“CHINESENESS” AND TONGZHI IN (POST)COLONIAL DIASPORIC HONG KONG

A Thesis

by

CHI CH’ENG WAT

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE

December 2011

Major Subject: Sociology
“Chineseness” and Tongzhi in (Post)colonial Diasporic Hong Kong

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Approved by:

Co-Chairs of Committee, Ashley Currier
Sarah N. Gatson
Committee Members, Zulema Valdez
Head of Department, Jane Sell

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ABSTRACT

“Chineseness” and Tongzhi in (Post)colonial Diasporic Hong Kong. (December 2011)

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In this thesis, I examine how colonial constructs on Chinese culture affects people’s views toward sexual minorities in Hong Kong. In the first Chapter, I explain the shift of my research focus after I started my research. I also conduct a brief literature review on existing literature on sexual minorities in mainland China and Hong Kong. In the second Chapter, I examine interviewees’ accounts of family pressure and perceived conflicts between their religious beliefs and sexual orientation. I analyze interviewees’ perceptions of social attitudes toward sexual minorities. Hidden in these narratives is an internalized colonial construct of Chinese culture in Hong Kong. This construct prevented some interviewees from connecting Christianity with oppression toward sexual minorities in Hong Kong.

In the third Chapter, I examine the rise of right-wing Christian activism in pre- and post- handover Hong Kong. I also analyze how sexual-minority movement organizations and right-wing Christians organized in response to the political situation in Hong Kong. Then, I present the result of content analysis on debates around two amendments to the Domestic Violence Ordinance (DVO)—the first legislation related to
sexual minorities in Hong Kong after handover. I draw on data from online news archives and meeting minutes and submissions of the Legislative Council (LegCo).

Based on the rhetoric of US right-wing Christians’ “(nuclear) family values,” Hong Kong right-wing Christians supported excluding same-sex cohabiting partners from the DVO. This rhetoric carved out a space for different narratives about “Chinese culture” and “Chinese family.” These different versions of Chinese culture matched diasporic sentiment toward the motherland and gained currency from post-handover political landscape and power configuration in Hong Kong. These versions also revealed the colonized and diasporic mindset of opponents of the amendments; these mindsets also reflect the same internalized colonial construct of “Chineseness” my interviewees have.

Based on analyses of interview data in Chapter II and in Chapter III of how people view sexual minorities, I argue that a colonial diasporic psyche aptly captures people’s views toward sexual minorities in Hong Kong. Since the political situation and DVO are specific to Hong Kong, I do not include interviewees who are not of Hong Kong origin in this thesis.
To all of us, who are wandering in time and space and keep wondering to where we belong.

It does not matter who we are; and it matters too much.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My gratitude goes to all interviewees of this thesis project, for their time and for their trust. I tried my best to present what they told me. I do not think that I did a very good job but I will keep trying.

I would like to express my gratitude to my committee. Dr. Ashley Currier has been providing supports from the very beginning of my graduate study in Sociology. I would especially like to express my gratitude for her encouragement, guidance, and efforts along the way; for these, I will always be grateful. Dr. Sarah N. Gatson helps me to see the big picture of the project and also from different perspectives. Dr. Zulema encourages me to think critically about my methodology and theoretical framework. In addition to my committee, I would also like to thank Dr. Vantia Reddy in the Department of English at Texas A&M University for providing invaluable feedbacks on an early draft of Chapter II of this thesis.

My special thanks go to conference organizers, faculty advisors, and presenters at the (Dis)locating Queer: Race, Region, and Sexual Diasporas Graduate Symposium at the University of Illinois—Urbana Champaign. They provided invaluable comments on Chapter II of this thesis. This Symposium also welcomed me and embraced me as part of a warm intellectual community, no matter how temporary it was. To all my cohorts, friends, and colleagues at Texas A&M University, thank you for your academic discussions and friendship we share. There are too many of you and I cannot say thanks to everyone here; but you know who you are! It is always my pleasure and honor to
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

I started my thesis project as an attempt to investigate the possible influence that the legal recognition of same-sex intimate relationships in Portugal and the United Kingdom (UK) may have on sexual minorities in their former colonies, Macao and Hong Kong, respectively. I wanted to understand how the legal recognition of same-sex intimate relationships might affect sexual minorities’ decisions to migrate to Portugal and the UK. My fieldwork in Hong Kong unearthed evidence that some Hong Kong same-sex couples traveled to Canada to marry their partners. I was able to conduct fieldwork in Canada during December 2010 and January 2011 and interviewed people who were involved in the same-sex wedding industry, including one married lesbian couple of Hong Kong origin who also own a same-sex wedding planning service. Except for this couple, I was not able to interview Hong Kong couples who came to Canada to marry their partners. Due to the lack of interviews on Hong Kong married same-sex couples and new questions that emerged from interview data I collected in Hong Kong, I decided to change the focus of this thesis.

During my fieldwork in Hong Kong, interviewees’ responses to the question about social attitudes toward sexual minorities intrigued me, though their answers were not completely unexpected. The majority of interviewees shared their experiences of

This thesis follows the style of American Journal of Sociology.
family pressure; however, they also attributed the conservatism of Hong Kong society to Chinese culture, in a way that situated China as conservative and the West as progressive. At the same time, the most high-profile antigay campaigns were organized by Hong Kong right-wing Christians. Many interviewees seemed to be unaware of this antigay movement. This further puzzled me. My research question shifted to explore this missing connection. I also wanted to examine if there was any relationship between the sovereignty handover and right-wing Christian organizing.

In order to answer these questions, I collected news articles related to right-wing Christian activism from five different online newspapers achieves. Preliminary results led me also to collect documents on the amendment of the Domestic Violence Ordinance (DVO) maintained in the online archive of the Legislative Council (LegCo) of Hong Kong. I balanced my archival data by collecting news articles from three right-wing Christian archives, one “neutral” newspaper, and one online independent media source that favorably reports on sexual-minority activism.

I organized the data I collected into two articles with a separate introduction, literature review, method, result, and conclusion; however, they are interconnected with each other. The first article, which is Chapter II, examines family pressure, religion, and the view of “conservative China and progressive West.” The second article, which is Chapter III, focuses on how people use a colonial construct of “Chinese family” to oppose legal protection for tongzhi. Chapter III also inquires how changes in the Chinese political situation affected the colonial diasporic psyche collectively and gave currency to antigay “Chinese family value” rhetoric.
Literature Review

In the following sections of this Chapter, I first perform a general literature review on tongzhi studies in mainland China\(^1\). Following this is background information on Hong Kong; and I will explain why prior research on mainland China cannot adequately explain the situation of tongzhi in Hong Kong. I then perform a general literature review on tongzhi in Hong Kong; I review specific literatures related to each Chapter at the beginning of each Chapter separately.

Mainland China

Examinations of tongzhi in mainland China cannot be separated from its legal, political, and economic history. During the Qing dynasty (AD 1644-1911), people in general considered same-sex intimate relationships as social practices rather than as resulting in social identities or subjectivities; there were no distinctive types of people as sexual minorities (Dikötter 1995). Furthermore, the Qing penal code of 1740 had no laws prohibiting homosexual acts. The penal code punished both homosexual and heterosexual extramarital sex, but did not distinguish between homosexual and heterosexual acts (Chou 2009). Punishing extramarital sex ensured that the patriarchal family system was not challenged (Chou 2009)\(^2\).

\(^{1}\) I include a mainland Chinese literature review upon the request of my thesis committee. I by *no* means suggest that Hong Kong sexual minority studies should be under mainland China sexual minority studies, at least not for my thesis.

\(^{2}\) Although Hong Kong became a British colony in 1842 and remained so until 1997, many of the Qing laws still governed ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong until 1971, when the British colonial government decided to fully replace Qing law with British common law (Marriage Reform Ordinance 1971). As a result, the legal departure on homosexuality between mainland China and Hong Kong occurred after the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) (1911- ).
During the early period of the Republic of China (ROC)\(^3\) (1911-), under a desperate desire to build a strong nation, the ROC government drew from British eugenics discourses. It was during this time that homosexuality was labeled as “perversion” and a threat to the nation’s population because of the assumption that homosexuality was inherently nonprocreative (Dikötter 1995). Nevertheless, homosexuality was not legally criminalized. After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized power in mainland China in 1949, homosexuality rapidly became a marker of the bourgeoisie, and thus, the homosexual became a “class enemy” under the communist revolution (Jones 2007). There was no law specifically targeting homosexuals \textit{per se}; however, starting from the beginning of the PRC until mid-1990s, the police regularly arrested homosexuals under suspicion of “hooliganism” (Ruan 1991, pp.3). Under socialism, “hooliganism” referred to activities that were considered immoral and antisocialist and included activities that were not appropriate social relations (Rofel 2007, pp. 96). “Hooliganism” was an effort by the CCP to prohibit any kind of unsanctioned social and organized activities in the public space (Rofel 2007, pp.96). Furthermore, during the Mao period from the 1950s to 1970s, homosexuality was invisible in magazines, newspapers, and other media (Sang 2003, pp. 163) due to the tight control the CCP exerted on all media. In the Mao era, the collective interest of the communist revolution and the nation building triumphed the expression and realization of individual desires, including sexual desires (Wang and Barlow 2002).

\(^3\) The ROC now only administrates Taiwan.
After Mao died in 1976, Deng Xiaoping relaunched economic reform in mainland China in 1978, which was interrupted by the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), whose goal was to introduce free market elements into the state-planned economy (Cheek 2006). During this period of economic reform, inflation and corruption became two major issues in the PRC (Cheek 2006, pp.68). In mid-April of 1989, some students gathered in the Tiananmen Square to protest and ask the government to address these issues. Gradually, this protest became a democracy movement, which resulted in military actions by the CCP against the unarmed students on June 4th 1989. The solution of the CCP to the social unrest was to accelerate the economic reform in the aftermath of Tiananmen Crackdown, including privatizing state-owned enterprises and partially abolishing social welfare, which affected rural areas much more than urban areas (Cheek 2006, pp.103-121).

**Suzhi and Desire in Reform Era**

In the reform era, *suzhi* (素質, quality) and “desire” become the two major elements constituting the mainland Chinese citizenship in the new neoliberal economy (Kipnis 2006). *Suzhi* has its genealogy traced back to the eugenics project by the ROC during the early Republican era—in order to have a strong and prosperous nation, the people should be of good quality—good *suzhi* (Kipnis 2006). In the contemporary neoliberal mainland China, a discourse of *suzhi* is used to justify the structural inequalities between the rural and the urban areas that are results of the economic reform—rural people have low *suzhi*; therefore, they are suffering from poverty
(Anagnost 2004). As a result, *suzhi* inevitably contains the notion of cosmopolitanism and wealth. The new mainland Chinese citizenship is also embodied by how much and what kind of consumptions people have (Davis 2000; Xu 2009). After the end of the repressive Mao era, everyone should have the right to consume, which is understood as one of the major ways for people to fulfill their desires. In this particular social, political, and economic context, *suzhi* and desire also becomes the two major themes in contemporary discourses about same-sex intimate relationships in mainland China (Ho 2008; Kong 2010; Rofel 2007; Rofel 2010).

*Suzhi* as a hegemonic discourse in contemporary mainland China also diffuses into the lives of *tongzhi*. This *suzhi* discourse allows *tongzhi* in mainland China to escape the construction of *tongzhi* as deviance and “perverts” to become Chinese citizens in the neoliberal mainland China. *Tongzhi* are also citizens with *suzhi*—they are also civilized and cosmopolitan (Kong 2010, pp.169-73). At the same time, people do not suppose that desire and individuality should be oppressed as it was in the Mao era; as a result, although some officials and general public condemned homosexuality as abnormal, some others argue that everyone is entitled to fulfill their desires, including homoerotic desires, in the post-Mao mainland China (Rofel 2007 pp.146-55).

However, at the same time, *suzhi* also stigmatizes rural *tongzhi* migrants in cities. This is especially the case for the “money boys”—who are rural migrants and “men who sell sex to other men” (Rofel 2010, pp.425). They are stigmatized as rural people who sell sex because they want to be in the cities; according to Rofel, this narrative implies that these money boys pretend to be gay to stay in the cities (Rofel 2010, pp.425). At the
same time, the existence of money boys also threatens the newly acquired citizenship for tongzhi—money boys are rural, they will lower the suzhi of the tongzhi communities (Ho 2008, pp.500).

The rural/urban divide also affects the strategies tongzhi deploy to evade family pressure and rejection, which are prevalent among mainland Chinese tongzhi (Chou 2009; Jones 2007; Rofel 2007). While rural tongzhi have the option of moving to urban areas to escape family pressure (Liu and Choi 2006), it is not desirable for urban tongzhi to move to rural areas because rural areas represent poverty and undesirable living, working, and educational conditions in contemporary mainland China.

Mainland China and Hong Kong

Amidst this discourse of suzhi—a specific product of mainland Chinese political and economic situations—“Hong Kong” occupies a peculiar position in the tongzhi discourse in mainland China. First, the adoption of tongzhi identity in mainland China, originated from Hong Kong (Chou 2001). In the neoliberal mainland China, where many people are rushing to leave the communism in the past (Zhen 2000), claiming a tongzhi identity more or less reflects an affinity of mainland tongzhi toward Hong Kong (Rofel 2007, pp. 102-3). Second, for many mainland Chinese, Hong Kong is foreign and simultaneously related to mainland China, but who does not have “a self-identical relationship with China” (pp.109). Hong Kong also signifies “sexual freedom” to mainland tongzhi (pp.109). This “foreignness” of Hong Kong, of course, is closely related to its colonial history. This colonial history also troubles the “foreignness” of
Hong Kong tongzhi subjectivity in the eyes of mainland tongzhi. As Rofel (2007 pp.100-1) describes, ethnic Chinese tongzhi from Hong Kong who reside in Beijing harbor a strong sense of “Chinese”/“foreign” divide of “how” to be tongzhi. This implies that “foreignness” can be “Chineseness”, depending on one’s perspective. Also, this “we/they” binary of Hong Kong tongzhi is a characteristic of the colonized’s self-policing of the boundary between the colonizer and themselves (Chatterjee 2001).

**Western (Gay) Modernity?**

As suzhi carries a meaning of cosmopolitanism and mainland Chinese tongzhi describe Hong Kong as foreign and a place of sexual freedom, there is ambivalence about whether a mainland Chinese tongzhi subjectivity is indeed located within a western gay modernity discourse. Altman (1997) articulates a universal global gay identity, which contains the notion that the West is the origin of gay liberation and thus creates different stages of time in which the West is in the front—modern—while the rest of the world, particularly Asia, is “behind.” In Altman’s vision of gay liberation, Asian homosexual practice is “pre-political”—Asians have not or some Asians have just started political activities in striving for gay rights. In other words, the end stage of gay modernity is gay rights. Rofel (2007, pp. 89-94) challenges this Western gay modernity and claims that it is not the mode of gay subjectivity in mainland China. Rofel situates mainland Chinese tongzhi subjectivity in neoliberal mainland China; this subjectivity is a product of the specific legal, political, and economic conditions of mainland China.
However, positioning mainland Chinese tongzhi within the neoliberal discourse of mainland China puts tongzhi in the Western modernity discourse. When tongzhi subjectivity is also a neoliberal subjectivity, it situates tongzhi into a “development” discourse along with the economic development of mainland China. Eng (2010, pp.466) argues that narratives by interviewees in Rofel’s study “implicitly situates China in a discourse of development.” Neoliberalism itself situates mainland China in what Chakrabarty (2000, pp.8) calls the “imaginary waiting room of history”—members of non-Western societies futilely chase after Western standards. Eng (2010, pp. 467) argues that mainland China is also waiting—waiting for the development of the economy and the “proper subjectivity, agency, and desire” that come with “privacy and property, rights and markets, individualism and choice” of neoliberalism. Under a neoliberal economy and an authoritarian political regime, individualism and freedom of a neoliberal subject, including a neoliberal tongzhi subject, serve as a yardstick to measure mainland China’s position in the modern world. In the authoritarian political regime, people usually consider the PRC lacks respect for human rights; if gay rights signify gay modernity, mainland China lags far behind.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong was a British colony from 1842 to 1997, with a brief period of military occupation by the Japanese Empire (1941-1945) during World War II (Carroll 2007). In 1997, Hong Kong became one of the two Special Administrative Regions (SAR) of PRC when the United Kingdom (UK) transferred the sovereignty of Hong
Kong to the PRC. After the sovereignty handover, Hong Kong still remains a largely separate political, economic, legal, and social entity from mainland China. There is a border control between mainland China and the Hong Kong SAR. The Basic Law—the constitution of Hong Kong SAR is only effective in Hong Kong but not in mainland China—safeguards the human rights, democracy, and freedom of residents of the Hong Kong SAR (Chan 1991). British common laws, when not in violation of the Basic Law, are still in full effect in Hong Kong. Except for matters related to foreign affairs and military defense for which the Central People’s Government of the PRC is in charge, Hong Kong SAR government is responsible for all of its internal affairs. The final adjudication power of Hong Kong SAR stays in Hong Kong SAR. Only twelve national laws of the PRC apply to Hong Kong SAR. The “return” of Hong Kong to the PRC does not mean that colonization ended in Hong Kong. The sovereignty transfer was completely a result of a diplomatic negotiation between the UK and the PRC and did not involve any self-determination of the people in Hong Kong. As Chow (1992) suggests, the return of Hong Kong to the PRC was more an act of recolonization than returning of diaspora to the motherland. This complicated the situation of Hong Kong; it is still in a colonial condition.

As reviewed in the previous section, mainland Chinese tongzhi subjectivity is constructed by the specific legal, political, and economic conditions of mainland China. In Hong Kong, there were no communist regime, Mao era, or economic reform—all of which constructed the mainland Chinese tongzhi subjectivity and affect their lives. As a

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4 The other one is Macao SAR, which was a former Portuguese colony.
result, the mainland Chinese *tongzhi* literatures cannot comprehensively explain the *tongzhi* situation in Hong Kong, if not at all\(^5\). On the other hand, the specific diasporic and colonial condition of Hong Kong constructed the *tongzhi* subjectivity. The following sections are on the diasporic and colonial conditions of Hong Kong.

**Chinese Diasporas\(^6\) and Cultural Nationalism in Hong Kong**

Hong Kong was a major destination for Chinese who sought to escape political and economic instabilities caused by the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), the Second Opium War (1856-1860), the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the overthrow of the last Chinese dynasty (1894-1911), the First Chinese Civil War (1927-1936), the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), World War II (1939-1945), the Second Chinese Civil War (1946-1950), and a series of chaotic political campaigns initiated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in mainland China (1958-1976). Furthermore, Hong Kong was also a major destination of many ethnic Chinese, mainly from Southeast Asia, who sought refuge when newly independent countries in Southeast Asia carried out anti-Chinese policies (Pina-Cabral 2002). Mobility and a refugee mentality typify Chinese diasporic identity in Hong Kong (Lin 2003).

Cultural nationalism in Hong Kong gave moral meanings to the Chinese diaspora for their lives as exile and fulfilled their “nostalgic longing for an imagined China” (Law

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\(^5\) None of the literature on mainland Chinese *tongzhi* reviewed here suggests that their studies also apply to Hong Kong. The co-chairs of my committee suggested me to include a literature review on mainland Chinese *tongzhi* because some readers might not fully understand the differences between the situations of mainland China and Hong Kong.

\(^6\) There are many other diasporas from different parts of the world living in Hong Kong. I only focus on Chinese diaspora in this thesis.
Cultural nationalism in Hong Kong stressed the importance of learning Chinese language, but did not criticize British colonialism (Law pp.144). As a result, cultural nationalism did not insert Chinese diaspora into the politics of the colony. Cultural nationalism the exiled scholars promoted only provided a “traumatic void rather than a coherent ideology” about China for Chinese diaspora in Hong Kong (Law 2009, pp.141). Since there was not a coherent narrative about the motherland, different forces and ideologies were free to shape the Chinese diasporic identity in Hong Kong. One of these forces was Cold War ideology.

The Construction of Chinese Diasporic Identity in Hong Kong

During the 1950s, the United States deemed Hong Kong as one of the cultural fronts to contain the communist ideology from spreading and invested a lot of money in education and cultural activities to establish an anti-communist ideology in Hong Kong (Law 2009, p.132-176). There was a discourse of “China as hell” and “Hong Kong as heaven” (Law 2009, pp.143). This “China” meant the Communist regime, the PRC. This discourse depicted British colonial Hong Kong as part of the liberal-democracy camp and the “free world,” which was pitted against the communist “un-free” world. Since there was a huge influx of refugees fleeing wars and political prosecution from the PRC, Cold War ideology easily rooted in Hong Kong. Cold War ideology served as the foundation of an emerging Hong Kongese identity when Hong Kong people felt alienated from their motherland.
One of the major political upheavals in the PRC—the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)—alienated ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong from China politically. President Mao initiated a Cultural Revolution in mainland China against anyone who was not a communist, working class, or a farmer. This campaign involved violent mass tortures and persecution (Kleinman and Kleinman 1994). Many Hong Kongese found mainland China during the Cultural Revolution as strange, dark, and alienating (Mathews 1997). At the same period of time, a post-World War II generation of Hong Kong residents reached adulthood and developed a distinct Hong Kongese identity, which is different from a Chinese identity (Mathews 1997). The Hong Kongese identity is “Chineseness” with an addition of colonial education, cosmopolitanism, democracy, and human rights (Mathews 1997). Cold War ideology helped rationalize Hong Kong, a British colony, as a “democratic society” that respected human rights; these democracy and human rights were constructed against the lack thereof in the PRC.

The construction of “China”—the PRC—as the Other of Hong Kong complicated the diasporic identity among ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong. The PRC needed (and still needs) Hong Kong to construct its image as the “loving motherland”, welcoming her long lost child, Hong Kong, “home”; the intended recipients of this “loving motherland” image were Taiwan and other overseas Chinese. On the other hand, the Hong Kongese identity was often (and still is) constructed in contrast to the “backwardness” of the PRC (Law 2009, pp.177-198). As a result, there were two dimensions of “Chineseness” within the diasporic identity in Hong Kong—the first is cultural, and the second is political-economic—that drag ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong...
in two opposite directions. The PRC is where the motherland is, which implies that
culture among diasporic Chinese originates in mainland China. This motherland-
diaspora relationship puts the PRC in a culturally authoritative position over Hong Kong.
On the other hand, on the notion that capitalism and democracy should be the end stage
of all human societies, the diasporic identity put Hong Kong in a more advanced position
in this temporal development model⁷.

The Hong Kongese identity is more than just being diasporic. The “diasporic
elements” that distinguish the Hong Kongese identity from a Chinese identity
correspond to what Eurocentrists defines as “progress” (Amin 2009 [1989]).
Chakrabarty (2000, pp.8) calls the evaluation of a society’s “progressiveness” by
Eurocentric standards as putting non-Western societies into the “imaginary waiting room
of history,” as members of these societies futilely chase after these Western standards.
Since the Hong Kong diasporic identity was constructed with the “progressive” elements
and as the opposite of mainland China, the existence and deployment of Hong Kong
diasporic identity put mainland China into the “imaginary waiting room of history.” In a
Eurocentric progressive model, mainland China is even further behind Hong Kong.
Existing literature does not address how the diasporic condition of Hong Kong affects
tongzhi; in contrast, most studies focus on how the colonial condition of Hong Kong
affects tongzhi.

