. Additionally, FPI committed approximately 51 cases of collective action, which were close to becoming violent. These include about 33 cases of collective action with physical threat and 18 cases of collective action with verbal threat made to the targets of FPI actions. Therefore, FPI was often considered as the most visible social movement that committed violence during the democratic era of Indonesia.

FPI's violence is more associated with religious issues, namely anti-immorality and blasphemy. FPI mostly attacked the targets that appeared to violate religious norms and state regulations, such as night clubs and brothels. The violence was most likely to occur when the targets were places of immoral entertainment, or what FPI considered as places of *maksiyat* (immorality).

In addition, these violent actions were mostly nonrandom and patterned. The violence appeared to be planned and, therefore, it could be expected. What was done by the central office of FPI was also adopted by other local branches of FPI. Prior to these violent actions, FPI usually performed a process of negotiation or requested permission for collective action from the government and police; FPI sometimes also informed its plans to the target groups. Lastly, for the most part, FPI also did not target people, even though they also sometimes did injure innocent people.

Again, the patterns and intensity of FPI's violent collective actions occurred in the democratic context of Indonesia from 1998 to 2010, or when state repression of social movements no longer existed and the previous Islamist movements had de-radicalized. Therefore, state repression, which is often understood as a major aspect of the social environment that lead to making of violent movements, can no longer be used to explain FPI's adoption of violence. Consequently, this study tried to examine at different factors, including social environments other than state repression, to explain FPI's adoption of violent means.

There are three levels of analysis being used in order to investigate these aspects, namely the level of organization, individual characters and FPI's violent actions.

Combining these three levels of analysis, this study found that the making of the violent Islamist movement (FPI) is complex. It involves multifaceted aspects from the history of Islamist movements in Indonesia, organizational ideology, activists' characteristics and the nature of FPI's violent actions; all of which seem to be interconnected.

Rather than arguing that there is a dominant factor in the making of FPI's adoption of violence, this study contends that the combination of those factors has made FPI's violence plausible in terms of why FPI adopted violent means and kept using them to pursue its organizational goals. Those interrelated factors can be summarized as follows.

1. Historical Context and FPI as an Islamist movement

First, for about 53 years (1945-1998), the position of Islamists, or Islamist movements, in Indonesia was always marginal and in opposition to the nationalist government. They mostly existed as underground rebellious movements and/or radical movements. Therefore, when FPI declared its organization as a *shari`ah*-oriented movement (an Islamist movement), FPI actually positioned itself closer to violence because FPI indirectly associated itself with the previous Islamist movements, which mostly adopted violent means. At the same time, because FPI was Islamist, the new government (post Suharto) that was also nationalist, became more difficult to co-opt FPI, especially in comparison to other new movement that did not embrace Islamic ideology (Islamism). In fact, government's failure to co-opt marginal movements often results in the radicalization of those movements.

2. Religious Timing, a Cultural Resource

As many other cases of religious violence, most of FPI's violence took place during the holy days of Islam, such as the month of Ramadan, the birthday of Muhammad and the first day of the Islamic calendar (1 Muharram). It is commonly understood that religious and political violence are often symbolic, that is why timing is so important and becomes part of violent action. However, in the case of FPI's violence, the holy days of Islam are better understood as cultural resources for FPI's mobilization, which enable FPI to gather anywhere between hundreds to thousands of participations. In turn, this can make violence-prone activities become potentially more violent, or turn into real violence.

In Indonesia, a country with the Muslim majority, most of the holy days of Islam are also the official state holidays. Muslims usually gather during these sacred days, especially in mosques, in order to celebrate them. Many Islamic groups often organize these kinds of religious celebrations because at these times it is usually easier to mobilize people. During the "holidays" people have more free time, and during the "holy days" people are more likely to engage in religious activities.

FPI used these moments to conduct some activities, including the activities of sweeping night clubs, brothels and other immoral places. Because of the nature of these holy days of Islam in Indonesia, FPI was often able to gather from hundreds to thousands of people. Consequently, this huge number of people made FPI's collective activities, which were also prone to violence, become real violence. In short, the holy

days of Islam (religion) have provided cultural resources for FPI to mobilize its members and launch its collective actions in more massive ways.

