PLATONIC COSMOPOLITANISM

A Dissertation

by

DANIEL VINCENT BETTI

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 2010

Major Subject: Political Science
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Approved by:
Chair of Committee, Cary J. Nederman
Committee Members, Scott Austin
Robert Harmel
Diego A. von Vacano
Head of Department, James R. Rogers

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ABSTRACT

Platonic Cosmopolitanism. (August 2010)

Daniel Vincent Betti, B.A., Mary Washington College

Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Cary J. Nederman

What is the content of a meaningful cosmopolitan theory? Contemporary cosmopolitanism offers numerous global theories of liberalism, democracy, republicanism, and postmodernism, but is there anything of the “cosmos” or “polis” within them? I argue these theories, though global, are not cosmopolitan. Ancient Greek philosophy holds a more meaningful, substantive conception of cosmopolitanism. From Homer to the Stoics and Cynics, ancient Greece was a hotbed for thinking beyond the confines of local tradition and convention. These schools of thought ventured to find universal understandings of humanity and political order. Conceiving of the world as a beautiful order, a cosmos, they sought a beautiful order for the association of human beings. Within that tradition is the unacknowledged legacy of Platonic cosmopolitanism.

Rarely do political philosophers find cosmopolitan themes in the dialogues of Plato. Correcting this omission, I argue that Plato’s dialogues, from the early through the late, comprise a cosmopolitan journey: an attempt to construct a polis according to an understanding of the cosmos. The early dialogues address questions of piety, justice,
and righteous obedience. More than that, they inquire into why a good man, Socrates, is persecuted in his city for nothing more than being a dutiful servant of the gods and his city. The middle dialogues construct a true cosmopolis, a political association in harmony with the natural laws of the world. Furthermore, they explain why those who know how to construct such a polis live best in such arrangements. In the late dialogues, Plato revises his political plans to accord with a more developed understanding of cosmic and human nature.

Platonic cosmopolitanism constructs a true polis according to the beautiful order of the cosmos. Such a feat of philosophy is remarkable in the Greek tradition, and inspires contemporaries to rethink their own conception of what is truly cosmopolitan versus merely global.
DEDICATION

To my parents: tens of thousands of dollars spent on twenty-five years of schooling and now you have to read this dissertation. Was it really worth it? At least you can tell people your son is a doctor… (sure, a Doctor of Philosophy!)

To all: Don’t store your treasures upon the earth, with moth and rust, where thieves break in and steal, for we live in but a shadow of the real- Mt. 6:19
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my committee, Drs. Cary Nederman, Diego von Vacano, Robert Harmel, and Scott Austin for their time and effort in this endeavor. Surely, I would not have reached this point without the help of my colleagues at Texas A&M University, especially the political theorists. Phil Gray, Jesse Chupp, Sarah Jordan, Roberto Loureiro, Hassan Bashir showed me the ropes in my first years. When I thought it could not be done, they proved it could. All of you at the unnamed Political Theory Group, Christie Maloyed, Mary Beth Sullivan, Ted Brown, Peyton Wofford, Mike Burnside, Brad Goodine, and Megan Dyer, thanks for all the help. Aristotle might say (and even be right!) that only a god or beast could survive graduate school alone. Special thanks to my cohort for making the early years passable and to all my friends in the department. Finally, I must thank Debra Nails and Jason Davidson. Professor Nails set me on this course when I enrolled in her Philosophy 100 course at Mary Washington College back in the spring of 2000. Honestly, I only took the class to fulfill the writing and speaking general education requirements. Who knew I would find Plato so interesting! And yet, a decade later, I have only begun to finish what I started in that classroom. For his part, Professor Davidson encouraged me to be a standout in the classroom and to pursue graduate school. Without his encouragement, I doubt I would have considered graduate school; without his assistance, I doubt my applications would have been accepted.
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CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION TO COSMOPOLITANISM

Contemporary Cosmopolitan Thought

Cosmopolitanism as a topic of study is rising to the forefront of political theory. One can find any number of books and articles generically titled “Cosmopolitan Democracy,” “Liberal Cosmopolitanism,” or even “Global Liberalism.”\(^1\) The very titles are the first clue something is wrong in the literature of cosmopolitanism, as “cosmopolitan” and “global” appear to be mere synonyms. In fact, the terms “cosmopolitan” and “global” correspond to a political system that encompasses the entire human population—everyone on the planet Earth. Is that all the term “cosmopolitan” conveys, a political system for entire the population of the globe? One can make a joke and ponder whether humanity will need “galactic” political theory to replace its cosmopolitanism once a colony is established on the moon or Mars. Sarcastic speculation aside, contemporary work in the area of cosmopolitan theory has limited understanding of what the term cosmopolitanism means and an expansive view of its political corollaries.

To elaborate, let us discuss four prominent and closely-related branches of political theory that pursue a cosmopolitan system of government. Liberalism focuses on the creation of a global system of just distribution. Moral and capability theory ruminates on the global distribution of material resources necessary to secure equal...
opportunity for all individuals to develop their inherent human capabilities. Democratic
theory advocates a global system of political participation in the affairs that concern
humanity as a group. Critical Constitutionalism (or republicanism) pursues a global
system of peace and cooperation among liberal-democratic republics and their
constitutive peoples. Each one of these branches raises a particular value as the global
priority and considers a system of global institutions necessary to secure the prioritized
value. Most are explicitly political, meaning they propose a set of global governmental
institutions to fulfill the elevated value of the theory.  

Evaluating this literature of contemporary cosmopolitanism, the overriding
concern is that the prioritized global value of each school of thought (liberty, democracy,
morality…) conflicts with the others within the institutions of their proposed
cosmopolitan government. The institutions of global liberalism threaten democracy and
republicanism. A global democracy threatens the just distribution of global resources,
individual rights, and the rights of peoples. Respecting the rights of peoples precludes
global democracy, undermines the just system of resource distribution, and is contrary to
the principles of global moral equality. These branches of cosmopolitanism find
thorough and recurrent conflict without apparent solution.

Of interest, each branch of cosmopolitan theory endorses one facet of the
Enlightenment to the detriment of others. One principle, whether the just resource
distribution of the liberals, the democracy of democratic theory, equal moral concern, or
the autonomy of peoples, is elevated above the others. None of the theories entirely

\footnote{Moral and Capability theorists are less prescriptive about the political institutions necessary for their purposes. Of course, their theory has political corollaries, but they are less concrete than the others.}
rejects the other principles, but subordinates them to the primary value. The disharmony among these Enlightenment theories is disconcerting upon analysis. Liberal theorists raise equality as their principle. Every individual should receive equal access (under realistic and rational conditions) to material and political resources. Justice demands that everyone possess equal opportunity to pursue and enjoy their liberty, their view of the good life. Democratic theorists primarily value the individual’s right to participate in government. They will not allow a technocratic or distant government to overrule this basic human right. Moral theorists seek to enshrine universal principles of morality to preclude the power, influence, and prejudice of limited groups of human beings or any other non-universal principles of morality. In contrast, global republicans look to protect the right of peoples and nations to their sovereignty, but within a stable and peaceful league of liberal-democratic republics. These values are all recognizable as descendents of the Enlightenment, and contemporary theorists now pit one against the rest.

The scenario too closely resembles the old tale of the blind men describing an elephant. Each branch of cosmopolitanism descends from the Enlightenment, but only grasps one facet of the broader philosophy. And now, sitting together, they each describe a part of the philosophy—liberty, equality, morality, democracy, republicanism—but cannot reconstruct the whole thing. These branches take one universal value from the Enlightenment as primary; the others are secondary. Having been separated, attempts to reconcile these individual universals create less of a coherent philosophy and more a power struggle among contending principles.

Another branch of contemporary theory ventures toward a cosmopolitanism quite
different from the Enlightenment variants. Postmodernism argues for a peculiar global system, one that is no system at all. Postmodern cosmopolitanism rejects any system of politics or thought that raises one value as authoritative. Postmodern cosmopolitanism embraces a global exchange of principles and values. The concepts of fluidity and hybridization form the essence of postmodernist cosmopolitanism. The global, human community should allow the free-flow of ideas and encourage the mutability of contemporary principles and values. All power centers (private and public, individual and group) should allow local customs to meet distant ones and not interfere with the organic interaction that follows. Postmodern cosmopolitanism accepts that no principle is sacred or primary. No authority may raise fixed ideals. On the contrary, a postmodern cosmopolitanism encourages the creation of new ideals, hybrid ideals, and fluid ideals.

**Cosmos and Polis**

Thinking about the aforementioned branches of thought, I am struck by the lack of meaning in contemporary cosmopolitanism for the core concepts of that theory, “cosmos” and “polis.”

Old Diogenes of Sinope, the dog himself, is recorded as coining the representative phrase of cosmopolitanism, “I am a citizen of the world,” or to rearrange the Greek, “My polis is the cosmos.” The attitude reflects a rejection of the

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3 Throughout this dissertation, I use both cosmos and the transliterated *kosmos*. By cosmos, I mean an understanding of the natural world. Different thinkers have varied understandings of that natural order. When using the transliterated *kosmos*, I am referring to how Plato is discussing the concept in the particular dialogue under investigation. Similarly, I use both polis and *polis*. By polis, I mean a legitimate, sovereign political community. By *polis*, I mean something closer to the Greek, and especially Platonic, understanding of a sovereign community of differently-skilled individuals living according to a common law.

4 From Diogenes Laertius (1950, 65).
narrow loyalty to one’s local community and its conventional laws in favor of the natural, universal principles that reign over physical reality. Diogenes’ phrase reflects an understanding of the natural world as law-like and orderly above the conventions that small groups try to impose on themselves in the form of political laws; the cosmos reigns supreme regardless of what laws exist in any particular polis. Unlike Diogenes, contemporary cosmopolitanism has no concept of the cosmos. The “cosmos” in contemporary cosmopolitanism is interchangeable with “global.”

The cosmos to Diogenes, and many other Greek thinkers, was far more than the giant rock we call Earth. The cosmos was an ordered thing, a divine thing, even a living thing, and certainly not merely one of the planets traversing the galaxy on which humanity happens to exist. When Diogenes claimed political attachment to the cosmos, he removed himself from the local prejudices of an arbitrary community and removed himself to the source of universal standards and imperatives. The cosmos as universal was the antithesis of the polis as particular. With a small qualification, there is no cosmos in contemporary cosmopolitanism.

Only postmodern cosmopolitanism employs a concept of the cosmos in its theory. Postmodernists view the universe, the “cosmos,” as containing no fixed ideals for humanity and being in a state of natural flux and change. The world is constantly changing, turning, and shifting with neither higher purpose nor fixed end guiding its motions. Their global system is an attempt to align political reality to this cosmic reality, to breakdown centers of power and allow change to happen at an individual level across the globe. Postmodern cosmopolitanism does have a politically-charged
understanding of the cosmos, but not one friendly to the idea of a polis. If the polis means a limited group of citizens living under a common, authoritative law, then the postmodernists certainly reject it. They favor a decentralized, non-authoritative political system, something that respects the flux of the cosmos and facilitates a similar fluidity in the values and principles of the individual.

Historically, cosmopolitanism has been heavy on the idea of the cosmos and rather light on that of the polis. The philosophy of cosmopolitanism affirms the rational individual and the rational world, the one who adheres to the universal standards of the cosmos rather than the conventions of a limited polis. Indeed, the Greek polis was a highly communitarian structure of relations. The polis raised its citizens to be loyal to the greater whole. The expression of Diogenes is at once an affirmation of universal ideals and individualism; the polis affirmed the priority of the group and viewed the independent, ambitious individual with suspicion. Cosmopolitanism, from ancient Greece and Rome through Enlightenment Europe, has been a philosophy of the universal and the individual against the strictures of group artifice and convention.

**Platonic Cosmopolitanism**

In terms of political association and government institutions, cosmopolitanism has reached different conclusions. The ancient cynics generally approved of a humanistic rejection of government. They believed natural law was rational, universal, and superior to any local authority. People needed only to use their reason to understand natural standards and peacefully coexist with others. Stoics, on the other hand, did apply their universal standards to the function of imperial government. They sought to forge
all humanity into one rational and natural community through a system of empire. During the European Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant argued for a global league of republics to ensure peace among peoples. These republics cooperated according to universal Reason, but still possessed a measure of domestic sovereignty as separate nations. All these cosmopolitans subordinated local communities and political associations to the idea of universal humanity, universal empire, or a universal republic of nation-states. Historically, cosmopolitans reject the polis, the limited, self-sustaining, and highly independent community, in favor of universal associations of one form or another.

The dialogues of Plato present an intriguing twist to cosmopolitan thinking. Instead of raising the individual out the polis to adhere only to universal standards of the cosmos, Plato raises the polis out of convention and grounds it in universal standards. Understanding the cosmos as a hierarchy of order, Plato’s dialogues inquire into how a polis, a local and limited community, might institute laws that reflect universal standards. The polis, he argues, should be reflective of the cosmos. Truly, Plato rejects the idea of imperial government; neither does he endorse the apolitical, Stoic community of universal humanity. To live well, Plato argues the individual must live in a polis, and to provide happiness for its citizens, the polis must reflect the order of the cosmos. Platonic cosmopolitanism, from the early dialogues to the late, is the construction of this hierarchy of cosmos, polis, and individual.

Calling Plato a cosmopolitan is something new, but I am not applying any novel

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5 English quotations of Plato’s (1997) dialogues are from John Cooper’s edited collection. When transliterating from ancient Greek, I rely on Plato (1913; 1925; 1926; 1929; 1930; 1935; 1952) in The Loeb Classical Library collection.
interpretation to the dialogues to produce this reading. Indeed, I am almost embarrassed by the simplicity and orthodoxy of my interpretation strategy. I will admit many of the dialogues are brilliant, but I cannot agree with Leo Strauss (2001, 5) when he writes, “There is nothing superfluous, nothing meaningless in a Platonic dialogue.” Plato is not perfect. Plato, being human, is subject to the frailties inherent in humanity. His philosophy is a reflection of genius and many of the dialogues are a pleasure to read, but they are not free of quandaries, perplexities, and even mistakes. Furthermore, I do not apply esoteric analysis as a strategy of interpretation; frankly, I can only understand esoteric analysis as a kind of distortion applied to the text. Whether that distortion is preconceived or a reflection of the interpreter’s stream of consciousness is unknown. Some of those analyses are interesting and engaging reads, others are not, and all elevate the interpreter above the text.

Across the dialogues, I find Plato asking similar questions about the nature of the cosmos and polis, about virtue and knowledge, and the life well-lived. However, he employs different methods of inquiry and reaches different conclusions regarding these questions. I agree with a general division of Plato’s work into early, middle, and later periods. In these divisions, scholars have reached no authoritative consensus about the proper assignment of each and every text. One can find a slew of arguments placing dialogue A, which everyone else judges to be in period x, to be more appropriately dated to period y or z. Consequently, I do not spend much time engaging in these matters as my ordering of the dialogues is neither revolutionary nor dogmatic. I order dialogues

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6 A vast literature exists on the chronology of Plato’s dialogues. Recent works include Kahn (2003), Poster (1998), Young (1994), Brandwood (1990), and Theslef (1982). One can venture back to Lutosawski (1905) and beyond.
according to general consensus and the interrelation of their content to the other dialogues. Since I read Plato as pursuing a continuous project, I must disagree with a particular, and popular, trend to divide the Socratic from the Platonic in Plato’s dialogue. A number of interpreters of Plato’s dialogues have separated the early, Socratic dialogues from the rest of the corpus in their construction of a democratic theory. From these dialogues, they construct a Platonic/Socratic philosophy more favorable to both ancient Athenian democracy and contemporary democratic theory. I find that this strategy of disconnecting a group of dialogues from the rest allows interpreters to impose a controversial, narrow, and highly modern reading of Plato’s main character, Socrates. Like the esoteric analysts, these democratic interpreters violate the integrity of individual texts by data-mining for evidence and they do injustice to the author by removing individual dialogues from a broader philosophy.

In short, my interpretation of the dialogues is neither controversial nor inventive. I find myself in agreement on a number of issues with prominent scholars of Plato. What, then, is the contribution of this dissertation? I will argue my dissertation offers a broad contribution to the history of political thought and a more specific contribution to cosmopolitan thought. Plato offers an inventive philosophy of cosmopolitanism in his hierarchy of cosmos, polis, and individual. He may be the only philosopher to embrace the idea of the Greek polis within a cosmopolitan theory. Tracing cosmopolitanism to the present, contemporary cosmopolitan theorists might look back at Plato’s dialogues and find a source of thought to assist their efforts to unify the enlightenment virtues in a
cosmopolitan system of government. Studying Plato as a cosmopolitan, one who constructs a true polis according to the standards of the cosmos, enriches our understanding of the idea of cosmopolitanism, yields a more complete history of cosmopolitan thought, and may assist contemporary work in cosmopolitan thought.
CHAPTER II
CONTEMPORARY COSMOPOLITANISM

On Modern Cosmopolitanisms

Strands of cosmopolitan thought pervade contemporary political theory. One thread employs the moral imperatives of Kantian heritage to guide global institutional reform. Another expands Rawlsian liberalism to break the bounds of closed societies and create a just system of political and economic relations among all people (and not among “peoples”). In democratic theory, plans for a global assembly are laid to solidify a cosmopolitan democracy. Critical theorists put forward the model of constitutional cosmopolitanism and ideal of communicative action to resolve disputes between constitutional republics. Postmodernists enter the fray, arguing for a cosmopolitan culture of fluidity and hybridization. The advocates of moral, liberal, democratic, critical, and postmodern cosmopolitanism each argue for the primacy of their different first principles, but all toward the same end of articulating a cosmopolitan theory.

These modern cosmopolitans all reflect a common problem among their theories: the absence of ontology for either the cosmos or the polis. Instead, the theories center on universalizing a concept of the individual. Whether the individual is primarily moral, liberal, democratic, critical, or postmodern is the object of contestation, but the heart of the theory is the individual. Once the theory has its universal individual, logic dictates global institutions, whether moral or political. The sentiments and attachments of particular individuals and the irrational motivations of groups of particular individuals no longer enter into the political calculus. The ontology of the cosmos is not a part of
these cosmopolitanisms. “What the world is” is left to other disciplines. When addressing the concept of the polis (again, broadly understood as the legitimacy of distinct, sovereign communities), modern cosmopolitan theories run into intractable problems. Beginning with the universal individual, contemporary cosmopolitans produce a radical re-conceptualization of the polis. The only legitimate political community among separate and distinct individuals is the community of all individuals. Logically, any subset of the total population is necessarily secondary to the full set of individuals. Whereas the absence of the cosmos in cosmopolitanism undermines the meaning of the term itself, the re-conceptualization of the polis undermines the subsequent theories themselves—except in the case of the postmodernists.

*Moral and Capability Cosmopolitanism*

Martha Nussbaum stands at the forefront of the revival of cosmopolitan theory. Beginning with a theory of moral cosmopolitanism, Nussbaum argued for the universal value of the human individual and the equal value of every human being. Early articulations of the theory created some intractable problems. First, Nussbaum could not reconcile a theory of universal moral consideration with the fact of unequal human sentiments and obligations. Second, the theory, rooted in Stoic and Kantian philosophy, could not maintain essential teleological, theological, and cosmological elements of those philosophies. Working with common purpose, Nussbaum and Amartya Sen rethought moral cosmopolitanism, and founded it anew as a theory of human capability and freedom. Moral cosmopolitanism remains beset with problems; prime among which is the inability to defend its call to universal and equal moral consideration.
Should an individual give moral priority to a limited group of persons or to all people equally? Moral cosmopolitanism argues for the latter, and Nussbaum (1996) argues for moral cosmopolitanism. Invoking the memory of Diogenes of Sinope, Nussbaum argues that people should consider the whole world their home, not any particular and limited patch of land. Accordingly, country, tribe, ethnicity, and other “accidents of birth” should not affect moral considerations. On the contrary, Nussbaum (1996, 7) contends that “we should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.” The moral capacity to treat all people as equals and overcome the widespread preference for local favoritism does not come easily.

Nussbaum (1997a), in *Cultivating Humanity*, proposes a course in cosmopolitan education to inculcate her moral universalism. In a complex, interdependent, and plural world, the prevailing morality of local preferences is not sufficient to maintain peaceful coexistence between peoples. Nussbaum’s educational program cultivates humanity by liberating the mind from the strictures of habit and custom. It creates a disciplined and rigorous faculty of reason within the individual to question the irrational or limited maxims of traditionalism. Based on classical philosophy, and broadly incorporating the Stoic tradition from Socrates and Diogenes through Marcus Aurelius, the cultivation of humanity looks to break free of postmodern relativism without enshrining a particular truth (1997a, 38-40). Yet, these historical foundations are problematic, and demonstrate the fundamental weakness of Nussbaum’s project of moral cosmopolitanism.

Nussbaum (1996, 6; 1997a, 52) often includes Diogenes’ famous saying, “I am a
citizen of the world,” as a concise expression of the cosmopolitan attitude. Herodotus, Plato, and Aristotle may have begun cross-cultural studies, but Diogenes began cosmopolitanism and the Stoics developed his philosophy in the following centuries (Nussbaum 1997a, 53-58). Nussbaum recalls Diogenes, Seneca, Cicero, and Marcus Aurelius from the pages of history to testify in defense of cosmopolitan morality. However, the testimony of these witnesses is incomplete, as certain aspects of their philosophy, including immaterialism, the defense of slavery, and indifference to suffering, cannot be taken seriously in the modern consciousness (Nussbaum 1997b). Problems arise as Nussbaum rejects these Stoic beliefs while reaffirming others, i.e. universal moral concern. The concept of reason in Stoic philosophy is central to this selection process. Stoic Reason, in the capitalized sense, is a connection to the divine. Reason is how the mere mortals who comprise humanity can reach the point of divine order and come to understand and accept their place in the universe (Hill 2000; Lu 2000). This facility of Reason leads individuals to be indifferent to material suffering, because the material world is ultimately not important. And for Nussbaum (1997b, 17), this faculty of reason is philosophically untenable. When discussing Kant’s debt to the Stoics, or such prominent Stoics as Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and Cicero, Nussbaum recognizes they relate their concept of reason to an understanding of divinity. When Nussbaum rejects such a relationship, calling it indefensible in modern discourse, she removes the cornerstone of their philosophy. 

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7 Diogenes of Sinope famously coined the term, cosmopolitan, as recorded in Diogenes Laertius (1950, 65).
8 Hill (2000) and Lu (2000) argue this point at length. Nussbaum (2000; 1997b) is cognizant of this problem, but does not reply to it at length.
Critics of Nussbaum’s moral cosmopolitanism have pointed out the tenuous validity of its historical heritage (Berges 2005). Nussbaum favors the Stoic conclusion of universal moral concern, but not the Stoic cosmology and theology that justify the interrelationship of reason, order, and divinity. Critical of Nussbaum, Sandrine Berges points out that her defense of reason as a common human faculty and the basis of morality (and thus morality should be as common as reason) fails specifically because the proposition is only a fragment of Stoicism. In Stoic philosophy, reason and morality are intricate human faculties that connect the individual to the order of the cosmos and the divine. Without their cosmology and theology, the common human faculty of reason does not entail necessarily a universal moral concern. As Berges (2005, 7) succinctly notes, “After all, we do not expect that all cats should live peacefully in a big brotherhood of cats, even though they are all cats.” Without Stoic cosmology and theology, reason is just another common human faculty, and is no more a defense for universal morality than any other common human faculty.

Moral cosmopolitanism is a theory that hopes to resolve the differences of a plural world in a reasonable manner. Moral cosmopolitanism connects its contemporary cause to the ancient Stoics, but without adopting the Stoic conception of reason or its cosmology. The absence of a transcendent faculty of reason creates problems for moral cosmopolitanism that have not gone unnoticed by Nussbaum and her detractors (Pogge 2002a; Scheffler 1999). Under scrutiny, moral cosmopolitanism divides into strong and weak forms. Ultimately, it cannot assert a universal moral imperative, and concludes with a moral platitude. Strong cosmopolitanism, the preferred theory of Nussbaum
(1997a, 9), dictates “the ideal of a citizen whose primary loyalty is to human beings the world over, and whose national, local, and varied groups loyalties are considered distinctly secondary.” Weak cosmopolitanism, regrettably admitted by Nussbaum (1997a, 9) as the more admissible, “allows a variety of different views about what our priorities should be.” Nussbaum (1997a, 9) defends a weak cosmopolitanism that recognizes “the worth of human life wherever it occurs” and compels individuals “to see [themselves] as bound by common human abilities and problems” despite the distances between them. Nussbaum remains torn between these versions of cosmopolitanism. Strong cosmopolitanism apparently rests on an impossible foundation, and in reality is impracticable, and even somewhat repellent.9 The problem with weak cosmopolitanism is that it succumbs to platitude and subjective preference (yes, all people deserve moral concern, but my people, family, and friends deserve more in this case). As much as Nussbaum wants to champion strong cosmopolitanism, she simply cannot defend it.

Strong cosmopolitanism denies the reality of everyday human life, that most individuals have families, friends, and neighbors who need attention and demand priority action. The problems of people hundreds of miles away, much less across continents, are beyond the scope of their moral concern and action. But the problem of weak cosmopolitanism is that its moral imperatives likely will collapse when they are put to the test. When weighing the merits of action, local concern will count more for a number of reasons, not the least being that local reasons are more understandable, closer to self-interest, and closer to reasons of family, friends, and community. Nussbaum

9 Particularly troublesome is the implication that one is equally responsible for raising the children of others (Nussbaum 1997a, 8).
accepts the central criticism of strong moral cosmopolitanism, the implausibility of universal and equal moral concern, yet still tries to massage weak cosmopolitanism into its strong form. The project of *Cultivating Humanity* is to teach people “to see themselves not simply as citizens of some local region or group, but also, and above all, as human beings bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern” (Nussbaum 1997a, 10). Moral cosmopolitanism becomes confused as Nussbaum rejects the foundation of strong cosmopolitanism and acknowledges the need for a less universal morality, yet still pursues a moral universalism. A prime example of this confusion is the anecdotal example of Anna the cosmopolitan.

As the exemplar of moral cosmopolitanism, Nussbaum (1997a, 50-52) describes the character of Anna. An American businesswoman working in Beijing, Anna must learn the cultures of the various people with whom she works, primarily Americans and Chinese, as well as international business law and norms. A problem arises when Anna adopts an orphaned girl in Beijing, as Anna’s American ideas about raising an infant are vastly different from the infant’s Chinese nurse. Anna’s mother even enters the scene offering to raise the child herself. Here Nussbaum (1997a, 52) explains that the goal of the educational plan of *Cultivating Humanity*, and of moral cosmopolitanism, is to create a certain individual like the fictional Anna:

> [The] sensitive cross-cultural interpreter, [who] is able to negotiate between mother and nurse and devise some plan for the baby’s development that is agreeable to all. To do this (Anna) has to think hard about the nonuniversality and nonnaturalness of such small matters as playing with a baby. But (Anna) has
also had to think of the common needs and aims that link her with the nurse, and the nurse with her own mother.

The problem is that no negotiation between these positions is apparent or necessarily natural. The rearing of infants is an important task to those who undertaking the venture, and yet Nussbaum dismisses a fundamental disagreement on the task between the two cultures. The suggested solution is to call these differences trivial, or “nonuniversal and nonnatural,” and focus on the common needs between the agents. This situation exemplifies how weak cosmopolitanism ends in platitudinous to find what is common and compromise over what is different. But if the nurse has good reasons for her child-rearing practices, and the adoptive mother good reasons for hers, then how exactly are they to compromise? Nussbaum does not suggest an appeal to science, which may at least draw reliable conclusions about the effects of each practice on the infant’s development. The appeal is simply to compromise, which is all that moral cosmopolitanism can do absent a faculty of reason that can appeal to universals and thus resolve such differences of custom. But why compromise if you are right?

The problems of moral cosmopolitanism have not escaped attention, and Nussbaum has worked with Amartya Sen to develop a revised theory of cosmopolitanism that secures an individual’s freedom to fulfill common human capacities. Each thinker has brought a complementary approach to the project. Nussbaum (2006) focuses on conceptually clarifying what the common human capacities are and why everyone has a right fulfill them. Sen (1999) has provided economic reasons why this cosmopolitanism is both morally just and materially
productive. Nussbaum and Sen’s work creates a cosmopolitan capability theory that argues a central point: everyone should have the intellectual freedom and material capital to develop their natural and common human capabilities. Ultimately, the theory endorses a certain kind of human life, a long one of peaceful appetite satisfaction. It is the opposite of immaterial and meditative Stoicism.

Sen’s work, *Development as Freedom*, puts forth a philosophy of free market economics that targets for reform the “unfreedoms” constraining rational choice and the free interaction of people. Freedom is indeed the central concept, both the end and the means of the argument. The individual must have freedom to produce and trade, and the free exchange of production is the goal. Nussbaum adds in *Frontiers of Justice* an exposition of the concept of capability. Every individual has a set of capabilities, and the goal of a just system of production and distribution is to provide each individual with at least a minimal level of access to the resources necessary to fulfill their capabilities. Nussbaum and Sen have worked to organize a cosmopolitan theory against the prevailing economic priorities of GDP growth or utilitarian distribution, and also against the prevailing theories of cultural relativism.

Despite efforts to shore up moral cosmopolitanism into the capability theory, the work of Nussbaum and Sen has not escaped criticism, even from within the liberal camp. The main criticism is that neither Sen nor Nussbaum fully explain the universalism that underlies their cosmopolitanism (Cameron 2006, Chhachhi 2006). In Cameron’s (2006 1274-1275) surmise, Sen suggests only a “hesitant relativism” of

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10 See especially Pogge’s (2002b) critique of the “Capability Approach,” the fusion of Nussbaum’s moral theory with Sen’s economic thought.
production, meaning everyone should be free to produce and everything produced in freedom is good, and Nussbaum offers a “hesitant universalism” of capabilities, that some capabilities are so common they are the criteria of universal species membership. Neither of these positions defends a strong and clear universalism, but constitutes a western, pragmatic, and materialistic approach to cosmopolitanism.

**Liberal Cosmopolitanism**

The moral cosmopolitanism of Nussbaum and Sen is broadly liberal, and some of its harshest critics are the fellow liberals constructing alternative theories of cosmopolitanism. Whether calling it liberal cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan liberalism, or global liberalism, a group of post-Rawlsians have sought to transcend Rawls’s own liberal internationalism, developed in *The Law of Peoples*, to create a just distribution of resources within and across state borders. After showing the need for a global system of justice, liberal cosmopolitanism constructs the institutional arrangements to secure fair resource access and political opportunity for all individuals regardless of national location.

Charles Beitz (1979) forged an early and prominent argument in favor of expanding liberalism from a national and international theory into a cosmopolitan one. With a Rawlsian background, Beitz reflected on the phenomenon of globalization and argued against a key assumption of Rawls’s (1996, 12; 1999, 4) own theory of liberalism: “Let us assume […] that a society is a more or less self-sufficient association of persons.” Beitz (1983, 595) contends that in our modern world economy:

The membership of the original position should be global rather than
national because national societies are not, in fact, self-sufficient: the system of global trade and investment, organized within a structure of international institutions and conventions constitute a scheme of social cooperation in Rawls’s sense.

Rawls’s assumption that members of a society form a self-sufficient unit is no longer tenable given the interdependence of modern state economies. Thus, given the reality of globalization, it is not fair and therefore not just for exclusive groups to claim the resources of a proscribed territory. In short, the principles of liberalism supersede the boundaries of the state.

Not long after Charles Beitz began his liberal reformation, another Rawlsian, Thomas Pogge, sought to revise the moral and institutional obligations of liberalism by expanding their saliency from national boundaries to the entire human race. Proclaiming a theory of cosmopolitanism generated from liberalism, Pogge (1992) set forth three core principles to guide his creation. Individualism, the first principle, proposes that familial, tribal, ethnic, religious, national, and state affiliations must factor beneath individuals in moral decision-making. In short, “the ultimate units of concern are human beings or persons” (Pogge 1992, 48). Universality, the second principle, dictates that every human being merits equal moral consideration. The third and final principle, generality, calls for each individual to recognize all other individuals as ultimate units of concern (Pogge 1992). With three brief principles, Pogge framed a grand theory of liberal cosmopolitanism.

Along with delineating the principles of liberal cosmopolitanism, Pogge argued
for institutional changes to the international system of governance. In defense of Rawls’s own principles of justice, Pogge (1994, 196) contended that Rawls’s theory of international liberalism crafted in *The Law of Peoples* fails in three ways:

- It fails to give members of different peoples roughly equal chances to influence the transnational political decisions that shape their lives; it fails to give equally talented and motivated persons roughly equal chances to obtain a good education and professional position irrespective of the society into which they were born; and it also generates international social and economic inequalities that are not to the maximum benefit of the world’s worse-off persons.

Pogge (1992, 197) criticizes Rawls for employing the vague concept of “a people,” arguing it is not “clear enough and significant enough in the human world to play the conceptual role and to have the moral significance that Rawls assigns to it.” Beitz and Pogge have argued that liberalism faces a choice between truly raising its universal principles, which cannot take into moral account the concept of peoples, or maintaining a notion of communitarian self-sufficiency and local priority. Whereas Rawls worked to ameliorate the liberal-communitarian divide, Beitz and Pogge began to set the standards for liberal cosmopolitanism. The reality of globalization undermining Rawls’s self-sufficiency assumption, the three core principles, and the need for institutional reform to entrench and enforce the three principles endures in scholarship on global liberalism.

Beitz (2005; 1999b; 1999a) and Pogge (2005a; 2005b; 2002a; 2002b; 2001) have worked diligently to advance liberal cosmopolitanism, but have not been reiterating their
defense of global distributive justice in isolation. Works on liberal cosmopolitanism have multiplied, but the central principles of the theory have not changed (Hayden 2005; Heater 2002; Moellendorf 2002; Anderson-Gold 2001; Carter 2001; Gowan 2000; Kuper 2000). In these works, liberal theorists declare that the reality of global economic interdependence invalidates Rawls’s *Law of Peoples* and that the core principles of liberalism, individuality, universality, and generality, apply to all persons regardless of group affiliation.