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⁷ For example, as of 2010, although the total GDP of mainland China far exceeds that of Hong Kong (US$ 5.9 trillion and US$224 billion, respectively), the difference between GDP per capita is huge between mainland China and Hong Kong, which are US$ 4,393 and US$31,877, respectively. Before the sovereignty handover, the gap was more or less within a similar range. For example, as of 1997, the GDP per capita of mainland China and Hong Kong was US$949 and US$25,374, respectively (The World Bank 2011).
Race and Colonial Legal Construction of Homosexuality

The British colonial government introduced the Offense Against the Person Ordinance in 1865. Under this ordinance, sexual behaviors between two consenting adult men were illegal in Hong Kong until 1991. The ordinance only penalized same-sex behaviors between two men, but not between two women (Offense Against Persons Ordinance 1901). In the Victorian age England, there was a belief that two women not capable of having sex with each other (Jennings 2007); as a result, the law was not direct against women who had sex with other women. Under the Offense Against the Person Ordinance, a man who was convicted of committing “act of gross indecency” with another man was liable to imprisonment for two years (Section 51). However, sodomy cases that received attention of authorities and the media usually involved only white men and occasionally couples of white and Chinese men (Chou 2009, pp.64).

As the British colonial government seldom interfered with affairs within the Chinese community, same-sex sexual encounters between two Chinese men were not under heavy governmental surveillance (Chou 2009, pp.62). At the same time, the Chinese community usually did not consider sexual behaviors between two Chinese men the same as the colonially criminalized homosexuality (Chou 2009, pp.64). Qing penal code did not differentiate between same-sex and heterosexual extramarital sex; as a result, the concept of “homosexuality” as a crime did not appear until the British colonial government enacted an anti-sodomy law in Hong Kong. Consequently, the colonial legal discourse on homosexuality constructed a gay subjectivity in Hong Kong as “white man.” Same-sex sexual behaviors between one white man and one Chinese man
provoked anxiety around racial boundaries. The Chinese community in Hong Kong accused gay white men of “contaminating” Chinese culture by introducing homosexuality to Chinese men (Chou 2009, pp.64). A binary of “us” and “them” between the colonizer and the colonized manifested in understanding of sexuality.

During early 1980s, a series of scandals involving several prominent British civil servants in Hong Kong who were allegedly homosexual urged the British government to consider decriminalizing sexual behaviors between two men. One argument against decriminalization was that homosexual behavior was unique to the West, and decriminalizing same-sex sexual acts would threaten traditional Chinese values (Leung 2007). Although both the criminalization and decriminalization of sexual behaviors between men were introduced by the British colonial government, people considered homosexuality as “Western,” not as “British.” Christian churches and groups fiercely opposed the decriminalization of sodomy. Their argument was not based on Christian teaching that homosexuality was a sin, but rather they argued that homosexuality was against Chinese tradition, values, and cultures (Chou 2009, pp.69). Chinese Christians created a binary in which homosexuality was Western, immoral, and individualistic, as opposed to Chinese culture which was moral and stressed family-based social order (Chou 2009, pp.69).

Due to pressure from Christian churches and other social sectors, the colonial government suspended the legal process of decriminalization. Decriminalization finally came in 1991; however, it was an indirect consequence of the British colonial

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8 The British government had already decriminalized sexual behaviors between two men in England and Wales in 1967 (Sexual Offenses Act 1967).
government’s plan to retreat from Hong Kong “gracefully”. After Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989, many Hong Kong residents were panicked about the prospect of returning to the PRC. In order to stabilize Hong Kong society and to alleviate residents’ fear, the British colonial government enacted the Bill of Rights in 1991 to protect residents from violation of human rights (Chou 2009, pp.76). The anti-sodomy law violated the Bill of Rights by interfering with people’s privacy. As a result, the British colonial government had to decriminalize sexual behaviors between two men in order to return a “liberal-democratic” Hong Kong to the PRC. Under British colonialism, Chinese diaspora in Hong Kong not only had a mentality of “we” and “they” with the colonizer, but also had an uneasy relationship with the motherland.
CHAPTER II

FAMILY PRESSURE, A GENERALIZED WEST, AND CHRISTIANITY

Introduction

Existing literature shows that in Hong Kong, the pressure for sexual minorities to “come out” to their family is enormous. As many parents experience difficulty accepting the fact that their children are sexual minorities, many people choose not to disclose their sexual identities to their parents. This Chapter focuses on interviewees’ narratives about family disapproval toward their sexual orientation. This type of disapproval is mainly based on the assumption that homosexuals cannot procreate. Interviewees’ accounts are embedded in Chinese culture. Some interviewees depicted friction within their families as intergenerational conflicts. However, interviewees described Chinese culture a conservative and a generalized West as accepting sexual minorities, which previous research does not address.

Moving from family to the society, some interviewees expressed a perspective that oppression toward sexual minorities in Hong Kong society is due to the conservatism of Chinese culture. Previous research shows that the colonizers’ Orientalist gaze toward the colonized was disseminated through diverse social mechanisms and influenced how the colonized viewed themselves (Cohn 1996; Said 1994). The Orientalist gaze is the gaze of the colonizers toward the colonized, who is the Other for the colonizers. In the case of British colonialism in Hong Kong, this Other is Chinese and that Chinese culture is static and despotic, as opposed to British culture. Yet, little is
known about how Orientalism has been transformed in the contemporary context of
equality and acceptance for sexual minorities. Drawing on Said’s (1994) theory of
Orientalism and interviewees’ narratives, I show that some sexual minorities hold an
internalized Orientalist view toward the oppressions of sexual minorities in Hong Kong.
Finally, I provide interviewees’ alternative accounts of oppression toward sexual
minorities in Hong Kong: Christianity.

**Literature Review**

*Nonprocreative Sex and Homosexuality*

Rubin (1993) argues that people organize sex into a hierarchy. In this hierarchy,
sexuality that is heterosexual and procreative is considered normal and natural;
nonprocreative, same-sex sexuality is considered abnormal and unnatural. British
common law has historically punished nonprocreative sex. In 1533, Henry VIII of
England first included buggery in statute law. Adopted from the church canon, buggery
was condemned as “against nature” and penalized with the death penalty. Buggery
included nonprocreative acts such as anal intercourse between a man and a woman, a
man and a man, and bestiality (Weeks 1996). In nineteenth-century England and Wales,
lawmakers lifted the death penalty against buggery, but the anti-sodomy law continued
to criminalize sex between men, but not women. Many contemporary countries that have
a British common law system have abolished the anti-sodomy law.

As the British expanded their colonial empire around the world, they also
introduced anti-sodomy law to its colonies, one of which was Hong Kong. In 1865, the
Offense Against the Person Ordinance 1865 came into effect in Hong Kong. This ordinance rendered sex between men illegal, but not sex between women (Section 51, Offense Against the Person Ordinance 1865). In the Victorian age England, there was a believe that two women not capable of having sex with each other (Jennings 2007); as a result, the law was not direct against women who had sex with other women.

Before Hong Kong became a British colony, the legal system in effect was the Qing penal code of 1740, which had no laws prohibiting homosexual acts. The penal code punished both homosexual and heterosexual extramarital sex, but did not distinguish between homosexual and heterosexual acts (Chou 2009). Such emphasis on legal punishment on extramarital sex was to ensure that the patriarchal family system was not challenged (Chou 2009). Procreation was the priority within the family; furthermore, whether a person was sexually normal or not did not depend on the gender of his/her erotic object choice but on whether s/he had fulfilled the duty to reproduce. As a result, although the sexual hierarchy in pre-republican China favored procreative sex over nonprocreative sex, there was no substantial difference between homosexuality and heterosexuality in this hierarchy. It was not until the republican era that China adopted the Western medical discourse that homosexuality as abnormal (Chou 2001).

*Family and Procreation--Chinese Cultures and Familial Biopolitics*

Previous research in Hong Kong examines family as an oppressive site for tongzhi in Hong Kong from the perspective of family duties. Family duties require people to take care of their elderly parents and produce children to continue the family
line. As a result, many *tongzhi* choose not to tell their parents about their sexual orientation to avoid any familial conflict (Chou 2009). However, Chou did not examine familial oppression from a broader social and colonial structure of Hong Kong.

Adopting Foucault’s theory of (1991) biopolitics, Ong (1993) argues that family organization in Hong Kong is not fully a Chinese tradition, but rather emerges out of a specific colonial situation. Foucault (1991) theorizes biopolitics as the governmental regulation of the sexual and reproductive behaviors of individuals and/or of population to guarantee the stability, development, and prosperity of a nation-state. Under British colonial rule, ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong were never full citizens of any country; as a result, they perceived familial interests over the interests of the society and the nation-state, which people practically did not have one (Ong 1993, pp.747-67). At the same time, under British colonial rule, the Hong Kong economy followed highly competitive laissez-faire capitalism; the British colonial government provided little welfare support. As a result, many Hong Kong residents depended heavily on family-kin networks to survive and accumulate wealth. Under these circumstances, families were under tremendous pressure to regulate themselves as healthy and successful units, which Ong calls “family biopolitics” (Ong 1999, pp. 110-36).

The continuation of families depends on procreation, and many people in Hong Kong deem homosexuality as inherently non-procreative and thus a threat to families. Under the regime of family biopolitics, *tongzhi* in Hong Kong cannot risk upsetting their families; for many people, leaving their families out of a sense of “gay liberation” is simply not an option. In the highly competitive social environment of Hong Kong, it is
difficult to survive without any family support (Kong 2010). Under these circumstances, tongzhi cannot afford to challenge heteronormative family structures. Such structures keep reproducing themselves under family biopolitics. Chinese culture, in this case family piety, obscures the underlying social and economic conditions that contribute to the formation of family biopolitics under British colonial ruling.

**Taboos on Sexualities and Sex**

Sexually repressive attitudes in Hong Kong may stem more from British colonial and Christian influences than a Chinese one (Ng and Lau 1990). Attitudes toward sex in China have fluctuated over time, characterized by long periods of sexual openness, but also punctuated by intermittent periods of tightened control over sexual morals (Ng and Lau 1990). Art and literature in different periods of time depicted Chinese adults openly enjoying a variety of sexual practices, including same-sex sexual acts, without much repression (Bullough 1976). During the Song Dynasty (970-1276 A.D.), Chinese society maintained a conservative point of view toward sex and prohibited open sexual expression (Bullough 1976). After the end of the Song Dynasty and until republican China (1276-1911 A.D.), diverse sexual practices and expressions thrived once again.

Christianity has a long history of repressing certain forms of sexualities, including homosexuality, but the ferocity against homosexuality has changed over time (Davis 1983). For example, hostility toward homosexuality grew after the Catholic Church metamorphosed into an all-male bureaucratic hierarchy of priests. Homosexuality was a taboo because it violated the hierarchical structure of the church
(Davies 1983, pp. 1047-9); intimate relationships between priests of different ranks transgressed the hierarchy. Foucault (1990[1978], pp. 3-9) suggests that religion was not the only cause of the repressive sexual culture in Europe. In industrializing Europe, sexual repression was a result of a newly formed bourgeois order; under capitalism, people were supposed to direct their maximum toward economic activities. As a result, people were supposed to reduce sexual activities to a minimal level and only for the purpose for reproduction; people were forbidden to talk about sex. This repressive sexual attitude was the sexual ideal of the Victorian age England (1837-1901) (Adam 1985), during which the British Empire colonized Hong Kong.

Orientalism, Colonialism, and Sexual Minorities

In the process of global colonial expansion, European empires developed a system of knowledge about the Orient,\(^9\) which Said (1994) calls “Orientalism.” In this system of knowledge, colonizers had the authority over the production of knowledge about the colonized. Furthermore, in this Orientalist imaginary, the Orient was anything but Europe—the Other of Europe. If Europe was modern, the Orient was primitive. Europe respected liberty and individuality, and the Orient did not (Metcalf 1996, pp. 32). As a result, the Orient needed European colonizers as the saviors to move toward modernity. As Cohn (1996) suggests, colonizers not only exerted formal military, legal, and other forms of governmental control, but also controlled the formation of culture and

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\(^9\) Said (1994) originally refers “Orient” to the Near East, but the concept of Orientalism can also apply to the Far East.
production of knowledge in their colonies. As a result, Orientalism was also produced, reproduced, and circulated in the colonies.

Pennycook (2002, pp. 97-102) shows that the British Empire and British Protestant missionaries in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century trained an Orientalist gaze on Chinese and Chinese culture. They produced a stagnant and despotic China, whose “social, economic and political systems were decried for their conservatism, for being immobi\textilized by the weight of tradition and history” (Yao 1999, pp. 104). This colonial construction of the fixity of Chinese culture justified the British attempt to colonize Chinese people; the British envisioned colonialism as an “intervention to force change upon a reluctant China” (Mackerras 1989, pp. 264). Since Chinese culture was constructed as unchanging and incompatible with modernity, this justified imperial domination of the Chinese and bringing them into modern progress (Spurr 1993, pp. 61-75). This viewpoint of the world still exists in the present, evidenced in the classification of the “First World” and “Third World” based on “Western standards of technological and political advancement” (pp. 69). This puts China in the “imaginary waiting room of history” (Chakrabarty 2000, pp.8).

This Orientalist narrative also appears in the contemporary context of demands for equality for sexual minorities. As the West seemingly becomes more accepting of sexual minorities, the East serves as the repressive Other. There seems to be a stereotype that cultures of the East are inherently less affirming toward sexual minorities than the West (Gopinath 1998; Lee 1997). Gopinath (1998, pp. 633) links this stereotype to the colonial construction of the repressive nature of non-Western societies, which needed
the rescue of Western civilization. However, in the specific context of the British Orientalist construction of Chinese culture, little is known about how this construction gained expression in the field of alternative sexualities.

Colonialism, Educational System, Christianity, and Upper- and Middle-Class

Two of the major functions of education in European colonies were to make colonization acceptable to the colonized (Altbach and Kelly 1978) and to train civic servants for the colonizer (Carnoy 1974; Nkabinde 1997). To lighten the load of education, British colonial governments collaborated with Christian missionaries by granting them financial aid and land to them to establish schools (Holmes 1967). As a result, the Roman Catholic Church and different Protestant dominations established their dominance in the educational system of British colonial Hong Kong, which continues to be the case today. The majority of the most prestigious schools in Hong Kong are still either Catholic or Protestant (Leung 1999). English language ability is essential for Chinese upward social mobility in Hong Kong.

In Hong Kong, English was the only language used in the colonial government until the early 1980s and the major language in the business sector (Morrison and Lui 2000). English-speaking ethnic Chinese became the middlepersons between British colonial governments/English-owned businesses and the urban masses in Hong Kong (Smith 1985). Furthermore, all professional education, such as classes in law and medical schools, was (and still is) conducted in English (Smith 1985). As a result,
Catholic and Protestant schools became sites for cultivating civic servants\textsuperscript{10} and the middle- and upper-class in Hong Kong. Many parents yearn to send their children to these schools, reinforcing the prestige of Christian institutions. As described earlier, Christianity has a long history of condemning homosexuality. Christian churches, especially Protestant churches, are also the most organized and fierce opponents of equality for sexual minorities in Hong Kong (Chou 2009). Given the dominance of Christian churches in the educational, government, and corporate sectors, it is likely that antigay attitudes become reproduced in these sectors\textsuperscript{11}.

\section*{Methodology}

\textit{Interviewee Recruitment and Interview}

During the summer of 2010, I conducted in-depth interviews with seven sexual minorities from Hong Kong origin and a staff member of a sexual-minority NGO. For detailed information about interviewees, please see Appendix I. I depended on snowball sampling—a recruitment method that relies on people to refer other individuals they know who may be interested in being interviewed (Goodman 1961). I initiated the recruitment process with people in Macao and Hong Kong I knew who self-identified as sexual minorities. Then I asked them to refer me to individuals possibly interested in participating in the project. I conducted all interviews in person.

\textsuperscript{10} Civic-service jobs are desirable in Hong Kong due to their stability and benefits.

\textsuperscript{11} Chapter Three of this thesis illustrates the perpetuation of homophobia within these sectors.
During December 2010 and January 2011, I also conducted three interviews with sexual minorities who are of Hong Kong origin in Metrocity (pseudonym\textsuperscript{12}), British Columbia, Canada. Metrocity has a well-established ethnic Chinese community; and as of 2006, there were about 407,225 ethnic Chinese living in British Columbia (Statistic Canada 2006). These interviewees now reside in Canada, and two of them still have significant family and friend ties to Hong Kong. One immigrated to Canada in 2006, nine years after the transfer of Hong Kong to China. She was twenty-five when she immigrated. The family of another two interviewees emigrated because of the Tiananmen crackdown\textsuperscript{13} in 1989; this might have an impact on how they viewed themselves as “Chinese” and how this identity affects their views toward the relationship between Chinese culture and acceptance toward sexual minorities. Of course, the length of time since they immigrated may also have influenced their views; for information about when these interviewees immigrated, please refer to Appendix I.

In order to protect interviewees’ privacy, I use pseudonyms for all interviewees except the NGO staff member because she wanted me to use her name. I let interviewees choose the pseudonyms because names are usually gendered. By letting interviewees choose their own pseudonyms, they had agency to select names that reflected their gender identities. I prepared a list of pseudonyms, which consists of two hundred English names; half were commonly used man names and half were woman names.

\textsuperscript{12} I decline to use the real name of this city in order to offer extra protection to interviewees. I would have done the same for Hong Kong. However, since this thesis requires delineation of specific historical, political, and colonial context, I have to use the real name for Hong Kong.

\textsuperscript{13} The Tiananmen Crackdown happened on 4\textsuperscript{th} June 1989. The Beijing government ordered military action against unarmed students who were peacefully protesting in the Tiananmen Square and asking the Beijing government to have a democratic reform. This democratic movement started in mid-April and continued until the military crackdown.
Some interviewees came up with their own pseudonyms. After assuring interviewees that no one could identify them by the pseudonyms they selected, I used these pseudonyms in my records.

I conducted interviews at locations interviewees chose. I conducted two interviews in study rooms of public libraries, five in coffee shops, two in individual rooms at a local community center, one in a bar in the afternoon, and two in interviewees’ homes. Informal chats happened on the ride home, during dinner in restaurants, or walking on the streets. I asked interviewees if I could include these informal conversations in my data, which they all agreed. I wrote these informal chats down after I got back to the hotel or my home. Some issues that concerned interviewees the most came out of these informal conversations.

Each interview lasted 60 and 150 minutes. Before the interview, I obtained interviewees’ informed consent. I recorded and transcribed all interviews. I used a list of open-ended questions to structure the interviews (see Appendix II). During the interviews, when an interviewee thought of other related topics she wanted to discuss, the interviewee changed the subject. I also asked interviewees at the end of each interview if they had other thoughts and/or experiences they wanted to share with me. One interviewee emailed me or sent texts to my mobile phone and messages via Facebook when she thought of something she wanted to add or clarify after the interview. I reminded her that these channels were not secure modes of communication and advised her not to do so. She told me that she understood and that she did not have
any problem with this. With her written permission, I also included these emails, texts, and messages as data.

I performed open coding for each paragraph of the transcripts. As a result, I derived analytic codes and categories directly from the interview (Charmaz 2001). One advantage of this approach is that instead of imposing preconceived ideas and theories onto the data, I followed the data’s lead. I then looked for the most salient categories and themes in the transcripts. I looked for variation and commonality in the same categories and themes.

*Researcher Identity*

Some studies on research methodology suggest that a researcher’s background may affect one’s investigation (Emerson 2001). This was certainly true for me. I was born and grew up in Macao, a former Portuguese colony with ethnic Chinese as the majority of the population. Macao also became a special administrative region (SAR) of People’s Republic of China (PRC), just two years after Hong Kong; Macao and Hong Kong are the only two special administrative regions of PRC. I was fourteen and seventeen, respectively, when Hong Kong and Macao were returned to China. I am among the first generation who reached adulthood after Macao was returned to China; this may affect how I viewed (post)colonial Macao and Hong Kong. My first language is Cantonese, the language that the majority of the population in Hong Kong speaks. I am queer and part of the Chinese diaspora in Macao. All these experiences posit me as an insider and outsider simultaneously.
My “insider” position gives me insight into the social experience that both people of Macao and Hong Kong share, namely the experience of being colonized and being “returned” to the PRC. I confess that I am also emotionally connected to the situation of people in Hong Kong, which risks projecting my own subjectivity onto the project. In order to minimize the influence of my own subjectivity, I present different perspectives by different interviewees on the same topic. On the other hand, my “outsider” position may free me from some particular modes of thinking in Hong Kong. It may also give me some distance in analyzing data and allow me to analyze the situation of tongzhi in Hong Kong from a different perspective.

**Results**

Family is the center of concern for all the interviewees. Six out of nine interviewees, excluding Waiwai, talked about family members are people from whom they have to hide their sexual orientations. Waiwai was one of the founding members of the Women Coalition of Hong Kong SAR (WCHK)—an NGO in Hong Kong that provides services to sexual minorities who self-identify as women. One of the interviewees, Alexis, did not mention her family in conversations regarding her being a tomboy. One of the interviewees, Madison, said that her family has been supportive. Madison’s wife, Cat (they married each other in Canada), said that she experienced difficulty when she first told her family about her being attracted to women, but the situation changed overtime. Cat’s family became more accepting and eventually flew to Canada to attend her wedding ceremony.
When interviewees discussed the family dilemma, many of them referred to family attitudes, such as rejecting homosexuality based on its “nonprocreativeness” as “traditional Chinese,” which previous research on Hong Kong tongzhi shows (Chou 2009; Kong 2010). However, hidden in these narratives is a view of the West being progressive and Chinese being conservative toward alternative sexualities. Moving from family to the society, the same binary of China-West exists. A few interviewees provided alternative accounts about the family dilemma and attributed the conservatism of Hong Kong society to Christian influence, which is embedded in the British colonial social structure of Hong Kong.

*From Family Pressure to a Generalized West*

Taylor was born in Hong Kong, but moved to Macao with family when Taylor was about six-months old. Taylor was a Chinese citizen and a British National (Overseas) (BN(O)). BN(O)s are British nationals and Commonwealth citizens, but not British citizens. This means that BN(O) passport holders do not have the right to adobe in the United Kingdom (British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act, 1990). Taylor was a permanent resident of Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR. Taylor self-identified as ethnic Chinese and was 29. Taylor self-identified as a tomboy (TB) and was attracted to women. Taylor earned a college degree in Macao. I included Taylor’s narrative in this thesis because Taylor’s family had lived in Hong Kong before they moved to Macao.

Taylor talked about the family’s expectation that Taylor would get married. Taylor said that although there was an expectation, the pressure was not intense. Taylor
attributed this to her being a woman. This may reflect that family pressure was gender specific—it tended to be more intense for gay men than for lesbians. Taylor said,

Actually, being a woman [who likes women] is not a real big deal; you don’t have to have children to continue the generation and to carry your family name (傳宗接代, chuan2 zong1 jie1 dai4).

Taylor was referring to the patrilineal practice that children bear their father’s last name. It is not a unique Chinese practice; many other countries in the world also have similar practices. However, since Taylor used the Chinese four-character idiom “傳宗接代”, Taylor may have meant it as a Chinese practice. Another interviewee, Lily, also cited non-procreation as being in conflict with Chinese tradition and thus causing intergenerational conflict. Lily was born in Hong Kong and has lived in Hong Kong ever since. She was a Chinese citizen and BN(O). Lily self-identified as an ethnic Chinese. Lily was a permanent resident of both Hong Kong and Macao SAR; she was 22. Her father was originally from Macao, and most of her extended family still lived in Macao. Lily self-identified as a woman and expressed that she liked whomever she liked, regardless of gender. She said,

It seems that it [same-sex intimate relationship] is becoming more and more general these days in Hong Kong. Usually there is not very much discrimination; but the elder generation is very antagonistic [toward homosexuals]. [People] usually will not let them know. I think that the older generation always thinks

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14 Origins of most Chinese four-character idioms can be traced back to stories from ancient Chinese literatures and Chinese Classics. When people use these four-character idioms, they may more or less rely on the Chinese ideological system (Wu 1995).
that a man and a woman who are together have to get married and have children.

At the end, the house has to be full of children and grandchildren (兒孫滿堂, er2 sun1 man3 tang2); then, it is a family.

Lily also used a Chinese four-character idiom “兒孫滿堂” to describe the intergenerational conflict, which was also centered on the notion of procreation. From the narrative recounted by Lily, it seemed the elder generation was antagonistic toward homosexuality because they assumed that homosexuals were inherently nonprocreative.