3. Encountering Legitimate Violence

Even though most FPI violent actions are nonrandom, initially it was involved in collective violence by accident, namely in the Ketapang incident in 1998. In this incident, FPI may not have expected that its involvement in this incident would cause destruction. At the beginning, FPI's members who came to Ketapang were aimed at celebrating the day of Isra' Mi`raj, which was led by the top leader of FPI, Habib Rizieq Syihab. However, at the same time, the conflict that was occurring in Ketapang, Jakarta, forced FPI become involved in this conflict. As a result, FPI along with thousands of Muslims around Ketapang caused destruction; several Ambones bodyguards were killed, and some churches, night clubs and several other buildings were damaged. However, FPI received no significant legal response from the state authorities; in fact, FPI received sympathy and support from members of Muslim community around Jakarta, so that the incident appeared to be legitimate and justified.

In short, the Ketapang incident introduced FPI to the use of violent means, and exposed them to the so-called "justified violence." Eventually, this may have affected how FPI looked at violent means as an effective strategy for pursuing its goals.

4. The character of Individual: Fundamentalism

Despite their similarities, every social movement in Indonesia has its own characteristics that make it different from other movements. In relation to the political violence, generally, the previous studies suggest that individual characteristics that can

be used to differentiate a violent group from a nonviolent group are the levels of fundamentalism, trust in government, and the interaction between trust in government and political efficacy.

However, the current study confirms that fundamentalism is the only factor that can differentiate FPI from other nonviolent groups, such as Muhammadiyah and NU (Nahdlatul Ulama). FPI activists tend to show fundamentalist attitudes, rather than moderate attitudes. Therefore, FPI activists demonstrate their support of the use of violent means. In short, only the aspect of fundamentalism shed light on FPI's adoption of violent means.

Nevertheless, this does not necessarily confirm the previous research that found the same relationship between fundamentalism and violent attitudes (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992 and 2004; Moaddel and Karabenich 2008). The measurement of fundamentalism in this study is somewhat different from the previous studies that measure fundamentalism, which merely focus on the aspect of beliefs. This current study takes into account both aspects of belief and its manifestation in social and political life, which are based on the theoretical concept developed by Marty and Appleby (1993), Almound et al. (2003) and Frey (2007).

5. The Character of Action: Violence-prone Activities

FPI identifies itself as an AMNM (*Amar Ma`ruf Nahi Munkar*) movement. In general, AMNM is meant to be calling Muslims to implement all Islamic teachings in total and to prevent them from any activities that can destroy the morals and beliefs of Islam. In FPI, AMNM is then translated into actions, which enforced religious and moral

values in society, such as raiding night clubs, discotheques and brothels with any means necessary (Syihab 2008).

Considering the nature of these actions, AMNM activities are by themselves prone to violence. It was because these activities always involved two oppositional groups, FPI and target groups. Therefore, the activities that took place always created tensions and direct confrontational circumstances between these two groups. In these circumstances, FPI usually involved anywhere between hundreds to thousands people and target groups, such as nightclubs and brothels, were always shielded by bodyguards. Therefore, regardless of other factors, FPI's choice to engage in these violent prone activities has led them to use violent means.

6. Framing Factor

Without sound framing, a social movement may not be able to launch its actions, especially the violent action that is usually avoided. Leaders or activists need to convince their members or bystanders that violence is needed, legitimate and sensible. Therefore, the assumption is that without good framing, FPI might not be able to launch a violent action and continue to use it.

In relation to the framing, there are at least three key organizational ideologies of FPI that can be understood as FPI's framing of its violent actions. They are the concepts of *shari`ah*, AMNM (*amar ma`ruf nahi munkar*) and jihad. These three concepts seem to fulfill three framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framings.

The *shari`ah* has shaped FPI on how it identify the problems of the society and who are responsible for the problems (similar to diagnostic framing). FPI's

understanding of the *shari`ah* lead to its perception that the Indonesian's constitution, night clubs and prostitution are sources of the problems. AMNM provides FPI with a view of looking at how to solve such problems, including the sending of letters to the government and the owner of immoral places and/or directly attacking the immoral places (prognostic framing). Lastly, FPI's concept of jihad and martyrdom provide religious encouragement and rationale for FPI members to engage in AMNM (motivational framing). Finally, by combining these three framing tasks, the violent collective actions have become more feasible, relevant, legitimate and rational for FPI. Therefore, it continues to adopt violent means in its collective actions. In addition, this FPI's framing of violence shows that a radicalization of religious discourse may occur without prior repression, such as from the state.