Two problems remain prominent and unresolved in the literature. First, liberal cosmopolitans dispute the saliency and legitimacy of group identities, complicating plans for global governance. Some liberals (Kymlicka 1995; Miller 1995; Tamir 1993) have argued that group identities are legitimate elements of human life and must be factored into moral and political reasoning. By accepting the legitimacy of group identity, liberal cosmopolitans must reconcile it with the principle of individualism (Tan 2004; 2002; Miller 1998). Unfortunately, attempts at reconciliation are not satisfactory, and have talked past the issue more than resolved it. For example, Tan re-conceptualizes group identities to avoid their communitarian implications, in effect massaging the intractable concepts of national and cultural identity into forms of civic patriotism. But that civic patriotism cannot be the raising of something local over the greater whole. Calling civic patriotism “liberal nationalism,” these group identities no longer threaten cosmopolitan institutions. Simply put, liberal cosmopolitanism cannot take group membership as morally or institutionally salient without violating the individualism at its core; it either denies the importance of group identities or massages them into
manageable liberal concepts.

Liberal cosmopolitanism is a theory of global individualism; it takes its well-established concept of the universal individual and expands it across the globe. Indeed, global liberalism is confident in its concept of the human individual and the individual’s rationality; thus, the problems of cross-cultural interaction or incommensurable reasons ought not to register within liberal thinking. Rather, the main problem is how to expand liberal institutions across the globe, and most writing deals with various plans to that effect. Global liberalism follows Rawls by using the logic of rational choice to scrub problematic interactions out of the human experience. Every individual is fundamentally a selfish individual actor and can reach a rational accommodation with every other rational actor given enough information and mutually agreeable rules to the game (fortuitously provided through the veil of ignorance device). The “cosmopolitanism” of liberal cosmopolitanism becomes a synonym for globalism; the theory devises a system of political liberalism for the total set of individuals in the world.

Democratic Cosmopolitanism

The main architects of cosmopolitan democracy are Daniele Archibugi and David Held. These two authors and others have sought to expand the political principles of the western, liberal-democratic tradition across the globe, but especially focusing on the value of democracy. They argue the process of globalization is creating both a global community and global problems, both of which provide reasons to construct a global parliament. The cosmopolitan theory faces widespread criticism, both of a
practical and theoretical nature. Still, democratic cosmopolitanism prioritizes the enduring principle of democracy, which other cosmopolitanisms neglect.

Archibugi (2002) has argued that two ancient concepts, demos and cosmopolis, are colliding in our times. Demos, or democracy, “is the power of the many and, internally, the rule of the majority” (Archibugi 2002, 24). It is a pragmatic ruling principle more than an abstract concept, and can work only where the demos is a close-knit community. Cosmopolis, or cosmopolitanism, has been an abstract and rare ideal, usually reserved for the travelers and intellectuals who learn of “lands, cities, and people outside their own native communities” (Archibugi 2002, 24). Historically, the two concepts have represented opposite political leanings, but Archibugi argues that globalization has brought these two concepts together. Western democracies, the drivers of globalization, have been introducing democracy, with varying degrees of success, all around the world in the course of opening a global market that interconnects national economies and undermines the sovereignty of the traditional state. Archibugi (2002, 28) writes, “The project of cosmopolitan democracy can thus be expressed very simply: it is the attempt to reconcile the phenomenon of globalization with the successes of democracy.”

Much of the argument for cosmopolitan democracy revolves around the declining legitimacy of the nation-state and the rise of global political problems. The homogenous nation-state is no longer a reality, if it ever was. The forces of globalization have led to worldwide migrations without any necessary cultural assimilation. States are now so internally diverse and multicultural that Archibugi
(2003, 4) questions whether they will be able to meet the needs of their citizens. As the state struggles with the demands of a diverse citizenry, it likewise finds that globalization is restricting its ability to act as a sovereign and independent entity. State economies are growing increasingly interdependent and subject to the rules and regulations of a global market and international regulatory agencies. Furthermore, globalization is creating problems that do not stop at state borders. States are finding that they cannot fight problems such as environmental pollution and the spread of diseases in isolation. Cosmopolitan democracy recognizes that globalization is creating new communities, both smaller and larger than existing states, that necessitate new forms of representation and governance. The traditional nation-state is no longer a viable entity for fulfilling the ideals of the Enlightenment or for addressing the problems of a global community.

In league with Archibugi, David Held (2005) has written of cosmopolitan democracy’s historical legacy and modern principles. Cosmopolitan democracy owes a debt to both Stoic and Enlightenment thought, the former for substituting the concept of cosmos for polis as the ultimate sphere of obligation and the latter for emphasizing the concept of the weltburger, or world citizen. In these traditions, Held has explicated a number of principles for cosmopolitan democracy, including equal and individual moral worth, active agency, and the right to vote. Held (2005, 16) admits that in a diverse world, we cannot expect consensus on every issue, but he argues these principles reflect the desire to solidify “the moral status of persons, the conditions of agency, and [the methods of] collective decision-making.” Prior to these principles, Held (2005, 16)
assumes people desire “ground rules for communication, dialogue, and dispute settlement […] precisely because all people are of equal moral value and their views on a range of moral-political values will conflict.” Furthermore, “the aim of modern cosmopolitanism is the conceptualization and generation of the necessary background conditions” to actualize its own principles (2005, 16). Here the argument becomes circular: cosmopolitan democracy puts forth its functional principles assuming the background conditions necessary for those principles to flourish previously exist, so that the principles will create the background conditions necessary to support the functioning of the principles (Scheuerman 2002). Cleary, something is awry in this logic.

The arguments for cosmopolitan democracy raise a number of questions. If the background conditions necessary for the functioning of the principles are absent, must the principles be kept in force to effect a change in background conditions? A specter of authoritarianism lurks here: who is to keep these unpopular principles in force? How can this be democratic? If the background conditions are present, then what prevents the adoption of the principles? Presumably some authoritarian force must be overcome. Are the background conditions absent, is something preventing the principles from becoming law, or are the principles simply not popular? Again, something is awry.

The recurring problem of cosmopolitanism rears its head here, in that the universal principles of cosmopolitanism clash with the diversity of values across cultures. The background conditions of cosmopolitan democracy, if evident, are not dominant. Individuals often assert the superiority of their own cultural values, whether ignorant or knowledgeable of other value systems. Held confronts this problem of
strong/weak cosmopolitanism, but not with resounding success. He (2005, 18) “affirms principles which are universal in their scope,” but clarifies “that the precise meaning of these is always fleshed out in situated discussions.” This position leaves ample space for people with differing values to reach accord through constructive dialogue, and it leaves an equal space for people to manipulate universal principles for the service of their local values. Though Held favors the former, he cannot explain fully how to avoid the latter.

Beyond the troubles of strong/weak cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan democracy seems beset with additional criticism of a practical nature. Cosmopolitan democracy points to the success of state and local democratic governments as evidence that democracy should be implemented for the global community. Geoffrey Hawthorn (2003) has criticized this position as naïve, arguing that local and state democracy is not such an obvious success story. Cosmopolitan democrats have attacked the legitimacy of the state and international system, but do not seem to consider the full implications of this approach, for the destruction of state sovereignty also undercuts the legitimacy of current international law (Chandler 2003). Nor has cosmopolitan democracy fully considered the potential of the global assembly turning into a global leviathan. A global parliament threatens to become more of a distant government than a representative one, and more of an oligarchy than a democracy. Further, the problems of a global world, and the solutions to those problems, threaten to become so complicated that only a global technocracy, rather than democratic assembly, can address them (Urbinati 2003, Pogge 1997). The simple critique that all the inhabitants of the globe are too many and too diverse to find representation in one assembly carries substantial persuasive force
against which the cosmopolitan democrats have not provided equal counter-argument.

The final problem of cosmopolitan democracy in practice is one of borders, constituency, and representation. If state sovereignty is no longer a legitimate principle of organizing a polity, then cosmopolitan democracy undermines the existence of borders; however, it still asserts the right of peoples to retain their culture and administer their own affairs. How, then, does democratic cosmopolitanism define a legitimate constituency? After the era of state sovereignty, may any community, however defined, become an independent entity? Should every community, however small, have a representative in the global assembly? This is the problem of constituency: the inability to establish a rule for legitimate self-determination.11 Once every community has a right to self-rule, how do we apportion representatives in the global assembly? Does every community get a representative, or are people divided into anonymous districts of equal population? The latter recreates global equality, the former communal equality. Evident in cosmopolitan democracy, more so than liberal cosmopolitanism, is the attempt to deal with global diversity and the plurality of value systems among peoples. What is not evident is a solution to the problem of diversity in a project of universalism. The failure to elaborate the very universalism that underlies the project is a likely source of the problems that plague democratic cosmopolitanism in practice.

**Constitutional Cosmopolitanism**

Another broad approach to cosmopolitan theory is patriotic or constitutional cosmopolitanism. An array of theorists has sought to modernize Kantian cosmopolitanism.

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11 In all fairness, self-determination is one of the more intractable problems of political theory. See Buchanan (1991).
ideals and create a peaceful and global order among peoples. These theorists offer two paths toward reconciling the universal right versus local value problem. Both paths are works in progress.

Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006; 1997) has defended the idea that a certain cosmopolitan sentiment can reconcile the disputes of values and ideologies between cultures. The proposal is that cosmopolitan patriots may remain attached to a specific place or culture, but still respect the cultures of others. Appiah acknowledges the reality that people live in specific cultures and lands, and grow fond of them. But the true patriot knows that cultures are not static things, and will change and develop internally and through global interactions. Cultural travel accustoms an individual to the goodness of other cultures, and also reveals the flaws within one’s own culture. However, globalization must be neither a unilateral force nor an assimilating and homogenizing thing. The cosmopolitan sentiment is distinct from and antagonistic to the homogenizing force of global liberalism. Just as individuals in a liberal society will pursue different conceptions of the good, societies in a cosmopolitan world must be free to develop their own cultural practices and conceptions of the good. Interventionism must be a cautious thing. Ultimately, the cosmopolitan sentiment rests on acknowledging that all people feel a certain pride in their country, simply because it is theirs. Therefore, all patriots can feel a certain respect toward each other, and hopefully this sentiment of cosmopolitanism can lead to more peaceful interactions between patriots.

Cosmopolitanism as a sentiment of respect between patriots retains weaknesses in crucial areas. First is the general weakness of sentiments as guides to political
relationships. The cosmopolitan sentiment threatens either to dissipate at the first true clash of principles or only emerge after a difficult reconciliation of principles. If the cosmopolitan sentiment is essentially a live-and-let-live mentality, it may not endure a real conflict between patriotic peoples, or at least it may not prevent the violent resolution of a conflict. The principles at stake may overwhelm the sentiment. Other the hand, the sentiment may only arise after two sides have worked through the difficulties that divide them. For example, the modern friendship between the United States of America and the Great Britain emerged only after a long period of wars, near-wars, distrust, and finally the desperate alliances of the World Wars. A sentiment of patriotic cosmopolitanism may exist among many Americans and Britons, but only after a long period of conflict.

A second problem is that the sentiment remains unclear about how cosmopolitans are to interact with distinctly non-liberal peoples. Appiah clearly believes that a liberal ought to tolerate the many different ways other liberal individuals and liberal societies pursue their conceptions of the good, and rightly so. However, he does not suggest they should tolerate non-liberal ways of living, nor does he suggest how the sentiment of cosmopolitanism resolves this problem. Are non-liberal societies simply off-limits to the cosmopolitan traveler? That way, the cosmopolitan would neither support an oppressive society nor risk a violent conflict with its ruling authority. Does the

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12 The examples of sentiments and even principles withering in the face of conflict are many. A prime one is how many social-democratic parties of Europe (Labour, SPD) eschewed international solidarity and pacifism to support their nation-states during World War I.

13 After American independence, the U.S.A. and U.K. fought each other the War of 1812 and tensions remained high for over a century. The two approached war in the 19th Century over the Northwestern border and during the Civil War. The so-called “special relationship” between the two is only a post-World War II phenomenon.
cosmopolitan attempt to engage the non-liberal society and potentially risk lending support to its tyrannical regime? Might engagement hazard an outbreak of war? The sentiment of cosmopolitanism is problematic because it appears to be an epiphenomenon. Something must lie deeper within it, or else it may dissipate should it face a conflict of implacable principles.

Another form of cosmopolitan patriotism, better phrased constitutional cosmopolitanism, addresses the conflict between peoples while still recognizing a people’s legitimate desire to live under a common government formed by their shared principles. Jürgen Habermas (2001a; 2001b; 1998; 1997) has worked to fulfill the promise of the Enlightenment, particularly the Kantian legacy of a global peace among republican peoples. Habermas takes seriously the diversity of local customs and lifestyles but wants these to reflect the universal values of the Enlightenment. Rather than relying on a sentiment, Habermas argues for the resolution of conflict through cultural communication, specifically through the processes of dialogue he has championed. Thus, communicative agreement is how individuals with differing conceptions of the good will establish just constitutions amongst themselves and likewise how various peoples will reach just accommodations with other peoples.

The Habermasian project is an attempt to attune distinct groups, meaning communities in which individuals share a bond in their ways of living, with a greater cosmopolitanism. The goal is that each distinct group will construct a constitution that embraces the particulars of their patriotic community but also will reflect the universal values of the Enlightenment found in dialogue with others (Fine and Smith 2003). This
project is just that- a work in progress. Some (Bellmay and Castiglione 2004) have criticized the project as mere justificatory tool for supranational institutions (the European Union) as they replace sovereign states. The criticism is true superficially, as the project looks to replace both the sovereignty of states and class conflict with a politics of rational and consensual constitutionalism (Fine 2003). The project works toward the broader end of a union of constitutional republics and cosmopolitan peace, not merely the E. U.

One criticism of constitutional cosmopolitanism strikes at the heart of the Enlightenment project itself. Some (Rosenfeld 2007) have pointed out that the emergence of global terrorism presents a challenge to communicative ethics, in that communication may not be possible with those who believe in violent forms of fundamentalism. If these violent fundamentalisms are ultimately the manifestations of solvable economic injustice, then constitutional cosmopolitanism can overcome them. However, if fundamentalists hold their beliefs deeply and regardless of economic relations, then reasonably they will set out to eradicate non-fundamentalist individuals and societies, and communicative discourse will have found the limits to its no longer universal values. Constitutional cosmopolitans will be forced to acknowledge the limits of dialogue and will be thrust into violent conflict with various fundamentalists. The argument suggests one possible outcome if communicative actions faces a limitation. Another group of cosmopolitans follow the denial of universalism with a far different cosmopolitan theory.
Postmodern Cosmopolitanism

Theorists of postmodern cosmopolitanism are a diverse lot who find a few common points of intersection. Primarily, they are critics of universalism. They reject any attempt to expand a particular principle into a universal as they reject the legitimacy of any one principle becoming the foundation for a dominant theory. Taking this position, they immediately come into conflict with the aims of the modern cosmopolitans. Many look positively at globalization, seeing in it the potential for limitless interaction. Given the absence of universalism, globalization provides the space and opportunity for many competing peoples, principles, and ways of living to interact with each other. Globalization is not necessarily all positive, however. Postmodern cosmopolitanism contends that the threat of globalization is that one particular entity will dominate others or that the espousers of universalism will not cede their claims. Absent these threats, one will not be able to avoid interaction with the other in the global world. This inescapable interaction will lead to hybridization of forms and fluidity of principles, expanding the possible methods and modes of life. In a way, postmodern cosmopolitanism is the antithesis of the previously discussed Enlightenment cosmopolitanisms. It holds no underlying universal (reason) and does not seek to put forth a single principle (morality, justice, democracy, communicative action) as superior to others. Postmodern cosmopolitanism accepts and facilitates the flux of identities, values, and principles.

Critiques of the West’s pursuit of universalism abound in postmodern cosmopolitanism. As expressed by Pollock et al. (2000, 582), “The cosmopolitanism of
our times does not spring from the capitalized ‘virtues’ of Rationality, Universality, and Progress; nor is it embodied in the myth of the nation writ large in the figure of the citizen of the world.” Indeed, the postmodern cosmopolitans analyze the idea of cosmopolitanism historically to find an absence of continuity to the very theory itself (Toulmin 1990)! Stoics, Kant and Kantians, and religious thinkers have defined cosmopolitanism differently to accord with their belief systems. Secular moderns likewise have used the idea of cosmopolitanism with a view to their own beliefs and purposes. If we are to have a cosmopolitanism, the postmodernists argue, it cannot be the simple assertion of one particular cultural value as a universal principle to determine the political organization of all peoples. Indeed, the postmodern cosmopolitans have argued against the (primarily western) imperialism that masquerades as universal values and cosmopolitanism (Woodiwiss 2002). To find principles that approach universality, western individuals must engage in creative synergy with non-western ideas; universal principles will not be an indigenous discovery (Featherstone 2002).

Postmodern cosmopolitans do not pursue such a universal; regardless, they do argue for cultural interaction and engagement. Globalization has thrown different cultures together, often forcing interaction between the strangest of strangers. Postmodern cosmopolitanism embraces this climate of interaction (Giri 2006; Stevenson 2003; 2002; Mehta 2000). The coming together of different peoples compels an individual toward a self-critical reflection that breaks down the presupposition (unconscious or not) that one’s values and principles are universal, true, and good. This reflection, along with the experience of other ways of living, leads an individual to adopt
a fluid conception of principles and discard the inflexible dogmas of particular cultures. Furthermore, as these cosmopolitan individuals continue to travel and learn of new ways of living, their fluid principles are apt to hybridize after encounters with the new principles of the “Other.” Globalization fosters this type of cosmopolitanism (a world of interaction, fluidity, and hybridization that create new ways of living) provided that no one entity comes to dominate (Pieterse 2006; Brennan 1997). In fact, before the modern era of globalization, frontier lands, the geographic areas in which no sovereign government could restrain or mold behavior, provided an example of this. In the frontier, individuals from different cultures learned from their interactions and often hybridized their values; however, they did come into violent conflict, which state governments exacerbated when they came to assert hegemony and sovereignty (Tomasi 2003). In short, postmodern cosmopolitanism advocates for a process of globalization undirected by hegemonic, global institutions or universal principles of political organization. Such an open phenomenon will allow individuals to become self-critical, to learn from others, and to create infinite ways of living.

The History of Cosmopolitanism

No one yet has written a comprehensive history of cosmopolitan thought, nor is my intention to write it here. For the purposes of this project, to show that contemporary cosmopolitan thought is disconnected from classical cosmopolitanism in its concepts of cosmos and polis will suffice. A few historical accounts of cosmopolitanism do exist, mainly focusing on the Enlightenment and ancient Greece (Schlereth 1977; Baldry 1965; Hadas 1943; Harris 1927). Rarely do these include Plato as a cosmopolitan thinker, and
when included, Plato is of marginal importance. Contemporary cosmopolitanism begins with a concept of the individual, abstract and universal, and builds its global political order from that concept. The variants of contemporary cosmopolitanism connect only partially and tenuously with historical antecedents. The cosmos, regardless of its own order or disorder, is not a factor in these theories. Platonic cosmopolitanism is the direct opposite. It begins with the search for what the cosmos is, and whether it can provide a source of order and stability for political thought. Depending on the ontology of the cosmos, one may be able to construct a political constitution, and thus align the “polis” to the “cosmos,” completing a truly cosmopolitan theory. The heart of my project is to show that Plato’s political philosophy is the attempt to ground a political order within the structure of a greater cosmic order. Plato’s cosmopolitanism is one that first searches for order in the world, the cosmos, and then accordingly designs the polis.

Moral cosmopolitanism presents itself as the most historically grounded of contemporary cosmopolitanism’s branch, finding a place in the broad traditions of Stoicism and Cynicism, as well as Kant and the Enlightenment. However, historical studies (Kleingeld 1999; Moles 1996) show the lack of congruence of contemporary moral cosmopolitanism with its forebears, specifically with the concept of Reason. Among Stoics, Cynics, and German Enlightenment philosophers, criticism of the polis did not imply that true political membership is rightly global or universal. They often suggested that truly moral behavior is universal and stems from the natural world, the cosmos. The Greek idea of the cosmos is not equivalent to the modern and non-normative terms “universe, world, or globe.” For Stoics and Cynics, the cosmos was the
container of all things, animate and non-animate, divine and mortal. Human beings, with their peculiar faculty of reason, had the ability to understand the ordering of all things in the cosmos, and thus found themselves with a special place within that order (Hadas 1943). Just reading Hadas’s brief account shows how distant moral cosmopolitanism is from its historical antecedents.

Greek cosmopolitanism of the Stoics and Cynics was a rejection of the primacy of the *polis*. Regardless of whether the *polis* claimed divine or conventional origin for its laws, Cynics and Stoics challenged it, and found the source of human obligation in the broader—indeed, the all-inclusive—cosmos. Individual poleis were not set against one another by gods or nature, but all individuals were set beside one another possessed of the same natural affections under the same cosmic order. Contemporary cosmopolitanism has little, if anything, to say about the cosmic order. The cosmopolitan interrelationship of all human individuals is something to *accomplish* because it is the end some humans have chosen, not because it is something inherent in the cosmos. The structure of the cosmos is a subject for other disciplines, and their discoveries neither have necessarily influenced the choice of ends for human beings nor contemporary cosmopolitanism’s concept of an end itself.

But the Stoics and Cynics were not the only cosmopolitans in ancient Greece. The center of my argument is that Plato is a cosmopolitan thinker sufficiently different from his own contemporaries, and far different from the cosmopolitans of the present age. From the cosmos to the *polis*, Plato seeks to understand what philosophy is, how one comes to know, and how that knowledge informs the constitution of the *polis*.
CHAPTER III
ANCIENT GREEK COSMOPOLITANISM

Ancient Cosmopolitanism

Diogenes of Sinope is both the founder of Cynicism and of cosmopolitanism; at least Diogenes Laertius attributes to him the founding phrase of cosmopolitanism.\(^{14}\) However, cosmopolitanism has deeper and broader roots than Diogenes the dog-like. In the epic poetry of Homer, humanity faces the common fate of death. Mortality unites all human beings. Homer therefore contributes an early understanding of the universality of the human condition. In the pre-Socratic era, Pythagoreanism and Orphism reshaped the Greek understandings of the soul, nature, and the divine. Together, Pythagoreanism and Orphism developed the concept of the soul from the Homeric shade to the immortal \(\text{psychē}\). Nature and the divine were understood as patterned and guided by intelligence. Local variations in the grander order of nature were less significant than the general laws. Also in the 6\textsuperscript{th} and 5\textsuperscript{th} centuries, the conventional laws of the city, the constitution or \(\text{nomos}\), fell under criticism from sophists, rhetors, and statesmen. After Socrates and Plato, cosmopolitanism explicitly took form in two schools of Greek philosophy, Cynicism and Stoicism.

Again, no one has written a comprehensive history of cosmopolitan thought, but a few scholars have written accounts the main moments of cosmopolitan thought, including Enlightenment Europe and ancient Greece.\(^{15}\) This chapter will illuminate the different ways the ancient Greeks approached the ideas of universal humanity and the

\(^{14}\) See note 4.

\(^{15}\) On Greek cosmopolitanism, see Baldry (1965), Hadas (1943), and Harris (1927); on Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, see Kleingeld (1999) and Schlereth (1977).
ordered, natural world before bringing the two together into a philosophy of cosmopolitanism. Important to note is that the finished products of Stoic and Cynic cosmopolitanism differ greatly from the political philosophy of Plato. Generally, Stoicism views all humanity as existing under the common, but hierarchical, order of reason. Stoic cosmopolitanism includes three varieties of human association, all of which ultimately reject the Greek *polis*. Cynics tend to reject all forms of limited political association and conventional laws as well, and are less inclined to establish a new political association in place of the old. Cynicism embraces a simple, ascetic life of reason and nature; it is fundamentally anti-political. Neither Stoic nor Cynic cosmopolitanism attempts to found a Greek *polis*, a limited political association of differently-skilled individuals, in harmony with the greater laws of the cosmos.

**The Universal Order in Homer**

In an underappreciated article, Hugh Harris (1927) searched for the roots of cosmopolitan thinking long before Diogenes the Cynic, the Stoics of ancient Greece, or Alexander the Great. He found four separate roots of what would grow into cosmopolitanism: the poetry of Homer, the religious faith of Orphism and Pythagoreanism, the natural philosophy of the pre-Socratics, and the historical inquiries of Herodotus. The short article is a fount of research into cosmopolitanism. Indeed, one can find in Homer a certain poetic cosmopolitanism, but not a rational or divinely ordered one. Homer’s epic poetry imagines a world of conflict, among both the gods and human societies. Still, Homer sees that human beings share a certain end regardless of national origin. No matter one’s *polis*, no matter one’s place in the *polis*, everyone
shares the fate of mortality. Whether Trojan or Greek, man or woman, Homer identifies all human beings as mortals, and thus introduces a crucial aspect of cosmopolitan thinking: the universality of the human condition.

That an epic poem displays a cosmopolitan flair should not be a huge surprise. Epic poetry, such as Homer’s *Iliad*, is a work of imagination. It recalls a mythic event from a distant time and among distant peoples. Portraying these distant peoples requires the use of “imaginative fancy.” Homer’s epic poetry (and epic poetry as a form of historical mythology) “enabled its followers to look away from their native heath to the horizon beyond” (Harris 1927, 2). The reader finds a parade of peoples in the *Iliad*, and Homer by no means paints them negatively, nor even as inscrutable “others.” Ethiopians, Phaeacians, and the Abii of the North all pass through Homer’s account. Readers of the *Iliad* may find Homer’s sympathies, and their own, fall to the Prince of Troy, Hector, more than the hero of Greece, Achilles (Harris 1927, 3). Whatever particularities he notes among the physical appearance, land of origin, or special fame of peoples, Homer dispenses universal human qualities and virtues (justness, blamelessness) without prejudice.

Encountering many different peoples, the essential nature of humanity is common to all its members. The Homeric world is not one of Greek versus barbarian, but of all peoples in the greater Mediterranean world existing under the rule of the Olympian deities (Voegelin 1953). Of course, that rule is in a state of disorder and war, but the conflict of the *Iliad* is a war among the divinities as much as a conflict among peoples. Achaeans and Trojans war on the earth as Zeus and Hera battle in the heavens.
Indeed, the gods use Greeks and Trojans as proxies for their infighting. The world is in a state of disorder, from the gods’ civil war, to Paris and Helen’s egregious breach of custom and tradition, through Achilles otherworldly rage (Vogelin 1953, 494). Reason cannot bring to heel the enormous power of desire among humanity and the gods themselves.

Homer’s epic poetry is only a beginning to cosmopolitan thinking. It perceives that the world exists as one order, but that state is disordered in the poetry. Homer lacks theology and cosmology; indeed, he lacks *logos*. Neither the divine nor the mortal world is ruled by reason or logic; *logos* is only one motivation among others in the workings of the divine and the human realms. Homer’s world is one of miracles and passions that subdue rationalism. Homer is fundamentally “pre-Greek;” his concepts are prior to the discovery of the intellect, the rational mind (Snell 1960, 1-22). However, lacking a universal understanding of *logos*, Homer does not lack a universal essence of humanity. For all the complexities of Homeric psychology, “one thing is really certain about Homeric man: that he must die” (Vogelin 1953, 515). Human beings are mortal (*thnētos*). Each and all share in the fate of death. One of the overarching themes in the *Iliad* is the confrontation with mortality and the attempts to secure a measure of immortality. Achilles famously seeks immortality in remembrance. His heroic deeds will be so great, future generations will recall them forever. Hector faces mortality differently. He risks his own death to protect the life of his son and wife. Hector seeks immortality in procreation. Sadly, his efforts fail, but like Achilles, his deeds remain in memorial.
Combining Homer’s humane portrayal of characters across the different sides of combat with his conception of the human being as mortal, the reader is lead to a proto-cosmopolitan sentiment. As much as the reader understands that Achilles is the hero of the tale, the sorrowful end of Hector is not cheered. The subsequent appeal by the supplicant King Priam to Achilles for the body of his slain and mutilated son only deepens the reader’s understanding that the story is not one of Greek heroes against barbarians, but a tale of the human struggle against the common fate of death.

Harris (1927) argues that Homer instilled a cosmopolitan flair to Greek poetry that would flourish in time. Poetry as a medium of communication activates the imagination of people and wisps their thoughts from their locality to distant places. Though not based on scientific studies, philosophical contemplation, or distant travels, Homer’s epic poetry vicariously transported the Greeks from their parochial poleis across the Mediterranean world. Describing the lands of Libya, Phoenicia, Italy, and beyond, the reader (or listener) of Homer learns of the people in those places and cannot help but to imagine their lives. As Homer tells the tale of a violent war between Greece and Troy, his epic treats enemy and ally as equally human. Indeed, the foreign characters of Hector and Priam often appear more heroic and sympathetic than their native counterparts of Achilles and Agamemnon. According to Harris (1927, 3-4), Homer established a legacy in poetry (continued, for example, in Euripides’ Trojan Women and Andromache or Plato’s Ion) of humanizing distant, foreign peoples. Poetry so often plays upon the imaginative soul, and Homer treated human beings as fundamentally moving toward the common fate of death. Humanity finds their common
essence in mortality, not in local attachment.

Though Homer’s epic poem reflects a proto-cosmopolitan sentiment, it contains three obvious problems. The first is the disorder among the gods. The second is the existence of miraculous phenomena. The third is the reliance on imagination as the foundation of the work. The first and second problems do interact at times and certainly influence the resolution of the third problem. Subsequent to Homer, the Greek world saw a slowly unfolding revolution in religious, scientific, and historical thought. Each would contribute to the development of robust cosmopolitanism in the place of Homer’s imaginative, proto-cosmopolitanism.

**Orphism and Pythagoreanism**

In the 6th-5th centuries, two religious movements of universalism and individualism, Orphism and Pythagoreanism, seeped into the wider Greek consciousness. The influence of Orphism, murky as that religion’s origins are, cannot be denied. Orphism instructed individuals to be concerned primarily with the salvation of their souls. This self-concern applied universally; all individuals regardless of their geographical birth or political association were ordered to take care of their souls. Pythagoreanism inspired similar concern for the soul and also developed a rational theology that encompassed the natural world, its abstract principles, and the immortal soul. Divinizing nature and illuminating a fuller concept of the soul, Orphism and Pythagoreanism continued to develop the preliminaries of cosmopolitan thought by attaching the individual soul to an understanding of universal order.

Scholars (Kahn 2001; Philip 1966; Cameron 1938) do not deny the influence of
Orphism and Pythagoreanism on the development of Greek philosophy, but accounts of that influence paint only in broad strokes, typically revealing the doctrines of Orphism and Pythagoreanism in later, more extant, philosophers (in Plato, for example). In studies of the development of Greek philosophy, research on Pythagoreanism and Orphism tends toward the vague. For example, G. M. A. Grube (1980, 121) wrote that Plato’s conception of the soul originated in the east, but Grube does not draw distinctions among “those mystical teachers and prophets who are usually somewhat summarily lumped together as Orphics.” In like manner, A. D. Winspear (1940) discusses the influence of eastern thought on Greek culture during and after the Homeric era. Post-Homer, Winspear credits Orphism with introducing an antagonistic soul-body relationship to the Greek mind.\(^\text{16}\) His research also credits Pythagoras with the development of parallelism, the patterns of similarity between the individual, city, and cosmos. However, Grube and Winspear produce only broad generalizations and lack the details of Orphic and Pythagorean influence. Other scholars (Jaeger 1959; Vlastos 1952; Greene 1936; Guthrie 1935; Nilsson 1935) have noted, and disputed, the influence of Pythagoreanism and Orphism on Greek thought and philosophy as well, but in generalities rather than specifics. Especially difficult is the separation of Plato from Pythagoras. Uzdavinys’s (2004) anthology treats Plato as a Pythagorean, but reading the dialogues of Plato as evidence of earlier Pythagoreanism is not uncontested or unproblematic.\(^\text{17}\) At best, this research only demonstrates Pythagoreanism through Plato, not an unadulterated or primary source of material.

\(^{16}\) In Homer, the soul and body were different elements in the unitary living being, but certainly not antagonistic. Nor is the shade in Homer akin to the psyche of later Greek thought.

\(^{17}\) See Guthrie (1962, 173-175) for the short version, or Burkert (1972) for the longer argument.
Some research aims at a basic distinction of Orphism as the more mystical cult and Pythagoreanism as the more rational philosophy, but such a strict separation is not tenable. Robbin (1928, 53-68) characterizes Orphism as a mystic cult of secret rites and Pythagoreanism as a more intellectual practice of philosophy, certainly with its own elements of mysticism. Guthrie (1962, 141-142, 216-221) argues such a strict separation is not tenable given the complexity of those creeds and the paucity of evidence for either. The path may be even more tortuous, as Robbin (1928, 55-56) and Guthrie (1962, 191-193) find evidence that Pythagoreanism split into two camps, one closer to a system of insular mystic rites and the other more intellectual, mathematical, and public. Thus, one might mistake mystical Pythagoreanism for Orphism. Though difficult to disentangle the two, the combined influence of Orphism and Pythagorean inspired new understandings of the soul, nature, reality, and the good life.

Obscure in its details, the influence of Orphism and Pythagorean is vibrant in broader strokes. The Homeric epics are famous for their idea of universal mortality and the soul as the shade of its former life. Pythagoreanism introduced “a radical break from the Homeric view” with its idea of the immortal, migratory, and remembering soul (Kahn 2001, 18). Unfortunately, little evidence remains of a naked Pythagorean concept of the soul; most scholarship refers to Plato’s dialogues, especially the *Meno*, *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, and *Timaeus*, for source material on Pythagorean teachings.

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18 Henceforth, I will refer only to Pythagoreanism instead of both Pythagoreanism and Orphism. The source material for Pythagoreanism in the 6th and 5th centuries is questionable, but the source material for Orphism is even more opaque.

19 See also Bremmer (1983) and Rohde (1950). For a more critical perspective, Claus (1981) argues for a less revolutionary and more developmental understanding of the soul from Homer to Socrates. The idea of the soul did not spring *ex nihilo* from Socrates, nor was the Homeric soul exclusively a mere shade.
What can be gleaned from the general picture of Pythagoreanism is an understanding of the soul as the true self, immortal, and cognizant of true reality. Pythagoreanism denied that the world consists solely of sense perception and that mortal life is solely the pursuit of appetite satisfaction and honor. Living well requires knowledge of nature and ethical training, and the possessor of these will live better on earth and earn a reward in the heavens. Not only “a doctrine of salvation” for the soul, Pythagoreans adhered to a life of ethical behavior and ritual purification in the hopes of avoiding mortal reincarnation (Riegweg 2002, 63-67). Metempsuchōsis, or transmigration of the soul, meant that those who fail to care for the soul do not receive the blessing of assimilation to the divine. The Pythagorean concept of the soul shares an intimate connection with nature and the divine, which differentiates it from its contemporaries in natural philosophy.