In a conversation about living outside of Hong Kong earlier during the interview, Lily also commented on the elder generation.

Lily: I think that it should, it should be freer, and [I could be] braver. I don’t have to...there are many people [who know me] in Hong Kong. This is, [I have to be] more careful and will not hold [my partner’s] hand. But if I am in foreign countries (外國, wai4 guo2), then I will.

Me: Why do you think so?

Lily: Because? Because foreigners (外國人, wai4 guo2 ren2) are more accepting [emphasis added] toward this [homosexuality], seems like [they have] a higher level of freedom. There are too many conservative [emphasis added] people sticking to the old [emphasis added] ways. No solution; even those people who are in their 20s or 30s may still not be able to accept [homosexuality].

Although Lily thought she would be freer in other countries because no one knew her, these countries are not just any other country, but “foreign” countries. The use of
“foreign countries” (外國, wai4guo2) in Hong Kong and Macao commonly refers to a general concept of the Global North. The term usually carries the meaning of European/North American, democratic, and advanced capitalism. Furthermore, Lily perceived all foreigners (read as white who live in democratic countries with advanced capitalism) as accepting homosexuals. Later in the interview, Lily mentioned that she thought the Netherlands is an accepting country. The reason was that it was the only country she could remember that had legalized same-sex marriage, which served as one of the measurements for the “progressiveness” of the West.

At the same time, she also assumed that the elder generation is conservative, while young people in their 20s and 30s are not “by default” conservative—some young people are, but in general they are not. As a result, she had to specify that “even those people who are in their 20s or 30s may still not be able to accept [homosexuality].” Lily, if not consciously, situated the elder generation, who upheld the “Chinese tradition” of having many children as the opposite of a generalized West. For Lily, conservatism also means reluctance to change and adherence to the “old” ways. This implies that in the cognition of Lily, there is a temporal process in accepting homosexuality—from the old and intolerant to the new and tolerant. In this process, the West represents the “new” and China represents the “old.”

Lily was not the only one who viewed the West as more “progressive” and “modern.” All other interviewees also shared similar point of view, though some expressed it more overtly and some more covertly. Elizabeth also made a comparison between Hong Kong and the West along the traditional-progressive spectrum. Elizabeth
was born in Hong Kong and had lived in Hong Kong ever since. She was a Chinese citizen and BN(O). Elizabeth self-identified as an ethnic Chinese. She was a permanent resident of Hong Kong SAR and was 28. She self-identified as women and being attracted to both men and women. Elizabeth earned her bachelor’s degree in Hong Kong. Elizabeth said,

I cannot deny that Hong Kong is actually an international city; and Hong Kong is really a place where China meets the West (中西薈粹, zhong4xi1hui4cui4), That is, traditional [emphasis added] Chinese culture is inherent (固有, gu4you3) [emphasis added] [in Hong Kong] and there is also influx of Western thoughts. But I had attended a seminar at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and I also have read some books, I observed that Hong Kong, in the society [of Hong Kong], sex is still a taboo. Although maybe now many people in Hong Kong are more open to sex, for example, getting pregnant without marriage, the visibility of homosexuals, and the appearance of some gay and lesbians organizations, there is still some very well ingrained (根深蒂固, gen1shen1di4gu4) thoughts, for example, um, sex is something that…should not be talked about […] So, on the surface, Hong Kong gives other people the impression that, as if, …, wa, the culture [of Hong Kong] is so mixed; but in term of sex, it is still…it seems that [Hong Kong] has not made much progress [emphasis added].

In Elizabeth’s narrative, the culture of Hong Kong is inherently a Chinese traditional culture, although there is some Western influence in the city. However, topics related to
sex\textsuperscript{15} were still taboo in Hong Kong. For her, Western influence brought “progress” to Hong Kong, in regard to sex and homosexuality. Elizabeth thought that the “un-progressiveness” of Hong Kong was due to deeply ingrained Chinese culture. In Elizabeth’s view, there was a spectrum of cultural backwardness-progressiveness; on this spectrum, China was the most backward, followed by Hong Kong, and then the West.

As I described earlier in the literature review, some Western societies also deem nonprocreative sex as problematic; it is not unique to Chinese culture. However, all the interviewees who discussed nonprocreation attributed this to Chinese culture only. This may due to family biopolitics in Hong Kong, in which procreation is highly linked to the success and survival of family-kin networks. Furthermore, it was self-evident to interviewees and their families that homosexuality is nonprocreative. As a result, the assumption that homosexuality is inherently non-procreative links homosexuality to family pressure. Since this happened in the arena of family-kin network and these interviewees self-identified as Chinese, they attributed this to Chinese culture.

Moving from the family to the society, interviewees also attributed non-acceptance toward homosexuality and sexual repression in general to Chinese culture. These narratives of Chinese culture seem to be reminiscent of Orientalist and British colonial constructs of Chinese culture. Chinese culture is old and stagnant while the West is modern. Furthermore, in terms of accepting homosexuality and releasing people from sexual oppression, the West signifies progress. This is the same kind of rhetoric

\textsuperscript{15} Elizabeth considered pregnancy without marriage and homosexuality in the same category, which was similar to some Christian rhetoric. I will examine this rhetoric in more details later in this thesis.
British Empire used to justify their colonization of Hong Kong in the 19th and early 20th century. Some tongzhi in Hong Kong seem to internalize these constructs and viewed homosexuality through these constructs.

It is possible that this view toward China as backward can also be a result of Cold War ideology, in which the PRC was depicted as “backward.” However, it seems that the “China” the interviewees referred to was a cultural “China” rather than the PRC because they focus on “culture” rather than politics. It is also possible that the interviewees did not think that there was a difference between the cultural “China” and the political “China.” As a result, they used the same term, especially when mainland China—the PRC—is considered as the “motherland” and thus carries a cultural authority over Hong Kong. Furthermore, in these narratives, interviewees described “China” as “old” and “unchanging”—the key words of British colonial construction—rather than “un-free”—which was the code of Cold War era. As a result, it is more likely that the British colonial construction influenced the interviewees more than the Cold War ideology in this particular issue.

Furthermore, interviewees’ narratives did not include any details about tongzhi lives in mainland China. One of the most diffused and prevalently used phrase in tongzhi community in mainland China—suzhi (Ho 2008; Kong 2010; Rofel 2007; Rofel 2010)—did not even come up once in any of the interviews. This signifies tongzhi social lives in Hong Kong still remain largely separated from tongzhi in the mainland. The “Chinese culture and tradition” they described is of a static “China” as if the “China” is still locked somewhere in the past. The most obvious difference is that in mainland China,
the mainland Chinese *tongzhi* subjectivity is in alignment with the development of the party-state—both are moving toward a more neoliberal existence (Rofel 2007). However, for interviewees in Hong Kong, they considered their well-being depends on how far Hong Kong is away from “China” and how close they are to the “West.” This difference reflects that *tongzhi* subjectivity of Hong Kong and mainland China still remain largely separated from each other.

There is also a discourse of linear development in which the “West” is ahead, then Hong Kong, followed by “China.” This linear model highly resembles the “gay modernity” narrative. The meaning of “China” in “the imaginary waiting room of history” (Chakrabarty 2000, pp.8) is twofold. First, the “China” interviewees described is a cultural China which is still somewhere in the past; it is not the PRC. This “China” is the colonial constructed “China.” Second, this “China” is lagging behind in the developmental discourse of gay modernity. Of course, it is lagging behind because it is colonially constructed to remain in the past. The fact that the “China” still largely remains as a cultural China rather than a substantial mainland China suggests that ethnic Chinese, at least the interviewees, still largely remain in a diasporic condition.

*Christianity*

Some other interviewees provided alternative accounts of the intolerant family and social attitudes toward *tongzhi* when they referred to the influence of Christianity. However, only three out of nine (excluding Waiwai) interviewees discussed the influence of Christianity. One interviewee, Benjamin, is Catholic. Another interviewee,
J., self-identified as an ex-Protestant. Another Catholic interviewee, Elizabeth, viewed Catholic condemnation of homosexuality as her own personal religious struggle. Benjamin, J., and Elizabeth are the only three (ex) Christian interviewees. J. was born in Hong Kong and immigrated to Canada with her family when she was twelve in 1993; J said that her family immigrated because of the Tiananmen Crackdown and the fact that Hong Kong would become part of China in 1997. J had lived in Canada ever since but had periodically gone back to Hong Kong to visit her extended family. J. is a Canadian citizen and a permanent resident of Hong Kong SAR. She self-identified as an ethnic Chinese and was 29. J. self-identified as a woman and a lesbian. J. earned her bachelor degree in Canada. Although J. immigrated to Canada with her family 17 years ago, her grandparents, parents, and J. were already Protestants when J. was still in Hong Kong. J. told me about her father’s reaction after she told her parents about her being a lesbian.

In my family, there are me, my younger brother [and my parents]. Since I was little, I thought, my parents favored me over my younger brother. [After I told me parents] I all of a sudden lost the status [of being the favored] of my parents. That is, sexual orientation can make a 180 degree change for the parents. Only because of this, [they] negated all the things I had done before. […] When my

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16 The fact that there are three (ex)Christian interviewees might have been caused by snowball method I employed in interviewee recruitment. As of 2011, only about 10% of the Hong Kong population is Christian (5% Catholic and 5% Protestants) (Hong Kong SAR Government 2011b); if this had been a random sample, there should have only been one Christian interviewee. This bias may be due to the fact that I went to a Catholic school in Macao; one of my high-school schoolmates, who is Catholic, referred me to the two Hong Kong Catholic interviewees, who are friends of hers.

17 J. and I have kept in contact with each other. During summer 2011, she went back to Hong Kong to visit her extended family. In summer 2011, she also told me that she thought she was bisexual.
dad during his craziest time, he was holding the Bible and used the Bible to curse homosexuals, then he said, “After I had prayed, I decided not to curse [you] any more.” So what did you \(^{18}\)[he] want from me? Did I need to thank you [him] for not cursing me?! Everyday on the dinner table, he talked about this stuff. Then could I not eat with you [him]?! 

J.’s father’s reaction to her sexual orientation was very confrontational. Her father’s condemnation of homosexuality happened regularly, and this caused a lot of distress for J. in her everyday life. It also seems that while the antagonistic attitude by parents of other interviewees mainly involved the issue of procreation, J.’s Christian father negated J as a person as a whole and all of her past good deeds just because of her sexual orientation. J. was still the same person; the only difference was that her parents did not know about her sexual orientation before.

Elizabeth also struggled with her sexual orientation and her religious beliefs. During my interview with Elizabeth, I asked her about the relationship between her sexual orientation and her other identities; Elizabeth talked about being a Catholic and as a person who is also attracted to individuals of the same-sex.

Actually, I thought that except me; or perhaps other people. I think especially me, I do feel that, my…this orientation is in conflict with my religion. Yes.

Because…because Catholic is a very traditional [emphasis added] religion; and it states at the beginning that marriage is a union only between one man and one

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\(^{18}\) Cantonese speakers often use the pronoun “you” to refer to a third person who is absent when the conversation takes place. They use “you” as if they are talking to the third person in his/her absence. In this case, “you” referred to J.’s father.
woman. So I believe that it [Catholic Church] definitely will not accept love between [individuals of the] same-sex or same-sex marriage. But I think that if [we] compare Protestantism with [Catholicism], Catholicism is a tolerant…has a higher degree of tolerance [than Protestantism].

During the interview, Elizabeth did not connect “Catholicism” with the West, which signified progressiveness to her. This missing connection points to an internal logical conflict in Elizabeth’s narrative: Catholicism is a Western religion, which is within the domain of a “progressive West”; however, Catholic teaching condemns homosexuality.

Why is the connection between “Catholicism” and “the West” missing? It seems that there are two kinds of “tradition” in Elizabeth’s narrative. The first “tradition” refers to “traditional Chinese culture,” and the second “tradition” refers to Catholicism. Furthermore, it seems that Elizabeth treated “traditional Chinese culture” as “the culture” in Hong Kong society in general and her struggle between her own sexual orientation and religion as her personal religious matter. The fact that only a small proportion of HK population is Catholic may have contributed to Elizabeth seeing religious conflict as her own personal struggle. Locating Catholic condemnation of homosexuality in religious and personal spheres might be one reason why Elizabeth did not make a connection between Catholicism and the “progressive West;” it seems that for Elizabeth, the “progressive West” only existed in the secular and public sphere in Hong Kong. An alternative explanation could be that the “absolute” progressiveness of the West as constructed in Orientalism and British colonialism prevented Elizabeth from connecting Catholicism to the West.
Elizabeth’s statement about Catholicism and Protestantism may seem counterintuitive. Globally, the Roman Catholic Church has been one of the most influential institutions fighting against any political agenda for equality for tongzhi (Buss and Herman 2003). Another interviewee, Benjamin, who is also Catholic, provided some insight into Elizabeth’s statement when she responded to the question on social atmosphere toward sexual minorities in Hong Kong. Benjamin was born, grew up, and lived in Hong Kong. Benjamin is a Chinese citizen and a BN(O), and also a permanent resident of Hong Kong SAR. Benjamin self-identified as an ethnic Chinese and was 28. Benjamin self-identified as a TB and was attracted to women. Benjamin has a Master of Arts in humanities. Benjamin was the only interviewee, except Waiwai, who explained the organized opposition against sexual-minority launched by some Protestant churches in Hong Kong.

Benjamin: I think that [the Catholic Church\textsuperscript{19}] is a very formal institution, so they can’t just send out some pontifical messages\textsuperscript{20} whenever they want talking about these things should not go this way. However, those Protestant churches can proactively bring out these topics to discuss, and then provoke some tongzhi (同志) organizations as if they are going for a war, stirring up a lot of debates [in the media and among

\textsuperscript{19} The Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong is independent from mainland China diocese, and is still directly under the spiritual leadership of the Pope. 
\textsuperscript{20} Only The Pope can send pontifical messages.
the general public]. After that, they [the Protestant churches] pretend to be rational, the things you heard last night, all of a sudden pretend to be logical; then they will tell the general public if the Sexual Orientation Discrimination Ordinance comes into effect, then we, heterosexual people, will be discriminated against. So, when people hear about this, they fear [that will actually happen].

Me: Why? This logic does not work at all.

Benjamin: All heterosexuals [will be discriminated against]…yes, yes.

Me: Oh, yeh, I haven’t noticed anything like this happens in Macao.

Benjamin: Yes, yes…but theirs [the Protestants’ logic] are brought from the US.

Me: You meant…

Benjamin: The Protestants, their theory is copied from the US Christian Right.

Benjamin viewed the Catholic Church’s hierarchical, centralized authority as keeping people from publicly condemning homosexuality whenever they wanted. However, different Protestant denominations maintained independent positions on homosexuality and launched antigay campaigns whenever they wanted.

Benjamin also provided an alternative perspective on social attitudes toward homosexuality in Hong Kong.

I guess, although it also happens in Taiwan, Hong Kong is influenced by the culture of Christianity. Yes. You know that Christianity is very middle-class.

That is, there are some Christian thoughts within the mainstream thought, so

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21 The night before this interview took place, Benjamin, Elizabeth, and I attended a seminar on the tactics these Protestant groups used.
even if some people who do have any religion belief also buy that, that is, homosexuality is unnatural, that kind of thought, and homosexuals cannot have any child. This kind of thought may infiltrate into the mainstream society of Hong Kong, but Hong Kong people will not think that this is Western Christianity thought—Hong Kongese always think that we are Chinese so that we are conservative, but maybe actually mainland [China] is not as conservative as [Hong Kong].

The above quotation illustrates the power structure of the former British colony, which continues to exist today. Christian influence in Hong Kong is palpable not only in political activities, such as lobbying against legal protection for tongzhi, but also in the educational and professional structure. Benjamin said that Christianity is very middle-class in Hong Kong; it is due to the colonial educational structure—Christian schools and the middle class produce and reproduce each other. Foucault’s (1991, pp.87-104) theorization of governmentality discusses how power operates on microlevel, such as educational practices, rather than on macrolevel, such as laws, to regulate the public life in diverse and mundane ways. In Hong Kong, Christian schools produce middle-class professionals such as lawyers and doctors; according to Benjamin’s narrative, it seems that the Christian treatment of homosexuality as unnatural infiltrated the society through the educational and professional system. The fact that only 10% of Hong Kong population is Christian does not necessarily mean that non-Christians are not influenced by Christian ideology since it is embedded in the social structure. However, social infiltration does not necessarily make people think that Christian ideology is Chinese
culture; the Orientalist and British colonial constructs of Chinese culture as conservative naturalize Christian homophobia as Chinese. This type of naturalization is built upon the imperial rhetoric developed in the 19th and early 20th century. In the contemporary context of sexual-minority equality, it seems that many Hong Kongese internalize this constructed Chinese conservatism and believe that homophobia is inherent in Chinese culture.

Later in the interview, Benjamin and I discussed whether Benjamin thought that the colonial history of Hong Kong and experiencing the handover had had an impact on Benjamin’s view on sexual minority issues. Benjamin started criticizing the SAR government. Benjamin thought that the government refused legislation to protect sexual minorities and gender non-conforming individuals from discrimination because officials were afraid of angering people.

If it [the government] does it, it will make some people unhappy. For example, those churches will launch serious oppositions. And you know some of the high officers [of the government] are Catholic. Many rich people in Hong Kong are either Catholics or Protestants, and even some business tycoons. If you [the government] infuriates them, it will bring yourself [the government] a lot of trouble. It is not like handicap or racial discrimination. [The government] already passed the race discrimination ordinance. Why could it be passed? Because it won’t hurt the wealthy people; it won’t infuriate them. […] That is, if you talk about legislation of sexual orientation discrimination ordinance or same-sex marriage, this kind [of legislation], factually it won’t affect those privilege
people [wealthy people]; there is no real impact on their interests. It is just that you challenge their moral view and make them unhappy.

After the sovereignty handover, due to the political reality and Hong Kong people’s trust in senior civic servants of the British colonial government, many of the highest-ranking administrative officers of Hong Kong SAR government are former senior civic servants of the colonial government. For example, two of former senior colonial civic servants, Sir Donald Tsang and Honorary Dame Anson Chan, eventually became the Chief Executive and the Chief Secretary—the two highest ranking administrative officers—respectively, of the Hong Kong SAR. Both Sir Tsang and Honorary Dame Chan are devoted Catholics, so are many other senior civic servants of the SAR government, lawyers, and business tycoons (Wong 2001). These elites were educated in colonial Christian schools. Christianity not only has a strong influence in the middle-class, but also among the administrative officers of the government and business tycoons in Hong Kong.

Benjamin also compared the ease to pass a legislation regarding legal equality for sexual minorities and gender non-conforming individuals with Racial Discrimination Ordinance (RDO). The Hong Kong SAR government passed the Race Discrimination Ordinance (RDO) in 2008. Benjamin thought that the government had no problem passing RDO because it did not challenge the Christian moral world of some of the most

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22 Sir Donald Tsang is a Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire (KBE). Mrs. Anson Chan is an Honorary Dame Grand Cross (GCMG) and a Commander of the Order of the British Empire (OBE). Sir Donald Tsang was the first ethnic Chinese and the last Financial Secretary of the British colonial government in Hong Kong (Hong Kong SAR Government 2011a; Parliament of the United Kingdom 12 July 2005). Mrs. Anson Chan was the first ethnic Chinese and the last Chief Secretary of the British colonial government; the Chief Secretary was second to the British Governor in the hierarchy of the colonial government (Chan 2011). The same persons, of course, can serve different masters.
influential people in Hong Kong. Benjamin thought that it would be extremely difficult to gain any legal protection and equality for tongzhi in Hong Kong because of these influential Christians.

Benjamin, Elizabeth, and I attended a seminar held by a tongzhi organization on the tactics and rhetoric used by some Protestant churches to demonize tongzhi the night before the interviews took place. The seminar did not mention the US Christian Right by name, but it covered how some HK Protestant churches interpret the Bible from a fundamentalist point of view. Elizabeth did not connect Christianity with discrimination against tongzhi in Hong Kong, even after the seminar. This implies that Elizabeth has a strong view that only Chinese culture contributes to the intolerance of tongzhi in Hong Kong, like other interviewees. Benjamin connected Christianity with social intolerance toward tongzhi; Benjamin also knew that HK Protestant churches copied the tactics and rhetoric of US Christian Right\textsuperscript{23}. However, Benjamin did not explicitly connect colonial constructs and structures to social intolerance in Hong Kong. This may reflect the naturalization of British colonial power; none of the interviewees, including Waiwai, discussed the relationship between British colonialism and social intolerance toward tongzhi.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

In this Chapter, I showed how the internalization of the colonial constructs of Chinese culture as stagnant and conservative found expression in the field of alternative

\textsuperscript{23} I discuss these HK Protestant churches as part of the globalization of US Christian Right in Chapter 3.
sexualities. This internalization naturalized Christian homophobia and sexual repression as Chinese culture. Christian ideology became embedded in a social structure established by the British colonial government—the educational system and its products including the government, upper- and middle-class, and the professionals. In this Chapter, I also show that how the colonial and diasporic conditions of Hong Kong significantly shape how tongzhi look at themselves and the social attitude toward them.

Some interviewees were aware of homophobia which associated with Christian churches and their links to US Christian Right, but some other interviewees were not. An internalized colonial construct of the Chinese identity also blinded some people from seeing the globalization of US Christian Right in Hong Kong and its negative impact on sexual-minority equality. Why were accounts of HK right-wing Christian and the link between Christianity and intolerance toward tongzhi missing in narratives of most interviewees? In addition to the internalized Orientalism and naturalized British colonial construct, another possible explanation could be that most interviewees did not pay much attention to politics; as a result, they were not aware of the antigay campaigns launched by HK right-wing Christians. However, an article written by Joseph Cho, a tongzhi activist in Hong Kong, led me to a further development in investigating this puzzle. In this article, Cho (2010) describes the opposition raised by HK right-wing Christians and general public toward the amendment of the Domestic Violence Ordinance (DVO). They opposed this amendment because the bill provided same-sex cohabiting partners with legal protection from domestic violence. “Chineseness” and “Chinese family values” were at the center of Christian opposition. An investigation of
HK right-wing Christians and rhetoric against the DVO is the second component of my effort to understand the missing link between Christianity and intolerance toward *tongzhi* in Hong Kong.

**Reflections**

I built this Chapter based on a presentation I gave at the (Dis)locating Queer: Race, Region, and Sexual Diasporas Graduate Symposium at the University of Illinois—Urbana Champaign in May 2011. Due to the time constraints I experienced when finishing this thesis, I was not able to fully reflect upon the nuances in interviewees’ narratives. For example, one of the interviewees, Alexis, who attended college in Australia, did discuss the general belief that “the West being progressive” did not seem true to her. One example Alexis used was the case of racial discrimination in the US. At the same time, Alexis also provided accounts of her own life experiences as a tomboy in Australia as examples of the West being progressive. Furthermore, many interviewees did mention that Taiwan was also progressive, when compared to Hong Kong, in term of social acceptance toward *tongzhi*. I will incorporate these nuances into this Chapter in the future.

Also, postcolonial theories such as Orientalism have limitations. Applying a framework of Orientalism does not register the possibility and location of resistance and risks erasing individuals’ agency (Ahmad 1994). For example, an Orientalist perspective may not be able to address interviewees’ view of Taiwan also being sexually progressive. It is possible that interviewees consider sexual progressiveness is highly
correlated to democracy. Taiwan has a democratic government while the government in Hong Kong is only very limitedly democratic and is highly controlled by Beijing. However, it could also be equally possible that a projection of a “gay dreamland” does not have to be onto the West; it can exist somewhere outside of Hong Kong. My presentation of the interview data does not address these complexities and dynamics.
CHAPTER III
CHINESENESS, TONGZHI, AND COLONIAL DIASPORIC PSYCHE

Introduction

In Chapter II, I argued that a “China” framework does not apply to tongzhi studies in Hong Kong. In this Chapter, I examine a historical amnesia of Hong Kong people under a colonial and diasporic framework. Many Hong Kong people forgot heterosexual monogamous marriage was a colonial imposition and built Chinese traditions upon a colonial construct of marriage. These reinventions of Chinese traditions served to exclude same-sex cohabiting partners from the “matrimony home” and “family.” These reinventions also converged with the interests of Hong Kong right-wing Christians, who are part of the globalized US Christian Right. “Reinvention” of traditions also happens in other places. In postcolonial Anglophone Caribbean and Africa, governments of some nations reinvented a heterosexual tradition to deny the existence of gays and lesbians. Such invention showed traces of colonial reminiscence. A cultural nationalism centered on the “motherland” also reinforced colonial construction of gender and sexuality of Indian and African diasporas in the Anglophone Caribbean (Puri 1997).