7. Social Support

FPI has been condemned and threatened with termination because of its continue to adopt violent means. However, not all elements of the Indonesian society disagreed with FPI's violent actions. In almost every action, FPI received significant support from various elements of the society, ranging from elite politicians to religious leaders and many Islamic groups.

For example, in the case of FPI's attack on the central office of the National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM), many influential elites directly and indirectly supported FPI's cause, including Munir (a famous human right activist), several members of the legislative institutions (DPR-MPR), and the chief of HMI (the Association of Muslim Students).

In relation to the support from Islamic groups, FPI did not only gain support from the Islamist movement (such as the PUI and HTI), but also from many moderate groups, and even from the organizational wings of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), the group that was often in confrontation with FPI. For example, in Pekanbaru Riau the provincial branch of NU, Pagar Nusa Riau (the paramilitary wing of NU) and GP Ansor (the youth wing of NU) of Pekanbaru declared their support for FPI's cause in the case of tMonas incident that victimized several NU activists.

In relation to the state, there were at least four institutions that often supported FPI, namely MUI (Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars), PKS (Party of Justice), PBB (Party of Moon-Stars), and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, especially during the periods of two ministers of Religious Affairs: Maftuh Basyuni (2004-2009) and Surya Dharma Ali (2009-now). In short, the support from many elements of the society, such as from Muslim leaders and elites, may have made FPI believed that its violent actions were socially justified, and, therefore, FPI continued to adopt violent means during the period from 1998 to 2010.

In addition, this support from several Indonesian elites indicates that the new democracy of Indonesia have divided people in the governments. In turn, this support might have undermined the legitimacy of some elites in the government –such as, the former president Abdurrahman Wahid– who wanted to crack down FPI or fully suppress FPI violent activities.

8. Low State Capacity

According to Tilly (2008), state capacity is the extent to which the government or the state controls resources, activities and citizens. Low capacity of the state tends to promote violence. In this study, the state capacity was analyzed through how well the state responded to FPI's violent actions.

Even though several cases of FPI violence were responded to well by the state, such as by bringing those cases to the court and jailing perpetrators and FPI leaders, most violent instances performed by FPI were not handled well by the state in terms of anticipating the potential violence, responding to violence that was occurring and following up a violent incident.

For example, in the case of the Ketapang incident, the state failed to respond to the initial conflict between several residents of Ketapang and the bodyguards of the Kino nightclub; the state failed to detect and respond to the deployment of approximately 300 Ambones bodyguards to Ketapang and the movements of thousands of people from around Jakarta to Ketapang. Therefore, the conflict escalated and turned into a bloody incident.

In the case of FPI attacks on Komnas HAM (the National Commission of Human Rights) office and the Catholic School of Sekolah Sang Timur, the police tended to be passive and did not stop the violence which was occurring. Similarly, in the case of FPI's anti-immorality campaigns, or the so-called *safari anti-ma`siyat*, the state, especially the police and intelligence agency, failed to respond to these violence-prone activities. Almost every year, FPI conducted a campaign of anti-immorality; most of

them resulted in violence. However, the state always failed to deal with these regular

violence-prone activities. In short, these all indicate that the state capacity is low. This

low capacity might have also prompted FPI's engagement in violence-prone activities to

become real violence.

In summary, the factors that explain FPI adoption of violence can be divided into

two categories: social environments and individual-organizational characters. First,

there are at least four social environments that have led FPI to the adoption of violent

means. They are the historical context of Islamist movements in Indonesia (1945-1998),

the timing of violence by FPI, social support for FPI's violent actions and low capacity

of the state. Second, there are at least four factors that relate to individuals and

organization of FPI. They are FPI's encounter with the so-called justified violence, FPI's

engagement in violence-prone activities, fundamentalism and FPI's framing of its

violent actions.

To simplify the answers of why FPI adopted violent means to achieve its goals

and continued to use them in the democratic context of Indonesia, they are because 1)

FPI chose to engage in violence-prone activities and 2) at the same time, the state

capacity was low. The combination of these factors is by itself can produce a collective

violence. 3) FPI as an Islamist movement and the history of Islamist movement in

Indonesia, 4) FPI's involvement in the Ketapang incident and 5) the characters of FPI's

activists who have a high scale of fundamentalism are important factors that make FPI

more prone to violence. In addition, 6) FPI's framing of violence, 7) the timing of

violence and 8) social support for FPI violence are also significant factors that lead FPI

to continue to use violent means in its activities. Finally, the combination and

interaction of these factors have led to the making of FPI into a violent Islamist

movement in the new democratic context of Indonesia.