The 6th-5th centuries saw the beginnings of the scientific study of nature (phusis) across the Greek world, with the Pythagoreans and Ionians exhibiting a key difference in their natural philosophies. Ionian natural science and Pythagoreanism both divinized nature, but the Ionians did not posit a principle of intelligence as the master of physical change until Anaxagoras’ philosophy (Guthrie 1962, 141-143). Seeking a master element or ethereal substance to explain changes of physical matter, the Ionian natural philosophy was exceedingly materialistic (McLean and Aspell 1971, 21-22). Even if it did divinize nature, there did not follow much of an ethical corollary for humanity (Vlastos 1975, 29-30). Plato’s Phaedo (96a-99d) especially captures the sense that Ionian philosophy, and even Anaxagoras’ concept of Mind, did not study nature with an
eye to teleology and correlative purpose. It studied physical causation and change without any notion of change-for-the-best. Studying nature to understand generation, causation, and change-for-the-best is essential to Pythagoreanism.

The Pythagoreans studied physical reality as a cosmos, a beautiful, harmonious arrangement of elements. Pythagoras may even be the first to call the world a cosmos (Guthrie 1987, 22). Pythagorean science revolved around the central importance of Number, meaning the principles of ratio, harmony, beauty, and universality among physical phenomena (McLean and Aspell 1971, 33-44). Physical reality changed according to intelligible principles; abiding these principles, physical nature exhibits harmony. Pythagoreanism freely attached ideas of harmonic principles to projects of aesthetic construction. Though mystical in its numerology and astrology, Pythagoreanism forged a path of applied science in musical architecture as well (Guthrie 1987, 11-12). The world being a cosmos implied something else in Pythagoreanism: an ethical imperative.

Number is the ruling principle for nature, but above Number are the Gods. The cosmos being an arrangement, something must have done the arranging. The hierarchy of reality in Pythagoreanism posits divinities supreme to physical nature that order nature according to number. The link that traverses the hierarchical levels of reality is intelligence. Pythagoreanism posited a supreme Mind permeating and ordering the world, and believed the human capability of intelligence could apprehend to an extent this Mind. Furthermore, Pythagoreans turned the capability of knowledge into an imperative of good living. The logic simply stated that living according to intelligence is
best.

Guthrie (1962, 199) wrote of the Pythagoreans that, “Assimilation to the divine” is the “essential aim of human life.” In other words, through the faculty of intelligence, human beings can escape their physical existence and ascend the ladder of reality toward the immaterial, immortal divine (Guthrie 1987, 12). The hierarchy of Soul, Nature, and Mind led to universalistic thinking, but not a familiar kind of cosmopolitanism. The code of living in Pythagoreanism, particularly the dietary restrictions, is a curious mixture of scientific investigation, introspective philosophy, and mystic rites that appears somewhat bizarre (Kahn 2001, 9; Guthrie 1987, 84). This way of life is decidedly anti-political, but it was not anti-social.

Pythagorean societies flourished in southern Italy in the middle of the 5th century before succumbing to popular political repression. Given their peculiar beliefs, an anti-Pythagorean political reaction is not surprising (Riedweg 2002, 104-106; Minar 1942). Pythagoreanism essentially espoused a scientific/philosophical aristocracy. Its philosophical life was anti-democratic, anti-oligarchic, and antagonistic to the traditional, landed aristocracy. Being a cult of knowledge, Pythagoreans looked down upon the ignorant masses of the democracy; equally, they deplored the materialism of the wealth-seeking oligarchy. Challenging the old Homeric mythology, they likely ran afoul of the landed aristocracy and its claim to rule through a mythical, heroic lineage. Making enemies with all three major classes of society, Pythagoreans were not long for political power, much less political coexistence. Besides making enemies, the Pythagoreans also displayed pacifist tendencies due to their belief in the transmigration
of the soul (Robbin 1928, 68). Even as they antagonized the main classes of society, the Pythagoreans’ own philosophy steered them away from the methods of power politics that might have preserved their authority.

The actual amount of power wielded by Pythagorean brotherhoods in southern Italy is unclear. Some evidence suggests that a Pythagorean elite, the *politikoi*, ruled the city of Croton for a time (Guthrie 1987, 31). Actually holding power may have instigated the revolt against them, as the Pythagorean element of Croton’s community was driven out (Riedweg 2002, 104-106). Rather than attain political power, Pythagoreans tended to form brotherhoods (Kahn 2001, 8). They lived in social communion on the outskirts of town, both metaphorically and geographically. With a philosophy that ran counter to normal life and antagonistic to the dominant classes of political society, Pythagoreanism veered away from politics and worldly engagement.

Thus, Pythagoreanism is not a political philosophy in a stricter sense of the term. The Pythagorean brotherhoods are not political communities in the sense of incorporating different people under a common law. They are associations of likeminded people. The problem is that Pythagoreanism is ambiguous about the obligation of the learned to guide the ignorant. The individual certainly benefits from the cultivation of the soul. Happiness being conformity to natural harmony, one lives best by understanding and adhering to natural order. The obligation or compulsion to rule others is not a necessary corollary. Truly, Pythagoras is said to have eschewed wanton cruelty because of the doctrine of transmigration of the soul, but acts of restraint are different from positive acts of good. Though Pythagoreanism could support the
political philosophy of a knowledge-based aristocracy, it need not. It might even support a kind of cosmopolitan theory. Conceivably, Pythagoreanism could argue for the rule of the wise over the ignorant to instill order in society. Questions might still remain about the appropriate size of the political community. Should the *polis* remain or should political society be larger? Ultimately, Pythagoreanism is a philosophy of the individual’s pursuit of knowledge of Mind and harmony with the cosmos. The status of a political community is ambiguous.

**Cynic Cosmopolitanism**

The 5th century BC was hardly an epoch of cosmopolitan thinking in mainland Greece. A more accurate generalization is the many *poleis* of the Greeks became more aware of their common “Greekness” and of others as barbarian. However, the era of *polis* supremacy and Hellene identification would see the development of a cosmopolitan response. The 5th century witnessed the expansion of travel literature among the previously parochial Greeks, awakening them to the diversity of peoples and customs across the Mediterranean world and beyond, and the products of historians, sophists, and rhetors all contributed to the growing nationalist movement in the Greek world (Baldry 1965, 16-24; Hadas 1943). Even as Greeks primarily identified with their local *polis*, a broader nationalist sentiment took hold in the popular imagination; Greeks possessed a common culture that stood opposed to all other barbarian peoples.

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20 To examine the complete philosophical and political spheres of activity in 5th century Athens, much less the wider Greek world, would comprise a book in itself. For examples of such work, see works such as Munn (2000), Finley (1975), and Havelock (1957). See Sabine (1937, 3-28) for a brief account of the importance of the *polis* as a form of association, *nomos* as the engine of political harmony, and the influence of expanded cultural knowledge in the 5th century. To stay focused on the topic of cosmopolitanism, I gloss over the deeper divide of *nomos* and *phusis* in non-cosmopolitan philosophy and politics.
The two invasions of the Persian Empire into mainland Greece probably ignited the Greek nationalist sentiments as well. Certainly, Greek victory inflamed the love of country. Works such as Herodotus’ *Histories* contributed to the acceptance of the principle that custom, or *nomos*, unites a people and differentiates peoples. Though a universal order permeates Herodotus’ thought (the pattern of *koros-atē-hubris*), his vivid portrayal of the diversity of custom across the world is more overt than his subtle, overarching framework for all humanity (Euben 1986). The primary loyalty to local custom and convention that typified membership in *polis* and the broader division of the world into Greek and barbarian generated a number of philosophical responses, including the Cynic and the Stoic.

Whatever Cynicism is, whether a lifestyle, doctrine, or philosophy, it is not conventional. The foundational principle of Cynicism is the rejection of all convention that does not accord with nature. Embracing all that can be observed in or learned from nature, the Cynics ruthless criticized the refinements and embellishments of civilized life. Until the Cynic way of life is clarified, the term “cosmopolitan” and Diogenes’ famous phrase are easy to misunderstand. The Stoics worked more formally to construct a philosophical school of thought than did the Cynics. They found the common element of reason, *logos*, in the individual soul, the whole of nature, and the divine, and argued for a certain kind of rational community instead of the traditional, conventional *polis*. In different ways, both the Cynics and Stoics developed theories of cosmopolitanism; yet, neither attempts to construct a genuine *polis* in harmony with the cosmos.

Even calling the Cynics a school of thought is not uncontroversial, as A. A. Long
(1974), writing on the development of Hellenistic philosophy, largely subsumes the Cynics into Stoicism. Reviewing early Cynicism, Long (1974, 4) acknowledges Cynics like Diogenes had a significant point to their acts of “exhibitionism and deliberate affront,” but the historical record of their thought is spotty. A better description than “school of thought” is that Cynicism is the imitation of Diogenes (Branham and Goulet-Caze 1996, 2-3). But even the claim that Diogenes is the first Cynic is not uncontroversial. Grote (1973, 149-172) begins his analysis of Cynicism with Antisthenes, but never did Aristotle acknowledge Antisthenes as a Cynic. Aristotle, as Long (1996, 31-32) points out, calls Diogenes the first Cynic. Skeptical of the “master-disciple” relationships later philosophers imposed on the historical record, Long (1974, 109-111) does not draw a straight line from either Socrates to Zeno or Antisthenes to Diogenes to Crates to Zeno. Given the uncertainty of determining who is a Cynic and who is not, we should not be surprised at the problems of delineating the lineage and influence of Cynicism on Stoicism.21 Cynicism, mainly through the paradigmatic exemplar of Diogenes, does demonstrate a rejection of social artifice and convention and an embrace of natural individualism. Whether it is a political theory or an anti-political theory, Cynicism is a shade of cosmopolitanism in its adherence to a kind of universalism.

I use obtrusive qualifiers for Cynic cosmopolitanism (shade, kind of) because it is exceedingly different from what we normally consider cosmopolitanism, both compared to ancient and contemporary conceptions. Tarn (1939) harshly chided those

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21 See Fisch (1937) for the similarities between Cynicism and Stoicism and Tarn’s (1939) thorough critique. Also, on the lineage of Cynics see Grant (1980, 24-25) for an argument against Antisthenes as the first Cynic and Guthrie (1969) for a conciliatory position between Grote and Grant.
who even call it “cosmopolitan.” He argued Cynicism was not a school of thought. Cynicism was not a philosophy, “it was a way of life, a mode of thought, and was entirely negative” (Tarn 1939, 42). In Tarn’s (1939, 42-44) analysis, Diogenes, the ostensible founder of “cosmopolitanism,” is really saying with his famous quip that he rejects all poleis, all conventional law, and all claims of lineage to authority. The expression, “my polis is the cosmos,” means that Diogenes can live anywhere in the world because nature and the natural life is universal. He needs no convention, no family lineage, and no home. This is certainly not an endorsement of a world-state or global citizenship; it is the total rejection of all political particularism and the identification of the natural and universal with the fit and suitable. Tarn’s analysis remains substantially valid in the literature and leaves us with a curiously un-cosmopolitan Cynic cosmopolitanism.

Still, a few points and qualifications can be raised against Tarn’s account. Long (1996, 34-36) points out that Diogenes is not arguing against all convention, but only the conventions against nature and, more importantly, the sophistic doctrine of natural pleonexia that rose in the wake of attacks against convention itself. Typified by Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias, arguments against convention in the 5th and 4th centuries often endorsed a doctrine of pleonexia, meaning the individual should expand the appetites and use all methods and means of acquiring satisfaction. Diogenes’ example actually upholds an extreme form of self-control and moderation, exactly opposite of those who argued against convention.

Another qualification is that Diogenes is not entirely negative in his statements
about the *polis* and cosmos. Moles (1996, 108-113) makes the argument that his famous attributions in Diogenes Laertius affirm that he is a citizen of the whole world and that the only good government is that of the cosmos itself. He is not denying citizenship entirely or good government, but his affirmation is certainly not the cosmopolitanism familiar to moderns or his own contemporaries. Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism is the freedom to live according to natural laws everywhere under the cosmos. As a “citizen” of the cosmos, Diogenes shares a *polis* with any other wise citizen, wisdom being conformity to natural, cosmic law. Attachment to this cosmopolis is a moral and natural one, not one of birth or necessity as in a traditional, political association.

Despite these minor qualifications, Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism, and Cynic cosmopolitanism more generally, is a radically anti-political theory of human association. Finley (1968, 89-101) harshly criticized Diogenes as a homeless beatnik who would accept and endure man-made oppression rather than establish a just system of law and politics. Nor are Finley’s condemnatory remarks without some accuracy. The primary virtue of Cynic life was *autarkeia*, or strict self-control and physical endurance. *Autarkeia* meant rational autonomy and asceticism: stark necessity in the satisfaction of only the most basic and natural desires and detachment from all non-natural concerns (Rich 1956). Living so simply and detached from normal human concerns, Cynicism finds no place for political life and all its convention, superficiality, and artifice.

Cynic *autarkeia*, under further examination, is a fascinating concept. Aristotle (*Pol*. 1235a) famously wrote that only gods and beasts are self-sufficient creatures.
Human beings need the *polis* to live well. The point captures Aristotle’s argument for man’s essentially political nature. The Cynics offer a different take on the idea that only gods and animals are self-sufficient. If gods and animals are self-sufficient, and self-sufficiency is a virtue, then logically humanity should imitate the gods and animals to be more virtuous. Diogenes was called the dog not without reason; he observed animal behavior and imitated it. Being closer to self-sufficiency, Cynicism rearranges the traditional “divine-human-animal” hierarchy into divine-animal-human (Goulet-Caze 1996, 61).

The primary virtue of Cynicism being *autarkeia*, political association is rejected as a vice (Branham and Goulet-Caze 1996, 9). The *polis* was both an admission of self-insufficiency and an embrace of particularistic law. The Cynics declined both and therefore put themselves outside membership in any *polis*. The records of the Cynics show that they flouted conventional law, endured physical hardships, and ultimately valued ascetic living and self-sufficiency. That they would live this way anywhere in the world affords them the opportunity to call the whole world their home, but in any particular community they will find no permanent attachment. The cosmopolitanism of the Cynics is the rejection of association and the elevation of *autarkeia*. The cosmos itself decrees that individuals must be self-sufficient and adhere only to the general laws that apply to all humans. This, curiously, is a eudaimonist theory of human happiness, but one that explicitly finds the *polis* and political life antagonistic to fulfillment (Sayre 1945). In total, Cynicism is curious twist on a number of Greek philosophical principles, but its cosmopolitanism is definitely anti-political and a strange mixture of the divine
and the animal.

**Stoic Cosmopolitanism**

Stoicism and Cynicism share some common philosophical roots, but certainly reflect substantial differences as well. On the surface, Stoic cosmopolitanism shares distinctive features in common with Cynic cosmopolitanism. Both stress control of the emotions and a certain indifference to material circumstance. Analysis of more depth shows that Stoicism is different in its conception of humanity, reason, and the cosmos. Still, Stoic and Cynic cosmopolitanism reject the idea of the *polis*, the local association of differently-skilled individuals under a common law. Depending on how one interprets the evidence, Stoicism raises an isolated society of the wise, the worldwide society of the wise, or the Cynic-like citizenship to the cosmos. The unwise are not included in a truly human community.

The most basic distinction one can draw between Stoicism and Cynicism is that the Stoic sought a basis in *logos* for *phasis*; or the lengthy version, the Stoics pursued a rational philosophy of logic, order, and harmony to explain natural phenomena and human ethics whereas the Cynics accepted less rigorous standards of natural and animal examples (Long 1974, 107-108). In terms of their political thought, some differences are salient. The Stoics did not consider animals more akin to the divine than humanity. The Stoics identified the faculty of *logos* in the human being as elevating humanity above the animals. Stoicism returned to the familiar divine-human-animal hierarchy.

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22 For clarification, when using the term Stoicism I mean early Stoicism. Any reference to later Stoicism will be explicitly labeled as such.

23 One can find more elaborate discussions of broader Stoic philosophy in Vogt (2008), Ierodiakonou (1999), Long (1996), and Reesor (1986), among others.
Identifying *logos* as the highest function of the human mind, the Stoic polity is one based on reason and nature. In theory, the best polity will be a community of the wise that assimilates to nature, or the cosmic-divine. However, Stoic writing, or at least interpretations of those writings, disagrees on the construction of this rational and natural cosmopolis. Research into Stoic political thought reveals three versions of the community of the wise, the cosmopolis, one of which greatly resembles Cynic cosmopolitanism.

The first Stoic cosmopolis stems from Zeno’s famous society of the wise. A significant stream of research interprets the scant evidence for Zeno’s *Politeia* as the blueprint for an isolated community of rational, self-ruling individuals— a Sparta for sages (Schofield 1991; Baldry 1965; 1958; Chroust 1965; Tarn 1948). Rowe (2002), for example, argues that Zeno’s *Politeia* is a Socratic critique of Plato’s *Republic*.²⁴ Plato’s ideal city famously includes three classes, two of which are not fully rational. Rowe (2002, 300) reads Zeno as applying a strict understanding of Socratic intellectualism to political association and concluding with the exclusive society of the wise— no ignoramuses allowed! If Rowe is correct, and Zeno was a Socratic, the later Stoics who disavowed Zeno’s work as Cynicism and not in keeping with their Socratic tradition certainly owe him an apology (Schofield 1991, 9-21).

Zeno’s *Politeia* as the society of the wise is strange sort of cosmopolitanism. The society of the wise is a city in the sense of being a geographically-bound place and encompassing a number of individuals under a common way of life, but it is a city of

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²⁴ Rowe’s argument is certainly interesting, and spawns numerous and intricate questions. Primarily, the argument suggests Zeno is more Socratic than Cynic or Stoic; indeed, he is more Socratic than Plato! In a different work, I would certainly pursue these issues at greater depth.
only one type of person, the philosopher. The society of the wise, as the name suggests, is an exclusive arrangement. Human beings who fail to exhibit rationality, who fail in their self-control, are not welcome in this cosmopolis. Zeno’s city is one in which the wise separate themselves from the ignorant to live in friendship according to nature and reason. The city is a group of individuals living in one place according to natural, rational standards, so we may call it in fairness a cosmopolis. However, the exclusivity of the city is not to be overlooked. The society of wise is not a Greek *polis* in the sense of encompassing a variety of differently-skilled people. It is a cosmopolitan theory of great exclusivity.

Interpreting Zeno’s society of the wise as the exclusive city for sages causes continuity problems with later Stoicism, which argued for a more expansive, imperial cosmopolis. Sellars (2007) directly challenges the interpretation of Zeno that produces the society of the wise and argues for a more continuous, cosmopolitan Stoicism. Zeno, Sellars (2007, 13-14) argues, is not calling for the retreat of the wise into their own society, but positing a conditional: if all people were sages, then the all the cosmos would be a city of concord and fulfillment. In a world of rational, autonomous individuals, everyone would act according to nature. Conventional law would be superfluous; conventional association would dissipate. Local political organizations would lose their meaning and purpose as every individual considered every other individual an equal, rational being wherever they met.

In the second interpretation of Stoic cosmopolitanism, the *polis* yields to the

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25 Interestingly, Sellars uses Cynicism to make Zeno and Seneca into a more coherent tradition. The evidence for the Cynics and early Stoics is opaque; I do not pick sides in these interpretation battles, but merely spell them out so they can be compared to Platonic cosmopolitanism.
cosmos. Geographical cities may remain, but their conventional laws succumb to the advance of reason, nature, and *autarkeia*. Like the first interpretation, the second is not unproblematic. Clearly, it is utopian, and excessively so. The first interpretation takes notice of humanity’s ignorance and encourages the wise to segregate themselves. The second interpretation looks forward to the time when all human beings are equally wise and autonomous. Whether I am feeling cynical right now or merely recalling history, the expectation that all humanity will realize the capability of *autarkeia* and reason strikes me as far too utopian. However, this interpretation stands as one of the paradigmatic examples of cosmopolitan thinking; all the cosmos will be as a *polis*, an association of equals, but equal in reason and nature instead of convention.

The third Stoic cosmopolis reflects the influence of Cynicism tempered with the rationality of Stoicism. Instead of an isolated community of sages or the eventual triumph of reason in the minds of all human beings, the Stoic cosmopolis is the citizenship of the wise according to the cosmos (Vogt 2008). Essentially, only the truly rational are acting according to cosmic law; only the rational are citizens to the true source of law, the cosmos. This cosmopolis is not a society of sages bound by a geographic location, nor is it the world-state of a rational humanity. However, anyone who reaches rational self-rule acts according to the laws of the cosmos. Wherever the rational individual exists, they adhere to the cosmopolis. This interpretation is cognizant that all humanity exists in the cosmos, but only some are truly aware of the rational laws that bind all in the cosmos. Those who come to understand the natural laws of the cosmos are truly citizens to the highest law, but many human beings will not come to
this realization. They will continue to live in states of ignorance as citizens under an irrational, conventional law. This third Stoic cosmopolis is the city of divinity and rational humanity; it is an individual state of awareness and inter-subjective accordance more than a physical city of sages or an end-of-history world-state. As the wise live according to cosmic law, irrational humanity will remain in their conventional political associations outside the full citizenship of the cosmos.

In these three cosmopoleis, the faculty of reason motivates political societies of unanimity rather than harmony. The wise individual is in harmony with the cosmos and with other wise individuals, but not with irrational humanity. The first cosmopolis simply removes the wise from general humanity into their own exclusive society. Since the rational and the irrational cannot be friends, the rational must separate from the irrational and essentially reclassify themselves as a new type of human being who merits a new society. The second cosmopolis contains the seeds of ultimate perfection. Eventually, reason will take hold in all people, and the whole world will live in one, harmonious state. This means differences of skill, craft, or class will be insignificant compared to rational uniformity. The third cosmopolis accepts that some/many people will remain ignorant and the wise can do little to cure them or escape from them. Instead of separation or ultimate victory, the third cosmopolis elevates the idea of citizenship from membership in an exclusive political community to adherence to the laws of the cosmos. The wise belong to a super-state, the cosmos, and treat lesser communities as conventional and essentially ignorant. Though subject to conventional law, the Stoic is indifferent to such circumstances, concerned only with living according
to divine standards for the sake of their soul. None of these Stoic *cosmopolis* end with a *polis* that brings fundamentally different people together into a harmonious unity. None unite the craftsmen, soldiers, and philosophers into a single, limited political system. None establish a genuine *polis* that mirrors the cosmos.

**Platonic Cosmic Ethics**

Between the eras of Pythagorean and Stoic cosmopolitanism, Plato wrote his dialogues. Though clearly influenced by Pythagoreanism, Plato is not considered a cosmopolitan thinker. Baldry (1965, 76-77) discusses him in the development of cosmopolitanism, noting that in Plato’s thought the same bonds that hold the cosmos in harmony will hold the soul and city in order. But Plato’s thought is treated as an interlude to the truly cosmopolitan Cynics and Stoics. Only recently has one author, Gabriela Carone, defended Plato’s philosophy as a kind of ethical cosmopolitanism. Carone (2005) argues that Plato’s late cosmology is the driving force behind his ethical thought. The rational world-soul, itself immanent in physical reality, provides an observable standard of order. All human beings can perceive true order with their physical senses. Thus understanding natural order, all people can become rational and ethical. Carone’s interpretation of Plato’s late cosmology and ethics is sharp divide from his early, aristocratic notions of knowledge, virtue, and philosophy, and closer to the Stoic idea of a world-polis and universal, rational humanity. In addition to disagreements about her interpretations of Plato’s cosmology, her argument is not political, but ethical. The political outcome of the ethics is unclear.

Carone (2005, 8-13) interprets the late dialogues as a return to Socratic
philosophy after Plato’s elitist turn in the middle dialogues. In the middle dialogues, including *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, and *Republic*, Plato is an ontological dualist and political elitist. Reality is divided into eternal, intelligible, and otherworldly Forms and observable, perceptible reality. The Forms provide the standards of order for changing reality. In this dualist ontology, human happiness, or *eudaimonia*, consists in contemplating the intelligible, otherworldly Forms. Only the philosopher is happy. Furthermore, only the philosopher has the knowledge to rule a community. The majority of human beings do not have the intellectual capacity for happiness or autonomy in Plato’s dualist ontology and elitist political philosophy.

Carone is not satisfied with either Plato’s dualism or his elitism, and she argues neither is Plato. Plato’s late cosmology, especially in the *Timaeus*, *Philebus*, *Statesman*, and *Laws*, shows a radical break with his earlier thoughts on dualism and elitism. Carone’s argument is intriguing, but not entirely convincing (Betegh 2007; Carelli 2007; Johansen 2007). The late dialogues, she argues, show the immanence of intelligence in the natural world, thus making education a matter of sense-perception. Education through sense-perception instead of philosophical contemplation opens the pursuit of knowledge to all. Of course, natural order includes human virtues, not just physical laws. Thus, Carone sees in the late dialogues a more democratic and worldly Plato, but one of sense perception and ethics more than philosophical contemplation and politics. The late Plato shares much in common with Stoicism.

The main pillar in Plato’s late cosmology is the immanence of order. Carone seizes upon the rational world-soul, a concept undeveloped until Plato’s later dialogues,
as a replacement for the philosopher-king as the exemplar of reason and order (Carone 2005, 12-13). Specifically, Carone (2005, 42-52) argues the world-soul is identical to the demiurge and immanent in physical reality. This cosmology uses the cosmic soul as a direct link between observable phenomena in nature and the intelligible Forms (Carone 2005, 70). The removal of the barrier of philosophical contemplation to knowledge is crucial to Carone’s conclusion of a more democratic, ethical Plato, as the immanence of intelligence allows all people to learn from the observable, natural phenomena.

Carone argues that Plato’s late cosmology yields a more individual and universal ethic. Because intelligence is immanent in nature, the observer of the natural world can find abundant examples of order, harmony, and reason. The planets and stars, for example, exhibit orderly motion across the heavens and are a prime tool of learning (Carone 2005, 70-78). The visible world becomes for Plato’s late ethics what the philosopher-king was to his middle politics: the ideal standard and instructor of virtue. Again, Carone (2005, 53-62) reads mind (nous) as immanent in the cosmos and the order of the cosmos as visible in the consistent, regular motions of the heavens and earthly seasons. Whereas the philosopher kings of the Republic would only acquire knowledge from the contemplation of the Forms (and be the only people to acquire true knowledge), everyone can observe the motions of the stars and the cycles of the seasons. Anyone can observe cosmic order and become knowledgeable and virtuous.

Carone’s interpretation of the late dialogues supports a system of ethics driven by a cosmology which supersedes political association. The cosmos provides the model for happiness and each individual can learn from it without the necessity of political
association. Carone (2005, 121-122) reads in the late cosmology a turn away from limited political associations and toward recognition of the cosmos as the standard of right and good action. The individual best pursues a life of rational autonomy by imitating rational, orderly intelligence, not becoming entangled in limited associations of conventional laws (Carone 2005, 141-145).

Overall, Carone reads Plato’s cosmology as providing the basis for individual human ethics, but the political outcome is uncertain. There is no reason to form a limited association of particular individuals in this cosmology; in fact, there is no reason to form any sovereign association. Carone’s interpretation most likely leads to something like the Stoic world-polis. Every person, once they understand the natural, rational laws of the cosmos, behaves accordingly wherever they happen to be. The whole world is container of ethics, and so every rational person will be ethical everywhere in the world. There is no need or reason for political associations to establish parochial codes for a set of people or a limited geographic area. If there is to be some coercive authority, they would only have the authority to educate, as education is the path to knowledge and virtue. Again, there is no reason for substantially different educational programs, as all education is observation of the natural world. One observes the motions of the heavens no differently in Mongolia than Montana. Ultimately, I disagree with Carone’s interpretation of the late dialogues, which Chapter VI will show in greater depth.

Conclusion

Tracing the development of cosmopolitan thought among the ancient Greeks reveals a number of approaches to the broader idea of universal humanity. From the
epic poetry of Homer to the philosophical discourses of the Stoics, the Greeks conceived of humanity as sharing a similar fate without necessary political attachments, and also of humanity as living within a universal, natural order with certain political implications. What is missing in the history of Greek cosmopolitan thought is the incorporation of Platonic political philosophy.

In Homer’s epics, humanity exists under the Olympian order. Whether Greek or Trojan, the Olympian deities rule over lives and fortunes of human beings and their political associations. Humanity, despite variations in culture, color, and language share the common fate of death. Every human is mortal; the best look for alternative means (procreation, great memorials) of immortality. This fundamental similarity does not lead to common political associations, but does influence the interaction among different peoples. Both Achilles and Priam can lament their ultimate fate of death, even as they wage a brutal war of annihilation against one another. Homer is not, strictly speaking, a cosmopolitan thinker. He certainly contributes to the understanding of humanity as existing under a universal order, and universalism is the fount of cosmopolitanism.

Between Homer and the more overt cosmopolitans of the 5th and 4th centuries, Pythagoreanism and Orphism influenced Greek civilization in ways difficult to discover or differentiate. The evidence suggests a few innovations. Pythagoreanism and Orphism introduced a new concept of the soul, more rational and immortal than the Homeric shade. Along with the soul, these mystic cults, especially Pythagoreanism, studied nature as a rational, harmonious, and mathematical whole. Bringing their conception of the soul into harmony with the cosmos, the Pythagoreans appear to
construct a preliminary cosmopolitanism. However, Pythagoreanism, and Orphism for its part, is not truly political. Both tend toward an immaterialism and mystic rationalism that drive them away from associations with non-Pythagoreans and non-Orphics. The actual associations formed in Pythagoreanism are better described as a society of the wise than a political association.

Explicitly cosmopolitan, Cynicism coined the very phrase that began the theory itself. Diogenes of Sinope rejected all establishments of irrational custom over universal nature. The conventional laws of the *polis*, he argued, were not binding upon him unless they happened to accord with the universal laws of nature and development. Despite coining the phrase, “I am a citizen of the world,” Diogenes’ thought is less than political. More accurately, he is rejecting the conventions and luxuries of civilized life characteristic of political association. Diogenes looked to nature for guidance, and modeled his behavior according to a strict criterion of self-sufficiency and *autarkeia*. If a behavior required the assistance of another human being, like political engagement, or some non-essential material pleasure, then Diogenes rejected that behavior. Cynic cosmopolitanism is the affirmation of ascetic self-sufficiency, and truly an anti-political cosmopolitanism.

When contemporaries think of ancient cosmopolitanism, Stoicism tends to be the source of their thought. However, the Greek Stoics were not a unified lot. Stoicism reached different conclusions about humanity’s relation to nature, and human beings’ relationships with each other. Greek Stoicism can support an insular society of the wise, a worldwide *polis*, or a worldwide society of the wise. Each of these is cosmopolitan in
different respects. The insular society constructs a rational, geographical association of sages. But it is hardly political; the city contains only one type of citizen— the rational individual. The worldwide polis anticipates the time when all human beings fully develop their rational faculty such that everyone in every city acts according to the laws of nature. Conventional laws will be replaced by natural ones, and political disputes will dissipate as rational individuals find agreement and coherence in natural harmony. Finally, Stoicism also offers the cosmopolitanism of the worldwide, rational elite. All those who develop their rational faculty will live in harmony and friendship with each other, but since not all people are rational, the society of wise exists across numerous and various conventional societies. Clearly, Greek Stoicism offers not cosmopolitanism, but cosmopolitanisms.

Plato is rarely included in the tradition of Greek cosmopolitanism. Most prominently, Plato is mined as a source of Pythagorean thought (indeed, he is the pinnacle of Pythagoreanism). However, the dialogues of Plato, from the early to the late, address the fundamental issue of cosmopolitanism: is the world an order that encompasses political association? Cosmopolitanism is above all a search for a standard of order to guide human behavior, both in the realm of interpersonal relations and natural desires. The conception of natural order in the cosmopolitan thinker will determine what behaviors are appropriate for the individual and what associations are appropriate for groups of individuals. Plato’s cosmopolitanism is the attempt to found a genuine Greek polis according to the standards of harmony in the broader cosmos. What could be more cosmopolitan than a polis in harmony with the cosmos?
CHAPTER IV

THE EARLY DIALOGUES

Platonic political philosophy begins with his early dialogues, the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*. Lately, much research on the early dialogues divides into those deciphering the elements of genuine Socratic philosophy from the Platonic and those using the Platonic dialogues as source material for the historical Socrates. This chapter pursues a different course, less concerned with separating Socrates and Plato, but viewing the early dialogues as the beginning of a longer course. The early dialogues are examinations of difficult questions. Should civil law be a reflection of divine law? What is divine law and how can one know it? What is philosophy? What do citizens owe their city? Can the philosopher be a citizen? Should one be? Asking many questions, the dialogues do not present a coherent answer. They are fundamental investigations with only preliminary and non-integrated solutions. However, the early dialogues spell out the puzzle: the cosmos is orderly, but is the *polis* a part of that order? If so, what part does the philosopher play in the greater cosmic order and lesser political order?

The Historical Socrates

The “Socratic problem” is a longstanding and contentious area of dispute about what researchers can know about the history and philosophy of Socrates; yet, many studies of the historical Socrates use Plato’s early dialogues as a source of information about the Athenian philosopher. A quarrel I raise here with Socratic studies is that in mining Plato’s early dialogues for the gems of Socratic wisdom, they often ignore *that*
the early dialogues are Plato’s. Undoubtedly, Plato’s conversations and experiences with Socrates influenced him. However, reading the early dialogues wholly as a container for the teachings of Socrates has two serious problems. First, Socratic studies have not produced a consensus on the philosophy of the historical Socrates. The opposite is true; the literature is filled with Sōkratai—multiple philosophers with multiple philosophies, all varying in slight or important matters but sharing the name of Socrates. Second, Socratic studies have a penchant for presenting the early dialogues as containing a complete, Socratic philosophy waiting for discovery by the skilled reader. Against this, I argue the opposite is true; the early dialogues are merely the beginning of a philosophical journey. Plato, after the death of Socrates, addresses general questions in writing for the first time. The dialogues end tentatively or inconclusively without resolving the fundamental problem.