Hong Kong is a city hosting diasporas from different parts of the world. In this thesis, I focus on the Chinese diaspora in Hong Kong. The case of Hong Kong complicates postcolonial and diaspora studies—the once disconnected “motherland”, China, is now the sovereign of Hong Kong. Without physical relocation, the Chinese diaspora is now within their motherland. As the “motherland” has increasing political,
cultural, and economic influence on Hong Kong, how does this complicate the scenario of British colonial construct of sexuality and the reinvention of Chinese traditions?

What furthermore complicates this picture is that before and after handover, Hong Kong residents have struggled to gain full democracy and to safeguard human rights from their “motherland”—the PRC. This resulted in the formation of two major political camps in Hong Kong—the pro-Beijing camp and the pro-democracy camp. Hong Kong right-wing Christian churches and organizations, the most aggressive and organized antigay institutions, merged with pro-Beijing camp. In this Chapter, drawing from interview with a staff member of a tongzhi organization and news articles from online news archives, meeting minutes and submissions to the Legislative Council of Hong Kong (LegCo), I first show that in recent years, tongzhi organizations participated in the democracy and human rights movement. The participation of tongzhi organizations in the movement indirectly situates them onto the tension between Hong Kong and Beijing.

I then describe the legislative process of the two amendments of the DVO, during which the Hong Kong right-wing Christians launched a high-profile campaign against the bill. They argued that the inclusion of same-sex cohabiting partners under the DVO would destroy “family-value”; they also mobilized “Chinese culture” in a way to use the political, economic, and cultural hegemonic presence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in post-handover Hong Kong to their advantage. However, their argument was still couched within a colonial framework of the West being “modern.” The HK right-wing Christian “family-value” rhetoric also carved out a discursive space enabling the
general public to describe their own versions of “Chinese family,” “Chinese culture,” and “Chinese tradition” in a framework of “cultural nationalism” to oppose the amendment. I show that this “Chineseness” is built upon a colonial construct of marriage. Some of them established a binary of “conservative/moral China vs. progressive/immoral West.” Their binary China vs. West was the opposite of the binary narrated by interviewees in Chapter II: for the interviewees, “progressiveness” is benevolent; for the opponents, “progressiveness” is immoral. “Chineseness” and “cultural nationalism” obscured the globalization of the US Christian Right movement in Hong Kong. The collaboration between tongzhi activists and pro-democracy camp indirectly put tongzhi in a position against Beijing. Under state nationalism, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is equal to the PRC. This may further fortify people’s impression that homosexuality is against “Chinese culture” because tongzhi organizations stand on the same side as the pro-democracy camp.

Based on the different versions of “Chineseness” I present in this Chapter and the narratives I described in Chapter II, I argue that a collective colonial diasporic psyche is a better framework to understand the dynamics and influence of colonialism, diaspora, political landscape, and power configuration on Hong Kong people’s view toward tongzhi. Both tongzhi and opponents to granting legal protection to tongzhi perceive topics related to tongzhi through this colonial diasporic psyche, which is collectively constructed by colonialism, cultural nationalism, and the post-handover political situation in Hong Kong.
**Literature Review**

*Reinvention of a Heterosexual Tradition*

In some former European colonies, people reinvented a precolonial heterosexual tradition to outlaw gays and lesbians. This kind of reinvention also involved an argument which is based on the colonial discourse of same-sex sexual acts as “unnatural” and a “sin.” This happens in the Anglophone Caribbean (Alexander 2005, p.44-46). In order to claim this reinvention of heterosexual tradition, people relied on the notion that homosexuality was a Western import (Alexander 1994; Alexander 2005). Similar constructions of homosexuality as a Western import also happened in postcolonial Africa. During the European colonial period, most anthropological studies, letters, and journalistic narratives produced by European scholars and travelers did not mention homosexuality; this gives people the impression that homosexuality is a Western import (Epprecht 2008) and led to the claim that homosexuality is “un-African” (Hoad 2007; Tamale 2007). As a result, homophobia also became an anticolonial tool because homosexuality is “Western.” Some nationalists also used the rhetoric of homosexuality as an Western import to consolidate their position as the liberators in anti-colonial struggles (Currier 2010). In both Anglophone Caribbean and Africa, the notions of homosexuality as Western were based on colonial discourse and production of knowledge.
Diaspora, Cultural Nationalism, and Colonial Constructions

Diaspora refers to the displacement of people from their homeland (Laguerre 1998). Diasporas form when large numbers of people are forced to resettle in places outside their homeland, as opposed to individuals or small groups that voluntarily emigrate (Tölölyan 1996). Caught in tension with their motherland and their host country, diasporas are in constant political and cultural struggles to define their local and distinctive communities and history of displacement (Clifford 1994). In these struggles, cultural nationalism can help building solidarity within the diaspora in the host country and keeping “connection” with the motherland. Cultural nationalism “defines the nation in terms of a common encompassing culture” (Nielsen 1999, pp. 125), which provides diaspora with a “well-bounded” and “pure” culture, on which they can build a community distinct from other groups of people and can oppose to the pressure of assimilation in their host country (Lowe 2006, pp.75).

In the US Indian diaspora, people define their motherland—India—as patriarchal, middle class, and heterosexual (Gopinath 2005, pp.17). As a result, alternative sexualities are at odds with the cultural nationalism in the Indian diaspora (Gopinath 1998). This nationalism relies on heteronormative constructs of sexuality and gender. A major component of Indian nationalism is Indian womanhood. Modern, middle-class Indian women were superior to white Western women, traditional and lower-class Indian women; this construction was a response to the British colonial construction of Indian culture as “barbaric” (Chatterjee 1989). Indian nationalism also emphasizes the difference between “we”—Indians—and “them” – the world (Chatterjee
Since “Indian womanhood” was central to nationalist discourses of the motherland, women’s gender and sexuality also became the cultural symbol of Indian diaspora and serve as demarcation between “we” and “them” –Indian diasporas and other groups in postcolonial Trinidad (Puri 1997). Under British colonialism, Africans in Trinidad were constructed as sexually impulsive as opposed to ascetic Indians (Froude 1888). The Indian diaspora mobilized Indian womanhood to reinforce this colonial racial logic—the sexual purity of Indian women needed protections from hypersexual African men (Puri 1997, pp.127-133). The Indian diaspora in Trinidad deployed cultural nationalism—itself was a response to British colonialism in India—in a way that reinforced the British colonial construct of race and racial boundary.

**State Nationalism in the People’s Republic of China**

In the specific condition of contemporary PRC, there is another kind of nationalism—state nationalism. Facing the prospect of rapidly fading Communist ideology caused by the gradual opening of the market in mainland China starting from late 1970s, the CCP initiated state nationalism through patriotic education that placed the CCP as the most faithful patriot and the most powerful guardian of China (Zhao 1998). The slogan, “Love the Party, Love the Nation” represents one of the most recent versions of patriotic education by CCP (The Chinese University of Hong Kong 2010). This slogan explicitly links the Party to the nation and equates patriotism with supporting the CCP.
This particular type of nationalism—state nationalism—contributes to the construction of masculinity in mainland China in a way to legitimize the ruling of the CCP by legitimization the disparity in wealth between rural and urban areas. In neoliberal mainland China, “money” is a major constituent of masculinity. In contemporary mainland China, a man can realize his own ambition, for example, he can be a successful businessman. This is in contrast to the fates of many men in Qing dynasty, whose effort to strive for better lives were constantly ruined by wars. In order words, a stable and strong PRC, which is under the authoritarian rule by the CCP, enables a man to embody masculinity, one of the major constituents of which is wealth in neoliberal mainland China (Song 2010). In this way, masculinity is linked to state nationalism. However, little is known how this state nationalism is related to the construction of femininity. Previous studies also fail to explore how people may or may not link state nationalism to tongzhi or how state nationalism may or may not shape tongzhi lives in mainland China. Beijing leaders and the Hong Kong SAR government transplanted this state nationalism to Hong Kong SAR (The Chinese University of Hong Kong 2010). Little is known how this state nationalism interacts with the political situation in Hong Kong and how this interaction affects tongzhi in Hong Kong.

**Political Situation in Post-Handover Hong Kong**

In post-handover Hong Kong, democracy and human rights are at the center of friction between Hong Kong SAR and Beijing. In post-handover Hong Kong, there are two major political camps—the pro-Beijing camp and the pro-democracy camp. The
binary and antagonism between these two camps grew out of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, its aftermath, and the electoral reform implemented by the last British colonial governor in Hong Kong.

The student protest for democracy and social justice in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989 awoke the collective political consciousness of Hong Kong people. In support of the student protest in Beijing, many residents participated in protests in Hong Kong. There were one million interviewees in the largest protest, which was 20% of the population at the time; this protest remains the largest protest in terms of scale in Hong Kong history (Mathews 1997). Two of the most popular slogans used in these protests were “For Freedom, Love Freedom” and “Democracy saves the nation” (TVB 4 June 1989; TVB 27 May 1989). The Tiananmen crackdown and the collective political consciousness it provoked in Hong Kong enshrined “democracy” and “freedom” in the political discourse in Hong Kong (So 2000). Tiananmen Crackdown also reinforced the Cold War ideology of PRC as “un-free”. At the same time, the pro-democracy camp solidified and gained popular support among people in Hong Kong, who yearned for political leaders who would safeguard people’s freedom and human rights after the handover.

In the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown, the last British colonial governor, Christopher Patten, put forward a last-minute electoral reform to introduce more democratic elements into the Legislative Council of Hong Kong (LegCo). The reform increased the number of seats in LegCo that were de facto generated by direct elections (universal suffrage). This infuriated Beijing because this reform was not what the UK
and PRC agreed upon during diplomatic negotiation in the early 1980s. Beijing assembled its own camp, the pro-Beijing camp, in Hong Kong to opposed this reform (So 2000). The mass media extensively covered the heated debates between these two camps on a daily basis, which further reinforced the ideology of PRC as a one-party-dictated nation. This was one of the most uncertain moments in the future of Hong Kong; many Hong Kong residents followed news everyday with simultaneous hope and anxiety. With intense emotion, the political and ideological binary framework formed in the minds of the Beijing government, the Hong Kong government, politicians, and the general public in Hong Kong. This political binary framework also becomes the framework in which antigay Christians and tongzhi organizations organize their movements. Antigay Christians merged with the pro-Beijing camp while tongzhi organizations collaborated with the pro-democracy camp in the post-handover Hong Kong.

The Rise of Right-Wing Christians in Hong Kong

The sovereignty handover of Hong Kong not only shaped the political landscape of Hong Kong, but also catalyzed the rise of right-wing Christians. “Right-wing” refers to Protestant conservatism on person-moral issues since HK right-wing Christians

24 According to Olson (1997), in the context of the US, there can be two-dimensions of liberalism (left) and conservatism (right)—the degree of regulation on personal-moral issues (by state/church) and economical-justice issues (by state). Personal-moral issues include issues such as sexuality, gender roles, and free speech; economic-justice issues refers to whether or not a state should, to some degree, redistribute wealth in order to reach equity and social justice. In the US, according to Olson, “right” refers to people who support more regulations on person-moral issues, but not on economy-justice issues, while “left” refers to people who support more regulations on economy-justice issues, but not on personal-moral issues.
have expressed little concern about economy-justice issues. Furthermore, “left” in Hong Kong means the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its supporters. The usage of “left” and “right” in this thesis does not refer to the CCP or any kind of partisanship.

In colonial Hong Kong, Protestant and Roman Catholic churches received privileges from British colonial government. Such privileges included paying low rent to the government for buildings used as venues for social services and education. The British colonial government selectively worked with Christian churches and organizations in order to maximize their influence in society over pro-Beijing organizations (Yeung 2010). Faced with Hong Kong’s return to China, many Protestant churches and organizations panicked about losing these privileges (Yeung 2010). In contrast, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong did not face the challenges of losing financial support and other privileges to the same degree some Protestant churches and organizations did because it remained under the direct management of Vatican after the handover. Protestant churches and organizations employed several strategies in preparing for the sovereignty handover. They purchased land and properties, expanded their social network, secured more funding, and recruited new members. Some churches became megachurches, with thousands of believers attending services. Protestant leaders also cooperated with the pro-Beijing camp in Hong Kong before and after the handover (Yeung 2010). For example, Reverend Wing Chi So (蘇穎智) of Yan Fook Church of the Evangelical Free Church of China supported the political agenda of pro-Beijing camp (Kingdom Rivival Times (HK) 9 January 2009).
Protestant churches and organizations in Hong Kong also have ties to the US Christian Right. The Hong Kong Christian Churches Union (HKCCU) held the Hong Kong Franklin Graham Festival (HKFGF) on the 10th anniversary of the sovereignty handover in 2007. HKCCU invited Franklin Graham to preach in the festival (Gospel Herald 30 January 2008). Franklin Graham, a son of Billy Graham, is the president and CEO of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association (BGEA) (Billy Graham Evangelistic Association 2011). The Billy Graham’s Crusade was one of the major missionary forces of Christian Right both in the US and overseas (Diamond 1989; Diamond 1995). The globalization of the US Christian Right is a worldwide phenomenon, which happens on the level of supranational organizations such as the United Nations (Buss and Herman 2003); it also happens on the level of the continent and individual countries in Africa, Asia, and South America (Brouwer, Gifford and Rose 1996; Chen and Wang 2010; Kaoma 2009).

Exodus Global Alliance25 (EGA) is another global Christian Right organization that has extended its network to Hong Kong. EGA is a US- and Canada-based international organization that proclaims that “change is possible for the homosexual through the transforming power of Jesus Christ” and that people “affected” by homosexuality can gain “freedom from homosexuality from the power of Jesus Christ” (Exodus Global Alliance 2011b). EGA has been organizing and engaging in antigay movement worldwide. EGA also has member ministries in Hong Kong, which is listed as the New Creation Association (ACA) on their website (Exodus Global Alliance 2011b).

25 Exodus Global Alliance changed its name from Exodus International to its current name in 2004 (Exodus Global Alliance 2011b).
The ACA and Dr. Hong advocated for conversion of homosexuals to heterosexuals in the past (Gospel Herald 13 June 2005).

The political situations in pre-handover Hong Kong catalyzed the rise of HK right-wing Christians. As HK right-wing Christians became wealthier and merged with the new hegemonic power in Hong Kong—the pro-Beijing camp, HK right-wing Christians also became part the globalized US Christian Right movement.

The Tongzhi Movement in Hong Kong

The start of the tongzhi movement in Hong Kong was also closely linked to the historical and political trajectory of Hong Kong. As mentioned earlier, the decriminalization of sexual behaviors between two men was largely part of the plan of the British colonial government to retreat from Hong Kong, and not a result of tongzhi movement. Tongzhi organizations started to emerge after the decriminalization of sexual behaviors between men in 1991. Little research has been done on the tongzhi movement in Hong Kong. In the following paragraphs, I summarize existing literature on tongzhi movement by Kong (2010), Nip (2004a; 2004b), and To (2004).

The Social Welfare Department (SWD) of Hong Kong SAR invited, Dr. Kwai-wah Hong (康貴華), a psychiatrist who was also the chairperson of ACA, to be the speaker for a training session for its social workers (Social Welfare Department of Hong Kong SAR, 2011). According to the SWD, this training session “was aimed at providing our social workers with information to enable them to have a better understanding of sexual identity and sexual attraction among the youth, and the skills when working with them” (Social Welfare Department of Hong Kong SAR 2011).

Based on Dr. Hong’s position as the chairperson of ACA, LGBT activists in Hong Kong claimed that Dr. Hong promoted conversion therapy during the SWD training session (Ming Pao, 18 June 2011). Both SWD and ACA denied such claim (New Creation Association, 2011; Social Welfare Department of Hong Kong SAR, 2011). Since I cannot find any first-hand description by the social workers who attended this seminar, I do not know whether Dr. Hong taught conversion therapy in this government-sponsored training session. This teaching session occurred in 2011, after my field work. This does not count as an event which may influence Hong Kong sexual minorities’ view toward sexual equality in Hong Kong. I include this event only to further illustrate the globalization of Christian Right in Hong Kong.

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Tongzhi organizations in the mid- and late-1990s mainly focused on building collective tongzhi identities and tongzhi communities, both online and offline (Kong 2010; Nip 2004a; Nip 2004b); they did not engage in political activities to strive for legal rights. The manifesto of the 1996 Chinese Tongzhi Conference explained why tongzhi organizations during the 1990s did not participate in political activities. It stated (as quoted in Kong 2010, pp.52-53),

The les-bi-gay movement in many Western societies is largely built upon the notion of individualism, confrontational politics, and the discourse of individual rights. Certain characteristics of confrontational politics, such as through coming out and mass protests and parades may not be the best way of achieving tongzhi liberation in the family-centered, community oriented Chinese societies which stresses [sic] the importance of social harmony.

In this quotation, the author characterized individual rights and political actions to strive for these individual rights as Western. The author also suggested that such “confrontational” politics was not suitable for the family- and community- oriented Chinese societies. During this period of time, tongzhi organizations in Hong Kong harbored the “we” and “they” distinction between Western and Chinese “way” of being sexual minorities; this distinction contained essentialized notions for both “Western” and “Chinese” culture.

Tongzhi organizations that were established in the late 1990s, such as Women’s Coalition of Hong Kong SAR (WCHK) and Rainbow of Hong Kong, started engaging in political activities. For example, in 2000, several tongzhi organizations worked together
to work on an election campaign for pro-\textit{tongzhi} legislative councilors (To 2004). In 2001, Rainbow of Hong Kong protested against Hong Kong Red Cross’s ban on homosexual men donating blood (Kong 2010, pp.54). Individual \textit{tongzhi} also sought legal equality through jurisprudence and sued the government for discrimination in 2005. After the decriminalization of sexual behaviors between two men in 1991, the age of consent for sexual intercourse was higher for two men (twenty-one) than for a man and a woman (sixteen). The High Court of Hong Kong SAR declared that differential in age consent was unconstitutional and violated both the Basic Law\textsuperscript{27} and the Bill of Rights Ordinance (Ming Pao 25 August 2005).

In 2005, in response to Hong Kong right-wing Christians’ antigay campaign, \textit{tongzhi} and other organizations held the first annual International Day Against Homophobia (IDAHO). The theme of IDAHO was striving for collective justice for different oppressed groups including women’s groups and sex worker groups, who also participated into the parade (Kong 2010, pp.59). Amnesty International Hong Kong was also one of the supporters. Several pro-democracy legislative councilors also joined the parades in different years (Kong 2010, pp.59). In the postcolonial political condition of Hong Kong, \textit{tongzhi} organizations formed a coalition with the pro-democracy camp while HK right-wing Christians merged with the pro-Beijing camp. Thus, \textit{tongzhi} organizations contribute to the tension between Hong Kong and Beijing. However,

\textsuperscript{27}After the PRC and the UK had confirmed the date of sovereignty transfer, the PRC set up a committee in Hong Kong to pen a new constitution, the Basic Law. In order to build confidence among Hong Kong residents, many articles in the Basic Law stressed the safeguarding of human rights, democracy, and freedom in the to-be Hong Kong SAR (Chan 1991). Many articles of the Basic Law also emphasize the protection of privacy and to ensure equality among residents. The Basic Law guarantees a high degree of autonomy of the Special Administrative Region. The final adjudication power of Hong Kong SAR stays in Hong Kong SAR (Article 2).
previous studies do not address how tongzhi organizations mobilized in response to this political situation.

**Methodology**

I collected and analyzed a total of 84 news articles and advertisements related to the first and the second amendment of Hong Kong’s Domestic Violence Ordinance (DVO), which took place in 2008 and 2009, respectively. I also collected and analyzed a total of 406 LegCo meeting minutes and submissions to LegCo on the amendments of the DVO. The second amendment of the DVO was the second time in Hong Kong’s history and the only time in post-handover Hong Kong when tongzhi-related legislation was proposed and eventually passed. The first time occurred when the British colonial government decriminalized sexual behaviors between two men in 1991. During the discussion of the second amendment of the DVO, right-wing Christians and organizations and some people from the general public used a “Chinese family values” argument to oppose the DVO, which is the major interest of this thesis in investigating how a “national/cultural” Chinese identity was incorporated in people’s view toward sexual minorities in Hong Kong.

Materials I analyzed included news articles and advertisements regarding the second amendment of the DVO published on Ming Pao and am730, articles in two Christian websites, articles of an independent media in Hong Kong—inmedia (which published tongzhi activists’ articles more), meeting minutes of LegCo on the second

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28 For details of these sources, please refer to Appendix IV.
amendment, and written opinions (called “submissions”) Hong Kong residents submitted to LegCo on the second amendment. I chose Ming Pao because the right-wing Christians and organizations opposing the DVO advertised in Ming Pao; Ming Pao also published articles written by both tongzhi activists and their alliance and also those by right-wing Christians. Ming Pao was also considered the most credible Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong (Chinese University of Hong Kong 2006). Am730 is a free-circulating newspaper in Hong Kong; I chose am730 simply because right-wing Christians also put their advertisement on am730.

As a result, in my sources, there were websites representing the standpoints of Christian churches, online media that leaned toward tongzhi activists, and Ming Pao, which published articles by both right-wing Christians and tongzhi activists and their alliance. Records from LegCo were important because they document that the proponents and opponents of the DVO and general public met to discuss the bill. All these materials are available online and open to public except the archives of Ming Pao, which require a paid digital subscription. For the news articles, I only focus on tongzhi and the DVO; for the meeting minutes and submissions to LegCo, I focus on the “Chinese tradition” argument. Time range of news articles is from 2004 to 2009. I traced articles back to 2004 because I need earlier articles to contextualize the rhetoric right-wing Christians used during the DVO. Unless otherwise noted, the original text is in Chinese and the English text presented in this thesis is my translation. I also include interview data with Waiwai to explain why tongzhi became a concern group in the legislative process.
Results

I organize the results in three different sections. The first section is on the peculiar relationship among the pro-democracy camp, the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, and tongzhi organizations in post-handover Hong Kong. The second section is on how this peculiar relationship among these three parties shapes the HK right-wing Christian antigay rhetoric, which deviated from the “immoral West vs. moral China” rhetoric by Protestant churches during debates about the decriminalization of sexual behaviors between two men during 1990s. The third section focuses on the two amendments of the DVO. Within this section, there are several subsections that are the major themes of the debates on the DVO.

Pro-Democracy Camp, the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, and Tongzhi Organizations

In post-handover Hong Kong, the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong and tongzhi organizations have a peculiar relationship with each other. On one hand, the Catholic Church condemns homosexuality; on the other hand, the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong and tongzhi organizations are allies in the democracy movement in Hong Kong. The Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong and several tongzhi organizations are both members of the pro-democracy public platform, Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF). Other member organizations of CHRF include several pro-democracy political parties, human rights organizations, women’s movement organizations, labor unions, tongzhi organizations, Protestant organizations (not right-wing Christians organizations), and two commissions of the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong (Civil Human Rights Front
Since these two commissions are directly under the control of the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong and because of the hierarchical nature of the Roman Catholic Church, their participation in CHRF more or less represents the stance of the Catholic Church in Hong Kong—it is with the pro-democracy camp. Unlike some Protestant churches and organizations that supported the pro-Beijing camp, the former Bishop of Roman Catholic Diocese, Joseph Cardinal Zen Ze-kiun (陳日君樞機), openly criticized the unwillingness of Hong Kong SAR government and of Beijing to implement universal suffrage in Hong Kong (Luehrmann 2009).