Recommendations

Being limited by the data, time and scope, this study tried to investigate the

puzzle of why a religious movement, FPI, adopted violent means in the new democratic

context of Indonesia. Therefore, there are some important concerns that need to be

addressed in relation to this study and future studies that will discuss a similar topic and

use a similar method.

First, in relation to the survey, this study initially targeted activists from three

Islamic groups, namely a violent Islamist group (FPI), moderate Islamic groups

(Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama) and nonviolent Islamist groups (HTI and MMI).

In doing so, it was expected that the survey could represent a diverse variety of Islamic

movements in Indonesia. However, in the middle of the data collection, both the

nonviolent Islamist groups (HTI and MMI) declined to participate in the study.

Consequently, this study only compares a violent group and moderate groups. Therefore,

a future study that conducts a similar survey should try to include nonviolent Islamist

group in order to give a stronger support or a more comprehensive explanation about the

relationship between fundamentalism and violence.

Second, in relation to the design of the survey questionnaire, this study dropped

variables measuring trust in government's work due to low reliability. This might have

been caused by an inaccurate design of the seven questions that measured trust in the government's work. For the first four questions the answers' choices indicate that "lower scores" mean "higher trust," but for the last three questions, the answers indicate that "lower scores" mean "lower trust." Many respondents may have been confused by the directional shift in the answers to these questions. Therefore, there might be many answers of the last three questions that are not valid. This problem was not detected during my pre-test study because the respondents were relatively young and highly educated. Consequently, despite its advantages, the future researchers need to be careful in designing such questions with differing manners of answering these questions, especially, if the questions are relatively long and not easily understood. This is also important because conducting a survey is expensive, and, therefore, researchers should attempt to eliminate this kind of survey error.

Third, in relation to the categories of FPI collective actions (nonviolence, nonviolence with verbal threat, nonviolence with physical threat and violence), the analysis in this study was based on newspapers, such as *Antara*, *Kompas* and *Republika*. In general, newspaper data have many advantages, such as the news is usually obtained from the first sources or parties involved in the incident and the validity of news can be easily checked by comparing newspapers with one another. However, the problem is that "bad news is good news." This general rule means that FPI nonviolent activities might have been ignored in this study because of undercover. For example, FPI humanitarian missions for tsunami victims of Aceh in 2004 and victims of the Merapi eruption in Central Java were not reported by those newspapers. Consequently, this

should be considered when reading the description of FPI collective action because there might be a number of FPI social activities that were ignored by the media.

Fourth, the present study found that fundamentalism sheds light on FPI's adoption of violent means. Fundamentalism is positively associated with violence, and this association is also stronger for FPI's activists than the activists of moderate groups (Muhammadiyah and NU). However, this study was designed only to statistically test this relationship in the context of FPI and other Islamic groups in Indonesia; it does not elaborate on the social process of the relationship between fundamentalism and FPI's adoption of violent means. Therefore, one of the future studies that can be performed is by investigating the social process of the relationship between fundamentalism and violence in the context of FPI.

Lastly, future studies that will investigate political violence in the context of democracy, especially new democracy, should look first at the level of state capacity, possible violence-prone situations and their combination. Second, if violence occurs at regular basis, researchers should also look the framing process of violence and to what extent groups adopting violent strategies receive support from the society. Third, researcher also need to look at other factors –even other factors that by themselves seems to be not associated with violence– that increase the likelihood of violence to occur, for example the timing of violence.

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APPENDIX A

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH VERSION)

1. Which of the following groups are you involved in?
  a. The FPI (Front Pembela Islam)   b. The HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia)
  c. The MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia)   d. Muhammadiyah
  e. The NU (Nahdlatul Ulama)

2. How long have you been active in that group? …….. years

3. What is your position in your organization?..

4. What level is your above position?
  a. National/Central (Pusat)   b. Provincial (Propinsi)
  c. District (Kab/Kota)   d. Local (Kec/Desa)
  Mention …………………………………………………..