Socratic studies divide into two main categories: one uses multiple sources of information to cobble together an account of the man; the other focuses on the character of Socrates in Plato’s dialogues, filtering the Platonic from the genuinely Socratic. The multiple sourced works are as fascinating as they are frustrating, for they contain no consensus on the historical Socrates. For a demonstration, let us compare Chroust (1957), Winspear and Silverburg (1960), and Zeller (1962), who rely on Plato,  

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26 Still, to say Plato “learned” what Socrates “taught” is too strong, as Socrates claimed not to teach at all in Plato’s own dialogues.
27 Hackforth (1928) argued long ago that the early dialogues represent Plato thinking through Socrates’ questions, not his reporting Socratic doctrines. Indeed, Socrates has no doctrine, only the unexplained dictum that virtue is knowledge. Gareth Matthews (2008) provides substantial evidence for Hackforth’s contention. Matthews finds evidence of Socratic epistemology and metaphysics in the *Meno* and *Gorgias*. Are these dialogues Socratic or Platonic? Is this Plato thinking through Socratic teachings, or Plato developing his own thought through the Socratic method? The dispute finds no easy resolution.
Xenophon, Aristotle, Diogenes Laertius, and Plutarch for accounts of Socrates. Zeller’s (1962, 49, 119) Socrates has no formal doctrine; Socrates contributes to philosophy the search for knowledge and a general intellectualist position that virtue is knowledge. Of course, one could argue that the equation of virtue to knowledge is at least the beginning of a doctrine. Sharply different, Winspear and Silverberg (1960, 58-62) argue that Socrates developed from his early embrace of Anaxagorean materialism to his later adoption of Pythagorean beliefs in cosmic harmony and the immortality of the soul.

Chroust (1957, 195-197) finds little evidence in Plato and Xenophon that Socrates actively participated in politics; Winspear and Silverberg (1960, 70) have little trouble placing Socrates as a partisan of the moderate oligarchic faction. Interestingly, both agree that Plato and Xenophon idealize Socrates in their writing to elevate him above the fray of Athenian politics, thus tainting the historical accuracy of the two (Chroust 1957, 195-197, Winspear and Silverberg 1960, 75). Three studies of the historical Socrates only produce three different Socrates, demonstrating the phenomenon of the Sōkratai.

Before these relatively recent Socrates studies, Eric Havelock (1934) wrote of the paucity of evidence for the historical Socrates. Criticizing two earlier attempts at discovering the historical Socrates, Havelock contends that the literary accounts of Socrates are not primarily containers of historical data, but dialogues that convey the philosophy of their respective authors, specifically, Plato and Xenophon.  

The only strong evidence for the historical Socrates, Havelock contends, is Aristophanes The

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28 Havelock criticizes A.E. Taylor (1954) and Arthur Kenyon Rogers (1971). Havelock points out that Taylor’s Socrates is a scientist and metaphysician while Rogers’s Socrates is a moralist and mystic, again revealing historical Sōkratai more than the historical Socrates.
Clouds and Plato’s Apology.\textsuperscript{29} Havelock’s essay is a short critique of Socratic studies. Montuori (1992; 1981) supplies ample reinforcement. Studying the treatment of Socrates through history, Montuori sees a wide gap between the historical man and the philosophy. The captivating figure of Socrates compels seemingly every era toward an understanding of his teachings. Throughout the history of philosophy, Socrates has been a heathen, a proto-Christian, a free-thinker, a martyr, and an anti-democrat. Who Socrates becomes and the content of his philosophical message reflect the methods, sources, and culture of those who study him. In a wide historical survey, Montuori concludes what Havelock (1934, 283) argued fifty years earlier, “Every interpreter is left free to pick out of the available material what he [or she] thinks is suitable to his [or her] own conception, and the portraits of Socrates which result are not history but subjective creations.” If we cannot discern the historical Socrates from the source material, can we reliably discern what is Socratic from what is Platonic in Plato’s dialogues? A second branch of Socratic studies aims to parse the philosophy of Socrates as it appears in the dialogues of Plato.\textsuperscript{30} This branch of study largely traces back to Gregory Vlastos (1991; 1994) and Terence Irwin (1977), with subsequent researchers (McPherran 1996; Brickhouse and Smith 1994) following their lead. As with historical inquiries, the philosophical separation of Socrates from Plato is not easy (Wood and Wood 1986). Vlastos (1991, 45-80, especially 53) contends the theory of forms and knowledge as recollection (anamnēsis) are sufficient to show a difference in philosophy between the

\textsuperscript{29} Interestingly, Winspear and Silverberg (1960, 74-76) disagree with Havelock, arguing that the Apology is essentially propaganda, an attempt by Plato to idealize Socrates and extricate him from partisan political judgment. Even Havelock’s small repository of historical information on Socrates is not uncontested.  
\textsuperscript{30} This assumes that the dialogues can be neatly divided and that Plato never revised his early works, thereby infusing early Socratic dialogues with later Platonic thoughts. Both assumptions are contestable.
early dialogues (Socrates) and the middle ones (Plato). But the separation is not so clear cut. Reasonably, the differences may reflect Platonic ignorance or uncertainty in his early works. Looking at the issue more closely, Vlastos (1991, 81-106) portrays Socrates as rational and worldly; forms exist within people and rational self-analysis can come to understand them. Plato argues for external universals and otherworldliness. However, these later differences may result from the working out of early problems, not necessarily representing two different philosophies. Vlastos (1991, 58-59) acknowledges that Socrates must hold some doctrine of the forms, only he does not defend it.

Who is this Socrates? In Vlastos’s account, he is hyper-rational, yet also a believer in traditional Greek religion; he is radically moral, but does not engage in theology (Vlastos 1991, 157-178). Hyper-rationality was not the hallmark of traditional Greek religion and the gods were not paragons of a radical morality. These features are integral to Plato’s grander political and theological reforms, especially in the *Republic* and later works. The evidence of a distinct Socrates in the early dialogues may be only evidence of a young Plato still thinking through the problems of philosophy, theology, and political organization.

The creation of a Socratic philosophy from Plato’s early dialogues also includes the problem of subjectivism. Vlastos (1991, 66-80), for example, argues that the *Phaedo* begins Plato’s movement away from Socratism by embracing an otherworldly theory of knowledge. Allen (1970) argues differently, that the goal of finding universals, however tentative, is present in the early Socratic elenchus. The nature of the universals

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31 Klosko (1986) argues essentially the same, that the *Phaedo* is the transitional dialogue where Plato moves away from the Socratic psychology of pure rationalism to develop a theory of forms and immortality of the soul.
will develop through Plato’s dialogues, but Allen argues this early Socrates is not as worldly as Vlastos would have him. The evidence for Allen’s argument is persuasive enough to cast doubt on the project of Socratic studies. Ultimately, what these theories cannot do is conclude with a complete Socratic philosophy. One can continually raise arguments about whether diverging doctrines in the Platonic dialogues reflect a truly Socratic teaching or just a change of Plato’s mind. Even if all scholars agreed on what doctrines in the dialogues are Socratic, they cannot assume that Plato included every Socratic teaching in his dialogues. Something crucial indeed may be missing.

No one is likely to argue that Plato’s early dialogues do not reflect at all Socratic thought or that some of Socrates’ philosophy cannot be found in Plato’s dialogues, but reading the early dialogues as a memorial to Socrates produces an ill effect: the explicitly subjective creations of literary Sōkratai. Plato’s dialogues often revolve around the character of Socrates. A number of works have built studies around a particular issue and the character of Socrates as he appears in author-selected dialogues. The main problem with these dialogues is the lack of concern for philosophical context, much less chronological continuity. The reader is left to wonder who Socrates is: a historical person, a character in Plato’s dialogues, Plato’s mouthpiece, or a composite character assembled by a contemporary scholar from multiple ancient authors? A different, less contentious method of interpretation is to read the early dialogues of Plato as early and Plato’s.

32 Looking for the ethics of Socrates, Gomez-Lobo (1994) bounces across dialogues with little concern for context or comprehensiveness, citing passages from the Apology, Crito, Gorgias, and Republic. The case is similar in Weiss (1998), Beckman (1979), and especially Nichols (1987), who creates a literary Socrates from Aristophanes, Plato, and Aristotle. Brickhouse and Smith (1994) concede their uncertainty about whom or what, in terms of historical personage or literary character, they are studying in Socrates.
The Early Dialogues as Investigation

Human affairs, politics and philosophy especially, are in a state of disorder in Plato’s early dialogues. The old religious mythology is fraught with contradiction and cannot stand as the foundation for piety or justice. One particular Athenian, Socrates, is under civil prosecution. His life has been service to the gods and his city, but one god has given Socrates a command that brings him into conflict with that city. Socrates appears to care for following the commands of the gods regardless of the judgment of his fellow citizens, but alternatively refuses to ignore their verdict and break the laws to extend his life and divine mission. Through the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, and *Crito*, the reader may ponder whether the laws of the city must be contrary to the commands of the gods. Is there not some way to reconcile the divine commands Socrates must obey with the political laws of Athens under which he lives? Is there a way for Socrates to obey his divine calling without transgressing his *polis*?

The *Phaedo* addresses these questions differently and with more complexity, but not at all completely. Plato gives an account of the soul and cosmos, and the proper role of philosophy and the lifestyle of the philosopher. In this dialogue, the philosopher ought not to care much about the city, but spend life in contemplative solitude or in limited community with other philosophers. Despite tentative statements and differences in theory, the early dialogues ultimately spell out the challenges of cosmopolitanism: is there order in the cosmos? What is its source? Is there some form of orderly harmony among the cosmos, city, and citizen? The dialogues do not propose a cohesive solution,
only raise questions and draw attention to the problems.33

\textit{The Euthyphro}

In the \textit{Euthyphro}, Plato constructs a dialogue in which Socrates questions the eponymous fellow Athenian about his knowledge of the gods and how that knowledge guides his political action. Euthyphro claims to know the commands of the gods, and on that knowledge he will charge his father with murder. Socrates aims to reveal Euthyphro’s ignorance of the gods with the consequence that Euthyphro’s political action, the public accusation and trial of his father, is foolish. Hold in mind that never in the dialogue does Socrates suggest that one \textit{should not} base political law on divine law. The dialogue criticizes both the traditional mythology of the divine and the use of those tales as a basis for political action. Positively, Socrates argues both he and Euthyphro could act confidently if they knew the divine, since nothing bad would occur if they followed the example of the gods.

The \textit{Euthyphro} begins with Socrates telling Euthyphro that he faces an indictment as a corruptor of the youth and innovator of religion (Eu. 2c-3b). Euthyphro sympathizes, thinking the charge stems from Socrates’ divine sign, and he relates his own troubles with prophesy. Euthyphro fancies himself a seer; his predictions having never failed to come true and he expresses frustration that people still disbelieve his warnings (Eu. 3b-c). Socrates, ever eager to learn from those who know, asks

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\item The secondary literature on Plato’s early dialogues is certainly frustrating among other things. First, much of the literature does not read these dialogues as Plato’s and as early. Second, many works are in-depth studies of single dialogues. They delve into a dialogue with more precision than my project demands. Denoting all the disagreements between these works and mine, the project frequently would find itself sidetracked. Like Rowe (1993) and Reeve (1989), I try to include references to secondary sources only for crucial points. I intend to stay on the track of Plato’s cosmopolitanism.
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Euthyphro to teach him his knowledge of the divine so he can refute the charges against him (Eu. 3d-e). The dialogue continues with Socrates attempting to draw forth from Euthyphro his knowledge of divine things.

Since Euthyphro believes himself to possess knowledge of the divine, he is on his way to prosecute his father for impiety (Eu. 4a). Astounded, Socrates asks Euthyphro again if he possesses the knowledge of the divine, of piety and impiety, to rightly prosecute his father (Eu. 4e). Euthyphro reasserts confidence in his knowledge of such things (Eu. 5a). Thus far, the dialogue has not expressed any disapproval of the proposition that political action follows from knowledge of the divine. Socrates merely asks Euthyphro if he truly possesses such knowledge and if he will share it. Socrates, of course, charged with impiety, would benefit greatly in his own trial if he could distinguish the pious from impious.

Desirous of his interlocutor’s wisdom, Socrates asks Euthyphro what godliness and ungodliness are, and piety and impiety. Euthyphro prepares to cite “powerful evidence” for his claims, but his words fall flat upon Socrates. The evidence is only his understanding of traditional Greek religion (Eu. 5e). Because Zeus bound and castrated his father for his unjust acts, Euthyphro feels secure in the prosecution of his own father (Eu. 6a). And why not? If Zeus, “the best and most just of the gods,” can mete out such punishment, then Euthyphro is right to follow his example in prosecuting his father (Eu. 6a). Euthyphro uses a simple understanding of a traditional Greek myth to justify his prosecution, an uncomplicated application of divine example to guide social and political rules. This basic comparison of divine and human action will carry the day in
After Euthyphro reveals his compelling evidence, Socrates casually admits his own guilt. He does not believe such stories about the gods, and because of this he is an innovator in religion (Eu. 6a). Nor does he believe straightaway Euthyphro’s credulity, and asks him if he believes other stories, including those about wars and enmities among the gods (Eu. 6b-c). Euthyphro assents to the veracity of these stories; Plato writes that Socrates should not find himself surprised (Eu. 6c-d). Of course, Socrates is not content with the “compelling evidence,” and asks Euthyphro to clarify what piety is. With Socrates’ question, the Euthyphro turns from a conversation to the dialectic.

Euthyphro, at Socrates’ behest, states that “what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious” (Eu. 7a). Obviously, the reader can jump ahead and calculate the trouble Euthyphro has created. If the gods are in a state of discord, of war and enmity, then they will not always agree on the piety of things. Humans will find themselves in the awkward and doomed position of offending some gods with actions meant to please other gods. If this is so, then Euthyphro’s action may indeed be pious and impious- but how does this help him know whether to prosecute or not?

Socrates points out to Euthyphro his statements on the definition of piety (Eu. 7a) and discord among the gods (Eu. 7b). But what can cause such discord? Not arithmetic or the calculation of numbers, nor measuring the large and small (Eu. 7b-c); only disagreement about the just and unjust, beautiful and ugly, and the good and bad could

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34 Here (Eu. 6e), Socrates asks Euthyphro to tell him what the form itself is. Allen (1970) argues this is evidence of an earlier theory forms. I agree. Certainly, Socrates wants Euthyphro to think beyond individual examples of pious and impious actions, and he wants no more arguments from traditional mythology. Socrates is urging Euthyphro to think of piety itself- the form, the paradigm.
cause such discord (*Eu. 7d*). Socrates does not think that the gods should differ on these things, and Euthyphro agrees (*Eu. 8a-b*). With this understanding, Euthyphro’s definition of piety fails. Piety has become too expansive (as well as repulsive), including both what is hated by the gods and what is dear to the gods.

As Euthyphro maintains that discord exists among the gods, Socrates challenges him to find proof that all the gods would agree with his prosecution (*Eu. 9a-b*). In this process, Euthyphro’s definition changes its grammatical voice. Piety shifts from being what is loved to what the gods love (*Eu. 9e*). Socrates’ train of thought leaves the station without Euthyphro on board. Socrates examines the relationship of piety and the gods’ affections, animating Euthyphro’s arguments like Daedalus until they escape their maker (*Eu. 10-12*). It seems Euthyphro has given Socrates only a quality of piety, not told him the nature of the thing (*Eu. 11a-b*).

Plato continues the discussion by introducing the topic of justice (*Eu. 12d*). Socrates inquires of Euthyphro whether piety encompasses all aspects of justice or if it only a part; moreover, what part of justice is piety? Euthyphro’s argument races headlong toward full collapse; his knowledge of the divine will be exposed as nothing of the sort. He argues that piety is the part of justice concerned with care of the gods (*Eu. 12e*). Again, he relies on traditional understanding of Greek religion and ritual. Socrates will demolish these claims. Euthyphro did not realize an implication of his argument, that human acts of piety improve the gods (*Eu. 13a-13d*). He restates his meaning: pious actions are those of which the gods approve and use for their purposes. Pious actions preserve domestic houses and the affairs of state; impious ones bring destruction (*Eu. 
14b). Socrates simplifies this to mean that piety is knowledge of prayer and sacrifice, how to give and get from the gods (Eu. 14c-e). Note that Euthyphro still retains a basic and traditional understanding of the gods. The gods protect those who sacrifice properly and do good; they punish those who do not. Regardless, Euthyphro’s restatement leads to the same conclusion: “the pious is once again what is dear to the gods” (Eu. 14b).

The dialectic, conversation, and the dialogue end shortly after this restatement.

As noted earlier, Socrates is guilty of innovating about the gods. In a short line, one can almost pass it over without notice, Plato writes that no good comes to humanity that is not from the gods (Eu. 15). He has criticized unashamedly the notion that the gods are in a state of disharmony about piety- and about the good, beautiful, and just. He implies with subtlety that the gods are not in disharmony at all, that bad things do not come from the gods. On the contrary, only good things follow from the divine.

Euthyphro has proven ignorant of the divine because of his acceptance of the old myths, despite their obvious contradictions.

With the contradictions exposed, Plato has shown that Euthyphro has no business charging his father with impiety, as he has no knowledge of what piety or impiety is. The dialogue is a refutation of the man who uses a mythology ridden with contradiction to bring public charges against a father and fellow citizen. Still, nothing in the dialogue suggests that impiety is not a crime, or that political law should have no relation to the divine. The implication is that true knowledge of divine would yield knowledge of piety, which is a part of justice. Knowledge of the divine may be necessary yet for good political rule.
The Apology

Plato’s Apology reveals a Socrates in a stark dilemma. Socrates has lived according to a specific command of the gods and the course of this task has led him into conflict with his polis, Athens. Throughout his life, Socrates has refrained from public action, instead pursuing his divine mission in private. Because his divine calling has precluded full political participation, Socrates the philosopher cannot be Socrates the citizen, but only a private interlocutor. Admittedly, Socrates could not avoid all political responsibilities (he served loyally in the phalanx) nor does he state such avoidance as his own desire or part of his divine mission. Socrates did judge that acting according to his divine command in public would bring persecution upon him. Socrates understood that his divine mission conflicted with public action and so he minimally engaged in political affairs as he worked in private for the good Athens. The dilemma is that Socrates will obey both the gods and his city, but the laws of the city are not in harmony with the commands of the gods. Conflict between the two was inevitable and irreconcilable.

According to Plato’s less than specific account of the charges, Socrates stands accused of corrupting the youth and offending and/or disbelieving in the gods of the city. His very way of life is the cause of the corruption and source of the offense. First, he must separate himself from other sophists, scientists, and philosophers of the era, some of whom did preach atheism. Plato will explain the philosophical mission of Socrates and how it benefited Athens. After setting out his mission, Plato tells why Socrates came into conflict with the city despite all the good he did for it. Socrates is the servant of the gods, specifically, the god at Delphi. What is interesting is that Socrates wavers
on whether his mission is to Athens exclusively or to humanity at large. Socrates is attached to Athens, yet expresses the willingness to pursue his mission anywhere and with anyone. One may inquire whether a philosopher belongs to a city or may he or she roam the earth to serve the divine at large.

Socrates first defends himself from his original accusers, those who associate him with atheist materialists (Ap. 18b-d). He is no Anaxagoras, and must dispel the caricature of the philosopher as one who claims knowledge of “all things in the sky and below the earth” (Ap. 18c). Socrates calls upon the god at Delphi as a witness, to testify to the kind of wisdom he possesses and to defend his actions as service to that god (Ap. 20e-21a). Plato’s first defense of Socrates is that he is a dedicated servant of the god at Delphi, a god sacred to all Greeks. How can that be impious! Singled out by the Oracle, Socrates is dumbfounded to learn that no one is wiser than he. His attempt to disprove the Oracle only illuminates the message.35 Socrates searches for wisdom in others through private conversation. He talks to statesmen, poets, and craftsmen. In each group, Socrates finds a peculiar ignorance. The statesman thinks himself wise, but Socrates does not (Ap. 21d). The poets may write beautiful compositions, but through inspiration and enthusiasm rather than knowledge (Ap. 22-c). Finally, Socrates finds that the craftsmen may know their craft, but they think they know so much more that, in fact, they do not (Ap. 22b-d). The statesmen, poets, and craftsmen are ignorant and yet think themselves wise.

This search for wisdom in others is service to the god at Delphi, Socrates

35 West (1979) accuses Socrates of impiety for not trusting in the Oracle’s message. Reeve (1989) retorts that Socrates merely inquires into its meaning, a common practice for received oracles.
repeatedly confesses. Though his examinations make him unpopular, Socrates persisted. “I must attach greatest importance to the god’s Oracle,” Plato writes of Socrates’ priorities (Ap. 21e). Indeed, he routinely defends his work as divine service, an “investigation in the service of the god” (Ap. 22a). He questions himself “on behalf of the Oracle,” and gives an answer to himself and the Oracle (Ap. 22e). Socrates way of life is service to this Oracle, and even to the point of personal poverty (Ap. 23b) and neglect of public affairs (Ap. 31c-d). In this dialogue, especially, one cannot understand Socrates’ philosophical life, his incessant questioning of others, apart from his service to the divine.36

Defending his life and acts as service to the divine, Socrates directly challenges an accuser, Meletus, to admit that he and the others bring charges against him not for spreading corruption or atheism, but for exposing ignorance in those who claim knowledge (Ap. 23-28b). Unpopularity, not impiety, may condemn Socrates. But neither unpopularity nor condemnation will deter Socrates. Plato writes, “Wherever a man has taken a position that he that believes to be best, or has been placed by his commander, there he must, I think, remain and face danger” (Ap. 28d). Socrates stands upon this principle; he obeyed the city’s orders as a soldier and the god’s orders as a philosopher (Ap. 28e-29a). Moreover, Socrates will not cease his obedience. He would not disobey the city and flee his soldier’s post. He will not disobey the god and cease his philosopher’s mission, even if the city orders his death for it (Ap. 29a-e). Plato writes of a hierarchy of obedience here. One owes certain obedience to the city, but owes more to

the divine. Socrates dutifully fulfilled his civic obligation to bear arms in defense of Athens when the city so commanded him, but the city is not authorized to override a command of a god. However, the *Apology* does not explain in full how one separates or harmonizes obedience to the city and the gods. It does state, in no uncertain terms, that Socrates obeys the city’s *just* laws and the commands of the gods. If a law is unjust, it compels no obedience.

A theological-political tension underlies Socrates’ divine mission and his obedience to the city. Socrates confesses his negligence of public affairs, specifically in failing to speak at the Assembly. His divine sign, an individual, enthusiastic check of his behavior, always stopped him from such engagements (*Ap. 31c-d*). His private rebukes served the city in place of public speaking. Socrates states flatly that his pursuit of justice must be a private one; done in public, his method of inquiry will incite mob retaliation (*Ap. 32a*). Contrasted with his life of private critique, Socrates tells of his strict obedience to the city’s laws. Political law compels his very speech to the jury (a public speech he may prefer to avoid), so he speaks to the public in his private style (*Ap. 19a*). When he held a political position, he followed the law scrupulously, and opposed those who would break it to prosecute ten generals (*Ap. 32b*). In this case, obedience to the law caused a public uproar against him. When the Thirty Tyrants tried to implicate him in their nefarious deeds, Socrates declined, refusing to commit an “unjust or impious” act (*Ap. 32d*). The hierarchy is clear: obedience to the gods above all; obedience to the city’s just laws second. However, this hierarchy of obedience causes

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37 Again, theorists of a democratic Socrates neglect this aspect of Socratic hierarchical obedience.
two kinds of conflict with his fellow citizens. They become indignant at the exposure of their ignorance and vengeful when someone stops them from violating their own just laws. Socrates does not want conflict at all, so he refrains from public action as much as possible. He cannot be a public (and thus full) citizen without shortening his life and mission, and that very mission is an outstanding benefit to the city.

Plato writes of the good Socrates had done for Athenians in his service to the god, but the philosopher is ambiguous about whether his service must be exclusively to Athens. Socrates boasts of his willingness to question, examine, and test his fellow Athenians, or anyone else, “young or old, citizen of stranger” (Ap. 30a). He does care more for Athenians, as they are “more kindred” to him, but Socrates’ investigations are not necessarily for them alone, but for foreigners as well (Ap. 30a). However, Plato thereafter includes three statements binding Socrates to Athens. First, Socrates says, “I was attached to this city [Athens] by the god” (Ap. 30e). Socrates then argues his words are not meant to prevent harm from coming to him because the lesser cannot harm the greater (Ap. 30d), but to prevent the city from harming itself by destroying god’s gift to it (Ap. 30e). Socrates again declares that the god placed him in Athens, with the purpose of rousing the Athenians from their ignorance (Ap. 30e-31a). The statements are not so clear, given further thought. If Socrates is serving the god at Delphi, sacred to all Greeks, why is he confined to perform his service in Athens? If they condemn him, might Socrates go to another city and continue his service? Would he follow a foreigner back to a foreign city to continue an investigation? Arriving in another city, would he remain to question those citizens? Socrates’ relationship to his city and the god(s) is not
wholly lucid. But it need not be, as this dialogue is an early work in a long career.

**The Crito**

Is the *Crito* compatible with the *Apology*? Do these two of Plato’s dialogues contain a coherent philosophy or a contradictory one? Research differs on these questions.\(^{38}\) What the research misses is that the dialogues need not be coherent in their strict arguments. Obedience, hierarchy, and priority are the concern of the two dialogues. In the *Apology*, Socrates declares his first priority is to obey and serve the god at Delphi. He will obey his city, Athens, when its laws are just. Moreover, the *Apology* is ambivalent about Socrates’ relationship to his city of Athens; the *Crito* is not. Plato’s *Crito* portrays Socrates as wholly Athenian; its laws constituted and crafted him. With justice, he cannot leave it to pursue his divine mission elsewhere. Socrates will obey his city’s order because disobedience to its laws is worse than death. Plato’s argument may not convince, but the quality of the argument should not overshadow the purpose of Plato’s argument. He is affirming the importance of obedience to one’s *polis*. Above all, three arguments should not be overlooked in the *Crito*: Plato denounces the opinion of the crowd, he rejects the opinion of the individual, and he affirms the law of the city as constitutive of the individual, thereby obliging obedience to a superior.

The dialogue begins with Socrates awaking to find his friend, Crito, at his prison bed. Crito warns Socrates time is running short; he must escape now. Crito’s initial argument reflects his self-concern in two ways (Cr. 44b-c). He does not want to lose a great friend and he does not want people thinking he allowed a friend to be executed.

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\(^{38}\) Especially, see Kraut (1984) and Allen (1980) for arguments that the two dialogues are philosophically coherent.
through failure to arrange his release. Socrates first admonishes him on the second point, saying, “Why should we care so much for what the majority think” (Cr. 44c). The many do not impress Socrates, as they can neither do great goods nor inflict devastating evils (Cr. 44d). In this case, they are like a storm that must be weathered.

Plato reiterates in formal dialectic his rejection of the opinion of the many (Cr.47b-48a). Whose commands merit obedience: the one with knowledge or the many without knowledge? Of course, one should listen well to those with knowledge and disregard the many who possess no knowledge. Just as one listens to doctors to find health, one listens to those who know justice and injustice to find truth and good living. Impending death is irrelevant. One must do what is right, and worry little about how the many respond.

Crito’s first argument (Socrates’ death will be a great loss to him) reflects a strong sense of individualism. Socrates is an adornment for Crito’s life, one that he does not want the many to remove. Crito’s statement betrays ignorance of any greater purpose beyond the enjoyment of his temporal existence or any authority beyond himself. Plato will remind his audience of an individual’s obligations to greater authorities. In this dialogue, the city is the greater authority.

Socrates and Crito agree to a strict code of right action: one must never do wrong, nor return a wrong with a wrong (Cr. 49b-c). Following from this, one must never cheat on a just agreement (Cr. 49e). Thus, Socrates raises the question, “If we leave here without the city’s permission, are we mistreating people […]? Are we sticking to a just agreement or not” (Cr. 49e)? Because Crito says he does not know,
Socrates clarifies the issue with a dramatic encounter between himself and the laws of Athens.

What if the laws of the city, representatives of the very city itself, confronted Socrates? Socrates, in escaping their judgment, is placing himself above the law (Cr. 50a-b). If every individual would do this, they would destroy the city itself. The city would cease to exist, replaced with a collection of individuals who ultimately do what they choose without regard for the judgments and political ties of others. Let us ignore for a moment whether this is a good and persuasive argument and focus on what Plato has put forth: the city is a good thing and must be preserved from radical individualism. Citizens cannot obey and disobey the courts as they see fit. Citizens must obey the verdicts, period.

What if the courts have decided wrongly? What if they are committing an injustice against a citizen (Cr. 50c)? The laws speak again to Socrates, reminding him of all they have done in making him. The laws sanctioned his parents’ marriage, allowing the legal birth of Socrates (Cr. 50d). The laws provided for his education (Cr. 50e). The laws of Athens create Socrates from his parents’ marriage to his birth; they nurtured and educated him from infancy to young adulthood. This depiction is not a modern social contract between a free, rational individual and set of political rules. The laws constitute Socrates before he even exists. They make him into a citizen when he enters the world. They are his superior, above his parents and forefathers (Cr. 51a-c). Socrates should revere his city, never do violence against it, and obey its commands after he has had the opportunity to persuade. Socrates had his chance to persuade during his trial, now he
must obey the verdict.

Even after creating and educating Socrates, the city allowed him the opportunity to leave. Athens asks its full citizens if the laws satisfy them, and raises no barrier should they decide to leave (Cr. 51d-e). By remaining in Athens, Socrates expressed his approval of its laws and his determination to live according to them. His decision to stay now obligates Socrates to obey Athenian law (Cr. 51e-52a). The obligation falls especially on Socrates (Cr. 52a-d). He has neither lived abroad nor left Athens’ limits except to serve it under arms. He has begat and educated children under its laws. He is the consummate Athenian citizen.\(^{39}\) If the city is to mean anything, he must obey its laws.

In the closing paragraphs of the *Crito*, Plato reveals the damage Socrates would do if he accedes to Crito’s wish for his escape (Cr. 53-54). In total, nothing good will follow from Crito’s plan. Acting for his selfish, individual purposes, Socrates will endanger his Athenian friends. Socrates himself will be a fugitive, unwelcome in well-governed cities. He will have to live in a disordered city. He will prove the jury correct, as his example of violating the law does corrupt the youth. And what will become of all his talk of virtue and goodness? Can fugitives be taken seriously when they talk of the good, true, and beautiful?

At the conclusion of the *Crito*, Plato writes that if Socrates in fact was wronged, the laws are not the guilty party, but only some men. Athens does not stand convicted, only those many that comprised the jury. Plato’s *Crito* does not convict and denounce a

\(^{39}\) In this dialogue, the *Crito*, he is portrayed as such.
city for the actions of some of its citizens. The dialogue argues against the many, who in
the form of juries may wrong individual citizens. The dialogue likewise convicts
individuals who believe their interests supersede the city. The *Crito* stresses the
importance of obedience to the city. Athens, especially, where one has the opportunity
of persuasion before obedience, is a city in which citizens must not destroy the law
through selfishness. Plato writes of Socrates that he is the consummate Athenian, and he
above all must not destroy the city. Not only did the city create and educate him, but the
adult Socrates consented to live in the city according to its laws. A city created him, and
he accepted its rules. Socrates is Athenian.

*The Phaedo*

Though the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, and *Crito*, Plato has defended Socrates as both
a philosopher on a divine mission and a good citizen of Athens, but the citizens of
Athens will allow no such harmony between a life of philosophy and an active political
life. The tragedy of these dialogues is that the philosopher who wishes to be a good
citizen cannot be that until the laws of the city find harmony with the divine mission of
philosophy. Presumably, laws must educate citizens to understand or accept the
philosopher’s presence and role in a good city. The *Phaedo* veers from this account.
Disputes continue about where to place the dialogue in Plato’s corpus. Is it an early,
middle, or transitional dialogue? Good arguments exist for all three positions, and I
cautiously call the dialogue early and transitional. The dialogue is early thematically: it

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40 Bobonich (2008, 321-323) places the dialogue as transitional between the early and middle periods, as
do I. Moreover, Bobonich reads the dialogue as espousing a radically anti-political doctrine. The
philosopher is truly separate from the concerns of non-philosophers, and would have no desire or interest
to engage in public affairs. Bobonich writes briefly on these positions; I intend a full treatment in the
following section.
The Phaedo is an intriguing dialogue. It departs from earlier argumentation, both in style and substance, and yet the new arguments will need correction. It begins the project of understanding how philosophy is the means to order the human soul through understanding the cosmos, but the dialogue does not argue that philosophy should produce a political order or find harmony within one. The dialogue rejects political philosophy for contemplative, individual philosophy; it rejects general, political community for ascetic, philosophical community. Whereas the Socrates of the Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito defended his philosophy as service to the god and good for the city, the Socrates of the Phaedo, practicing philosophy as it is described therein, would not be concerned with temporal matters at all. He would be all philosopher and no citizen.

The argument of the Phaedo begins with Socrates stating his willingness and readiness to die, and that all philosophers should be prepared similarly (Phd. 61c-d). Plato returns to the scene of Socrates’ execution to defend the philosophy supporting his preparedness for death. Cebes raises the challenge to Socrates, that as a possession of the gods, should he not endure in this world to continue his service (Phd. 62d-e)? Should he not have escaped prison to continue his divine mission elsewhere? This time, the laws of Athens will not accuse Socrates. Plato will articulate an introductory description of the cosmos and find the place of the human soul within it. Once Plato
sketches the cosmos and soul, Socrates will be able to defend his decision to die.

Socrates believes that philosophy is a preparation for death, and trusts that a good future lies after death, at least for good men (*Phd*. 63c-64a). His companions request an explanation of these beliefs. The first step in this defense is to clarify what death is, the second is to explain philosophy. Clarifying death proves easy, as the party agrees that death is only the separation of body and soul (*Phd*. 64c). Philosophy as preparation for death means that the philosopher will despise the pleasures of the body—food, drink, sex, and all others (*Phd*. 64d-65a). The philosopher pursues knowledge, not physical pleasures. Nor can the philosopher attain knowledge through the physical senses—sight, touch, hearing (*Phd*. 65b). The soul must become disentangled from the body to find true reality, for the body only deceives the soul in its pursuits (*Phd*. 65b-c). Plato writes, “The soul of the philosopher most disdains the body, flees from it and seeks to be by itself” (*Phd*. 65d). Indeed, Plato conceptualizes philosophy as contemplative, “the soul reasons best when none of these [bodily] senses troubles it” (*Phd*. 65c).

Fine shades may separate the understanding that physical pleasures are unimportant and inconsequential to human life from the actual despising of them. Socrates in so many dialogues partakes in the physical world. He drinks and eats at gatherings; he does not overturn the tables and chastise the revelers. Furthermore, Plato has written Socrates to be convivial in so many dialogues. He talks with others, sharing his thoughts and listening to others. He is not a hermit in a cave with his eyes closed and his ears shut. Socrates has practiced philosophy as a conversation with others, not only as quiet contemplation in solitude.
In the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, and *Crito*, Plato defends Socrates as both a good philosopher and a good citizen. Socrates engages his fellow Athenians in private to improve their souls and serves in public when he must. The *Phaedo* appears to reject this. The overt body-soul (*sōma-psychē*) dualism crosses a distinct line. The previous dialogues certainly affirm that greater goods exist beyond the physical, but they neither denigrate material existence nor show Socrates abandoning general company for communion with elite, ascetic philosophers. Socrates frequents symposia; he talks with whoever crosses his path. He is neither ascetic nor elitist. Philosophy is the means to self-improvement and the improvement of others; it therefore has a place in the physical world. In the *Phaedo*, philosophy becomes entirely otherworldly. The philosopher has no concerns for improving this world, but only for improving one’s soul (though sometimes pursued with select others). It is strict preparation of the soul for death.