The CHRF also becomes a major platform for tongzhi organizations to demand legal protection and equality in Hong Kong. For example, in 2005, CHRF—the organizer of the annual July-1st Rally—arranged for several tongzhi organizations, along with women movement organizations, to lead the rally29; one subtheme of that year rally was the demand for legislation to ensure equality for sexual minorities and women. Some Protestant churches openly opposed tongzhi organizations leading the July-1st Rally and called on Christians not to participate into the 2005 July-1st Rally (Ming Pao 25 August 2005). In post-handover Hong Kong, right-wing Christians and tongzhi organizations collaborate with pro-Beijing camp and pro-democracy camp, respectively, which are political rivals. This political situation has shaped right-wing Christian antigay rhetoric.

29 The theme of 2005 July-1st Rally was “Oppose government collusion, strive for universal suffrage.” About 22,000 people participated in the demonstration in 2005 (The Public Opinion Programme, 2009).
**Shifting Rhetoric Mapped on Shifting Political Landscape**

In the 1980s, when the British colonial government proposed decriminalization of sexual behaviors between two men, antigay rhetoric from Protestant churches mainly focused on pitting homosexuality against “Chinese tradition and culture,” as reviewed earlier. By setting up this binary, these Christians put the two groups this binary symbolized—the British colonial government (the West) and the majority of Hong Kong population, ethnic Chinese—into antagonistic position. This binary also falsified a consensus of the majority of the Hong Kong population—since they were ethnic Chinese, they had to oppose decriminalization of homosexual acts.

After sovereignty handover, the British colonial government did not exist any more, and the pro-democracy camp advocated for *tongzhi*. Hong Kong right-wing Christians adjusted their rhetoric according to changes in political landscape. The general secretary of one of the most active and vocal HK right-wing Christian organizations, the Society for Truth and Light (STL) (明光社)\(^{30}\), Mr. Chi Sum Choi (蔡志森) opposed *tongzhi* organizations leading the 2005 July-1\(^{st}\) Rally. His rhetoric deviated from the binary “homosexuality = Western and immorality vs. Chinese=morality” put forward by some Protestant churches during debates about decriminalizing sexual acts between two men. The conceptual framework of the cultural war initiated by the US Christian right and post-handover political landscape in Hong Kong molded Choi’s antigay rhetoric. Choi wrote (Choi 18 June 2005),

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\(^{30}\) Dr. Kwai-wah Hong, who is the chairperson of New Creation Association (the ministry of Exodus Global Alliance in Hong Kong), is one of the board members of the Society for Truth and Light (The Society for Truth and Light 2011).
Democracy is the greatest common divisor. As the organizer of the July-1st Rally, [CHRF] should try their best to uphold the demand which can be accepted by most people and to agglomerate all forces that support democracy [movement], at the same time to try to avoid talking about some demands which cannot easily generate consensus or even demands that are controversial. Regretfully, I wonder if the CHRF has already been controlled by pro-tongzhi organizations so that it has to propagate tongzhi agenda [via the July-1st Rally], or even to force other organizations to indirectly support tongzhi movement while they are supporting democracy and human rights [movement].

First, Choi assumed that most people who planned to participate in the Rally would find topics related to tongzhi controversial. Second, there were two tongzhi member organizations in CHRF; instead of viewing having tongzhi organizations leading the Rally as a consensus generated within CHRF, he assumed that tongzhi organizations had taken over CHRF. Third, Choi assumed that organizations that supported human rights would be coerced into supporting the tongzhi movement. The second and the third assumptions revealed the effects of the conceptual framework of HK right-wing Christians had on political discourse—liberals were taking over every sector of the society, and conservatives were being oppressed and forced to support them. Lastly,

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31 The greatest common divisor is a mathematical term. For example, 6=1x6=2x3, the divisors of 6 include 1, 2, 3, and 6; 30 = 1x30=2x15=3x10=2x3x5=6x5, the divisors of 30 include 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 15, and 30. The biggest divisor 6 and 30 in common is 6. As a result, the greatest common divisor (gcd) of 6 and 30 is 6. Choi made an analogy between gcd and the common goal of different groups who participated in the July-1st Rally. Choi suggested that different groups of people who participated into Rally might have different demands but they all had one common goal—to fight for democracy in HK; democracy was the greatest common divisor of the Rally.
Choi asserted that organizations that supported human rights were *forced* to support the *tongzhi* movement; this meant that Choi did not think the *tongzhi* movement fought for human rights.

Nevertheless, I and many people will continue to support [the pursuit of] democracy, human rights, and freedom. However, supporting democracy does not equate supporting CHRF; supporting human rights does not equate supporting homosexuals to get privilege (特權, te2 quan2).

For Choi, the *tongzhi* movement asked for special privileges, not human rights. The “privilege” to which Choi referred was the “legislation of Sexual Orientation Discrimination Ordinance, which will specifically benefit [emphasis added] homosexuals,” as he wrote earlier in the same article. No law in Hong Kong currently protects or has ever protected individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In the first half of 2005, there were rumors that the Hong Kong SAR government would consider introducing the bill of Sexual Orientation Discrimination Ordinance (SODO) to LegCo, which would make discrimination based on sexual orientation illegal. In the understanding of Choi, SODO would grant sexual minorities “privilege” because such law would protect only sexual minorities, not other groups.

An article Choi wrote in May 2005, which was published on the website of STL, revealed his underlying logic of SODO as granting “privilege” to homosexuals (Choi 20 May 2005),

Fairly speaking, in Hong Kong, homosexuals do not receive very unfair treatment. […]
Learning from the experience of foreign countries, the so-called Sexual Orientation Discrimination Ordinance, is reverse discrimination against people who do not agree with homosexuality, is a behavior of a new hegemony which prohibits other people from rejecting homosexuality based on consciousness and religious reasons.

Since “human rights” had been an important component of Hong Kongese identity and signified the distance between Hong Kong and mainland China, Choi could not just simply defy “human rights.” Instead, he argued that there was no discrimination against sexual minorities, which was contrary to findings of many studies—discrimination on the ground of gender and sexual nonconformity was prevalent in many workplaces in Hong Kong, as summarized in Lau and Stotzer (2010). By claiming that discrimination against sexual minorities was not a general social phenomenon, he could

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32 “Reverse discrimination, the original Chinese phrase Choi used was “逆向歧視,” which was a Chinese translation of “reverse discrimination.”

33 “New hegemony,” the original Chinese phrase Choi used was “新霸權主義.” “霸權主義” was the translation many Chinese academic writings used for “hegemony.” For examples of usage of this Chinese phrase, see Ho (2003). In gender studies, “hegemony” refers to the dominance of white and middle-class heterosexual masculinity/femininity over other forms of masculinities/femininities (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). It is the style of the many right-wing Christians to flip term like “hegemony” over and refers it to the “dominance” of “pro-homosexuality” organizations over other people (actually refer to the right-wing Christians themselves), who do not accept homosexuality.

34 According to Thoreson (2009), the human-rights-based argument for protection of sexual minorities from bodily harm and other forms of discriminations started to gain momentum globally in 2007, after international activists declared support for the Yogyakarta Principles, which advocated that rights of sexual minorities as at-risk group should be protected under international laws. When I interviewed Waiwai, she told me that they mainly used identity politics and coalition building as strategies for the movement. Since I do not do a systemic content analysis, I cannot say with any certainty that tongzhi organizations in Hong Kong had not used the human rights based argument before 2005. The earliest case of using human rights based argument I encountered was during the amendment of Domestic Violence Ordinance (DVO) in 2008 and 2009. My guess is that since one of the major goals of CHRF had been promoting human rights in Hong Kong, Choi might grasp a vague connection between what he called “privilege” and human rights.
argue that SODO would grant “privilege” to sexual minorities and would cause “reverse discrimination.”

Choi applied “reverse discrimination” to SODO in an abstract way, which was similar to the usage of “reverse discrimination” in the US, in regard to affirmative action (Bonilla-Silva 2006). The claim of “reverse discrimination” in the US is a form of covert racism because the claim of affirmative action as “giving quotas” to people of color emerges within the conceptual framework that whites are entitled to job and educational opportunities while people of color are not; these opportunities are “quotas” for people of color, while “opportunities” for whites are just “opportunities.” Under the concept of abstract liberalism, such opportunities should be open to “fair competition,” regardless of the “merit system” itself is not neutral but racially biased because the poor, whom under the structural inequality of the US society were disproportionately people of color, did not have a fair competition because of the lack of resources in their communities (Bonilla-Silva 2006). Whether Choi knew “reverse discrimination” was a form of racism or not, he applied an out-of-context racist concept to argue against protecting sexual minorities from discrimination.

Although Choi plagiarized “reverse discrimination,” he (and the STL) was able to generate antigay rhetoric specific to the situation of Hong Kong by distancing tongzhi rights from human rights and CHRF from democracy movement. It was crucial for right-wing Christians to distance CHRF from democracy movement because ever since the Tiananmen Crackdown, “democracy” has carried a significant symbolic meaning in Hong Kong. Many people view “democracy” as the key to safeguarding them from
perceived oppression by Beijing. Furthermore, the pro-democratic political parties have been popular among people in Hong Kong; the majority of the LegCo seats that are directly elected by Hong Kong people are pro-democracy political parties. The annual July-1st Rally has become a public ritual for people to express their demands in Hong Kong and has been an effective way of mobilizing people in Hong Kong; for example, in 2003, there were 500,000 people participating into the Rally, which remains the second largest protest in scale in the history of Hong Kong, only next to the protest during Tiananmen Crackdown (Ming Pao 2 July 2003). As a result, Choi might have found the support pro-democracy camp and CHRF provided with tongzhi organizations warning. Again, he could not simply defy “democracy;” instead, he tried to distance CHRF from “democracy” as he wrote “supporting democracy does not equate supporting CHRF.”

This case was an example of how antigay rhetoric in Hong Kong shifted from the binary of “homosexuality = Western and immorality vs. Chinese=morality”— which mapped onto the political landscape of the British colonial era—to the rhetoric of “supporting democracy ≠ supporting CHRF; supporting human rights ≠ supporting homosexuals to get privilege”—which mapped onto the political landscape after sovereignty handover, when pro-democracy camp serves as a symbol of representing Hong Kong people. Since the annual July-1st Rally has been one of the most high-profile political events in Hong Kong in which many people participate, the disputes generated by Choi captured the attention of a lot of people in Hong Kong. His opposition helped create the impression that tongzhi organizations and the pro-democracy camp were on the same side. In fact, CHRF became a platform for coalition building between tongzhi
organizations and other organizations. This coalition resulted in the involvement of tongzhi organizations in the amendments of Domestic Violence Ordinance (DVO).

*The Amendments of Domestic Violence Ordinance (DVO)*

The Domestic Violence Ordinance (DVO) first went into effect in 1986 in Hong Kong, which the British colonial government modeled after the UK Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 (The Alliance for the Reform of Domestic Violence Ordinance 2007). There had been no major changes since 1986, except some technical changes in names due to the sovereignty transfer in 1997. The original DVO only covered married couples and their children living in a “matrimonial home,” couples in a “cohabitation of a man and a woman as it applies to marriage,” and their children (Guillerman 1997). In 2004, an unemployed man murdered his wife and their twin daughters. The victims had already been living in a woman shelter prior to the murder. Eight hours before the murder, the wife called the police for help after her husband had threatened to kill their daughters. The police officers met the victim outside the door of the family’s residency; the door was locked, and the victim could not open it. The police officers simply left the apartment without referring the victim to any help or making any follow-up (Ming Pao 12 April 2004). This tragedy exposed the inefficiency and insensitivity of both the police and the social welfare department of Hong Kong SAR and also shocked many Hong Kong residents. Many legislative councilors, mass media, the general public, and many NGOs urged the government to reform the DVO. Among these NGOs were women’s organizations and tongzhi organizations.
Involvement of Tongzhi Organizations in the Amendments of the DVO

Tongzhi organizations in Hong Kong have been politically active since the early 2000s. The first attempt at generating pro-tongzhi legislation after the handover occurred with the DVO. Some tongzhi activists and organizations had been working closely with other NGOs to fight for social justice for a few years when the LegCo initiated the procedure to discuss the reform of the DVO in 2007. As a result, the collaboration with other civic groups became one strategy used by tongzhi organizations in Hong Kong.

Waiwai discussed tongzhi activists’ coalition with other civic groups during the interview, which happened after she had attended a CHRF meeting.

The staff of tongzhi organizations has been having a very close [collaborative] relationship with other civic and minority groups; as a result, the front line has been widened, that is, tongzhi is one of the groups who have to fight [for equality and social justice]. For example, [we work] with [people who fight for] minimum wage, racial minorities, sex workers, etc., many minority groups. We tend to line up with each other; the civic society of HK is like this in the recent years.

Our strategy is, we will line up with many different issues, and every of these

\[35\] Waiwai used the word “小眾.” Many tongzhi organizations in Hong Kong translated “sexual minorities” to “性小眾” (for example, see WCHK website and compare its Chinese and English versions: http://www.wchk.org/index_news.html and http://www.wchk.org/index_news_e.html). Waiwai referred to the sociological concept of “minorities”. However, sex workers and people who fought for legislation on minimum wage are not minority groups per se (at least in the context of the US), “oppressed”, “subordinate”, or “marginalized” would be better translations. However, out of respect of her usage of words and the fact that she did also mention sexual and racial minorities, I used the word “minority”. The social meanings of racial minorities in Hong Kong usually does not mean minority in number but the racially subordinate status these groups have in a Han Chinese dominated Hong Kong society. Racial minorities usually refer to Southeast Asians, such as Filipino/as, Indonesians, etc., and South Asians, such as Indians, Pakistanis, etc. Although Europeans are minorities in number, they are not usually referred to as “racial minorities”, regardless of the social status of these groups.
issues contain tongzhi rights. For example, racial minorities—we have racial-minority tongzhi; minimum wage—we have grass-root tongzhi.

Instead of organizing the tongzhi movement as a movement on its own, tongzhi organizations have been inserting tongzhi rights into different segments of society and do not frame tongzhi rights as a set of isolated rights. This strategy and framing allows different minority and marginalized groups to form a coalition to fight for collective social justice. Of course, this strategy is not one-way; it requires other groups to support the tongzhi movement too, and this was the case in the amendment of the DVO. Waiwai continued,

The DVO was a very woman-oriented legislation. In 2004, a tragedy triggered the discussions of making an amendment to the DVO which would significantly change the ordinance. Tongzhi organizations have had a very close line up with some woman organizations. As a result, the review [of the proposed amendment] also added the concept of same-sex partners and same-sex cohabiting partners, as one of demands for the amendment. [This proposal] garnered wide-ranged supports from political parties and women, that is, the pro-democracy political parties and woman organizations. We thought that such a “raid” could improve [the situation] of tongzhi rights, which [we] had not made any progress in the past ten, twenty years; [we called this], as if a raid. You could not imagine that we could squeeze [ourselves] into the [amendment of] the DVO and make a fight.

36 The tragedy mentioned at the beginning of this section.
Different groups, including WCHK and another tongzhi NGO, the Hong Kong Ten Percent Club, formed the Alliance for the Reform of Domestic Violence Ordinance” (The Alliance) 37 and submitted a proposal to the LegCo for the reform of the DVO (The Alliance for the Reform of Domestic Violence Ordinance 2007). This proposal suggested many changes, one of which was to extend protection from domestic violence from the only two types of couples covered in the original DVO to other members of their immediate and extended families, former spouses, former-cohabiter, and same-sex cohabiter.

As Waiwai suggested, stand-alone tongzhi-rights bills would have a very small chance at being passed. Cho (2010) also points out that the tongzhi movement in Hong Kong depends more and more on jurisprudence to achieve equality. When tongzhi organizations opted to take the legislation route, it seemed that they had to depend on other bills that were appealing to the general public or at least to some other sectors of society, like women’s organizations in the case of the DVO. Furthermore, the composition of The Alliance reflected that some pro-democracy legislative councilors and one pro-democracy political party supported tongzhi rights. With the support of women’s organizations and pro-democratic political parties, tongzhi organizations were

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37 Here is the full list of the member/member organizations of The Alliance: Action for REACH OUT, Association Concerning Sexual Violence Against Women, The Association for the Advancement of Feminism, The Civic Party, Harmony House, Hong Kong Association For The Survivors Of Women Abuse (Kwan Fook), Hong Kong Federation of Women’s Centres, Hong Kong Ten Per Cent Club, Hong Kong Women Christian Council, Hong Kong Women’s Coalition for Equal Opportunities, Hong Kong Women Workers’ Association, Oxfam Hong Kong, Office of the Hon Fernando Cheung (Legislative Councilor), Office of the Hon Margaret Ng (Legislative Councilor), Office of the Hon Ronny Tong Ka-Wah SC (Legislative Councilor), Society For Community Organization, Hong Kong Women’s Coalition on Equal Opportunities, Dr. Anne S.Y. Cheung (Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong), and Robin Egerton (Barrister-at-law) (The Alliance for the Reform of Domestic Violence Ordinance, 2007). (“Hon” stands for “honorable,” the title for legislative councilors in Hong Kong).
able to assert their voice in the legislation of the DVO and to advocate protection for 
tongzhi from domestic violence. The Hong Kong SAR government responded with a 
reluctance to include same-sex cohabiting partners under the DVO and deployed a delay 
strategy.

Pass of the First Amendment of the DVO without Coverage on Same-Sex Cohabitating 
Partners

LegCo introduced the bill of the first amendment of the DVO in June of 2007. 
However, this bill did not cover same-sex cohabiting partners (Mencimer 2001). 
Although not providing protection to couples who were in same-sex cohabiting 
relationships might be unconstitutional because it violated the Article 22 of Hong Kong 
Bill of Rights Ordinance and the Article 25 of the Basic Law—everyone should be 
“equal before the law” and enjoy “equal protection,” the administration of the Hong 
Kong SAR insisted (Bills Committee on Domestic Violence (Amendment) Bill 2007, 13 
November 2007, p.4) (original English text from the LegCo official meeting minutes), 
not including same sex relationship under the DVO as with other laws in Hong 
Kong reflected the conscious policy position of the Government. Specifically, the 
Hong Kong law did not recognise same sex marriage, civil partnerships, or any 
same sex relationships. Recognising same sex relationships was an issue 
concerning ethics and morality of the society. Any change to this policy stance 
would have substantial implications on the society and should not be introduced 
unless consensus or a majority view was reached by the society.
The administration argued that since the Hong Kong SAR did not legally recognize any form of same-sex intimate relationship, the DVO should not cover same-sex cohabitating partners. The administration also framed it as an ethical and moral issue, which might have primed subsequent debates centered on “morality.” Suddenly on 27 May 2008, the administration changed its mind and agreed to cover same-sex cohabiting partners under the DVO, but clarified that it was only “in response to the distinct and unique context of domestic violence” (Bills Committee on Domestic Violence (Amendment) Bill 2007, 27 May 2008, pp.3).

At the same time, the administration stated that since including same-sex cohabiting partners was outside the scope of the amendment of the DVO, the government needed time to prepare a separate amendment bill. As a result, the first amendment of the DVO passed without extending protection to same-sex cohabitating partners; it did extend protection to other members of the immediate and extended families, former spouses, and former-cohabiters of opposite sexes on 18 June 2008 (Domestic Violence (Amendment) Ordinance 2008 (Cap. 189)). As a result, the second proposed amendment singled out same-sex cohabiting partners as the only parties concerned in the second amendment. Furthermore, since the second amendment was a separate bill, the legislation process had to start all over again. The passage of the bill, if it were to happen, would fall in the next term of the LegCo (the fourth term\textsuperscript{38}), which commenced on 1 October 2008. The delay strategy deployed by the Hong Kong SAR government gave the right-wing Christians plenty of time to mobilize and allegedly to

\textsuperscript{38} Each LegCo term is four years. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} LegCo term, during which the LegCo passed the first amendment of the DVO, was from 1 October 2004 to 29 September 2008.
Influence the election result of the 4th LegCo term. Unfortunately for tongzhi movement organizations, the second amendment of the DVO became an election tool for some candidates of legislative councilors.

**HK Right-Wing Christians and the Election of the 4th LegCo Term**

The election of the 4th LegCo term occurred on 7 September 2008. This gave HK right-wing Christians time to mobilize to oppose the second amendment. Although the administration had stated clearly that the proposed second amendment did not mean recognition of any form of same-sex intimate relationships, right-wing Christians still argued that it would do so indirectly. They further argued that such indirect recognition would open the door to same-sex marriage.

On 6 August 2008, The Hong Kong Alliance for Family (HKAF), which consisted of The Society for Truth and Light and some of the biggest Protestant churches in Hong Kong, published a “A Manifesto of Safeguarding the Family” as an advertisement on two full pages of Ming Pao and one full page in am730. A total of 125 units—almost all of them were Protestant churches, schools and social welfare services under these Protestant churches—and 7,048 individuals jointly signed this manifesto.

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39 The Hong Kong Alliance of Family (HKAF) was established in 2003. Member organizations include Chinese Rhenish Church Hong Kong, Evangelize China Fellowship Tsim Sha Tsui Canaan Church, China Holiness Church, Chinese Coordination Center of World Evangelism, The Society for Truth and Light, Kowloon Tong Church of The Chinese Christian and Missionary Alliance—Tai Wai Church, Hong Kong Sex Culture Society, The Baptist Convention of Hong Kong, Fellowship of Evangelical Student (Hong Kong), Hong Kong Church Renewal Movement, Tsuen Wan Baptist Church, and Goodnews Communication International(GNCI)/Gospel Communication Centre (GCC) (Hong Kong Alliance for Family, 2011).
Based on the rate of 2011, I estimated the total cost of this “manifesto” itself would be about US$532,710\textsuperscript{40}.

The goal of these advertisements by the HKAF was to “ask the government [emphasis added] and every candidate for LegCo [emphasis added] to unambiguously support the safeguarding of family and marriage between one man and one woman” (Hong Kong Alliance for Family 6 August 2008). As a result, everyone knew that the HKAF wanted people who would carry out their agenda in the LegCo and that HKAF had a lot of money and supporters, the two things every candidate wanted during election season. In the same advertisement, the HKAF also described what marriage and family meant to them.

The Omnipresence of a Heterosexual Monogamous Marriage and the “Natural” Family

In these advertisements, the HKAF presented marriage as a heterosexual monogamous marriage and family as a nuclear family formed from such a marriage. In the manifesto, below a red box with the word “family” (家庭, jia1ting2), there were the following four points:

1. We believe that marriage is a union between a man and a woman, which is the foundation of the development of the human society, from one generation to

\textsuperscript{40} HKAF put two full-black-and-white pages in A12 and A13 in Ming Pao and one full-full-colored page in am730. Estimated from the rate of 2011, it would have a total cost around US$532,710 (am730, 2011; Ming Pao, 2011). I did not adjust for any inflation rate or currency exchange rate; I would like to give a rough idea of how much money they raised to just to get a “manifesto” published on newspapers. This is not even the most expensive event/activity right-wing Christians have had, the HK Franklin Graham Festival, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, cost about US $1,300,000.
2. We believe that families formed from such marriage are at the core of the human society. Everyone is born and grows up in a family and is raised by a father and a mother. [Everyone] learns to love and to be loved and to build a moral integrity from love [from a family].

3. We believe that family is the core carrier of the culture and the transmission of the culture.

4. We believe that a healthy marriage and family system is indispensable for the human civilization and the cohesion of the society. In history, different races, countries, and cultures also approve and protect [this marriage and family system].