5. *Are you also in other Social Islamic organizations (Ormas Islam)? Yes or No, if Yes please mention*:
……
……………………………………………………………………………………………

6. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.							
	Strongly Disagree	**Mostly Disagree**	**Somewhat Disagree**	**Neither Agree nor Disagree**	**Somewhat Agree**	**Mostly Agree**	**Strongly Agree**
The Quran							
a. We do need to **reinterpret al-Quran** because it is **a complete flawless guide** that fits all times and places (all contexts).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b. Whenever current knowledge/science and al-Quran conflict, **science should be wrong**; and we do not need to compromise between them.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Threats to the Muslim Ummah							
c. Currently the activities of **Christianization** targeting Muslim in Indonesia have become **a serious threat to our Muslim community**.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d.The Islamic liberal groups, like JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal) has gone too far from the real tenets of Islam and potentially **harm the true beliefs of** Muslim community of Indonesia.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

6. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.							
	Strongly Disagree	Mostly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Mostly Agree	Strongly Agree
e. Muslims of Indonesia is in **a state of serious danger** because of the widespread of corruptions, pornography, prostitutions, and other immoralities	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
f. Currently, I feel that I **am obliged to do something to protect** Islam/Muslim society from such immorality because many Muslims tend to ignore such problems.	1	2	3	4	5	6	
g. To deal with these problems, the government should prioritize **to solve moral problems** rather than other problems because immorality (the moral problem) is the source of all problems.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Woman Leadership							
h. According to Islam, **a woman cannot be a leader**, such as president, governor and mayor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
i. According to Islam, **a woman cannot be a judge.**	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
j. A Muslim should **not vote for female** candidates for president or governor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Apocalyptical Views							
k. The Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, the US military intervention in Afghanistan and the widespread of immorality **are signs about the closeness** of the end of the world.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
l. I believe that the president of the USA or the prime minister Israel are today *Dajjal*.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Islam and State; Secular vs Religious							
m. Indonesia is **a secular state** because its constitution is not based on a religion (Islam or the Quran and Hadith).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

6. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Strongly Disagree	Mostly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Mostly Agree	Strongly Agree
n. Muslims make up **the majority of the Indonesian population**. Therefore, state constitutions should be based on **Islam/*Shari`ah* principles** (al-Quran and al-Sunnah).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

7. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Strongly Disagree	Mostly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Mostly Agree	Strongly Agree
a. The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b. People in the government waste a lot of the money.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c. Almost all of the people running the government don't seem to know what they are doing.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d. Many people running the government are a little crooked.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
e. The government can deal with the problem of morality, like pornography and prostitution.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
f. The government has effectively combated the problem of corruptions.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
g. The government/court will be fair in dealing with the case of Bibit-Chandra versus Anggodo (two officers of corruption watch versus the businessman).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

8. Please indicate how much of the time you can trust the following institutions.

	Strongly Disagree	Mostly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree
a. SBY Administration	0	1	2	3	4
b. Your Provincial Government	0	1	2	3	4
c. Your City Government	0	1	2	3	4
d. The Police	0	1	2	3	4
e. The Courts (Pengadilan)	0	1	2	3	4
f. Prosecutor General (Kejaksaan)	0	1	2	3	4
g. People's Representative and Consultative Assembly of Republic of Indonesia (MPR and DPR RI)/ People of Congress	0	1	2	3	4

9. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Strongly Disagree	Mostly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Mostly Agree	Strongly Agree
a. I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c. Other people seem to have an easier time understanding complicated issues than I do.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d. I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
e. I often don't feel sure of myself when talking with other people about politics and government.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
f. I think that I am as well-informed about politics and government as most people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
g. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

10. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.							
	Strongly Disagree	Mostly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Mostly Agree	Strongly Agree
a. The Gay and Lesbian groups have publicly tried to conduct some activities like seminars and beauty contest for gay people. Therefore, it is normal for society to use force or any violent means in order to stop their activities.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b. Any Muslims who bluntly declare that there is a prophet after Muhammad are considered to be infidels/apostates and the enemy of Islam; their blood is allowed to be shed.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c. There have been some churches built without legal consent. Therefore, it is okay if some people force those churches to close, including with some necessary violent means.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d. Prostitution has been legalized and localized in many cities. We have no other way out to stop prostitutions, but to stop them with the use of force, including some necessary violent actions.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
e. The problems of gambling and drinking have been growing in Indonesian society. We have no other way out to stop them except with the use of force, including some necessary violent actions.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

11. How old are you?.....................years old

12. *What is the highest educational level you have achieved?*
 a. Junior High School (SMP) b. Senior High School
 c. Undergraduate (S1) Major in……………………. d. Master (S2) Major in…………..
 e. Doctoral (S3) Major in………………………….. e. Informal Islamic School (Pesantren)