Plato continues the dialogue, explaining why a philosopher must spurn the physical senses to know true reality. The true things themselves, Justice, Beauty, Goodness, Health, Strength, the body cannot grasp (*Phd*. 65e). These things the soul alone can know through pure thought and reason (*Phd*. 66a). Plato denigrates the body in its relationship to philosophy (*Phd*. 66a-d). “The body confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom” (*Phd*. 66a). The body impedes the soul’s pursuit in numerous ways. Its need for nurture consumes time and effort. It becomes diseased and pain overcomes the mind. The wants, fears, illusions, and desires springing from the body impede philosophy. The body’s appetites and desires for acquisition cause wars and civil discord. The body appears to cause all evil and wrongdoing in the world.
Trapped within it, the soul can never attain true knowledge (*Phd. 66e*). Life must be a preparation for death, for only when the soul finally separates from its physical house may it see true things in themselves (*Phd. 66a*). The philosopher’s soul will endeavor “to refrain as much as possible from association with the body,” and philosophers will join together in this pursuit, separating themselves from those souls who remain anchored to the physical world (*Phd. 66e-67b*). Together, they purify the soul, suppress the body, and await that final separation of the two in death (*Phd. 67c-d*).

Plato has defended Socrates’ readiness to die. At death, his soul will escape his body and attain true wisdom. Being resentful or afraid is simply illogical, unless, of course, the soul is not eternal (*Phd. 69b-e*). Cebes raises this objection to Socrates’ defense (*Phd. 70a-b*). The new topic introduces what the soul is and from whence it comes. In answering this question, Plato will set forth some principles of the cosmos to explain how the world works.

The first topic is of generation and reincarnation, and Socrates does not restrict the topic to humanity alone, but to all life in the physical world (*Phd. 70c-d*). From where do souls come when they arrive in the physical world? They are not created newly, but have a prior existence. Plato details an extended analogy to defend generation from reincarnation (*Phd. 70e-72a*). He argues that all things must come from their opposite, so the living must come from the dead just as the dead come from the living. Cebes agrees with the conclusion.

The cosmology Plato sets up is one of recurrence and balance, a rejection of

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41 Solmsen (1983, 360) writes that Plato “vigorously asserted” the “dualism between body and soul” and that the ethic of the *Phaedo* is “wholly individualistic.”
linear or progressive cosmology. Generation from reincarnation must occur in cycles otherwise all things would end up in the same state (*Phd.* 72b). Plato reiterates that unless life comes from death, all things would end up dead and only dead (*Phd.* 72b-d). One may read the argument as the attempt to avoid cosmic despair. If life is only a short time of material desires, and death an eternal oblivion, what point is there to anything? What good is either philosophy or material hedonism? Recurrence also provides additional support for Plato’s conception of philosophy. Learning in the physical world is recollection of the true knowledge possessed by the soul in the other world (*Phd.* 72e-77a). The soul coexists with the true things in themselves, the Forms, in death. It comprehends them and knows them. When born into the physical world, the soul forgets its knowledge, and physical objects and images only can spark mere recollection in the soul of its former state.

The argument for knowledge as recollection demonstrates that the soul exists prior to birth, but Simmias and Cebes remind Socrates that he has not proven the soul exists after death (*Phd.* 77b-c). Plato proceeds to elaborate his concept of the soul to demonstrate its eternal nature. The argument begins with the contrast of compound versus pure things. A compound can be divided into its parts; a pure thing is indivisible (*Phd.* 78c). Plato creates a comparison of tangible, physical objects with the eternal, invisible forms. The speakers classify the body as a physical object, of course, and the soul as invisible; it is similar to the forms and therefore similar to that which is eternal (*Phd.* 77d-79e). In the composite human being, the body is an earthly thing that

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42 again, Plato repeatedly denigrates the body and physical existence, even to the point of arguing that
naturally dissolves. The soul, however, is a divine thing naturally existing eternally (*Phd.* 80a-d).

As Plato explains the process of reincarnation, he states the great purpose of philosophy: union with the divine. Socrates discusses how the state of one’s soul determines one’s reincarnated form. Gluttons return as donkeys. Tyrants return as predators. People who learned to control their appetites return as social animals (*Phd.* 82a). Philosophers, having purged their souls of all physical desires, “may join the company of the gods” (*Phd.* 82c). Divine union is the reward for pure living, or better stated, living a life of contemplation without concern for transient, physical desires.

Given Plato’s account of philosophy in the *Phaedo*, let us examine the relationship between the philosopher and the city. Plato has set the soul against the body and philosophy against temporal, earthly affairs. Philosophers “do not travel the same road as those who do not know where they are going” (*Phd.* 82d). They avoid the pleasures and pains that bind the soul to the body (*Phd.* 82e-83e). Philosophers, then, must not have much of a relationship to their city or to fellow citizens. They may congregate with other philosophers, but they will avoid those ignorant souls concerned with life’s pleasures and pains. The philosopher in the *Phaedo* is not a citizen at all. Arguing for a cosmos in which the body is the enemy of the soul, philosophy dictates one must avoid physical concerns, and those concerned with physical things. No more will Socrates converse with anyone he meets, but he will discuss his contemplation with likeminded, philosophical souls.

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bodily desires can doom a soul to wander the earth after death, still pursuing physical appetites even after death (*Phd.* 79c, 81a-e).
With so much already argued, Plato continues to defend his conception of the soul. Still unconvinced by the arguments for the soul’s immortality, Simmias and Cebes raise two further objections. Simmias grants that the soul is an invisible harmony, but can it be lost when the body dies as harmony is lost when an instrument breaks (Phd. 86a-d)? Cebes follows, asking whether the soul may endure longer than a body but still not sometime degenerate and disperse, worn and battered by so many births (Phd. 87a-88b). Plato dispatches these arguments. First, the interlocutors conclude that the soul is not a harmony within the body, a mixture of good and wicked motivations, but a ruling principle of good over the body (Phd. 92a-95a). Second, the interlocutors investigate Cebes’ objection, finding the argument soon turns to questions of generation, degeneration, and the principle of order in the kosmos: Mind (Phd. 95c-97c). Socrates read in a book of Anaxagoras that a first principle orders all things in the world to be for the best; the idea pleased him. Upon reflection, he came to understand the materialism underlying the theory, much to his dismay. Plato rejects the materialism, but not the idea of a prime, intelligent cause.

Plato’s theory is still nascent and understated, but the basic structure is evident. The cosmos is hierarchical. At the apex, a perfect Mind provides order, directing all things to be for the best. The soul can apprehend this order, understanding the directives of Mind, through philosophical contemplation. Knowing its place and function in the cosmic order, the soul directs the body to order its chaotic appetites, and thus creating the best life for a human being, the philosophical life.

Granted the existence of the Forms, “Beautiful, itself by itself” (Phd. 100b),
Socrates argues that what is immortal could never become mortal, as a Form “could never become opposite to itself” (Phd. 103b). The argument ends with Socrates and Cebes agreeing that the soul, that which brings bodies to life, could not admit of death to itself (Phd. 103b-107a). Putting all objections to rest, Plato writes a strange, cosmological myth to end the Phaedo, offering a glance into what he thought the organization of the cosmos was, but also relaying his doubts about the value of life on earth. Earth is a large sphere positioned in the center of a homogenous kosmos (Phd. 109a-b). The earth’s atmosphere is the cold sediment of the kosmos’s ether (Phd. 109c). Life in this atmosphere is not the pinnacle of existence, but a middle order between the lesser developed, water dwelling organisms and the more developed beings above the atmosphere (Phd. 109c-110b). The myth is, of course, just a myth, not a literal truth (Phd. 114d). But the lesson is clear. The cosmos is hierarchical and humanity finds itself in the middle; one can ascend to a higher plane through contemplation and philosophical living or descend into a lower plane through bodily living.

The Phaedo creates an account of the soul, philosophy, and cosmos that is very much at odds with how Plato portrayed Socrates in the Apology and Crito. But if the argument is problematic, that is no reason to turn against argumentation itself. Plato issues a caution in the Phaedo not to become a misologue, a hater of reason (Phd. 89d). If philosophers fail to construct persuasive, coherent arguments, they ought not hate argumentation or reason itself, but fault themselves, never giving up the pursuit of truth in argument and reason. Plato provides an initial system of philosophy and a picture of the cosmos in which the soul struggles to free itself of its bodily prison through pure
contemplation. The soul distrusts all sensory perception; it avoids those mired in sensual living. Philosophers are not political at all. They avoid temporal affairs; they eschew physical concerns and those devoted to satisfying the physical appetites. The argument contradicts the earlier account of Socrates who tries to reconcile his living in Athens and care for all people with his service to the god. Socrates did not seek the exclusive company of philosophical, ascetic souls; he discussed the nature of things with whoever crossed his path. The cosmos, the soul, and the life of philosophy in the Phaedo are incompatible with the account of Socrates in the Apology and Crito, but the Phaedo is not Plato’s final work on the soul, cosmology, and the relationship of philosopher and city.

Conclusion

Plato’s early dialogues raise questions more than they provide answers. Each one appears discrete; connecting them provides no doctrinal coherence. Taken in turn, and read as a collection, they spell out challenges to philosophy and politics, raise questions about the relationship between gods and humans, and compel the reader to wonder about the place of the philosopher in the city and of the city’s purpose in the cosmos.

The Euthyphro is critical of the irrational, conflicting mythology of the traditional gods. Furthermore, by revealing this irrationality and contradictions within the mythology, the Euthyphro denies that the traditional understanding of the gods can support political institutions and individual political charges. Plato’s dialogue shows that a simplistic or partial understanding of a divine mythology can lead a citizen to think he or she possesses certain knowledge of the gods, specifically about what the gods
consider pious and impious actions. Of course, if one did know the gods’ thoughts on piety, one would apply those standards to interactions with human beings, or fellow citizens at least. Plato does not challenge the notion that divine standards may guide humanity, but he does challenge the notion that the old myths contain those standards. In fact, they contain multiple and contradicting standards. In such a mythology, a person may follow a divine example only to find they have pleased some gods and angered others. This sort of mythology will not suffice for Plato. Divinities ought not be in conflict, and divine standards should be rational and coherent. Still, the dialogue ends without answering important questions. If not the traditional ones, do divine standards truly exist? How does one come to know the divine?

The *Apology*, in a way, answers the last question. Socrates comes to know the divine through his own personal sign, through the Oracle’s message, and through a life of investigating that message. But the *Apology* is about more than just Socrates’ trial. Can a philosopher, a servant of the divine, live in a political order? Socrates’ philosophical life leads him to challenge the foundations of the city in which he lives. He must question his fellow citizens about what they think they know. These discussions only reveal the interlocutor’s ignorance, and thus raise questions about whether such people are fit to rule the city. Furthermore, these revelations stir anger and resentment against Socrates. His philosophical pursuits must be private, and thus he cannot be a public man. Philosophy precludes his full citizenship. But the dialogue includes some curious ambivalence about this. Certainly, Socrates will not yield his divine service to civic participation or civic penalty. He is a philosopher, a servant of
the gods, before he is an Athenian citizen. Yet, Socrates also expresses a deep connection to the city. He is proud of his military service. He calls himself a divine gift to the city. He participates in public obligations as much as possible, but does not recklessly endanger his philosophical mission by speaking in the public assembly, thereby needlessly antagonizing fellow citizens. Can a philosopher be a full citizen? Should they even want to be one? Should servants to gods be bound to the city in which they were born? Should a divine servant travel among cities, talking to all who will listen and avoiding all particular connections?

The *Crito* does not address these questions directly, but rather offers a different perspective. First, the dialogue defends the non-traditional maxim that one must never do wrong, not even a wrong in return for a wrong. Socrates has the opportunity to escape prison and live in another city. Presumably, he may continue his philosophical life. But the old philosopher rejects that course. He thinks of himself as created by the laws of Athens. They provided for his legal genesis with their marriage laws. They provided for his education. The laws, the city itself really, constituted him. After making him, the laws allowed Socrates to leave if he found them wanting. Socrates, made by Athens, remained in Athens. To escape, besides ulterior negative consequences, would be to wrong the city, and one must never do wrong.

Problems abound in connecting the lessons of *Crito* to the *Apology*. If the philosopher owes obedience to the city (as in the *Crito*) and owes obedience to the gods (as in the *Apology*), what happens when the demands of the two authorities are not in harmony? Clearly, the philosopher must tread lightly. Socrates faced such a dilemma.
The public institutions of Athens (namely, speaking at the assembly) would not long tolerate a philosophical mission. Socrates thus avoided this aspect of citizenship. Eventually, the conflict between his philosophical mission and the public duties and expectations of Athenian citizenship caught up to him. The gods and city were not in harmony. Socrates would run afoul of one of them sooner or later. The philosopher could not be a citizen, and being a citizen would cut short the philosophical mission. The question remains unanswered: can the city find harmony with the divine?

The *Phaedo* does provide an answer to this question, but one that only raises more problems. Plato’s body-soul dualism is an explicit denunciation of material life. The life of philosophy is isolated and contemplative. The philosopher flees from the physical world, and the sense-perception of it, seeking to free the soul from the grips of the body. By itself, the soul contemplates true reality and things in themselves. Practiced in this way, philosophers will not engage in politics and not dialogue with common ignoramuses. Philosophers may commune with the like-minded, but that is the extent of their social interactions.

Plato defends a philosophical life in the *Phaedo* that rejects political pursuits. This rejection offers an alternative to the conflict between philosophy and politics found in the earlier dialogues, but at what cost? The stark dualism betrays Socrates’ enjoyment of life and discussion. Socrates (in Plato’s own dialogues and the little-known historical figure) is a social being. He talks with whoever crosses his path, not strictly philosophical types. Nor does the location matter. Socrates will speak in the agora or a symposium; he enjoys drink and discussion. Socrates may be ascetic, living simply, but
he does not appear to utterly despise material existence. Finally, Socrates did not flee all material concerns. He married, begat children, exercised, and served in the military. Plato defends a material, Athenian existence in the *Apology* and *Crito*. He puts material existence in a proper place; he does not despise it nor flee from it. The *Phaedo* divides the philosophical life from the material and political life. It argues that the philosopher can never be truly happy if they try to be a citizen, minimally or fully.

Philosophy and political thought could end here. Philosophy is care of the soul and politics is pursuit of the material. Philosophy damns politics as it binds the soul to its inferior, temporary, and bodily prison. Politics ridicules philosophy as a period of quiet at best and a life of madness at worst. The two are separate and can never work in harmony. Of course, Plato does not end here. The middle dialogues will address philosophy again, and find a purpose for it in the material world. Politics will be not the futile pursuit of material satisfaction, but the construction of harmony among citizens. If philosophy can find the source of order in the cosmos, can and should it create a reflective political order?
CHAPTER V

THE MIDDLE DIALOGUES

Philosophy and the Cosmopolis

Plato articulates the structure of a cosmopolis in the middle dialogues. Critical to this project are the *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, and *Republic*. The *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* reveal Plato’s developing thought about the practice of philosophy, indicating crucial differences from the *Phaedo*. The dialogues reassess what philosophy is and what motivates or compels the philosopher. Rethinking philosophy, Plato finds a necessary place for philosophers in the city. They have a political function that follows from the motive forces and ontological hierarchy of the cosmos. The *Republic* is Plato’s first grand dialogue; he creates his most comprehensive outline of philosophy, the cosmic order, and a political constitution. The city is crafted according to the harmonized functioning of philosophers, soldiers, and craftsmen. These elements are grades in a hierarchy that compose a functioning whole. Philosophic love compels the philosopher toward universals, the standards for order in the physical world. Loving the universals, the philosopher looks to recreate them in the physical world. To do this, the philosopher needs a system of education. The ideal city only exists because of philosophical education, and yet true philosophical education cannot exist without the ordered city.

The completion of the ideal city requires not only a philosopher, but a legacy, the capacity to generate future philosophers. Philosopher-kings rule the city, ordering it according to their understanding of the same source of knowledge that directs all motion.

Rowe (1993, 4) argues there is no difference in Plato’s account of philosophy from the *Phaedo* to the *Phaedrus*; only the interlocutors change. The *Phaedo* shows philosophy among a group of equals; the *Phaedrus* depicts philosophy between a master and student. I aim to show a more substantial difference.
in the cosmos. The city and cosmos exist in the same plane of material reality, but at
different levels in the hierarchy of being. Cosmopolitanism, rightly understood, is the
construction of the ordered city in the harmonious cosmos. Both find their principles of
order in a greater source of being. Philosophy leads to that source, and knowledge of it
compels the philosopher to replicate the eternal standards in the form of a *polis*.

*The Phaedrus*

The *Phaedrus* opens with the eponymous student excitedly relating a speech to
Socrates, one teaching deception and false love. The opposite is the focus of the
dialogue: how to teach true conviction and what real love is. To explain, Plato
elaborates his concept of the soul. No longer will he stress a body/soul dualism, but the
soul will be composite and in conflict with itself. Again differing from the *Phaedo*, the
force of love that drives the philosophic soul gives the philosopher a political function, a
necessary role in this world. Love motivates the elder philosophers to the education of
philosophic youths, recreating the universal intelligibles in the minds of both student and
teacher.

The dialogue begins with the topic of education; the first lesson is the importance

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44 Bluck (1949) sees the dialogue as Plato’s attack on Isocrates’ school of rhetoric, or the use of persuasion
without knowledge. Griswold (1986, 2-3) argues in like fashion, that Plato begins to connect self-
knowledge to knowledge of the forms. One of the author’s purposes is to contrast Plato’s “self-
knowledge” to modern and postmodern understandings of the term.

45 The *Phaedrus* is often read without political content. Scully (2003, vii) argues the dialogue is about
“soul leading.” Similarly, Rowe (1986) argues the *Phaedrus* concerns the relationship of teacher and
student in an individualized pursuit of knowledge. These interpretations fail to see how Plato connects
souls, cities, and the knowledge of true reality reached through philosophy. Connecting these dots is
exactly what I mean by the term Platonic cosmopolitanism.

46 My interpretation of the *Phaedrus* is comparatively brief, but shares essential agreements with White’s
(1993) more detailed work. Specifically, White (1993, 66-69) argues that philosophical *erōs* connects the
soul to *nous* and the order of true reality. However, White is analyzing the one dialogue in depth. I aim to
relate the dialogue to the development of Plato’s political philosophy.
of the teacher knowing the student. Socrates indeed knows his student, Phaedrus, and sees through a veneer of bashfulness to his true, youthful enthusiasm (Phdr. 228a-c). Phaedrus has heard a speech about how and whom to seduce (Phdr. 227c). He wishes to practice his oratory on Socrates, but the old sage is aware of the game, as he notices the boy clutches the speech itself under his cloak (Phdr. 228d). The two proceed toward a shady grove where Phaedrus may practice the speech, discussing the unreliability of traditional mythology along the way (Phdr. 229a-234c).

Socrates reacts to the delivered speech in an ironic, facetious manner, and Phaedrus calls on him to explain his feigned ecstasy (Phdr. 234d-e). To Socrates, the speech is unimpressive, almost as if the author was bored with the subject itself (Phdr. 233e-234a). Phaedrus disagrees, arguing the speech has discussed the topic so thoroughly that nothing ever need be said about love again (Phdr. 235b). The exchange foreshadows a major theme of the dialogue, that no written account is ever a complete and perfect account. In the moment, Socrates’ argument stirs Phaedrus to defend the speech and he challenges Socrates to do better. But outwitting the clever speech on its own terms is not Plato’s purpose. The dialogue rethinks what love is, properly beginning by noticing the madness inherent in it. At least, Phaedrus has demonstrated the petulance of love in his adolescent demand that Socrates give a speech (Phdr. 236-237).

Instigated by Phaedrus, Socrates yields and offers a speech (Phdr. 237a-241d).

Phaedrus had spoken on why a beautiful youth should give his favors to one not in love

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47 Ferrari (1987) attends to the setting of the dialogue, using setting as a method of orientating the reader. A number of authors, including White (1993) and Ferrari, have discussed the meaning of Socrates’ words on mythology. The brevity of my account suits its purpose but leaves many topics unearthed.
with him. Socrates mocks this speech, and issues a caution against its author. Phaedrus’ speech comes from Lysias, who intends to convince the beautiful boy to favor the one (Lysias himself) who does not love him. Socrates warns Phaedrus that Lysias is quite in love with him, and cleverly is searching for a way to win the competition for his favors. Socrates’ speech is a mockery of love, detailing all the harms that the adult lover will perpetrate upon the youth. Erōs, that “all conquering… forceful drive,” will compel the adult to ruin the youth, keeping him ignorant, physically effeminate, poor, and socially isolated. Eventually, the force of love on the adult will succumb to reason, and he will abandon the youth. Love in this relationship caused nothing but ruin for the youth. The lesson is to give favor to the one not in love; for every disadvantage the lover offers, the non-lover presents benefit (Phdr. 241e).

Something is amiss, and Socrates quickly realizes his mistake. His divine sign appears to him, preventing his departure until he has undone his error (Phdr. 242c). Love, being divine, does not perpetrate wrongs, yet both speeches condemn it as the corruptor of adults and destroyer of youths (Phdr. 242d-243d). Socrates has given offense to the gods with his words and must make amends.

Love is a kind of madness. Speaking again on love, this time reverencing its divinity, Socrates argues that love can be a kind of divine madness, like that given to the oracles (Phdr. 244a-b). Divine madness is the source of prophesy and purification. Receiving a divine message, one is not in control of themselves, but this state is not to be feared. Remember that nothing evil comes from the gods. Defending this conception of love, Socrates and Phaedrus will re-examine whether a youth should give favors to a
lover or a non-lover (Phdr. 245b-c). The answer will hinge on the character of the love. If it is a divine love, then surely the youth will benefit from a relationship. But if love is otherwise motivated, a youth must be wary.

The dialogue continues as Socrates offers an account of the soul itself, the cosmos, and philosophy (Phdr. 245c). Souls are what bring life to matter. A soul is immortal and eternal; it is the source of motion internal to physical beings (Phdr. 245c-e). Socrates admits that to describe the soul is more of a god’s task, but a human account must suffice (Phdr. 246a). Plato’s “human account” introduces a concept of the soul different from the one of the Phaedo, and demonstrated in the following simile: the soul is like “a natural union of a team of winged horse and their charioteer” (Phdr. 246a). The souls of gods have perfect horses and drivers, but humanity is not so well-equipped. The human soul is like a chariot team with one good horse and one bad (Phdr. 246b). The change in concept is clear from the start. Neither the body nor anything physical causes the failures and miseries of mortal life. The soul itself is flawed, and in conflict within itself. This new concept of the soul will effect a change in how philosophers interact with others during their embodied life.

Plato develops his concept of the soul as he enters into cosmological analysis. Souls, Socrates tells, “look after all that lacks a soul” (Phdr. 246b). Perfect souls look after the entire kosmos, but in their course through the heavens, they can “lose their wings.” A soul can drift from the higher orders of reality, steadily descending until it

48 Translations of Phdr. 245c differ. See Hackforth (1952, 64) and Guthrie (1975, 419 n.4) for rival expositions. The ambiguity of the phrase may be intentional as well, for Plato may convey that the concept itself is insufficient, and so he is re-conceptualizing it. See Ferrari (1987, 124).
49 Plato provides an extended metaphoric analysis of conflict in the soul later in the dialogue (Phdr. 253d-254e).
lands upon a material thing. The soul then animates the body upon which it has fallen; the two becoming a living, mortal being (Phdr. 246c-d). At the center of the kosmos is a source of motion, a circular procession revolving around the forms that order lesser reality (Phdr. 247a). During this procession, souls must fly to the highest orders of reality, but will struggle if their chariot team includes an unruly horse or lesser charioteer (Phdr. 247b-c). The gods fly this path, their souls being perfect, but not all lesser souls may complete the circuit.

Some souls ascend to the heights of reality, viewing the eternal forms which nourish and strengthen their wings. The eternal forms, ideals that do not partake of shape, color, or any sensory-based perception, exist beyond the heavens (Phdr. 247c). They are the things in which intelligence finds true knowledge. In the myth, intelligence is the driver in the chariot team of the soul (Phdr. 247c-e). In the heavens, intelligence has its fill of knowledge before returning to lower orders of reality, where souls apply their knowledge to bring order to the lesser realms of reality. The souls of gods view all the forms and acquire true knowledge of these things; lesser souls cannot accomplish as much.

The souls of mortals rarely reach the heights of true reality (Phdr. 248a-b). The best of these souls catch merely a glimpse of the forms, but even these souls struggle against themselves. Internally, the unruly horse drags even the most god-like of lesser souls down. Most souls never behold even a mere glimpse of true reality, the place beyond the heavens. The unruly horses within these souls struggle violently, creating a

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50 “hyperourian,” or beyond the heavens (Phdr. 247c).
procession of chaos and carnage. The souls clash and collide, breaking their wings in the rampage. Never in the presence of true reality, they descend upon bodies without knowledge, and will have only opinions as their guide to order.

The order of mortal lives thus depends on the amount of knowledge planted within the soul before it descends into a material body (Phdr. 248c-e). Souls full of knowledge keep their wings in health and remain in the protected realm of the divine. The souls that cannot reach the heights, or become forgetful, descend into a hierarchy of incarnation. A soul with a love of knowledge or beauty animates a philosophic human. The lesser grade of soul becomes a lawgiver, king, or military general. Beneath this, souls become statesmen, then domestic or business managers, followed by physicians, and then priests. Lesser souls become poets and artists, then manual laborers, and demagogues. The most base souls become tyrants. Each soul can improve its status in the next incarnation by living a just life, but only the philosophic soul becomes winged (Phdr. 249a-c). And there is a next life for most souls, as it takes time and just living for a soul to re-grow its wings and return to a purely immortal existence.

With this description of the soul and kosmos, Plato returns to the topic of love (Phdr. 249c-250b). Souls that have seen reality recollect the form of beauty when they behold a beautiful object during mortal existence. Remembering true beauty, they desire to return to eternal reality, growing distant from the affairs and concerns of mortal humanity. In this state, a philosopher appears mad to those souls which cannot recollect true reality at the sight of a beautiful object. Most souls cannot apprehend the forms

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51 The place of the tyrant in the hierarchy is intriguing compared to the description of the tyrannical soul in the Republic. If the tyrant’s soul is so base, how can it cause such great ruin?
within objects through their murky, physical senses (*Phdr*. 250b). A wide gap still exists between philosophers entranced in an ecstatic vision of eternal reality and the souls so bereft of knowledge they only can understand such a person as mad, rather than possessed by a divine vision (*Phdr*. 250c).

Returning to the dialogue, the philosophic soul pursues the beautiful youth in a state of madness and ecstasy. Beholding a reminder of the beautiful, the broken wings of the soul begin to heal. The process is both painful and joyful, and the philosophic soul must retain the company of the beautiful object to continue the soul’s healing (*Phdr*. 251a-252b). This is a key change from the *Phaedo*. Individual contemplation is not sufficient for philosophy. A philosophic soul *needs* the company of other beautiful souls. They first apprehend this beauty through sight- a physical sense. The goal is still to escape from mortal, material life, but the manner of escape has changed. Plato has found reason for the philosopher to live a sociable existence. Philosophers must seek about objects of beauty to spur the re-growth of their soul’s wings; they may not reside in solitary contemplation, spurning physical existence until their soul separates from its wicked body.

The philosopher being the lover, a relationship with a beautiful youth can be beneficial to both (*Phdr*. 255a-256e). If they can maintain self-control, meaning if intelligence (the charioteer) keeps its rule over the physical desires (the unruly horse), both the philosopher and the youth will grow wings and return to higher orders of existence upon death. Even if they cannot maintain strict self-control, they still benefit each other. They will stimulate the wings, but fail to re-grow them. From a non-lover, a
youth gains only human things (Phdr. 256e-257a). The soul remembers nothing of eternal reality, the wings neither grow nor are stimulated. Socrates concludes his ode to love with this: the youth should choose the lover.

Solving the problem of whom the youth should choose, the dialogue concludes with a related discussion of rhetoric and speech-writing (Phdr. 257c). The concern is whether speeches, orated and written, convey good or ill (Phdr. 258d). For a speech to be good, the composer must possess the truth of the subject (Phdr. 259e). Using knowledge of a particular subject and the soul, the art of rhetoric will produce persuasion in a soul ignorant of true knowledge (Phdr. 270a-271a). This is the crux: rhetoricians of the era know nothing of the soul and only the preliminaries of any given subject (Phdr. 267a-269e). They do not persuade souls to knowledge. True rhetoric adjusts the style of speech to the soul receiving the words (Phdr. 271d-272b). The discussion includes this important note: interpersonal dialogue is superior to the written word in transmitting truth from soul to soul (Phdr. 276a-b). Thus, philosophy itself needs living philosophers to maintain its rigorous standards; a philosophical text is only a second-level good (Phdr. 277d-278b).

The Symposium

The Symposium recounts a celebration at the house of Agathon, the winner in a dramatic competition. The guests, still suffering from the previous day’s drinking of spirits, decide not to imbibe for the night. For amusement they will give speeches in praise of Love. Four speakers take their turns before Agathon himself praises divine Love, and the guests applaud his efforts with great approval. Socrates, of course, is less
Socrates engages in a brief dialectical exercise before his companions request a speech from him. Socrates obliges, recounting a lesson he once learned from the philosophical Diotima. Like the *Phaedrus*, Plato addresses the idea of love in the *Symposium*. He explains what it is, meaning both the compelling force of it and what actions it fosters among people and animals. The force of love will explain why philosophers have a purpose in the material world above merely waiting for the mortal release of death.

Following four of his guests, Agathon speaks every praise imaginable to love and receives a loud ovation for his efforts (*Smp.* 194e-198a). Love is delicate and fluid, so it can encompass the entire soul. It is just and good, never doing violence. Love is moderate and brave; love inspires all crafts. Of all things, Love is best and beautiful! Socrates spoils Agathon’s tribute with a cutting remark. In short, Socrates thought the art of praise meant telling the beautiful truths about a thing, but apparently Agathon found a different approach (*Smp.* 198d). Agathon simply applied the most beautiful truths to the object, whether it possesses them or not (*Smp.* 198e). The preceding speeches have not revealed the true nature of Love, but only relayed old myths, comedic stories, and flattery.

Socrates, rather than conjuring flattery, asks a basic question of Agathon, “Is Love such as to be a love of something or of nothing” (*Smp.* 199d)? The exchange serves to point out that love is a desire for things; it is not the possession of those things (*Smp.* 199d-200b). Love is the force that motivates people to possess the necessary things they do not have, or to want in perpetuity the necessary things they have in the
moment (Smp. 200c-d). Defining love this way, it is neither beautiful nor good, as Agathon described it, but it is a desire for beauty and goodness (Smp. 201a-c). Socrates has refuted Agathon’s method of praise with simple definition, and the simple definition carries significant philosophical importance.

Now that Agathon’s great praise is reduced to muddle, the guests clamor for Socrates to give a speech. He obliges in his way, retelling a conversation about love he had with another philosopher, Diotima. Like Agathon, Socrates was once stumped about the nature of love. He thought if it is not beautiful, must it be ugly (Smp. 201e)? No, love is not ugly, nor strictly beautiful. Diotima introduced him to the category of in-between things (Smp. 202a). Correct judgment (to ortho doxazein), knowing without being able to give complete reasoning, is a state between ignorance and wisdom, so why can there not be a state between the beautiful and the ugly (Smp. 202a-b)? Thus, love is not beautiful and good, but the desire for these things. It is an intermediary being or a great spirit (daimôn megas) residing between divinity and mortality (Smp. 202c-e).

Love is a messenger spirit between the divine and mortals.

Among human beings, everyone is in love with something, but some people are in love in a peculiar way. Love compels the pursuit of good and beautiful things. Satisfying that love, one reaches a state of well-guided fulfillment, or eudaimonia (Smp. 204e-205a). Plato writes that people pursue the good in many ways, but these pursuits are not the true ideal of love (Smp. 205b-d). What love compels is giving birth in both body and soul (Smp. 206b). The phrase mystifies Socrates as Diotima speaks it (Smp.
What Plato means is that love motivates reproduction in all its forms. The common expression of love for mortals is physical reproduction (*Smp. 206c-d*). This form of reproduction is beautiful and good as the avenue of immortality to mortals (*Smp. 207a*). Reproduction, from the genesis of new mortals to the simple act of studying to replace lost knowledge, is the outcome of love’s desire.

However, some human beings pursue immortality through means other than physical reproduction. Love inspires heroism and great deeds, so that one may be remembered forever (*Smp. 208c-e*). Love inspires some people, pregnant in their souls (*en tais psychais kuousin*), to give birth in all the virtues; for some this means giving birth in wisdom. With regard to the virtue of wisdom or prudence (*phronēsis*) the highest, most beautiful genesis is that of the lawgivers (*Smp. 209a*). Love inspires lawgivers to establish a political constitution for others. This constitution includes more than the institutional form of government. The laws regulate the whole of the culture, education, religion, and government. In effect, lawgivers become the fathers of citizens rather than bodies.

Plato ends the conversation between Socrates and Diotima with a few thoughts on education, or how to raise a philosophical soul. Always needing direction toward what is beautiful, young students first need beautiful companions. Initially, the students will see only the physical beauty of their companion, but soon they progress to see the beauty within the soul (*Smp. 210a-c*). The students graduate to study customs and laws,

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52 Indeed, the phrase is difficult to translate and understand. Lear (2006) writes a helpful account, explaining how beauty provokes the desire for immortality through a creative act. He understands the *Symposium* to defend the ontological status of beauty.

53 Reeve (2006, 144) argues similarly, but with brevity to a fault. He notes that once beholding a beautiful vision, a mortal will desire to give birth to more beautiful images.
and then theories of knowledge (Smp. 210c-d). Finally, these full-fledged lovers of wisdom will come to know beauty itself (Smp. 210e-211c). Never changing, never a particular thing, a form is always purely itself. Beholding such a vision is what love compels within a philosophical soul.