The concept of “family” represents in these four points is identical to the “natural family” concept of many North American pro-family advocates. A family consists of two parents—a man and a woman, bonded by marriage—and their children (Buss and Herman 2003). As a matter of fact, in 2007, the HKAF invited Glen Lavy and Jeffery Ventrella, two senior counselors of the Alliance Defense Fund (ADF), to give a seminar on “tongzhi movement Vs Religious Freedom” in Hong Kong (Gospel Herald 14 January 2010). The ADF helped defending Proposition 8, a ballot proposition which banned same-sex marriage in California in the US in 2008 (The New York Times 5 December 2010). Below are quotations from the seminar (Gospel Herald 14 January 2010),

Why defend marriage and family?
Gley [Glen] discussed the four reasons why Christians have to defend marriage and family. First, marriage and family are the rock\textsuperscript{41} of the society. Experts on the history of marriage state that marriage is a common practice of all human beings. If we lose the natural family, the foundation of the society will collapse. Second, marriage and natural family are the plans of God. Whether a person is a male or a female is determined by God. Life-long marriage between one man and one woman is also the intention of God. Homosexuality destroys the order of the Creation and attacks the one-man-and-one-woman system [...] Fourth, children need a family. Natural family is the best environment to educate children. If someone say that same-sex couples can educate children the same as ordinary parents, this is an impossible result. It is because there has not been any research which has sample [of children] starting from the birth.

What Glen Lavy said in this seminar and the first two points of the manifesto by the HKAF expressed the same ideas. Many Hong Kong people might not know to what “natural family” refers; the HKAF might have to define and emphasize “a marriage is a union between one man and one woman” first and then has to replace “children need a natural family” with “every child is raised by a father and a mother.” Furthermore, the HKAF does not use “God’s Will” and “God’s intention;” it might due to the fact that only about 10 percent of the population in Hong Kong is Christian. Emphasizing God may not be very appealing to the general public in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, both the

\textsuperscript{41} I translated the Chinese words “基石” to “rock” as its meaning of “rock” in the New Testament, “And I tell you that you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not overcome it” (Matthew 16:18) to match the context of this seminar the ADF gave to right-wing Christians in Hong Kong. “Rock” has the meaning of foundation in this passage.
HKAF and Glen Lavy advocated that the natural family is the foundation of all human societies and without it, the society will collapse.

Later during the seminar, Glen said, “in the 4000 years of human history, [it has always] been a marriage of a man and a woman [emphasis added].” Lavy deployed a concept of a universal marriage formation, which coincided with the fourth point of the manifesto by the HKAF. The “natural outcome” of this form of marriage is the establishment of a “natural family.” Furthermore, this set of a heterosexual monogamous marriage and a natural family is not only ahistorical but also translocal—it is for all human beings; and all human beings cannot possible live at the same locality. This omnipresence of a heterosexual monogamous marriage and its consequent natural family—lends HK right-wing Christians a perfect rhetorical tool which fits their need in opposition of the DVO. In the argument of HK right-wing Christians, the inclusion of same-sex cohabitating partners in the DVO will equate to recognizing same-sex marriage, which will in turn destroy the (natural) family value because the parents are not of opposite sexes. Since the omnipresence of a heterosexual monogamous marriage and a natural family is ahistorical and translocal, they should also be applicable to Hong Kong. This gave the HK right-wing Christians an authoritarian voice.

This rhetorical tool was so perfect that it exposed itself as plagiarism. The first amendment of the DVO, which the LegCo passed in June 2008, already covered members of the immediate and extended families of heterosexual couples such as their parents, uncles, aunts, cousins, etc., and also former spouses and former-cohabiters of opposite sexes. These people were certainly not within the natural family (nuclear
family) with which HK right-wing Christians are obsessed; there was no “natural family” for them to defend. However, it seemed that HK right-wing Christians did not have problem deploying rhetoric that had no legal merit or any actual meaning within the DVO. Like their plagiarism of “reverse discrimination,” this “natural family value” was also out of context.

In addition to advertising on the newspapers, right-wing Christian churches allegedly encouraged their followers to vote for three pro-Beijing candidates, who belonged to their congregation, for legislative counselors (Ming Pao 28 August 2008). One candidate, Priscilla Leung Mei-fun⁴², eventually won a seat in the LegCo. Beijing also supported Leung to enter the LegCo to secure more pro-Beijing seats in the geography constituencies that are directly elected by Hong Kong residents. The pro-Beijing camp already controlled another half of the LegCo, the functional constituencies, which are elected by a very small number of electorates. These electorates represent the interests of business, financial, and professional sectors of Hong Kong (Scott 2000). Another candidate, Sing Chi Wong—a pro-democracy candidate and a Protestant Christian—also won a seat the LegCo. Protestant churches currently have two “representatives” in the LegCo. Priscilla Leung and Sing Chi Wong brought the “natural family” rhetoric to the 4th term of the LegCo.

⁴² In Hong Kong, when a person has a Chinese last name and an English given name and also wants to include both his/her English and Chinese given name, it is a common usage to put his/her name in this order: English given name, last name, followed by Chinese given name. For example, in “Priscilla Leung Mei-fun,” “Priscilla” is the English given name, “Leung” is the last name, and “Mei-fun” is the Chinese given name.
Excluding Same-Sex Cohabiting Partners from the “Matrimonial Home” and the “Marriage”

Once Priscilla Leung and Sing Chi Wong were in the LegCo, they strongly opposed the second amendment of the DVO. However, the debates were not about whether to offer legal protection to victims of domestic violence who were in a same-sex intimate relationship or not; rather, it was about excluding same-sex intimate relationship from the “matrimonial home” and the “marriage.” Right-wing Christians argued that, since the law stated, “this Ordinance shall apply to the cohabitation of a man and a woman as it applies [emphasis added] to marriage and references in this Ordinance to ‘marriage’ and ‘matrimonial home’ shall be construed accordingly” (Domestic Violence (Amendment) Ordinance 2008 (Cap 189)), including same-sex cohabiting partners would treat cohabitation as a marriage (The Society for Truth and Light & Hong Kong Sex Culture Society 2009, pp. 4). However, the fact was that since the DVO was first enacted in 1986, heterosexual cohabiting partners had not been entitled to other legal rights to which married heterosexual couples were entitled, such as the right to adopt children (Hong Kong Women Christian Council 23 January 2009, pp.2). This meant that couples whom the DVO covered/would cover, regardless of the same sex or of opposite sexes, were not automatically entitled to the legal status as married couples except for the purpose of domestic violence. Another reason why right-wing Christians could assert a “pro-family value” argument was that the official Chinese translation of the first amendment of the DVO was “《2008年家庭暴力(修訂)條例》,” which literally...
translated the English word “domestic” to “family” in Chinese\textsuperscript{43}. This “lost in translation” gave HK right-wing Christians plenty of room to maneuver and make the “pro family-value” argument.

Although the pro-Beijing legislative counselor, Priscilla Leung, opposed the second amendment of the DVO strongly, there was no evidence suggesting that Beijing ordered her to prevent the passage of the second amendment of the DVO; on the contrary, it seemed that Beijing did not oppose, or at least was indifferent, to the second amendment of the DVO. Before the election of Priscilla Leung for the 4\textsuperscript{th} term LegCo, the 3\textsuperscript{rd} term LegCo already had a consensus on passing the second amendment. Some of most vocal supporters of the second amendment were pro-Beijing legislative councilors (The Legislative Council of HK SAR 18 June 2008, pp. 8793-8830).

In addition, the Beijing government did not make any public comment on the second amendment. This silence of Beijing central government was in contrast with all of its past vocal and strong opposition against proposals of universal suffrage in the Hong Kong SAR (Ma 2011). It is a conventional wisdom that if Beijing keeps silent on an issue of Hong Kong, it means that Beijing is not for or against that particular issue and will leave it completely as an internal affair of the Hong Kong SAR. Furthermore, one of the biggest concerns of Beijing over Hong Kong is to prevent it from becoming a base of challenging the CCP regime (So 2000). Since the handover, the most intense conflicts between Beijing and the pro-democracy camp over Hong Kong involve

\textsuperscript{43} When the DVO was first enacted in 1986 in Hong Kong, it was an adaptation of the UK Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976. As a result, the English ordinance came first and then was translated into Chinese. For verification of the Chinese title of the DVO, readers could refer to LegCo website: www.legco.gov.hk.
universal suffrage, freedom, and national security; Beijing deems these issues as threats to its power, not only in Hong Kong, but also in mainland China. As a result, it is reasonable to make two inferences. First, Beijing was neither for nor against the second amendment of the DVO; rather, the antigay stance was the agenda of right-wing Christians in Hong Kong, which is part of the globalization of US Christian Right. Second, Beijing did not consider offering legal protection from domestic violence to gays and lesbians in Hong Kong SAR as a threat to its regime.

In mainland China, governmental oppression against *tongzhi* was mainly caused by the corruption of Chinese governments on different administrative levels; governmental crackdowns did not specifically target *tongzhi* organizations, but all kinds of unapproved public gatherings (Rofel 2007, pp.94-97). In post-handover Hong Kong, the Beijing government did not directly suppress legislation for equality for *tongzhi*; rather, it was an unintentional convergence of interests of Beijing and HK right-wing Christians onto a particular legislative counselor. This interest convergence made it possible for HK right-wing Christians to insert their antigay “pro-family” agenda into the LegCo.

**Submissions to the Two Special Meetings on the Second Amendment of the DVO**

The controversies on the second amendment of the DVO stirred up by HK right-wing Christians and their LegCo “representatives” forced the LegCo to hold two special meetings on 10 January 2009 and 23 January 2009 to explain the legal meaning of “family” and “matrimonial home” to the general public. The general public also
submitted written opinions—submissions—to the LegCo in regard to the second amendment of the DVO. The LegCo eventually passed the second amendment of the DVO on 16 December 2009; however, these submissions provide valuable data to examine the general public’s opinion toward legal rights of tongzhi in Hong Kong. There were a total of 275 submissions by individuals/organizations for the meeting on the 10th. According to Cho’s tabulation (2010, pp. 194), around 80% of the submissions were based on four formats; many of these submissions were exactly the same, down to the level of every single word. All of these submissions opposed the second amendment of the DVO44.

I tabulated submissions the LegCo received for the 23rd meeting. There were a total of 176 submissions. I was able to identify at least five formats and 102 submissions (about 58% of the total submissions) were based on one or more than one of these formats45. This high percentage of identical submissions intrigued me. One of the

44 Due to time constraint, I did not verify Cho’s tabulation. However, I did scan through all of these submissions and also had the impression that around 80% of these written opinions were based on about four formats. For the interest of time, I did not perform detailed content analysis on these identical submissions. However, from my scanning, I found the arguments and concerns of these identical submissions centered on covering same-sex cohabitating partners would equate to legally recognizing same-sex intimate relationships and thus opened the door to same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage would destroy the core family value in Hong Kong. I intended to verify Cho’s tabulation and performed content analysis of these submissions in the future.

45 Nineteen of these submissions asked the government to define “family/domestic” and suggested that the DVO should also extend to roommates because they also lived in the same flat. Twenty-eight of these submissions expressed that they would like to see the DVO to cover same-sex cohabitating partners but suggested the government to change the name from “Domestic Violence Ordinance” to “Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships Ordinance.” Such name change would take same-sex couples out of “domestic” (”family:” the word “domestic” was translated to “family” in the Chinese version of the Ordinance). Nine of these submissions were exactly the same to each other, except the signatures of people who submitted them; they suggested to cover roommates and did not ask the government to define “family/domestic.” Twenty-five of these submissions had exactly the same paragraph(s) and headings; all of them opposed to inclusion of same-sex cohabiting partners in the DVO because they argued that it would equate to recognizing same-sex marriage and same-sex couples as families. They also listed what adverse effects this would have on the society, family, and/or school, with exactly the same paragraph(s).
submissions by Ms. Ming Yeung may provide some explanations for these identical submissions (Yeung 23 January 2009),

I am a Christian. After worship, I saw the church giving everyone a copy of submission [on the DVO] and talking about including same-sex cohabiting partners will equate to the beginning of recognizing their [legal] status as a marriage. The church asked people to sign the submissions and return them [to the church] immediately. I felt very surprised because these people had not understood the content of the Ordinance before they signed the submissions. This might provide a plausible explanation of why the majority of the submissions, about 80% for the first special meeting and 58% for the second meeting, were seemingly written based on about four or five formats. Some churches allegedly urged the congregation to sign the submissions without giving them sufficient time to understand what the submissions were actually about. Furthermore, many of these submissions were faxed to the LegCo; the PDF files of these faxed submissions showed that they had the exact same paragraphs, headings, and three blanks for people to fill in their names, HK

Twenty-one of these submissions stated that inclusion of same-sex cohabitating partners in the DVO would equate to recognizing same-sex marriage and same-sex couples as families, thus making the DVO in conflict with the Marriage Ordinance (Cap. 181). All of these submissions were either submitted electronically or faxed to the LegCo. In addition to the 102 identical submissions, there were nine submissions from organizations that supported the second amendment. These submissions explained that people misunderstood the second amendment. One submission stated that many of these misunderstandings were caused by the government—most of these misunderstandings would not have happened if the general public had already known about the first amendment, which extended its coverage to other members of the immediate and extended families. This submission commented that the government should have made sure that the general public knew about this before it proceeded to the second amendment. The rest of the submissions seemed to be independently penned by individual Hong Kong residents.
identification card numbers, and phone numbers. Furthermore, the arguments in these submissions reflected misunderstandings of the purpose of the second amendment of the DVO; and these misunderstandings were exactly the argument put forward by HK right-wing Christians. As a result, I think it is reasonable to treat these identical submissions under the same category as repetitive.

Out of the remaining 20% (55) submissions to the first special meeting, twelve of them used a “Chinese culture/family value” and/or “a sexually immoral West” argument to oppose the second amendment; four of these 55 submissions claimed that the West was a bad example. Out of the remaining 52% (74) submissions to the second special meetings, six of them used a “Chinese culture/family value” and/or “a sexually immoral West” argument to oppose the second amendment; five of these 74 submissions claimed that the West as a bad example. In the following section, I focus on the “Chineseness” arguments. The “Chineseness” referred not to the same “Chinese” but to different versions of “China/Chinese.” In addition to the materials from the content analysis, I will also refer to my interviewees’ narratives described in Chapter II to illustrate how these narratives and antigay rhetoric mapped onto each other. I will specify the source.

46 Of course, the LegCo covered the HK identification card numbers and phone numbers before they uploaded these submissions to the LegCo online database. For an example of these submissions, please refer to LC Paper No. CB(2)750/08-09(52). A copy is available for the public via www.library.legco.gov.hk.
Which China/Chineseness? When?

Despite the fact that the HK right-wing Christian “family value” rhetoric was completely out of context of the DVO, it carved out a space for a portion of Hong Kong public and legislative councilors to express their understandings of “Chinese family value” and its relationships with homosexuality. Different people came up with different versions of “China,” “Chinese culture,” and “Chinese family values” across different times. These different versions of “China/Chineseness” revealed how people invented or imagined “Chineseness” to delegitimize same-sex couples as families, and how “a generalized West” was set up to be the “immoral” Other. These narratives of “China” and the West were similar to my interviewees’ views toward sexual equality—a conservative China and a generalized progressive West. They were two-sides of the same coin—for my interviewees, who self-identified as sexual minorities, this “progressiveness” was benign; for people who opposed the second amendment of the DVO, this “progressiveness” was immoral.

China/Chinesness Version#1—a Colonial Construct as an Ahistorical Chinese Culture

The first version of “China/Chineseness” involves an appropriation of a colonial construct of marriage as part of the thousand-years-long Chinese culture. There are depictions of an ahistorical “China” in which the marriage institution has been one

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47 It was “a portion” of the public because I only had access to written records of opinions Hong Kong residents submitted to the LegCo regarding the proposed 2nd amendment of the DVO. These opinions may not represent opinions of many other Hong Kong residents since people who voice their mind tend to be politically more active. Furthermore, as I discuss in the main text, it is highly suspicious that many of these people were under mobilization of HK right-wing Christians.
husband and one wife. For example, in the submission by Shatin Swatow Baptist Church, it states (Shatin Swatow Baptist Church 10 January 2009),

A couple formed by legal marriage is a man and a woman, a husband and a wife. This is not only what the Marriage Ordinance in Hong Kong states but also an important foundation of our long and thriving (源遠流長, yuan2yuan3liu2chang2) Chinese culture as well as of the stability of the family and of the nation.

Another submission by an organization called “Thinking Academy” expressed similar concepts (Thinking Academy 23 January 2009),

This organization [Thinking Academy] agree with the current Marriage Reform Ordinance (Cap.178) and the Marriage Ordinance (Cap.181)’s definition [of marriage as] a voluntary union between one man and one woman as the foundation of marriage. This foundation [of marriage] also conforms to the man-and-woman marriage tradition in China, which has been in well practiced and has a history of several thousand years [emphasis added].

Thinking Academy specified that the one-man-and-one-woman marriage has been the marriage tradition of China for several thousand years. Both the Shatin Swatow Baptist Church and the Thinking Academy mention “Marriage Ordinance,” which was part of their Chinese culture. This rhetoric might have been circulated more widely in Hong Kong than just these submissions. A Legislative Councilor, Dr. Margret Ng (吳靄儀), responded to this version of China during the LegCo meeting held on 16 December
2009. This “Chinese culture” might have haunted Dr. Ng for quite some time; this meeting was during the last phrase of the discussion of the bill. Dr. Ng said (original English text from the LegCo official meeting minutes) (The Legislative Council of HKSAR 16 December 2009, pp. 3415),

Chairman, our marriage law was drawn up during the colonial era on the basis of European Christian matrimonial concepts. It is not based on the traditional Chinese concept of the family, under which outside of a husband and a wife, there can also be some concubines.

Under British colonial ruling, it was legal for ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong to practice the marriage of “one husband, one wife, and multiple concubines” as if they were still under the sovereign of Qing dynasty (清朝) (AD1644-1912). In 1971, the British colonial government enacted the Marriage Reform Ordinance (Cap. 178). When the British colonial government enacted this ordinance, it had been 60 years after the end of the Qing Dynasty; and the 2nd amendment of the DVO was only 38 years after the Marriage Reform Ordinance. Section 5 of the Marriage Reform Ordinance states, “no man may take a concubine and no woman may acquire the status of a concubine;” the Marriage Reform Ordinance also established heterosexual monogamous marriage as the only legal form of marriage in Hong Kong (Section 4, Marriage Reform Ordinance (Cap.178)). What the Shatin Swatow Baptist Church and the Thinking Academy claimed as the traditional marriage of China was a colonial construct.
These two submissions also showed how people invented an ahistorical “Chinese culture” and “Chinese tradition” so that they could fit into the nuclear family model—tossed the words “China” and “Chinese,” and topped them with “several thousand years.” This invention also required a historical amnesia (Cheung 2001)—in this case, forgetting how recent it was for the heterosexual monogamous marriage as the only legal marriage in Hong Kong. This was the similar historical amnesia some Protestant churches had during the decriminalization of man-man sexual acts in the late 1980s and early 1990s—forgetting that criminalization itself was a colonial construct. The next version of “China/Chineseness” builds a binary of “immoral West vs. moral China” upon a colonial construct of marriage.

**China/Chineseness Version#2—a Sexually Immoral West vs. a Transhistorical Cultural China**

In this version of China/Chineseness, the binary of West vs. China appeared again as it had during the decriminalization of sexual behaviors between two men in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Authors of some submissions deployed a binary of a sexually immoral West vs. a transhistorical cultural China to oppose the second amendment of the DVO. Like the previous version, the culture and tradition of this China also remain static. At the same time, this “Chinese culture” is also transhistorical—it transcends time and is the culture of every political entity who is the sovereign of “China.” As the previous version, people also claimed a colonial imposition of marriage as Chinese tradition. One of the differences between these two versions is
that people also fused Confucianism with the colonial construct of marriage. The China in this version is also a cultural nationalist one—all Chinese share the same and bounded culture with each other but not with other racial groups.

Some of these authors wrote the submissions by putting a few conceptual blocks together. One example is the submission by Ms. Stella Li (Li 10 January 2009),

What is a family? Chinese (中國人, zhong1guo2ren2) have a long-thriving (源遠流長, yuan2yuan3liu2chang2) family concept of one father and one mother—one man and one woman, one-husband-one-wife marriage institution (一夫一妻, yi1fu1yi1qi1zhi4)—which also includes their children and parents, etc. This is what can be called a “family.” This is also the core of morality. The world has already had a lot of negative influence on family and on relationships. […] Legislative councilors can go to Canada, the US, and the Europe to see; we can learn from their mistakes. The government should oppose [original emphasis] to include same-sex cohabiting partners into the DVO to protect the harmony of families.

Although this quotation may seem incomprehensible, it is clear what conceptual blocks Ms. Li put together. Her categorization shared a similar framework with others’, which I

48 Although this will be out of the scope of my thesis, I want to note that maybe the name of “heterosexual monogamous marriage” and “one-husband-one-wife” already suggest that there are conceptual differences embedded in the language. While “heterosexual monogamous marriage” is specified by sexual orientation (heterosexual), it seems that “one-husband-one-wife” does not, at least not explicitly, contain the concept of sexual orientation. By sexual orientation, I mean the gender of the object-choice for sexual activities. The Chinese name emphasizes the composition of the marriage and the roles of the two people involved—a husband and a wife. As Chou (2001) suggested, it seemed that the concept of “sexual orientation” did not exist in pre-republican Chinese cultural system. People who engaged in same-sex erotic activities were described by the activities rather than by the gender of the object-choice.
will describe later. The first category of the conceptual blocks includes “family,” “Chinese,” “long-thriving,” “one-husband-one-wife marriage institution,” and “morality.” These are the major building blocks of a transhistorical cultural China. The second category includes “the world” and “bad influence.” This category suggests that bad influence is external, not internal. The third category includes “Canada,” “US,” “Europe,” and “mistakes.” It seems that “mistakes” are inclusions of same-sex cohabiting partners into some legislation similar to the DVO in these countries/continents.

Another submission shared similar categorization and offered more content of the conceptual framework. This is a submission by Mr. Sze Chung Lok, the representative of a group called “Male Violent Concern Group.” Mr. Lok first stated that including same-sex cohabiting partners under DVO would equate to recognizing same-sex marriage. Then, he explained why he objected the 2nd amendment of the DVO (Male Violent Concern Group 23 January 2009),

Before going back to Hong Kong, my wife and I had been studying and working in the US for many years. One of the things which prompted us to decide to go back to Hong Kong was the decay in morality in the US, especially when same-sex marriage was legalized in California and Boston [Massachusetts]. My wife and I imagined that if our children were going to go to school in the US, the text books would teach them that kissing and intimate relationship between two persons of the same sex is not a problem. We as Chinese (中國人,
zhongguoren), have morality and conscience; [China] is a country with manners. It is very difficult for us to accept these unnatural behaviors.

So, we decided to go back to Hong Kong, thinking that Hong Kong was still a society of Chinese people and that the social atmosphere would be better.

In Mr. Lok’s understanding, the legalization of same-sex marriage in California and Massachusetts were signs of moral decay in the US. Mr. Lok sent this submission to the LegCo in January 2009, a time when only two—Massachusetts and Connecticut—out of fifty states in the US granted marriage licenses to same-sex couples, while Prop 8 banned the once-legalized same-sex marriage in California in November 2008 (Los Angeles Times 5 November 2008; The New York Times 10 October 2008). To Mr. Lok, “same-sex marriage” was a symbol of “immorality” while it was a symbol of acceptance for Lily, one of the interviewees in Hong Kong, as discussed in Chapter II. Although Mr. Lok had been living in the US for many years, he did not provide any actual examples of “moral decay” in the US; rather, he projected a future with fear onto what his children would learn. Furthermore, Mr. Lok stated that China was a country with morality and conscience, as opposed to the US. There was a binary framework in Mr. Lok’s narrative—“Chinese/China as moral vs. US in a moral decay.”