13. In your daily life, how do you identify yourself (the highest priority)?
 a. An Indonesian b. A Muslim c. By profession…………… d. By Ethnicity
 d. By ethnicity……….. e By organization groups………………

APPENDIX B

CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE OBSERVED VARIABLES

MEASURING TRUST IN GOVERNMENT'S WORK

	Q7a	Q7b	Q7c	Q7d	Q7e	Q7f	Q7g
Q7a	1.000						
Q7b	.559	1.000					
Q7c	.470	.604	1.000				
Q7d	.432	.582	.531	1.000			
Q7e	-.020	.061	.156	.088	1.000		
Q7f	-.066	.092	.095	.102	.477	1.000	
Q7g	-.131	.069	.109	.072	.464	.672	1.000

CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE OBSERVED VARIABLES

	Q6a	Q6b	Q6c	Q6d	Q6e	Q6f	Q6g	Q6h	Q6i	Q6j	Q6k	Q6l	Q6m	Q6n	Q8a	Q8b	Q8c	Q8d	Q8e	Q8f	Q8g	Q9a	Q9b	Q9c	Q9d	Q9e	Q9f	Q10a	Q10b	Q10c	Q10d	Q10e	Q10f	Group
Q6a	1.000																																	
Q6b	.675	1.000																																
Q6c	.492	.456	1.000																															
Q6d	.499	.472	.656	1.000																														
Q6e	.224	.175	.435	.348	1.000																													
Q6f	.238	.232	.320	.264	.400	1.000																												
Q6g	.323	.289	.306	.245	.295	.229	1.000																											
Q6h	.596	.536	.441	.498	.188	.350	.247	1.000																										
Q6i	.544	.473	.535	.479	.177	.322	.207	.830	1.000																									
Q6j	.649	.564	.458	.493	.118	.246	.238	.863	.775	1.000																								
Q6k	.481	.489	.531	.515	.243	.313	.236	.592	.630	.628	1.000																							
Q6l	.502	.443	.451	.498	.194	.319	.225	.582	.514	.648	.623	1.000																						
Q6m	.350	.471	.355	.255	.175	.157	.132	.541	.521	.559	.451	.451	1.000																					
Q6n	.637	.598	.462	.522	.264	.291	.408	.716	.630	.727	.576	.630	.537	1.000																				
Q8a	-.010	.032	.098	.153	.124	.091	.006	-.076	.021	-.052	.136	-.053	-.043	-.119	1.000																			
Q8b	-.122	.006	.118	.045	.143	.189	.003	-.116	-.137	-.089	.108	-.053	-.109	-.153	.429	1.000																		
Q8c	-.141	-.074	.096	.027	.177	.182	.013	-.218	-.136	-.203	.070	-.123	-.154	-.178	.462	.653	1.000																	
Q8d	-.264	-.162	-.045	.022	.058	.111	-.077	-.101	-.097	-.123	.048	.159	-.124	-.096	.166	.254	.322	1.000																
Q8e	-.261	-.151	.024	.045	.132	.172	-.028	-.042	-.091	-.118	.047	.098	-.100	-.043	.119	.343	.391	.697	1.000															