Tracing the argument from the end to the beginning, we see a nascent but complete cosmopolitan philosophy. A good city needs a lover of wisdom to write its laws. Lovers of wisdom need proper education to attain true knowledge. The force of love that compels the desire for true knowledge also compels the desire for reproduction. The very force that motivates philosophical contemplation also motivates political thought. Love is the intermediary spirit, communicating the eternal forms of the cosmos, truth, beauty, and goodness, to the mortal realm. Knowing these things, philosophers reproduce the physical, political world in the image of the cosmos.

_The Republic_

Plato’s _Republic_ is a classic work of literature, philosophy, and political theory. Analyses of the dialogue can lose their way in its intricacies if the author is not careful. For the purposes of this project, I am focusing on three interlocked conceptual levels of the dialogue. Plato gives an integrated account of the individual soul, the city, and the cosmos. The soul is famously tripartite, the city has three classes, and the cosmos follows from the good itself. The _Republic_ contains a cosmopolis, a political design that follows from the inherent and eternal order of being and harmony within hierarchical reality. The highest level of earthly fulfillment is only possible when the individual soul

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54 The literature pays significant attention to the city-soul analogy in the _Republic_. See Williams (1997) and Annas (1981) for critical analyses, and Evrigenis (2002) for a defense of the city-soul analogy. There is less analysis of the cosmos-city-citizen hierarchy which I intend to elucidate.
is ordered and when that individual lives in the well-ordered city. Each individual must attain harmony among the competing motivations within their composite soul. As a citizen, each individual must fulfill his or her function, whether as a craftsman, soldier, or philosopher. Finally, the city itself, when consisting of well-ordered souls and political classes, will reflect the principles of good, beauty, and truth. After a brief introduction to the dialogue, analysis of the Republic will focus on the interwoven concepts of individual, city, and cosmos to better reveal the cosmopolitan structure of the argument.

Book I of the Republic introduces the topic of justice. Thrasymachus, following Polemarchus and Cephalus, all introduce different conceptions of justice (ten dikaiosunēn, R. 331c). For Cephalus, justice is not having to cheat, lie, or steal to acquire and secure his wealth (R. 331b). The old man is happy to have been wealthy through his life, since money has precluded him from situations of deception and debt. In his old age, he begins to worry about the stories of Hades, particularly those that say the unjust must pay for their misdeeds (R. 330d-331c). Polemarchus clarifies his father’s conception, arguing that justice is giving what is owed, and one owes good things to friends and bad things to enemies (R. 332a-b). The father and son present traditional conceptions of justice: Cephalus supplies the business ethic (deal straightly and pay your debts) and Polemarchus provides the clan ethic (treat your relations well, outsiders cautiously, and enemies poorly). Plato wrote in other dialogues on how traditional ideas

55 I provide commentary on Book I to set the frame for the remainder of my analysis. The subject, plot, or purpose of Book I is not clear cut. Many have offered their own analyses. See Dobbs (1994), Klosko (1984), and Burrell (1916) for a diversity of arguments.
had broken down.\textsuperscript{56} Similarly in the \textit{Republic}, traditional conceptions of justice do not withstand Socrates’ logical interrogation.

Unlike the earlier interlocutors, Thrasymachus rejects the traditional, conventional accounts of justice. Thrasymachus declares what anyone might conclude in an era of traditional breakdown: justice is nothing at all or the interest of the stronger (\textit{R.} 338c-339a). Rulers establish codes of law, “the justice system,” to secure desired advantages for themselves. Thrasymachus’ answer represents one possible conclusion to what justice is, and a shrewd, empirical one at that. An observer of Greek cities may realize the laws are not divine, not ancient, and not ideal. Is it coincidence that democracies establish laws to the benefit of the demos? Or that oligarchies establish laws consistent with their class preferences? Clearly, tyrants erect laws to preserve their own power and pursue their desired ends. Thrasymachus’ argument is clear, observable, and conventional. Governments make laws for the benefit of those in the government and its supporters. One need not look to the gods, to tradition, nor to philosophers for some idealized conception of what justice is.

Thrasymachus’ view of government and law is one of exploitation (\textit{R.} 343b-344c). Rulers attend the ruled as shepherds attend their sheep; rulers maintain some of their flock as a store of resources and fatten a portion for slaughter. Of course, this view turns the ideal of justice upside-down. The just person, the law-abiding citizen, complies with his or her own exploitation. The just citizens are the sheep that provide material advantages to their rulers, all the while ignorantly thinking they are acting

\textsuperscript{56} The \textit{Euthyphro} shows problems in anthropomorphic pantheism, and its subsequent duties of piety. The \textit{Phaedrus} investigates rhetoric and what makes for a good speech. The \textit{Symposium} questions understandings of love.
according to some greater standard. The just are ignorant and exploited, Thrasymachus contends; the unjust, if they gain power, are wise, happy, and live virtuously, meaning they exhibit “the qualities of excellence” that lead to a fulfilled life. Without an ideal conception of justice, Thrasymachus’ conventionalism, if unpalatable, stands as a solid description of government.

Socrates ultimately refutes Thrasymachus’ claim that injustice is more profitable than justice and that the unjust live happily while the just are miserable, but the victory is logical and formal rather than convincing. The unresolved nature of justice, whether virtue or vice, permeates the atmosphere. Glaucon raises his voice to articulate the challenge to Socrates: prove that justice is good in itself, not only for the rewards it provides (R. 357b-358a). Glaucon echoes a common defense of injustice and common complaints about justice. Injustice, if one can get away with it, is good for the individual. If one could kill the king, marry the queen, usurp the kingdom, and not pay any penalty or suffer any loss, why not reap these advantages (R. 359d-360d)? Justice is a kind of mean, Glaucon argues. Individuals who are too weak to commit injustice with impunity prefer to reach a mutual agreement not to commit injustice at all. No one will commit injustice, nor suffer it. They establish laws as guarantors of the agreement and to punish those who commit injustice. However, these people still would prefer to commit injustice with impunity if they could escape punishment (R. 359b-c). Justice, commonly understood, is an arduous and second-best choice.

Ideally, Glaucon challenges Socrates to show that justice is desirable in itself.

57 The quoted phrase is my translation of aretē.
58 Indeed, Klosko’s (1984) argument that the whole affair is a technical argument rather than a dialectical one is persuasive.
even if the just person faces persecution and torture, mistakenly believed by fellow citizens to be unjust (R.361e). After heaping praise and benefit upon the unjust life, and curses and pains upon the just life, Glaucon completes his challenge. His brother, Adeimantus, adds a final touch by introducing the divine (R. 362d-363b). Through their justice, the pious accrue all sorts of benefits from the gods (R. 363d). The impious suffer eternal labors and punishments in Hades (R. 363e). However, Adeimantus notes that some priests and prophets persuade individuals and whole cities that certain rites can absolve or purify the living or the dead of their injustice (R. 364e-365a). Adeimantus challenges Socrates to address the ambiguous relationship of the divine, the just, and excellence. If one can bribe the gods to remove the stain of injustice, then the successful practitioner of injustice will have the resources to secure their absolution—vice may be an excellence! Adeimantus inquires into the nature of the gods and the just. He even questions their existence (R. 365a-366b). How does the divine relate to justice?

Socrates himself completes the challenge. Justice exists in both the individual and in the city as a whole (R. 368d-369). As a city is larger than a single person, civic justice ought to be larger and more visible than individual, psychic justice. Socrates and his interlocutors will create a city, watch it come to be in theory, and hopefully find where justice exists within it.59 Three levels have been set and interrelated. First, what is justice in the individual soul? Is it good in itself? Does justice motivate the individual to good things, or does the reputation of justice yield conventional honors? Second,

59 “If we would see a city coming to be in speech [logoi] (R. 369a)… Of course, the word logos means more than just speech; it means reasoned speech. The phrase conveys that the interlocutors are going to discuss rationally why human beings create cities in the first place, and then decipher what part justice plays in civic construction. “City in speech” is not the only possibly translation; city in reason is equally plausible.
what is interpersonal, meaning political, justice? How does justice come to be in the city and what is its function there? Third, if divinities exist, how do they view the just and unjust? Can sacrifice and ritual purge the stain of unjust deeds? If Plato cannot answer these questions coherently, then justice may be as Glaucon or Thrasymachus described it.

*The Cosmos*

The dialogue within the *Republic* constructs the city from its human foundation, beginning with individual need before reaching to the heavens. To facilitate the exposition of the cosmopolitanism theory within the dialogue, I divide from the dialogue three broad sections, one of the cosmos, another on the individual, and final one on the city itself. Assumptions, axioms, and understandings of the heavens intertwine with individual psychology and political order. Plato’s dualistic understanding of the cosmos, that the physical world exists along with an immaterial world, is the foundation of his political philosophy, or least that understanding is what his philosophy has found to counter the conventionalism of Thrasymachus and Glaucon.

The word *kosmos* and its derivatives relate to a state of order or of putting things into order.60 The *kosmos* is the totality of the material world and the principles and forces that order it. Substantively, the *kosmos* is a material thing. However, thinking through the concept, the *kosmos* must include those non-material things from which it finds its very order. To discuss the material structure of the *kosmos* without reference to its non-material sources of order would make little sense. The examination of Plato’s

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60 From Liddell and Scott’s *Greek-English Lexicon*. Some derivatives refer to the adornment of women’s dress, but the previous two senses of the word hold more pertinence.
cosmology will focus on the non-material sources of order in the discussion of the
*kosmos*, and how the *polis* is an integral component of the *kosmos*.

Plato’s first axiom about the *kosmos* is that contrary to popular mythology, the
divine is good (*agathos*) and only good (*R.* 379a-c). The divine is the cause of good
things. Nothing evil comes from the divine. The gods do not quarrel, fight, or hate each
other, as some of their stories tell (*R.* 378c). The divine, broadly understood, is the
source of order for the material world; it is not a source of disorder or chaos. Since the
divine is good, and nothing bad comes from something good, then people must cease
blaming the divine for their troubles in the material world (*R.* 379c). The source of
goodness and order in the world cannot be the source of troubles and disorder.

Second, what is good is resistant to change (*R.* 380d-381b). As nothing evil
comes from the divine, so neither is the divine shape-shifting, deceptive, or deceitful.
Again, Plato contradicts popular myths and posits that true order is unchanging.

Relating back to accounts in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, principles of the *kosmos*
remain consistent. The gods and the *daimonia* are the communicators between the
highest levels of reality and human beings. They exist near the unchanging eternals, the
source of order for material things. Goodness in the material world depends on

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61 The *Euthyphro* raised this point as well. Solmsen (1936) argues similarly about Plato’s thoughts on the
divine in an analysis across the *Republic*, *Laws*, and other dialogues.
62 The *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* provided more clarification the divine and the cosmos. The divine has
many levels, and at the highest level, eternal, unchanging things. The *Symposium* posits the existence of
intermediary beings that transmit between levels, providing the medium of order among levels of
existence. Plato’s ontology and epistemology are not flawless, but he is painting the picture more clearly
in these middle dialogues.
63 Plato is denouncing the myths that portray the gods as taking human or animal shapes to satisfy their
desires. If the gods are superior to humans and animals, they would not mimic their shape, both lowering
themselves in appearance and perpetrating deception. Of course, this implies that the gods would not do
what Gyges does with his invisibility ring.
replication of these eternals. Plato’s revision of traditional religion, from anthropomorphic gods to the eternal, unchanging order, is evident. The gods are not filled with the base desires and chaotic motions characteristic of human beings.

Third, there exist the Forms, eternal, unchanging, and intelligible models for physical reality (R. 474c-476a). The Forms do not take material existence, but all particulars in material existence are instantiations of the ideal Forms. The material world is one of change, flux, and opinion; one can have knowledge only of the unchanging Forms.

Fourth, the highest aspiration of love is to know true order and beauty with prudence or temperance. Physical desire is not the apex of love’s motivation (R. 403a). Rightly, love desires order and temperance, rather physical pleasures. The context of the discussion concerns the relationship between erastēs and erōmenos, or an adult lover and his younger beloved. Plato explains that higher love directs one toward true, ordered being, not toward physical pleasure. Right or higher love leads a person to know true reality and become truly aware. A life without this awareness is like living in a permanent sleep (R. 476c-e). Lesser types of love only entangle a person in a fluctuating world of maddening, material desires.⁶⁴

Fifth, only a strict education and upbringing can lead a person to knowledge. Throughout childhood, a philosophical soul must see order and never encounter anything unjust or evil (R. 409a-e). Such a soul must be trained in music and gymnastics to strengthen the spirit (to thumoeidēs), but to keep it moderate as well (R. 410c-411e).

⁶⁴ These two principles are common in the Phaedrus.
When a promising student begins to mature, he or she will embark on a course of study designed to turn the soul toward true being— that which always is. In the very nature of their souls, philosophical youths are not satisfied to study generation and decay, but their souls desire eternal things (R. 485a-b). Subjects that lead the mind to abstractions, eternals, and unchanging reality comprise the curriculum, including arithmetic, geometry, three-dimensional solids, astronomy, and dialectical reasoning. Philosophers will consort with the eternal Forms, becoming ordered and godlike in themselves (R. 500c-d). Attaining knowledge, they can discern a well-ordered instantiation from an ill-ordered one, and order instantiations into harmony with one another.

The ontology of the *kosmos* is one half of the foundation of Plato’s middle cosmopolitanism. The second foundational pillar, the tripartite soul, concerns Plato’s account of the individual. Plato explains that the human soul contains three separate components: appetite, spirit, and reason. Each one is a motive force that desires a particular good. The appetitive force desires material satisfaction, the spirited force desires victory and honor, and the rational force desires knowledge. Of the composite whole, one force inherently rules the total soul, and that soul can be well-educated or ill-educated within itself. The proper education of any soul will require political relationships. For any individual to live the best way possible, he or she must live in harmony with others in the ordered, ideal city.

*The Citizen*

Individuals are not self-sufficient in Plato’s calculation. No craftsman can produce enough individually to satisfy his or her wants (R. 369b-c). The quality and
quantity of goods will suffer if a craftsman attempts to learn multiple skills to satisfy all desires. The principle of specialization appears to be the solution; one individual learns the craft at which he or she excels and produces a surplus for trade. Soldiers and philosophers are not self-sufficient as well. No soldier can win a battle alone. No philosophical soul can come to know true reality in isolation. Especially for the ancient Greeks, soldiers are not self-sufficient - a phalanx of one is not an intimidating sight! Philosophers also need assistance in material provision, security, and education. In Plato’s reckoning, the kosmos determines that individuals are not self-sufficient.

That individuals have an inherent and unmixed nature (phusis) is a primary axiom in constructing the city (R. 370a-c, 394d-398b). One is born a craftsman, soldier, or philosopher, and will not lead a fulfilled life attempting to be something else. Craftsmen possess a nature that leads them to work at specific a station, or technē. Blacksmiths are born to work the furnace, farmers born to till the soil, and so forth. Similarly, soldiers possess a soul attuned to war and philosophical souls desire to contemplate all that truly is. Attempts to perform multiple crafts, for a blacksmith to be a soldier as well, preclude that individual from eudaimonia or living a fulfilled life.

To defend this separation of humanity into three classes, Plato conceives of the tripartite soul. Three motive forces exist within the composite soul, competing for primary rule. Appetites, spirit, and reason impel people in different degrees. Within craftsmen, the appetitive drive rules the soul. Within soldiers, honor or spirit primarily motivates the soul. Finally, reason rules the philosopher’s soul.

Ignorance and lower motivations lead to a disordered world. Well-ordered, each
soul lives the best way possible. Craftsmen will produce material goods and distribute them through trade. They will provide for soldiers, who in turn defend the city from external threats and domestic turmoil. Philosophers, similarly receiving provision from the craftsmen, create and enforce a system of education for the whole city. Yet, individuals and cities often go awry. Soldiers enslave and plunder their city’s craftsmen. They grow rich and turn into money-lovers. Still plundering the many, these oligarchs grow weak. The many overthrow them and establish a democracy in which everyone is free to pursue a self-identified conception of the good. The absence of true philosophers allowed ignorance to enter the city and began its decline. In a democracy, a philosophical youth receives an education in luxury, freedom, and indulgence, and may develop into the tyrant who enslaves the whole city. Each of Plato’s souls can be well-ordered or ill-ordered. An appetitive soul can work as craftsman in an ordered city or a slave in a disordered city. A spirited soul can become a guardian soldier or a plundering one. And a philosophical soul can grow into a just king or an unjust tyrant. For each individual to live a fulfilled life, they must reside in an ordered city.

*The Cosmopolis*

The *polis* was the basic Greek form of society and government. Distilling an idealized concept from the *Republic*, the true *polis* is the harmony of the three classes of humanity. In the ideal city, the members of each class live in *eudaimonia* and contribute to the other classes’ *eudaimonia*; each class owes the others a debt. In a *polis* without this comprehensive harmony, without the confluence of three ordered classes, no type of

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65 Plato chronicles how constitutions degenerate in Book VIII of the *Republic*. 
Plato described the ideal city as a union of individuals who call each other fellow citizens, or *politas* (*R*. 463a). Since individuals alone are unable to satisfy their needs, they share their production amongst each other (*R*. 369c-370a). To satisfy material needs, the city must include an assortment of craftsmen, including farmers, builders, cowherds, merchants, sailors, wage laborers, and more (*R*. 369d-371a). A simple city is not sufficient to satisfy necessities. Craftsmen need luxuries, and so the city will need hunters, actors, beauticians, and more (*R*. 373b-c). Such a city will need to conquer land to secure these luxuries, and in turn will become a tempting prize for conquest. The city will need a body of soldiers to provide martial defense (*R*. 373d-374a). Recall that an individual soul has only one nature, so craftsmen cannot function as soldiers as well. The city needs another class of humanity, a group of soldiers.

The spirited souls of nature’s soldiers are complex compared to appetitive souls. Spirited souls need proper training to grow into protective guard dogs rather than ravenous wolves. All soldiers must acquire a measure of philosophy necessary to compliment their spirited nature, or *thumoeidēs* (*R*. 376c–d). Music, poetry, and physical education are necessary (*R*. 376e). Courses in poetry convey the true stories of gods, heroes, and virtues (*R*. 376e-377, especially 377b-c). The city will teach stories that are true, fine, and beautiful and discard the false ones, like Hesiod’s tales of Uranus, Kronos, and Zeus (*R*. 377e-378a). The task of creating this educational program falls to philosophers. Here the soldiers find themselves indebted to philosophical souls. They

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66 The educational program includes a filtering process that removes the unnecessary luxuries, and the
will not live a fulfilled life if, being ill-educated, they are either cowardly in defense of their city or cruel in its plunder.

Education is the central pillar of the city and the heart of Plato’s political organization (R. 423e). Education instills moderation (sōphrosunēn) within the classes and harmony (homonoian) among them (R. 432a). The education program has three prongs: leading the soldiers to courage, instilling moderation in the craftsmen, and raising the next generation of philosophers to know the good. Awakening courage in the souls of soldiers requires purging certain elements from poetry. Anything that teaches the young to fear death, the afterlife, or Hades and the underworld must be censored (R. 386a-387c). Stories portraying the gods as deceptive or committing vile deeds must not be told (R. 380d, 381d-e). The education young soldiers receive must foster the control of their emotions, especially fear of death. However, all the elements of the spirited soul need educating; therefore, soldiers must learn neither to lament nor laugh in excess (R. 387c-389a). Soldiers train physically, but receive an education for their souls. Gymnastics, music, and poetry order the tripartite soul, awakening reason to temper the spirit, and controlling the appetites. Fear of death, desire of luxury, and cruelty to fellow citizens are the soldier’s vices. Proper education turns the spirited soul to virtue instead. Without the guidance of philosophers, soldiers would not receive a proper education, and their souls may remain ignorant and turned to vice instead of virtue.

Craftsmen require an education from philosophers as well. Programs of gymnastics and poetry teach the craftsmen to regulate their appetites and avoid gluttony professions that produce them, from the city.

67 homonoia literally translates to likeness of mind.
(R. 410a-c), and they will need philosophical guidance in other matters (R. 389d). Despite their technē, craftsmen need the supervision of philosophers over their items of production to prevent the release of inferior or damaging works into the city (R. 401a-402c).68 Well-educated in the city and well-ordered in their souls, craftsmen work their technē, distribute goods, and enjoy material satisfaction. It is a simple routine, and the proper life for the appetitive class of soul.

The city owes much to the philosophers for their program of education, but do the philosophers in turn owe anything to the city? Philosophers order the souls of craftsmen and soldiers, and that internal ordering also creates harmony between those classes. Harmony and moderation are necessary for the education of young, philosophical souls as well. A young philosopher’s worst possible fate is to live among a collection of disordered, poorly-educated, appetitive and spirited souls (R. 492e). A mob instead of a city, this collection of disordered souls will mislead a philosophical soul, twisting all of that individual’s potential advantages (beauty, intelligence, and strength) into pitfalls (R. 491b-c). A philosophical soul, when ill-educated in a disordered city, may grow into a tyrant. Living in these conditions, a desire for the crowd’s favor overwhelms the young philosopher (R. 492e). Sophists, peddling their “knack” of persuasion, imbue contempt for the crowd even as they convey the tricks of persuasion, only deepening the ill-education and further twisting the soul’s motivation (R. 493a-c). An ill-educated philosophical soul in a disordered city can cause great evils,

68 If the craftsmen have knowledge over their production, why do they need supervision? Logically, they should know what good their craft produces and not need a philosopher’s supervision. Reeve (1995) points out that Plato argues as much (R. 596b), and he uses this difficulty as a spring board into broader problems of understanding knowledge, the Forms, and the Good.
ruining the city and the souls of its inhabitants (R. 491d-e). In the subsequent chaos, the philosopher’s own fate is worst of all. Should the young philosopher develop into a tyrant, he or she will experience the worst of all possible lives. To avoid this fate, philosophers must grow up in a city that exhibits internally ordered and mutually harmonious craftsmen and soldiers. In addition, when they reach maturity, young philosophers will need older philosophers to guide their higher education.

The city’s educational structure establishes the foundation for young philosophers in the examples of moderation and harmony among the craftsmen and soldiers. A philosopher’s education continues into soldierly training. Philosophers receive the same education in music and gymnastics as the soldiers. Again, such education is not for the body, but for the soul. Music and gymnastics rouse and temper the spirit, so that philosophers strengthen the spirited part of the soul (R. 410c-411e). The education of the philosophers aims to order the tripartite soul to its highest functioning. To this end, spirit must tame the appetites without overwhelming reason.

Awakening the rational component of the soul requires a specialized curriculum at the highest levels of education. Philosophers must love learning itself, love the whole of wisdom, and possess a desire to learn everything (R. 475b-c). True philosophers do not love beautiful examples, but love the beautiful itself. They must see in empirical examples only reminders of the eternal forms (R. 475e-476d). Their education moves philosophers to love the thing in itself, not instantiations of the thing (R. 480a). They must be able to grasp what is always the same in all respects, to love the kind of learning

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69 Book IX of the Republic chronicles the harrowing psychology of the tyrant.

70 ἐὰν μνημονευομεν ἀπὸ ταῖς καὶ ἀκραις καὶ τὰ τοῖχα καὶ τὰ οἰκήματα τουτούς φιλεῖν τῷ θεῶν ἀνεκθεστὶ οὐς τί ὁμοίως (R. 480a).
associated with being. Philosophy aims at what always is, not the lower things that change (R. 484b-485b).

After their service as soldiers and junior political officers, philosophical souls will study an advanced curriculum (R. 498a-b). Arithmetic, geometry, the study of three dimensional solids, and astronomy are courses of study that prime the soul for dialectical reasoning (R. 522c-530b). In addition to practical and military applications, these primer courses deal with abstractions rather than sense data. The curriculum turns the soul toward what is: true being, not temporary examples of things. However, they do not reach true being, but only lead the soul to understanding based on hypotheses. Dialectic reasoning alone leads a soul from a position of understanding to knowledge of the forms themselves (R. 531d-532b). After awakening true knowledge in the soul and beholding a vision of the good (to agathon auto), a philosopher returns to the city to use the good itself as the ideal (paradeigmata) of right-ordering (kosmein, R. 540a-b).

In the course of the dialogue, Adeimantus objects that philosophers, as he has observed them, tend to be good for nothing (R. 487b-e). Socrates has affirmed that properly educated, philosophers will contribute to the city by giving birth in mind and truth (R. 490a-b). What does Plato mean by this act of genesis? Having apprehended the Good itself, a philosopher returns to the city to resume a political station. With knowledge of the Forms, a philosopher-king censors the poetry and musical practices, revises the educational code, oversees the procreation of the soldier class, and guides the next generation of philosophical souls to true knowledge. A philosopher translates

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71 gennēsas noun kai alētheian (R. 490b).
knowledge of the Good into political revision. When the term of service expires, the elderly philosophers leave the city, rejoin the practice of dialectical contemplation, and return to the “Isle of the Blessed” (R. 540b-c). Most people, including Adeimantus, are ignorant of what true philosophers are. Living in disordered cities, the many see only the corrupted philosophical souls, not properly educated ones. Knowing the Good, a philosopher-king would be the greatest advantage to a city.

Why must philosophers abandon dialectical philosophy for kingship? This demotion from the Isle of the Blessed to a city of mere humanity appears to be unjust. Indeed, Plato writes that philosophers must be compelled or persuaded to return to the city (R. 519-520e). What could persuade someone to leave the divine to dwell with the mortal? Echoing an argument from the Crito, Plato writes that the philosophers will be persuaded to return because the city made them and they owe obedience to their superior (R. 520b-c). The city itself is superior to any individual within it, as no individual can live as best as possible outside an ordered political association—even philosophers.

Plato’s argument in the text is not convincing. Looking back at the Phaedrus and Symposium, Plato has a better answer. Philosophers become kings because they desire reproduction, like all mortal things. Their acts of reproduction (they give birth in mind and truth) are not physical procreation necessarily, but the replication of the Forms in the

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72 Why philosophers must rule is one of the more controversial points in Plato. The traditional view, Barker (1947), Cornford (1941), and Nettleship (1901), is that Plato is serious in his philosophy, but skeptical about the implementation of the subsequent political reforms. Others, including Nichols (1984; 1987) Annas (1981), Saxonhouse (1978), Bloom (1968), and Strauss (1964), interpret the Republic as arguing philosophers should not rule as kings, or at least that they do not benefit from ruling. Harman (1986) contests the comedic interpretation of the Republic, especially Bloom’s, and proposes the condition of the philosopher-kings is tragic, not absurd. Others, including Mahoney (1992) Reeve (1988), Kraut (1973), Dobbs (1985; 2003), Andrew (1983), Klosko (1981), Hall (1977), Irwin (1977), and Beatty (1976), have argued that philosophers are rightly kings; political rule is not a burden but a fulfillment.
minds of philosophical youths and in the political structure itself. Creating future philosophers and establishing the ideal city is a positive good for mature philosophers. This must be true to defend the political function of philosophers as kings, and it is true according to Plato’s understanding of how philosophy, knowledge, and the Forms instill order in physical reality.

Ultimately, Plato is ambiguous on the topic in the *Republic*, but he is not unclear or uncertain. The problem is that he defends both sides too strongly. In theory, putting the city in order is the *technē* of philosophy. *Eudaimonia* for a philosopher, like every other citizen, ought to consist in practicing their *technē*. Therefore, returning to the city and restoring order to it should be a good thing. Yet, Plato specifically says philosophers will not consider this political task a good thing, but a necessity (*R.* 540b). This ambivalence at least shows that Plato is unable or unwilling to wholly reconcile the philosopher’s soul with his or her temporary, physical life.

**The Philosopher-Citizen**

Until philosophers rule as kings, or political and philosophical power coincide, cities will face misrule and humanity will suffer. The ideal city will never be instantiated until philosophers rule as kings (*R.* 473d-e). Such is the doctrine of the *Republic*. Political justice requires philosophers, those who possess true knowledge of the eternal things, the Forms. Those without knowledge of the true models cannot make reference to real standards when judging instantiated things; they judge by opinion alone (*R.* 484c-d). Without Forms, and philosophers who know them, the city is merely a collection of clashing, opinionated individuals. By nature, opinions about the Good are
bound to differ. Soldiers will say victory is the highest good and craftsmen will say material satisfaction is the best; absent knowledge, nothing can harmonize the two. A *polis* will not exist, but only a collection of geographically-proximate individuals. This chaotic group of human beings will exhibit disagreement and conflict about what is good and just. Why call them citizens or a city? Do they work together toward the Good? Does the collection of individuals represent any coherence? No, only the ideal city is a *polis* in the proper sense; all other “cities” are in conflict with themselves. In all cities save the true *polis*, the strongest faction or individual will rule, and any collection of opinionated individuals can become the strongest under changing circumstances. In fact, “the strongest” becomes a continuously changing concept, for whatever quality vaults a faction into power is the thing that makes it “strongest.”

On the contrary, the best city is ordered and divine—*cosmopolis*, not a mere collection of human factions (*R.* 497c). Plato maintains the ideal city exists as a Form, thus knowable to philosophers. Philosopher kings are necessary for the instantiation of the ideal city, only they can apprehend the Form and translate the true being of the abstraction into a physical reality. Philosophers as kings will always be necessary to maintain the imitation of physical reality to the ideal Form (*R.* 412a-b, 497d). The philosopher will be a citizen in the ideal city or none at all, because only in that city can they harmonize the life of philosophy with the duty of citizen (*R.* 591c-592b).

**Epilogue**

Do the middle dialogues defend the idea of worldly order, a *kosmos*? Does Plato create a political order, a *polis*, in harmony with the *kosmos*? What is the status of
citizenship in the cosmopolis? Is the philosopher a citizen in the ideal city?

Philosophy and cosmology unfold in the middle dialogues, especially in the *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, and *Republic*. Plato defends an orderly world, and the source of order is knowable through philosophy. The *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* tell of the force of divine love, or *Erōs*. This force compels whomever it possesses toward the beautiful. What is beautiful? Permanence, unchanging, and the eternal are Plato’s qualities of truly beautiful things. The beautiful itself is the ideal of changelessness, of eternal being. *Erōs* compels a philosopher to knowledge of the ideal, raising him or her to behold the form. However, a philosopher cannot remain in that enthusiastic state permanently, for nothing is ideal in the changing, material reality. Signs of the beautiful in the material world awaken philosophers to that eternal ideal. A prominent cue is the beautiful soul of a young philosopher. In this way, *Erōs* compels mature philosophers to educate young philosophers toward true ideals, continuing the practice of philosophy and the knowing of true reality in the changing material world.

The *Republic* expands on cosmology and ontology, detailing what reality truly is, distinguishing knowledge from understanding, opinion, and imagination, and explaining how education leads a philosopher to knowledge.\(^\text{73}\) One will never learn what truly is through sense-perception alone. The *kosmos* is material and immaterial, but the source of order for material, observable things is strictly intelligible. True education must

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\(^{73}\) Solmsen (1940) explains the importance of education, especially Plato’s unified approach to the sciences, in leading the philosophical souls to knowledge. Shorey (1889) argued the *Republic* as a dialogue is primarily concerned with politics and ethics. Ontology is only a secondary aid to the discussion of philosophy and political rule. Compared to a dialogue like the *Timaeus*, Shorey is right. Ontology in the *Republic* is more understated than later dialogues, but that does not mean it is unimportant to politics and philosophy.
stimulate the mind to think abstractly and reason dialectically. Subjects like arithmetic teach about number, forcing students to confront the idea of a number itself: what is one or two in itself? Study in geometry and three-dimensional solids trains students in logical deduction from axioms. Astronomy moves students to think about the orderly motion of the *kosmos*, not merely to observe the motion of planets. All of these subjects deal with unchanging abstractions- the number one never changes, a triangle always has three angles equal to one hundred eighty degrees, and the motions of the planets were assumed to be fixed and eternal. Finally, a student of philosophy trains in dialectic, discussing things not from axioms or hypotheses, but beginning with true being. Philosophers come to know that the material world follows a source of true, eternal order.

Standards exist for material things, though material things do not perfectly accord with ideals. No triangle drawn in the sand will be perfect. But like the triangle, an ideal standard exists for the *polis*. In changing, imperfect reality, the just city is reflection of the ideal. The *Republic* details the just city, and Plato bases its composition on three classes of citizens (craftsmen, soldiers, and philosophers) and three virtues (moderation, courage, and wisdom). Craftsmen provide for the material goods of the city. They work only at their crafts, and do not participate in martial training, lawgiving, or law enforcement. Craftsmen know their purpose in the city and have the ability to control their appetites, preventing the city from lurching toward the pitfalls of luxury. The soldiers live a common, barracks lifestyle, exclusively preparing for the defense of the city. They know to fear only dishonor, not death, and so they are courageous in
protection of the city. Finally, philosophers rule the city, keeping each class working
toward its particular civic contribution and educating the next generation of
philosophers. Knowing the Good, the philosophers can order the city according to the
eternal Forms. The just city, the cosmopolis, is moderate in its appetites, courageous in
spirit, wise in reason, and in harmony with itself.

Chapter IV addressed problems in the early dialogues of the relationship between
philosophy and citizenship. In the *Apology* and *Crito*, Socrates was a dedicated
philosopher, and would not relinquish that divine duty to be a full citizen, yet he also
acknowledged the city as superior to the individual. His city created him and he felt
obligated to obey its commands. However, in the *Phaedo*, the description of a
philosopher’s life makes citizenship an irrelevant, insignificant pursuit of material
things. The middle dialogues address these problems, arguing for a conception of
philosophy compatible with citizenship. *Erōs* drives philosophers to recreate the
otherworldly Forms in this reality; more accurately, philosophers order material reality
according to the Forms. Furthermore, *Erōs* compels mature philosophers to educate
young, philosophical souls. The young souls present a vision of beauty to the elders, and
awakening knowledge within them provides a source of fulfillment to mature
philosophers. With these two compulsions, Plato has found reason for philosophers to
participate in the material world, and thereby finds a place for them in the city. The
ideal city raises and educates its young, philosophical souls as citizens. As children,
they witness the harmony of virtues in their fellow citizens and the just order of the city.
As youths and young adults, they train as soldiers and fight in defense of the city. In
adulthood, they study the curriculum of philosophy and serve as officers of the law. Finally, after a retreat to study in dialectic, they return to the city to rule as kings. Philosophers live in the city and contribute to its harmony through the application of their skill. Throughout their lives, the practice of philosophy does not impede their function as citizens; rather, citizen-philosophers are a civic necessity. And yet, Plato writes at the conclusion of Book IX that a philosopher’s true city is the ideal one, not necessarily the one into which he or she is born (R. 592a-b). Socrates as philosopher and citizen has found his harmony, but Plato has not reconciled Socrates and Athens specifically. Only if Athens conforms to the ideal polis will Socrates be its philosopher-citizen.