Mr. Lok’s decision to go to back to Hong Kong was also based on cultural nationalism—he thought that Hong Kong was a society of Chinese people; as a result, the society had to be “moral” and less accepting toward homosexuality. This was also the reverse of how Elizabeth, one of the Hong Kong interviewees, thought—the culture of Hong Kong is inherently Chinese and thus conservative because the majority of the
population is ethnic Chinese. Mr. Lok kept on explaining why he objected to the second amendment of the DVO,

    Please don’t misunderstand me. I object to violence; I object to discrimination; but I respect the benefits of the majority even more; [I] value morality even more; [I] value the right [emphasis added] family value even more because “The cultivation of the person, the government of the family, the regulation of the State, and the tranquilization of the kingdom” is the culture and wisdom of thousands of years of us, the Chinese!

For Mr. Lok, same-sex cohabitation is not the “right” form of family; he relied on Confucianism as his source. Mr. Lok cited a passage from one of Confucian classics, “the cultivation of the person, the regulation of the family, the government of the State, and the tranquilization of the kingdom.”

According to Confucius, there are seven steps before the tranquilization of the kingdom; Mr. Lok cited the last three steps. Confucius states that each of these steps depends on its previous step; as a result, failure in achieving any one of these steps will destroy the state and ultimately the kingdom (many states constituted the kingdom, which can be understood as a nation in contemporary context) (Legge 2005[1893]). As a result, families are the foundation of a state and ultimately of the kingdom (the nation).

49 This is the translation by James Legge (2005[1893], p. 29). The original Chinese text is “修身，齊家，治國，平天下” (xiu1shen1 qi2iia1 zhi4guo2 ping2tian1xi4) (the author of the submission mixed up two words). This is a quotation from the Great Learning (大學, da4xue2), which is one of the chapters in the Record of Rites (禮記, li2ji4), which is one of the Five Classics (禮記, wu3jing1) of the Confucian canon (Legge, 2005[1893]). According to the Great Learning, there are seven steps to reach to the tranquilization of the kingdom—the investigation of things, the completion of knowledge, the sincerity of thoughts, the rectifying of the heart, the cultivation of the person, the regulation of the family, and the government of the State (格物, 至知, 誠意, 正心, 修身, 齊家, 治國, ge2 wu4 zhi4zhi1 cheng2yi4 zheng1xin1 xiu1shen1 qi2iia1 zhi4guo2) (Legge, 2005[1893], p. 29).
This might be one of the reasons why the “natural family” argument can easily become a “Chinese family” argument because both of them view that without families, the society will collapse/not be peaceful. The difference may be, saying “natural family” will not resonate among people in Hong Kong to the same degree as saying “Chinese family.”

Since the ultimate goal of this Confucian teaching is a tranquil kingdom, an argument based on this Confucian teaching will remains incomplete without a kingdom (nation). Another joint submission by two Hong Kong residents, Mr. Ka Keung Cheung and his wife Mrs. Chung Wah Law Cheung, also quoted the same Confucian teaching and extended their argument all the way to the PRC,

The culture and the standard of morality, decency, and propriety of Confucianism of our country have existed for over a thousand years; they teach us concepts of one-man-one-woman marriage and of family […] This will lead to a result of “the cultivation of the person, the regulation of the family, the government of the State, and the tranquilization of the kingdom.” As a result, in order to maintain the social stability and prosperity [emphasis added], we have to hold on tight to this one-man-one-woman marriage and family, or else we will follow the steps of many countries in the West—only know about “individualism” and “free but self-indulgence,” which will lead to losing our morality, “family becoming non-family (incest and murdering parents)” (家不家 (亂倫, 殺父母) (jia1bu4jia1; luanlun2, sha1fu4mu2)) and “nation becoming non-nation (asking for independence and wars)” (國不國 (求獨立, 挑戰爭) (guo2bu4guo2; qiu2du2li4, tiao1zhan4zheng1).
The first few sentences are concepts I delineated earlier—claiming a colonial construct as the culture and tradition of China based on Confucianism. Then, there is a picture of “an immoral West,” which Mr. and Mrs. Cheung describe as individualistic and self-indulgent. The word “incest” and the phrase “murdering parents” seem a bit hyperbolic. Mr. and Mrs. Cheung might write this based on a rationale that a family should have an “appropriate” composition and relationship. Same-sex cohabitation was not an appropriate family composition, which would lead to “inappropriate” relationship among family members such as incest and even tragedy such as murder of the parents.

Mr. and Mrs. Cheung then suggested that the nation might fall. However, there has not been any country which is at wars or part of it becomes independent after the government legally recognized same-sex intimate relationships. As a result, it would be more plausible to consider “independence and wars” as Mr. and Mrs. Cheung’s own projection onto the Hong Kong SAR and the PRC. The phrase “stability and prosperity” may retrospectively reflect the anxiety on handover; this phrase was a discursive tool to alleviate people’s uncertainty about the future of Hong Kong (Chan and Clark 1991). No one knew whether “One Country, Two Systems” would actually work and how it would impact Hong Kong as one of the international financial centers; no one knew how it would be like to be governed by the CCP after handover, which happened only eight years after the Tiananmen Crackdown.

The next paragraph of the submission gives more support to the explanation that “independence and wars” might be the authors’ projection onto the Hong Kong SAR and the PRC.
Hong Kong is part of China (中國, zhong1guo2). Although we are entitled to “One Country, Two Systems” and a high degree of autonomy, thoughts and culture of our society cannot deviate from the moral standard of our motherland (祖國, zu3guo2) and [we] cannot separate [ourselves] from the motherland! This does not follow the principle of “Love Hong Kong, Love the Nation!”

Although Mr. and Mrs. Cheung used the term “中國” (China, zhong1guo2) in the above quotation, they referred to the People’s Republic of China” (中華人民共和國, zhong1hua2ren2min2gong4he2guo2) because this “China” was in the context of “One Country, Two Systems”—the political and administrative relationships between the Hong Kong SAR and the PRC. It is ironic because the CCP had a long history of campaigns to tear down the Confucian philosophical system (Spence 1991). Also, the goal of the communist revolution was to completely demolish the feudal society and the old China (Spence 1991). As a result, the “China” Mr. and Mrs. Cheung carried an internal contradiction—this “China” is Confucian and simultaneously against Confucianism. This implies that this “China” is not only the contemporary PRC but also the transhistorical cultural China—because the cultural China is transhistorical, no matter what the political entity is, the cultural China is still the same.

For Mr. and Mr. Cheung, PRC is not only the political and cultural China but also the “motherland” and thus the cultural authority of Hong Kong. As a result, Hong Kong should comply with the moral standard of the motherland, which in Mr. and Mrs. Cheung’s cognition, is based on Confucianism. The last sentence “Love Hong Kong, Love the Nation” gives some hint of how Mr. and Mrs. Cheung extrapolated this far—
from the DVO to “separating ourselves from our motherland.” “Love the Nation, Love Hong Kong”\textsuperscript{50} is one of the most frequently used slogans of the state nationalism deployed by Beijing.

Both national leaders in Beijing and pro-Beijing camp in Hong Kong have been using the slogan “Love the Nation, Love Hong Kong” to emphasize that the relationship between the PRC and the Hong Kong SAR is a mutually beneficial one (Ta Kung Pao 14 July 2011); loving Hong Kong requires loving the nation simultaneously. This request seems reasonable if one does not know what this “nation” implies. There is another slogan of the state nationalism—“Love the Party, Love the Nation” (The Chinese University of Hong Kong 2010), which explicitly links the nation to the CCP. Furthermore, Beijing is the one who “decides” who loves the nation and Hong Kong and who does not; the pro-democracy camp is certainly among the latter (Ma 15 July 2011). The pro-democracy camp has been in an antagonistic relationship with Beijing and the CCP since Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. Pro-democratic legislative councilors and the CHRF were among the most high-profile supporters of the DVO. Furthermore, the 2005 July-1\textsuperscript{st} Rally in which tongzhi organizations led the demonstration had already created an impression that the pro-democracy camp is with tongzhi.

All these may lead to the idea that the second amendment of the DVO was against Chinese culture. Under state nationalism, Beijing and the CCP represent the PRC; under a transhistorical cultural China, the PRC culturally represents “China.” The long-term nemesis of the CCP—the pro-democracy camp—supports the DVO. As a

\textsuperscript{50} I consider the difference in sequence of “nation” and “Hong Kong” is not conceptually significant because it still expresses patriotism in the context of Hong Kong and the PRC.
result, state nationalism and the transhistorical cultural China together situate the second amendment of the DVO on the opposite side of Beijing and thus Chinese culture. The two pro-Beijing legislative councilors—Ms. Yuen-Han Chan (陳婉嫻) and Ms. So-Yuk Choy (蔡素玉) (The Legislative Council of HKSAR 18 June 2008)—who were among proponents of including same-sex cohabiting partners under the DVO during the 3rd term of the LegCo were not councilors any more in the 4th term.

Although the British colonial government no longer existed in Hong Kong and the UK no longer seemed to play a significant role in Hong Kong politics, the binary of “moral China vs. immoral West” continued as it had during the debate on decriminalization of sexual behaviors between men in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This binary still contained an obvious notion of “we” and “they”—Chinese and the West. The binary also contained a notion of cultural nationalism. Cultural nationalism in Hong Kong did not challenge British colonial power before the handover (Law 2009, pp.140). After the handover, people who deployed cultural nationalism against the inclusion of same-sex cohabiters did not reflect on how “marriage” was legally constructed in colonial Hong Kong and claimed it as Chinese tradition and culture. At the same time, people were seemingly rejecting the West by claiming it as immoral; however, it was done by saying, “look what happens in the West,” which meant something already happened there, and it had not happened here yet. Despite it was a negative portray of the West, it was still someone who was “ahead” of Hong Kong—the question was only about whether Hong Kong would follow the West or not.
As Hong Kong was part of China in 2009, the PRC was not only the motherland (cultural authority) of ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong, but also the dominant political power in Hong Kong. The Chief Executive, the highest administrative officer of Hong Kong SAR, is *de facto* appointed by Beijing and the majority of the LegCo is almost guaranteed to be pro-Beijing (Scott 2000). The power of interpretation of the Basic Law is vested in the National People’s Congress of the PRC (Article 158, Basic Law of Hong Kong SAR). There are anxiety and tension on Beijing’s interference in the autonomy of Hong Kong SAR. Right-wing Christians in Hong Kong utilized the hegemony of the PRC and the tension to their advantage.

**China/Chineseness Version#3—the People’s Republic of China**

The third version of China is the current political entity of “China”—the PRC. As some of the most prominent figures of HK right-wing Christians are pro-Beijing, they also incorporated the most frequently used word of Beijing propaganda—“harmony.” Beijing leaders use “harmonious society” to convey the message that the central government acknowledges the huge disparity in wealth that exists in the PRC and is addressing the issue. However, at the same time, Beijing leaders also use “harmonious society” against political dissidents by accusing them of creating “chaos” and destroying the “harmonious society” (Cheek 2006, pp.42-46).

In their joint submission to the LegCo for the special meeting on the DVO, the Society for Truth and Light (STL) and Hong Kong Sex Culture Society (HKSCS)—both
of which were considered as right-wing Christian organizations (Cheung 2009)—mobilized “harmony” and “China” to state the importance of the one-husband-one-wife marriage and family (The Society for Truth and Light and Hong Kong Sex Culture Society 10 January 2009),

Connections with the Society and the Culture of China (中國, zhong1guo2)

Now Hong Kong is part of China. Although speaking from the system, it is [under] “One Country, Two Systems,” we cannot ignore the overall harmonious [emphasis added] and mutual beneficial relationship between Hong Kong and China, both culturally and institutionally. China also accepts one-husband-one-wife [marriage institution] (一夫一妻制, yi1fu1yi1qi1zhi4). Although in the past both Hong Kong and China [emphasis added] also had the possibility of qie (妾) and bi (婢)51, it was the privilege of high officials and upper-class and was not usual among the general population. As China and Hong Kong are on their way to modernization [emphasis added], [both of them] abolished the system of qie and bi. As a result, one-husband-one-wife is already the consensus between China and Hong Kong. If Hong Kong changes this carelessly, it is inevitable to bring some impacts to China.

Since STL and HKSCS mentioned “One Country, Two Systems,” the “China” was the party-state, the PRC (1949- ). However, the sliding from the PRC to an ahistorical China

51 I do not know to which period of Chinese history STL and HKSCS referred. I guess they might have been referring to a very general concept of qie and bi—both were concubines and socially recognized by the family and by the wife. People practiced concubinage, which was legal in many dynasties. For example, concubinage was legal and socially accepted at least in Tang Dynasty (AD618-907), Ming Dynasty (AD1638-1644), and Qing Dynasty (AD1644-1911) (Gao, 2003; Huang, 2002).
was smooth. In the first three sentences of the above quotation, “China” was the “PRC;” however, in the middle of the paragraph (the “China” in italic), it slipped back to time before 1931, when concubinage became illegal under the Civil Code of the Republic of China (ROC) (The Legislative Yuan of Republic of China 2011). A seamless transition back to the PRC occurred when the authors treated Hong Kong and “China” as two separate entities in the last few sentences.

STL and HKSCS knew that they could not make the argument of one-husband-one-wife as the traditional Chinese marriage because Joseph Cho, a prominent tongzhi activist in Hong Kong, had challenged STL with the existence of concubinage in pre-republican China (Cho 2006). Instead of claiming an ahistorical China, STL and HKSCS put the concubinage in the past, behind modernization. No matter how many times HK right-wing Christians tried, the ghost of colonialism still haunted them. “Modern” was the legal code the British colonial government assigned to the marriage of a “voluntary union for life of one man with one woman to the exclusion of all” (Section 4, Marriage Reform Ordinance) to distinguish it from the “customary marriage,” which was a marriage “in accordance with Chinese law and custom” (Section 7). As Fanon (1967[1952]) argues, people under colonization may appropriate the cultural code of the colonizers and desire to become the colonizers. In this case, HK right-wing Christians appropriated the legal code of “marriage” imposed by British colonial government. The “modernization” of marriage in Hong Kong was a result of colonization while the one-husband-one-wife marriage institution of the PRC was, as CCP put it, the victory of the communist revolution (Engel 1984).
By suggesting that Hong Kong and the PRC were on the same trajectory of modernization, STL and HKSCS implied a consensus developed during this process. This also put both Hong Kong and the PRC into what Chakrabarty (2000, p.8) calls the “imaginary waiting room of history”—if the heterosexual monogamous marriage institution was one of the end goals of modernization, the colonizer was the master of modernization because the colonizer had reached modernization before Hong Kong and the PRC did. For STL and HKSCS, both Hong Kong and the PRC were still on their way to modernization.

STL and HKSCS also suggested that any “careless change” in the marriage institution in Hong Kong would impact the “harmonious and mutual beneficial relationship” between Hong Kong and the PRC. When the authors mobilized the national propaganda “harmony”—the CCP deployed to against political dissidents, the propaganda transformed into rhetoric against sexual dissidents in Hong Kong. In doing so, the HK right-wing Christians almost effortlessly transferred the most powerful political discourse in mainland China to the DVO to against same-sex cohabiters. At the same time, HK right-wing Christians also ingratiated themselves with Beijing by acting like the “protector” of the “harmonious society” as they were against any deviation from the marriage norm of the PRC. As the CCP still tightly controls the religious sector in mainland China, no one can perform any missionary work in the mainland without the approval of the CCP (Leung 2005). As a result, ingratiating themselves with the CCP is an essential act for HK right-wing Christians. HK right-wing Christians fused this ingratiation seamlessly with their antigay rhetoric. When right-wing Christians used this
rhetoric, they should have a certain degree of confidence that it would resonate with the general public. What were the interests of the HK general public in the “mutual beneficial relationship” between the Hong Kong SAR and the PRC?

The PRC: the Dollar Sign

Another submission by the Parents for the Family Association (PFA) had similar reasoning as STL and HKSCS but was more specific about what they were worried about (Parents for the Family Association 10 January 2009),

Hong Kong as a part of China, although it is [under] “One Country, Two Systems,” the connections between China and Hong Kong are becoming stronger and stronger, not only economically but also in family and culture; [we are] also connected through blood and vain (血脈相連, xi3 mai4 xiang1 lian2).

Currently, the society in China also has one-husband-one-wife marriage as the foundation of the marriage institution. If Hong Kong acts carelessly on maintaining and safeguarding the one-husband-one-wife [marriage] institution, it is inevitable to bring impacts to Hong Kong and China. For example, if same-sex marriage is allowed through legal precedence by some

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52 The legal system of Hong Kong is a British common law system; as a result, like the US, there is legal precedence. I would argue that it does not need the second amendment of the DVO to lead to a legal precedence of same-sex marriage in Hong Kong. First, the Marriage Law of the PRC was not among the twelve national laws applied to Hong Kong. Second, the Article 8 of the Basic Law states that any legislation, as long as it complies with the Basic Law, is completely under the power of the Hong Kong SAR to implement. If it were as the right-wing Christians said, inclusion of same-sex couples into the DVO would be equal to recognizing same-sex marriage, it did not violate the Basic Law. On the other hand, under a hypothetical situation, even without the second amendment of the DVO, if a same-sex couple applied for a marriage license in Hong Kong and was denied, it would be unconstitutional.
judges who are sympathetic with tongzhi, then there must be many ziyouxing (自
由行) man and man, woman and woman, who will come to Hong Kong to get
married. This obviously will destroy the marriage institution of Hong Kong and
also bring troubles and turbulence to the motherland.

First, the PFA held a biological perspective toward the relationship between Hong Kong
and the PRC—they were connected through blood and vain. Second, what really at stake
to the PFA, was not only morality but also economy. Ziyouxing referred to tourists
through Individual Visit Scheme (IVS), which was launched by Beijing and the Hong
Kong SAR government as an effort to revitalize the economy of Hong Kong after the
epidemic of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). Before the IVS, mainland
Chinese tourists could not visit Hong Kong individually but had to visit via package
tours (Yeung, Lee and Kee 2008). The IVS still requires mainland tourists to apply for
visas to travel to Hong Kong (there is a border-control between the PRC and the Hong
Kong SAR). The IVS boosted the total number of tourists visiting Hong Kong from
15,536,800 in 2003 to 28,169,300 in 2007. As of 2007, about 55% of total tourists to
Hong Kong were from mainland (Yeung, Lee and Kee 2008). Tourism is one of the key
industries of Hong Kong, constituting about 3% of the total gross domestic product

(USD) 53 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was an epidemic first started in Guangdong province,
China, and then spread to Hong Kong and 26 other countries within weeks (Wang & Jolly 2004). There
were a total of 1755 known cases and 299 deaths within 3 months and a half in Hong Kong (WHO 2004).

according to the Basic Law. Article 37 of the Basic Law states, “The freedom of marriage of Hong Kong
residents and their right to raise a family freely shall be protected by law;” Article 25 states, “All Hong
Kong residents shall be equal before the law.” The Basic Law is the constitution of Hong Kong SAR; in
my opinion, the Marriage Ordinance itself is unconstitutional because it violates both Article 25 and 37 of
the Basic Law.

53 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was an epidemic first started in Guangdong province,
China, and then spread to Hong Kong and 26 other countries within weeks (Wang & Jolly 2004). There
were a total of 1755 known cases and 299 deaths within 3 months and a half in Hong Kong (WHO 2004).
The first and the only example the PFA gave about potential impacts on the motherland was highly related to economy. The PFA was worried that if Hong Kong legally recognized same-sex marriage, a lot of mainland same-sex couples would come to Hong Kong to get married. The PFA assumed that this would be troublesome for the PRC. Based on this assumption, a possible outcome would be that Beijing would terminate or restrict the scale of the IVS, which would have a strong negative impact on the tourism and economy of Hong Kong. However, if this is really about economy, Hong Kong should actually legally perform same-sex marriage because it would be the only city/country to do so in Asia. Same-sex marriage tourism has brought enormous income to Canada and some US cities (Boyd 2008). As a result, I argue that the PFA was using people’s concern on economy to their advantage—the general public of Hong Kong might not know legalizing same-sex marriage could bring more income to Hong Kong, but they knew the IVS, which saved Hong Kong from the pit after the SARS epidemic and have contributed to the tourism of Hong Kong ever since.

In the third version of China, opponents of the DVO deployed state nationalism to exclude same-sex cohabiters from the DVO. Underneath this seemingly patriotic argument was the appropriation of the colonizer’s legal code of “modern,” which situated both Hong Kong and the PRC in the imaginary waiting room of history. For some other people, the issue at stake in the DVO was not “morality” but the economic outlook of Hong Kong, which largely depended on the PRC. Peculiarly, the Beijing government had never publicly laid a word on the second amendment of the DVO. As analyzed earlier, this implied that the Beijing was indifferent to the amendment. The
authors of these submissions took the political, economic, and cultural hegemonic presence of the PRC in Hong Kong after handover to their advantage.

These three versions of “China,” no matter what the “China” was, did not escape colonization and the West. In the first version of China, the colonial imposition of the heterosexual monogamous marriage was naturalized as Chinese tradition and culture. In the second version, when people set up an antagonistic binary between China vs. West, they simultaneously put “China” and Hong Kong in the imaginary waiting room of history. In the third version, while HK right-wing Christians took advantage of the cultural, political, and economical hegemonic presence of the PRC on Hong Kong, they appropriated the legal code of the colonizer and applied it to both the PRC and Hong Kong to cover up their “pro-family” agenda, which is part of the global “pro-family” movement of the US right-wing Christians. For some of the interviewees as described in Chapter II, the West is progressive while China is backward; for opponents of the DVO, the West is immoral while China is moral. They are different but at the same time the two sides of the same coin—they just use different adjectives to describe a binary; they are both a reflection of an internalized Orientalism.

Discussions and Conclusions

Before the sovereignty transfer, ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong were not only diaspora but also under British colonial administration. The transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong from the UK to the PRC was more a recolonization than returning Hong Kong to its “motherland” (Chow 1992). Amidst the narratives of interviewees in Chapter
II and the objections against the DVO in this Chapter, a diasporic Chinese identity does not comprehensively capture how British colonialism, the hegemonic presence of the PRC, state and cultural nationalism, and political landscape intertwine with each other and affect people’s view toward the relationship among “Chinese culture”, tongzhi, and the “West.”

Fanon (1967[1952], pp.11) argues that under colonization, the psyche of the colonized of having a conscious of being inferior to the colonizer not only operates on individual level, but also on a collective level through domination and economic exploitation by the colonizers. As a result, the psyche of the colonized can also be collectively constructed and has collective consequences on people’s lives. Identity can also carry a meaning of collectivity—members who claim a particular identity perceive there are some fundamental sameness among members (Melucci 1995). The difference between “psyche” and “identity” is that it is usually an action for a person to claim an identity and that this person is aware of his/her action (Brubaker and Cooper 2000) while people may not be aware of how a collective psyche affects their world view and their actions.

Among the narratives of the interviewees and the objections to the DVO, people did self-identify as Chinese, deploy notions of “Chineseness” and a binary of “China vs. West.” However, it does not seem that they were aware of the colonial construction of “Chineseness” and the undertone of Orientalism of the colonial construction. It seems that they were not aware that the heterosexual monogamous marriage was a colonial construct; as a result, they were not aware of the “pro-family” agenda of the HK right-
wing Christians. This unawareness carves out a psychic space in which different powers and discourses can shape people’s view toward the relationship between Chineseness and tongzhi. This psychic space is not only individual but collective—the interviewees, who were tongzhi, and the opponents of the DVO, who tried to exclude tongzhi from the matrimonial home and marriage, both had this psychic space. It was not merely about antigay or progay; there was a larger concept rooted in this collective psychic space which framed their narratives.