Q8f	-.241	-.117	-.014	.070	.104	.136	-.010	.012	-.037	-.040	.064	.155	-.074	-.009	.088	.298	.355	.741	.847	1.000														
Q8g	.126	.083	-.007	.074	.025	.249	.153	.240	.234	.218	.158	.154	.115	.164	.198	.146	.049	.110	.203	.206	1.000													
Q9a	-.149	-.107	-.231	-.257	-.108	-.059	.002	-.126	-.113	-.149	-.149	-.248	-.030	-.109	.002	-.060	-.021	-.194	-.135	-.167	.252	1.000												
Q9b	.062	.047	-.086	-.034	-.011	.115	.036	.058	.066	.087	.027	.086	.100	.054	.043	-.094	.003	.050	-.027	-.025	.078	.397	1.000											
Q9c	.135	.066	-.163	-.080	.001	.128	.082	.102	.065	.089	-.019	.076	.073	.069	-.098	-.155	-.087	-.132	-.127	-.146	.098	.461	.676	1.000										
Q9d	-.332	-.247	-.237	-.295	-.026	-.114	-.283	-.312	-.329	-.349	-.263	-.238	-.242	-.452	.029	.166	.054	.196	.043	.043	-.178	.027	.135	.037	1.000									
Q9e	-.153	-.110	-.310	-.257	-.126	-.035	.016	-.122	-.108	-.106	-.152	-.134	-.003	-.081	.028	-.095	-.046	-.024	-.107	-.137	.149	.675	.519	.496	.160	1.000								
Q9f	-.341	-.449	-.334	-.353	-.256	-.141	-.309	-.374	-.283	-.354	-.304	-.304	-.334	-.459	-.053	-.116	-.002	-.011	-.129	-.071	-.127	.224	.138	.156	.358	.250	1.000							
Q10a	.537	.465	.427	.427	.150	.214	.301	.610	.548	.647	.426	.519	.386	.653	-.142	-.136	-.198	-.216	-.139	-.158	.098	-.032	.110	.163	-.338	.013	-.305	1.000						
Q10b	.571	.476	.447	.445	.168	.251	.319	.591	.546	.651	.465	.451	.319	.601	-.014	-.081	-.165	-.191	-.112	-.133	.168	-.103	.023	.081	-.330	-.110	-.341	.712	1.000					
Q10c	.590	.530	.493	.503	.253	.305	.277	.632	.577	.649	.505	.527	.337	.618	-.023	-.035	-.084	-.054	.026	-.009	.090	-.147	.065	.086	-.247	-.130	-.323	.736	.740	1.000				
Q10d	.556	.473	.429	.444	.097	.212	.290	.640	.548	.667	.467	.505	.366	.614	-.150	-.179	-.229	-.241	-.157	-.165	.155	-.001	.088	.126	-.337	.016	-.227	.806	.686	.761	1.000			
Q10e	.547	.451	.396	.389	.086	.190	.303	.631	.549	.671	.458	.495	.399	.611	-.105	-.207	-.223	-.201	-.142	-.155	.139	.002	.068	.143	-.336	.052	-.199	.752	.660	.693	.832	1.000		
Q10f	.551	.498	.366	.361	-.001	.166	.281	.611	.530	.684	.426	.507	.419	.650	-.166	-.185	-.249	-.256	-.168	-.171	.131	-.032	.036	.144	-.364	.015	-.245	.762	.683	.692	.773	.817	1.000	
Group	.507	.398	.237	.218	.097	.197	.197	.517	.490	.586	.341	.402	.423	.548	-.169	-.176	-.228	-.206	-.187	-.142	.141	-.149	.038	.171	-.301	-.079	-.236	.545	.519	.477	.518	.532	.629	1.000