On a final note, a paradox does exist in the Republic concerning citizenship and the possibility of the ideal city. The existence of an ideal city is a prerequisite for the proper education of philosophers. In their childhood, young philosophers need to see order, beauty, and harmony among all classes of the city. Examples of disorder and vice can turn their souls away from philosophy. Raised in disorderly cities, philosophers become the perpetrators of great evils. A true philosopher seems to exist only in the ideal city. Yet, the dialogue implies that a philosopher is necessary to construct the ideal city in the first place. How does the philosopher necessary for the creation of the ideal city come into being before the city necessary for the creation of philosophers? The question finds no apparent resolution through the middle dialogues, and points to deeper problems with Plato’s philosophy. Truly, the paradox is confounding.
CHAPTER VI
THE LATE DIALOGUES

Cosmological and Political Reform

The *Republic* stands as the apex of the middle dialogues. Plato has written a grand work of philosophy, examining the structure of the *polis* and inquiring into the origins of world order. Its conclusion is worth restatement: only philosophers possess the knowledge to bring political order into harmony with true principles of good. Only if philosophers rule will the *polis* be in harmony with the *kosmos*. In this best of cities, philosophers live as full citizens. They have a function in the city and the city raises them from birth to fulfill that function. These philosophers are citizens not only in function, but in belonging. They feel attached to the city and their fellow citizens. Believing the myth of metals, every citizen will think of the earth upon which they live as their mother and their fellow citizens as family. They will feel attached to a specific place and to a definite group of people. And the city’s philosopher-kings will create their future replacements, the generation and education of philosophical souls a prime concern. The city is a unity where each citizen, whether philosopher or farmer, lives and works in harmony and justice.

In the late dialogues, I argue that Plato shifts the calculus and divides the philosopher-king into two separate and hierarchical functions: that of the lawgiver and the citizen.\(^\text{74}\) The lawgiver represents the political function of a fully-developed and

\[^{74}\text{Steinberger (1989) made the argument that in the *Republic* the functions of the philosopher and the guardian should be independent. A philosopher’s work is to contemplate order only; the guardian applies that knowledge through hand-on ruling. I disagree with the argument applied to the *Republic*, but it can be applied to the later dialogues.}\]
truly philosophical soul. Having knowledge of the essential unity of the Good, the philosopher functions as a lawgiver over a political community; they bestow a code of law that best organizes a group of individuals. Through their political act of lawgiving, they create a *polis* from a chaotic, motley group of human beings. The citizen is a fully-developed soul, but lesser in inherent capability than the lawgiver. The citizen may possess one or more of the political virtues, but does not have the philosophical ability to understand how these seemingly distinct virtues find a harmony. To harmonize a group of differently-skilled individuals is the function of a lawgiver; to effect the plan is the function of citizens.

The division of philosopher-kings into lawgivers and citizens initially occurs in the *Statesman* and with more clarity in the *Laws*. The division especially accords with Plato’s late cosmology, specifically his understanding of philosophers as more rare and otherworldly than in the middle dialogues. The late dialogues turn away from the *Republic*’s proposal that a city raise its philosophers one generation after another and that those philosophers should live in the political community and among its citizens.\(^75\)

If the ideal city of the *Republic* is impossible, then Plato must draft a new political design that does not rely upon the continual generation of philosopher-kings. In the new political design, philosophical souls will not rule as kings or live as citizens. In the late dialogues, philosophers write law codes for a group of citizens to follow. The citizens of such a *polis* strictly implement and administer the law code; they refrain as much as

\[^75\] A prolific literature debates whether the ideal city of the *Republic* is a serious design or a farce, and if serious, whether that ideal model can serve as the basis of political reform. Strauss (1964) famously argued the city is not a true model of reform. I read the design as serious, following the old orthodoxy and the more recent arguments of Reeve (1988 and Klosko (1981; 1983). Though serious, the plan is not perfect, but subject to revision.
possible from interpretation or alteration. The philosopher-lawgiver who writes the law code is above the citizenry; the citizenry who administer the law code are not capable of the highest levels of philosophy. In the hierarchy of human types, the citizens are beneath the lawgiver. Indeed, the law code brings the city into being and generates the citizenry themselves from the broader mass of chaotic humanity. The political thought of philosopher-lawgiver and citizen is parallel to Plato’s cosmological thought. As the philosopher instills order into a group of humanity to create citizens, the \textit{dēmiourgos} instills order on chaotic material to create the \textit{kosmos}. As the lawgiver brings the city into being through the law code, the \textit{dēmiourgos} ordered the \textit{kosmos} through the creation of the world-soul.

The division of the philosopher-king is congruent with Plato’s revised thoughts on the cosmic order. In the \textit{Timaeus}, Plato delves into cosmology to determine how order came to be in the material world. He writes of a divine craftsman, the \textit{dēmiourgos}, who shapes and orders the material world according to eternal standards. This \textit{dēmiourgos} creates the \textit{kosmos}, the highest being of physical reality. The \textit{kosmos} is the living union of perfect soul and imperfect material; the \textit{kosmos} is all material things united in one whole entity. Within the \textit{kosmos} itself, lesser souls instill order in more delimited areas of reality. Plato understands reality as a hierarchy of being and order. Both the \textit{Statesman} and \textit{Laws} follow in this line of thought. In the realm of political order, the philosopher is like the cosmic \textit{dēmiourgos}. The philosopher rules over the whole of the city, and is therefore above civic life within it. A lesser class of soul, the citizen, follows, implements, and administers the philosopher’s laws as best it can.
Plato’s attempt to understand the cosmos leads to his rethinking the *polis*. The result is a second cosmopolis, Magnesia of the *Laws*. According to my interpretation, the late dialogues investigate similar questions of political order and philosophy, but produce an answer different from the middle dialogues.

*The Timaeus*

Through the middle dialogues, Plato’s cosmology is the least clarified component of his political philosophy. The Forms and the Good are clearly important to the education of philosophers, and to how those philosopher-kings will rule in their city, but what exactly are they? Plato memorably ends the discussion between Socrates and Glaucon prior to reaching the Good, as Socrates does not think poor Glaucon will understand the lesson any further (*R.* 533a). Of course, this leaves the audience in the same state as Glaucon, lacking a true understanding of the highest levels of reality. *The Timaeus* offers a resolution to this abrupt ending and an account of all levels of existence in hierarchical reality, or the chain of states from perfect being to absolute becoming. Plato tells a tale of cosmic genesis to portray the levels of reality and how they come into being. Perfect being, eternal and unchanging, exists as the highest plane of existence. Matter, the totality of all material things, exists in a state of chaos, change, and becoming. Timaeus’ story examines how certain entities, spirits or forces, span the distance between these levels of reality to bring order and being to the chaotic world of material becoming. *The Timaeus* is a dialogue concerning the creation of order in the cosmos, and contains important parallels to acts of political creation and order.

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76 Of course, one could argue that Plato’s telling the tale of cosmic origins is different than leading an interlocutor on a dialectical journey. At this point, I am not such a one.
The *Timaeus* begins almost as a sequel to the *Republic*, recapitulating the structure of an ideal city (*Ti*. 17-19). The dialogue forges its own path when Critias admits of the historical ignorance of Athenian civilization (*Ti*. 20e). The Greeks, he tells, are forgetful of their past. They think themselves a young race and are unaware of the great deeds of their ancestors (*Ti*. 22b-c). Equally, they are ignorant of the essential truth within myths (*Ti*. 22e-23d). The earth is the scene of recurrent, cataclysmic events which destroy civilizations and limit the historical memory of peoples. To the modern, progressive mindset, this point is intriguing in its own right. The statement reflects a cyclical worldview; notice how such a cycle allows for the continual regeneration and re-founding of civilization. Cities destroyed by human or environmental catastrophe can be rebuilt; cities are built in reality just as a city was built by words (*logōi*, *R*. 369a) in the *Republic* (*Ti*. 26b-e).

The *Timaeus* is not about the construction of a city, however. Timaeus will address the hierarchical structure of reality and explain the origin of the *kosmos* and the human being (*Ti*. 27a). At least, he will give a likely account of such things (*Ti*. 28c-d). The first thing Plato clarifies is the difference between the heavens (*ouranos*) and

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77 Voeglin (1947) reads the *Timaeus* and *Critias* as following the *Republic*, and adding to it. Taylor (1936, 437-38) reads the *Timaeus* as following after the *Republic*, both in a dramatic sense and philosophically. The interlocutors will continue the previous day’s discussion, i.e., the discussion from the *Republic*. Cornford (1937, 4-5) argues against reading the *Timaeus* as following the *Republic* or correcting it; the *Timaeus* stands as the first dialogue in a new trilogy. My understanding of the *Timaeus* follows with Cornford (1937), Taylor (1936; 1938), and Shorey (1888; 1889) but does not attempt to resolve their differences of interpretation. Such a project is outside the scope of this work.

78 Naddaf (1994) places the Atlantis myth of cataclysm at the center of his interpretation of the late dialogues. Taylor (1936, 472) argues that Plato shows a sober understanding of mankind’s long pre-history, and of the need for myth and poetry to fill in those gaps.

79 The interlocutors establish that they will require three speeches to analyze the ideal city. Timaeus will discuss the creation of the cosmos, Critias will speak of ancient Athens, and Hermocrates will detail a contemporary constitution. Of course, the *Critias* famously ends in mid-sentence, forever incomplete. Cornford (1937) argues that the *Laws* may include much of the material intended for the *Hermocrates*. 

In earlier dialogues, he equivocated the two (the terms seemingly were interchangeable) but Timaeus points out that the *kosmos* has a body.\(^{80}\) Furthermore, having a body, something external must have set the *kosmos* in motion, as material things are not the causes (*aitia*) of their own motion (*Ti.* 28b-c).\(^{81}\) Timaeus begins with the proposition that the *kosmos* is a physical thing set in motion by something external. A superior, external force acting according to a hierarchical standard must have instilled order in the physical *kosmos*.

To account for the external cause, Plato introduces the concept of the divine craftsman, the *de miourgos*. Deciphering the place of the *de miourgos* in the hierarchy of being is not easy. Plato initially writes that the *de miourgos* is the best of causes (*Ti.* 29a). It looks to the Eternal (*aïdion*) to imbue beauty and order in the *kosmos*. This suggests that the *de miourgos* is beneath the eternals in the hierarchy of reality, yet equally good, beautiful, true, and eternal.\(^{82}\) The *de miourgos* orders matter because it desires all things to be like itself, and it will order matter as best as it is able (*Ti.* 29e-30a). The *de miourgos* acts like a universal principle of identity; it desires all things to be as similar to itself as possible. However, the *de miourgos* is not omnipotent, and cannot instill perfect order into chaotic matter. To order material things, the *de miourgos* crafts a world-soul by fashioning reason (*logismos*) into soul (*psuchē*) and soul into body (*sōma*)

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\(^{80}\) In the *Phaedrus* (247c.), *ouranos* and *hyperouranos* refer to the heavens, or the eternal reality that exists different from mortal reality. In the *Symposium* (189a, 209a), Plato uses a variant (*diakosmesis*) of the root word *kosmos* to express the act of putting things into order, or the internal order a body should have.

\(^{81}\) Strictly speaking, the *kosmos* is both its soul and body. At this juncture, the separation is an explanatory device, not a statement that the *kosmos* pre-existed its soul. The issue of cosmic creation, and the controversy over the interpretation of the passage, will arise later in the dialogue. See notes 83-86.

\(^{82}\) Robinson (1967, 61) reads the hierarchy this way. Taylor (1936, 442) separates the *de miourgos* from the forms by differentiating soul from forms. Perhaps Shorey (1888, 411) captures Plato’s *de miourgos* best: it is “the embodiment of artistic purpose as opposed to lawless chance or arbitrary convention.”
The kosmos is a living thing and a unity within itself (Ti. 31a-b). The dēmiourgos unites all matter, every piece of chaotic material, and crafts it into a harmony and friendship (Ti. 31c-33b). The kosmos is a physical thing, so it must have a body. The act of creation entails ordering the elements into a proper proportion. Again, every piece of matter is contained in the kosmos; no matter exists outside its body. The kosmos is one, self-sufficient, and self-contained (Ti. 33c-d). Nothing within it can dissolve the unity of the kosmos; nothing external can be added to improve it.

Plato conceives of the cosmic body as a three-dimensional sphere which encompasses all matter and spins on its own axis (Ti. 34a). Physically, the kosmos is the totality of all material things, and psychically, it is the most rational soul joined to a material body.

Timaeus’ story continues to elucidate the soul of the kosmos. The dēmiourgos creates the soul of the kosmos as the most divine thing to exist in physical reality (Ti. 34b). Imbued with mathematical principles to instill reason and harmony, the cosmic soul is the greatest and most perfect of all created things (Ti. 35a-37a). However, Plato’s account is confusing when he tries to determine if the soul is older than matter and

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83 The cosmic body raises debate in the literature, notably in Taylor (1936, 442-444) and Cornford (1937, 24-26), concerning whether the dēmiourgos generated the body in time, and therefore chaotic material exists prior to the cosmic body, or if Plato uses the verb “to become” not in the sense of an event in time, but a continuous process of becoming. Pre-existing matter would create problems for Plato's hierarchy of being.

84 Language is a sticky problem when discussing cosmology. The above “act of creation” is a disputable phrase. If the kosmos is always in a state of becoming, there was no “act of creation,” but an eternal process of becoming. However, if chaotic material existed in disorderly motion, which the demiurge acted upon, then one can speak of an act of generation, at least. The dēmiourgos creates the kosmos through this act of generation. Cornford’s (1937, 163-210) discussion of this issue stretches across his commentary, and reaches no clear conclusion. Taylor (1936, 443-444) relies on the authority of Aristotle to argue for a moment of creation, the demiurge as a “Creator,” and no previous era of primordial disorder. Still, he admits the world is a generated thing and not a perfect, eternal thing. Shorey (1888, 400-401) supersedes these debates with the contention that the Timaeus is less of a “metaphysical masterpiece” than Plato’s “hymn of the universe.” The doctrine is less important than the method of philosophy.
when/how time came into existence.\textsuperscript{85} The soul cannot be younger than the body, for the younger should not rule the older (\textit{Ti.} 34c). Yet, physical reality appears to exist in a primordial state of chaos, thus necessitating the forging of the cosmic soul. Telling stories can be difficult, especially in matters of chronology, and Plato admits as much in dealing with the order of creation and the coming-into-existence of the \textit{kosmos} and time (\textit{Ti.} 34c, 38b). Plato’s description of the \textit{kosmos} as both soul and matter is fraught with difficulties that continue to instigate disagreement among his readers.\textsuperscript{86}

The \textit{kosmos}, a union of divine soul and fashioned body, is not immortal by its own work, but the \textit{dēmiourgos} grants and preserves it from “the fate of death” (\textit{thanatou moiras}, \textit{Ti.} 41a-b). As the \textit{dēmiourgos} creates the \textit{kosmos} in its image, the \textit{kosmos} creates lesser divinities in its own image (\textit{Ti.} 41c-d). Descending this hierarchy of reality, each level will contain entities less perfect, eternal, and immortal. Continuing down the hierarchy, each level grows more susceptible to death and exhibits more change in itself. One set of lesser divinities within the \textit{kosmos} are the planets. Despite the literal meaning of their name (the wanderers), the planets traverse the \textit{kosmos} in an orderly pattern. Though they appear to wander, their paths have a mathematical rationality to them (\textit{Ti.} 39b-c). Lesser divinities such as these are responsible for the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{85} Cornford (1937, 57-59) argues the soul and body of the cosmos are coeval and eternal, despite Plato’s description that soul is prior to body. The argument about a literal versus non-literal reading of this passage continues with Cherniss’s (1944) non-literal interpretation against Vlastos’s (1965) literalist reading. The non-literalists argue for an eternal relationship between body and world-soul; the literalists argue for the existence of pre-ordered matter. Both sides present excellent cases, and the difficulty in determining a winner may hint at flaw within Plato’s philosophy rather than a failure of interpretation.

\textsuperscript{86} The problem generally revolves around the origin of disorder. Why is necessity sometimes persuaded by reason to come to order and other time not? There is no consensus on Plato’s understanding of disorder/evil, or the place of disorder in Plato’s comprehensive philosophy. See Mohr (1978a; 1980), Robinson (1967), Hackforth (1959; 1946; 1936), Miller (1957), Cherniss (1954), Vlastos (1939), Hoffleit (1937), Boodin (1930), Chilcott (1923), and Shorey (1889, 48-49).
\end{footnotesize}
creation of the last and lowest of the created divinities: the human being.

Plato absolves the divine *kosmos* for the creation of the grossly imperfect human being (*Ti*. 42d). The *kosmos* brings into being orderly things like the planets. Though imperfect, the planets contain a soul that moves them in mathematical, ordered patterns. Lesser divinities, those beneath the *kosmos* in perfection, create the human being. Distant from the perfection of the *kosmos*, the human being is a disorderly thing. Composite in soul, the human being struggles within itself because it contains both rational and irrational forces (*Ti*. 43a-44c). The head of the human being contains the rational part of the soul which struggles toward the higher levels of reality against baser, physical desires (*Ti*. 44d-e). At this point, Plato explains the purpose of the physical senses. Senses exist to facilitate the understanding of order. Sight, for example, functions to bring an image of the orderly motions of the *kosmos* to the rational mind (*Ti*. 45-46c). The human being can observe an orderly event like the motions of the planets across the sky, and be lead to think about order itself and the hierarchy of orderly things (*Ti*. 47b-c). Hearing similarly exists to lead the soul to musical harmonies (*Ti*. 47d-e). The *kosmos* exhibits sensible patterns of order and harmony accessible to human senses, facilitating the faculty of understanding.

Timaeus appears near the completion of his tale when he realizes he must qualify his speech to such a degree that a new beginning is required. Timaeus begins anew to explain how mind and necessity (*anankē*) interact in “errant” or “wandering” material

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87 In *Phaedo*, for example, the senses are a distraction and hindrance to philosophy. In the educational system of the *Republic*, they are early facilitators of learning, but ultimately must be put aside in favor of pure thought.
Plato is attempting to elucidate how the forms and matter interact (Ti. 50b). He starts by relaying that true being and chaotic matter existed prior to the creation of the kosmos (Ti. 52a-d). Matter existed in a state of becoming under the influence of necessity. Material things existed in a state of unreason until the divine being ordered (kosmeisthai) these elements according to forms (eidesi) and number (arithmois) so that the material world would be as best (kallista arista) as was possible (dunaton) (Ti. 53a-b). Plato explains how geometric shape is the means of ordering different physical elements, how shape determines the physical properties of the elements (Ti. 53c-67c). Geometry being the premier abstract science of the time, Plato based his understanding of the physical world in this discipline (Taylor 1936, 457-458).

If his geometrical physics is obsolete, bear in mind that Timaeus has not changed the argument of the dialogue, but merely attempted to explain in more depth the hierarchy of reality, the underlying causes of physical motion, and the properties of elements (Cornford 1937, 210-239). He reaffirms that the dēmiourgos created the kosmos as a unity and perpetually secures its immortality and perfection - at least the highest degree of perfection attainable by a material thing (Ti. 69b-c).

The dialogue has one final section discussing the human being. In the narrative, the Timaeus initially appears to differ from the tripartite soul of the Republic. Plato writes that the kosmos itself created the immortal and rational human soul, but the lesser gods created the mortal body to encase it along with a mortal soul to motivate the body

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88 to tēs planōmenēs eidos aitias (Ti. 48a). Taylor (1936, 456-457) reads the “receptacle” or “matrix” as unordered becoming, a purely chaotic realm but only a hypothetical construct, as the matrix is coterminous with ordered generation. Shorey (1889, 67-68) long ago argued Plato’s relation of being to becoming in the receptacle admits of no easy translation.
(Ti. 69c-e). Of course, these divinities wanted to keep the rational and immortal separate from the irrational and mortal; thus, the rational soul resides in the head and the irrational soul resides in the body, with the neck providing a measure of separation between the two (Ti. 69e). However, Plato does divide the soul into three after this first division of two. The mortal soul has two components that correspond to spirit (thumos) and appetite (epithumia), as in the Republic (Ti. 70a-b).\(^9\) Dividing the rational, immortal soul from its irrational, mortal parts actually raises some disturbing problems for Plato. Do most people (all non-philosophers) simply lack a rational soul? Are they totally mortal? Is there no transmigration of the soul for them? Or is the case that reason is a weak force in most people? If the latter, then Plato must concede that the mortal and inferior souls of the body can rule despite the presence of the rational, immortal, and superior soul of the head. Such an admission would be ruinous to Plato’s hierarchical structure of command and reality. Otherwise, to preserve the philosophical system, Plato would have to utterly debase the worth of most human beings. Most people would not possess a rational, immortal soul. Parts of the Timaeus (86b-90d) even suggest that the physical body is responsible for moral failures (Taylor 1936, 459; Cornford 1937, 243-247).\(^{90}\) That cannot mean the physical material, as material is lifeless without a soul. The mortal soul must lead the immortal soul into vice. But that, too, violates Plato’s hierarchy. Again, the late dialogues are not free of problems, but

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89 What exactly is a mortal soul? Cornford (1937, 39, 146) mentions it without further comment. This is a strange new element in Plato. Compare this soul to the charioteer and horses of the Phaedrus or the tripartite soul of the Republic; they are not identical. These newly mortal elements are present in the eternal soul of those middle dialogues.

90 Taylor (1936, 491-492) later recants this suggestion. Many souls do cause motion in the world, and some are more disordered than others. All disorder is caused by these imperfect souls, not body.
what is clear is that this cosmological exposition has importance for Plato’s political
designs.\textsuperscript{91}

The *Timaeus* is an account of how the divine brought order to chaotic material.
Souls imbued with reason bring matter to order as far as it is in the souls’ power to
command and matter’s nature to obey. The *dēmiourgos*, a divinity connected to the
eternals, crafted the *kosmos*, a union of physical body and intangible soul, to make every
piece of disorderly matter into a rational unity. The *kosmos*, a living animal itself,
fashioned souls and formed bodies for smaller packets of matter, bringing the lesser
divinities into existence. The lowest of these soul-and-body-beings is the human being.
The soul of this peculiar and imperfect animal is composite, with a rational part crafted
by the cosmic deity and an irrational, mortal part crafted by lesser divinities. A
composite being, the human animal struggles internally. The rational soul desires to
comprehend true reality and ascend to higher levels of being. The irrational parts of the
soul lower the animal to an earthly existence.\textsuperscript{92} The hierarchy is complete. The divine
instills high order in matter, generating the *kosmos*. Lesser divinities order matter within
the *kosmos*, creating lesser, rational beings- humanity. Some human beings will devolve
into lower forms of life, generating the irrational animals. All reality is a chain, a
hierarchy from eternal being to chaotic becoming.

\textsuperscript{91}A separate inquiry is necessary to answer the questions above. For this project, I only aim to show that
Plato’s late cosmology, however logical or flawed, corresponds to a rethinking of his political designs.
\textsuperscript{92}Plato’s theory of evolution is fascinating and brief. Animal species are generated from the struggle
within the souls of humans. The lower parts of the soul, if they succeed in ruling over the rational part,
will bend the body to the ground, first forcing the animal to walk on all fours, then slithering on its belly.
Evolution is really devolution, as all the animals of the world descend from human beings (*Ti. 91e*). One
must wonder: how do the lower, inferior parts of the soul come to rule over the higher, superior part? In a
hierarchical world, it does not make sense.
The Statesman

The Statesman famously represents an example of the method of division; pertinently, Plato divides the skills of the philosopher-king into two separate political functions. The division broaches two important differences with the ideal city of the Republic. First, the singular philosopher-king is separated into two distinct human souls and political functions. In this dialogue, the two types correspond to the philosophical and the administrative. The philosophical soul has the knowledge to harmonize individuals with various virtues. These virtuous individuals do not have the broader philosophical knowledge to integrate their individual talent with the talent of others. The philosopher no longer rules as a king, but becomes a lawgiver, one who organizes and directs the activities of the citizenry. The citizens, possessing a discrete virtue or virtues, become the administrators of the polis. Effectively, Plato separates the philosopher from citizenship. Second, the Statesman reveals Plato’s concern that a city cannot expect to be ruled by generations of philosophers. A truly philosophical soul is more of a rarity than Plato anticipated when constructing the ideal city of the Republic. Philosopher-kings will not do as a political archetype; the Statesman begins a new path.

The Statesman begins the transformation of philosopher-kings that Plato will complete in the Laws. This transformation will see philosopher-kings replaced by philosophical lawgivers and dutiful citizens. The function of lawgiver elevates the

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93 Reading the Statesman, I focus my argument as much as possible on the separation of the philosopher-king into two, distinct functions. The dialogue, in itself, in its period, and in the broader corpus, is fascinatingly complex. One can find a number of lengthy and thorough interpretations of the dialogue, for example Castoriadis (2002), Annas and Waterfield (1995), Rowe (1995), Miller (1980), and Skemp (1952). These interpretations have sparked additional commentary and interpretation in Merrill (2003), Stern (1997), and McCabe (1997).
philosopher above those who live in the polis as equal citizens. The philosopher-lawgiver drafts the law code for a city, but does not live in the polis. Citizens of the polis cooperate in administering the city with a broad measure of equality, as all exist under the law and are responsible for its enforcement. The life and political function of citizenship is fundamentally different from the life and function of a philosopher. Whereas the philosopher-kings possessed both abstract knowledge and practical skills of political order, lawgivers and citizens do not. The lawgiver still possesses the knowledge of true political principles, but does not engage in daily political life. The citizens only possess the disparate skills of political life without the knowledge of how to best integrate them. Individual citizens do not know how to bring their particular skills into a harmony for the city’s best interest. Thus, citizens must follow the law code strictly because it provides the only stable guidance for their city. Plato divides the philosopher-king into two political functions, the lawgiver and the citizen. The citizens live in the city as implementers and managers of a law code; the lawgiver creates that law code. In consequence, the philosopher is the law itself.

Plato explicitly wrote in the Republic that a well-ordered city would not need an extensive law code to regulate all facets of life (R. 425b-e). Good citizens, well-educated and minding their own craft, would not need such a detailed prescription of proper behavior. Raised to work at their craft, citizens know, understand, and believe only the good. Accordingly, they will act well. So why would Plato write a dialogue about philosophical lawgivers and citizen administrators? A likely answer is that Plato

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94 Is the lawgiver merely an old philosopher-king set out to rule another city? No, they would have returned to the Isle of the Blessed rather than engage in a new political project.
found the truly philosophical soul is an exceedingly rare creature. Given the rarity, a city cannot expect to raise generation after generation of philosophers to rule as kings. Plato still maintains that the best government for a city is rule by one possessing a king’s wisdom (Stm. 294a). However, he notes that a wise king will possess the knowledge of law-making (nomothetikē, Stm. 294a). Though a king best serves the city through direct, person-to-person rule (better yet, soul-to-soul), a law code can establish a good government as well (Stm. 294b-c). A wise king can write a set of general principles that will be good for most citizens, most of the time (Stm. 294e-295a). The point should not be overlooked: a good city need not have living, ruling philosophers as kings.

Plato expresses doubt that enough philosophers will exist to direct each citizen individually. First, he admits that only a few people will ever possess kingly knowledge (Stm. 297c, 300e). Given that admission, a form of government reliant on a cadre of philosophers is unlikely to exist. Second, even if a city came to be ruled by a philosopher-king, one individual cannot tell every other citizen how to live (Stm. 295a-b). This problem is one of logistics and administration; one philosopher-king can talk only to so many citizens in a day. No generation will yield enough philosophic souls to rule the city as kings. If there cannot be philosopher-kings, then the alternative is a philosopher’s written law code.

95 phronēseōs basilikon (Stm. 294a).
96 The division of the philosopher-king suggests that the concept is not impractical, but utterly untenable. This means that the ideal city of the Republic is not too impractical to be realized, but utterly impossible. The city of philosopher-kings is not too difficult to achieve. It based on a flawed estimation of the quantity of philosophers, which stems from a faulty understanding of the cosmos itself. If the cosmos produces too few philosophers for them to rule generation after generation, then such a city is impossible, not impractical. That city being impossible, the next best design would be, in fact and theory, the ideal city, not a second best city. The semantics of “second-best” can obscure that Plato has made the ideal city
After the philosopher writes the law code, the citizens must implement it and adhere to it. Plato explains what skills the citizenry must possess to maintain the excellence of their city (*Stm.* 304b-c). Specifically, rhetoric, generalship, and judgment are the key political skills, but the citizens’ expertise does not include knowing when to deploy their skills or how to harmonize the three together (*Stm.* 304e-305c). Only kingly wisdom knows how to harmonize the particular political skills of individual citizens (*Stm.* 305e). The philosopher weaves these skills together, integrating and harmonizing the different skills so they will function for the best of the city (*Stm.* 306a). Like the virtues in the soul, these skills may come into conflict if they are not in balance; therefore, something greater must instill harmony and generate order (*Stm.* 306b-c). The philosopher’s law code is that source of order and harmony; it provides the standards to guide the citizenry in their administration and maintenance of the city.

The *Statesman* is an intricate dialogue, and it suggests that Plato is rethinking his political philosophy. In the *Statesman*, the interlocutors doubt that a city can raise successive generations of philosophers. Recall that the ideal city of *Republic* is contingent on the education of philosophers in every generation. But what if philosophers are not in such great supply? The alternative is to persuade the rare philosopher who does live to write a constitution, a code of laws, for a city. The

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97 The citizens resemble the craftsmen in the ideal city of the *Republic* in some respect. Those craftsmen needed the supervision of philosophers over their work. These citizens need supervision over their skills, further clarifying the separation of political skills and the art of lawmaking, and degrading the faculty of reason in the soul of the citizen.

98 My analysis of the *Statesman* need not venture into the dialogue’s intriguing, perplexing myth. Many scholars have attempted to illuminate the myth and its meaning, especially Carone (2004), Nightingale (1996), Mohr (1978b; 1981), and Robinson (1967). The main problem in understanding it is that the myth implies the cosmos spins out of control. In the *Timaeus*, the *kosmos* is guaranteed perfect motion by the *dēmiourgos*. The myth may be more of thought experiment than a vehicle for cosmology.
citizenry (who do not possess the wisdom to rule themselves) must adhere strictly to the code to live as best they can. Instead of philosopher-kings, the city will have a philosopher’s law code as the highest authority. Citizens, skilled in the lesser political arts of generalship, rhetoric, and judgment, will act according to the laws, administering them without true wisdom of political harmony. Not a second-best city or the only practical city, the city of laws is the only logical city given the Plato’s later thoughts on philosophers, citizens, and the cosmos.

The Laws

What type of constitution do the interlocutors create for Magnesia, the colonial city established in the Laws? How does the city’s constitution make sense as the final political design in Plato’s corpus? If Magnesia is consistent with the ideal city of the Republic, merely a later elaboration of an earlier idea, then Plato’s political philosophy is unitary and self-consistent. The debate between the unitary and developmental schools is somewhat pedantic, as some unitarists tend to acknowledge there is “development” in how Plato presents and defends his philosophy, and some development interpretations cohere around certain, fundamental consistencies. I argue that Plato’s philosophy shows consistency in the questions he asks and some fundamental assumptions about reality and human beings, but how these basics blossom into a full political philosophy shows development. Klosko (1986, 18-20) succinctly captures the essence of the unity and development within Plato’s corpus. With more depth, Prior (1985) demonstrates the flaws in the strict unitarianism of Taylor (1936) or Shorey (1903) and the radical revisionism of Ryle (1939) and Owen (1953). Against these, Prior argues that the
Platonic Corpus shows critical development in answering difficult questions of metaphysics and epistemology. Again, I agree with this assessment.

And still, the unitary-development debate is something of a let down. Even Taylor’s (1936) so-called unitarian reading shows development. For example, though he reads the *Laws* as consistent with the *Republic*, he calls it more practical (472) and calls its detailed education program a development (482-485). The debate continues, with Lewis (1998a) more recently arguing that Plato’s dialogues are unitary in doctrine but plural in perspective. The debate between unitary or development does tend to hinge on how one interprets the political design of Magnesia. Is it consistent with the ideal city of the *Republic* or not?

Magnesia may be a “second best city,” less ideal but more practical in some respect.99 One can read the *Laws* as consistent with the earlier political philosophy in two ways. First, the *Laws* represents a longer, more practical version of the ideal. Second, Plato drafted a defense of the second best city, an educated timocracy. In both estimations, the constitution of Magnesia coheres with Plato’s earlier political thought. More frustrating is an argument that defies easy classification. For example, Vlastos (1968, 292) casually refers to Morrow’s interpretation of Magnesia as a “second best city.” However, Morrow (1960), in *Plato’s Cretan City*, reads the *Laws* as Plato translating his ideal city into a practical one; the two are consistent, only crossing the barrier of ideal into real. Yet, this transition requires a significant rewriting of the city, including the reinstatement of private property, the installation of a mixed-system of

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government, and the rejection of rule by philosopher-kings. Indeed, the bulk of Morrow’s work supports the main point that Magnesia is a new city which integrates administrative practicality, historical tradition, and political philosophy. Yet Morrow does not consider these significant variations. Morrow’s (1960, 591-593) conclusion especially supports Magnesia as a new ideal city. Such differences reflect more than the transition from ideal to real, as I will argue.

The potential for inconsistency and confusion exists across these interpretations, but semantics may conceal it. If Plato is arguing that the ideal city of the Republic cannot be established, and Magnesia is the only good constitution that can be realized, then this rejection of the ideal city constitutes a fundamental alteration of his political philosophy. The ideal city is not merely impractical, and therefore a more practical city should be designed, but the city itself is non-existent. If the reality is impossible then the theory utterly collapses and must be replaced. The new formulation of a “second-best” city is in fact the new ideal. Of course, if Magnesia is a thorough defense of a more educated timocracy, then Plato’s corpus is not inconsistent, but merely circumspect. The third possibility is that Magnesia is not consistent with the design of the ideal city; it is neither a retelling of the ideal city nor a more an educated timocracy. Magnesia, the city of laws, is a second cosmopolis. \(^{100}\)

Read closely, Magnesia bears similarities to both the ideal city and the timocracy of Plato’s middle dialogues, but is in total neither. The crux of making sense of this

\(^{100}\) Bobonich (2008, 329-331; 2002) briefly reads the Laws as offering a new ideal city, and rather than revealing an old man’s pessimism, the new city is based on the education of all citizens to understand rationally the laws that are for the best. Carone (2005) interprets the Laws within Plato’s later cosmology as constructing a new cosmopolis as well, but a more equitable and imperial political regime, not a Greek polis and certainly not the ideal city of the Republic.
political system hinges on one’s interpretation of the Nocturnal Council. Up to the late introduction of this institution in Book X (L. 908a), Magnesia is a mixed-government system of democracy and aristocracy. It certainly lacks that utopian vision of philosopher-kings found in the Republic. Thus, some readers (Barker 1947; Sabine 1937) of Plato find the introduction of the Nocturnal Council as contradicting the spirit and design of the preceding work. Morrow (1960) attempted to bridge this divide, and his work is lauded (Marquez forthcoming; Lewis 1998b; Kahn 1961). In Morrow’s (1960, 500-515) interpretation, the guardians of the law in Magnesia are akin to the philosopher-kings of the ideal city. The guardians are the educated elite who perform two functions in the city: understand the broad law code as a rational totality so they can tinker with its application; and, to educate their fellow citizens in the law. These guardians do not rule openly, but exert influence through the practice of philosophy on an individual level. They study and discuss amongst themselves the grand design of the law, and they question their fellow citizens to expand the political awareness of the citizenry. Not all readers of Plato have accepted Morrow’s interpretation of the Nocturnal Council.