The British colonialism, the diasporic identity, cultural and state nationalism, and the hegemony of the PRC collectively construct this psychic space. This psychic space is not just colonial but also diasporic. A heterosexual monogamous marriage was colonially imposed on people in Hong Kong; “Chinese culture” was colonially constructed as conservative and static. A diasporic Chinese identity allowed opponents of the DVO to mobilize cultural and state nationalism and to claim that same-sex cohabiting partners are not part of traditional Chinese family. It is diasporic because the opponents invoked a cultural nationalism and deferred to the cultural authority of the motherland. The claim of heterosexual monogamous marriage as Chinese tradition fused colonial construction and cultural nationalism together, which cannot be neatly separated from each other. Lastly, the increasing hegemonic presence of the PRC in Hong Kong enforced this falsified authority of the motherland over Hong Kong in the issue of the DVO. This psychic space in which all these types of power operate is a colonial and a diasporic one; it is a colonial diasporic psyche.
In this colonial diasporic psyche, space and time are important constituents of the “Chineseness” and its relationship with tongzhi. The space is what McClintock calls the “anachronistic space”—within the geographic space of European empire, the colonized do not “inhabit history proper but exist in a permanently anterior time” (1995, pp.30). Within Hong Kong—the geographic space, where formal colonization ended within a dozen of years—ethnic Chinese and their culture always lag behind the colonizer. The time in which the ahistorical China and transhistorical cultural China exist is a panoptical time—a time in which a unified world history unfolds (McClintock 1995, pp.36); by “unified,” McClintock means the history of the European colonizers. In this panoptical time, every human society has the same unified world history—they all will follow the same “historical” development of the European colonizers. The concept of “time” and “historical development” are identical to the notion of “time” and “development” in the gay modernity—gay subjectivities in all countries should follow the rights-based political movement as the West.

“China” is confined to the imaginary waiting room of history, and this imaginary waiting room is located in a stream of panoptical time. Within this imaginary waiting room of history, “China” is both ahistorical and a transhistorical cultural China. In this imaginary waiting room of history, “Chinese culture and tradition”—which are actually colonial constructs of Chineseness—will be always against tongzhi because this “China” is ahistorical and transhistorical. As European colonizers control time and space as a discursive tool to legitimize their colonization and exploitation of the colonized, antigay
people in Hong Kong control time and space in a similar fashion to legitimize their homophobia and discrimination against *tongzhi*.

Previous studies on Hong Kong *tongzhi* do not examine antigay rhetoric and organizing in a postcolonial and diasporic framework. My thesis suggests that such a framework can be very productive in studying Hong Kong *tongzhi* study. This framework is a powerful tool for dissecting antigay rhetoric. However, undertaking a Hong Kong *tongzhi* study is very difficult situation, as is initiating studies about Hong Kong. Due to the “rising” of the PRC, scholars inside and outside of the PRC are frenetic about studying “China.” However, due to language barriers, most China scholars do not study Hong Kong. The first language of the majority of Hong Kong population is Cantonese, and most people there cannot speak fluent Mandarin. However, most China scholars can only speak Mandarin.

Language may be a secondary concern for those who study Hong Kong. How people view Hong Kong and how Hong Kong studies are categorized in academia may be an even more important factor. As I have demonstrated in this thesis, Hong Kong has its own very specific (post)colonial and diasporic condition. Without a framework that is sensitive to the situation of Hong Kong, it is unlikely that scholars will fully understand how antigay rhetoric and campaign are constituted in Hong Kong and how they are mapped onto the specific situation of Hong Kong.

In addition to contributing to Hong Kong *tongzhi* study, the combination of diaspora and postcolonial frameworks may also be helpful to queer studies of other people who are also in a diasporic and postcolonial condition. Sexuality is a highly
contested site for anticolonial struggle and the battlefield for nationalism in many former European colonies (Alexander 1994; Currier 2010; Gopinath 2005; Hoad 2007; Puri 2002; Tamale 2007). In some places, such as former European colonies in the Caribbean, colonization is not the only factor that contributes to the construction of sexuality; the diasporic conditions of these people may also affect how sexuality is constructed. I hope that my thesis will serve as one of the starting points of combining postcolonial, queer, and diaspora studies.

**Reflections**

Due to time constraints, in this Chapter I only focused on the antigay rhetoric that mobilized “China” and “Chineseness.” There are other themes in the submissions of the LegCo in regard to the amendments of the DVO. As a result, I missed out other types of antigay rhetoric some Hong Kong residents used. This means I oversampled a particular type of argument. I intend to bridge this gap in my analysis in the future.

During the process of thesis writing, I also kept wondering if Hong Kong were still a British colony, would there be a mainland Chinese literature review in my thesis. If the answer is no, the political domination of mainland China on Hong Kong is reproduced in academia. As “China” scholars do not have the burden to understand Hong Kong and include a Hong Kong literature review in their research articles, Hong Kong studies seem to have this burden. There is not much representation of Hong Kong within “China” study.
The first language of the majority of Hong Kong population is Cantonese, which is a minority language, even within the PRC. As a result, a graduate student in a US university who will conduct Hong Kong research is highly likely a person from Hong Kong, Macao, and/or the Canton province of mainland China. This graduate student, once s/he is in the US, becomes a minority minority—a person of color and an international student; not to even to mention if s/he is studying a field like queer study, which is marginalized.

Under these circumstances, a graduate student in the US who studies Hong Kong faces a lot of obstacles and difficulties. One would argue that all people who conduct studies on minorities have similar burdens; however, it seems to me that Hong Kong is not recognized as “minority” in the US academia. Since it is not recognized as such, at least in my case, it was not until I divulged my emotional burdens that it was fully understood the difficulties for me to include a mainland Chinese literature review in my thesis. However, once I divulged this emotional burden, the immediate response I got was that my thesis committee was not the appropriate party I talked to about my personal feelings toward my thesis project; yet, this was one of the major difficulties for me to include a mainland Chinese literature review. My committee was the party who decided what to include and what not to include in my thesis. This just left me wonder: what was I supposed to do?

Everyone is so frenetic about “China;” why does not one just study “China?” Then, will the underrepresented continue to be underrepresented? Furthermore, as there is a global hierarchy in academia—Western academia, including US academia, is still on
the top of this hierarchy, any kind of knowledge production in the US academia has an enormous impact onto academia in other places, including Hong Kong. Almost all faculty members of universities in Hong Kong received their postgraduate education in the West; many of them studied in the US. I start to wonder, what are the implications of this global hierarchy? As Hong Kong academia is one of the major sites of knowledge production in Hong Kong, how do these affect what kind of knowledge Hong Kong people have about themselves? This worries me tremendously and will continue to haunt me for the rest of my life, if I decide to stay in academia.

Hong Kong can be a very productive site for diaspora and postcolonial studies, as I illustrate in this thesis. I may not have done a very good job in presenting how productive it is; however, I am sure that this thesis certainly presents some possibilities. If Hong Kong study has to be under “China” study, I am wondering how this is going to affect the potential of Hong Kong as a study site which contributes to diaspora and postcolonial studies in its unique and valuable ways. If there is anything else of this thesis, I wish that I had done something which would prevent other graduate students from having the burdens to explain all these as I had.

As so often the US academia discusses the research ethics on studying minority populations and/or other countries, very few discussions address how students from outside of the US who are minorities in their home towns/countries and also in the US are mentored. As the US academia has the urge to discuss the guilt in studying other countries, why are there few discussions of how graduate students from other
countries—who occupies very different social positions and subjectivities, both locally and globally, from many US scholars—are mentored?
Final Conclusion

Before the sovereignty handover, an ethnic Chinese identity signified a subjugation status of ethnic Chinese under colonial ruling. Also, some Christian churches mobilized “Chinese culture and tradition” to against decriminalization of sexual behaviors between two consenting adult men. After the sovereignty handover, HK right-wing Christians continue to discursively deploy “Chineseness” to oppress tongzhi. “Chineseness”, under a new state nationalism, subjugates Hong Kong tongzhi to the hegemony of the PRC and its associated “Chinese culture and tradition.” This “Chineseness” as a discursive tool situates in a colonial and internalized Orientalist framework. This thesis suggests that recognizing the colonial and internalized Orientalist framework might be very important for the tongzhi movement in Hong Kong.
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Note on English Translation and Romanization

All interviewees preferred to conduct interviews in Cantonese, the language most commonly used in Hong Kong. All quotations in this thesis are my English translation, unless otherwise noted. However, it is common for people in Hong Kong to use English terms during a Cantonese conversation; as a result, I kept English words in quoted excerpts and underlined them.

For Romanization of Chinese characters, I used pinyin, which is the official system in use for Romanization of Chinese characters in the People’s Republic of China (The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China 31 October 2000). Pinyin is based on Mandarin pronunciation to romanticize Chinese characters. When there is no official English translation for Chinese names, it is conventional for English academic writers to use pinyin instead of the author translating it to English. Although there is a Cantonese pinyin system in Hong Kong, people barely know and/or use it because English has been the official language of Hong Kong. Whenever there is a need to romanize Chinese, people will translate terms into English instead of using pinyin. As a result, for a broader audience, I use Mandarin pinyin for Romanization rather than Cantonese pinyin. I use the website http://humanum.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Lexis/Lindict/ as a reference for Romanization of Chinese characters. In addition to pinyin, I also include the Chinese characters for terms and phrases so that people who have no knowledge of
pinyin but can read Chinese characters will also know what the original terms and phrases are.
APPENDIX II

Note on the Usage of “Chinese”

My use of “Chinese” in this thesis has two major limitations. First, it tends to homogenize “Chinese” across different places and different times. To circumvent this limitation, when I mention “Chinese,” I specify its spatial and temporal context.

Second, even if I do so, the usage is still Han-centric. As of 1990, in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Han was the majority group, constituted about 92% of the total population (Poston, Chang and Dan 2006). The PRC government officially recognized 55 ethnic minority groups in mainland China (Poston, Chang and Dan 2006). The usage of “Chinese” in this thesis actually refers to Han Chinese, but not other minority groups. The theoretical framework of this thesis only applies to Han Chinese, but not other minority groups because I focus on Hong Kong, the majority population of which is Han Chinese. In this thesis, my theoretical framework also focuses on the relationship between the PRC and Hong Kong; both political entities are both Han-dominated.

I use the term “Chinese” instead of “Han Chinese” because all literatures I cite except one (Chen 2010) do not make a distinction between Han and other minority groups. An argument that suggests that “Chinese” in these existing literatures actually refer to “Han Chinese” is beyond the scope of this thesis. As a result, although I commit Han-centrism by using the term “Chinese” to refer to “Han Chinese,” existing literatures limit me to use the term “Chinese.”
APPENDIX III

Tongzhi Identity

*Tongzhi* identity is an identity commonly used in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and mainland China to refer to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals\(^\text{54}\) (Chou 2009, pp.1). Not everyone who identifies as gay, lesbian, and/or bisexual in these societies identifies as *tongzhi*; however, it is commonly used in the media. Many activists in Hong Kong use the term *tongzhi* to refer to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in Hong Kong. Except for cases in which I am sure how people identify themselves, I use tongzhi to refer to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in Hong Kong in general.

*Tongzhi* has indigenous cultural and political components. The first character “tong” means “the same” in Chinese, and the second Chinese character “zhi” means “will” and “inspiration.” Combining these two characters together, the term “tongzhi” literally means people who share the same spirit and ideals. This term makes no gender or sexual distinctions and covers a range of alternative sexualities and genders. Politically, both the Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist Party, which overthrew the last Chinese dynasty and established the first republic) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used this term as a way to refer to their comrades. This term also contained a sense of revolutionary passion during the early years of the republic (Hong Kong University Library 2006). Edward Lam, who first used the term tongzhi to refer to sexual minorities

\(^{54}\) It seems that transgender individuals tend not to claim *tongzhi* as their identity in Hong Kong (Emerton 2006); and I did not have the opportunity to interview individuals who self-identify as transgender individuals in Hong Kong. *Tongzhi* refers to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in Hong Kong.
in Hong Kong, stated that he was inspired by the last words of Sun Yat-sen, the leader of KMT and also the founding father of Republic of China, which were: “As the revolution is not yet completed, my followers [tongzhi] must endeavor to carry it out!” (Wong 2008; Zhen 11 January 2007). Wong (2008) argues that the adaptation of the term tongzhi reflects activists and sexual minorities’ desires for community, public and political visibility, and positive image.
APPENDIX IV

Interviewees’ Self-Identification in Gender and Partner Preference

All sexual minority interviewees identify as women. There are gender-specific, sexual-minority categories used in Hong Kong that require explanation; these categories are “pure,” “TB,” and “TBG.” There is no clear-out definition for these categories. Since these terms are in use in the communities of women who are attracted to women, I summarize the definitions as articulated by my interviewees rather than the definitions in existing literature. The definitions in previous research may not reflect the most recent usage of these terms. The definitions below by no means encompass all definitions and usage in the communities; they are definitions used by my interviewees.

The first set of definitions focuses on gender expression and manner. “TB” refers to a woman who dresses almost exclusively in a mannish style and behaves in a manner which is considered as masculine, while “TBG” refers to a woman who dresses almost exclusively in a womanly style and behaves in a manner which is considered as feminine. “Pure” refers to a woman who dresses and behaves more or less in a gender-neutral manner. The second set of definitions also includes women’s preferences for partners. A TB usually dates a TBG, while a TBG usually dates a TB. Pure is a feminine woman who desires feminine women. While this definition seems to be contradictory to the first

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55 Chou (2009: 213-226) describes TB and TBG in the early 1990s Hong Kong as role-playing—TB takes on the masculine role and assume the responsibility of taking care of TBG, who is the feminine one in the relationship. Chou also describes a third identity bu-fen (241). People who claim a bu-fen identity usually find that they do not fit into the TB/TBG binary of classification. Bu-fen engage in woman-woman intimate relationships and claim that their relationships are more gender dynamic and do not adhere to a strict binary of TB/TBG.
set of definition, this is the definition J., the only interviewee who self-identify as pure, gave me. The “pure” in the first set of definition is described by other interviewees who self-identify as TB. This is an example of how fluid gender and sexual identities can be.

Although there are different sets of definitions of TB, TBG, and pure used in sexual-minority communities, some individuals refuse all labels. Since interviewees who identified as a TB/tomboy did not strongly identify as men or women, in this thesis, I do not use pronouns “he” or “she” to refer to them; I only use their pseudonyms whenever I mention them.
APPENDIX V

Information of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Usual Residency</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Permanent Residency**</th>
<th>Self-identified Ethnicity</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Years Since Immigration</th>
<th>Gender Identity ***</th>
<th>Self-identified Sexual Orientation</th>
<th>Highest Educational Achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexis</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Chinese; BN(O) *</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Tomboy</td>
<td>Lesbian</td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Chinese; BN(O)</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>TB</td>
<td>Attracted to women</td>
<td>Master of Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cat</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Hong Kong; Canada</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>Lesbian</td>
<td>College Year 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chloé</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Chinese; BN(O)</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Tangren, Chinese</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4 Year-College in Australia</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>Lesbian</td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Chinese; BN(O)</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>Not want to label herself; been with men and women before</td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>Hong Kong; Canada</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Pure</td>
<td>Lesbian</td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lily</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Chinese; BN(O)</td>
<td>Hong Kong; Macao</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>Whoever I like</td>
<td>High School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>Hong Kong; Canada</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>Lesbian</td>
<td>College Diploma** **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor</td>
<td>Macao</td>
<td>Chinese; BN(O)</td>
<td>Hong Kong; Macao</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>TB</td>
<td>Attracted to women</td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiwai***</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Bachelor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* British National (Overseas) (BN(O)) are British nationals and Commonwealth citizens, but not British citizens. This means that BN(O) passport holders do not have the right to adobe in the United Kingdom (British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act, 1990)

** A Chinese citizen does not automatically become a permanent resident of Macao/Hong Kong SAR. For example, a mainland Chinese/Macao SAR permanent resident has to apply for immigration to become a Hong Kong SAR permanent resident. However, a Hong Kong/Macao SAR permanent resident who is also a Chinese citizen can reside legally in mainland China.

*** Participants who self-identified as a tomboy used the exact English word “tomboy” or “TB”, and these are not my translations.
A college diploma is obtained after 3-year of training in nursing, while bachelor degree is granted after four years of training.

Since Waiwai conducted the interview as a founding member, I did not collect any personal biographical data about her except for details related to her work at the NGO. However, during the interviews, I learned that she was in her mid- or late-30s, and she went to college in Hong Kong.

Woman Coalition of Hong Kong SAR (WCHK) is an NGO in Hong Kong which provides services to sexual minorities who self-identify as women. Women here do not mean biological sex but gender self-identification. This founding member had been volunteering in this NGO for seven years at the date of interview.
APPENDIX VI

Interview Schedule

I collected informed consent before in the interview started.

1. Could you please tell me about your profession?

2. Could you please tell me your educational background? (I will probe for the highest educational achievement.)

3. How would you self-identify ethnically?

4. How old are you?

5. Would you mind telling me the names of the country (ies) where you are a citizen and/or are a permanent/non-permanent resident?

6. How did you obtain this (these) citizenships? (I will probe for specific times and how.)

7. For these country-states and/or city states in which you are a citizen, how long have you been living there? How old were you when you started living in these places?

8. How do you think about this (these) citizenship (s) or permanent/nonpermanent residence? (Depending on the answers the participants give, I may probe further for their thoughts or feelings.)

9. What do you like about this (these) places?

10. What do you not like about this (these) places?

11. Do you consider any of these places as “home”? How do you feel about the word “home”? What makes you feel like at home?
12. (For participants who are citizens/residents of more than one country and/or city)

   How do you think about your multiple citizenships? (I will probe for specific
   thoughts and feelings about how, when, and why respondents obtained these
   citizenships.)

13. If you have a chance, would you like to live somewhere other than where you are
   inhabiting or places where you have inhabited before? Why?

   a. If yes, would you put this thought into action? If yes, how would you do
      it?

   (This is a control question to see whether the participants want to move to
   somewhere in general.)

14. What language(s) are you confident and/or comfortable in using for daily
   communications?

   a. If the answer for #13 is “yes”:

      Do you think your language ability will affect you putting your thought of
      living in other places into action? If yes, how?

15. How would you self-identify yourself, in terms of gender and sexual identity?

16. How do you think about your life as a person of alternative sexuality in
   Macao/HK/or overseas? (I will probe for general perceptions and some specific
   occurrences that may lead to these perceptions.)

17. How do you think about the general atmosphere toward persons of sexual
   minority (including gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender persons (LGBT)) in
society(ies) in Macao/HK/overseas? (I will probe for more detail about their perceptions.)

18. How do you think about the relationship between being a person of sexual minority and your other identities?

19. How do you think about sexual minority issues in general? What experiences have affected your view toward sexual minority issues?

20. How do you think about the relationship between your view of sexual minority issues and your other values?

21. Do you know anything about same-sex marriage and/or domestic partnership in other nation- or city-states? If yes,

   (a) How did you get this information?

   (b) What do you know about same-sex marriage and/or domestic partnership in other nation- or city-states?

22. Would you mind telling me whether you are in a relationship or not? What is your relationship status?

23. Are you in or have you been in a same-sex marriage(s)? In an opposite-sex marriage?

24. If yes, (a) Where did you get married?

   (b) What motivated you to get married at that particular point of time in your life?

   (c) Do/did you live at the same place before and after you get married?
(d) If no, why did you decide to move?

(e) Would you mind sharing your experience, thoughts, and feelings of getting and being married?

25. If no, would you want to know more about it? Why or why not? (If the answer is yes, I will do my best to tell the participants of all what I know and refer him/her to relevant resources.)

26. Would you consider getting married somewhere else, why or why not? If yes, where?

27. If yes, would you consider moving to that place before or after you get married? Why or why not?

28. Do you know any one who has emigrated overseas who are in same-sex relationships?
   a. If yes, could you tell me how you think about them?

29. Do you think citizenship issue play a role in your intimate relationship? If yes, how so?

30. Do you think the legal status of same-sex marriage has affected your intimate relationship? If yes, how so?

31. What do you think about the colonial history of Macao/HK?

32. What do you think about the return of Macao/HK to China?

33. Do you think the colonial history of Macao/HK and experiencing the handover of Macao/HK has had an impact on your view toward citizenship? (I will probe for both legal citizenship and cultural citizenship. Legal citizenship is the legal rights
and status in a nation- or city- state. Cultural citizenship is a cultural process of making a person as a subject to a particular culture and society through negotiation with the norms in this particular culture and society.)

34. Do you think the colonial history of Macao/HK and experiencing the handover of Macao/HK has had an impact on your view on sexual minority issues?

35. Do you think the historical and political situations of Macao/HK have affected your decision in migration and/or same-sex marriage?

36. Is there anything else you would like to share with me in addition to anything we have discussed? Do you have any question for me?

37. Finally, I would really want to thank you for participating in an interview today. Without your help and time, this project will not be possible. If you know anyone who may be interested in participating in an interview with me, would you please let them know about this project and my contact information? I would really appreciate it if you could.
## APPENDIX VII

### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BGEA</td>
<td>Billy Graham Evangelistic Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRF</td>
<td>Civil Human Rights Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGA</td>
<td>Exodus Global Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HK</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKAF</td>
<td>Hong Kong Alliance for Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKCCU</td>
<td>Hong Kong Christian Churches Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKFGF</td>
<td>Hong Kong Franklin Graham Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKSCS</td>
<td>Hong Kong Sex Culture Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LegCo</td>
<td>Legislative Council of HKSAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macao SAR</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>New Creation Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People's Congress of People's Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFA</td>
<td>Parents for the Family Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDO</td>
<td>Race Discrimination Ordinance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STL</td>
<td>The Society for Truth and Light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Alliance</td>
<td>Alliance for the Reform of Domestic Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>The United States of America</td>
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<td>WCHK</td>
<td>Women Coalition of Hong Kong SAR</td>
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## APPENDIX VIII

List of Archives of Content Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese Name</th>
<th>English Name</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
<th>Number of Articles/Advertisement Analyzed</th>
<th>Time Range of Articles/Advertisement</th>
<th>URL Link</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>明光社</td>
<td>The Society for Truth and Light</td>
<td>One of the most vocal and high-profile right-wing Christian organizations which opposes legal protection and rights for tongzhi in Hong Kong</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td><a href="http://www.truth-light.org.hk/">http://www.truth-light.org.hk/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>獨立媒體</td>
<td>inmediahk</td>
<td>Hong Kong on-line independent media.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td><a href="http://www.inmediahk.net/">http://www.inmediahk.net/</a></td>
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<td>明報</td>
<td>Ming Pao</td>
<td>Considered to be the most credible Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td><a href="http://premium.mingpao.com/">http://premium.mingpao.com/</a></td>
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<td>am730</td>
<td>am730</td>
<td>A free newspaper in Hong Kong</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td><a href="http://www.am730.com.hk/">http://www.am730.com.hk/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting Minutes and Submissions to LegCo</td>
<td>LegCo meetings on DVO and Hong Kong residents written opinions on DVO to LegCo</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td><a href="http://legco.gov.hk/">http://legco.gov.hk/</a></td>
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Education
2009-present Master of Science in Sociology, Texas A&M University
2007-2009 Master of Science in Zoology, Texas A&M University
2000-2005 Bachelor of Science in Life Sciences, National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan

Honors, Awards, and Grants
- Graduate Travel to Fieldwork Grant, Melbern G. Glasscock Center for Humanities Research, Texas A&M University, 2010, US$1,000
- Postgraduate Scholarship, Macau Special Administrative Region of People’s Republic of China, 2009-2011, US$9,000
- Graduate Research Fellowship 2010-11, Women’s and Gender Studies, Texas A&M University, US$750

Teaching Experience
- Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Gender and Society, Texas A&M University, Fall 2011, with Dr. Ashley Currier
- Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Gender and Society, Texas A&M University, Fall 2010, with Dr. Kazuko Suzuki
- Teaching Assistant, Introductory Sociology, Texas A&M University, Fall 2009-Spring 2010, with Dr. Stuart Hysom

Professional Association
Eastern Sociological Society

Languages
Cantonese: reading, writing, comprehension, and speaking proficiency; first language
English: English Language Proficiency Certificated at Texas A&M University, Dec 2007
Mandarin: reading, writing, and comprehension proficiency; speaking fluency