APPENDIX D

COVARIANCE MATRIX OF THE OBSERVED VARIABLES

Variables	Q6a	Q6b	Q6c	Q6d	Q6e	Q6f	Q6g	Q6h	Q6i	Q6j	Q6k	Q6l	Q6m	Q6n	Q8a	Q8b	Q8c	Q8d	Q8e	Q8f	Q8g	Q9a	Q9b	Q9c	Q9d	Q9e	Q9f	Q10a	Q10b	Q10c	Q10d	Q10e	Q10f	Group
Q6a	3.90																																	
Q6b	2.34	3.09																																
Q6c	1.55	1.28	2.57																															
Q6d	1.62	1.37	1.73	2.70																														
Q6e	.47	.33	.74	.61	1.14																													
Q6f	.50	.43	.55	.46	.46	1.14																												
Q6g	.78	.62	.60	.49	.39	.30	1.51																											
Q6h	2.28	1.83	1.37	1.57	.39	.72	.59	3.75																										
Q6i	1.98	1.53	1.58	1.45	.35	.63	.47	2.961	3.39																									
Q6j	2.46	1.91	1.41	1.55	.24	.50	.56	3.21	2.73	3.69																								
Q6k	1.54	1.39	1.38	1.37	.42	.54	.47	1.86	1.88	1.95	2.62																							
Q6l	1.69	1.33	1.23	1.40	.35	.58	.47	1.93	1.62	2.12	1.72	2.91																						
Q6m	1.16	1.39	.95	.70	.313	.28	.27	1.76	1.61	1.80	1.22	1.29	2.80																					
Q6n	2.24	1.88	1.32	1.53	.503	.55	.89	2.48	2.07	2.49	1.66	1.92	1.61	3.18																				
Q8a	-.01	.03	.08	.13	.07	.05	.00	-.074	.02	-.05	.11	-.05	-.04	-.11	.25																			
Q8b	-.14	.01	.11	.04	.09	.12	.00	-.130	-.15	-.10	.10	-.05	-.11	-.16	.12	.33																		
Q8c	-.16	-.08	.09	.03	.11	.11	.01	-.249	-.15	-.23	.07	-.12	-.15	-.19	.14	.22	.35																	
Q8d	-.28	-.15	-.04	.02	.03	.06	-.05	-.106	-.10	-.13	.04	.15	-.11	-.09	.04	.08	.10	.29																
Q8e	-.30	-.16	.02	.04	.08	.11	-.02	-.048	-.10	-.13	.04	.10	-.10	-.04	.03	.12	.13	.22	.35															
Q8f	-.26	-.11	-.01	.06	.06	.08	-.01	.013	-.04	-.04	.06	.14	-.07	-.01	.02	.09	.11	.22	.27	.29														
Q8g	.12	.07	-.01	.06	.01	.13	.09	.230	.21	.21	.13	.13	.09	.14	.05	.04	.01	.03	.06	.05	.24													
Q9a	-.46	-.30	-.58	-.66	-.18	-.10	.00	-.38	-.33	-.45	-.38	-.67	-.08	-.31	.00	-.05	-.02	-.16	-.12	-.14	.20	2.48												
Q9b	.15	.10	-.17	-.07	-.01	.15	.05	.14	.15	.21	.05	.18	.21	.12	.03	-.07	.00	.03	-.02	-.02	.05	.77	1.54											
Q9c	.31	.13	-.30	-.15	.00	.16	.11	.23	.14	.19	-.03	.15	.14	.14	-.06	-.10	-.06	-.08	-.08	-.09	.05	.83	.96	1.31										
Q9d	-.86	-.57	-.50	-.64	-.04	-.16	-.46	-.79	-.78	-.88	-.56	-.53	-.53	-1.06	.02	.13	.04	.14	.034	.03	-.11	.06	.22	.06	1.727									
Q9e	-.41	-.26	-.67	-.57	-.18	-.05	.03	-.32	-.27	-.27	-.33	-.31	-.01	-.19	.02	-.07	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.10	.10	1.43	.87	.76	.28	1.82								
Q9f	-.99	-1.16	-.79	-.85	-.40	-.22	-.56	-1.06	-.77	-1.00	-.72	-.76	-.82	-1.20	-.04	-.10	-.00	-.01	-.11	-.06	-.09	.52	.25	.26	.69	.49	2.16							
Q10a	1.90	1.47	1.23	1.26	.29	.41	.66	2.12	1.81	2.23	1.24	1.59	1.16	2.09	-.13	-.14	-.21	-.21	-.15	-.15	.09	-.09	.24	.34	-.80	.03	-.80	3.23						
Q10b	2.13	1.58	1.36	1.38	.34	.51	.74	2.17	1.90	2.37	1.42	1.46	1.01	2.03	-.01	-.09	-.18	-.19	-.12	-.14	.16	-.31	.05	.17	-.82	-.28	-.95	2.42	3.58					
Q10c	1.91	1.53	1.30	1.36	.44	.53	.56	2.01	1.74	2.04	1.34	1.48	.93	1.81	-.02	-.03	-.08	-.05	.03	-.01	.07	-.38	.13	.16	-.53	-.29	-.78	2.17	2.30	2.69				
Q10d	1.87	1.42	1.17	1.24	.18	.39	.61	2.12	1.72	2.19	1.29	1.47	1.05	1.87	-.13	-.18	-.23	-.22	-.16	-.15	.13	-.00	.19	.25	-.76	.04	-.57	2.47	2.22	2.13	2.91			
Q10e	1.83	1.34	1.07	1.08	.16	.34	.63	2.07	1.71	2.18	1.25	1.43	1.13	1.84	-.09	-.20	-.22	-.18	-.14	-.14	.12	.01	.14	.28	-.75	.12	-.49	2.29	2.11	1.93	2.40	2.87		
Q10f	1.98	1.59	1.07	1.08	-.00	.32	.63	2.16	1.78	2.39	1.26	1.57	1.28	2.11	-.15	-.19	-.27	-.25	-.18	-.17	.12	-.09	.08	.30	-.87	.04	-.66	2.49	2.35	2.07	2.40	2.52	3.31	
Group	.50	.35	.19	.18	.05	.10	.12	.50	.45	.56	.27	.34	.35	.49	-.04	-.05	-.07	-.05	-.05	-.04	.03	-.12	.02	.10	-.20	-.05	-.17	.49	.49	.39	.44	.45	.57	.24

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