Klosko (2008; 1988) has challenged Morrow’s interpretation of the Nocturnal Council and his overall reading of the Laws. Klosko (1988, 75) dubs Morrow’s thesis “the informal view.” The Nocturnal Council is an informal power in the state. It is a kind of super-institution above the ordinary functioning government. However, Plato (L. 969b) writes in the Laws that if such a council of well-educated philosophers were ever established, then the city should hand over political power to it. Klosko (1988, 79)
argues that this conditional means that the established Nocturnal Council would be a formal institution of government endowed with supreme power. There is nothing informal about it. Furthermore, the function of the Nocturnal Council as an informal, advisory/revision board is inconsistent with the purpose of the law code. Plato stresses that the laws are to be followed rigidly (Klosko 2008; 1988, 82). Finally, Klosko (1988, 83-84) points out something Plato (Stm. 293e) has made clear: the rule of philosophical wisdom is superior to the rule of law. When a contingent of philosophers rules the city, it will not resort to the promulgation of a rigid law code. The purpose of a law code is to provide general guidelines for political organization in the absence of true wisdom.

If the Nocturnal Council is not an informal body of philosopher to advise the citizenry and adjust the law code, what is it? Klosko (1988, 84-85) argues that the introduction of the Nocturnal Council represents a change in Plato’s argument inconsistent with the earlier Books of the Laws. Had Plato completed the Laws, he would have revised this divergence into a coherent dialogue, but alas, he did not. Klosko (2008, 466-469; 1988, 86-87) cites numerous discrepancies in the Laws as evidence of its incompleteness, and argues the best method of interpretation is to read the Laws as incomplete. This is obviously not a satisfying conclusion, but Klosko recognizes it as the most logical and only acceptable one. Let us continue the investigation to determine if Klosko is correct.

If Plato maintains a consistent political philosophy, the city in the Laws must be

\[101\text{ See note 104 for a further discussion.}\]
either fundamentally similar to the ideal city of the *Republic* or one of the lesser constitutions. Is Magnesia the ideal city of the *Republic*? The main evidence for this understanding is in Magnesia’s educational and political structure, particularly with the guardians of the laws (*nomophulakes*). These guardians receive a similar education to those in the *Republic*. Plato briefly describes their education, as if to remind the reader of the program constructed in the *Republic* (*L*. 809c-d, 817e-818a). The guardians will study arithmetic, literature, music, geometry, and astronomy, the disciplines necessary to understand right-order in the *kosmos* and in the *polis*. The guardians in Magnesia will become as knowledgeable as the lawgiver of the dialogue and the philosopher-kings of the *Republic* (*L*. 964b-c). They will possess reason in their soul awakening knowledge of the virtues (*L*. 963e-964b). They will know the Good and Beautiful. They will be students of true theology. In terms of education and knowledge, the guardians of Magnesia appear consistent with the guardians of the ideal city. Institutionally, the guardians exercise their political rule in the Nocturnal Council. Plato has described their education and placed them in power. These guardians appear to be identical to those in the *Republic*.

If Plato is being consistent in his political philosophy, then the *Laws* will contain either an elaboration of the ideal city or an exposition of a lesser city. Interpreting Magnesia as the ideal city, one reads the *Laws* as Plato’s detailed explanation of the general laws necessary to instill the proper moderation in the guardian class. The

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102 If this reminder is insufficient, Taylor (1936, 497-501) reads the *Epinomis* as the crown of the *Laws*. It details the education of the guardians of Magnesia. However, the authorship of the *Epinomis* is suspect. On the other hand, Stalley (1983, 3) shrugs off the *Epinomis*, indifferent to its authenticity and unimpressed with its contents. I am inclined to agree with Taylor that the *Epinomis* shows no break with the *Laws*, but I do not think the Guardians of Magnesia are identical to those of the *Republic*. 
guardians, trained as philosophers, will defend the law code and amend individual laws, if necessary, according to their rational understanding of political order. Ultimately, a thorough reading of the *Laws* will not reach this conclusion.

The main argument against the equivalence of the cities in the *Laws* and *Republic* is very promulgation of a detailed law code (Klosko 2008). Plato wrote in both the *Republic* and the *Laws* that the rule of knowledge, however rare and unlikely, is superior to the rule of laws (R. 425a-e; L. 874d-875d). Philosopher-kings (living, breathing, ruling philosophers) provide the rule of knowledge, as they have knowledge in their soul which they can communicate to others. As long as they exist, generation after generation, the best political order is the ideal city of the *Republic*, the rule of knowledge provided by living philosopher-kings. Magnesia obfuscates this issue, and Plato’s thought is unclear. He states definitively that knowledge is superior to law and writes a detailed law code for the city. The logical conclusion is that Magnesia is not a city ruled by philosopher-kings; it is not the ideal city of the *Republic*.

A second argument against the equivalence of the philosopher-kings to the citizens of Magnesia is the possession of private property. The city will have five thousand forty citizens, as in the *Republic*, but each citizen will be responsible for a plot of land (L. 740a). The land ultimately belongs to the city itself, but each citizen will act as steward and manager of an individual estate. And the division into plots is sacred and permanent (L. 741b-e). The difference between Magnesia and ideal city is evident. Plato specifically denied the auxiliaries and guardians private estates in the *Republic*. They were to share the city as a common enterprise and rule the whole as a whole.
Magnesia’s division of its lands into privately-managed plots changes this. Each of the five thousand forty citizens exclusively bears responsibility for a delimited part of the city. Each citizen’s prime responsibility will be to administer the law to a personal estate, keeping careful watch on the private plot to prevent disorder (L. 758a-e). Administering the law to the city as whole is the responsibility of elected officials, who must guard the city in addition to their individual plots of land. Interestingly, these private estates require many laws, and the interlocutors return to this topic multiple times (L. 842e, 846c, 913a, 915e). The profusion of laws in Magnesia and the private estates of its citizens suggest that this city is not identical to the ideal city of the Republic. In the middle dialogues, philosophers needed neither laws nor lands.

Indeed, the Laws is ambivalent about what the citizen-guardians are. The description of these guardians sometimes accords with a philosophical nature, but other times it does not. One argument is the guardians are timocrats and Magnesia is the timocracy, the second best city in the Republic. Some evidence does support this conclusion. As argued in the previous paragraph, the citizens administer private estates. This administration includes ruling over the craftsmen, laborers, and slaves of that property (L. 742a-c, 777d-778a, 806d-e, 846d-848b). The productive crafts must not interfere with each citizen’s physical and mental training (L. 807d). Individually, these land-holding citizens rule over those engaged in productive work, and distribute the fruits of their production. Like the timocrat of the Republic, the citizens of Magnesia are the exclusive practitioners of martial discipline in the city. Unlike the guardians in the ideal city, the citizens in Magnesia own individual lands and exclusively rule the set of
workers on that property.

The case for Magnesia being a timocracy gains credence from the fact that two of the three interlocutors are timocrats. Clinias the Cretan and Megillus the Spartan both hail from timocratic cities and the characters’ words reflect their martial values. When the Athenian asks Clinias what is good in life, the Cretan responds, “to subdue the inferior” (L. 627a). When the Athenian asks about the purpose of laws, Clinias answers, “to train good soldiers, for war never ends” (L. 625c-626b). Megillus agrees, and explains the activities that instill discipline in a Spartan (L. 633a-d). These two characters are not dissuaded from their beliefs easily. They adhere to their conception of the good as their Athenian interlocutor promotes contrary and more complex ideas of virtue, education, and justice (L. 662a).

Analyzing Magnesia’s law code, the city is clearly not a timocracy. The citizens will receive a rigorous and realistic education in warfare, but the city is more than a militarized city (L. 829a-831a, 833a-834d). The law code does not establish a timocracy, but attempts to convince the representatives of two timocratic cities to embrace a government of knowledge and a system of education to inculcate all the virtues, not simply courage. The Athenian argues that courage alone will lead to a city’s eventual destruction, as ancient timocracies themselves were destroyed (L. 684a-685a). A city needs wisdom for its long-term well-being. A city that enshrines only a part of virtue will be undone by its limited vision (L. 688c-e, 705d-e). In brief, one part of virtue is not enough to provide a vision of the whole, and without knowledge of the whole, one may inadvertently pursue a disastrous course (L. 687a-688b). Recalling the
non-military education the citizens receive, and weighing the Athenian’s invocation of the unity of the virtues, the law code clearly aims at a political system different from the simple timocracy.

The guardians appear too philosophical to be timocrats, and yet are not philosophical enough to be philosopher-kings. And if they are philosophical, why is there a detailed, comprehensive law code? What is this city of Magnesia? In total, the *Laws* is an ambivalent dialogue. Literally, Plato gives valence to two different positions of the argument. The guardians do resemble philosopher-kings in certain respects, and Magnesia, with its wise constitution, is an ideal city. Yet, the guardians in the *Laws* are not identical to the philosopher-kings in the *Republic*, nor is Magnesia identical to the ideal city of the *Republic*. The *Laws* contains a surplus of frustrating evidence to support these contrary positions. To break the impasse, one might read the *Laws* in light of the *Statesman* and *Timaeus*. Read together, the *Timaeus*, *Statesman*, and *Laws* reflect a political philosophy different from the middle dialogues.\(^{103}\) Magnesia is ideal in Plato’s later understanding of humanity’s place in the cosmos.

**The Philosopher-Lawgiver**

In the *Statesman*, Plato separated the function of law-creating from law-administering. In the *Laws*, Plato continues the distinction. In the dialogue, the Athenian actually writes a law code for a colony, following the theory that the lawgiver creates the code that generates and rules a city. The lawgiver possesses knowledge above the capability of the citizens who will live in the new city. The terms lawgiver

\(^{103}\) Morrow (1954, 8-9) suggested a version of this path, but his (1960) later interpretation of the *Laws* differs greatly from mine and he takes the *demiourgos*-lawgiver parallel less seriously.
(nomothetēs) and statesman (politikos) represent two different human types, and both have specific functions in the polis (L. 693a).

Recalling the Statesman, Plato uses the analogy of the weaver and the art of weaving to illustrate the lawgiver’s function. In the Laws, human beings are a varied sort, specifically in their skills. The good lawgiver (agathos nomothetēs) molds these human materials into the best form using music and song (L. 671c). Plato returns to this analogy again. When plotting the colony, Plato writes that the lawgiver will weave the different types of citizen together, the strong type to preserve the laws and the weaker type to live under them (L. 734e-735a). The meaning of the analogy is clear. A lawgiver is a different class of human being than those who comprise the citizenry. Lawgivers have insight into the human soul; they know the internal nature of the material with which they construct a city. In addition, they know how to arrange these different materials to create a functioning city. The lawgiver’s skill is the integration of different, chaotic materials into a harmony, constructing order in the form of a whole city from the chaos of individuals. These individuals will find order in themselves as well. Citizens cannot do these things, else they would be lawgivers. However, the laws can shape citizens into a prosperous city if they adhere to the code.

Lawgivers write the constitution that properly orders a citizen’s soul and best arranges the citizens as a political unity- and the city is not lacking in laws. The lawgiver bequeaths an extensive code for the citizens (L. 746b-c). For their benefit, the citizenry must adhere to the code (L. 746d-747b). Plato repeats this point throughout the
The laws: the citizens must obey the law code and preserve it from change.\textsuperscript{104} The laws will explain all political duties, relations, and education (\textit{L. 718a-b, 820e}). The law code will demand little independent thought of the citizens, and in confusing circumstances they are to ask the lawgiver for assistance (\textit{L. 631e, 752a-c}). The number and comprehensiveness of the laws is a strong piece of evidence that Magnesia is not the ideal city of the \textit{Republic}.

The distinction between lawgiver and citizen has a precedent in the \textit{Timaeus}. Recall the hierarchical structure of reality in that dialogue. The \textit{dēmiourgos} orders the whole \textit{kosmos}; the \textit{kosmos} creates lesser divinities to order the matter within itself.

Magnesia follows the pattern of this cosmology in its own genesis. The lawgiver is analogous to the \textit{dēmiourgos} and the city like the \textit{kosmos}. Before the lawgiver brings a city into existence, human beings are the chaotic material awaiting order. As the \textit{dēmiourgos} crafted a soul for the whole \textit{kosmos}, instilling order on it, the lawgiver fashions a code for the whole city, transforming a set of chaotic human beings into an ordered \textit{polis}. Lawgivers are the best and most rational of human beings. They are superior, meaning closer to the divine, than the lot of humanity that lacks the internal rule of a rational soul. Like the \textit{kosmos}, a city only is a city when a rational law code puts a formerly chaotic set of human materials in order. Such a city is not the ideal one of the \textit{Republic}, but a new design, ideal in its own right.

\textsuperscript{104} Egypt is praised for adhering to its nearly-eternal standards (\textit{L. 656d-e}), Sparta for strictly enforcing a long-held law code (\textit{L. 683a-685a}). Citizens living in voluntary slavery to the laws are good (\textit{L. 700a-b}). The Athenian stranger disapproves of the chaos and anarchy of changing laws and governments (\textit{L. 701b-c, 711b-d}). In Magnesia, the citizens must obey the laws and strive to preserve them from change (\textit{L. 715b-d, 762e, 874d}). Popper’s \textit{Open Society} (2002), with emphatic condemnation, details Plato’s antipathy to change. Klosko (2008) stresses the point without the antipathy.
In the *Timaeus*, the *dēmiourgos* fashions a rational soul for the *kosmos*, imbuing the whole body with order. In the *Laws*, the lawgiver fashions a law code for a new city, likewise imbuing it with order. The law code is the container for reason (*nous*) and reason becomes the chief virtue of the laws and the ruling principle of the city (*L.* 632c, 963a). Similar to how the *dēmiourgos* functions in the *Timaeus*, the lawgiver’s work is the creation of good motion in the raw materials. To organize the city into a harmony, the lawgiver uses music, song, and dance as the primary form of education (*L.* 653d-654a, 658e-659c). And the lawgiver must have knowledge of the good and beautiful, because music is an imitation of true standards (*L.* 668b-669b). The human material of the city is not rational, but chaotic. The lawgiver must rely on imitations of reason, not pure reason itself, to bring the materials to order. The lawgiver possesses knowledge and embodies reason in a law code according to true standards that bring harmony to chaotic, human material. However, reality is a hierarchy, thus the lawgiver’s product will be inferior to the work of the *dēmiourgos*. The *polis* is an inferior copy of the *kosmos*, as the lawgiver can succeed only through the rare confluence of divine guidance, luck (*tuchē*) and skill (*L.* 709a-c). The law code is sufficient for its purpose, but not perfect or eternal. Over time, necessity and chaos will prevail over the rational code. Plato displays a farsighted view of the human condition, and the cosmic one, when he notes that civilizations face an inevitable cycle of destruction and rebirth (*L.* 676a-679c).105

Magnesia is not identical to the ideal city of *Republic*, but it is still an ideal city.

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105 Indeed, the *Timaeus* in part and the *Critias* in its unfinished whole included accounts of such a cataclysm: the destruction of Atlantis.
Magnesia is Plato’s second cosmopolis. The philosopher acts upon human material as the démiourgos acts upon the whole kosmos, forging a city and citizens from empty lands and disordered (or at least pre-ordered) human beings. Plato does retain an important feature of the ideal city, that the number of citizens will be five thousand forty. The number is not a coincidence, and Plato explains its significance in practical terms (L. 737e-738b). The number has many divisors (including 2-10 and 12), which allows the lawgiver to divide the city into administrative sections. Citizens will know everyone in their group, and by knowing only one person from another group, they will know the character of all citizens in that group. The divisions function as both facilitators of government administration and social familiarity (L. 738b-e). But the number has more than practical purpose to Plato. The number is a mathematical standard inherent in reality; a city must adhere to the standard to be well-organized- to be a city at all (L. 746d-e). The lawgiver must maintain the standard for the health of the city (L. 747a-b). Indeed, Plato sanctifies the number to preserve it from change (L. 771a-d).

Plato completes the cosmopolis in the later books of the Laws. Instituting the city’s religion, he recapitulates for a last time his cosmology, psychology, and theology. Discussing theism and atheism, the interlocutors defend a specific view of the world that ultimately is one of perspective. Clinias scoffs at those who cannot see the order of nature. “Just look at the earth and the sun and the stars and the universe in general; look at the wonderful procession of the seasons and its articulation into years and months” (L. 886a)! The world has an order to it. Plato argues that living according to that order will result in a fulfilled life. His cosmology is a theistic naturalism, and very much opposed
to atheist naturalism, those scientific naturalists who believed matter moves according to internal properties. Plato’s cosmopolitanism is one of order, harmony, and fulfillment. He fears that atheist naturalism will render political organization subject to rule of the strong or the rule of *tuchē*, meaning random chance (*L.* 888e, 889e-890a).

Plato relies on the concept of the soul to differentiate his cosmology from atheistic naturalism (*L.* 892a). His first principle is that matter does not move itself. Something is responsible for motion in the physical matter that moves all across the *kosmos*. Ultimately, something must have set matter in motion; this first principle of motion is the soul (*L.* 896a-b). Soul is self-generated motion that imparts motion to physical objects (*L.* 894-895a, 896a). Plato examines the many kinds of observable motions (*L.* 893c-e), and concludes that a soul will move an object depending on whether it clings to mind or mindlessness (*nous* and *anous*, *L.* 897a-b). Observing the motions of the sun, the stars, and moon, everyone will see these bodies travel in an orderly fashion and give evidence that reason rules the *kosmos* (*L.* 899b). Unless those who do not recognize the gods can produce a more beautiful, convincing argument, Plato suggests they accept his (*L.* 899c-d).

**Epilogue**

Contrary to the ideal city of the *Republic*, the cosmopolis of Magnesia incorporates a cosmology that rejects the possibility of philosophers living as citizens. Philosophers are not the native sons and daughters raised in the city and educated to be kings. They are lawgivers above the law they construct and outside the city they

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106 Plato summarizes the natural materialists (*L.* 889a-e), and criticizes their contention that the gods are merely conventional and contrived fictions.
establish. This model yields another answer to the dilemma of Socrates caught between his divine service and political attachment. In fact, Plato ends the dilemma by devaluing Socrates’ attachment to Athens. Philosophers no longer owe their allegiance to a particular polis, but may act as the creators of poleis. Neither kings nor citizens, philosophers become lawgivers and founders. They live outside the city and supervise its operation. Should the citizens become confused with the application of a law to a particular circumstance, the philosopher will intervene. In times of normalcy, however, the lawgiver does not participate in daily politics. Plato has explained the soul of the kosmos and found the source of its orderly motion in the work of a divine craftsman. In parallel, Plato seeks to impart order into the polis through the philosopher’s law code. Lost is the binding connection of the philosopher, Socrates, to the city, Athens.

The contrast between the Republic and Laws is most clear when studying the role of the philosopher in each of the political designs. In the Republic, philosophers are indigenous to the polis. Adult, native philosophers select for martial education the youths who exhibit the nature of a guardian. If these youths excel, they continue to study in the philosophic program. Finally, the few who attain true knowledge will function in their city as those who educated them; one generation raises the next in continuity. In the Laws, the philosopher is already fully formed, possessing the highest knowledge, and unattached to the polis of his or her origin. The legal code stresses equality and homogeneity among the citizenry. The home cities of the colonists are unimportant. Terrain and geography are factors, but the lawgiver selects these not from any sentimental attachment, but to cultivate virtue. Any land that possesses certain traits
will do. Where the city of the Republic harmonizes the skills among a certain people, the city of the Laws creates a certain kind of citizen and equality among those citizens. The pattern of lawgiving should be transferable to any set of people, not only Athenians. The Laws is more universal than the Republic. The Republic speaks to the Socratic dilemma of how the philosopher also can be the citizen. The Laws, reflecting on a complete cosmology, declines that possibility to show how the philosopher can create the polis and must reside outside it. Socrates becomes a wandering philosopher and potentially the founder of a new city, but not the martyr of Athens.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

This dissertation is an investigation into the idea of cosmopolitanism, especially its constitutive concepts of “cosmos” and “polis.” Reading contemporary cosmopolitanism, one is hard-pressed to find an examination of the cosmos, the polis, or their interrelation. Modern cosmopolitans are secure in their foundational principles, whether universal morality, economic liberty and equality, democracy, or constitutionalism. Cosmopolitanism is then merely the functional work of expanding a favored principle across the globe. Typically, the project is institutional: what is the best institutional structure to support the favored principle? Postmodernism is different, of course. It travels the past of least resistance, that there is no cosmos (not a beautiful, natural order) nor should there be a polis (a limited, sovereign community). Such a state of thought is unbecoming of cosmopolitanism’s long tradition of inquiry into the nature of the cosmos, the order of the polis, and the harmony of latter in the former. As a remedy to this state, I have investigated the development of Platonic cosmopolitanism across the Plato’s dialogues within the context of broader Greek cosmopolitanism. Greek cosmopolitanism reached various conclusions about the cosmic order and its implications for political association. Plato’s is distinct in arguing for a truly Greek polis that reflects the order of the whole kosmos. Ultimately, there is no one true cosmopolitanism, but any meaningful cosmopolitan thought must include the study of the natural world, political association, and the subsequent implications for human existence.
Contemporary Cosmopolitanism

What does one make of contemporary cosmopolitan thought? Clearly, most branches are not cosmopolitan in any meaningful sense of studying the cosmos and applying natural standards to political association. Liberalism looks to expand a just distribution of resources across the global economy. Though it endorses a magnanimous materialism, it still only materialism. Why is material comfort the good? If it is the good, why should a wealthy individual relinquish resources to less advantaged individuals? Why should the developed world sacrifice its high affluence to raise the developing world? It is even natural to relinquish one’s hold on resources to facilitate the material comforts of others? Is that what evolution teaches us? Overall, liberal, democratic, and constitutional branches of cosmopolitan thought are globalism losing touch with the foundation of their theories even as they expand them across the world.

Postmodernism does apply an understanding of the cosmos to political thought, but it understands the cosmos as unordered. Postmodern cosmopolitanism is anti-cosmopolitan. Since there is no order in the cosmos, there ought to be no order in the polis. As in the cosmos, let political elements collide, comingle, and fuse. Let authority be fluid and principles be hybrid. Postmodern cosmopolitanism embraces the forces of globalization without elevating any particular driving motive. It is a global theory, like its contemporaries, but does not endorse an overarching principle to dominate the globe. Fluidity and hybridization are the key concepts, and postmodernism welcomes a world of fluctuating values and political authorities.

Little of ancient Greek cosmopolitanism persists in contemporary
cosmopolitanism. Even when a cosmopolitan, like Martha Nussbaum, harkens back to Diogenes the Cynic, the message is misinterpreted. Contemporary cosmopolitanism does not study nature and does not defend an idea of the world as a cosmos, a beautiful order. It certainly does not look for political principles in the physical laws of the world. Why contemporary cosmopolitanism has reached this nadir requires another, longer investigation. Discussion of such fundamentals is utterly absent in contemporary cosmopolitanism.

**Ancient Greek Cosmopolitanism**

Recalling ancient Greek cosmopolitanism, we find a philosophy invested in the study of nature as a cosmos and of humanity as a part of that cosmos. The world as a cosmos means that the physical material of reality interacts according to fixed laws instituted by a superior intelligence for the best. There is no gap or division between scientific fact and normative value in Greek cosmopolitanism. The same intelligence superior to causative physical laws also yields laws of human association, political laws. Greek cosmopolitans were not a unified bloc of thinkers, but they agreed that conventional laws tended toward irrationality, and being against reason, they were not best. Greek cosmopolitanism, more than anything else, is a more universalistic movement against conventional laws and the assumption of unexamined, conventional principles. Cosmopolitan universalism took different shapes, from Diogenes’ ascetic renunciation of human pretense and conventional civility to the Stoic pursuit of a rational, worldwide society of sages, but it always looked to a natural order of things as the foundation for human interaction and association.
The literature on Greek cosmopolitanism is surprisingly thin. Research traces the beginnings of universalism back to Homer and the actual terms “citizen of the world” to Diogenes of Sinope, but the details of cosmopolitanism are far less lucid. The influence of Pythagoreanism and Orphism, both regularly acknowledged as critically important to the development of the Greek ideas of the psuchē and kosmos, is frustratingly vague. For example, most research cannot disentangle Pythagoreanism from Orphism. The evidence for each is so opaque and the doctrines appear so similar at times that there is no convincing means of separating them. Indeed, the most abundant source for Pythagoreanism is Plato himself! The confusion and lack of clarity within cosmopolitan thought extends even to more popular philosophies. Scholars often have difficulty in distinguishing the figures of Cynicism from Stoicism, and the efforts at differentiating do not reach agreement. The historical record simply lacks the evidence, the actual texts written by the authors, for researchers to conduct thorough analyses of Greek cosmopolitanism.

Research into Greek cosmopolitanism, despite the limited evidence, reveals a distinct school of philosophy that organized human associations according to rational, natural order. Cynicism and Stoicism rejected the irrationality of convention and affirmed the rationality of natural order. Their different understandings of reason and order led to different forms of association, none of which are particularly Greek or political. Diogenean Cynicism is an ascetic detachment from convention and civility. The Cynic lives according to strict, natural imperatives and in friendship with all who live similarly. Political association is thoroughly rejected. A Cynic is a “citizen” of the
cosmos, meaning he or she follows the natural laws across the whole world. Dutifully adhering to cosmic law, the Cynic is “home” anywhere in the world. Stoicism is not strictly ascetic, but affirms that nature obeys the consistent, universal laws instituted by a superior force of intelligence. From its understanding of intelligence and the natural world, Stoic philosophy reaches a few conclusions about human society, ranging from the social detachment of the wise from the ignorant, to the more utopian prognosis that all humanity may live rationally in a polis that extends across the world. Cynic and Stoic cosmopolitanism do base their ideal human society on their understanding of the cosmos, but their societies hardly resemble the traditional Greek polis.

Of course, we should not be surprised, as cosmopolitanism grew as a revolt against the irrationality of the conventional polis. Yet Cynic and Stoic societies are exceptionally rational, perhaps exceedingly so. Cynic and Stoic cosmopolitanism either endorse the separation of the wise from the ignorant or look forward to the ultimate triumph of reason over ignorance. They do not attempt to bring the wise and ignorant together in a community; they do not unite the many different types of human beings into a political harmony. That is what I mean by an association of differently-skilled individuals, or a truly Greek polis.

**Platonic Cosmopolitanism**

Plato’s dialogues, from the early through the late, reflect a concern for the cosmos, polis, and citizen, particularly revolving around the place of the philosopher in the world and in the city. The early dialogues probe into the political conditions of Athens and the fate of one of its citizen, Socrates. What has this citizen done to merit
execution? Is the citizen at fault for some transgression or is the city’s law itself out of step with the life of a dedicated citizen? The middle dialogues address these questions in a more positive way, explaining the practice of philosophy and its necessary role in the construction of an ordered city. Philosophy leads to the knowledge of true things which stand as the basis for political organization. Only in a city arranged according to philosophical standards will good citizens live according to good laws; only in such a city can a philosopher be a true citizen. The late dialogues continue Plato’s thought about the standards which philosophy discovers for the purpose of ordering cities. Constructing a more definitive account of the cosmos, Plato accordingly revises his political law code. Throughout, the dialogues pursue an understanding of the cosmos, the ordered world, to provide the basis for the Greek *polis*, the best political organization.

The early dialogues, especially *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*, explicitly portray the conflict of Socrates and the city of Athens. Fellow citizens charge Socrates with impiety and misleading the city’s youth. Socrates defends himself as acting in the service of the Oracle of Delphi and for the best interest of Athens itself. The conflict demonstrates a breakdown in the rationality of the laws and the public religion. How could this Oracle send Socrates on a mission that causes his conviction and execution? Why would the city execute a citizen for investigating the meaning of the divine Oracle? Socrates’ philosophic pursuit would be service to both the Oracle and Athens, but the laws of the city and its democratic citizens will not tolerate such a combination. The *Phaedo* interestingly suggests that the problem may be with politics
itself, that the philosopher must retreat from public action into the private sphere of philosophical introspection and exclusive conversation. Such a conclusion would separate philosophy from citizenship, and implicitly chastise Socrates for his dutiful service to Athens. A philosopher rightly would hold no political affiliation, but privately search for the truth in any city.

The middle dialogues, especially, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, and *Republic*, reevaluate the life of philosophy and political association, arguing that the philosopher rightly will rule the city which raises them properly. The life of philosophy differs in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* from the *Phaedo* in a key respect: the former dialogues find a place for the philosopher in the world. The philosophical life is more than the ascetic, contemplative preparation for death. Older philosophers find pleasure in engaging in inquiry with younger philosophical souls. Philosophy is the love of the truth, not the immanent possession of it. Pursuit requires assistance, and so older philosophers act as mentors to younger philosophical souls. The relationship provides mutual benefit. The elders ascend to behold truth, beauty, and goodness; the youths are initiated into philosophy and the “wings of their souls” are guided toward truth, beauty, and goodness. Politically, this education in philosophy is the function of philosophers. Philosopher-kings educate the non-philosophical classes by means of rational mythology to inculcate and maintain virtuous habits. Most important, the philosopher-kings educate the philosophical youths, who become the true threats to a political association when they are ill-educated. Raised from youth to maturity in the *polis*, serving as soldiers, political officers, and kings, philosophers are full and true citizens in the *polis* that embodies the
virtues and reflects the divine forms.

The late dialogues show the development of Plato’s cosmology, and his elaborate understanding of the cosmos fosters political reorganization. The *Timaeus* presents a story of the cosmos as a living being, meaning an ensouled totality. All reality is a hierarchy in Plato’s cosmology, with the cosmos itself one gradation removed from the eternal, unchanging, and divine. Human beings exist as the lowest of divinities, created with both immortal and mortal elements. The *Statesman* and *Laws* reflect this influence of cosmology on Plato’s political thought. Plato illustrates a grand parallel between the cosmos and the city and the *dēmiourgos* and the philosopher. As the cosmos was created by supreme intelligence, so the city is created by the philosopher’s intelligence. The *Statesman* clarifies political organization; the city divides into the citizen who lives within the political association and administers its laws and the lawgiver who crafts the founding law code. The *Laws* continues in this vein, showing the actual drafting of a constitution by a philosopher. The relationship of the philosopher to the city appears to change in the *Laws*, but the dialogue is ambiguous. I am convinced that the *Laws* removes the philosopher from citizenship and establishes philosophers, rare as they are, as the writers of law codes and the founders of cities. Philosophers will not be raised as citizens dedicated to a particular city, as Socrates was in Athens, but will be committed to the eternal, universal standards of virtue wherever they legislate.

Platonic cosmopolitanism offers two *cosmopoleis*, two cities constructed according to the standards of divine intelligence. In the *Republic*, the ideal city integrates an assortment of skilled individuals melding into a harmony of virtues.
Craftsmen exhibit their talents and produce the economic goods for all citizens. Soldiers practice their martial discipline and provide protection and security for the polis. Philosophers, beholding the eternal true, good, and beauty, establish the initial order of the city and use their talents in education to maintain a political harmony reflective of eternal standards. The three classes mutually contribute to the whole; all are productive citizens offering their talents for the good and harmony of the city.

The Laws puts forth a different city according to a more developed cosmology. The citizens in the colonial city of Magnesia are largely equals. They hold equal estates of private property and hold equal responsibilities for the care of their city. Though essentially equal in political stature, some citizens will be elected to positions of greater responsibility and authority. These are not class differences, but distinctions of ability. However, this political association of equals does not establish itself, but is established by an external individual. A roving philosopher acts as lawgiver to the colonial city. Having apprehended the forms, the philosopher is akin to the divine intelligence which orders the whole cosmos. For his or her part, the philosopher only orders a group of individuals, arranging them into a well-order political association through a law code. The philosopher instills intelligence into the law code, and thus puts order into what was merely chaotic, human material. However, the lawgiver is not a citizen in the city. Possessing intelligence in their souls, philosophers are above political association, which is only a means of providing order to chaos.

In both the middle and late dialogues, Plato affirms that the polis is a legitimate organization. Indeed, the polis is the best form of human organization according to the
very standards of the cosmos. Understanding the cosmos as an ordered totality, and all reality as a hierarchy, Plato constructs cities in the likeness of order. Smaller, less perfect, and not including the totality of all humanity, the polis is a lesser image of the cosmos. This is Platonic cosmopolitanism: the creation of the polis according the standards of the cosmos.

**The Future of Cosmopolitanism**

Contemporary cosmopolitanism is not looking to the cosmos for the standards of political association. It does posit a facet of idealist individualism as the first principle of a global regime. Where do these facets originate? What is the basis of their legitimacy as a ruling principle? Are these principles fit for global expansion? I cannot claim to answer such questions here. I will delay to consider whether Platonic cosmopolitanism must appear as a historical curiosity in the contemporary milieu of political theory. I only urge readers to consider whether Platonic cosmopolitanism is so far-fetched in itself, or only in comparison to contemporary cosmopolitan theory. Which is a more meaningful cosmopolitanism: the creation of a political association according to the standards of the cosmos, or a global regime of liberty, or equality, or republicanism, or postmodernism, or any singular facet of individualism?
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Company.


VITA

Name: Daniel Vincent Betti

Address: 4348 TAMU
Department of Political Science
Texas A&M University
College Station, Texas 77845-4348

Email: dbetti24@politics.tamu.edu

Education: Ph.D., Political Science, Texas A&M University, 2010
B.A., Political Science, Mary Washington College, 2002